Category Archives: Security Review / 安全审查

China’s Draft Special Provisions on Protecting Trade Secrets: What the Six Proposed Measures Would Reach

  • The Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Treaty and Law released a draft of the Special Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets for public comment on 26 October 2026, and the text remains a consultation draft that has not taken effect.
    商务部条法司于 2026 年 10 月 26 日就《保护中国商业秘密特别规定(征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,该文本仍为征求意见稿,尚未生效。
  • The draft is directed at foreign entities that carry out, outside China, acts infringing China’s trade secrets.
    征求意见稿针对的是在中国境外实施侵犯中国商业秘密行为的外国实体。
  • It sets out six categories of measures that may be applied individually or in combination, running from trade restrictions through investment, entry and work authorisation to a fine of an appropriate amount.
    征求意见稿列出可单独或合并采取的六类措施,从贸易限制延伸到投资、入境、工作许可,直至相应数额的罚款。
  • Five of the six operate on eligibility rather than on property: they touch trade in goods, technology and services, new investment in China, entry, and work, stay or residence status.
    六类措施中的五类作用于资格而非财产:涉及货物、技术与服务贸易,境内新增投资,入境,以及工作、停留或居留资格。
  • The draft sets no fine amount and no calculation method; it says only that a fine of an appropriate amount may be imposed in accordance with the circumstances.
    征求意见稿未设定罚款数额,也未规定计算方法,仅规定可根据情节轻重依法给予相应数额的罚款。
  • For companies already operating in China the exposure runs the other way: an employee who leaves with technical material can trigger Chinese trade secret liability and a group compliance failure at the same time.
    对已在华经营的企业,风险方向相反:员工带着技术资料离职,可能同时触发中国商业秘密法律责任与集团合规失守。
  • Cross-border technology transfer inside a group needs a three-part record — source, authorisation and purpose — because one document can be a trade secret, a controlled export item and personal data at once.
    集团内部的跨境技术转移需要”来源—授权—用途”三段留痕,因为同一份文件可能同时是商业秘密、受管制出口物项和个人信息。
  • Supply chain due diligence should add lawful provenance of intellectual property as a separate line item, alongside the export control screening most groups already run.
    供应链尽调应在多数集团已做的出口管制筛查之外,把知识产权的合法来源单列一项。

China’s Draft Special Provisions on Protecting Trade Secrets: What the Six Proposed Measures Would Reach | 中国《保护中国商业秘密特别规定(征求意见稿)》:六类拟采取措施对外国实体意味着什么

Overview

On 26 October 2026 the Department of Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Commerce published a draft of the Special Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets and opened it for public comment. The document is a consultation draft: it has not been adopted, has not been promulgated and is not in force. The channel for comment is the one published on the ministry’s website, and the ministry’s policy consultation page carries the text.

What the draft does is narrow and specific. It is directed at foreign entities that carry out, outside China, acts infringing China’s trade secrets, and it lists the measures that may be taken against them. It is not a restatement of the domestic trade secret rules, and it does not amend them.

Where the draft sits

China already has several routes against trade secret infringement, and each works on conduct with a Chinese nexus. The Anti-Unfair Competition Law, as revised with effect from 15 October 2025, prohibits infringement of commercial secrets and provides civil and administrative remedies. The Criminal Law reaches serious cases through the offence of infringing trade secrets. Technology leaving the country is separately regulated under the technology import and export rules, which operate through a catalogue of prohibited and restricted technologies and through licensing and registration. Cross-border data transfer is regulated on its own track.

Those routes are effective where the infringer, the act or the assets are in China. The draft addresses the case they handle awkwardly: an act committed abroad by a foreign entity, where a Chinese rights holder holds a judgment or finding but has few assets in the jurisdiction to enforce it against. Whether the measures will be used in that way is a matter for the final text and for practice; the draft itself only lists what may be done.

The six proposed measures

As published for comment, the draft provides that one or more of the following measures may be taken against a foreign entity:

  1. Trade. Restricting or prohibiting its engagement in goods and technology import and export, and in international service trade, connected with China; and prohibiting the export of relevant items to it.
  2. Investment. Restricting or prohibiting new investment by it within China.
  3. Entry. Restricting or prohibiting the entry of its relevant personnel and means of transport.
  4. Work and residence. Restricting or cancelling the work permits, stay or residence qualifications of its relevant personnel in China.
  5. Fine. Imposing a fine of an appropriate amount in accordance with law, according to the seriousness of the circumstances.
  6. Residual. Other necessary measures.

Read as a set, five of the six operate on eligibility. They remove or condition the ability to trade with China, to invest in China, to enter China, or to work and reside in China. Only the fifth is monetary, and the draft leaves its amount open. For a company whose business depends on a Chinese supply chain, a Chinese customer base or a Chinese technical team, the eligibility measures are the ones that matter: a restriction on new investment or on entry does not need a large number attached to it to change a business plan.

On the text as published, no entity is named and no listing mechanism is described. The measures are framed as powers that may be applied, not as a schedule of designations.

What the draft does not do

Three limits should be recorded before the text is read into a compliance programme.

It is not in force. A consultation draft has no legal effect. Nothing in it can be relied on as a basis for a decision, and any internal note should say so in terms.

It sets no amount. The reference to a fine of an appropriate amount is a reference to the applicable law and to the circumstances; the draft does not fix a figure, a range or a method. Any figure circulating in commentary is not from the text.

It does not replace the existing routes. The civil, administrative and criminal routes to trade secret infringement continue unchanged. A foreign entity that infringes a Chinese party’s trade secrets abroad remains exposed to those routes in the ordinary way, and a Chinese party that suffers the loss retains its claims.

What it means for foreign-invested companies in China

The direction of the draft points outward, at foreign entities acting abroad. A foreign-invested company operating in China is, in the ordinary case, a rights holder rather than an addressee. The practical relevance is indirect, and it runs through three points.

Departing employees. A researcher or engineer who leaves a Chinese subsidiary for a competitor, taking process documentation, formulation data or source code, is the classic fact pattern. It engages the Chinese trade secret rules directly, and it engages the group’s own compliance record: a group that cannot show what it protected, how it was protected and when access was withdrawn has a weak position both in the Chinese proceedings and in its own internal review.

Intra-group technical flows. Technical material moving between a Chinese entity and an overseas affiliate is often treated as internal and therefore unremarkable. It is not. The same file may be a trade secret, a technology whose export is restricted or prohibited, and personal data. A transfer file that records only the sender and the recipient is not enough; the record needs to show where the material came from, who authorised the transfer and what it is being used for.

Supply chain due diligence. Most groups already screen suppliers for export control exposure. The additional question is provenance of intellectual property: whether the supplier’s technology, tooling or design was lawfully obtained, from whom, and under what agreement. A supplier that cannot document provenance can transmit risk upstream, and the risk runs in both directions — a Chinese rights holder may claim against the group, and the group may find its own technology in a supplier’s product.

Preparing during the comment period

The comment period is the right time to do work that is useful whatever the final text says.

  • Audit the confidentiality architecture. Identify what the Chinese operation actually treats as a trade secret, and whether the classification is documented. Secrecy that exists only in a policy manual is difficult to prove.
  • Upgrade exit protocols. Return-of-material obligations, device imaging, access revocation on the last working day, and an exit interview record. These are the facts that decide a case two years later.
  • Map intra-group technical transfers. For each recurring flow, record source, authorisation and purpose, and check the export control position of the technology concerned before the next transfer.
  • Separate the three legal characters of a document. A technical file may need handling as a trade secret, as controlled technology and as personal data; one review that covers all three is cheaper than three.
  • Add an IP provenance line to supplier questionnaires. Ask for the origin of the technology, the licence chain and any restriction on further transfer.
  • Track the final text. The measures may change; the drafting of the fine provision and any procedural article are the parts to watch.

Outlook

A consultation draft is a statement of intent, and the gap between the draft and the final instrument is usually where the operative detail appears: the standard for identifying an entity, the procedure, and the relationship between these measures and the existing enforcement routes. Until the text is promulgated, the appropriate internal position is that the instrument is pending and that no decision should be built on it.

What can be said now is that the direction is consistent with a broader pattern: Chinese trade secret protection has been strengthened on the domestic side over several years, and the draft extends the frame to conduct outside the territory. For a group with technology in China, the useful response is not to speculate about the final text but to be able to demonstrate, with documents, where its technology came from and where it went.

Related reading

  • *China’s Five Export-Control Notices of 19 October 2026: A Supplier Screening Update* (Article 475) — the export control screening that the provenance review described above sits alongside.

Sources

  • Ministry of Commerce, Department of Treaty and Law — consultation page for the draft Special Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets: https://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/lfzqyj/art/2026/art_db6a858a9d4e4ec0a3dbeece659c324d.html
  • Ministry of Commerce — policy and regulation consultation column: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zqyj/zcfgzqyj/index.html
  • Ministry of Commerce — policy releases: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
  • The State Council of China — policy document library: https://www.gov.cn/

中国《保护中国商业秘密特别规定(征求意见稿)》:六类拟采取措施对外国实体意味着什么

概述

2026 年 10 月 26 日,商务部条法司公布《保护中国商业秘密特别规定(征求意见稿)》,公开征求意见。该文件是征求意见稿:尚未通过、尚未公布、尚未生效。反馈渠道为商务部网站公布的渠道,商务部政策法规征求意见栏目载有该文本。

这份稿子的内容范围很窄,也很具体。它针对的是在中国境外实施侵犯中国商业秘密行为的外国实体,并列出可对其采取的措施。它不是对境内商业秘密规则的重复表述,也不修改这些规则。

这份稿子在制度中的位置

中国对侵犯商业秘密行为已有若干条路径,每一条都作用于与中国有连接点(属地、属人、财产所在地等)的行为。《反不正当竞争法》经修订后自 2025 年 10 月 15 日起施行,禁止侵犯商业秘密,并提供民事与行政救济。《刑法》通过侵犯商业秘密罪处理情节严重的案件。技术出境另由技术进出口管理规则调整,通过禁止类、限制类技术目录以及许可、登记程序运行。数据出境则另有独立轨道。

这些路径在侵权人、侵权行为或财产位于中国境内时有效。征求意见稿针对的正是这些路径处理起来不顺畅的情形:行为由外国实体在境外实施,中国权利人有生效裁判或认定,但在境内可供执行的财产有限。这些措施最终是否这样使用,取决于正式文本与实务;征求意见稿本身只列出”可以做什么”。

六类拟采取措施

按公开征求意见的文本,可对外国实体采取以下措施中的一项或多项:

  1. 贸易。 限制或禁止其从事与中国有关的货物、技术进出口以及国际服务贸易活动;禁止向其出口相关物项。
  2. 投资。 限制或禁止其在中国境内新增投资。
  3. 入境。 限制或禁止其相关人员、交通运输工具等入境。
  4. 工作与居留。 限制或取消其相关人员在中国境内的工作许可、停留或者居留资格。
  5. 罚款。 根据情节轻重,依法给予相应数额的罚款。
  6. 兜底。 其他必要的措施。

作为一组来看,六类中有五类作用于”资格”。它们取消或限制与中国贸易、在中国投资、进入中国、在中国工作与居留的能力,或者为其附加条件。只有第五类是金钱性的,而征求意见稿对其数额留白。对业务依赖中国供应链、中国客户群或中国技术团队的公司而言,起决定作用的是资格类措施:限制新增投资或限制入境,不需要配上很大的数字,就足以改变一项商业计划。

就公开的文本而言,没有点名任何实体,也没有描述列名机制。这些措施被表述为”可以采取”的权力,而不是一份列名清单。

征求意见稿没有做什么

在把这份文本读进合规方案之前,有三点界限应当先记下来。

它尚未生效。 征求意见稿没有法律效力。其中任何内容都不能作为决策依据,内部备忘应当把这一点写明。

它没有设定数额。 “相应数额的罚款”指向的是适用法律与具体情节;征求意见稿没有固定金额、区间或计算方法。流传于评论中的任何数字都不是文本内容。

它不替代既有路径。 侵犯商业秘密的民事、行政与刑事路径照旧运行。在境外侵犯中国主体商业秘密的外国实体,仍按原有方式面对这些路径;受损害的中国主体也仍然保有相应请求权。

对在华外资企业意味着什么

征求意见稿的方向是向外的,指向在境外行事的外国实体。在华经营的外资企业,通常情况下是权利人而不是被采取措施的对象。其现实关联是间接的,落在三点上。

离职人员。 研发或工程人员带着工艺文档、配方数据或源代码离职加入竞争对手,是最典型的场景。它直接触发中国商业秘密规则,也触及集团自身的合规记录:一个无法说明保护了什么、如何保护、何时收回访问权限的集团,在中国程序中与在自身内部复盘中都处于弱势。

集团内部技术流转。 中国实体与境外关联方之间的技术资料流转,常被视为内部事项而不以为意。事实并非如此。同一份文件可能同时是商业秘密、属于限制或禁止出口的技术、以及个人信息。只记录发件人与收件人的传输档案不够;记录需要显示材料从何而来、由谁授权转移、用于何处。

供应链尽调。 多数集团已就出口管制风险筛查供应商。需要增加的问题是知识产权的来源:供应商的技术、工装或设计是否合法取得、从谁取得、依据何种协议。无法证明来源的供应商,会把风险向上游传导,而这一风险现在是双向的——中国权利人可能向集团主张,集团也可能在供应商的产品中发现自己的技术。

征求意见期内的准备工作

征求意见期适合做那些无论正式文本如何都有用的工作。

  • 梳理保密体系。 确认中国业务实际把什么当作商业秘密,这一分类是否有文档记录。只存在于制度手册里的”保密”,在举证时很难成立。
  • 升级离职流程。 资料返还义务、设备镜像、最后工作日的权限收回、离职面谈记录。这些正是两年后决定案件走向的事实。
  • 绘制集团内部技术转移图。 对每一类反复发生的流转,记录来源、授权与用途,并在下一次转移前核对相关技术的出口管制状态。
  • 区分一份文件的三种法律属性。 技术文件可能同时需要按商业秘密、按受管制技术和按个人信息处理;一次覆盖三项的审查,比三次分别做更省成本。
  • 在供应商问卷中增加知识产权来源一项。 询问技术来源、许可链条以及是否限制再转移。
  • 跟踪正式文本。 措施内容可能调整;罚款条款的写法以及任何程序性条款是值得关注的部分。

展望

征求意见稿是意向的表达,而草案与正式文件之间的差距,通常正是可操作细节出现的地方:认定实体的标准、程序,以及这些措施与既有执法路径之间的关系。在文本正式公布之前,恰当的内部立场是:该文件尚在制定过程中,不应据此作出任何决定。

现在可以确定的是,方向与一个更大的趋势一致:中国在境内一侧对商业秘密的保护已持续强化数年,征求意见稿把视野延伸到境外行为。对在中国拥有技术的集团而言,有用的应对不是猜测正式文本,而是能够用文件证明:技术从何而来,又去了哪里。

延伸阅读

  • 《2026 年 10 月 19 日五份出口管制公告:供应商筛查更新》(第 475 篇)——与上述来源审查并行的那套出口管制筛查。

来源

  • 商务部条法司·《保护中国商业秘密特别规定(征求意见稿)》公开征求意见页面:https://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/lfzqyj/art/2026/art_db6a858a9d4e4ec0a3dbeece659c324d.html
  • 商务部·政策法规征求意见栏目:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zqyj/zcfgzqyj/index.html
  • 商务部·政策发布:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网·政策文件库:https://www.gov.cn/

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China

  • The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items has applied since 1 December 2024 and provides the framework for licensing, declaration and compliance in this area.
    《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》自2024年12月1日起施行,为这一领域的许可、申报与合规提供了制度框架。
  • GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption.
    海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。
  • Licences for controlled items are applied for through MOFCOM’s unified business system, with technical descriptions and end-user certificates submitted and a review period of 45 working days; the customs declaration remarks column must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the control code.
    出口管制物项许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请,须提交技术说明、最终用户证明等材料,审查期限为45个工作日;报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写管制编码。
  • On 29 June 2026 MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities in the export-control control list, prohibiting export operators from exporting dual-use items to them and prohibiting foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them.
    2026年6月29日,商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单,禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。
  • Unreliable Entity List announcement No. 10 of 2025 listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches, with measures covering China-related import-export activity, new investment in China, and transactions or cooperation by organisations and individuals in China.
    不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单,措施涉及与中国有关的进出口活动、在华新增投资,以及中国境内组织和个人与其进行的交易与合作。
  • On 24 April 2026 seven EU entities were listed; the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, that the measures concern only dual-use items and do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about.
    2026年4月24日发布将7家欧盟实体列名;商务部新闻发言人表示,列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。
  • For buyers in China, screening should run on four dimensions — the control list, end-use, technical parameters and the customer’s ultimate use — with machine-tool control codes such as 2B201 as a worked example.
    对中国境内的采购方而言,筛查应从四个维度展开——对照管制清单、分析用途属性、审查技术参数、确认客户及最终用途——并以2B201类数控机床等管制编码为实操示例。

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China | 出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

Overview

China’s export-control regime rests on a defined legal framework and a set of official listing and declaration procedures. For foreign-invested enterprises that buy, resell or re-export controlled goods in China, the practical task is not to interpret policy intent but to run a reliable screening and licensing process. This guide sets out the framework, the declaration and licensing mechanics, the recent listing actions announced by the Ministry of Commerce, and a four-dimension screening method that procurement and compliance teams can apply.

The tone throughout is deliberately procedural: the measures are described as they are published — by reference to the applicable laws and regulations, and to the stated purpose of safeguarding national security and interests and fulfilling non-proliferation and other international obligations.

The legal framework

The cornerstone is the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, which has applied since 1 December 2024. It sits alongside the Export Control Law and the rules governing the Unreliable Entity List. Together they define which items are controlled, how exports are licensed, and what obligations attach to entities that are listed.

At the border, GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption. In other words, the channel a shipment travels through does not change the declaration obligation: the same control requirements apply to a conventional container, an express parcel and a cross-border e-commerce consignment.

Declaration and licensing mechanics

For controlled items, a licence is obtained through MOFCOM’s unified business system platform. The applicant submits supporting materials including a technical description and an end-user certificate, and the review period is 45 working days. Once a licence is in hand, the declaration stage carries its own requirement: the remarks column of the customs declaration must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the applicable control code. Getting the code right is what allows the declaration to be processed as a controlled shipment rather than as ordinary cargo.

For procurement and logistics teams, the sequence is therefore: screen the item and the counterparty, apply for the licence in good time, and make sure the customs broker carries the control marking and code into the declaration. The 45-working-day review period is the planning constraint that most often catches companies out when they treat a controlled item like a routine purchase.

Recent listing actions

Several listing actions published by MOFCOM in 2026 and late 2025 are relevant to supply-chain screening.

Export-control control list — 20 Japanese entities (29 June 2026). MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities assessed as participating in enhancing Japan’s military strength. The measures prohibit export operators from exporting dual-use items to those entities, and prohibit foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in the People’s Republic of China to them. Related activities already under way are to be stopped immediately; where an export is genuinely necessary in special circumstances, the export operator is to apply to MOFCOM. The announcement took effect on the date of publication.

Unreliable Entity List — announcement No. 10 of 2025. This listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches. The measures prohibit those entities from engaging in China-related import-export activities, prohibit them from making new investment in China, and prohibit organisations and individuals in China from conducting related transactions or cooperation with them — in particular transmitting data or providing sensitive information to them.

Export-control control list — seven EU entities (24 April 2026). In its published question-and-answer, the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action under law targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, and that the measures concern only dual-use items, do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about. Before the measures were announced, China had notified the European side through the bilateral export-control dialogue mechanism.

The screening method in practice

A workable screening process runs on four dimensions:

  1. Check the control list. Compare the item against the *Catalogue of Dual-Use Items and Technologies Subject to Import and Export Licence Administration*, verifying the model and performance parameters rather than relying on a generic product name.
  2. Analyse the end-use attribute. Assess whether the item could be used in military or weapons-of-mass-destruction-related fields.
  3. Review technical parameters. Precision, speed and power are the usual triggers — for example, high-precision five-axis machining centres.
  4. Confirm the customer and the ultimate use. Establish who the end user is and what the goods will actually be used for.

Machine tools offer a concrete illustration. Control code 2B201 covers numerically controlled machine tools including lathes, milling machines, grinding machines, multi-axis machining centres and roll-forming machine tools. Indicative parameters include: a lathe with a machining diameter greater than 35 mm and a positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm; a milling machine with positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm, or two or more contouring rotary axes, or five or more simultaneous axes; and a grinding machine with positioning accuracy of less than 4 μm. These thresholds are why screening by product category alone is unreliable — the same broad category can be controlled or uncontrolled depending on its specifications.

What this means for foreign-invested buyers

  • Screen before you commit. Run the four-dimension check at the sourcing and contracting stage, not at the declaration desk, so that a control finding does not derail a shipment already in motion.
  • Budget for the licence timeline. The 45-working-day review is a planning assumption, not a formality; build it into procurement lead times for controlled items.
  • Mind the counterparty. Listing measures can prohibit transactions and cooperation, not merely the physical export of goods; check counterparties against the relevant lists before onboarding.
  • Keep the reassurance in view. The official position is that measures of this kind target specific dual-use items and specific listed entities, and do not affect normal commercial dealings; the published Q&A on the EU listing states plainly that law-abiding entities have nothing to worry about.
  • Document everything. Technical descriptions, end-user certificates and the correct control code on the declaration are the evidence base that makes a compliant shipment defensible.

Sources

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

概述

中国的出口管制制度建立在明确的法律框架与一套官方的列名、申报程序之上。对在中国境内采购、转售或再出口受管制货物的外资企业而言,实务任务并非解读政策意图,而是运行一套可靠的筛查与许可流程。本文梳理制度框架、申报与许可操作机制、商务部近期公布的列名措施,以及采购与合规团队可以直接套用的四维度筛查方法。

全文基调刻意保持程序化:各项措施均按其公布时的表述呈现——依据相关法律法规有关规定,并出于维护国家安全和利益、履行防扩散等国际义务的既定目的。

法律框架

制度基石是《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》,自2024年12月1日起施行。它与《出口管制法》以及不可靠实体清单相关规定共同构成体系,界定了哪些物项受管制、出口如何取得许可,以及被列名实体承担何种义务。

在口岸环节,海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。换言之,货物走哪条通道并不改变申报义务:同一套管制要求,既适用于常规集装箱,也适用于快件包裹与跨境电商件。

申报与许可操作机制

对受管制物项,许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请。申请人须提交包括技术说明和最终用户证明在内的材料,审查期限为45个工作日。取得许可证后,申报环节另有要求:报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写适用的管制编码。编码填对,申报才能作为受管制货物而非普通货物被处理。

对采购与物流团队而言,顺序因此是:筛查物项与交易对手,及时申请许可证,并确保报关代理把管制标注与编码带入申报。当企业把受管制物项当作常规采购处理时,45个工作日的审查期往往是最容易被打乱的计划约束。

近期列名措施

商务部在2026年及2025年末公布的多项列名措施,与供应链筛查相关。

出口管制管控名单——20家日本实体(2026年6月29日)。 商务部将参与提升日本军事实力的20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单。措施包括禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。正在开展的相关活动应当立即停止;特殊情况下确需出口的,出口经营者应当向商务部提出申请。本公告自公布之日起正式实施。

不可靠实体清单——2025年第10号公告。 该公告将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单。措施包括禁止上述实体从事与中国有关的进出口活动,禁止上述实体在中国境内新增投资,以及禁止中国境内的组织、个人与上述实体进行有关交易、合作等活动——特别是向上述实体传输数据、提供敏感信息。

出口管制管控名单——7家欧盟实体(2026年4月24日)。 在公布的答记者问中,商务部新闻发言人表示,依法列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。措施公布前,中方已通过双边出口管制对话机制向欧方通报有关情况。

实操中的筛查方法

一套可落地的筛查流程从四个维度展开:

  1. 对照管制清单。 将物项与《两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录》比对,核查型号与性能参数,而不是依赖笼统的产品名称。
  2. 分析用途属性。 评估该物项是否可能用于军事或大规模杀伤性武器相关领域。
  3. 审查技术参数。 精度、速度、功率通常是触发点——例如高精度五轴联动加工中心。
  4. 确认客户及最终用途。 弄清最终用户是谁、货物实际用于何处。

机床是一个具体例证。管制编码2B201涵盖数控机床,包括车床、铣床、磨床、多轴加工中心、滚压成形机床等。判定参数示例包括:车床加工直径大于35毫米且定位精度小于6微米;铣床定位精度小于6微米,或具有2个以上成形旋转轴,或5轴及以上联动;磨床定位精度小于4微米。这些阈值正是”仅按产品大类筛查”不可靠的原因——同一大类,规格不同,受管制与否也不同。

对在华外资采购方的含义

  • 先筛查、后承诺。 在寻源与签约阶段就完成四维度核查,而不是等到报关台前,以免管制结论打乱已在途的货物。
  • 为许可时限留出预算。 45个工作日审查期是计划假设,不是形式;受管制物项的采购提前期应把它计入。
  • 关注交易对手。 列名措施可能禁止交易与合作,而不只是禁止货物的物理出口;在准入新交易对手前,应对照相关名单核查。
  • 把握免责口径。 官方立场是:此类措施针对特定两用物项与特定列名实体,不影响正常商业往来;关于欧盟列名的公开答记者问明确表示,诚信守法实体完全无需担心。
  • 做好留档。 技术说明、最终用户证明,以及报关单上正确的管制编码,是让一票合规货物站得住脚的证据基础。

来源

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: September 2026 Filing Practice and Local Support Mechanisms

  • On 14 September 2026, the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone Zhengding Area released a Filing Guide for Foreign-Investment Security Review that establishes a four-tier process: enterprise filing, zone service, hierarchical verification, and national final review.
    2026 年 9 月 14 日,中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区发布《外商投资安全审查申报指引》,确立”企业申报、片区服务、逐级核验、国家终审”四级流程。
  • The guide creates a “foreign-investment security-review service officer” system and a dedicated “security-review service window” (co-located with the foreign-investor complaint office); the investment-service bureau gives a preliminary assessment feedback within five working days of receiving an enquiry or initial materials.
    指引建立”外商投资安全审查服务官”制度与”安全审查服务专窗”(与外商投诉服务办公室合署);投资服务局在收到咨询或初步材料后 5 个工作日内给予初步研判反馈。
  • The filing basis is the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations, together with the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020). This article covers the service mechanism and recent practice, not the thresholds and timelines already detailed in the site’s general security-review guide.
    申报依据为《外商投资法》及其实施条例,以及《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号)。本文聚焦申报服务机制与近期实操口径,不重复站内安全审查总论已详述的门槛与时限。
  • A publicly documented case — the 27 April 2026 prohibition decision by the foreign-investment security-review working mechanism office (housed at the NDRC) on the foreign acquisition of the Manus project — illustrates the review’s scope and the “substance-over-form” piercing principle.
    一例公开案件——2026 年 4 月 27 日外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(设在国家发展改革委)就外资收购 Manus 项目作出的禁止投资决定——体现了审查范围与”实质重于形式”的穿透原则。
  • Outcomes fall into three categories — approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition — and non-compliance can lead to orders to divest equity or assets, restoration of the pre-investment state, and adverse credit records.
    审查结论分三类——通过、附条件通过、禁止投资——违规可能导致限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态及不良信用记录。
  • Practical readiness means using pre-filing consultation, preparing materials early, leveraging local coaching and pre-review, embedding conditions precedent in deal documents, and budgeting realistic timeline expectations.
    实操准备意味着善用申报前咨询、尽早备齐材料、借力地方辅导与预审、在交易文件中嵌入先决条件,并对时间轴作出务实预期。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: September 2026 Filing Practice and Local Support Mechanisms | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年 9 月申报实操与地方服务机制

Overview

China’s foreign-investment security review is the gate that no sizeable inbound transaction can structure around. The operative rules — the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020, effective January 2021) — set the reporting scope, the two-stage review timeline and the three possible outcomes. Those structural elements are set out in our general security-review guide and are not repeated here.

This article instead focuses on two developments from 2026 that change how foreign investors actually experience the filing: a concrete local filing-support mechanism published by the Zhengding pilot zone in September 2026, and a publicly documented prohibition decision that clarifies the review’s reach. The emphasis throughout is practical — how to engage the system efficiently and what to build into a transaction’s documentation.

The Zhengding pilot-zone filing guide (14 September 2026)

On 14 September 2026, the Management Committee of the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone Zhengding Area published the *Filing Guide for Foreign-Investment Security Review in the Zhengding Area*. The guide’s stated purpose is to implement the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations and the Security Review Measures, to standardise security-review filing within the zone, and to facilitate enterprises’ compliant filing while preventing and resolving national-security risks in the foreign-investment field.

Basis and scope. The guide cites as its basis: the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations; the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37); the Overall Plan for the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone and related strategic upgrading documents; and the zone’s own implementation plans for aligning with international high-standard economic and trade rules and strengthening the security-review mechanism. It applies to foreign investors and relevant domestic parties within the zone whose investment falls within the scope of the Security Review Measures and requires filing with the national security-review working-mechanism office.

The four-tier principle. The guide organises the review work around the principle of “enterprise filing, zone service, hierarchical verification, and national final review.” The first two tiers are described in operational detail:

  1. *Zone coaching and pre-review.* The zone’s Investment Service Bureau acts as the lead service department. It establishes a “foreign-investment security-review service officer” system to provide guidance to key enterprises, and sets up a dedicated “security-review service window” (co-located with the zone’s foreign-investor complaint office) offering policy consultation, materials pre-review and process guidance as a one-stop service. Upon receiving an enterprise’s enquiry or initial materials, the Investment Service Bureau gives a preliminary assessment feedback within five working days and coaches the enterprise to complete its filing materials.
  2. *Municipal preliminary compliance verification.* The enterprise submits the complete filing materials to the municipal-level competent departments — the Shijiazhuang Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal Commerce Bureau. Those departments perform a preliminary compliance verification of the completeness and standardisation of the materials.

The upper tiers — hierarchical verification and national final review — follow the working-mechanism office’s statutory process under Order No. 37. The guide’s contribution is to make the local front-end service explicit and time-bound, so that enterprises in the zone have a named contact and a defined feedback clock before materials reach the national office.

A documented prohibition decision: the Manus project

The reach of the security review is illustrated by a publicly documented case. On 27 April 2026, the foreign-investment security-review working-mechanism office (housed at the National Development and Reform Commission) issued, in accordance with laws and regulations, a decision prohibiting foreign investment in the acquisition of the Manus project and ordered the parties to revoke the acquisition transaction. The decision was published on the NDRC government-information-disclosure page.

Two points from this case are relevant to transaction planning. First, the review scope explicitly covers important information-technology and internet products and services, as well as key technologies — sectors that frequently sit at the centre of cross-border technology and AI deals. Second, the case reflects the “substance-over-form” piercing principle: a transaction structured so that the underlying assets, technology or data originate within China may still fall within the review’s jurisdiction regardless of where the entities are incorporated. The working-mechanism office’s decision is a final decision under the Foreign Investment Law, and the three possible outcomes of any review are approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition.

This article states the case as a matter of public record and does not attach any value judgement to the parties or the commercial context. The point for practitioners is operational: the security-review gate applies to sensitive-sector control transactions wherever they are booked, and the piercing principle means entity location is not a reliable shield.

Practical filing playbook

1. Use pre-filing consultation early. The Security Review Measures expressly permit parties to consult the working-mechanism office before filing. For borderline transactions, this consultation should happen during structuring, not after a term sheet is signed.

2. Prepare the core materials. A filing requires a filing statement, an investment plan, a statement on whether the investment affects national security, and any other materials the office prescribes. The filing statement should set out the foreign investor’s name, domicile, business scope and the basic facts of the investment. Build the national-security-impact statement during due diligence, not at closing.

3. Leverage local coaching and pre-review. Where a zone such as Zhengding offers a service-officer system and a dedicated window with a five-working-day feedback clock, use it to de-risk the materials before they reach the municipal and national levels. Local pre-review reduces the risk of a defective filing that triggers delays.

4. Budget the timeline realistically. Under Order No. 37, the office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; a general review completes within 30 working days; a special review within 60 working days (extendable in exceptional cases). The investment may not be implemented during the review. Treat these as hard clocks when sequencing a deal.

5. Embed conditions precedent in deal documents. Where a sector is sensitive but potentially approvable, anticipate conditional approval and embed the necessary regulatory filings — including the security review — as conditions precedent to closing, with clear long-stop dates and termination rights.

6. Respect the consequences of non-compliance. Failing to file an in-scope investment, providing false materials, or breaching attached conditions can lead to orders to file, to divest equity or assets, to restore the pre-investment state, and to recording in the national credit-information system with joint disciplinary measures. These outcomes are enforceable and should be reflected in the deal’s risk allocation.

Related reading

  • Our general security-review guide, which details the reporting scope, the control definition, the statutory timeline and the outcomes.
  • The Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.

Sources

  • 中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》(2026-09-14):http://www.sjzzhbsq.gov.cn/columns/dc61a0a4-dd22-4dbc-a012-78b211e02b06/202609/14/d703655c-31b8-4189-ad9b-8e545f1cf4f0.html
  • 国家发展改革委政府信息公开《外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对外资收购 Manus 项目作出安全审查决定》(2026-04-27):https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?from=qcc&id=20623
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网《外商投资安全审查办法》(国务院公报):https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5582626.htm
  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年 9 月申报实操与地方服务机制

概述

中国外商投资安全审查是任何规模化入境交易都无法绕开的闸门。现行操作规则——《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)——界定了申报范围、两阶段审查时限与三类审查结论。这些结构性要素已在本站点安全审查总论中详述,此处不再重复。

本文转而聚焦 2026 年改变外资实际申报体验的两项进展:正定片区于 2026 年 9 月发布的具体地方申报服务机制,以及一例厘清审查辐射范围的公开禁止投资决定。全文贯穿实操导向——如何高效对接制度,以及应在交易文件中嵌入什么。

正定片区申报指引(2026 年 9 月 14 日)

2026 年 9 月 14 日,中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会发布《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》。指引载明的目的,是落实《外商投资法》及其实施条例与《外商投资安全审查办法》,规范片区内外商投资安全审查申报工作,便利和服务片区内外商投资企业依法依规办理安全审查申报,切实防范化解外商投资领域国家安全风险。

依据与范围。 指引列明的制定依据包括:《中华人民共和国外商投资法》及其实施条例;《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号);《中国(河北)自由贸易试验区总体方案》及相关战略提升文件;正定片区关于对接国际高标准经贸规则、强化安全审查机制的相关实施方案。指引适用于片区内投资行为属于《外商投资安全审查办法》规定范围、需向国家外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室申报安全审查的外国投资者及境内相关主体。

四级原则。 指引围绕”企业申报、片区服务、逐级核验、国家终审”的原则组织审查工作,并对前两级作出操作层面的细致描述:

  1. 片区辅导与预审。 正定片区投资服务局作为牵头服务部门,建立”外商投资安全审查服务官”制度,为重点企业提供指导服务;设立”安全审查服务专窗”(与正定片区外商投诉服务办公室合署办公),提供政策咨询、材料预审、流程指引等”一站式”服务。投资服务局在收到企业咨询或初步材料后,5 个工作日内给予初步研判反馈,辅导企业完善申报材料。
  2. 市级初步合规核验。 企业将完备的申报材料提交至石家庄市发展改革委、市商务局等市级主管部门。市级主管部门负责对申报材料的完整性、规范性进行初步合规核验。

更上级的逐级核验与国家终审,依第 37 号令下工作机制办公室的法定程序推进。指引的贡献在于,将地方前端服务明确化、时限化,使片区企业在材料送达国家办公室之前,即有具名对接人与明确的反馈时钟。

一例公开的禁止投资决定:Manus 项目

审查的辐射范围可由一例公开案件说明。2026 年 4 月 27 日,外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(设在国家发展改革委)依法依规对外资收购 Manus 项目作出禁止投资决定,要求当事人撤销该收购交易。该决定已在国家发展改革委政府信息公开页发布。

本案有两点与交易规划相关。其一,审查范围明确覆盖重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务,以及关键技术——这类领域常处于跨境科技与人工智能交易的核心。其二,本案体现”实质重于形式”的穿透原则:一项交易即便实体注册在境外,只要其底层资产、技术或数据源自中国境内,仍可能落入审查管辖。工作机制办公室的决定依《外商投资法》为最终决定,任何审查的结论均为三类之一:通过、附条件通过、禁止投资。

本文仅将本案作为公开记录陈述,不对当事人或商业背景作任何价值判断。对实务者的操作意义在于:安全审查闸门适用于敏感行业控制权交易,无论交易在何处记账;穿透原则意味着注册地并非可靠的规避屏障。

申报实操手册

1. 尽早善用申报前咨询。 《外商投资安全审查办法》明确允许当事人在申报前就有关问题向工作机制办公室咨询。对边界交易,咨询应在结构设计阶段进行,而非签署条款清单之后。

2. 备齐核心材料。 申报须提交申报书、投资方案、外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明,以及工作机制办公室规定的其他材料。申报书应载明外国投资者的名称、住所、经营范围与投资基本情况。国家安全影响说明应在尽调期间起草,而非交割阶段补做。

3. 借力地方辅导与预审。 在设有服务官制度与具名专窗(如正定片区 5 个工作日反馈时钟)的片区,应善用其于材料送达市、国家层级前完成风险前置化解。地方预审可降低因材料瑕疵引发延误的风险。

4. 对时间轴作出务实预期。 依第 37 号令,办公室自收到完备材料起 15 个工作日内决定是否需审查;一般审查 30 个工作日内完成;特别审查 60 个工作日内完成(特殊情况可延长)。审查期间不得实施投资。安排交易顺序时,应将上述时限视为硬性时钟。

5. 在交易文件中嵌入先决条件。 对敏感但可能获批的行业,预判附条件通过,将包括安全审查在内的必要监管申报设为交割先决条件,并设定明确的截止日期与终止权。

6. 尊重违规后果。 属于申报范围而未申报、提供虚假材料或违反附加条件,可能导致责令限期申报、限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入国家信用信息系统实施联合惩戒。这些后果可强制执行,应在交易的风险分配中予以体现。

相关阅读

  • 本站点安全审查总论,详述申报范围、控制权定义、法定时限与审查结论。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号),现行操作规章。
  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。

来源

  • 中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》(2026-09-14):http://www.sjzzhbsq.gov.cn/columns/dc61a0a4-dd22-4dbc-a012-78b211e02b06/202609/14/d703655c-31b8-4189-ad9b-8e545f1cf4f0.html
  • 国家发展改革委政府信息公开《外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对外资收购 Manus 项目作出安全审查决定》(2026-04-27):https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?from=qcc&id=20623
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网《外商投资安全审查办法》(国务院公报):https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5582626.htm
  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide

  • China’s foreign-investment security review, governed by the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37, effective January 2021), applies to investments in defence-related fields and to investments that would give a foreign investor control over enterprises in ten categories of important sectors.
    中国外商投资安全审查制度以《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)为依据,适用于国防领域投资,以及将使外国投资者取得十类重要领域企业实际控制权的投资。
  • The review is mandatory-before-investment: parties must file before implementing an investment falling within the reporting scope, and the working mechanism may demand filing even where the investor has not self-reported.
    安全审查是”投资前强制”程序:属于申报范围的投资须在实施前申报,未自行申报的,工作机制办公室有权要求当事人申报。
  • The procedural timeline is predictable: a decision on whether security review is needed within 15 working days, a general review within 30 working days, and a special review within 60 working days, with investments on hold throughout.
    程序时限明确:是否启动安全审查的决定 15 个工作日内作出,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成,特别审查 60 个工作日内完成,审查期间当事人不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are final and enforceable: approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition; violations can result in orders to divest or restore the pre-investment state, plus adverse credit records.
    审查决定为最终决定且可强制执行:通过、附条件通过或禁止投资;违规后果包括限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入不良信用记录。
  • In the 2026 policy context, the authorities are simultaneously facilitating foreign M&A and data flows while maintaining the security-review gate, so transaction planning should run security-review screening in parallel with merger-control and negative-list checks.
    2026 年政策背景下,主管部门在便利外资并购与数据跨境流动的同时维持安全审查闸门,交易规划应将安全审查筛查与经营者集中、负面清单核查并行推进。
  • Practical steps: screen the target sector and the control threshold early, use the pre-filing consultation mechanism, and document the national-security-impact analysis thoroughly before signing binding agreements.
    实操要点:尽早筛查标的行业与控制权门槛,善用申报前咨询机制,并在签署约束性协议前完成影响国家安全的说明文件。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

Overview

Foreign investment security review is one of the three pillars of China’s foreign-investment management system under the Foreign Investment Law, alongside the negative-list regime and the information-reporting regime. The operative rules are the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (《外商投资安全审查办法》), jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce as Order No. 37 of 2020 and effective since 18 January 2021.

The regime’s design is deliberately gate-like rather than discretionary. The Measures define a reporting scope, set out a two-stage review process with fixed deadlines, and give the review decisions — approval, conditional approval or prohibition — the status of final decisions under the Foreign Investment Law. In the 2026 policy environment, where the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” is simultaneously easing foreign M&A procedures and data-crossing rules, the security review remains the one filter that foreign investors cannot structure around. Understanding its triggers and timeline is therefore a prerequisite for any sizeable inbound transaction.

Who must file and when

The reporting scope covers two categories. First, investments in defence-related fields: investment in the military industry and its supporting industries, and investment in the vicinity of military facilities and military-industrial facilities. Second, investments in ten categories of important sectors — important agricultural products, important energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies, and other important fields — where the investor would obtain actual control of the target enterprise.

“Actual control” is defined broadly and includes holding 50% or more of the equity; holding less than 50% but having voting power that can materially influence the resolutions of the board, shareholders’ meeting or general meeting; or any other situation where the foreign investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. This broad control definition means that some non-majority, governance-heavy structures may still trigger the filing duty.

Filing is required before the investment is implemented. The foreign investor or the domestic party (together, “the parties”) must proactively file with the working mechanism’s office before implementation. Even where the parties have not self-reported, the office may require filing if the investment falls within the reporting scope. The practical message for deal teams: treat the security-review screening as a mandatory checklist item before signing definitive agreements, not as an afterthought discovered during closing.

The process and timeline

The process has a predictable rhythm. Within 15 working days of receiving a complete filing, the working mechanism’s office decides whether a security review is needed and notifies the parties in writing. If no review is needed, the investment may proceed. If a review is needed, the office must complete the general review within 30 working days. Where the general review finds that the investment affects or may affect national security, a special review is launched, to be completed within 60 working days, extendable in exceptional circumstances. Throughout the review period, the parties may not implement the investment.

The system also contains relief valves. During the review, the parties may modify the investment plan — in which case the review clock restarts from receipt of the revised plan — or withdraw the investment, which terminates the review. Before filing, the parties may consult the working mechanism’s office on questions about the transaction. And a change to the investment plan after approval, where the change affects or may affect national security, requires re-filing.

Outcomes and consequences

The review can end in approval (the investment may proceed), conditional approval (the investment may proceed subject to conditions that the parties have committed to in writing), or prohibition (the investment may not be implemented; if already implemented, the parties must divest or take other measures to restore the pre-investment state). Decisions are final under Article 35 of the Foreign Investment Law.

Enforcement is multi-layered. The working mechanism’s office, together with relevant departments and local governments, supervises implementation; for conditional approvals, it can require evidence and conduct on-site inspections. Non-compliance carries escalating consequences: failing to file an in-scope investment leads to an order to file within a deadline and, if refused, an order to divest; providing false materials or concealing information can lead to revocation of the approval and restoration of the pre-investment state; violating conditions triggers a correction order and, if refused, divestment. Violations are recorded in the national credit information system with joint disciplinary measures.

2026 interaction with the facilitation agenda

The security review does not exist in a vacuum. In June 2026, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promised to accelerate the revision of the foreign M&A rules, allow eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in listed-company issuances, and streamline data-outbound flows through negative lists in pilot zones. None of these changes touches the security-review gate; if anything, the simultaneous easing of entry and tightening of control screens makes it more important to run security-review screening in parallel with merger-concentration filings and negative-list checks.

Foreign investors should also note the international context is one of converging practice: major economies all operate equivalent review regimes, and China’s framework mirrors this global trend of gatekeeping foreign investment in sensitive sectors. The compliance posture — early screening, thorough documentation, and timely filing — is the same that prudent investors apply in any jurisdiction with a mandatory review regime.

Practical checklist for inbound transactions

  1. Screen the sector and control threshold early. Map the target against the defence-related categories and the ten important-sector categories, and assess whether the post-investment control structure meets the actual-control definitions.
  2. Use the pre-filing consultation. The Measures expressly allow parties to consult the working mechanism’s office before filing; use this for borderline transactions.
  3. Prepare the national-security-impact analysis. The filing requires a statement on whether the investment affects national security; build this document during due diligence, not during closing.
  4. Run parallel screenings. Coordinate the security-review timeline with merger-concentration filing and negative-list clearance; the review stays on hold while other approvals proceed.
  5. Build in condition-readiness. For sensitive but approvable deals, anticipate conditional approval and prepare to comply with attached conditions, including evidence production and on-site inspections.

Related reading

  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.
  • The Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), which sets the facilitation context around the review gate.

Sources

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》: https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》: https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目: https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

概述

外商投资安全审查是《外商投资法》确立的外商投资管理制度三大支柱之一,与负面清单管理和信息报告制度并列。现行操作规则是《外商投资安全审查办法》,由国家发展改革委、商务部以 2020 年第 37 号令联合发布,自 2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行。

该制度的运行设计刻意采用”闸门式”而非自由裁量式:办法界定申报范围,设定两阶段审查流程和固定时限,并依《外商投资法》赋予审查决定——通过、附条件通过或禁止投资——最终决定地位。在 2026 年的政策环境下,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》同时放宽外资并购程序和数据跨境规则,但安全审查仍是外国投资者无法绕开的唯一过滤环节。因此,理解其触发条件与时限,是任何规模化入境交易的先决条件。

谁须申报、何时申报

申报范围涵盖两类。第一类,国防领域投资:投资军工、军工配套等关系国防安全的领域,以及在军事设施和军工设施周边地域投资。第二类,投资十类重要领域——重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术以及其他重要领域——并取得所投资企业实际控制权。

“实际控制权”的定义宽泛,包括持有企业 50% 以上股权;持股不足 50% 但其表决权能够对董事会、股东会或股东大会决议产生重大影响;以及其他能够对企业经营决策、人事、财务、技术等产生重大影响的情形。这一宽泛的控制权定义意味着,部分非控股但治理权重大的架构仍可能触发申报义务。

申报须在投资实施前完成。外国投资者或境内相关当事人(合称”当事人”)应在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报。即使当事人未自行申报,若投资属于申报范围,工作机制办公室也有权要求申报。对交易团队而言,实务提示是:把安全审查筛查作为签署确定性协议前的强制清单项,而非交割期间才发现的疏漏。

流程与时限

流程节奏清晰可预期。收到符合要求的申报材料后 15 个工作日内,工作机制办公室决定是否需要安全审查并书面通知当事人。无需审查的,投资即可实施;需要审查的,一般审查须在 30 个工作日内完成。一般审查认定投资影响或可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,须在 60 个工作日内完成,特殊情况下可延长。审查期间,当事人不得实施投资。

制度也包含疏导阀门。审查期间,当事人可以修改投资方案——此时审查期限自收到修改后方案之日起重新计算——或撤销投资,从而终止审查。申报前,当事人可以就交易问题向工作机制办公室咨询。审查通过后变更投资方案、影响或可能影响国家安全的,须重新申报。

决定与后果

审查结果有三种:通过(投资可以实施)、附条件通过(按当事人书面承诺的附加条件实施投资)、禁止投资(不得实施;已实施的须限期处分股权或资产等,恢复投资前状态)。依《外商投资法》第三十五条,审查决定为最终决定。

执行是多层次的。工作机制办公室会同有关部门、地方人民政府监督实施;对附条件通过的投资,可要求提供证明材料、开展现场检查核实条件落实情况。违规后果逐级加重:属于申报范围而未申报即实施的,责令限期申报,拒不申报的责令限期处分股权或资产;提供虚假材料或隐瞒信息的,撤销决定、恢复投资前状态;未按附加条件实施的,责令改正,拒不改正的责令处分。违规情形记入国家信用信息系统并实施联合惩戒。

与 2026 年便利化议程的互动

安全审查并非孤立存在。2026 年 6 月,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订外资并购规定、允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与上市公司发行、通过试点负面清单简化数据出境。这些变化均不触动安全审查闸门;恰恰相反,准入门槛的放宽与管控筛网的收紧并行,使得交易方更有必要将安全审查筛查与经营者集中申报、负面清单核查并行推进。

外国投资者也应注意到国际背景是实践趋同:主要经济体均运行同等审查机制,中国的框架与全球对敏感领域外资把关的趋势一致。合规姿态——尽早筛查、充分留档、及时申报——与审慎投资者在任何实行强制审查机制的法域采取的做法相同。

入境交易实操清单

  1. 尽早筛查行业与控制权门槛。将标的对照国防类与十类重要领域清单,评估投资后控制结构是否落入实际控制权定义。
  2. 善用申报前咨询。办法明确允许当事人在申报前向工作机制办公室咨询,边界交易应优先使用。
  3. 准备国家安全影响说明。申报须提交外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明;这份文件应在尽调期间起草,而非交割期间补做。
  4. 并行推进各项筛查。将安全审查时限与经营者集中申报、负面清单合规协调安排;其他审批推进期间审查保持冻结。
  5. 预置条件应对能力。对敏感但可获批的交易,预判附条件通过,并准备履行附加条件,包括提供证明材料与接受现场检查。

相关阅读

  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(2020 年第 37 号令),现行操作规章。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),构成审查闸门周边的便利化背景。

来源

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》:https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》:https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目:https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

Investment and Data Security Review in China: The 2026 Compliance Matrix

  • The CAC’s Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Internet Enterprises (2026-2030), issued on 21 August 2026, commits to efficient implementation of data-export security assessments, standard contracts and certification, and to FTZ data-export negative lists and cross-border data service centres.
    中央网信办 2026 年 8 月 21 日印发《促进网信企业高质量发展行动计划(2026-2030 年)》,承诺高效实施数据出境安全评估、个人信息出境标准合同、个人信息出境认证等制度,支持自贸区发布数据出境负面清单、设立数据跨境服务中心。
  • The first batch of data-export security assessment results, mostly issued in 2023, are expiring in 2026: extensions must be requested within 60 working days before expiry, meeting six conditions including a cap of 20% growth over three years.
    首批数据出境安全评估结果(多在 2023 年出具)2026 年集中到期:须在有效期届满前 60 个工作日内申请延期,同时满足六项条件(含未来三年出境数量增幅不超过原准予数量的 20%)。
  • Foreign investment security review is controller-piercing and substance-over-form: the April 2026 prohibition of a foreign takeover of a Chinese-founded AI company illustrates that review extends to indirect transactions over Chinese-controlled assets.
    外商投资安全审查遵循穿透式、”实质重于形式”原则:2026 年 4 月对一起收购中国背景 AI 公司交易的禁止投资决定显示,审查延伸到涉及中国控制资产的间接交易。
  • Under the Foreign Investment Security Review Measures (effective January 2021), investment in military-related or critical sectors (important IT and internet products, key technologies, etc.) that obtains de facto control must be declared before implementation.
    依《外商投资安全审查办法》(2021 年 1 月施行),投资军工及关系国家安全的重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、关键技术等重要领域并取得实际控制权的,应在实施投资前主动申报。
  • The four-part review matrix for foreign companies covers: foreign investment security review, cyber-security review (for platforms with over one million users going offshore), data-export security assessment and the network data security risk assessment regime.
    外资企业面对的”四大安全审查”矩阵包括:外商投资安全审查、网络安全审查(超 100 万用户平台赴国外上市)、数据出境安全评估与网络数据安全风险评估制度。
  • For foreign-invested companies, the 2026 checklist is to audit assessment expiry dates, map data flows against the three export routes, confirm security-review thresholds for any offshore listing or sensitive acquisition, and monitor CAC and NDRC implementation guidance.
    对外资企业,2026 年合规清单是:核查评估到期日、对照三条出境路径映射数据流、确认境外上市或敏感并购的安全审查门槛、跟踪网信办与发改委实施指引。

Investment and Data Security Review in China: The 2026 Compliance Matrix | 中国投资与数据安全审查:2026 年合规矩阵

Why this matters now

Two developments in 2026 concentrate the security-review agenda for foreign-invested companies. First, on 21 August 2026 the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC) issued the Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Internet Enterprises (2026-2030), which commits to efficiently implementing data-export security assessments, personal-information-outbound standard contracts and personal-information-outbound certification, supporting FTZs in issuing data-export negative lists and encouraging data cross-border service centres. Second, the first batch of data-export security assessment results — mostly issued in 2023 — are expiring in 2026, forcing companies through the extension or re-application window. Separately, the April 2026 decision by the Foreign Investment Security Review Working Mechanism Office (NDRC) to prohibit a foreign acquisition of a Chinese-founded AI company demonstrates the reach of foreign investment security review. This article maps the four-part compliance matrix and the practical calendar.

The four-part review matrix

For a foreign-invested company, four regimes intersect. First, foreign investment security review under the Measures (NDRC and MOFCOM Order, effective 18 January 2021): investment in military-related fields, or in critical sectors — important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, critical infrastructure, key transport services, important culture products, important IT and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies and other important fields — that obtains actual control must be declared before implementation. Review is substance-over-form and controller-piercing: the April 2026 prohibition decision applied to a transaction between two foreign parties because the underlying assets, technology and data originated in China. Second, cyber-security review under the Cyber Security Review Measures (2021): network platform operators holding data of more than one million users must declare before going public abroad. Third, data-export security assessment under the Data Export Security Assessment Measures and the Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions: critical information infrastructure operators, important data exports, and personal-information exports above volume thresholds must pass assessment. Fourth, the network data security risk assessment regime introduced by the Measures on Network Data Security Risk Assessment (effective 20 August 2026): important data processors must conduct an annual assessment.

The 2026 expiry wave and the extension conditions

The first batch of data-export security assessment results was mostly issued in 2023. Under Article 9 of the Provisions, the assessment result is valid for three years from issuance; the validity period was extended from two to three years by the March 2024 Provisions. Companies wishing to continue exporting must apply for an extension within 60 working days before expiry, through the provincial cyberspace administration to the national office. Six conditions must all be met: the purpose and scope of data export are unchanged; the data processor and overseas recipient are unchanged; for personal information, the number of individuals involved over the next three years does not exceed 20% of the amount approved in the original assessment; for important data, the volume growth over three years does not exceed 20%; the legal documents with the overseas recipient comply with Article 9 of the Measures; and no major data-security incident occurred during the past three years. Where any condition fails, the company must re-apply, a longer process.

The CAC action plan and data-flow facilitation

The CAC’s 2026-2030 action plan, issued 21 August 2026, signals both enforcement and facilitation. It commits to guiding internet enterprises to establish sound data-security compliance systems, efficiently implementing the three data-export routes, supporting FTZs in issuing data-export negative lists under the national classification system, organising industry-specific guidelines on cross-border data flows, and encouraging regions to set up data cross-border service centres. For foreign-invested companies, this means the three-route framework will be administered more efficiently, but compliance obligations are not relaxed — the plan also calls for cracking down on data-related violations.

Practical calendar for foreign companies

First, locate every data-export security assessment notice and check its issue date; calendar the 60-working-day extension window before expiry. Second, run the six-condition self-check for extension eligibility; where growth will exceed 20% or other conditions fail, budget for a full re-application. Third, map data flows against the three routes — security assessment, standard contract (with provincial filing within 10 working days of execution) and certification — and confirm which applies to HR data, global-system access and SaaS operations. Fourth, for any offshore listing or acquisition of a sensitive-sector target, assess cyber-security review and foreign investment security review thresholds before signing. Fifth, monitor CAC Q&A releases (the July 2026 Q&A clarified extension conditions) and NDRC guidance. Sixth, for important-data processors, complete the first annual network data security risk assessment under the regime effective 20 August 2026.

Compliance notes

Extension is not automatic: approval is discretionary and re-application is materially longer, so start compliance self-audits six months before expiry. The 20% growth cap is measured against the amount approved in the original assessment, not current volumes, and companies should keep annual data-transfer ledgers. Foreign investment security review applies to indirect and “substance-over-form” transactions; the April 2026 prohibition shows that Chinese-founded, Chinese-asset AI companies remain in scope even after restructuring abroad. Finally, the security-review landscape is evolving — the CAC plan and pending sectoral data-classification catalogues will reshape the map, so treat 2026 as a year for proactive mapping rather than reactive compliance.


中国投资与数据安全审查:2026 年合规矩阵

为什么当下重要

2026 年两项动态把安全审查议程推到外资企业面前。其一,2026 年 8 月 21 日,中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室印发《促进网信企业高质量发展行动计划(2026-2030 年)》,承诺高效实施数据出境安全评估、个人信息出境标准合同、个人信息出境认证等制度,支持自贸区发布数据出境负面清单,鼓励设立数据跨境服务中心。其二,首批数据出境安全评估结果(多在 2023 年出具)2026 年集中到期,迫使企业进入延期或重新申报窗口。此外,2026 年 4 月外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对一起外国企业收购中国背景 AI 公司的交易作出禁止投资决定,展示了外商投资安全审查的穿透范围。本文梳理四大审查矩阵与实务时间表。

四大审查矩阵

对外资企业,四个制度相交织。其一,《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令,2021 年 1 月 18 日施行)下的外商投资安全审查:投资军工领域,或投资关系国家安全的重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域并取得实际控制权的,须在实施投资前申报。审查”实质重于形式”且穿透式:2026 年 4 月禁止决定适用于两个境外主体之间的交易,因为底层资产、技术与数据源于中国。其二,《网络安全审查办法》(2021 年修订)下的网络安全审查:掌握超 100 万用户个人信息的网络平台运营者赴国外上市前须申报。其三,《数据出境安全评估办法》及《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》下的数据出境安全评估:关键信息基础设施运营者、重要数据出境、超数量阈值个人信息出境须通过评估。其四,《网络数据安全风险评估办法》(2026 年 8 月 20 日施行)确立的网络数据安全风险评估制度:重要数据处理者须开展年度评估。

2026 到期潮与延期条件

首批数据出境安全评估结果多在 2023 年出具。依《规定》第九条,评估结果自出具之日起 3 年内有效(2024 年 3 月《规定》将有效期由 2 年调整为 3 年)。企业继续出境的,须在有效期届满前 60 个工作日内,经所在地省级网信部门向国家网信部门提出延期申请。六项条件须同时满足:数据出境目的、范围未变化;数据处理者与境外接收方未变化;出境个人信息的,未来三年涉及自然人数量增幅不超过原评估结果准予过去三年出境数量的 20%;出境重要数据的,未来三年出境数据规模增幅不超过 20%;与境外接收方订立的法律文件符合《办法》第九条;过去三年按评估结果合规开展且未发生重大数据安全事件。任一项不满足即须重新申报,周期明显更长。

网信办行动计划与数据流动便利化

网信办 2026-2030 行动计划(8 月 21 日印发)释放执法与便利双重信号。它承诺引导网信企业建立健全数据安全合规体系,高效实施三条数据出境路径,支持自贸区在国家数据分类分级保护制度框架下制定发布数据出境负面清单,组织重点行业制定网络数据跨境流动合规指引,鼓励有条件地区设立数据跨境服务中心。对外资企业,这意味着三条路径管理更高效,但合规义务并未放松——计划同时要求依法严厉打击涉数据违法犯罪活动。

外资企业实务时间表

其一,找出每份数据出境安全评估通知书并核对出具日期;在到期前把 60 个工作日延期窗口列入日历。其二,按六项条件自检延期资格;增长率将超 20% 或其他条件不满足的,为完整重新申报做预算。其三,对照三条路径——安全评估、标准合同(签署后 10 个工作日内省级备案)、认证——映射数据流,确认 HR 数据、全球系统访问与 SaaS 运营适用哪条。其四,任何境外上市或敏感行业标的收购,签署前评估网络安全审查与外商投资安全审查门槛。其五,跟踪网信办问答(2026 年 7 月问答已明确延期条件)与发改委指引。其六,重要数据处理者须在 8 月 20 日生效制度下完成首次年度网络数据安全风险评估。

合规提示

延期非自动:批准存在裁量空间,重新申报周期显著更长,建议在到期前 6 个月启动合规自检。20% 增幅上限以原评估结果准予的数量为基准而非当前数量,企业应留存逐年数据出境台账。外商投资安全审查适用于间接与”实质重于形式”的交易;2026 年 4 月禁止决定表明,中国创始、中国资产的 AI 公司即使在境外重组后仍在审查范围。最后,安全审查版图仍在演进——网信办行动计划与待出台的行业数据分类目录将重塑地图,2026 年应视为主动映射之年而非被动合规之年。

Sources

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: What Investors Must File and When (2026)

  • Foreign investments that may affect national security must be self-filed with the working mechanism office before implementation; the office may also require filing.
    可能影响国家安全的外商投资,须在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报;办公室亦可要求当事人申报。
  • The mandatory filing scope centres on military/defence-related fields and on acquiring controlling interest in important sectors such as key infrastructure, important information technology and internet, and important financial services.
    强制申报范围聚焦军工国防领域,以及取得重要农产品、重要基础设施、重要信息技术与互联网、重要金融服务等领域实际控制权的投资。
  • Review has two stages — general (30 working days) and special (60 working days, extendable) — during which the investor may not close the deal.
    审查分一般审查(30 个工作日)与特别审查(60 个工作日,可延长)两阶段,审查期间不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are pass, prohibition, or conditional pass; a prohibition requires unwinding to the pre-investment state.
    结论分为通过、禁止、附条件通过;禁止类须限期处分股权资产、恢复到投资前状态。
  • The 2026 “stabilise and optimise foreign investment” action plan reaffirms improving the foreign M&A management regime, signalling tighter coordination between market-entry and security review.
    2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》重申完善外资并购管理制度,预示准入与安审的协同将更紧密。
  • The Manus case (April 2026) is the first prohibition decision under the 2020 rules for an AI-sector inbound deal, a clear warning on tech-export and data-export overlap.
    2026 年 4 月 Manus 案是 2020 年办法下首例针对人工智能领域 inbound 交易的「禁止投资」决定,凸显技术出口与数据出境的叠加风险。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: What Investors Must File and When (2026) | 外商投资安全审查:投资者必须申报什么、何时申报(2026)

China operates a standing foreign investment security review mechanism. The *Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment* (NDRC and MOFCOM Order No. 37, 2020; in force since 18 January 2021) set the framework. A working mechanism, with its office hosted at the NDRC and led by the NDRC and MOFCOM, organises, coordinates and guides reviews.

Which investments must be filed? The investor (or relevant domestic party) must proactively file before implementation when the deal falls in the declared scope: (1) investment in military, military-support or adjacent sensitive areas; or (2) investment in important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies and other important fields, where the foreign investor obtains actual control. “Actual control” includes holding over 50% equity, holding less but able to materially influence board/shareholder resolutions, or otherwise materially influencing operations, finance or technology. The office may also require filing for any investment in scope.

The timeline is strict. Upon receiving a complete filing, the office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; during this period the deal must not proceed. If a review is opened, general review completes within 30 working days. If the office finds a possible national-security effect, it launches special review, which completes within 60 working days (extendable). Throughout, the investor may not implement the investment. Outcomes: pass; prohibition (with unwinding to the pre-investment state); or conditional pass where added conditions can eliminate the effect and the investor accepts them in writing.

Enforcement is real. In April 2026 the foreign investment security review working mechanism issued its first “prohibit investment” decision against an inbound acquisition of a Chinese-background AI agent company, citing overlap with export-control, data-security and security-review laws. The transaction had to be unwound. This is a strong signal that deals touching sensitive algorithms, data and key technologies will face heightened scrutiny, and that “re-domiciliation” does not remove the need for compliance.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (Commerce, NDRC and Finance ministries, No. 97 [2026]) reinforces the environment: it commits to revising the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimising merger procedures and payment terms, and strengthening inter-agency coordination. For dealmakers, security review is no longer a back-office afterthought — it is a gating item that should be assessed at term-sheet stage alongside antitrust merger control.


外商投资安全审查:投资者必须申报什么、何时申报(2026)

中国建立了常态化的外商投资安全审查机制。《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号,2020 年;2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行)确立框架。国家建立工作机制,办公室设在国家发展改革委,由国家发改委、商务部牵头,组织、协调、指导安审工作。

哪些投资必须申报?当事人在下列范围内应在实施前主动申报:(一)投资军工、军工配套等国防安全领域,以及在军事设施周边地域投资;(二)投资重要农产品、重要能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术与互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域,并取得所投资企业的实际控制权。「实际控制」包括持股 50% 以上、持股不足 50% 但能重大影响董事会/股东会决议,或能以其他方式重大影响经营、财务、技术。工作机制办公室也可要求当事人申报。

时限严格。办公室收到齐备材料后 15 个工作日内决定是否审查,期间不得实施投资。决定审查的,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成;认为可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,60 个工作日内完成(可延长),期间亦不得实施。结论:通过;禁止(须限期处分股权资产、恢复至投资前状态);或附条件通过(附加条件能消除影响且当事人书面承诺接受)。

执法是实打的。2026 年 4 月,外商投资安全审查工作机制对一宗涉及中国背景 AI 智能体企业的 inbound 收购作出首例「禁止投资」决定,理由指向与《出口管制法》《数据安全法》及安审办法的叠加。交易须复原。这强烈提示:触及敏感算法、数据与关键技术的交易将面临更高审查,且「迁册」不能免除合规义务。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、发改委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97 号)强化了这一环境:提出加快修订外国投资者并购境内企业的规定、优化并购流程与对价支付、强化部门协同。对交易方而言,安审不再是后台事项,而是应在 term sheet 阶段与反垄断经营者集中审查并列评估的「闸口」。

How Deal Teams Should Operate

Treat security review as a gating item, not a formality. At term sheet, screen the target’s business against the mandatory-scope fields and ask whether the deal confers actual control. If both are true, build the filing into the signing and long-stop mechanics; do not sign a deal that closes unconditionally before clearance. The 15-working-day triage, then 30 (or 60) working days of review, must be priced into the timeline.

Coordinate with merger control. A deal can be both notifiable to SAMR for antitrust and to the security-review office; the two run on different statutory clocks and can overlap. A combined project plan — with one owner tracking both — avoids the classic mistake of assuming “antitrust cleared” means “investment allowed.” Where the target is in a sensitive tech or data field, also check export-control and data-export angles early, as the Manus case shows they can converge.

Finally, use the consultation channel. Parties may consult the working-mechanism office before filing, and may modify or withdraw the investment during review. Designing the structure to be adjustable — and documenting a clean national-security narrative — materially improves the odds of a pass or a conditional pass rather than a prohibition.

交易团队应如何操作

把安全审查视为闸口,而非形式。在 term sheet 阶段即将标的业务对照强制申报领域,并判断交易是否取得实际控制;若两者皆然,须将申报嵌入签约与长停机制,切勿签署一个在获批前无条件交割的交易。15 个工作日初筛、再 30(或 60)个工作日审查,必须计入时间表。

与经营者集中审查协同。一宗交易可能既须向 SAMR 作反垄断申报,又须向安审办公室申报;两者法定期限不同且可重叠。设单一负责人统筹两者的合并计划,可避免「反垄断过了就等于投资获批」的典型误判。若标的处敏感技术或数据领域,还应早查出口管制与数据出境,正如 Manus 案所示,它们可能汇合。

善用商谈渠道。当事人可在申报前咨询工作机制办公室,并在审查中修改或撤销投资。将结构设计为可调整、并备好清晰的国家安全叙事,能显著提升「通过」或「附条件通过」而非「禁止」的概率。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Filing duty: self-file before implementation when in scope; office may also require filing.
  • Mandatory scope: military/defence fields; acquiring control in important agriculture, energy, infrastructure, IT/internet, financial services, key tech.
  • Control test: >50% equity, or <50% but material board/shareholder influence, or other material influence.
  • Clock: 15 working days triage; 30 (general) / 60 (special, extendable) working days review; no closing during review.
  • Outcomes: pass; prohibition (unwind); conditional pass (written acceptance).
  • Recent signal: April 2026 first prohibition under the 2020 rules for an AI inbound deal.
  • Coordinate: run security review alongside merger control and (if relevant) export-control/data-export checks.

实务速查

  • 申报义务: 在范围内须实施前主动申报;办公室亦可要求申报。
  • 强制范围: 军工国防领域;取得重要农业、能源、基础设施、信息技术与互联网、金融服务、关键技术控制。
  • 控制测试: 持股超 50%,或不足 50% 但重大影响董事会/股东会,或其他重大影响。
  • 时限: 15 工作日初筛;30(一般)/60(特别,可延)工作日审查;审查期间不得交割。
  • 结论: 通过;禁止(复原);附条件通过(书面接受)。
  • 近期信号: 2026 年 4 月 2020 办法下首例 AI inbound 交易禁止。
  • 协同: 安审与经营者集中及(如适用)出口管制/数据出境一并考量。

Sources

Critical Infrastructure Security Review in China: The CII Gate

  • Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) protection is codified in the 2021 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》, effective 1 September 2021 and reinforced through 2026 implementing rules.
    关键信息基础设施(CII)保护由2021年《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(2021年9月1日施行)确立,并通过2026年相关实施规则持续强化。
  • CII operators must pass CAC-led network security review before procuring network products or services that may affect national security—a direct gate on inbound technology supply.
    关基运营者在采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务前,须通过网信办主导的网络安全审查——这构成对境外技术供给的直接关口。
  • A multi-sector identification mechanism designates CII across telecommunications, energy, finance, transport, public services, and e-government.
    跨行业认定机制在电信、能源、金融、交通、公共服务及电子政务等领域认定关基。
  • Foreign suppliers face “secure and controllable” expectations, localisation of core data, and ongoing compliance audits once inside a CII supply chain.
    外国供应商一旦进入关基供应链,即面临”安全可控”要求、核心数据本地化及持续合规审计。
  • As of 2026, designations have broadened to cloud, data centres, and large platforms, raising diligence obligations for entrants selling into these sectors.
    截至2026年,认定范围已扩展至云、数据中心及大型平台,提高了向这些行业销售的准入者尽调义务。
  • Missteps can exclude a vendor from CII procurement entirely, a commercial outcome more damaging than a single deal loss.
    失误可能导致供应商被整体排除在关基采购之外,其商业后果甚于单一交易损失。

Critical Infrastructure Security Review in China: The CII Gate | 中国关键基础设施安全审查:CII关口

The Statutory Backbone

Critical Information Infrastructure protection in China is anchored by the 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》 (Regulations on the Security Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure), promulgated as State Council Order No. 745 on 30 July 2021 and effective from 1 September 2021. It sits beneath the 《网络安全法》 (2017) and works in tandem with the CAC’s 《网络安全审查办法》 (2022). Through 2026, implementing rules from the CAC and sector regulators have progressively sharpened the obligations on operators and their suppliers.

What Counts as CII?

CII means information infrastructure whose impairment or data leakage would gravely endanger national security, the national economy, or public welfare. Designation follows a multi-sector identification mechanism led by the CAC together with industry regulators. Sectors typically captured include:

  • Telecommunications and broadcasting;
  • Energy and power;
  • Finance;
  • Transport and logistics;
  • Water, public-health, and other public services;
  • E-government and national defence-adjacent systems.

By 2026, cloud computing platforms, large data centres, and systemically important internet platforms have been drawn into the CII perimeter, widening the population of operators—and their vendors—subject to review.

The Procurement Gate

The most consequential rule for foreign suppliers: a CII operator intending to procure network products or services that may affect national security must apply for a CAC-led network security review and may not proceed with the procurement until cleared. The review assesses:

  • Risk of foreign-government control or coercion;
  • Risk of tampering, surveillance, or data leakage;
  • Supply-chain continuity and “secure and controllable” (安全可控) attributes.

This makes CII procurement a hard gate: a foreign technology vendor cannot close a sale into a CII operator without the operator first clearing review, often with the vendor’s own architecture and provenance under examination.

Supplier Obligations Once Designated

Suppliers that enter a CII supply chain assume durable duties:

  • Secure-and-controllable commitments, including source transparency and remediation cooperation;
  • Core-data localisation, keeping important and core data onshore;
  • Ongoing audits, with the operator required to conduct annual self-assessments and report to the regulator;
  • Incident response, with strict breach-notification timelines.

Foreign vendors should expect contractual clauses嵌入 (embedded) these obligations and should price the compliance burden accordingly.

2026 Trajectory

The 2024–2026 period has seen CII rules extended to emerging environments—edge computing, AI services, and cross-border cloud—and a tightening of the “secure and controllable” standard. For market entrants, the practical effect is that selling advanced IT, security, or cloud products into Chinese state-linked and platform customers now presupposes CII readiness. Early engagement with the operator’s regulatory channel is advisable before a bid is finalised.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Determine if your customer is a CII operator. If so, assume the procurement gate applies and plan for review lead time.
  2. Pre-position compliance artefacts: source provenance, security certifications, data-handling statements, and a local support entity.
  3. Avoid sole-source foreign dependencies where a domestic alternative can be paired, easing the “secure and controllable” assessment.
  4. Negotiate allocation of review risk in the contract—who bears delay, cost, and disqualification.
  5. Localise core data and operations to reduce the surface area of review.

Commercial Stakes

Exclusion from CII procurement is not a one-deal loss; it can be an industry-wide disqualification. Because CII operators span the backbone of the economy, a vendor barred on security grounds loses access to the most strategic and durable customer base in China. Treating CII readiness as a market-entry prerequisite—rather than a reactive clearance—is the disciplined approach for 2026.


中国关键基础设施安全审查:CII关口

法律主干

中国关键信息基础设施保护由《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》确立。该条例于2021年7月30日以国务院第745号令公布,自2021年9月1日起施行。它位于《网络安全法》(2017年)之下,并与网信办《网络安全审查办法》(2022年)协同运作。2026年,网信办及各行业主管部门的实施规则持续细化运营者及其供应商的义务。

何为CII?

CII 指一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或数据泄露,可能严重危害国家安全、国计民生或公共利益的网络基础设施。认定遵循由网信办会同行业主管部门主导的跨部门认定机制。通常被纳入的行业包括:

  • 电信与广播电视;
  • 能源与电力;
  • 金融;
  • 交通运输与物流;
  • 水利、公共卫生及其他公共服务;
  • 电子政务及国防相关系统。

至2026年,云计算平台、大型数据中心及具有系统重要性的互联网平台已被纳入 CII 范围,扩大了须接受审查的运营者及其供应商群体。

采购关口

对外国供应商最具约束力的规则是:关基运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务,须申报网信办主导的网络安全审查,且未获通过前不得采购。审查评估以下方面:

  • 受外国政府控制或胁迫的风险;
  • 被篡改、监视或数据泄露的风险;
  • 供应链连续性及”安全可控”属性。

这使关基采购成为一道硬关口:外国技术供应商若未先由运营者通过审查(往往需审查供应商自身的架构与来源),便无法向关基运营者完成销售。

认定后的供应商义务

进入关基供应链的供应商须承担持续性义务:

  • 安全可控承诺,包括来源透明与配合整改;
  • 核心数据本地化,将重要数据与核心数据留存境内;
  • 持续审计,运营者须开展年度自评估并向监管报告;
  • 事件响应,须遵守严格的泄露通报时限。

外国供应商应预期合同中嵌入上述义务条款,并据此核算合规成本。

2026年走向

2024–2026年间,CII 规则已扩展至新兴场景——边缘计算、人工智能服务及跨境云——并收紧了”安全可控”标准。对市场准入者而言,其实质影响是:向中国的国资关联及平台客户销售先进 IT、安全或云产品,如今须以 CII 就绪为前提。在投标最终确定前,宜尽早与运营者的监管渠道沟通。

市场准入实务指引

  1. 判定客户是否为 CII 运营者。 若是,应假定适用采购关口,并为审查预留前置时间。
  2. 预先备妥合规材料:来源溯源、安全认证、数据处理说明及本地支持实体。
  3. 避免 sole-source 外国依赖,在可搭配境内替代方案处采用,以缓解”安全可控”评估。
  4. 在合同中约定审查风险分配——由谁承担延误、成本与失格。
  5. 将核心数据与运营本地化,以缩减受审查的暴露面。

商业利害关系

被排除于关基采购之外,并非单一交易损失,而可能构成全行业失格。由于关基运营者横跨经济骨干,因安全原因被禁入的供应商将失去中国最具战略性与最稳定的客户群。将 CII 就绪作为市场准入前提——而非被动应对的审批——是2026年应有的纪律化做法。

Sources

Data Security Review in China: CAC-Led Controls for 2026

  • China’s data-security review is led by the CAC under the 2022 《网络安全审查办法》, reinforced by the 2021 《数据安全法》 and 《个人信息保护法》, all in force through 2026.
    中国的数据安全审查由网信办依据2022年《网络安全审查办法》主导,并辅以2021年《数据安全法》与《个人信息保护法》,上述规则在2026年持续有效。
  • Network security review is mandatory for CII operators procuring network products/services that may affect national security, and for platforms holding over one million users’ personal information seeking overseas listing.
    网络安全审查对采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品/服务的关基运营者,以及拟境外上市、掌握超100万用户个人信息的平台具有强制性。
  • A “data export” security assessment by the CAC is required before important data or large-scale personal information leaves China, gating many inbound and outbound deals.
    重要数据或大规模个人信息出境前,须通过网信办的数据出境安全评估,这构成众多境内外交易的关口。
  • As of 2026, review focus has sharpened on cross-border data flows, algorithm filing, and the security of core data centres and cloud services.
    截至2026年,审查重点已聚焦跨境数据流动、算法备案,以及核心数据中心与云服务的安全。
  • Deal teams must screen data assets for “important data” classification and build CAC assessment timelines into the transaction schedule.
    交易团队须对数据资产是否构成”重要数据”进行筛查,并将网信办评估时限纳入交易时间表。
  • Penalties for non-compliance include rectification, suspension of data-export activities, fines, and in serious cases criminal referral.
    违规后果包括责令改正、暂停数据出境活动、罚款,严重者移送刑事处理。

Data Security Review in China: CAC-Led Controls for 2026 | 中国数据安全审查:2026年网信办主导的管控

The Legal Triad

China’s data governance rests on three pillars, all operative in 2026:

  • The 《网络安全法》 (Cybersecurity Law, effective 1 June 2017);
  • The 《数据安全法》 (Data Security Law, effective 1 September 2021);
  • The 《个人信息保护法》 (PIPL, effective 1 November 2021).

These are implemented and enforced, for security-review purposes, primarily by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC, 国家互联网信息办公室). The central procedural instrument is the 《网络安全审查办法》 (Network Security Review Measures), revised by the CAC with twelve other departments and effective from 1 June 2022 (CAC Order No. 8).

When Network Security Review Is Mandatory

Two scenarios trigger a mandatory CAC-led review:

  1. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) operators procuring network products or services that may affect national security. The CII operator must apply for review through its industry regulator; the product or service cannot be procured before clearance.
  2. Platform operators with personal information of more than one million users that seek an overseas listing (initial public offering outside mainland China). Such a listing requires a CAC security review beforehand.

The review examines risks of control by foreign governments, data tampering or leakage, supply-chain disruption, and the concentration of important data.

Data Export Security Assessment

Perhaps the most transaction-relevant mechanism is the CAC’s security assessment for cross-border data transfers. Under PIPL and the Data Security Law, before “important data” or large volumes of personal information are transferred outside China, the handler must pass a CAC-led assessment (or meet an alternative pathway such as certification or a standard contract, subject to thresholds). For market entrants, this gates:

  • Sharing group data with an overseas parent;
  • Cloud or SaaS arrangements routing data offshore;
  • M&A where the target’s data must be integrated into a foreign group.

The assessment evaluates the necessity of the transfer, the volume and sensitivity of data, and the protection level in the receiving jurisdiction.

2026 Enforcement Emphasis

Entering 2026, CAC activity has concentrated on:

  • Cross-border flow governance, including tightening of important-data inventories and the promotion of free-trade-zone “negative lists” for data export;
  • Algorithmic governance, with the 2022 《互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定》 requiring algorithm filing for recommendation services;
  • Core infrastructure security, covering data centres, cloud, and large-platform resilience.

The through-line is that data is treated as a sovereign asset: control over it, and its movement across borders, is a national-security question, not merely a privacy one.

Practical Steps for Entrants

  1. Classify the data. Determine whether the target holds “important data” or “core data”, and quantify personal-information volumes against the one-million-user and export thresholds.
  2. Map transfer pathways. Identify every outbound flow—group reporting, vendor access, cloud replication—and match it to the correct mechanism (assessment, certification, standard contract).
  3. File early for listings. Any overseas IPO by a qualifying platform must clear CAC review before launch.
  4. Negotiate the SPA. Make data-export clearance a condition precedent and allocate remediation costs.
  5. Localise where needed. In-sector data centres and in-China storage reduce exposure.

Consequences of Non-Compliance

CAC can order rectification, suspend data-export activities, confiscate unlawful gains, and impose fines reaching significant sums; serious cases may trigger criminal referral. For an acquirer, unmitigated data-export risk can destroy the value of a data-rich target and delay or block an overseas listing. Treating data-security review as a parallel, co-equal workstream to antitrust and foreign-investment review is now standard prudence.


中国数据安全审查:2026年网信办主导的管控

法律三重支柱

中国数据治理建立在三大支柱之上,均于2026年有效:

  • 《网络安全法》(2017年6月1日施行);
  • 《数据安全法》(2021年9月1日施行);
  • 《个人信息保护法》(2021年11月1日施行)。

就安全审查而言,上述法律主要由国家互联网信息办公室(网信办)实施与执行。其核心程序性文件是《网络安全审查办法》——由网信办联合其他十二部门修订,自2022年6月1日起施行(第8号令)。

网络安全审查的强制触发

两类情形触发网信办主导的强制性审查:

  1. 关键信息基础设施运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务。关基运营者须通过行业主管部门申报审查,且在获批前不得采购该产品或服务。
  2. 掌握超过100万用户个人信息的平台运营者拟赴境外上市(在中国大陆以外首次公开发行)。此类上市须事先通过网信办安全审查。

审查评估被外国政府控制、数据被篡改或泄露、供应链中断,以及重要数据集中等方面的风险。

数据出境安全评估

最具交易相关性的机制,或许是网信办主导的数据出境安全评估。依据《个人信息保护法》与《数据安全法》,在”重要数据”或大规模个人信息向境外提供前,处理者须通过网信办评估(或满足认证、标准合同等替代路径,并受门槛限制)。对市场准入者而言,这构成以下交易的关口:

  • 与境外母公司共享集团数据;
  • 将数据离岸路由的云或 SaaS 安排;
  • 标的的数据须并入外国集团的并购交易。

评估考察传输的必要性、数据的体量及敏感性,以及接收方所在法域的保护水平。

2026年执法重点

进入2026年,网信办的工作集中于:

  • 跨境流动治理,包括收紧重要数据目录,并推动自贸试验区数据出境”负面清单”;
  • 算法治理,依据2022年《互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定》对推荐服务实行算法备案;
  • 核心基础设施安全,涵盖数据中心、云及大型平台韧性。

其内在逻辑在于:数据被视为一种主权资产——对其的控制及跨境流动,是一个国家安全问题,而非单纯的隐私问题。

市场准入实务步骤

  1. 对数据分类。 判定标的是否持有”重要数据”或”核心数据”,并量化个人信息体量,对照100万用户及出境门槛。
  2. 梳理传输路径。 识别每一处出境流向——集团报告、供应商访问、云端复制——并匹配正确机制(评估、认证、标准合同)。
  3. 上市前尽早申报。 符合条件的平台赴境外上市须在启动前通过网信办审查。
  4. 协商协议条款。 将数据出境审批设为先决条件,并分配补救成本。
  5. 必要时本地化。 境内数据中心与境内存储可降低风险敞口。

违规后果

网信办可责令整改、暂停数据出境活动、没收违法所得,并处以可观罚款;严重者可移送刑事处理。对收购方而言,未缓释的数据出境风险可能摧毁数据富集型标的的价值,并拖延或阻断境外上市。将数据安全审查视为与反垄断、外商投资审查并行且同等重要的工作流,已成为标准审慎做法。

Sources

Key Technology M&A Review in China: Security Meets Competition

  • Foreign acquisitions of Chinese technology companies are swept into three overlapping regimes: MOFCOM/NDRC security review, SAMR antitrust clearance, and technology-export licensing.
    外资收购中国科技企业同时落入三套相互叠加的制度:发改委/商务部安全审查、市场监管总局反垄断审批,以及技术出口许可。
  • The Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports (revised 2020, with ongoing 2023–2025 refinement) can block or condition the transfer of sensitive know-how embedded in a target.
    《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》(2020年修订,并在2023–2025年持续完善)可阻止或附条件于标的中敏感技术诀窍的转移。
  • “Control” of a critical-technology enterprise triggers mandatory national security review even below merger thresholds, and semiconductors sit at the centre of 2026 scrutiny.
    取得关键技术企业”控制权”即便未达并购门槛亦触发强制性国家安全审查,而半导体正处于2026年审查的核心。
  • The 2022 revised Anti-Monopoly Law and SAMR guidance treat entanglements between tech giants and startups as potentially competition-reducing, adding a second gate.
    2022年修订《反垄断法》及市场监管总局指引将科技巨头与初创企业间的捆绑视为可能减损竞争,构成第二道关口。
  • Deals should budget for parallel timelines and build a technology-export clearance condition into the SPA before signing.
    交易应为并行的审查时限预留预算,并在签约前于股权转让协议中设置技术出口审批先决条件。
  • As of 2026, the “small yard, high fence” approach means narrow but strict controls on frontier tech rather than blanket bans, raising the premium on precise target mapping.
    截至2026年,”小院高墙”思路意味着对前沿技术采取范围窄但强度高的管控,而非全面禁止,这进一步凸显精确梳理标的的重要性。

Key Technology M&A Review in China: Security Meets Competition | 中国关键技术并购审查:安全与竞争的双重关口

Three Regimes, One Deal

A foreign buyer pursuing a Chinese technology target rarely faces a single clearance. Three regimes routinely converge:

  1. National security review under the 2020 《外商投资安全审查办法》 (MOFCOM/NDRC Order No. 37) where the target sits in a key sector or holds critical technology.
  2. Antitrust merger control under the 《反垄断法》 administered by SAMR, where turnover thresholds are met.
  3. Technology-export control under the 《技术进出口管理条例》 and the 《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》 (Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports), which governs whether the underlying know-how can lawfully leave Chinese control.

The third regime is the one most often missed by foreign teams who plan only for antitrust and security review.

The Technology Export Catalogue

The Catalogue, administered by MOFCOM, lists technologies whose export is prohibited or restricted. The 2020 revision significantly expanded restricted entries—adding or tightening items across civilian drones, AI, quantum computing, laser, and satellite technologies. It was further refined through 2023–2025 consultations, and as of 2026 the restricted list captures a broad band of frontier and dual-use know-how. Where a target’s value depends on a restricted technology, the buyer must obtain an export licence (or restructure to keep the technology in China) before the deal can close. Failure to do so can void the transaction or attract penalties.

Security Review of Tech Targets

Under Order No. 37, acquiring “control” of an enterprise in critical and emerging technologies triggers mandatory security review. The 2026 posture is unambiguous: semiconductors, advanced packaging, EDA tools, and certain AI model capabilities are treated as core national-security assets. The review’s two-stage clock (30 + 60+ working days) applies, and conditions short of prohibition—such as onshore retention of R&D, governance limits, or data-localisation—are common outcomes.

The Antitrust Overlay

Even where security review is cleared, SAMR merger control may independently bite. The 2022 revised 《反垄断法》 strengthened the treatment of “gun-jumping” and introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism for deficient filings. For tech deals, SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 and subsequent guidance signal that acquisitions by dominant platforms of nascent competitors warrant close scrutiny for potential elimination of future competition. A clean security clearance does not immunise a deal from an antitrust hold.

“Small Yard, High Fence” in Practice

China’s 2024–2026 technology-control posture is often described as “small yard, high fence”: the restricted perimeter is deliberately narrow but the controls within it are strict. For market entrants this means most ordinary technology transactions proceed, but any target touching listed frontier items—advanced chips, certain algorithms, cryptography, and dual-use sensors—will face a high wall. Precise target mapping against the Catalogue and the key-sector annex is therefore the single highest-leverage step in deal planning.

Practical Deal Structuring

  • Run a tri-regime screen early. Map the target to the security-review key sectors, the merger thresholds, and the export Catalogue simultaneously.
  • Sequence the filings. Export-licence applications and security-review filings often inform each other; begin both before signing.
  • Use SPA conditions precedent for export approval and security clearance, with long-stop dates reflecting the special-review clock.
  • Consider onshore carve-outs. Retaining restricted technology and R&D within a Chinese subsidiary, while the foreign parent acquires non-restricted assets, can clear the export gate.
  • Plan for behavioural remedies. Expect possible commitments on R&D location, local data storage, and board governance.

Consequences of Missteps

A technology-export violation is distinct from, and can be more severe than, a security-review failure: the restricted know-how cannot lawfully transfer, which may collapse the deal’s value thesis. Combined with possible antitrust hold and security-order unwinding, the cumulative risk is substantial. Foreign acquirers should treat the Catalogue as a first-read document, not an afterthought.


中国关键技术并购审查:安全与竞争的双重关口

三套制度,一项交易

外资收购中国科技标的,鲜少只需一道审批。三套制度通常会汇聚于同一交易:

  1. 国家安全审查:依据2020年《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委/商务部第37号令),当标的位于关键领域或掌握关键技术时适用。
  2. 反垄断经营者集中审查:依据《反垄断法》,由市场监管总局主管,于营业额达标时适用。
  3. 技术出口管制:依据《技术进出口管理条例》及《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》,规范底层技术诀窍能否合法移出中国控制。

第三套制度最常被只规划反垄断与安全审查的外资团队忽视。

技术出口目录

该目录由商务部主管,列明禁止或限制出口的技术。2020年修订大幅扩充了限制类条目——在民用无人机、人工智能、量子计算、激光及卫星技术等方面新增或收紧了项目。该目录在2023–2025年通过征求意见持续完善,截至2026年,限制清单已覆盖广泛的前沿与两用技术诀窍。当标的价值依赖某项受限技术时,买方须在交割前取得出口许可(或将技术留在中国境内并重组交易)。否则交易可能被认定无效或招致处罚。

科技标的的安全审查

依据第37号令,取得关键和新兴技术企业”控制权”将触发强制性安全审查。2026年的立场十分明确:半导体、先进封装、EDA工具及部分人工智能模型能力被视为核心国家安全资产。审查的两段式时限(30 + 60个工作日起)适用,而低于禁止水平的附条件措施——如研发境内留存、治理限制或数据本地化——是常见结果。

反垄断叠加

即便安全审查通过,市场监管总局的经营者集中审查仍可能独立介入。2022年修订的《反垄断法》强化了对”抢跑”行为的规制,并引入了针对瑕疵申报的”停钟”机制。对于科技交易,市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》及后续指引表明, dominant 平台收购新生竞争对手的交易,将因可能消除未来竞争而受到密切审视。安全审查的通过并不能使交易豁免反垄断阻却。

“小院高墙”的实践

中国2024–2026年的技术管控态势常被概括为”小院高墙”:受限范围刻意收窄,但其中的管控强度很高。对市场准入者而言,这意味着多数普通技术交易可正常推进,但凡触及所列前沿项目——先进芯片、特定算法、密码学及两用传感器——的交易都将面临高墙。因此,对照目录与关键领域附件精确梳理标的,是交易规划中杠杆率最高的一步。

交易结构实务

  • 尽早开展三制度筛查。 同步将标的映射至安全审查关键领域、并购门槛及出口目录。
  • 统筹申报顺序。 出口许可申请与安全审查申报常相互影响,应在签约前同步启动。
  • 在协议中设置审批先决条件,针对出口批准与安全审查设置反映特别审查时限的最晚截止日。
  • 考虑境内分拆。 将受限技术与研发保留于中国子公司,由外国母公司收购非受限资产,可越过出口关口。
  • 为行为性救济作准备。 应预判可能涉及研发地点、本地数据存储及董事会治理方面的承诺。

失误后果

技术出口违规不同于安全审查失败,且可能更为严重:受限技术诀窍无法合法转移,可能从根本上瓦解交易的价值逻辑。叠加可能的反垄断阻却与安全审查撤销令,累积风险相当可观。外资收购方应将技术目录视为首要审阅文件,而非事后补充。

Sources

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Market-Entry Guide

  • China’s foreign investment security review is a mandatory, two-stage regime administered by MOFCOM and NDRC under the 2020 Measures (Order No. 37), in force since 18 January 2021.
    中国外商投资安全审查是由商务部与国家发展改革委依据2020年《外商投资安全审查办法》(第37号令,自2021年1月18日起施行)实施的强制性两段式审查制度。
  • Acquiring “control” of a Chinese entity in defined key sectors—defence, technology, energy, transport, and data-intensive industries—triggers review even where merger-control thresholds are not met.
    在国防、科技、能源、交通及数据密集型等规定关键领域内取得中国实体”控制权”的交易,即便未达经营者集中申报标准亦触发审查。
  • The general review runs 30 working days; a triggered special national security review lasts at least 60 working days and is extendable, materially affecting deal timelines.
    一般性审查时限为30个工作日;一旦启动特别审查,至少持续60个工作日且可延长,对交易时间表影响显著。
  • Deals closed without clearance can be unwound, restructured, or subjected to divestment and penalties, so pre-closing analysis is essential for inbound investors.
    未经审查即完成的交易可能被责令恢复原状、变更或转让,并面临处罚,因此外资方在交割前开展分析至关重要。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny has intensified around critical and emerging technologies, semiconductors, and data-rich targets, reflecting a broader whole-of-government national security posture.
    截至2026年,对关键及新兴技术、半导体以及数据富集型标的的审查明显趋严,反映出更广泛的整体政府国家安全立场。
  • Foreign investors should map the key-sector catalogue, consider minority or non-control structures, and engage qualified PRC counsel early to avoid irreversible remediation.
    外资方应梳理关键领域目录,考虑少数股权或非控制型交易结构,并尽早聘请合格中国法律顾问,以避免不可逆的补救措施。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Market-Entry Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026年市场准入指南

The Regulatory Anchor: Order No. 37

The foreign investment national security review of the People’s Republic of China is governed by the 《外商投资安全审查办法》 (Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment), jointly promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) as Order No. 37 on 19 December 2020. The Measures entered into force on 18 January 2021 and remain the operative rulebook for 2026. They sit alongside—but are legally distinct from—the Negative List for market access and the SAMR-led antimonopoly merger-control system. A transaction can be perfectly lawful under the Negative List yet still be unwound for failing security review, a point that surprises many first-time entrants.

When Does a Review Trigger?

The Measures cast a wide net. Two principal scenarios require mandatory review:

  • Military and adjacent zones. Any foreign investment in enterprises engaged in military-industrial production or in scientific research and design units serving national defence, and any foreign investment within the prescribed perimeter around military facilities and military-use ports, airports, and border crossings.
  • Control of key-sector enterprises. Where a foreign investor acquires “control” (控制权) of a domestic enterprise whose business falls within the key areas enumerated in the Measures’ annex. These cover national defence and the military; agriculture, energy and mineral resources; infrastructure, transport, and utilities; and critical and emerging technologies.

“Control” is defined functionally—holding 50% or more of voting rights, or otherwise being able to exert a decisive influence over the target’s resolutions, board, or operations. Importantly, the review can bite even where the deal is too small to meet SAMR’s merger-notification thresholds, making it a trap for unwary minority-led acquisitions structured as control.

The Two-Stage Adjudicative Process

The system is deliberately sequential:

StageWhat happensStatutory timeframe
General review (一般性审查)The inter-ministerial office screens the filing30 working days
Special review (特别审查)Escalated to a national security assessmentAt least 60 working days, extendable

If the general review finds no national security concern, the transaction clears. If concerns arise, it escalates to the special review, which may impose conditions, prohibit the deal, or—retrospectively—order restructuring or divestment. Parties may also file voluntarily where uncertain, buying certainty at the cost of timetable.

Interaction with the Negative List and Other Regimes

Security review operates in parallel with the foreign investment Negative List. The 2024 edition of the 《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)》 issued by NDRC and MOFCOM continues to restrict or prohibit foreign investment in a catalogue of sectors; a transaction permitted by the Negative List is not exempt from security review. The same deal can concurrently require SAMR merger clearance, a CAC data-security assessment, and MOFCOM/NDRC security review. Sequencing these workstreams deliberately is now standard deal hygiene for China inbound M&A.

The 2026 Enforcement Posture

Although Order No. 37 dates from 2020, its application has sharpened. Entering 2026, reviewing authorities have visibly prioritised:

  • Critical and emerging technologies, especially semiconductors, advanced computing, and dual-use items;
  • Data-rich targets, where control would concentrate sensitive personal or important data in foreign hands;
  • Infrastructure and utilities with geopolitical sensitivity.

This intensification tracks the broader national-security framing of the 2021 《数据安全法》 (Data Security Law) and the 2022 revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), and the steady refinement of the foreign investment Negative List’s restricted catalogues. Inbound investors should assume that any deal touching these sectors will receive heightened scrutiny and should budget for the full special-review clock.

Practical Steps for Market Entrants

  1. Map the target against the key-sector annex before signing. A control transaction in a listed area is presumptively reviewable.
  2. Model alternative structures. Minority stakes, golden-share arrangements held by domestic partners, or contractual (rather than equity) control may avoid a “control” finding—each carries its own legal nuance and must be assessed on the facts.
  3. File early and voluntarily when in doubt. The 30-working-day general clock starts on acceptance; waiting until signing can compress the deal timeline dangerously.
  4. Build remediation into the SPA. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and reverse termination fees calibrated to a possible special review.
  5. Coordinate with merger-control and cybersecurity reviews so that one clearance does not silently prejudice another.

Consequences of Getting It Wrong

Transactions completed without required clearance are vulnerable: the reviewing authority may order the foreign investor to dispose of the interest, transfer assets, change the structure, or restore the original state, and may impose penalties. Because unwinding a closed deal is costly and often practically impossible, the commercial risk is borne almost entirely by the buyer. For this reason, security-review analysis is now a standard workstream in any China inbound transaction involving sensitive sectors.

How This Compares Globally

The Chinese regime is frequently compared with the U.S. CFIUS process. Both are ex ante, national-security-oriented, and capable of blocking or conditioning foreign acquisitions. China’s system is distinctive in its explicit sector catalogue, its codified two-stage timeline, and its tight coupling with the Negative List and the data-security regime. Investors familiar with CFIUS will recognise the logic but should not assume the timelines or sector scope translate directly.


中国外商投资安全审查:2026年市场准入指南

制度基石:第37号令

中国的外商投资国家安全审查由《外商投资安全审查办法》规范。该办法由国家发展改革委与商务部于2020年12月19日联合发布(第37号令),自2021年1月18日起施行,并仍是2026年适用的规则基础。它与市场准入负面清单以及国家市场监管总局主导的经营者集中反垄断审查在法律上相互独立。实践中,一项交易即便完全符合负面清单规定,仍可能因未通过安全审查而被否决或撤销,这一点常令初次进入中国市场的投资者感到意外。

哪些交易触发审查?

《办法》的适用范围相当广泛,主要存在两类强制审查情形:

  • 军工及邻近区域。 外国投资者对军工生产企业和军工科研设计单位,以及对军工设施、军用港口、机场、边境口岸周边划定区域内的投资。
  • 关键领域企业控制权。 外国投资者取得境内企业”控制权”(控制权),且该企业经营业务落入《办法》附件所列关键领域,包括国防军工、农业、能源与矿产资源、基础设施、交通运输,以及关键和新兴技术。

“控制权”采功能化定义——持有50%以上表决权,或能够对被审查企业决议、董事会或经营施加决定性影响。值得注意的是,即便交易规模过小而未达市场监管总局的经营者集中申报标准,仍可能触发安全审查,这对以控制为目的、却采用少数股权安排的收购构成潜在陷阱。

两段式审查程序

该制度在程序设计上呈顺序递进:

阶段审查内容法定时限
一般性审查联席会议办公室对申报进行筛查30个工作日
特别审查启动国家安全评估至少60个工作日,可延长

若一般性审查未发现国家安全风险,交易即获通过。若存在风险,则进入特别审查,审查机关可附加条件、禁止交易,或在事后责令变更或剥离。当事人亦可在不确定时主动申报,以时间换取确定性。

与负面清单及其他制度的衔接

安全审查与外商投资负面清单并行。国家发展改革委、商务部发布的《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)》2024年版继续在目录中对部分领域采取限制或禁止。符合负面清单的交易并不豁免安全审查。同一项交易可能同时需要市场监管总局的经营者集中审批、网信办的数据安全评估,以及发改委/商务部的安全审查。审慎地统筹这些工作流,已成为中国 inbound 并购的标准操作。

2026年执法态势

尽管第37号令颁布于2020年,但其适用在近年明显趋严。进入2026年,审查机关明显优先关注以下领域:

  • 关键和新兴技术,特别是半导体、先进计算与两用物项;
  • 数据富集型标的,控制此类标的将使敏感个人信息或重要数据集中于外资之手;
  • 具有地缘政治敏感性的基础设施与公用事业。

这一趋严态势与2021年《数据安全法》及2022年修订《反垄断法》所确立的广义国家安全框架一脉相承,也与外商投资负面清单受限目录的持续完善相呼应。外资方应预判:任何涉及上述领域的交易都将受到更高强度审查,并应为完整的特别审查时限预留预算。

市场准入实务步骤

  1. 签约前对照关键领域附件梳理标的。 在列明领域内取得控制权的交易,原则上具有可审查性。
  2. 设计替代交易结构。 少数股权、由境内合作方持有的”金股”安排,或合同控制(而非股权控制)可能避免构成”控制权”认定——但每种安排均有其法律细微差别,须依事实评估。
  3. 存疑时尽早主动申报。 30个工作日的一般性审查时限自受理起算;等到签约后再申报会严重压缩交易时间表。
  4. 在股权转让协议中嵌入补救机制。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,以及针对可能出现的特别审查的反向终止费。
  5. 统筹经营者集中与网络安全审查,避免一项审批在无意中损及另一项。

违规后果

未经审查即完成的交易面临风险:审查机关可责令外国投资者转让股权、转移资产、变更结构或恢复原状,并可能处以处罚。由于已交割交易的撤销成本高昂且往往在实操中难以实现,商业风险几乎完全由买方承担。正因如此,安全审查分析已成为任何涉及敏感领域的中国 inbound 交易的标准工作流。

国际比较

中国的审查制度常被与美国 CFIUS 程序比较。二者均属事前、以国家安全为导向、并可禁止或附加条件于外资收购。中国的制度特点在于其明确的行业目录、成文的二段式时限,以及与负面清单及数据安全制度紧密耦合。熟悉 CFIUS 的投资者可识别其逻辑,但不应想当然地认为时限或行业范围可直接对应。

Sources