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China’s eight-department smart-home action plan: standards, trade-in subsidies and ageing-appropriate design

  • Eight central departments led by the Ministry of Commerce jointly issued the “Action Plan for Promoting Smart Home Consumption” (商消费发〔2026〕148号, dated 2 September 2026, published 14 September), a seven-part plan to expand China’s smart-home market.
    商务部会同国家发展改革委、工业和信息化部、民政部、财政部、自然资源部、住房城乡建设部、市场监管总局等8部门联合印发《促进智能家居消费行动方案》(商消费发〔2026〕148号,成文于2026年9月2日,9月14日对外发布),从七个方面部署扩大智能家居消费。
  • The plan requires mandatory national standards for smart-home interoperability: a product intelligence grading and evaluation standard system will be completed, and interoperability and related compulsory national standards will be accelerated — a compliance item every connected-device maker selling in China must track.
    方案要求完善智能家居标准体系:完善产品智能化分级评价标准体系,加快制定实施智能家居互联互通等强制性国家标准,加速全屋智能一体化融合发展——这是所有在华销售联网设备的企业必须跟踪的合规事项。
  • Network infrastructure requirements are written into the plan: basic telecom operators’ home broadband equipment will default to IPv6, and newly built fully-fitted residences must include basic smart products in-room, with fibre-to-the-room cabling encouraged.
    网络基础设施要求写入方案:推动基础电信企业家庭宽带网络设备默认开启IPv6;对新建全装修住宅,明确户内设置基本智能产品要求,鼓励光纤到房间布设。
  • Consumption support runs through the 2026 trade-in programme: localities may independently determine which smart-home product categories and subsidy standards to include, with whole-house smart-home purchases covered under the consumer-goods trade-in policy.
    消费支持接入2026年消费品以旧换新政策:支持地方结合实际自主合理确定智能家居产品补贴品类、补贴标准,统筹支持全屋智能家居购新。
  • Ageing-appropriate smart homes are a named direction: family-service robots, health monitoring and smart care products will be promoted, with dialect recognition, safety performance and size adapted for older users, and “silver product” certification piloted in the segment.
    适老化智能家居被点名发展:推广家庭服务机器人、健康监测、智能照护等适老化产品,引导企业在产品尺寸、操作便利、方言识别、安全性能等方面推行适老化设计,并推动在适老化智能家居领域开展银发产品认证。
  • Financial support includes consumer-finance products for home decoration and the personal consumption-loan interest-subsidy policy, guiding lenders to increase smart-home consumption credit — relevant to foreign consumer-finance and home-appliance players alike.
    金融支持包括鼓励金融机构围绕家居家装需求开发消费金融产品,用好个人消费贷款财政贴息政策,引导加大对智能家居消费的信贷投放——外资消费金融机构与家电企业均相关。

China’s eight-department smart-home action plan: standards, trade-in subsidies and ageing-appropriate design | 八部门智能家居行动方案:强制性国标、以旧换新补贴与适老化设计

Overview

On 14 September 2026, the Action Plan for Promoting Smart Home Consumption (《促进智能家居消费行动方案》, 商消费发〔2026〕148号) was published. The document — dated 2 September 2026 and jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the State Administration for Market Regulation — implements the 15th Five-Year Plan directive to enrich smart-home scenarios, support ageing-friendly renovation of older housing, and expand quality supply for different consumer groups.

For foreign-invested enterprises in home appliances, smart devices, home decoration and consumer finance, the plan signals where China’s largest consumer-policy machinery will push the smart-home market through the current policy cycle.

Seven measures, four priorities

The plan sets out seven measures: expanding quality supply; improving the standards system; supporting consumption; developing ageing-appropriate smart homes; smoothing used-home-furnishing recycling; optimising community convenience services; and increasing fiscal and financial support. The interpreting statement from MOFCOM’s Consumption Promotion Department groups them into four priorities.

Supply and demand in tandem. Producers are encouraged to strengthen smart-home R&D; furniture malls and shopping centres are supported in setting up smart-home experience centres and whole-house and digital-home demonstration rooms; large home-decoration enterprises and platforms are to be cultivated, with customised, order-based and appointment-based services.

A multi-layer ecosystem — the standards headline. To fix the interoperability pain point, the plan requires completing the product intelligence grading and evaluation standard system and accelerating the formulation and implementation of smart-home interoperability and other compulsory national standards (强制性国家标准). Network requirements follow: basic telecom operators’ home broadband equipment will default to IPv6, and newly built fully-fitted residences must set basic smart products in-room, with fibre-to-the-room cabling encouraged.

Consumption support through trade-ins

Under the 2026 consumer-goods trade-in policy, localities may decide — within their own budgets and programme rules — which smart-home product categories to subsidise and at what standards, and the policy explicitly covers whole-house smart-home purchases (全屋智能家居购新), not only single devices. Foreign brands participate through the same local trade-in channels as domestic producers; inclusion in local subsidy catalogues has been the practical gateway in prior rounds.

Ageing-appropriate smart homes and recycling

The plan names family-service robots, health monitoring and smart care as products to promote, with enterprises guided to adapt product size, ease of operation, dialect recognition and safety performance for older users, and to enrich ageing-appropriate supply together with home-decoration services. “Silver product” certification (银发产品认证) will be developed in the segment. On the exit side, localities are guided to plan used-furnishing recycling outlets with land and space support, and enterprises are encouraged to offer “deliver-new plus collect-old” and “internet plus recycling” services.

Community services and finance

Neighbourhood-level “home renewal” comprehensive service stations will integrate maintenance, storage and trade-in exchange services, leveraging leading enterprises within the 15-minute convenience-life-circle programme. On finance, banks and consumer-finance companies are encouraged to develop products around home-decoration demand; the personal consumption-loan fiscal interest-subsidy policy applies, guiding more credit toward smart-home purchases.

What this means for foreign-invested enterprises

  • Treat the interoperability compulsory standard as a product-compliance deadline. Once the mandatory national standard is formulated and implemented, connected home devices sold in China will need to conform; foreign brands should map their China portfolio against the coming grading and interoperability standards and join standard-setting work early.
  • Position for trade-in inclusion. Whole-house smart-home purchases are now an explicit subsidy object; foreign brands should engage local commerce departments on inclusion in regional trade-in catalogues and prepare SKU-level documentation.
  • Watch the new-build requirements. Housing rules requiring basic smart products in fully-fitted new residences, plus IPv6 defaults and fibre-to-the-room, shape the B2B channel (developers, integrators) as much as retail.
  • The ageing segment has policy wind. Dialect recognition and safety-adapted design plus silver certification create a distinguishable product line for groups with care-robot or health-monitoring portfolios.
  • Consumer finance partnerships. The interest-subsidy channel works through lenders; foreign consumer-finance players and appliance financiers should verify their products’ eligibility for the subsidy arrangement.

Sources

  • 中国政府网 — 商务部等8部门关于印发《促进智能家居消费行动方案》的通知(商消费发〔2026〕148号,成文日期2026年9月2日): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202609/content_7081037.htm
  • 中华人民共和国商务部 — 商务部等8部门关于印发《促进智能家居消费行动方案》的通知(政策发布,2026年9月14日): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/gnmygl/art/2026/art_10bdf8f3a8a14d0cb567fe7ec4013e0f.html
  • 中国政府网 — 商务部消费促进司负责人解读《促进智能家居消费行动方案》(2026年9月): https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/zhengce/202609/content_7081045.htm

Related reading

  • see also: consumer-goods trade-in programme mechanics for foreign brands (consumer-trade-in-foreign-brands)
  • see also: smart-device regulatory compliance for connected products (connected-device-compliance)

八部门智能家居行动方案:强制性国标、以旧换新补贴与适老化设计

概述

2026年9月14日,《促进智能家居消费行动方案》(商消费发〔2026〕148号)对外发布。这份文件成文于2026年9月2日,由商务部、国家发展改革委、工业和信息化部、民政部、财政部、自然资源部、住房城乡建设部、市场监管总局等8部门联合印发,落实”十五五”规划纲要关于丰富智能家居场景、支持老旧房屋适老化改造和智能化升级、适应不同群体消费需求扩大优质供给的工作要求。

对家电、智能设备、家装与消费金融领域的外资企业而言,这份方案指明了本轮政策周期内中国消费政策机器将把智能家居市场推向何方。

七条举措、四个重点

方案提出七条举措:扩大优质供给、完善标准体系、支持消费、发展适老化智能家居、畅通废旧回收、优化社区便民服务、加大财政金融支持。商务部消费促进司负责人解读将其归纳为四个重点。

供需协同发力。 鼓励生产企业加强智能家居产品研发;支持家居卖场、购物中心设立智能家居体验中心、全屋智能和数字家庭样板间;加快培育大型家装企业和平台,发展定制式、订单式、预约式服务。

打造多元融合生态——标准的头条。 针对互联互通堵点,方案要求完善产品智能化分级评价标准体系,加快制定实施智能家居互联互通等强制性国家标准,加速全屋智能一体化融合发展。网络要求同步明确:推动基础电信企业家庭宽带网络设备默认开启IPv6;对新建全装修住宅,明确户内设置基本智能产品要求,鼓励光纤到房间布设。

以旧换新通道的消费支持

按照2026年消费品以旧换新政策部署,支持地方结合实际自主合理确定智能家居产品补贴品类、补贴标准,并明确统筹支持全屋智能家居购新——不只是单品。外资品牌与本土厂商通过相同的地方以旧换新渠道参与;此前的政策轮次中,进入地方补贴品类目录是实际上的参与门槛。

适老化与回收

方案点名推广家庭服务机器人、健康监测、智能照护产品,引导企业在产品尺寸、操作便利、方言识别、安全性能等方面推行适老化设计,丰富适老化产品与家装服务供给,并推动开展银发产品认证。出口端,指导各地科学设置废旧家居回收网点并给予用地空间支持,鼓励企业提供”送新+收旧””互联网+回收”服务,推广”以车代库”流动回收模式。

社区服务与金融

依托一刻钟便民生活圈建设,发挥龙头企业作用,在具备条件的街道、社区设立家居焕新综合服务站点,整合维修保养、物品寄存、回收置换等服务。金融端,鼓励金融机构围绕家居家装需求开发消费金融产品,用好个人消费贷款财政贴息政策,引导加大对智能家居消费的信贷支持。

对外资企业的启示

  • 把互联互通强制性国标当作产品合规节点。 强制性国家标准制定实施后,在华销售的联网家居设备需要符合标准;外资品牌应对照即将出台的分级与互联互通标准梳理在华产品线,并尽早参与标准制定工作。
  • 卡位以旧换新目录。 全屋智能家居购新已是明确的补贴对象;外资品牌应与地方商务部门对接区域补贴目录纳入事宜,并准备SKU级材料。
  • 关注新建住宅要求。 全装修新房须设基本智能产品、IPv6默认开启、光纤到房间,这些规则对B2B渠道(开发商、集成商)的影响不亚于零售端。
  • 适老化赛道有政策顺风。 方言识别与安全适配设计加银发认证,为拥有照护机器人或健康监测产品线的集团提供了可区隔的产品方向。
  • 消费金融合作。 贴息通道经由贷款机构落地;外资消费金融机构与家电金融业务应核实其产品是否纳入贴息安排。

来源

  • 中国政府网 — 商务部等8部门关于印发《促进智能家居消费行动方案》的通知(商消费发〔2026〕148号): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202609/content_7081037.htm
  • 中华人民共和国商务部 — 政策发布(2026年9月14日): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/gnmygl/art/2026/art_10bdf8f3a8a14d0cb567fe7ec4013e0f.html
  • 中国政府网 — 商务部消费促进司负责人解读《促进智能家居消费行动方案》: https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/zhengce/202609/content_7081045.htm

相关阅读

  • 见:外资品牌参与消费品以旧换新的机制要点(consumer-trade-in-foreign-brands)
  • 见:联网设备的智能设备监管合规(connected-device-compliance)

Hainan’s International Education Innovation Island: New Openings for Foreign Education Providers in 2026

  • Hainan’s Lingshui Li’an International Education Innovation Pilot Zone has attracted 30 well-known domestic and foreign universities and obtained approval for 24 Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions and programmes, with over 15,000 students expected on campus in 2026.
    海南陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区已引进国内外知名高校 30 所,获批中外合作办学机构及项目 24 个,2026 年园区师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人。
  • The zone’s “five mutuals and one shared” model — mutual learning, disciplinary exchange, curriculum sharing, credit recognition and co-governance — has opened 337 shared courses to more than 7,000 cross-registration students.
    试验区”五互一共”人才培养模式(中外互鉴、文理互通、学科互融、课程互选、学分互认、管理共商)已累计开放共享课程 337 门,选课学生超 7000 人次。
  • Hainan’s goal is 50 undergraduate-and-above Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions or programmes and a 50,000-student campus by 2030, making it the clearest test bed in China for foreign universities seeking an independent or joint footprint.
    海南提出到 2030 年实现本科层次及以上中外合作办学机构(项目)达到 50 个、园区师生规模超 5 万人,成为境外高校在华独立办学或合作办学最明确的试验田。
  • Six new Sino-foreign programmes were approved in 2026, including Xi’an Jiaotong University with UBC and China University of Political Science and Law with the University of Ottawa, signalling continued pipeline growth.
    2026 年已新增获批西安交通大学与加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学、中国政法大学与加拿大渥太华大学等 6 个中外合作办学项目,项目储备持续扩容。
  • The national “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026) adds vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science-engineering-medicine-agriculture universities to the opening-up pilot list, extending education-opening beyond Hainan.
    2026 年 6 月印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》将职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学纳入对外开放试点,教育开放从海南向全国扩围。
  • Practical implications for foreign education providers: Hainan offers the deepest regulatory opening (independent campuses and degree-credit recognition), while the national pilot signals opportunities in vocational and professional training in major cities.
    对境外教育机构的实操启示:海南提供最深的制度开放(独立办学与学历学分互认),全国试点则预示着主要城市职业技能与职业培训领域的机会。

Hainan’s International Education Innovation Island: New Openings for Foreign Education Providers in 2026 | 海南国际教育创新岛:2026 年境外教育机构的新机遇

Overview

For foreign education providers weighing entry into China, the single most consequential laboratory right now is Hainan. On 19 August 2026, at the Hainan provincial government’s “Start of the 15th Five-Year Plan” press series, the provincial education department and the management authority of the Lingshui Li’an International Education Innovation Pilot Zone (黎安试验区) laid out the zone’s progress and targets. The numbers are striking: 30 well-known domestic and foreign universities already enrolled, 24 Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions and programmes approved by the Ministry of Education, and a projected campus community of more than 15,000 students in 2026, drawing students from over 50 countries and regions.

The significance of Li’an extends well beyond the numbers. It is the only one of Hainan Free Trade Port’s 13 key parks with education-opening as its core mission, and it has been designated the flagship vehicle of Hainan’s “international education innovation island” strategy, which has now been written into the national education development plan for the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030). In plain terms: if a foreign university wants to test a genuinely independent campus or a deep joint programme in China, Hainan is currently the most legally and institutionally permissive jurisdiction in the country to do so.

The “five mutuals and one shared” model

The institutional heart of Li’an is what the zone calls the “five mutuals and one shared” talent-training model: mutual learning between Chinese and foreign education systems, interpenetration of arts and sciences disciplines, integration of academic fields, cross-selection of courses, mutual recognition of credits, and co-governance of campus management. In practice, this means that a student admitted to one partner university can take shared courses across the zone’s entire campus network. To date, 337 shared courses have been opened, with more than 7,000 student course selections covering all resident universities.

For foreign partner universities, the model has a direct commercial and academic implication: credit recognition across institutions is operational, and the zone operates a dual-degree pattern in which graduates receive both the Chinese partner’s degree certificate and the foreign partner’s degree certificate. Data from the 2026 graduating cohort illustrate the value proposition: of 273 graduates, 61 secured postgraduate admission (including 8 to Peking University and Tsinghua University) and 157 went abroad for further study, of whom 92 entered QS top-50 universities. For a foreign university, partnering in Li’an is not a marginal experiment but a visible channel into the Chinese higher-education market with credible output metrics.

The 2030 roadmap

The zone’s stated target is to reach 50 undergraduate-and-above Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions or programmes by 2030 and a campus community exceeding 50,000 students. In 2026 alone, six new programmes were approved, including Xi’an Jiaotong University with the University of British Columbia and China University of Political Science and Law with the University of Ottawa. The recruitment strategy is deliberately top-tier: the zone targets universities ranked in the world’s top 50 overall or top 10 in their discipline for new partnerships.

This roadmap matters for foreign investors in the education sector because it defines the pipeline: expect continued approvals of cooperative programmes and institutions, continued expansion of the independent-campus pilot pioneered by Hainan Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences (the first overseas higher-education institution allowed to operate an independent campus in Hainan) and Hainan Lausanne Hospitality Management School, and continued refinement of cross-border education services, international degree recognition and education-qualification access — the three frontier areas Hainan says it will push on during the 15th Five-Year Plan.

The national opening-up pilot beyond Hainan

Hainan is not the only door. The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》), jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance in June 2026, explicitly proposes to “steadily expand opening-up pilots for vocational skills training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level universities specialising in science, engineering, medicine and agriculture.” This extends the education-opening agenda beyond Hainan to select institutions and pilots on the mainland, alongside parallel openings in biotech, wholly foreign-owned hospitals and value-added telecommunications that were already being trialled.

For foreign education providers, the practical read is a two-tier opportunity map. In Hainan, the deepest regulatory opening is available now — independent campuses, degree-credit mutual recognition and a state-backed recruitment pipeline. On the mainland, the near-term openings are most realistic in vocational skills training and professional education, where the Action Plan names specific institutional categories, and where provincial authorities in pilot regions such as Beijing are being asked to move first.

What foreign providers should prepare

  1. Verify the regulatory route per target. Independent campus (Hainan), Sino-foreign cooperative institution (approval by the Ministry of Education), cooperative programme (approval or filing) and vocational training institution (local licensing) each follow different approval tracks.
  2. Engage early with the zone or provincial authorities. Li’an’s management bureau runs a structured intake for new partners, and the pipeline is being managed against the 2030 targets.
  3. Prepare quality-assurance documentation. Approval processes assess faculty, curriculum, degree arrangements and sustainability plans; comparable documentation used in the home jurisdiction accelerates review.
  4. Model the dual-degree and credit-recognition mechanics. The zone’s cross-registration system means foreign partners should align curricula with shared-course and credit-transfer standards from the outset.
  5. Monitor the national pilot list. The Action Plan’s vocational and professional education pilots are expected to translate into local implementation rules in 2026-2027; registration of interest with provincial education departments in pilot regions is advisable.

Related reading

  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (2026), which anchors the national education-opening pilots.
  • Hainan’s 15th Five-Year Plan for education development and the Li’an Pilot Zone’s published targets.
  • The State Council’s framework for Hainan Free Trade Port construction and the island-wide closure operation, which underpins the zone’s special customs, tax and talent regimes.

Sources

  • 海南省人民政府《”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会——《海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划》专场》: https://www.hainan.gov.cn/hainan/zxxx/202608/022333331af84bac828452fc6f164a4a.shtml
  • 海南省营商环境建设厅《〈经济日报〉整版关注海南:”家门口留学”到底香不香》: https://db.hainan.gov.cn/xwdt/yszx/202608/t20260819_4131097.html
  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》: https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html

海南国际教育创新岛:2026 年境外教育机构的新机遇

概述

对正在权衡进入中国市场的境外教育机构而言,当前最重要的试验田就是海南。2026 年 8 月 19 日,在海南省人民政府”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会上,省教育厅与陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区管理局披露了园区的进展与目标。数据相当可观:已引进国内外知名高校 30 所,获批教育部审批的中外合作办学机构及项目 24 个,2026 年园区师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人,生源覆盖全球 50 多个国家和地区。

黎安试验区的意义远超数字本身。它是海南自贸港 13 个重点园区中唯一以教育对外开放为核心使命的园区,被确立为海南”国际教育创新岛”战略的旗舰载体,而这一战略已写入国家教育发展”十五五”规划。简言之:如果一所境外高校想在中国试水真正意义上的独立校园或深度联合办学项目,海南目前是制度与法律上最为开放的窗口。

“五互一共”培养模式

黎安的制度核心是”五互一共”人才培养模式:中外互鉴、文理互通、学科互融、课程互选、学分互认、管理共商。实务上,这意味着入读园区内任何一所合作大学的学生,可以在整个园区的课程网络内跨校选课。截至目前,累计开放共享课程 337 门,选课学生超 7000 人次,覆盖全部入驻高校。

对外方合作高校而言,这一模式具有直接的学术与商业含义:跨机构学分互认已经落地运行,园区推行双学位模式,毕业生同时获得中方高校毕业证书、学位证书和外方高校学位证书。2026 届毕业生的数据说明了价值:273 名毕业生中,61 人保研(其中 8 人升入北京大学、清华大学),157 人出国(境)深造,其中 92 人进入 QS 排名前 50 高校。对境外高校来说,在黎安合作办学不是边缘试验,而是以可信产出指标进入中国高等教育市场的显性通道。

2030 路线图

园区公布的目标是:到 2030 年,本科层次及以上中外合作办学机构(项目)达到 50 个,师生规模超 5 万人。仅 2026 年就新增获批 6 个中外合作办学项目,包括西安交通大学与加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学、中国政法大学与加拿大渥太华大学等。引校策略明确走顶尖路线:新增合作瞄准综合排名世界前 50 或学科排名前 10 的高校。

这份路线图对教育领域的外国投资者意义重大,因为它界定了项目储备节奏:预计合作办学机构和项目的审批将持续放量,由海南比勒费尔德应用科学大学(中国境内第一所境外高校在琼独立办学的高校)和海南洛桑旅游大学开创的独立办学试点将持续扩围,跨境教育服务、国际学历互认、国际教育资格准入——海南承诺”十五五”期间重点突破的三个前沿领域——将持续细化。

海南之外的全国开放试点

海南并非唯一入口。商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部 2026 年 6 月联合印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确提出”稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点”,把教育开放议程从海南扩展到内地指定机构和试点,与已先行试点的生物技术、外商独资医院、增值电信等开放举措形成联动。

对境外教育机构而言,实操读法是一张双层机会地图。在海南,最深度的制度开放现在即可获得——独立办学、学历学分互认、国家支持的生源通道。在内地,近期最现实的开放点在职业技能培训与职业教育领域,行动方案点名了具体机构类别,并要求北京等试点地区先行先试。

境外机构应做的准备

  1. 按目标核验监管路径。独立办学(海南)、中外合作办学机构(教育部审批)、合作办学项目(审批或备案)、职业技能培训机构(地方许可)各有不同审批通道。
  2. 尽早与园区或省级主管部门接洽。黎安管理局对新合作方有结构化引入流程,项目储备正对照 2030 目标管理。
  3. 准备质量保障材料。审批环节评估师资、课程、学位安排与可持续性方案;与母国同类材料可加速评审。
  4. 设计双学位与学分互认机制。园区的跨校选课系统意味着外方合作方应从立项之初就按共享课程与学分转换标准对齐课程体系。
  5. 跟踪全国试点清单。行动方案中的职业与专业教育试点预计 2026—2027 年转化为地方实施细则;建议向试点地区省级教育部门登记合作意向。

相关阅读

  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年),是全国教育开放试点的制度锚点。
  • 海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划与黎安试验区公布的各项目标。
  • 国务院海南自由贸易港建设总体方案及全岛封关运作安排,是园区特殊海关、税收与人才制度的基础。

来源

  • 海南省人民政府《”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会——《海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划》专场》:https://www.hainan.gov.cn/hainan/zxxx/202608/022333331af84bac828452fc6f164a4a.shtml
  • 海南省营商环境建设厅《〈经济日报〉整版关注海南:”家门口留学”到底香不香》:https://db.hainan.gov.cn/xwdt/yszx/202608/t20260819_4131097.html
  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》:https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide

  • China’s foreign-investment security review, governed by the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37, effective January 2021), applies to investments in defence-related fields and to investments that would give a foreign investor control over enterprises in ten categories of important sectors.
    中国外商投资安全审查制度以《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)为依据,适用于国防领域投资,以及将使外国投资者取得十类重要领域企业实际控制权的投资。
  • The review is mandatory-before-investment: parties must file before implementing an investment falling within the reporting scope, and the working mechanism may demand filing even where the investor has not self-reported.
    安全审查是”投资前强制”程序:属于申报范围的投资须在实施前申报,未自行申报的,工作机制办公室有权要求当事人申报。
  • The procedural timeline is predictable: a decision on whether security review is needed within 15 working days, a general review within 30 working days, and a special review within 60 working days, with investments on hold throughout.
    程序时限明确:是否启动安全审查的决定 15 个工作日内作出,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成,特别审查 60 个工作日内完成,审查期间当事人不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are final and enforceable: approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition; violations can result in orders to divest or restore the pre-investment state, plus adverse credit records.
    审查决定为最终决定且可强制执行:通过、附条件通过或禁止投资;违规后果包括限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入不良信用记录。
  • In the 2026 policy context, the authorities are simultaneously facilitating foreign M&A and data flows while maintaining the security-review gate, so transaction planning should run security-review screening in parallel with merger-control and negative-list checks.
    2026 年政策背景下,主管部门在便利外资并购与数据跨境流动的同时维持安全审查闸门,交易规划应将安全审查筛查与经营者集中、负面清单核查并行推进。
  • Practical steps: screen the target sector and the control threshold early, use the pre-filing consultation mechanism, and document the national-security-impact analysis thoroughly before signing binding agreements.
    实操要点:尽早筛查标的行业与控制权门槛,善用申报前咨询机制,并在签署约束性协议前完成影响国家安全的说明文件。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

Overview

Foreign investment security review is one of the three pillars of China’s foreign-investment management system under the Foreign Investment Law, alongside the negative-list regime and the information-reporting regime. The operative rules are the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (《外商投资安全审查办法》), jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce as Order No. 37 of 2020 and effective since 18 January 2021.

The regime’s design is deliberately gate-like rather than discretionary. The Measures define a reporting scope, set out a two-stage review process with fixed deadlines, and give the review decisions — approval, conditional approval or prohibition — the status of final decisions under the Foreign Investment Law. In the 2026 policy environment, where the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” is simultaneously easing foreign M&A procedures and data-crossing rules, the security review remains the one filter that foreign investors cannot structure around. Understanding its triggers and timeline is therefore a prerequisite for any sizeable inbound transaction.

Who must file and when

The reporting scope covers two categories. First, investments in defence-related fields: investment in the military industry and its supporting industries, and investment in the vicinity of military facilities and military-industrial facilities. Second, investments in ten categories of important sectors — important agricultural products, important energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies, and other important fields — where the investor would obtain actual control of the target enterprise.

“Actual control” is defined broadly and includes holding 50% or more of the equity; holding less than 50% but having voting power that can materially influence the resolutions of the board, shareholders’ meeting or general meeting; or any other situation where the foreign investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. This broad control definition means that some non-majority, governance-heavy structures may still trigger the filing duty.

Filing is required before the investment is implemented. The foreign investor or the domestic party (together, “the parties”) must proactively file with the working mechanism’s office before implementation. Even where the parties have not self-reported, the office may require filing if the investment falls within the reporting scope. The practical message for deal teams: treat the security-review screening as a mandatory checklist item before signing definitive agreements, not as an afterthought discovered during closing.

The process and timeline

The process has a predictable rhythm. Within 15 working days of receiving a complete filing, the working mechanism’s office decides whether a security review is needed and notifies the parties in writing. If no review is needed, the investment may proceed. If a review is needed, the office must complete the general review within 30 working days. Where the general review finds that the investment affects or may affect national security, a special review is launched, to be completed within 60 working days, extendable in exceptional circumstances. Throughout the review period, the parties may not implement the investment.

The system also contains relief valves. During the review, the parties may modify the investment plan — in which case the review clock restarts from receipt of the revised plan — or withdraw the investment, which terminates the review. Before filing, the parties may consult the working mechanism’s office on questions about the transaction. And a change to the investment plan after approval, where the change affects or may affect national security, requires re-filing.

Outcomes and consequences

The review can end in approval (the investment may proceed), conditional approval (the investment may proceed subject to conditions that the parties have committed to in writing), or prohibition (the investment may not be implemented; if already implemented, the parties must divest or take other measures to restore the pre-investment state). Decisions are final under Article 35 of the Foreign Investment Law.

Enforcement is multi-layered. The working mechanism’s office, together with relevant departments and local governments, supervises implementation; for conditional approvals, it can require evidence and conduct on-site inspections. Non-compliance carries escalating consequences: failing to file an in-scope investment leads to an order to file within a deadline and, if refused, an order to divest; providing false materials or concealing information can lead to revocation of the approval and restoration of the pre-investment state; violating conditions triggers a correction order and, if refused, divestment. Violations are recorded in the national credit information system with joint disciplinary measures.

2026 interaction with the facilitation agenda

The security review does not exist in a vacuum. In June 2026, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promised to accelerate the revision of the foreign M&A rules, allow eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in listed-company issuances, and streamline data-outbound flows through negative lists in pilot zones. None of these changes touches the security-review gate; if anything, the simultaneous easing of entry and tightening of control screens makes it more important to run security-review screening in parallel with merger-concentration filings and negative-list checks.

Foreign investors should also note the international context is one of converging practice: major economies all operate equivalent review regimes, and China’s framework mirrors this global trend of gatekeeping foreign investment in sensitive sectors. The compliance posture — early screening, thorough documentation, and timely filing — is the same that prudent investors apply in any jurisdiction with a mandatory review regime.

Practical checklist for inbound transactions

  1. Screen the sector and control threshold early. Map the target against the defence-related categories and the ten important-sector categories, and assess whether the post-investment control structure meets the actual-control definitions.
  2. Use the pre-filing consultation. The Measures expressly allow parties to consult the working mechanism’s office before filing; use this for borderline transactions.
  3. Prepare the national-security-impact analysis. The filing requires a statement on whether the investment affects national security; build this document during due diligence, not during closing.
  4. Run parallel screenings. Coordinate the security-review timeline with merger-concentration filing and negative-list clearance; the review stays on hold while other approvals proceed.
  5. Build in condition-readiness. For sensitive but approvable deals, anticipate conditional approval and prepare to comply with attached conditions, including evidence production and on-site inspections.

Related reading

  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.
  • The Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), which sets the facilitation context around the review gate.

Sources

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》: https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》: https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目: https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

概述

外商投资安全审查是《外商投资法》确立的外商投资管理制度三大支柱之一,与负面清单管理和信息报告制度并列。现行操作规则是《外商投资安全审查办法》,由国家发展改革委、商务部以 2020 年第 37 号令联合发布,自 2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行。

该制度的运行设计刻意采用”闸门式”而非自由裁量式:办法界定申报范围,设定两阶段审查流程和固定时限,并依《外商投资法》赋予审查决定——通过、附条件通过或禁止投资——最终决定地位。在 2026 年的政策环境下,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》同时放宽外资并购程序和数据跨境规则,但安全审查仍是外国投资者无法绕开的唯一过滤环节。因此,理解其触发条件与时限,是任何规模化入境交易的先决条件。

谁须申报、何时申报

申报范围涵盖两类。第一类,国防领域投资:投资军工、军工配套等关系国防安全的领域,以及在军事设施和军工设施周边地域投资。第二类,投资十类重要领域——重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术以及其他重要领域——并取得所投资企业实际控制权。

“实际控制权”的定义宽泛,包括持有企业 50% 以上股权;持股不足 50% 但其表决权能够对董事会、股东会或股东大会决议产生重大影响;以及其他能够对企业经营决策、人事、财务、技术等产生重大影响的情形。这一宽泛的控制权定义意味着,部分非控股但治理权重大的架构仍可能触发申报义务。

申报须在投资实施前完成。外国投资者或境内相关当事人(合称”当事人”)应在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报。即使当事人未自行申报,若投资属于申报范围,工作机制办公室也有权要求申报。对交易团队而言,实务提示是:把安全审查筛查作为签署确定性协议前的强制清单项,而非交割期间才发现的疏漏。

流程与时限

流程节奏清晰可预期。收到符合要求的申报材料后 15 个工作日内,工作机制办公室决定是否需要安全审查并书面通知当事人。无需审查的,投资即可实施;需要审查的,一般审查须在 30 个工作日内完成。一般审查认定投资影响或可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,须在 60 个工作日内完成,特殊情况下可延长。审查期间,当事人不得实施投资。

制度也包含疏导阀门。审查期间,当事人可以修改投资方案——此时审查期限自收到修改后方案之日起重新计算——或撤销投资,从而终止审查。申报前,当事人可以就交易问题向工作机制办公室咨询。审查通过后变更投资方案、影响或可能影响国家安全的,须重新申报。

决定与后果

审查结果有三种:通过(投资可以实施)、附条件通过(按当事人书面承诺的附加条件实施投资)、禁止投资(不得实施;已实施的须限期处分股权或资产等,恢复投资前状态)。依《外商投资法》第三十五条,审查决定为最终决定。

执行是多层次的。工作机制办公室会同有关部门、地方人民政府监督实施;对附条件通过的投资,可要求提供证明材料、开展现场检查核实条件落实情况。违规后果逐级加重:属于申报范围而未申报即实施的,责令限期申报,拒不申报的责令限期处分股权或资产;提供虚假材料或隐瞒信息的,撤销决定、恢复投资前状态;未按附加条件实施的,责令改正,拒不改正的责令处分。违规情形记入国家信用信息系统并实施联合惩戒。

与 2026 年便利化议程的互动

安全审查并非孤立存在。2026 年 6 月,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订外资并购规定、允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与上市公司发行、通过试点负面清单简化数据出境。这些变化均不触动安全审查闸门;恰恰相反,准入门槛的放宽与管控筛网的收紧并行,使得交易方更有必要将安全审查筛查与经营者集中申报、负面清单核查并行推进。

外国投资者也应注意到国际背景是实践趋同:主要经济体均运行同等审查机制,中国的框架与全球对敏感领域外资把关的趋势一致。合规姿态——尽早筛查、充分留档、及时申报——与审慎投资者在任何实行强制审查机制的法域采取的做法相同。

入境交易实操清单

  1. 尽早筛查行业与控制权门槛。将标的对照国防类与十类重要领域清单,评估投资后控制结构是否落入实际控制权定义。
  2. 善用申报前咨询。办法明确允许当事人在申报前向工作机制办公室咨询,边界交易应优先使用。
  3. 准备国家安全影响说明。申报须提交外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明;这份文件应在尽调期间起草,而非交割期间补做。
  4. 并行推进各项筛查。将安全审查时限与经营者集中申报、负面清单合规协调安排;其他审批推进期间审查保持冻结。
  5. 预置条件应对能力。对敏感但可获批的交易,预判附条件通过,并准备履行附加条件,包括提供证明材料与接受现场检查。

相关阅读

  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(2020 年第 37 号令),现行操作规章。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),构成审查闸门周边的便利化背景。

来源

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》:https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》:https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目:https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

A New On-Ramp for Foreign Capital: Strategic Investment in A-Share Listed Companies in 2026

  • The June 2026 “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” opens the door for eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance by listed companies in “non-related industries” — removing the industry-relevance test that previously limited foreign PE participation.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,取消了此前限制外资 PE 参与的行业相关性要求。
  • The same Action Plan commits to accelerating the revision of the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises (the “2006 Measures”, known as Order No. 10), promising streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements.
    同一《行动方案》承诺加快修订《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(2006 年 10 号令),优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求。
  • The revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) already lowered the minimum shareholding threshold for strategic investment via agreement transfer and tender offer from 10% to 5%, added the tender-offer route, and allowed cross-border share swaps using shares of unlisted overseas companies in private placements and tender offers.
    修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)已把协议转让、要约收购方式战略投资的最低持股比例由 10% 降至 5%,新增要约收购路径,并允许定向发行、要约收购中以境外非上市公司股份实施跨境换股。
  • Together, these moves create a clearer pathway for foreign PE, sovereign funds and long-term capital to invest in A-share listed companies without needing a same-industry strategic partner narrative.
    综合来看,这些举措为外资 PE、主权基金和长期资本投资 A 股上市公司开辟了更清晰通道,不再需要”同行业战略资源”的叙事前提。
  • Practical implications: review the capital-investor versus industrial-investor distinction under CSRC rules, prepare governance-participation and lock-up undertakings, and align cross-border share-swap structures with the still-pending revision of Order No. 10.
    实操要点:对照证监会规则区分”资本投资者”与”产业投资者”,准备参与治理与锁定期承诺,并将跨境换股架构与仍在修订中的 10 号令做好衔接。

A New On-Ramp for Foreign Capital: Strategic Investment in A-Share Listed Companies in 2026 | 外资入市新通道:2026 年 A 股上市公司战略投资

Overview

For years, foreign equity investment institutions seeking to take meaningful stakes in Chinese listed companies faced a structural mismatch. The strategic-investment regime under the Measures for Strategic Investment by Foreign Investors in Listed Companies required either a “same or related industry” relationship or a path through the narrower private-placement rules, and the legacy rules on foreign M&A (the 2006 Measures, commonly called “Order No. 10”) had not kept pace with the market. Foreign PE funds that could bring capital, governance discipline and global resources often found themselves unable to fit the strategic-investor mould because their “strategic resources” did not map to the target’s industry.

That mismatch is now being dismantled from two directions. First, the revised Strategic Investment Measures, effective December 2024, lowered the minimum stake for strategic investment via agreement transfer and tender offer from 10% to 5%, added tender offers as a permitted route, extended eligibility to foreign natural persons, relaxed asset requirements for non-controlling investors, and — critically — allowed cross-border share swaps using shares of unlisted overseas companies in private placements and tender offers. Second, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》), issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance in June 2026, explicitly states that eligible foreign equity investment institutions may participate as strategic investors in securities issuance by listed companies in “non-related industries,” and commits to accelerating the revision of Order No. 10.

What the “non-related industry” change means

Under the CSRC’s refinancing rules, strategic investors in a lock-up private placement are split into two categories: industrial investors and capital investors. Industrial investors must hold “important strategic resources in the same or related industries” of the listed company. Capital investors — long-term institutional investors that hold a prescribed threshold, participate in corporate governance and contribute strategic resources in practice — were defined without clearly including foreign equity investment institutions.

The Action Plan’s language cuts through this uncertainty. By allowing eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of non-related industries, it signals that foreign PE and sovereign-wealth-type investors can qualify as capital investors without needing an industry-adjacent story. In practice, this is the clearest regulatory recognition to date that professional long-term capital — willing to hold, participate in governance and integrate resources — is itself a legitimate form of strategic value.

The Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office’s August 2026 briefing on foreign-investment policy describes this as the “crossing of boundaries” for strategic investment, noting that the change opens the A-share market to incremental foreign capital and reserves policy space for long-term investors such as foreign sovereign funds.

The pending revision of Order No. 10

The Action Plan also promises to “accelerate the revision and promulgation of the provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimise M&A procedures and consideration-payment requirements, and strengthen cross-departmental regulatory coordination.” The reference is to Order No. 10, the 2006 Measures on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.

Three frictions make the revision consequential. First, the cross-border share-swap clause in Order No. 10 still requires that shares used as consideration be shares of an overseas listed company, whereas the revised Strategic Investment Measures already allow unlisted overseas company shares in private placements and tender offers — an inconsistency the revision is expected to reconcile. Second, the coordination between Order No. 10’s procedural requirements and the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting regime needs streamlining. Third, the interface between Order No. 10 and the strategic-investment regime overlaps and should be clarified.

For foreign investors structuring deals today, the practical guidance is to build transactions with the expectation that Order No. 10 will be revised, while complying with the current rules: foreign M&A continues to require information reporting, and the revised Strategic Investment Measures already govern strategic investment thresholds, lock-ups and payment methods.

Practical checklist for foreign investors

  1. Determine which regime applies. Strategic investment in a listed company (revised Strategic Investment Measures), M&A of an unlisted domestic target (Order No. 10, pending revision), and concentration filing under the Anti-Monopoly Law may all be triggered; map them before structuring.
  2. Classify the investor role. Under the CSRC’s strategic-investor framework for refinancing, document how the investor qualifies as a capital investor — long-term holding intent, shareholding threshold, governance participation and actual resource contribution.
  3. Prepare the lock-up and governance undertakings. Strategic investment typically entails a 12-month lock-up (or longer for controlling positions) and governance commitments; align these with the issuer’s board arrangements.
  4. Review consideration methods. Where cross-border share swaps are contemplated, confirm whether the consideration shares are listed or unlisted and which regime governs, given the divergence between Order No. 10 and the Strategic Investment Measures.
  5. Anticipate the Order No. 10 revision. Monitor the MOFCOM and SAMR consultation pipeline; the Action Plan signals that streamlined procedures and flexible consideration-payment requirements are coming.

Related reading

  • The Strategic Investment Measures (revised, effective December 2024) and the CSRC’s refinancing rules on strategic investors.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), including its M&A and strategic-investment commitments.
  • The Anti-Monopoly Law’s merger-concentration filing thresholds, which apply to foreign M&A regardless of the strategic-investment route.

Sources

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》: https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

外资入市新通道:2026 年 A 股上市公司战略投资

概述

多年来,希望在中国的上市公司中取得有意义持股的外资股权投资机构一直面临结构性错配。现行《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》下的战略投资制度要求”同行业或相关行业”关系,或只能走更窄的定向发行规则;而关于外资并购的旧规(2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》,俗称”10 号令”)也未能跟上市场变化。能够带来资本、治理纪律和全球资源的外资 PE 基金,往往因为其”战略资源”无法对应标的企业所处行业,而无法契合战略投资者身份。

这一错配正从两个方向被拆除。其一,修订后的《战略投资管理办法》自 2024 年 12 月施行,把协议转让、要约收购方式战略投资的最低持股比例由 10% 降至 5%,新增要约收购路径,将外国自然人纳入投资者范围,降低非控股投资者的资产要求,并——关键之处——允许定向发行、要约收购中以境外非上市公司股份实施跨境换股。其二,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部 2026 年 6 月印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确表示,允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,并承诺加快修订 10 号令。

“非相关行业”突破意味着什么

根据证监会再融资规则,锁定价格定向发行中的战略投资者分为两类:产业投资者和资本投资者。产业投资者须持有上市公司”同行业或者相关行业重要战略性资源”。资本投资者——长期持股、达到规定持股比例、参与公司治理并实际导入战略资源的长期机构投资者——其定义并未明确包含外资股权投资机构。

《行动方案》的表述一举扫除这一不确定性。允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,意味着外资 PE 和主权基金类投资者可以在不编造行业相邻叙事的前提下,以资本投资者身份获得资格。实务上,这是迄今对”专业长期资本本身就是一种合法战略价值形态”最清晰的监管认可。

上海市人民政府外事办公室 2026 年 8 月的涉外政策简报将此举描述为战略投资的”跨界”,指出这一变化为 A 股引入增量外资打开通道,并为外国主权基金等长期资本预留了政策空间。

10 号令修订在即

《行动方案》同时承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求,强化部门监管协同”。所指正是 10 号令——2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》。

三处摩擦使修订势在必行。其一,10 号令关于跨境换股的条款仍要求作为支付手段的股权必须是”境外上市公司股权”,而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》已允许定向发行、要约收购使用境外非上市公司股份,两者存在规范冲突,预计通过修订实现制度衔接。其二,10 号令的程序性要求与《外商投资法》框架下的信息报告制度需要理顺。其三,10 号令与战略投资制度的适用范围存在重叠,应予以澄清。

对当前正在设计交易的外国投资者,实务指引是:在预期 10 号令将修订的前提下构建交易,同时遵守现行规则——外资并购继续需要信息报告,战略投资的持股门槛、锁定期与支付方式则已由修订后的《战略投资管理办法》规范。

外国投资者实操清单

  1. 确定适用制度。上市公司战略投资(修订版《战略投资管理办法》)、未上市境内标的并购(10 号令,修订在即)以及《反垄断法》下的经营者集中申报可能同时触发;构架前先逐项梳理。
  2. 界定投资者角色。按证监会再融资战略投资者框架,书面论证投资者如何符合资本投资者条件——长期持股意图、持股比例门槛、参与治理与实际资源导入。
  3. 准备锁定期与治理承诺。战略投资通常涉及 12 个月锁定期(控股地位更长)与治理承诺;与发行人的董事会安排对齐。
  4. 审查对价方式。在考虑跨境换股时,确认对价股份是上市还是非上市、由哪套制度管辖,注意 10 号令与《战略投资管理办法》的差异。
  5. 预判 10 号令修订。跟踪商务部、市场监管总局征求意见动态;《行动方案》已释放流程简化、对价支付要求灵活化的信号。

相关阅读

  • 《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月修订施行)与证监会再融资战略投资者规则。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),含其并购与战略投资承诺。
  • 《反垄断法》经营者集中申报标准,无论是否走战略投资路径,外资并购均须适用。

来源

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》:https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

Enterprise Deregistration in China 2026: A Practical Guide for Foreign-Invested Companies

  • Six central ministries jointly issued the “Enterprise Deregistration Guidelines (2025 Revision)” (Announcement No. 52 of 2025), systematically consolidating dissolution, liquidation and deregistration rules scattered across the Company Law and other statutes into one standardised reference.
    市场监管总局等六部门联合发布《企业注销指引(2025 年修订)》(2025 年第 52 号公告),将散见于《公司法》等多部法律法规中的解散、清算、注销规则系统整合为一份标准化指引。
  • The revised Guidelines offer three deregistration tracks — ordinary, simplified and “one thing” joint processing — so that foreign-invested enterprises can choose the fastest lawful path to exit.
    修订后的《指引》提供普通注销、简易注销、”一件事”联动注销三类流程,外资企业可按自身情况选择最快合规退出路径。
  • The “one thing” reform allows tax clearance, social-insurance termination, seal cancellation and bank-account closure to be handled through a single online application with one form and one submission.
    “一件事”改革实现清税、社保停缴、印章注销、银行账户销户等事项一表填报、一次提交、一网通办。
  • Special difficult cases — missing shareholders, lost licences or seals, deregistered legal representatives — now have defined solutions, removing the classic “stuck at deregistration” dead ends that trapped many FIE wind-downs.
    股东失联、执照公章遗失、法定代表人失联等特殊疑难情形有了明确解决路径,破除了长期困扰外资企业清算退出的”注销卡死”难题。
  • Simplified deregistration keeps a 20-day public-notice period with no advertisement fees, making it the fastest option for debt-free or never-traded foreign-invested companies.
    简易注销公示期维持 20 天且网上公示免费,是无债务或未实际经营外资公司的最快退出通道。
  • Enforcement is tightening in parallel: deregistration does not extinguish liability, and regulators can revoke a completed deregistration and restore tax registration where concealed tax or illegal invoicing is later discovered.
    监管同步趋严:注销不等于免责,若事后发现隐匿收入、虚开发票等违法情形,登记机关可撤销注销登记并恢复税务登记。

Enterprise Deregistration in China 2026: A Practical Guide for Foreign-Invested Companies | 2026 年中国企业注销实务:外资企业退出指南

Overview

Exiting China can be harder than entering it. For years, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) that decided to wind down faced a patchwork of requirements: tax clearance certificates, creditor notices, seal and licence returns, bank account closures — each handled by a different authority, often in a fixed order, with little coordination. A single missing document or an uncooperative shareholder could stall the process for months.

That picture has changed. On 12 December 2025, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), together with the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the People’s Bank of China, the General Administration of Customs and the State Taxation Administration, issued the “Enterprise Deregistration Guidelines (2025 Revision)” (《企业注销指引(2025 年修订)》) under Announcement No. 52 of 2025. Building on the 2023 revision, the new Guidelines implement the requirements of the revised Company Law and the Company Registration Administrative Implementation Measures, and codify the results of the “one thing” (高效办成一件事) government-services reform. For FIEs, the practical effect is threefold: a clearer legal map of the exit process, a faster and more coordinated procedure, and — importantly — a sharper warning that deregistration never wipes out liability.

Three deregistration tracks

The Guidelines set out three tracks, and choosing the right one is the single biggest lever on exit speed.

The ordinary track applies to the general case. The company adopts a resolution to dissolve, forms a liquidation committee (led by directors under the new Company Law, unless the articles say otherwise), publishes a creditor notice within 60 days (with a 45-day announcement period), conducts liquidation, files tax deregistration and a tax-clearance certificate, and then applies for deregistration of the company. For a typical operating FIE, the full cycle takes roughly two to three months, and longer in complex cases.

The simplified track is available to companies that have never started business or that have fully settled their debts and liabilities, and that are not on the list of abnormal operation or seriously dishonest entities. The process is dramatically shorter: a 20-day public notice on the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System, followed by submission of the application and the all-investor undertaking letter. The notice is published online for free, and the whole procedure can often be completed in about a month. Since 1 May 2026, the 2026 versions of the registration document and material standards have made the simplified track more precise by splitting it into its own lane.

The “one thing” joint track is the reform highlight. Tax clearance, social-insurance termination, seal cancellation and bank-account closure are handled through a single online application on the government service platform — one form, one submission, one window. This eliminates the classic requirement to run between the market regulation bureau, tax bureau, social-insurance office, and bank branches in a fixed sequence.

Solutions for difficult cases

A major part of the 2025 revision addresses the special situations that historically trapped FIEs. Where a shareholder is missing or uncooperative and a liquidation committee cannot be formed, the Guidelines set out defined routes: the remaining shareholders can apply to the court to appoint liquidators, and in the seven-province pilot for compulsory liquidation (Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, Sichuan and Guangdong), the registration authority itself can apply to the court for compulsory liquidation of “zombie” companies.

Where the business licence or company seal has been lost, companies no longer need to re-apply for the licence before deregistration; a public loss notice on the credit information system suffices. Where the legal representative is missing, deceased or refuses to cooperate, the company can proceed with the support of the remaining governance bodies and the heir or successor procedures set out in the Guidelines. Where a shareholder is deceased, the lawful heirs can act in place of the deceased shareholder to sign the deregistration resolutions.

For companies whose licences have been revoked for three years without deregistration, the compulsory deregistration mechanism applies, with a 90-day objection period after the public notice. The Guidelines are careful to state, however, that compulsory deregistration does not extinguish the debts or tax liabilities of the original shareholders and directors.

What has not changed — and what has sharpened

Three points deserve emphasis for foreign investors planning an orderly exit.

First, tax clearance remains the gateway. Deregistration is not a tax amnesty. The tax authorities will verify that all tax returns, including liquidation income tax, have been filed and that all taxes, late fees and penalties are settled before the tax-clearance certificate is issued. Fines and unpaid social-insurance contributions must be cleared before the simplified track can be used; four categories of enterprises — those with tax arrears or abnormal invoicing, unsettled social-insurance or housing-fund arrears, administrative penalties or pending litigation, and those flagged as tax risk payers — are excluded from simplified deregistration and must use the ordinary track.

Second, the liability horizon has lengthened. Under the revised framework, the statute of limitations for pursuing concealed tax or fraudulent invoicing extends to five years after deregistration, and in cases of fraud the tax authorities can revoke the deregistration and restore the tax registration at any time. Practically, the records of liquidation must be retained for ten years. Foreign parent companies should therefore insist that Chinese subsidiaries complete a thorough pre-deregistration tax and debt review, and that liquidation files be archived properly, rather than assuming that deregistration closes the file forever.

Third, directors now carry the primary liquidation duty. Under the new Company Law, directors are the default liquidation obligors, and failure to form a liquidation committee within 15 days of the dissolution event can give rise to personal liability. Foreign shareholders nominating directors to a Chinese JV or WFOE should confirm that those directors understand their liquidation duties — a point that is often overlooked until a wind-down begins.

Practical steps for FIEs

  1. Decide the track early. Map the company’s debt, tax, invoicing and employment status against the eligibility criteria for simplified deregistration before announcing anything.
  2. Run a pre-exit tax and social-insurance health check. Clear arrears, close abnormal tax status, cancel unused invoices and tax-control equipment, and settle payroll and social-insurance contributions.
  3. Handle cross-border specifics. For FIEs, confirm that foreign-exchange deregistration, customs registration cancellation (where applicable) and any special permits are included in the joint application or sequenced correctly.
  4. Use the online one-stop platform. Publish the notice, submit the application and track progress through the National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System and the government service portal.
  5. Keep the archives. Retain liquidation reports, accounts and vouchers for ten years, and keep evidence of creditor notification and asset distribution.

Related reading

  • The Company Law (revised, effective July 2024) and the Company Registration Administrative Implementation Measures, which anchor the liquidation and deregistration duties.
  • SAMR’s “high-efficiency one thing” implementation opinions covering enterprise information changes, deregistration and restaurant opening.
  • Provincial implementations of the deregistration “one thing” reform, which add local service channels and timelines.

Sources

  • 公安部《六部门发布〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉》: https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254098/n4904352/c10351993/content.html
  • 国家税务总局上海市税务局《市场监管总局等六部门关于发布〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉的公告》: https://shanghai.chinatax.gov.cn/gate/big5/shanghai.chinatax.gov.cn/zzzb/zcwj/202601/t478906.html
  • 国家市场监督管理总局《关于进一步优化政务服务提升行政效能推进”高效办成一件事”的实施意见》: https://www.samr.gov.cn/djzcj/zcfg/qt/art/2026/art_88cdbfde20d54e9396ff6d7d649b6acd.html
  • 武汉市洪山区人民政府《市场监管总局关于印发经营主体登记文书规范和提交材料规范(2026 年版)的通知》: https://www.hongshan.gov.cn/gzfw/ztfw/qykb_85388/zctz_85390/202608/t20260825_2838574.shtml
  • 柳州市行政审批局《〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉正式发布》: http://wsbs.liuzhou.gov.cn/xwzx/xwdt/202601/t20260112_3712408.shtml

2026 年中国企业注销实务:外资企业退出指南

概述

退出中国往往比进入中国更难。多年来,决定清算的外资企业要面对一套零散的要求:清税证明、债权人公告、印章和执照缴回、银行账户销户——每项由不同部门办理,往往还有固定顺序,部门之间缺乏协同。一份材料缺失或一位股东不配合,就可能让整个流程停滞数月。

这一局面已经改变。2025 年 12 月 12 日,市场监管总局会同公安部、人力资源社会保障部、中国人民银行、海关总署、税务总局,以 2025 年第 52 号公告发布《企业注销指引(2025 年修订)》。新《指引》在 2023 年修订版基础上,落实新修订《公司法》和《公司登记管理实施办法》的要求,并将”高效办成一件事”政务服务改革成果固化为制度。对外资企业而言,实际影响有三方面:退出流程的法律地图更加清晰,办理程序更快更协同,同时——重要的是——注销从不豁免责任的警示更加明确。

三类注销流程

《指引》设置了三条路径,选对路径是决定退出速度的最大杠杆。

普通注销适用于一般情形。公司决议解散,成立清算组(按新《公司法》由董事担任,章程另有规定除外),60 日内通知已知债权人并发布债权人公告(公告期 45 天),开展清算,办理税务注销并取得清税证明,最后申请注销登记。对正常经营的外资企业,全周期约需两到三个月,复杂情形更久。

简易注销适用于未开业或已清偿全部债权债务、且未被列入经营异常名录或严重失信主体名单的企业。流程大幅缩短:在国家企业信用信息公示系统公示 20 天,随后提交申请和全体投资人承诺书即可。公示网上办理且免费,全程约一个月内办结。自 2026 年 5 月 1 日起施行的《经营主体登记文书规范(2026 年版)》和《经营主体登记提交材料规范(2026 年版)》,将简易注销独立成专属通道,适用标准更加明确。

“一件事”联动注销是本次改革亮点。清税、社保停缴、印章注销、银行账户销户通过政务平台一次申报——一表填报、一次提交、一窗办结,不再需要按固定顺序往返市监、税务、社保和银行网点。

疑难情形的解决路径

2025 年修订的很大篇幅用于解决历史上卡住外资企业的特殊情形。股东失联或不配合、无法自行组织清算的,可按《指引》设定的路径由其余股东申请法院指定清算;在北京、河北、江苏、浙江、河南、四川、广东七省市开展的公司登记机关向法院申请强制清算试点中,登记机关可主动推动”僵尸企业”退出。

营业执照或公章遗失的,不再需要先补办证照再注销,只需在信用信息系统完成遗失公示即可。法定代表人失联、死亡或不配合的,可在其余治理主体配合下按《指引》规定的继承人、继受主体程序推进。自然人股东死亡的,其有权继承人可代为办理注销。

被吊销营业执照满三年仍未申请注销的,适用强制注销机制,公告期 90 日。但《指引》明确提示:强制注销不豁免原股东、清算义务人的债务清偿和纳税义务。

不变与趋严之处

对外国投资者规划有序退出,有三点值得强调。

第一,清税仍是前提。注销不是税收豁免。税务机关会核验包括清算所得在内的所有税种申报是否完成、全部税款、滞纳金和罚款是否结清,之后才出具清税证明。有欠税或发票异常、社保公积金欠费未结清、涉及行政处罚或诉讼、被列为税务风险纳税人的四类企业,均不得适用简易注销,须走普通程序。

第二,责任追溯期延长。修订后框架下,对隐匿税款、虚开发票等违法情形的追缴时效延伸至注销后五年,涉欺诈的,税务机关可随时撤销注销并恢复税务登记。实务上,清算档案法定保存期延长至十年。外国母公司应要求中国子公司完成彻底的事前税务与债务审查,并妥善归档清算文件,而非假定注销即永久结案。

第三,董事成为清算第一责任主体。按新《公司法》,董事是默认的清算义务人,解散事由出现后 15 日内未成立清算组可能引发个人责任。向中外合资或外商独资企业委派董事的外国股东,应确认这些董事了解其清算职责——这一点在清算启动前常常被忽视。

外资企业实操要点

  1. 尽早确定路径。在对外宣布前,对照简易注销的适用条件梳理公司的债务、税务、发票和用工状态。
  2. 开展退出前税务与社保健康检查。结清欠费、解除税务非正常状态、缴销未用发票和税控设备、结清工资与社保。
  3. 处理跨境特有事项。确认外汇登记注销、海关报关单位注销(如涉及)和各类专项许可纳入联办或按正确顺序办理。
  4. 使用线上一站式平台。通过国家企业信用信息公示系统和政务服务门户发布公告、提交申请并跟踪进度。
  5. 留存档案。清算报告、账簿、凭证保存十年,并保留债权人通知与财产分配的凭证。

相关阅读

  • 《公司法》(修订后自 2024 年 7 月施行)与《公司登记管理实施办法》,是清算与注销义务的基石。
  • 市场监管总局关于企业信息变更、企业注销和开办餐饮店”一件事”的实施意见。
  • 各省注销”一件事”改革实施方案,叠加了地方服务渠道与时限。

来源

  • 公安部《六部门发布〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉》:https://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254098/n4904352/c10351993/content.html
  • 国家税务总局上海市税务局《市场监管总局等六部门关于发布〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉的公告》:https://shanghai.chinatax.gov.cn/gate/big5/shanghai.chinatax.gov.cn/zzzb/zcwj/202601/t478906.html
  • 国家市场监督管理总局《关于进一步优化政务服务提升行政效能推进”高效办成一件事”的实施意见》:https://www.samr.gov.cn/djzcj/zcfg/qt/art/2026/art_88cdbfde20d54e9396ff6d7d649b6acd.html
  • 武汉市洪山区人民政府《市场监管总局关于印发经营主体登记文书规范和提交材料规范(2026 年版)的通知》:https://www.hongshan.gov.cn/gzfw/ztfw/qykb_85388/zctz_85390/202608/t20260825_2838574.shtml
  • 柳州市行政审批局《〈企业注销指引(2025 年修订)〉正式发布》:http://wsbs.liuzhou.gov.cn/xwzx/xwdt/202601/t20260112_3712408.shtml

Cross-Border Share Swaps and Red-Chip Structures: The 2026 Revision Window

  • The June 2026 “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promises to accelerate the revision of the 2006 Measures on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises (Order No. 10), with streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements — directly affecting the legal environment for cross-border share swaps and red-chip restructurings.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订 2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(10 号令),优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求——直接影响跨境换股与红筹架构的法律环境。
  • A known friction point: Order No. 10 still requires that shares used as consideration in a cross-border share swap be shares of an overseas listed company, while the revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) already allow unlisted overseas company shares in private placements and tender offers — an inconsistency the revision is expected to resolve.
    已知摩擦点:10 号令仍要求跨境换股的对价股份须为境外上市公司股份,而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)已允许定向发行、要约收购使用境外非上市公司股份——这一规范冲突预计通过修订解决。
  • Red-chip structures, while less dominant since the 2023 offshore-listing filing regime, remain attractive for accessing overseas investors and non-Hong Kong listings; the pending revision of Order No. 10 and new rules for resident individuals’ overseas investment will shape the next generation of these structures.
    红筹架构自 2023 年境外上市备案新规后优势有所下降,但在吸引境外投资者、赴港以外市场上市等方面仍有价值;10 号令修订在即以及境内居民个人境外投资新办法,将塑造下一代红筹架构。
  • For investors structuring cross-border M&A or listings in 2026, the practical guidance is to run parallel scenario models — listed-share swaps under current rules, unlisted-share swaps once the revision lands, and direct investment via FDI — and to keep transaction documents flexible enough to switch lanes.
    对 2026 年设计跨境并购或上市架构的投资者,实务指引是并行建立情景模型——现行规则下的上市股份换股、修订落地后的非上市股份换股、以及直接 FDI 投资——并保持交易文件足够灵活以便切换通道。

Cross-Border Share Swaps and Red-Chip Structures: The 2026 Revision Window | 跨境换股与红筹架构:2026 年修订窗口期

Overview

For foreign investors and Chinese companies raising capital offshore, the structuring question has always been: which vehicle, and through which regulatory gate? The 2026 answer is in motion. The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026) commits to “accelerating the revision and promulgation of the provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises” — the 2006 Measures, commonly known as Order No. 10 — with streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements. In parallel, the revised Strategic Investment Measures, effective December 2024, already modernised the strategic-investment lane. Between the two, the regulatory architecture for cross-border share swaps and holding-company structures is being rebuilt in real time.

Order No. 10 has been the backbone of cross-border share-swap structuring for two decades. Its core mechanics — approval or filing for foreign investors acquiring domestic enterprises, and the use of overseas-listed-company shares as consideration — created the original framework for red-chip and SPV structures. Two decades of market evolution, however, have left the rules showing their age in three specific places, and each is on the 2026 revision agenda.

The three frictions the revision must resolve

First, the cross-border share-swap clause. Order No. 10’s Article 28 requires that shares used as consideration in a share swap be shares of an overseas listed company, excluding unlisted overseas company shares (except special-purpose vehicles). The revised Strategic Investment Measures, by contrast, explicitly allow strategic investment through private placements and tender offers to use unlisted overseas company shares as consideration. A Chinese company that wants to acquire an overseas business by issuing its own shares to the overseas target’s shareholders, or a foreign investor that wants to pay for a stake in a Chinese company with shares of an unlisted overseas affiliate, currently faces two inconsistent rulebooks. The revision is expected to align the two.

Second, the interplay with the offshore-listing filing regime. Since the CSRC’s 2023 rules brought red-chip and H-share listings into one filing framework, the compliance cost and time of red-chip structures have risen. The filing regime, however, does not prohibit the structure; it makes it transparent. And with the State Council’s June 2026 regulation on outbound investment tasking the NDRC to draft rules for resident individuals’ overseas investment, the personal-investment layer of red-chip structures is also being redrawn. How Order No. 10’s related-party merger clause will be revised will signal the policy stance on the next generation of these structures.

Third, coordination with the Foreign Investment Law. Order No. 10’s procedural requirements and the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting regime need to be rationalised. The Action Plan’s reference to “strengthening cross-departmental regulatory coordination” points directly at this: investors should not need to file the same transaction under overlapping regimes with inconsistent thresholds and timetables.

What this means for structure choices in 2026

For a foreign investor acquiring a Chinese business or a Chinese company doing an offshore capital raise, the practical read is that the lane selection window is open but not yet settled:

  • Direct FDI remains the baseline. For most operating investments, a straightforward WFOE or JV under the negative-list-plus-reporting regime continues to be the default, fastest and most predictable structure.
  • Listed-share swaps remain usable today. Where a share swap is the right consideration structure and the target shares are overseas-listed, current rules support it; transaction documents should nonetheless be drafted with fallback clauses in case the revision changes the applicable lane mid-transaction.
  • Unlisted-share swaps should be modelled, not assumed. Where the consideration is unlisted overseas company shares, the current inconsistency means structuring should either use the strategic-investment lane (private placements and tender offers in listed-company contexts) or defer the swap leg until the revised Order No. 10 clarifies the position.
  • Red-chip listings should be built for transparency. The 2023 filing regime, the pending resident-individual outbound investment rules and the Order No. 10 revision together mean that red-chip structures must be documented for filing and disclosure from day one, rather than retro-fitted at listing.

Practical checklist for 2026 structurings

  1. Run parallel scenario models. Build the same deal as (a) direct FDI, (b) share swap under current rules, and (c) share swap under the expected revised rules, and compare tax, timing and regulatory exposure.
  2. Pin the applicable gate. Confirm whether the transaction involves a listed-company strategic investment (Strategic Investment Measures), an unlisted-target acquisition (Order No. 10), or a securities-market purchase (QFII / Stock Connect channels), and identify which filings are mandatory today.
  3. Keep documents flexible. Include condition precedent and alternative-consideration clauses so the transaction can switch from a share swap to cash or to a different vehicle class without renegotiating the entire deal.
  4. Prepare the information-reporting file. Regardless of structure, the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting duty applies to establishment, change and merger events; build the reporting schedule into the closing plan.
  5. Monitor the revision pipeline. The MOFCOM revision of Order No. 10, the NDRC rules for resident-individual overseas investment, and provincial implementations of the Action Plan’s M&A facilitation will each change the structuring calculus; track them through official channels.

Related reading

  • The 2006 Measures on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Order No. 10), pending revision.
  • The revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) and the CSRC’s offshore-listing filing rules (2023).
  • The State Council’s regulation on outbound investment (effective July 2026) and the draft NDRC implementing measures.

Sources

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

跨境换股与红筹架构:2026 年修订窗口期

概述

对外国投资者和在境外融资的中国公司而言,架构问题始终是:选哪个载体,过哪道监管门?2026 年的答案正在变化之中。《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月)承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定”——即俗称 10 号令的 2006 年规定——优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求。与之并行,修订后的《战略投资管理办法》已于 2024 年 12 月落地,使战略投资通道现代化。两者之间,跨境换股与控股架构的监管体系正在实时重建。

十多年来,10 号令一直是跨境换股架构的支柱。其核心机制——外国投资者并购境内企业的审批或备案、以境外上市公司股份作为对价——创造了红筹与特殊目的公司(SPV)架构的最初框架。然而,二十年的市场演进让规则在三处显出老态,而每一处都在 2026 年修订议程之上。

修订必须解决的三处摩擦

第一,跨境换股条款。10 号令第 28 条要求换股支付手段的股权须为境外上市公司股权,排除了境外非上市公司股权(特殊目的公司除外)。而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》明确允许定向发行、要约收购方式的战略投资使用境外非上市公司股份作为对价。一家想通过向境外标的企业股东发行自身股份来收购境外业务的中国公司,或者想以境外未上市关联公司股份支付中国公司股权对价的外国投资者,如今面对的是两套不一致的规则。预计修订将实现制度衔接。

第二,与境外上市备案制度的互动。自证监会 2023 年新规把红筹与 H 股上市纳入同一备案框架后,红筹架构的合规成本和时间有所上升。但备案制度并不禁止这一结构,只是使其透明化。随着国务院 2026 年 6 月对外投资规定要求发改委起草境内居民个人境外投资具体管理办法,红筹架构的个人投资层也在被重绘。10 号令关联并购条款将如何修订,将释放政策层对下一代红筹架构的态度信号。

第三,与《外商投资法》的协调。10 号令的程序性要求与《外商投资法》的信息报告制度需要理顺。《行动方案》中”强化部门监管协同”的表述直指此处:投资者不应在门槛与时间表不一致的重叠制度下重复申报同一交易。

对 2026 年架构选择的意义

对收购中国业务的外国投资者或进行境外融资的中国公司,实操读法是:通道选择窗口已开,但尚未定型。

  • 直接 FDI 仍是基线。对大多数经营性投资,负面清单加信息报告体制下的直接外商独资企业或合资公司,继续是默认、最快、最可预期的结构。
  • 上市股份换股今天仍可用。换股是合适的对价结构且标的股份为境外上市公司的,现行规则支持;但交易文件仍应起草回退条款,以防修订在交易中途改变适用通道。
  • 非上市股份换股应建模而非假设。对价涉及境外非上市股份的,当前的不一致意味着构架应要么走战略投资通道(上市公司语境下的定向发行、要约收购),要么推迟换股环节直至修订后的 10 号令澄清立场。
  • 红筹上市应面向透明构建。2023 年备案制度、居民个人境外投资新规与 10 号令修订共同意味着:红筹架构必须从第一天起就按备案与披露要求留档,而非上市时追溯补做。

2026 年构架实操清单

  1. 并行建立情景模型。把同一笔交易分别构建为(a)直接 FDI、(b)现行规则下的换股、(c)预期修订规则下的换股,比较税务、时间与监管敞口。
  2. 锁定适用闸门。确认交易涉及上市公司战略投资(《战略投资管理办法》)、未上市标的并购(10 号令)还是证券市场购买(QFII / 互联互通通道),并识别当下哪些申报是强制性的。
  3. 保持文件灵活。加入先决条件与替代对价条款,使交易无需重谈即可从换股切换为现金或不同载体类别。
  4. 备好信息报告档案。无论何种架构,《外商投资法》的信息报告义务适用于设立、变更与并购事件;把申报时间表纳入交割计划。
  5. 跟踪修订管道。商务部对 10 号令的修订、发改委居民个人境外投资办法以及《行动方案》并购便利化在各省的落实,都将改变构架计算;通过官方渠道跟踪。

相关阅读

  • 《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(10 号令,2006 年),修订在即。
  • 修订版《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)与证监会 2023 年境外上市备案规则。
  • 国务院《对外投资的规定》(2026 年 7 月施行)及发改委征求意见稿。

来源

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

Services Take Centre Stage: China’s Market-Access Opening as of Late August 2026

  • At a State Council Information Office press conference on 28 August 2026, the Ministry of Commerce confirmed that services are now the centrepiece of market-access opening, with work under way to steadily and prudently expand market access and opening fields with services as the focus.
    在 2026 年 8 月 28 日国新办新闻发布会上,商务部确认服务业已成为市场准入开放的重心,正稳妥有序推动以服务业为重点扩大市场准入和开放领域。
  • The MOFCOM is building National Service Trade Innovation and Development Demonstration Zones in 17 regions (the overall plan was issued in April 2026), positioning them as comprehensive reform-and-opening platforms for services trade in the 15th Five-Year period.
    商务部正在北京等 17 个地区建设国家服务贸易创新发展示范区(总体方案 2026 年 4 月印发),将其定位为”十五五”时期服务贸易综合改革开放平台。
  • The demonstration zones will explore a more open institutional environment for the cross-border movement of funds, people, technology and data, steadily expand services market opening, simplify licensing approval procedures and improve risk-prevention mechanisms.
    示范区将探索优化资金、人员、技术、数据等要素跨境流动的制度环境,稳步有序扩大服务市场开放,简化有关许可审批程序,完善风险防控机制。
  • The cross-border services-trade negative list will be improved to remove barriers to cross-border services trade, and the factor flows closely linked to services trade — people, capital and data — will be made more convenient and secure.
    将完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,破除跨境服务贸易壁垒,推动与服务贸易密切相关的人员、资金、数据等要素便利、安全地跨境流动。
  • Regional positioning is differentiated: Shanghai will lift its full-chain transport-services capacity, Guangzhou will leverage the Greater Bay Area core-engine role in finance and foreign-related law, and Chengdu will build biomedicine innovation chains and digital-content export clusters.
    各地定位差异化:上海提升全链条运输服务能级,广州发挥大湾区核心引擎功能创新发展金融、涉外法律等服务,成都着力打造生物医药创新链、数字文创出口集群。
  • For foreign service providers, the practical takeaway is a widening, more predictable entry landscape: services sectors are the frontier of liberalisation, demonstration zones offer pilot ground for new licences, and the services negative list defines the boundary.
    对外资服务提供商,实操启示是:准入图景更宽、更可预期——服务业是开放的先行领域,示范区为新牌照提供试验场,跨境服务贸易负面清单划定边界。

Services Take Centre Stage: China’s Market-Access Opening as of Late August 2026 | 服务业站上 C 位:2026 年 8 月底的市场准入开放图景

The 28 August press conference

On 28 August 2026, the State Council Information Office held a press conference on the development of China’s services trade and the preparation of the 2026 China International Fair for Trade in Services (CIFTIS). The MOFCOM officials used the platform to set out the services-focused opening agenda. Vice Minister Yan Dong said that in the 15th Five-Year period, as global industrial chains reconfigure and digital and green transformation accelerates, the MOFCOM will implement a services quality-and-capacity upgrading action, speed up innovation in services trade, and — the key phrase — “steadily and prudently promote the expansion of market access and opening fields with services as the focus”. He also committed to improving the cross-border services-trade negative-list system, removing barriers to cross-border services trade, and making the factor flows closely related to services trade — people, capital and data — more convenient and secure.

The demonstration-zone mechanism

The flagship mechanism is the National Service Trade Innovation and Development Demonstration Zones. The MOFCOM issued the overall plan in April 2026, and 17 regions — Beijing among them — are now building demonstration zones as “comprehensive reform-and-opening platforms for services trade in the 15th Five-Year period”. The MOFCOM services-trade director, Kong Dejun, described three positioning goals. First, innovation highlands: zones should build on their location, resources and industrial strengths to push integrated innovation along industry and supply chains and expand services exports. Second, competitive operators: zones should widen financing channels, upgrade the public-service capacity of services-trade platforms, and cultivate leading services-export firms with international competitiveness. Third, policy-innovation sources: zones should explore an enabling institutional environment for the cross-border movement of funds, people, technology and data, steadily and orderly expand services market opening, simplify licensing approval procedures and improve risk-prevention mechanisms.

What this means on the ground

The differentiated positioning is concrete. Beijing will raise its full-chain transport-services capacity; Shanghai will open up the full international services chain for aircraft; Guangzhou will use its Greater Bay Area core-engine role to innovate in finance and foreign-related legal services; Chengdu will build a biomedicine innovation chain and digital-content export clusters. For foreign service providers, the pattern is clear: services are the frontier of liberalisation, and the demonstration zones are where new licences and new business forms get their first trial. The cross-border services-trade negative list — the mirror image of the goods negative list — will be the document that defines what is open by default and what remains restricted, and its “non-prohibited means open” logic is the most important single rule for foreign providers to internalise.

Practical guidance for foreign service providers

Foreign services companies should take four steps. (1) Map your sector against the services negative list: if your activity is not on the list, it is open by default under the filing/registration regime; if it is listed, check the specific restriction (ownership cap, licensing condition, local-presence requirement). (2) Identify the pilot ground: if your business is in a restricted or pilot area, the demonstration zones and the earlier services-opening pilots (e.g. the 119-task services-opening round) are the places where access is being tested first — engaging a zone can put you ahead of the national timeline. (3) Watch the factor-flow agenda: the commitment to make people, capital and data flow more conveniently is not a slogan — the demonstration zones are authorised to explore field-level data-export negative lists and simplified procedures, which directly affect how a services firm operates across borders. (4) Use the CIFTIS channel: the fair, held annually in Beijing, is the de facto annual checkpoint where services-opening measures and zone achievements are presented — a useful intelligence and networking event for entry planning.

Sources


服务业站上 C 位:2026 年 8 月底的市场准入开放图景

8 月 28 日的发布会

2026 年 8 月 28 日,国务院新闻办公室举行发布会,介绍中国服务贸易发展和 2026 年服贸会筹备情况。商务部官员借此平台阐明了以服务业为重点的开放议程。副部长鄢东表示,”十五五”时期,在全球产业链加速重构、数智化和绿色转型加快的背景下,商务部将深入实施服务业提质扩能行动,加快服务贸易创新发展,并——关键表述——”稳妥有序推动以服务业为重点扩大市场准入和开放领域”。他还承诺完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,破除跨境服务贸易壁垒,推动与服务贸易密切相关的人员、资金、数据等要素便利、安全地跨境流动。

示范区机制

旗舰机制是国家服务贸易创新发展示范区。商务部 2026 年 4 月印发总体方案,北京等 17 个地区正在建设示范区,定位为”十五五”时期服务贸易综合改革开放平台。商务部服贸司司长孔德军阐述了三个定位目标。其一,创新发展高地:示范区应立足区位、资源与产业优势,推进产业链供应链集成创新,扩大服务出口。其二,培育竞争优势主体:拓宽企业融资渠道,提升服务贸易平台载体公共服务能力,培育具有国际竞争力的服务出口领军企业。其三,政策创新策源地:探索优化资金、人员、技术、数据等要素跨境流动的制度环境,稳步有序扩大服务市场开放,简化有关许可审批程序,完善风险防控机制。

落地意味着什么

差异化定位已经具体化。北京提升全链条运输服务能级;上海打通飞机国际服务链条;广州发挥粤港澳大湾区核心引擎功能,创新发展金融、涉外法律等服务;成都打造生物医药创新链、数字文创出口集群。对外资服务提供商,图景清晰:服务业是开放先行领域,示范区是新牌照与新业态的试验场。跨境服务贸易负面清单——货物负面清单的镜像——将界定”默认开放”与”仍受限”的边界,其”未禁止即开放”的逻辑是外资服务商最需要内化的单一规则。

给外资服务商的实操建议

外资服务企业建议落实四步。(1)对照服务贸易负面清单定位本行业:业务不在清单上即默认开放,走备案/登记制;在清单上则核对其体的限制(持股上限、许可条件、本地存在要求)。(2)找到试验场:业务处于受限或试点领域时,示范区和此前的服务业开放试点(如 119 项服务业开放试点任务)是准入最先被测试的地方——接入一个示范区可能让你领先全国时间表。(3)盯住要素流动议程:让人员、资金、数据更便利流动不是口号——示范区获授权探索字段级数据出境负面清单与简化程序,直接影响服务企业的跨境运营方式。(4)用好服贸会渠道:每年在北京举办的服贸会实际上是服务业开放措施与示范区成果的年度检阅点——是入华规划中很有价值的信息与社交场合。

Sources

Export Control & Dual-Use Items: What Foreign Buyers Sourcing from China Must Check

  • China’s export-control regime is now unified under the Export Control Law (2020) and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (State Council Decree No.792), effective 1 December 2024.
    中国的出口管制制度现已在《出口管制法》(2020)与《两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024年12月1日施行)下统一。
  • “Dual-use items” are goods, technology and services with both civilian and military uses — the control net covers export, re-export, transit, transshipment and even certain overseas-to-overseas transfers of China-origin items.
    “两用物项”指兼具民用与军事用途的货物、技术和服务——管制网覆盖出口、再出口、过境、转运,甚至含中国成分物项的境外向境外转移。
  • The unified Dual-Use Items Export Control List (MOFCOM/MIIT/GACC/State Cryptography Administration Notice 2024 No.51) took effect the same day and replaced multiple older lists.
    统一的《两用物项出口管制清单》(商务部/工信部/海关总署/国家密码局2024年第51号公告)同日施行,取代多份旧清单。
  • Licences come in three forms: single licence (single end-user, one export, ≤1 year), general licence (multiple exports/users, ≤3 years, for compliant exporters), and a registration-and-filing pathway for specified low-risk situations.
    许可分三类:单项许可(单一最终用户、一次出口、≤1年)、通用许可(多次出口/用户、≤3年,面向合规出口商)、以及针对特定低风险情形的登记填报凭证方式。
  • End-user and end-use management is central: applicants must submit end-user/end-use certificates and cannot change them; a Control List and a Watch List can restrict counterparties.
    最终用户与最终用途管理是核心:申请须提交最终用户/用途证明且不得擅自变更;管控名单与关注名单可限制交易对手。
  • The regulation abolished the old exporter-registration prerequisite — exporters can now apply for a licence directly — a genuine trade-facilitation step.
    条例取消了旧的出口经营者登记前置——出口商现可直接申请许可——是实实在在的贸易便利化举措。
  • For foreign buyers this matters even when they are the importer: your Chinese supplier’s licence status, catalogue classification and end-user paperwork determine whether goods can lawfully leave China.
    对外资买家而言,即便你是进口方也息息相关:中国供应商的许可状态、清单归类与最终用户材料,决定货物能否合法离境。
  • Build export-control screening into supplier due diligence — classification check, licence verification, end-use statements, re-export awareness and an internal compliance programme (ICP).
    将出口管制筛查纳入供应商尽调——归类核查、许可核验、最终用途声明、再出口意识与内部合规制度(ICP)。

Export Control & Dual-Use Items: What Foreign Buyers Sourcing from China Must Check | 出口管制与两用物项:从中国采购的外资买家必须核查什么

Overview

When a foreign company buys from China, the usual worries are price, quality and delivery. Export control is a quieter risk that can stop a shipment cold — and it applies to a surprisingly broad range of ordinary industrial goods, not just obvious “weapons parts”. Certain sensors, chemicals, machine tools, advanced materials, software and encryption can all be dual-use items. Since 1 December 2024, China runs a single, modernised framework for these items. This article explains the legal architecture, the licence types, end-user rules, the re-export reach, and — crucially — how a buyer folds export-control checks into supplier due diligence so a purchase order is not derailed at the border.

The legal framework

Two instruments anchor the system:

  • Export Control Law of the PRC (2020) — the umbrella statute establishing a unified export-control system through control lists and export licensing.
  • Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (国务院令第792号) — signed 30 September 2024, effective 1 December 2024, 6 chapters and 50 articles. It consolidates previously scattered rules (nuclear dual-use, missile-related, biological dual-use, certain chemicals) into one coherent regulation, and simultaneously repealed the older stand-alone regulations.

On the same day, the unified Dual-Use Items Export Control List (Notice 2024 No.51, jointly by MOFCOM, MIIT, GACC and the State Cryptography Administration) took effect, replacing multiple legacy lists and folding in commercial-encryption controls.

What counts as a “dual-use item”

A dual-use item (两用物项) is a good, technology or service with both civilian and military applications — or one that could help enhance military potential, especially anything usable to design, develop, produce or deploy weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The definition expressly includes related technical data. Because “technology and services” are covered, sending a Chinese engineer’s technical drawings or providing certain technical support abroad can itself be a controlled “export”.

The three licence pathways

Article 15 of the regulation sets out how a controlled item may lawfully leave China:

  • Single licence (单项许可): one exporter, one specified item, a single export to a single end-user; valid ≤1 year; auto-expires once the export completes.
  • General licence (通用许可): multiple exports to one or multiple end-users within the stated scope; valid ≤3 years; available only to exporters with a well-run internal compliance programme, a track record and relatively fixed channels/end-users.
  • Registration-and-filing (登记填报信息获得出口凭证): for specified low-risk situations (e.g. re-export after repair/testing, exhibition goods returned unchanged, civil-aircraft parts repair) the exporter registers information before each export and self-declares.

MOFCOM must generally decide a single-licence application within 45 working days (identification, expert consultation or on-site verification time is excluded).

End-user and end-use management

This is the heart of the system. Applicants must submit end-user and end-use certificates and may not change the declared end-user/end-use without re-applying. The regime uses two lists:

  • Control List (管控名单): importers/end-users who breach end-use requirements or pose national-security risks can be listed, and transactions with them can be prohibited or restricted; listed parties lose access to general licences and filing conveniences.
  • Watch List (关注名单): parties who refuse end-use verification can be listed, and dealing with them forfeits licensing conveniences.

Re-export, transit and the long reach

The regulation reaches beyond a simple China-to-abroad shipment. Re-export, transit, transshipment and through-transport of controlled items are within scope. Article 49 also allows MOFCOM to require overseas operators to comply when they transfer, to specified destinations/parties, items that contain, integrate or are mixed with specified China-origin dual-use items, or that are produced abroad using specified China-origin controlled technology. Foreign buyers who re-export goods with Chinese content should therefore assess China-origin controls in addition to their home-country rules.

Trade-facilitation upside

It is not all restriction. The 2024 regulation abolished the exporter-registration prerequisite: exporters no longer need prior “dual-use exporter registration” and may apply for a licence directly. It also increases policy transparency, codifies the general-licence convenience, and provides a filing route for low-risk cases such as repairs and exhibitions — reducing friction for compliant, legitimate trade.

Folding export control into supplier due diligence

Add an export-control gate to onboarding and to each significant PO:

  1. Classification check — is the item (or its technology/software/encryption) on the current Dual-Use Items List, or under temporary control? Ask the supplier for its classification; when unsure, the supplier can seek a MOFCOM ruling.
  2. Licence verification — confirm the supplier holds the correct single/general licence, or qualifies for filing, before shipment.
  3. End-use documentation — provide accurate end-user/end-use statements; understand that changing them mid-stream can void the licence.
  4. Screen counterparties — check that neither you nor downstream users are on the Control/Watch lists.
  5. Re-export awareness — if you will re-export goods containing Chinese content, evaluate China-origin controls alongside your own jurisdiction’s.
  6. Internal Compliance Programme (ICP) — favour suppliers with a functioning ICP; a general licence itself signals maturity.
  7. Customs interface — remember GACC will not release controlled goods without the licence; missing paperwork means detention.

What to do next

  • Map your China-sourced items and technology transfers against the 2024 Dual-Use Items List; flag anything sensitive early.
  • Require suppliers to confirm classification and hold the correct licence before you place binding orders.
  • Standardise end-user/end-use certificates in your procurement templates; never misstate them.
  • Screen all counterparties against the Control List and Watch List; re-screen periodically.
  • For goods with Chinese content that you will re-export, assess China-origin re-export exposure in your compliance review.
  • Prefer suppliers with an internal compliance programme; treat a general licence as a positive due-diligence signal.

Sources

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)— http://www.npc.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024-12-01 施行)— https://www.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 司法部、商务部负责人就《两用物项出口管制条例》答记者问 — https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zcjd/202410/t20241019_508011.html
  • 商务部 工业和信息化部 海关总署 国家密码局 2024年第51号公告(发布《两用物项出口管制清单》)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 中国出口管制信息网(商务部安全与管制局)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn

Related reading

  • see also: 采购供应-供应商尽调 (the broader supplier vetting checklist)
  • see also: 采购供应-供应商尽调 (compulsory product certification / CCC)
  • see also: 进口清关-进出口清关 (import-export licensing & customs clearance)

出口管制与两用物项:从中国采购的外资买家必须核查什么

概述

外资企业从中国采购时,通常关心的是价格、质量与交期。出口管制是一种更隐蔽的风险,可能让一票货戛然而止——而且它适用于范围惊人的普通工业品,绝不只是显而易见的”武器零件”。某些传感器、化学品、机床、先进材料、软件与加密都可能是两用物项。自 2024 年 12 月 1 日起,中国以统一、现代化的框架管理这些物项。本文说明法律架构、许可类型、最终用户规则、再出口的延伸效力,以及——最关键的——买家如何把出口管制核查纳入供应商尽调,避免订单在口岸受阻。

法律框架

两部文件构成制度基石:

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)——统领性法律,通过管制清单与出口许可建立统一出口管制制度。
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号)——2024 年 9 月 30 日签署、2024 年 12 月 1 日施行,共 6 章 50 条。它把此前分散的规则(核两用、导弹相关、生物两用、部分化学品)整合为一部统一条例,并同时废止相关旧行政法规。

同日,统一的《两用物项出口管制清单》(2024 年第 51 号公告,商务部、工信部、海关总署、国家密码局联合发布)施行,取代多份旧清单并纳入商用密码管制。

什么算”两用物项”

两用物项指兼具民用与军事用途——或有助于提升军事潜力,尤其可用于设计、开发、生产或使用大规模杀伤性武器及其运载工具——的货物、技术和服务,其定义明确包括相关技术资料。因涵盖”技术和服务”,向境外发送中国工程师的技术图纸或提供某些技术支持,本身即可能构成受控”出口”。

三条许可路径

条例第 15 条规定受控物项合法离境的方式:

  • 单项许可:一个出口商、一项特定物项、向单一最终用户一次出口;有效期≤1 年;完成出口后自动失效。
  • 通用许可:在载明范围内向单一或多个最终用户多次出口;有效期≤3 年;仅面向内部合规制度运行良好、有出口记录、渠道及最终用户相对固定的出口商。
  • 登记填报凭证:对特定低风险情形(如进境检修/试验/检测后复运、参展原样复运、民用飞机零部件维修等),出口商每次出口前登记信息并自行填报。

商务部原则上应自受理单项许可申请起 45 个工作日内决定(鉴别、征询专家或实地核查时间不计入)。

最终用户与最终用途管理

这是制度核心。申请须提交最终用户与最终用途证明,且不得擅自变更所申报的最终用户/用途,否则须重新申请。制度设两份名单:

  • 管控名单:违反最终用途要求或危害国家安全的进口商/最终用户可被列入,与其交易可被禁止或限制;被列入者丧失通用许可与填报便利。
  • 关注名单:不配合最终用途核查者可被列入,与其交易不享受许可便利。

再出口、过境与长臂效力

条例的效力超出简单的”中国—境外”出运。受控物项的再出口、过境、转运、通运均在管制范围。第 49 条还允许商务部要求境外经营者遵守:当其向特定目的地/对象转移含有、集成或混有特定中国成分两用物项、或使用特定中国原产受控技术在境外制造的物项时。因此,再出口含中国成分货物的外资买家,除本国规则外,还应评估中国成分的管制。

贸易便利化的一面

制度并非只有限制。2024 年条例取消了出口经营者登记前置:出口商无需事先登记即可直接申请许可;同时提升政策透明度、明确通用许可便利,并为维修、参展等低风险情形提供填报路径——为合规、正当贸易减少摩擦。

把出口管制纳入供应商尽调

在准入及每一笔重要订单中加入出口管制关卡:

  1. 归类核查——该物项(或其技术/软件/加密)是否列入现行两用物项清单或临时管制?向供应商索取归类;不确定时供应商可向商务部咨询。
  2. 许可核验——出运前确认供应商持有正确的单项/通用许可,或符合填报条件。
  3. 最终用途材料——提供真实的最终用户/用途声明;理解中途变更可能使许可失效。
  4. 筛查交易对手——确认你与下游用户均不在管控/关注名单。
  5. 再出口意识——若将再出口含中国成分货物,须与本司法辖区规则一并评估中国成分管制。
  6. 内部合规制度(ICP)——优先选择有运行良好 ICP 的供应商;通用许可本身即成熟度信号。
  7. 海关接口——海关不凭许可不放行受控货物;材料缺失即被扣留。

下一步建议

  • 将你在华采购物项与技术转移与 2024 年两用物项清单比对;尽早标出敏感项。
  • 在下达约束性订单前,要求供应商确认归类并持有正确许可。
  • 在采购模板中标准化最终用户/用途证明;切勿虚报。
  • 对所有交易对手比对管控名单与关注名单;定期复筛。
  • 对将再出口的含中国成分货物,在合规审查中评估中国成分再出口敞口。
  • 优先选择有内部合规制度的供应商;将通用许可视为尽调正向信号。

来源

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)— http://www.npc.gov.cn
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024-12-01 施行)— https://www.gov.cn
  • 司法部、商务部负责人就《两用物项出口管制条例》答记者问 — https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zcjd/202410/t20241019_508011.html
  • 商务部 工业和信息化部 海关总署 国家密码局 2024年第51号公告(发布《两用物项出口管制清单》)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 中国出口管制信息网(商务部安全与管制局)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 参见:采购供应-供应商尽调(更完整的供应商尽调清单)
  • 参见:采购供应-供应商尽调(强制产品认证 CCC)
  • 参见:进口清关-进出口清关(进出口许可与海关清关)

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains

  • On 5 August 2026 China’s Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 34 of 2026, strengthening export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: every export is now subject to case-by-case strict review and license-preference measures do not apply.
    2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部发布 2026 年第 34 号公告,加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。
  • The same day, MOFCOM placed seven US entities on its countermeasures list — six entities (including Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir and Altana Technologies) under Order No. 2 of 2026 and Compliance Testing LLC under Order No. 3 of 2026 — banning Chinese organisations and individuals from transacting or cooperating with them.
    同一天,商务部依据反外国制裁法将 7 家美国实体列入反制清单——2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司等 6 家美国实体列入,第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入——禁止我国境内组织、个人与其进行交易、合作等活动。
  • The August measures follow an earlier July batch (Order No. 30 of 2026 placing 14 EU entities on the export-control management list) and a June 2026 customs announcement tightening drone export declarations, showing a steady escalation of China’s export-control enforcement.
    8 月措施紧随此前批次:7 月第 30 号公告将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单,2026 年 6 月海关公告收紧无人机出口申报——显示中国出口管制执法的稳步升级。
  • For foreign companies, the compliance consequences are concrete: if you are a US or EU entity on the lists, your Chinese counterparties are prohibited from dealing with you; if you buy or re-export controlled drone components, you face case-by-case review and must not rely on licensing-preference pathways.
    对外国企业,合规后果具体而直接:若你是在列的美欧实体,你的中国对手方被禁止与你交易;若你采购或转口受管制无人机零部件,将面对逐案审查且不能依赖许可便利通道。
  • Supply-chain due diligence must now screen counterparties, end-users and goods against three instruments: the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, the export-control management list and the countermeasures list, under the Export Control Law, the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.
    供应链尽调现须对照三份清单筛查对手方、最终用户与货物:《两用物项出口管制清单》、出口管制管控名单与反制清单,依据《出口管制法》《两用物项出口管制条例》与《反外国制裁法》。
  • The Foreign Trade Law, revised and effective 1 March 2026, adds a further layer: it prohibits any person or organisation from providing agency, freight, customs, warehousing or platform services to evade measures against listed foreign persons or organisations.
    2026 年 3 月 1 日施行的新修订《对外贸易法》增加一层:禁止任何个人、组织为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持。

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains | 中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

The 5 August package

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce issued three measures on a single day. Announcement No. 34 of 2026 strengthens export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: for drones, their key components and related technology listed in the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, every export to the US is subject to case-by-case strict review, and license-preference measures do not apply. Order No. 2 of 2026 places six US entities on the countermeasures list — Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, Responsible Business Alliance, Verite Group and Human Rights in China — and Order No. 3 of 2026 places Compliance Testing LLC on the list. For entities on the countermeasures list, Chinese organisations and individuals are prohibited from transacting or cooperating with them. The legal basis is the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations for the first measure, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and its implementing regulations for the latter two.

The escalation context

The August package is the latest step in a sequence that global supply-chain teams should read as a pattern, not a one-off. On 24 July 2026, MOFCOM announced (Announcement No. 30 of 2026) that 14 EU entities were placed on the export-control management list. In June 2026, the GACC issued Announcement No. 78 of 2026 strengthening supervision of drone and other dual-use exports at the declaration stage: exports through express delivery or cross-border e-commerce channels may not use simplified declarations, and for goods whose technical parameters approach control standards, exporters must proactively declare that the goods are not controlled items. On 5 August the drone-specific US controls and the countermeasures against seven US entities followed. The cumulative picture: China’s export-control and countermeasure apparatus is being used with increasing frequency, and the dual-use control list, the management list and the countermeasures list are being updated as operational instruments, not as dormant legislation.

What the drone controls mean for global buyers

For companies that source drone components, drones or related technology from China, or that re-export such goods to the US, the practical changes are: (1) exports of listed items to the US now go through case-by-case strict review — no license-preference pathway; (2) exporters must verify the final destination and end-use more rigorously, which will slow down and add compliance cost to US-bound shipments; (3) for non-US destinations, controls continue to apply under the general dual-use regime, but the “no simplified declaration” rule for express and e-commerce channels announced in June applies regardless of destination; (4) buyers should expect Chinese suppliers to ask for more end-user and end-use documentation and to decline orders where the chain is unclear. For a global buyer, the lesson is to treat drones and dual-use electronics as controlled goods with a destination-sensitive compliance profile.

The countermeasures list and counterparty screening

The countermeasures list under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law has direct binding enforcement effect: Chinese organisations and individuals must not transact or cooperate with listed entities. For a foreign company, the question is not whether it agrees with the listings but whether it or any subsidiary appears on the list, and whether its Chinese counterparties will be forced to terminate relations. Compliance steps include: screen the company, its subsidiaries, its beneficial owners and its key counterparties against the countermeasures list and the export-control management list on a continuous basis; monitor updates to the lists (MOFCOM publishes them via announcements and the countermeasures list annex); and where a listed entity is involved anywhere in the transaction chain, assume the Chinese leg will be blocked. The revised Foreign Trade Law adds a service-layer prohibition: no one may provide agency, freight, forwarding, customs, warehousing or third-party trading-platform services to circumvent measures against listed foreign persons or organisations. This matters for freight forwarders, customs brokers, warehouses and platforms that handle transactions with listed entities — even non-US service providers routing through China face the prohibition.

The interplay with US sanctions and compliance dual-use

Foreign multinationals now operate in a genuinely two-way sanctions environment. US sanctions and export controls restrict what US persons and goods may do with Chinese entities; China’s export-control management list and countermeasures list restrict what Chinese entities may do with US and EU entities. A multinational that is simultaneously subject to US export controls (e.g., ITAR, EAR) and dealing with Chinese suppliers must map both regimes onto every transaction. Practical friction points include: US-origin components embedded in goods bought from Chinese suppliers; US persons serving on boards that approve transactions with listed Chinese entities; and Chinese suppliers refusing to route shipments through US-sanctioned logistics chains. The compliance function must therefore maintain a dual sanctions map and run both US and Chinese list screening in parallel.

Practical due-diligence framework

For foreign companies sourcing from or selling into China, the 2026 framework suggests a four-layer screen. Layer one, goods: confirm whether the product is on the Dual-Use Items Export Control List (and the annual licence-management catalogue), whether it approaches control thresholds, and what declaration obligations apply under the June 2026 customs announcement. Layer two, parties: screen counterparties, end-users and end-use against the export-control management list, the countermeasures list and, for completeness, China’s unreliable-entity list and the MOFCOM guidance. Layer three, services: verify that no Chinese freight, customs, warehousing or platform provider would be violating the Foreign Trade Law service prohibition by handling your transaction. Layer four, jurisdictions: map both US and Chinese control regimes onto the transaction chain and identify any conflict that makes a deal unexecutable. Documentation of the screening is itself a compliance asset — Chinese regulators increasingly expect written evidence that exporters and their counterparties verified end-users and end-use.

What to watch next

Several indicators will shape the next six months. First, whether the drone-specific US controls extend to other dual-use categories or other destinations. Second, whether the management list and countermeasures list grow further in response to foreign measures — the pattern since mid-2026 suggests regular additions. Third, the implementation guidance for the new Foreign Trade Law’s service-prohibition provisions, which may come through MOFCOM Q&As or administrative rules. Fourth, whether Chinese customs deepens declaration-level scrutiny of dual-use goods through further announcements in the 2026 series. For global supply-chain and compliance teams, the operating assumption should be that China’s export-control and countermeasure regime is now a routine, frequently updated component of cross-border trade compliance — to be screened continuously, not reviewed annually.

Sources


中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

8 月 5 日一揽子措施

2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部同日发布三项措施。2026 年第 34 号公告加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟、维泰集团、”人权在中国组织”等 6 家美国实体列入反制清单;第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入反制清单。对在列实体,我国境内组织、个人禁止与其交易、合作。法律依据:第一项依《出口管制法》与《两用物项出口管制条例》,后两项依《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定。

升级的脉络

8 月一揽子是序列中的最新一步,全球供应链团队应视为模式而非一次性事件。2026 年 7 月 24 日,商务部公告(2026 年第 30 号)将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单。2026 年 6 月,海关总署发布 2026 年第 78 号公告,在申报环节强化无人机等两用物项出口监管:经快件、跨境电商渠道出口的不得简化申报,技术指标接近管制标准的物项,出口经营者申报时应主动声明其不属于管制物项。8 月 5 日,无人机对美专项管制与对 7 家美实体反制接踵而至。累积图景:中国出口管制与反制体系正被更频繁地启用,两用物项管制清单、管控名单与反制清单作为操作性工具持续更新,而非沉睡立法。

无人机管制对全球买家的意义

对从中国采购无人机零部件、无人机或相关技术、或向美国转口此类货物的企业,实际变化是:(1)清单物项对美出口现走逐案从严审核——无许可便利通道;(2)出口商须更严格核验最终目的地与最终用途,对美运输将变慢并增加合规成本;(3)对非美目的地,一般两用物项管制继续适用,但 6 月公告的”快件与电商渠道不得简化申报”规则不分目的地适用;(4)买家应预期中国供应商索取更多最终用户与最终用途文件,并在链条不清时拒绝订单。对全球买家,教训是无人机与两用电子产品须作为受管制货物、按目的地敏感性配置合规。

反制清单与对手方筛查

《反外国制裁法》下的反制清单具有直接的商业约束力:中国境内组织、个人不得与在列实体交易、合作。对外国企业,问题不在于是否认同列名,而在于自身或任何子公司是否在列、以及中国对手方是否被迫终止关系。合规步骤包括:对公司、子公司、受益所有人及关键对手方连续筛查反制清单与出口管制管控名单;持续跟踪名单更新(商务部经公告与反制清单附件发布);交易链任何环节涉在列实体的,按”中国一侧将被封堵”预判。新修订《对外贸易法》增加服务层禁令:任何个人、组织不得为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持、协助、便利。这对处理与在列实体交易的货代、报关行、仓库与平台意义重大——即便非美服务商经中国中转也面临禁令。

与美国制裁的相互作用与双重合规

跨国企业如今身处真正的双向制裁环境。美国制裁与出口管制限制美国主体与货物可与中国实体做什么;中国的出口管制管控名单与反制清单限制中国实体可与美欧实体做什么。同时受美国出口管制(如 ITAR、EAR)约束又与中国供应商交易的多国公司,必须把两套制度映射到每笔交易。实际摩擦点包括:从中国供应商采购货物中嵌入的美国原产部件;参与批准与在列中国实体交易的董事会的美国人士;以及中国供应商拒绝经美国制裁物流链转运。合规职能因此须维护双向制裁地图,并行运行美国与中国清单筛查。

实务尽调框架

对从中国采购或对华销售的外国企业,2026 年框架建议四层筛查。第一层,货物:确认产品是否在《两用物项出口管制清单》(及年度许可管理目录)之上、是否接近管制阈值、按 2026 年 6 月海关公告承担何种申报义务。第二层,主体:对照出口管制管控名单、反制清单,以及中国不可靠实体清单与商务部指引,筛查对手方、最终用户与最终用途。第三层,服务:核实无中国货代、报关、仓储或平台提供者会因处理你的交易而违反《对外贸易法》服务禁令。第四层,法域:把美中两套控制制度映射到交易链,识别使交易不可执行的冲突。筛查留痕本身即是合规资产——中国监管者日益期待出口商及对手方留存书面证据证明已核验最终用户与最终用途。

下一步看点

若干指标将塑造未来半年。其一,无人机对美专项管制是否扩展到其他两用物项类别或其他目的地。其二,管控名单与反制清单是否随外国措施进一步扩大——2026 年年中以来的模式提示将定期增列。其三,新《对外贸易法》服务禁令的实施指引,或经商务部问答或行政规则出台。其四,中国海关是否以 2026 年序列后续公告深化两用物项申报级审查。对全球供应链与合规团队,运营假设应是:中国出口管制与反制体系现已是跨境贸易合规的常规、高频更新组成部分——应持续筛查,而非年度复核。

Sources

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms

  • On 5 August 2026 MOFCOM enacted Order No. 2 (2026), placing six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and banning domestic organisations and individuals from transactions or cooperation with them.
    2026年8月5日,商务部令第2号将6家美国实体列入反制清单,禁止境内组织、个人与其交易或合作。
  • The listed entities include Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), Verite Group and Human Rights in China.
    被列入的实体包括应用DNA科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟(RBA)、维泰集团与人权在中国组织。
  • A separate action the same day also listed Compliance Testing LLC, and the US drone-related dual-use export control was tightened — broadening the sanctions perimeter.
    同日另一行动还将美国合规性测试公司列入清单,并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制,拓宽制裁边界。
  • Foreign-invested firms must screen suppliers and partners against MOFCOM’s counter-sanctions and Unreliable Entity lists before contracting and on an ongoing basis.
    外商投资企业必须在签约前及持续地对供应商与合作伙伴对照商务部的反制清单与不可靠实体清单进行筛查。
  • The legal basis is the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law; violating a counter-sanctions listing can sever a company’s China supply chain and trigger liability.
    法律依据为《反外国制裁法》;违反反制清单可能切断企业在华供应链并引发责任。
  • Practical step: build a sanctioned-entity screening clause into procurement and partner contracts, with audit rights and termination triggers.
    实操建议:在采购与合作伙伴合同中嵌入受制裁实体筛查条款,含审计权与终止触发条件。

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms | 商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) enacted Order No. 2 (2026) — the *Decision on Countermeasures Against Six US Entities Including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.* The order, approved by the National Counter-Foreign Sanctions Coordination Mechanism, places six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and prohibits organisations and individuals within China from engaging in related transactions or cooperation with them. For any foreign-invested company with a China supply chain, this is a due-diligence event, not just a geopolitical headline.

What Order No. 2 does

The order responds to US sanctions against Chinese entities. Citing the *Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law* and its implementation provisions, MOFCOM decided to list the following six US entities and ban transactions/cooperation with them within China:

  1. Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.
  2. Stratum Reservoir, LLC
  3. Altana Technologies, Inc.
  4. Responsible Business Alliance (RBA)
  5. Verite Group, Inc.
  6. Human Rights in China (HRIC)

The prohibition is broad: “related transactions or cooperation” covers procurement, sales, licensing, auditing, certification and other commercial engagement. The effect is to cut the listed entities off from economic activity with China-based parties.

The widening sanctions perimeter

The same 5 August wave was not limited to the six. Reporting indicated a parallel listing of Compliance Testing LLC, and a tightening of US drone-related dual-use export controls. Together these show a broadening perimeter: certification bodies, audit/assurance groups, testing labs and supply-chain organisations can be drawn in, not only manufacturers. For foreign firms, the practical risk is that a trusted auditor, certifier or standards body in your supply chain quietly becomes a listed entity.

Why supplier due diligence must adapt

Traditional supplier due diligence focuses on financial health, quality and ESG. China’s counter-sanctions regime adds a sanctions-screening layer that foreign-invested firms cannot ignore:

  • Direct exposure. Buying from, selling to, or partnering with a listed entity is prohibited.
  • Indirect exposure. Using a listed entity as an auditor, certifier (e.g., RBA-style labour audits), testing lab or standards body can constitute “cooperation.”
  • Continuity risk. A previously-clean supplier or partner can be listed overnight, severing a production line or certification path.

MOFCOM also operates the Unreliable Entity List (UEL), a separate but related mechanism targeting foreign entities that harm Chinese sovereignty, security or development interests. Prudent supply-chain teams should screen against both the counter-sanctions list and the UEL.

Practical steps

  1. Screen at onboarding. Run every new supplier, distributor, auditor, certifier and lab against the current counter-sanctions and UEL lists before contracting.
  2. Screen continuously. Lists change fast; re-screen the active base on a set cadence and upon any geopolitical trigger.
  3. Contractualise it. Insert a sanctions-screening representation, audit right and termination-for-listing clause in procurement and partner agreements.
  4. Map dependencies. Identify where a single auditor/certifier (e.g., a labour-audit body) is mission-critical and build a fallback.
  5. Train procurement. Ensure buyers understand that “cooperation” includes certification and audit services, not just goods.
  6. Keep evidence. Document screenings and decisions to show compliance if challenged.

商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

2026年8月5日,商务部发布第2号令——《关于对应用DNA科学公司等6家美国实体采取反制措施的决定》。该令经国务院国家反外国制裁工作协调机制批准,将6家美国实体列入反制清单,并禁止境内组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作。对任何拥有中国供应链的外商投资企业而言,这是一起尽调事件,而非仅是地缘政治新闻。

第2号令的内容

该令回应美国对中国实体的制裁。依据《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定,商务部决定将以下6家美国实体列入清单,并禁止境内与其交易、合作:

  1. 应用DNA科学公司(Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.)
  2. 地层水库公司(Stratum Reservoir, LLC)
  3. 阿尔塔纳技术公司(Altana Technologies, Inc.)
  4. 责任商业联盟(Responsible Business Alliance, RBA)
  5. 维泰集团(Verite Group, Inc.)
  6. 人权在中国组织(Human Rights in China, HRIC)

禁令范围很广:”有关交易、合作”涵盖采购、销售、许可、审计、认证及其他商业往来。效果是切断被列实体与在华主体的经济活动。

拓宽的制裁边界

8月5日这一波并非仅限6家。报道显示同时列入了美国合规性测试公司(Compliance Testing LLC),并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制。共同显示边界正在拓宽:认证机构、审计/保证团体、检测实验室与供应链组织都可能被纳入,不仅是制造商。对外资企业,实际风险在于供应链中可信的审计方、认证方或标准机构悄然成为被列实体。

供应商尽调须随之调整

传统供应商尽调聚焦财务健康、质量与ESG。中国的反制制裁制度新增了一层制裁筛查,外商投资企业不可忽视:

  • 直接敞口。 向被列实体采购、销售或与之合作均被禁止。
  • 间接敞口。 使用被列实体作为审计方、认证方(如RBA式劳工审计)、检测实验室或标准机构,可能构成”合作”。
  • 连续性风险。 原本清白的供应商或合作伙伴可能一夜之间被列,切断产线或认证路径。

商务部还运行不可靠实体清单(UEL)——一项针对损害中国主权、安全、发展利益的外国实体的独立但相关机制。审慎的供应链团队应同时对照反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。

实操步骤

  1. 准入即筛查。 签约前对每家新供应商、经销商、审计方、认证方与实验室对照现行反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。
  2. 持续筛查。 清单变化快;按固定节奏并在任何地缘触发时重新筛查活跃库。
  3. 合同化。 在采购与合作伙伴协议中嵌入制裁筛查陈述、审计权与”被列入即终止”条款。
  4. 梳理依赖。 识别单一审计/认证方(如劳工审计机构)为关键路径的环节,建立备用。
  5. 培训采购。 确保采购理解”合作”包括认证与审计服务,不止货物。
  6. 留存证据。 记录筛查与决策,以应对可能的合规质疑。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • MOFCOM Order No. 2 (2026), 5 August: six US entities listed; domestic transactions/cooperation banned.
    商务部2026年第2号令(8月5日):6家美实体被列入;禁止境内交易合作。
  • Six named: Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana, RBA, Verite, HRIC.
    六家名单:应用DNA科学、地层水库、阿尔塔纳、RBA、维泰、人权在中国。
  • Perimeter widening: Compliance Testing LLC + drone dual-use controls added the same day.
    边界拓宽:同日新增合规性测试公司与无人机两用物项管制。
  • Screen two lists: counter-sanctions list AND the Unreliable Entity List.
    筛查两份清单:反制清单与不可靠实体清单。

Common Pitfalls

  • Thinking “goods only”: certification and audit services count as “cooperation” with a listed entity.
    以为”仅货物”:认证与审计服务也算与被列实体的”合作”。
  • One-time screening: lists move fast; a clean supplier today can be listed tomorrow.
    一次性筛查:清单变动快;今日清白的供应商明日可能被列。
  • Ignoring the UEL: the Unreliable Entity List is a separate, related risk many teams miss.
    忽视不可靠实体清单:这是独立的关联风险,许多团队遗漏。

Sources