Category Archives: Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Fair Competition Review: China Bans Local Performance Requirements in Procurement and Bidding

  • The State Administration for Market Regulation published Order No. 130 amending the implementation measures of the Fair Competition Review Regulation on 16 October 2026, with effect from 1 December 2026.
    市场监管总局于 2026 年 10 月 16 日公布第 130 号令,修改《公平竞争审查条例实施办法》,自 2026 年 12 月 1 日起施行。
  • Local performance requirements are now expressly prohibited, including local track record, years of establishment, local awards, a local branch, and local tax or social insurance payments used to grade an operator’s credit.
    本地业绩要求被明确列入禁止情形,包括以本地业绩、成立年限、本地奖项荣誉、在本地设立分支机构、在本地缴纳税收社保来评价经营者信用等级。
  • Differentiated credit scoring based on the origin of goods is banned where it affects out-of-town operators in Government Procurement and Bidding and Tendering.
    以商品产地等因素设置差异化信用评分标准、影响外地经营者参加本地政府采购与招标投标的,同样被禁止。
  • Unreasonably short publicity or response periods, and on-site-only registration or purchase of tender documents, are listed as prohibited practices.
    设置不合理的公示时间或响应时间、仅允许现场报名或现场购买采购文件招标文件的,被列为禁止情形。
  • Where a drafting body commissions government procurement, tendering or investment promotion, the drafting body itself must carry out the fair competition review.
    起草单位委托实施政府采购、招标投标、招商引资的,由起草单位自己对相应政策措施开展公平竞争审查。
  • Repeated procedural failures may draw a reminder from the market regulator, a supervisory prompt rather than a sanction.
    多次出现审查不到位情形的,市场监管部门可以提醒督促,这是督促而非处罚。
  • The amendment is published but not yet in force, so it binds measures drafted after 1 December 2026 rather than curing rules already issued.
    该修改决定已公布但尚未施行,约束的是 2026 年 12 月 1 日之后起草的政策措施,并不溯及已经发布的文件。

Fair Competition Review: China Bans Local Performance Requirements in Procurement and Bidding | 公平竞争审查:把”本地业绩”写进禁止清单

Overview

On 16 October 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published Order No. 130, amending the implementation measures of the Fair Competition Review Regulation. It takes effect on 1 December 2026.

Fair competition review is the procedure by which a government body checks, before issuing a policy, whether it restricts competition. Most of what it covers — subsidy rules, local standards, licensing conditions — never reaches a foreign investor’s desk. This amendment matters because it writes into a binding rule the devices local authorities have used to keep outside firms out of public purchasing — and a foreign-invested company bidding for a public contract is, in this context, precisely an out-of-town operator.

Status: published, not yet in force

Two dates must not be merged: publication on 16 October 2026, application from 1 December 2026, existing measures in force until then.

The consequence is a drafting window. Measures already issued are not automatically rewritten; the amendment bites on measures drafted, reviewed or submitted after it takes effect, and on reviews still open. A grievance about a tender rule issued last year is not reopened by this order.

What the amendment changes

Credit scoring. Article 15(4) is rewritten. Using an operator’s local track record, years of establishment, awards obtained locally, a local branch, or local tax and social insurance payments to evaluate its credit rating is prohibited where this affects out-of-town operators’ participation in local government procurement or bidding. Differentiated scoring set by reference to factors such as the origin of goods is prohibited on the same item.

Access to the process. Article 15(6) prohibits unreasonably short publicity or response periods, and registration or document purchase available only on site.

Outsourced processes. A new Article 48 provides that where a drafting body commissions the implementation of government procurement, bidding and tendering, or investment promotion, that drafting body carries out the review of the corresponding measures. Outsourcing the process does not outsource the review.

The review procedure. Article 31 gains a fifth paragraph: where a drafting body repeatedly reviews poorly, fails to consult as required or submits incomplete materials, the regulator may remind and urge it to perform its duty. Article 33 gains two paragraphs: a measure found not to meet the standards must be revised per the review opinion and resubmitted, and a measure sent to the government must carry the compliant review conclusion. Article 35 requires third-party assessment results, and how far they were adopted, to be stated in the conclusion.

Consequential items. Article 25(1)(4) becomes “other circumstances provided for by laws and administrative regulations”; Article 37 requires the regulator to handle a report promptly or transfer it; Article 47 corrects a term for grassroots self-governing bodies.

Why local scoring was the target

A credit score is a threshold that does not look like one. Every bidder is measured the same way, so the rule reads as neutral. But a supplier with no local branch, no local tax record and no local awards starts below the line before its price is opened. The exclusion is produced by the scoring table, not by a sentence saying outsiders need not apply.

Naming these devices in a binding rule moves the argument to the drafting stage. A policy office that wants a local performance score must now write it down and defend it in review, rather than treat it as ordinary practice — a smaller step than an outright ban, and a more durable one.

What it means for foreign investors and M&A

First, qualification clauses requiring a local branch, a local tax registration or a fixed number of years of local operation become reviewable defects rather than commercial preferences. They will not vanish on 1 December; they become citable.

Second, in acquisition projects, the localised conditions that sometimes attach to a project face a narrower space. The amendment regulates the policy documents around a transaction, not the transaction — which shifts diligence toward the local measures the target’s business depends on.

Third, the review duty follows the commissioning body: where an authority runs procurement through an intermediary, the obligation stays with the authority.

What it does not do

It creates no private right of action; the route is a report to the market regulator, which must handle it promptly or pass it on. It does not touch merger control, a separate track under the Anti-Monopoly Law. And it does not turn a reminder into a penalty: Article 31(5) is a supervisory prompt, and reading it as a fine misstates the text.

Practical steps

  • Search your tender documents for local branch, local tax record, local awards and years of local operation.
  • Read the scoring table, not only the qualification section; local performance usually appears as points.
  • Log each timetable: publicity period, question deadline, document purchase window.
  • Keep the evidence when a clause looks exclusionary — the document, the scoring table, the timeline, your submission.
  • Route a complaint to the regulator at the level that drafted the measure, citing Article 15(4) or 15(6).

Outlook

The new text will be applied in individual reviews, where the interpretive work will happen. For investors the value is specificity: a clause requiring three years of local experience is now a named defect.

Sources

  • 市场监管总局·《关于修改〈公平竞争审查条例实施办法〉的决定》(总局令第 130 号):https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxxgk/fdzdgknr/fgs/art/2026/art_cca9cd5968f0479ab82e7980fbe51571.html
  • 市场监管总局·实施办法条文:https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxxgk/fdzdgknr/fgs/art/2026/art_d1f14a9d18ec42f0abc671d1034e2c35.html
  • 中国政府网·《公平竞争审查条例》(国务院行政法规):https://www.gov.cn/
  • 市场监管总局·总局令与规范性文件发布:https://www.samr.gov.cn/

公平竞争审查:把”本地业绩”写进禁止清单

概述

2026 年 10 月 16 日,市场监管总局公布第 130 号令,修改《公平竞争审查条例实施办法》,自 2026 年 12 月 1 日起施行。

公平竞争审查是政府机关在出台政策之前,先自查这项政策是否限制竞争的程序。它管的大多数内容并不会摆到外资企业桌上:补贴规则、地方标准、许可条件。这份修改决定之所以值得看,是因为它把地方政府用来把外地企业挡在公共采购之外的那些具体手法,写进了一部有约束力的规章;而一家参与政府采购投标的外资企业,在这个语境里恰恰就是”外地经营者”。

状态:已公布,尚未施行

两个日期不能合并:10 月 16 日公布,12 月 1 日施行,在此之前现行办法继续有效。

由此产生的是一个起草窗口。已经发布的政策措施不会被自动改写;修改决定约束的是施行之后起草、审查或报送的政策措施,以及届时仍在进行的审查。手里握着一份去年招标文件的企业,不要把这份令当成重启旧案的工具。

修改了什么

信用评分。 第十五条第四项被改写。将经营者在本地的业绩、成立年限、所获得的奖项荣誉,或者在本地设立分支机构、缴纳税收社保等用于评价经营者信用等级,影响外地经营者参加本地政府采购、招标投标的,属于禁止情形。同一项还禁止根据商品产地等因素设置差异化信用评分标准。

参与程序的机会。 第十五条第六项禁止设置不合理的公示时间或者响应时间,以及仅允许现场报名、现场购买采购文件招标文件的做法。

委托出去的事。 新增第四十八条:起草单位委托实施政府采购、招标投标、招商引资的,由起草单位对相应政策措施开展公平竞争审查。把流程委托出去,不等于把审查责任委托出去。

审查程序本身。 第三十一条增加一款作为第五款:起草单位多次出现审查不到位、未按条例要求征求意见、提请审查时材料不完备等情况的,市场监管部门可以提醒督促其认真履行审查责任。第三十三条增加两款:审查结论认为不符合标准的,起草单位应按审查意见修改并重新提请审查;提请本级政府审议或审批时,应一并报送符合审查标准的审查结论。第三十五条要求引入第三方评估的,在审查结论或初审意见中说明评估结果及采纳情况。

配套与文字调整。 第二十五条第一款第四项改为”法律、行政法规规定的其他情形”;第三十七条明确接到举报后应及时处理或转送有关部门;第四十七条对基层群众性自治组织的表述作了修正。

为什么盯上的是本地评分

信用评分是一道不像门槛的门槛。所有投标人用同一把尺子量,规则读起来是中立的。但一家没有本地分支机构、没有本地纳税记录、没有本地奖项的供应商,在报价被拆封之前就已经排在分数线以下。排除效果由评分表产生,而不是由某句”外地企业不得参与”产生。

把这些手法写进有约束力的规章,等于把争论挪到文件被写出来的起草环节。想要保留本地业绩加分的政策部门,现在必须把它写下来、在审查中说明理由,而不能当作惯例带过——这比直接禁止这种做法步子更小,却更耐久。

对外资与并购意味着什么

第一,要求本地分支机构、本地税务登记或固定本地经营年限的资格条款,从”商务偏好”变成了”可指出的审查瑕疵”。它们不会在 12 月 1 日消失,但从此可以被点名。

第二,在并购项目中,有时附着于项目的本地化条件可操作空间被压缩。这份修改决定规范的是交易周边的政策文件,不是交易本身——尽职调查的重点因此转向标的业务依赖哪些地方性措施。

第三,审查责任跟着委托方走:地方机关通过中介机构实施采购的,义务仍留在机关身上。

它不做什么

它没有创设私人诉权,投诉的通道是向市场监管部门举报,接到举报后应及时处理或转送。它不涉及经营者集中,集中申报是反垄断法下另一条线。它也没有把”提醒督促”变成处罚:第三十一条第五款是督促,不是罚款。

落地步骤

  • 把手头参与过的招标文件梳理一遍,检索本地分支机构、本地纳税记录、本地奖项、本地经营年限这几类表述。
  • 读评分表,而不只是资格条件部分;本地业绩通常以分值而非门槛的形式出现。
  • 记录每个项目的时间表:公示期、提问截止、文件购买窗口。
  • 遇到疑似歧视性条款,把证据留全——招标文件、评分表、时间安排,以及自己的投标材料。
  • 向起草该政策措施那一级的市场监管部门举报,直接引用第十五条第四项或第六项,而不是泛泛谈公平。

展望

新条文要在一个个具体审查里落地,解释工作会发生在个案中,而不是在指引里。对投资者而言,价值在于具体:要求”本地三年经验”的条款现在是一项有名目的瑕疵。

来源

  • 市场监管总局·《关于修改〈公平竞争审查条例实施办法〉的决定》(总局令第 130 号):https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxxgk/fdzdgknr/fgs/art/2026/art_cca9cd5968f0479ab82e7980fbe51571.html
  • 市场监管总局·实施办法条文:https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxxgk/fdzdgknr/fgs/art/2026/art_d1f14a9d18ec42f0abc671d1034e2c35.html
  • 中国政府网·《公平竞争审查条例》(国务院行政法规):https://www.gov.cn/
  • 市场监管总局·总局令与规范性文件发布:https://www.samr.gov.cn/

China’s Revised IC Layout-Design Regulation: Originality Statements and the New Filing Discipline

  • The revised Regulation on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits (State Council Order No. 842) was adopted on 10 July 2026, promulgated on 23 July 2026 and took effect on 15 October 2026, in six chapters and 54 articles — the first comprehensive revision in the 25 years since the 2001 regulation.
    《集成电路布图设计保护条例》修订由国务院第 91 次常务会议于 2026 年 7 月 10 日通过,7 月 23 日以国务院令第 842 号公布,自 2026 年 10 月 15 日起施行,共 6 章 54 条,是 2001 年条例施行 25 年来第一次全面修订。
  • A statement of originality becomes a statutory filing document under Article 22, identifying the design area, design points and corresponding functions; where originality lies in the layout as a whole, Article 24 requires a specific explanation, and Article 23 requires the drawings to show the original part clearly.
    第 22 条把独创性声明列为法定登记文件,应指明独创性的设计区域、设计要点及相应功能;作为整体具有独创性的,第 24 条要求具体说明,第 23 条要求提交的图样能清楚显示独创性部分。
  • Article 20 requires an application to rest on genuine creative activity and bars falsification; Article 27 allows rejection, Article 30 lets any person request cancellation, Article 31 treats a cancelled registration as never having existed, and Article 33 adds a restoration procedure.
    第 20 条要求登记申请以真实创作活动为基础、不得弄虚作假;第 27 条规定明显不符合规定的应予驳回,第 30 条允许任何人请求撤销,第 31 条规定被撤销的专有权视为自始即不存在,第 33 条新增权利恢复程序。
  • Protection is measured by the registered copies or drawings, and the statement may be used to interpret originality (Article 34); damages follow actual loss or the infringer’s profit, and for wilful infringement in serious circumstances may be set at one to five times the amount so determined (Article 46).
    保护范围以登记的复制件或图样所显示者为准,独创性声明可用于解释独创性(第 34 条);赔偿按实际损失或侵权人获利确定,故意侵权且情节严重的,可按上述方法确定数额的 1 倍以上 5 倍以下确定(第 46 条)。
  • The term is 10 years from the filing date or from first commercial exploitation anywhere in the world, whichever is earlier, with an absolute cut-off 15 years after creation; no application filed more than two years after first commercial exploitation anywhere will be registered (Articles 17 and 26).
    保护期为 10 年,自登记申请日或世界任何地方首次商业利用之日起算,以较前日期为准;自创作完成之日起 15 年后不再保护;首次商业利用之日起 2 年内未申请登记的不再予以登记(第 17 条、第 26 条)。
  • Assignments take effect on registration, licences must be recorded within three months of the contract taking effect, pledges require registration (Article 35); a non-voluntary licence may be granted in an emergency, for public interest or to remedy a monopoly, and abuse of layout-design rights is handled under the Anti-Monopoly Law (Articles 39 and 9).
    转让自登记之日起生效,许可须在合同生效之日起 3 个月内备案,出质须办理出质登记(第 35 条);国家紧急状态、公共利益目的或经认定构成垄断需补救时可给予非自愿许可,滥用布图设计专有权依照《反垄断法》处理(第 39 条、第 9 条)。

China’s Revised IC Layout-Design Regulation: Originality Statements and the New Filing Discipline | 中国《集成电路布图设计保护条例》修订:独创性声明与登记新规

Overview

The revised Regulation on the Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits (State Council Order No. 842) was adopted at the 91st executive meeting of the State Council on 10 July 2026, promulgated by Premier Li Qiang on 23 July 2026, and took effect on 15 October 2026. It runs to six chapters and 54 articles and is the first comprehensive revision in the 25 years since the 2001 regulation came into force. The questions and answers released with the revision set out the changes (http://mrdx.cn/content/20260804/Articel02003NR.htm).

Two changes carry most of the practical weight. A statement of originality becomes a statutory filing document, so an applicant must now say where the original design lies and what that part does. And the filing is anchored to genuine creative activity, with rejection, cancellation and restoration procedures around it. The rest of the revision modernises the term, the transaction mechanics and the remedies, and extends coverage to layouts for integrated circuits with photonic and quantum functions.

Key developments in 2026

Originality, on the record. Article 22 adds the statement of originality to the statutory filing documents, identifying the design area, the design points and the corresponding functions. Where originality lies in the layout as a whole, Article 24 requires a specific explanation to that effect. Article 23 requires the copies or drawings to show the original part clearly, so drawings and statement are prepared together.

Scope of protection. Under Article 34, protection is measured by what the registered copies or drawings show, and the statement may explain the originality. It is therefore more than a formality: it becomes an interpretive aid in infringement analysis, and a vague statement narrows the reading of the registration itself.

Filing discipline. Article 20 requires an application to rest on genuine creative activity and prohibits falsification; Article 27 provides for rejection where an application obviously fails to comply. After registration, Article 30 allows any person to request cancellation, and Article 31 treats a cancelled registration as never having existed — a retroactive consequence reaching licences and assignments already recorded. Article 33 adds a procedure for restoring rights. The Ministry of Justice’s commentary explains the statement in these terms (https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrjdhy/202608/t20260803_538208.html).

Term and the three dates. Article 17 sets a 10-year term from the filing date or from first commercial exploitation anywhere in the world, whichever is earlier, and ends protection 15 years after creation, whether or not the layout was registered or exploited. Article 26 bars registration where no application is filed within two years of first commercial exploitation anywhere in the world.

Foreign applicants. Article 4 protects a layout created by a foreign national or enterprise where it is first commercially exploited in China, or where the applicant’s country has a protection agreement with China or is party with China to a relevant treaty. Article 5 requires a foreign applicant without habitual residence or a business office in China to appoint a patent agency established in accordance with law.

Transactions. Article 35 requires an assignment by written contract, registered and published, effective on registration; a licence by written contract, recorded within three months of the contract taking effect; a pledge by pledge registration. Article 36 lets co-owners agree how the right is exercised and supplies default rules.

Enforcement and competition. Article 46 measures damages by actual loss or the infringer’s profit, refers to a reasonable multiple of the licence fee where neither can be determined, and allows one to five times that figure for wilful infringement in serious circumstances. Articles 37 and 38 exclude copying for personal use, evaluation, analysis, research and teaching, layouts created on that basis, independent creation of an identical layout, and acts within an exhausted right. Article 39 permits a non-voluntary licence in a national emergency or other extraordinary situation, for public interest, or to remedy a monopoly found by a court or an antitrust authority. Article 9 provides that abuse of layout-design rights to exclude or restrict competition is handled under the Anti-Monopoly Law.

Practical implications for foreign businesses

The statement is a drafting project, not a form. It should be written by the engineers who know which blocks are original and why, then checked by counsel against the drawings to be filed. Because Article 34 lets the statement interpret the scope, the wording chosen at filing sets the ceiling on what can be argued later.

The genuine-creation requirement shifts attention to records: design files, revision histories, tool logs and the identity of those who did the work, which may be needed years later, particularly where a contractor or design house produced the layout. A layout supplied by a firm that did not itself create it deserves scrutiny before filing, because Article 31 reaches back over what is built on the registration.

The calendar is unforgiving. Two years from first commercial exploitation anywhere is short for a group that launches a chip abroad before considering China; ten years is the term, but fifteen years from creation is a ceiling no registration extends.

Transactions have three formal steps: an assignment signed but not registered does not transfer the right; a licence not recorded within three months leaves a compliance gap even if the contract binds the parties; a pledge needs its own registration. Co-ownership is better handled in an agreement.

Licensing now sits alongside competition law explicitly. Article 9 states the consequence, and Article 39 makes a non-voluntary licence a remedy where a monopoly is found. A programme that bundles layouts, ties licences to other products or refuses access on unexplained terms is exposed on two fronts.

Related reading

  • Patent and trademark protection for semiconductor and design businesses, and how the three regimes divide the work.
  • Merger control and antitrust review, including the treatment of intellectual property in competition analysis.
  • Technology licensing, recordal and the tax treatment of royalties paid across the border.

Sources

  • Xinhua Daily Telegraph, questions and answers with the Ministry of Justice and the intellectual property authority on the revision: http://mrdx.cn/content/20260804/Articel02003NR.htm
  • Ministry of Justice, expert commentary on the originality statement system: https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrjdhy/202608/t20260803_538208.html
  • People’s Daily Online, reproduction of the questions and answers: https://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0803/c461001-40773140.html
  • China National Intellectual Property Administration: https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/

中国《集成电路布图设计保护条例》修订:独创性声明与登记新规

概述

《集成电路布图设计保护条例》修订经国务院第 91 次常务会议于 2026 年 7 月 10 日通过,由总理李强于 2026 年 7 月 23 日签署国务院令第 842 号公布,自 2026 年 10 月 15 日起施行。修订后的条例共 6 章 54 条,是 2001 年条例施行 25 年来第一次全面修订。随修订一同发布的答记者问,对此次修改的背景与要点作了说明(http://mrdx.cn/content/20260804/Articel02003NR.htm)。

其中两项变化承担的实务分量最重。其一,独创性声明成为法定登记文件,申请人必须说明独创性落在何处、该部分实现什么功能。其二,登记被锚定在真实创作活动之上,驳回、撤销与权利恢复程序围绕这一要求展开。其余修改则更新了保护期、权利变动的手续与救济手段,并把保护范围扩展至具有集成光子、量子等功能的集成电路布图设计。

从结构上看,这次修订没有改变布图设计专有权的取得方式——仍以登记为基础,也不改变民事保护的基本框架;改变的是登记环节要交什么、声明写什么、以及声明与保护范围之间如何对应。对已经持有登记或以许可方式使用布图设计的企业,需要重新检查的是登记档案与合同台账,而不是权利类型本身。

术语口径也需留意:条例所使用的是”布图设计””独创性””商业利用””非自愿许可”等表述,与著作权法上的”作品”、专利法上的”专利”并非同一概念。内部合规文件、供应商合同与技术许可协议在援引时,宜沿用条例用语,避免因概念混用而导致权利基础表述不准。

2026 年的关键进展

独创性,写进档案。 第 22 条把独创性声明列入法定登记文件,要求指明独创性的设计区域、设计要点及相应功能。若独创性体现为布图设计整体,第 24 条要求就此具体说明。第 23 条要求提交的复制件或图样能清楚显示独创性部分,因此图样与声明必须一并准备,而不能先出图样、后补声明。司法部发布的专家解读即按这一思路解释独创性声明制度(https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrjdhy/202608/t20260803_538208.html)。

保护范围。 依第 34 条,保护范围以登记的复制件或图样所显示者为准,独创性声明可用于解释独创性。因此声明不只是满足形式要求:它在侵权比对中成为解释工具,写得含糊,权利人对自己已获登记的布图设计反而只能主张更窄的范围。

登记纪律。 第 20 条要求登记申请以真实创作活动为基础,不得弄虚作假;第 27 条规定,明显不符合规定的应予驳回。获准登记之后,第 30 条允许任何人请求撤销;第 31 条规定,登记被撤销的专有权视为自始即不存在——这一后果具有溯及力,会波及此前已经登记的转让与许可。第 33 条新增权利恢复程序,为耽误期限的权利人提供了一条回归路径。

保护期与三个时间点。 第 17 条规定保护期为 10 年,自登记申请日或世界任何地方首次商业利用之日起算,以较前日期为准;并规定无论是否登记或投入商业利用,自创作完成之日起 15 年后不再保护。第 26 条规定,世界任何地方首次商业利用之日起 2 年内未申请登记的不再予以登记。

外国申请人。 第 4 条规定,外国人、外国企业创作的布图设计首先在中国境内投入商业利用的,或其所属国与中国签订保护协议、共同参加有关国际条约的,依条例享有专有权。第 5 条规定,在中国没有经常居所或营业所的外国人申请登记,应当委托依法设立的专利代理机构办理。

权利变动。 第 35 条规定,转让须订立书面合同,并向主管部门登记、公告,自登记之日起生效;许可须订立书面合同,并自合同生效之日起 3 个月内备案;出质须办理出质登记。第 36 条允许共有人约定权利行使方式,未约定的适用默认规则。

救济与竞争。 第 46 条规定,赔偿按权利人的实际损失或侵权人的获利确定;两者均难以确定的,参照许可使用费的倍数合理确定;对故意侵权且情节严重的,可按上述方法确定数额的 1 倍以上 5 倍以下确定赔偿。第 37 条、第 38 条分别列出不视为侵权的情形与权利用尽:为个人目的或评价、分析、研究、教学目的复制,在评价分析基础上创作出具有独创性的布图设计,独立创作出相同布图设计,以及在权利用尽范围内的行为。第 39 条规定,国家紧急状态或非常情况、公共利益目的,或经人民法院、反垄断执法机构认定构成垄断需补救时,可以给予非自愿许可。第 9 条则明确,滥用布图设计专有权排除、限制竞争构成垄断行为的,依照《反垄断法》处理。

对外资企业的实务意义

独创性声明宜当作一项撰写工程,而不是一张表格。它应由清楚哪些模块具有独创性、理由何在的工程人员起草,再由法律顾问对照拟提交的图样核对。由于第 34 条允许以声明解释保护范围,登记时的措辞实际上设定了日后主张的上限。

真实创作的要求把注意力引向记录。设计文件、版本历史、工具日志以及实际完成人员,都是日后可能被要求出示的证据,在布图设计由承包商或设计服务公司完成的情形下尤其如此。若供应商提供的布图设计并非由其本人创作,这样的安排在申请前就值得审视,因为第 31 条的溯及后果会波及建立在登记之上的一切安排。

时间上的安排格外不容拖延。自世界任何地方首次商业利用起算的 2 年,对先在境外流片、再考虑中国市场的集团而言并不宽裕;10 年是保护期,而自创作完成起 15 年是硬性上限,任何登记都无法延长。若某款产品已在境外销售多年,宜先确认首次商业利用的具体日期,再判断是否仍有登记空间。

权利变动有三个彼此独立的手续环节。已签署但未登记的转让不产生移转效力;未在合同生效后 3 个月内备案的许可,即使合同在双方之间仍然有效,合规上仍留有缺口;出质则须单独办理出质登记。共有关系宜以协议安排,而不是留给默认规则。

许可行为现在与竞争法明确并列。第 9 条写明了后果;第 39 条则在认定垄断后把非自愿许可列为补救方式之一。把布图设计与其他产品捆绑、以许可换取其他交易条件、或以难以说明理由的条件拒绝许可的许可方案,会同时在两条线上承受压力。

对多数集团而言,真正需要动手的是三件事:核对既有登记的声明是否仍足以支撑主张的保护范围;核对许可备案、转让登记与出质登记是否齐备,尤其是跨年度、跨主体的老合同;核对尚未申请登记的布图设计是否仍落在 2 年与 15 年的窗口之内。这三项工作都不涉及重新设计产品,却直接决定一份登记在争议中能起多大作用。人民网转载的答记者问对此次修订的背景与要点亦有说明(https://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0803/c461001-40773140.html),可作为内部培训与合规宣讲的基础材料。

需要说明的是,条例自 2026 年 10 月 15 日起施行,登记实务中的具体审查尺度、声明范本与补正要求,仍以主管部门的操作口径为准。上述解读依据的是条例条文与主管部门公开发布的答记者问,不构成对个案结果的判断;具体办理仍宜与专利代理机构就声明格式与图样要求逐项核对。

延伸阅读

  • 半导体与设计企业的专利、商标保护,以及三类制度之间的分工。
  • 经营者集中审查与反垄断分析中对知识产权的处理。
  • 技术许可、备案以及跨境特许权使用费的税务处理。

来源

  • 新华每日电讯·司法部、国家知识产权局就条例修订答记者问:http://mrdx.cn/content/20260804/Articel02003NR.htm
  • 司法部·独创性声明制度专家解读:https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrjdhy/202608/t20260803_538208.html
  • 人民网·答记者问转载:https://politics.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0803/c461001-40773140.html
  • 国家知识产权局官网:https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/

China’s Merger Filing Standard 2026: A One-Stop Guide for Deal Teams

  • The Merger Filing Standard took effect on 1 October 2026, issued by SAMR for the first time in the form of a market-regulation industry standard.
    市场监管总局以市场监管行业标准形式发布的《经营者集中申报规范》已于 2026 年 10 月 1 日施行,这是申报要求首次以行业标准形式作系统整合。
  • The standard consolidates existing filing practice rather than creating a new notification obligation.
    该规范整合的是既有申报实务,并未新设申报义务;申报义务仍来自反垄断法与国务院规定的申报标准。
  • Six chapters and six appendices answer three questions: whether a deal must be filed, what must be submitted, and how acceptance and review run.
    六章、六个附录回答三个问题:交易是否需要申报、应提交哪些文件资料、受理与审查流程如何运转。
  • Four earlier filing guidance documents were repealed once the standard took effect.
    原有的四部申报指导性文件在规范施行后予以废止,申报材料应按新规范统一准备。
  • SAMR’s overseas antitrust compliance platform has been live since 10 September 2026 and covers 135 countries and regions.
    市场监管总局海外反垄断合规服务平台已于 2026 年 9 月 10 日上线,汇集 135 个国家和地区的反垄断法律法规、典型案例与执法动态。
  • The revised overseas antitrust compliance guide has completed public consultation but has not yet been issued.
    《企业境外反垄断合规指引》修订稿已完成公开征求意见,但截至目前尚未出台,现行版本仍是有效文本。

China’s Merger Filing Standard 2026: A One-Stop Guide for Deal Teams | 2026 年中国经营者集中申报规范:交易团队实操指南

Overview

Every China-related transaction begins with the same three questions. Does this deal have to be notified? If so, what goes into the filing? And how does the file move through acceptance and review? Since 1 October 2026, a large part of the answer sits in a single document.

The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has issued the Merger Filing Standard, which for the first time gathers the filing requirements into a market-regulation industry standard. It runs to six chapters and six appendices. It does not create a new duty to notify: that duty continues to flow from the Anti-Monopoly Law and the turnover thresholds set by the State Council. What the standard changes is how the duty is assessed and how a notification is assembled — from separate guidance notes into one structured reference.

That distinction is worth holding on to. A standard is drafted to be applied the same way by different reviewers, which makes it a steadier planning tool for deal teams and makes ad hoc departures from the text harder to justify in an investment paper.

Key developments in 2026

One document, three questions. The standard is organised around what a filing party actually has to decide. First, whether notification is required: the situations that amount to a concentration, the State Council thresholds, the transactions that fall below the thresholds but still need to be notified, and the circumstances in which notification is exempt. Second, what has to be submitted: the main content of the notification form and the particular requirements that apply to simple cases. Third, how to prepare and submit a file, and how acceptance and review proceed.

Four older guidance documents retired. The standard absorbs and replaces four documents that practitioners had worked from for years — the guidance on merger notification, on notification documents and materials, on simple case notification, and on the naming of case filings. All four were repealed when the standard took effect. Any playbook that still cites them is out of date.

Simple cases in the spotlight. On 10 October 2026 SAMR held a press conference on the results of the simple case review system, addressed by Xu Lefu, Director-General of the Second Bureau of Anti-Monopoly. The timing is telling: the lighter procedure for transactions that raise no obvious competition concerns is where clearer filing requirements pay off most directly.

An overseas compliance platform. SAMR’s overseas antitrust compliance service platform went live on 10 September 2026. It gathers antitrust laws and regulations, representative cases and enforcement developments from 135 countries and regions, and offers four functions: legal lookup, outbound guidance, case warnings and regulatory alerts. For a foreign group it is a useful mirror — a way to see how Chinese regulators describe the regimes the group already knows.

A revised outbound guide, still pending. The revision of the Compliance Guide for Enterprises’ Overseas Antitrust Activities has completed its public consultation. The draft reflects regulatory trends such as the digital economy, refines the rules of key jurisdictions, and adds channels for pursuing remedies, 15 typical cases and six appendices of toolkits. It has not been issued. Until it is, the current guide remains the operative text, and planning that leans on the new remedies channels or the case library is planning against a draft.

Capacity building alongside the rules. In July 2026 SAMR launched a special action on overseas antitrust compliance capacity, setting out 12 key tasks across four areas with the aim of visible results within a year. Briefings have been held in Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu, and China has signed competition cooperation documents with 39 countries and regions. The authority is building outbound compliance infrastructure while tightening the inbound filing standard.

Practical implications for foreign businesses

  • Rebuild the playbook. With the four old guidance documents repealed, templates, board papers and adviser instructions should be re-based on the standard’s six chapters and six appendices. It is easiest before the next deal rather than during it.
  • Screen early against the notification test. The standard sets out the concentration situations, the thresholds, the below-threshold cases that still need filing and the exemptions in one sequence. Running that sequence at term-sheet stage costs far less than discovering an obligation at signing.
  • Choose the track deliberately. Simple case filings carry their own documentation requirements, separate from the ordinary pack. The choice should be reasoned and recorded, because it drives both the evidence set and the internal timeline.
  • Read the platform as a two-way tool. A platform covering 135 jurisdictions is built for Chinese companies going out, but it also shows foreign groups how their own regimes are summarised for a Chinese audience.
  • Do not plan against the draft guide. The revised outbound guide, its 15 typical cases and its six toolkits are not yet in force. Where a compliance memo relies on them, label them as draft material.

Related reading

  • SAMR’s antitrust portal, where the standard and related notices are published: https://www.samr.gov.cn/
  • Report on the 10 October 2026 press conference: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694970422000960036/
  • Report on the overseas compliance platform and the draft guide: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694951789489177130/

Sources

  • State Administration for Market Regulation — official portal, antitrust publications: https://www.samr.gov.cn/
  • CNR report on the standard’s six chapters and six appendices, and the repeal of four guidance documents: https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202509303527791467.html
  • Zhongxin Jingwei report on the 10 October 2026 press conference: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694970422000960036/
  • Xinhua Daily report on the platform and the draft revised guide: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694951789489177130/

2026 年中国经营者集中申报规范:交易团队实操指南

概述

涉及中国的交易,开头总是同样三个问题:这笔交易要不要申报?如果要,材料里放什么?文件递进去之后,受理和审查怎么走?自 2026 年 10 月 1 日起,这三个问题的答案有很大一部分集中在同一份文件里,而不是散落在若干份年份不同的指导意见当中。

市场监管总局发布了《经营者集中申报规范》,首次以市场监管行业标准的形式,把申报要求系统整合起来。规范共六章、六个附录。它并没有新设申报义务——申报义务仍来自《反垄断法》以及国务院规定的申报标准,这一点在判断交易是否需要申报时不能混淆。规范改变的是判断义务的方式和组装申报文件的方式:过去散落在若干份指导意见里的内容,现在收进了一个有结构的参照文本。

这层区别值得记住。标准是为”不同审查人员按同一口径适用”而写的,对交易团队来说,它是更稳定的规划工具;同时,内部投资备忘录里若想偏离文本另作解释,也更难自圆其说。换句话说,过去申报更像是一门靠经验传授的手艺,现在它被写成了一份可以被逐条对照的文本——这对第一次在中国做交易、或者隔了几年才回来的团队尤其重要。

对境外收购方、合资伙伴及其顾问而言,还有一层附带效果:需要同时翻阅的文件变少了。以往判断一个细节,往往要在几份指导意见之间来回比对,甚至要参考过往案例的做法;现在同一件事大概率能在规范的某一章或某个附录里找到落点。这不意味着判断变简单了,但至少讨论的起点统一了——无论交易团队在北京、香港还是伦敦,翻的是同一份文本,争论的也就不再是”该看哪份文件”。

需要提醒的是,规范的定位是”申报怎么做”,而不是”交易能不能做”。竞争影响的实体评估仍然按《反垄断法》的框架推进,规范解决的是程序与材料层面的确定性。把两者分开,才不会在项目会上把”材料齐了”误当成”审查过了”。

2026 年的主要进展

一份文件,三个问题。 规范围绕申报方真正要做的判断来组织。第一,是否需要申报:构成集中的情形、国务院规定的申报标准、未达到标准但仍需申报的情形,以及豁免申报的情形。第二,需要提交什么:申报表的主要内容,以及简易案件适用的特别要求。第三,如何准备和提交、受理与审查如何推进。这三组问题原本分散在不同文件里,现在按顺序排在一处,实务上的好处是可以用同一份文本完成从”要不要报”到”怎么报”的整段推演。

四部旧指导文件退场。 规范吸收并取代了实务界沿用多年的四份文件——《关于经营者集中申报的指导意见》《关于申报文件资料的指导意见》《关于简易案件申报的指导意见》《关于规范经营者集中案件申报名称的指导意见》。规范施行后,上述四部文件予以废止。任何仍在引用它们的申报手册、模板库或顾问指示,都已经过期。值得注意的是,其中一份专门规范”案件申报名称”,说明连案卷命名这类细节也被纳入了统一口径,交易团队在立案环节的往返沟通应当相应减少。

简易案件被单独摆到台前。 2026 年 10 月 10 日,市场监管总局召开”经营者集中简易案件审查制度成效”专题新闻发布会,反垄断二司司长徐乐夫出席。会议回顾了简易案件审查制度的运行成效。时点值得注意:对不存在明显竞争关注交易适用的较轻程序,恰恰是”申报要求更清楚”最能直接见效的地方——材料清单明确,申报方就少走弯路,审查方也少发补正通知。把这两件事放在同一场发布里讲,也方便媒体和企业在同一次沟通中理解”标准”与”通道”的关系。

海外合规服务平台。 市场监管总局的海外反垄断合规服务平台已于 2026 年 9 月 10 日上线。平台汇集 135 个国家和地区的反垄断法律法规、典型案例与执法动态,设有法规查询、出海指引、案例警示、动态预警四项功能。四项功能的排列本身透露了使用场景:先查规则,再看路怎么走,然后用案例校准风险判断,最后靠预警盯住变化。对跨国集团来说,它是一面可用的镜子——可以看到中国监管者如何描述自己早已熟悉的那些法域。

境外合规指引修订稿仍在路上。 《企业境外反垄断合规指引》修订稿已完成公开征求意见。修订稿体现数字经济等监管趋势,细化重点司法辖区规定,新增维权救济渠道、15 个典型案例和 6 个附录工具箱。指引尚未出台。在出台之前,现行版本仍是有效文本;依赖新救济渠道或案例库做规划,等于按草案做规划。

这一点在实务上容易被忽略。修订稿新增的内容看起来都很”可用”——救济渠道可以直接写进应对预案,案例可以拿来做培训材料,工具箱可以当作自查清单。但征求意见稿与生效文本之间往往还有距离,条目编号、表述边界甚至章节归属都可能调整。比较稳妥的做法是:把修订稿当作观察监管取向的窗口,把现行指引当作对外承诺的依据。

规则之外的能力建设。 2026 年 7 月,市场监管总局启动”海外反垄断合规能力提升专项行动”,部署 4 方面 12 项重点任务,力争一年见效。北京、上海、江苏等地已开展合规宣讲;我国已与全球 39 个国家和地区签署竞争领域合作文件。把平台与专项行动放在一起看,方向很清楚:在收紧境内申报标准的同时,总局也在搭建面向境外的合规基础设施。对同时在”引进来”和”走出去”两条线上运作的跨国集团而言,这意味着同一套反垄断知识要能同时服务两个方向——境内交易按规范报得清楚,境外交易按平台和指引看得明白。

对外资企业的实务含义

  • 重做申报手册。 四部旧指导文件废止后,模板、董事会材料和顾问指示都应以规范的六章六附录为基准重新梳理。这是一项文档工作,不是策略调整,但在下一笔交易之前做,比在交易当中做要省力得多。建议同时清理共享盘里那些来源不明的旧版表格,避免团队成员误用。
  • 在早期就过一遍申报测试。 规范把构成集中的情形、申报标准、未达标但仍需申报的情形、豁免情形排在同一个顺序里。在条款清单阶段就跑完这个顺序,成本远低于在签约时才发现存在申报义务。具体做法上,可以把这几步做成一份一页纸的筛查表,由法务与业务在立项会上共同确认。
  • 有意识地选择通道。 简易案件申报有自己的文件要求,与普通案件的材料包分开。通道选择应当有理由、有记录,因为它同时决定证据清单和内部时间表;如果一开始按简易案件准备,后来发现需要转普通程序,返工量会集中在最紧张的时间段里。
  • 把平台当作双向工具用。 覆盖 135 个法域的平台是为中国企业走出去而建的,但它同时也展示了境外法域如何被概括给中文读者。做集团内部沟通时,这类”对方视角下的我们”往往比自制的说明材料更有说服力。
  • 不要按草案做规划。 境外合规指引修订稿及其 15 个典型案例、6 个工具箱尚未生效。合规备忘录如引用这些内容,应明确标注为草案材料,并注明所依据的是征求意见稿而非正式发布文本。

延伸阅读

  • 市场监管总局官网反垄断栏目,规范及相关公告的发布渠道:https://www.samr.gov.cn/
  • 关于 2026 年 10 月 10 日简易案件审查制度成效发布会的报道:https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694970422000960036/
  • 关于海外反垄断合规服务平台与境外合规指引修订稿的报道:https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694951789489177130/

来源

  • 国家市场监督管理总局 — 官网,反垄断二司公告与政策发布栏目,可查规范文本及配套发布:https://www.samr.gov.cn/
  • 央广网报道 — 《经营者集中申报规范》六章六附录的构成,以及四部申报指导性文件废止的安排:https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202509303527791467.html
  • 中新经纬 — 2026 年 10 月 10 日”经营者集中简易案件审查制度成效”专题新闻发布会报道:https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694970422000960036/
  • 新京报 — 海外反垄断合规服务平台上线与《企业境外反垄断合规指引》修订稿征求意见情况:https://www.toutiao.com/article/7694951789489177130/

China’s Revised Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Digital Economy, FDI Screening and Private Litigation Signals for Cross-border Dealmaking (2026)

  • On 22 September 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation released a draft revision of the Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for public comment, with feedback due by 29 September 2026 — the first systemic revision of the 2021 guidelines, which had five chapters and 27 articles.
    市场监管总局于 2026 年 9 月 22 日就《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为 2026 年 9 月 29 日;这是对 2021 年发布、共五章 27 条的原指引的首次系统性修订。
  • The revised draft expands to 33 articles and six appendices.
    修订后扩充至 33 条及 6 个附录。
  • Three priorities: rising overseas antitrust attention to the digital economy, a high incidence of extraterritorial antitrust litigation and investigations, and insufficient corporate familiarity with the rules of different jurisdictions.
    三方面重点:境外反垄断执法对数字经济的关注持续升温、域外反垄断诉讼和调查数量高发、企业对不同司法辖区规则辨识度不足。
  • The draft embeds digital-economy enforcement points in the monopoly-agreement, abuse-of-dominance and concentration chapters, updates the latest merger notification thresholds of the EU, the United States and Germany, and flags foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.
    修订草案在垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位、经营者集中等专章中列入境外执法机构对数字经济的监管要点,更新欧盟、美国、德国等主要司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准,并提示关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。
  • On litigation, it adds the rules of major jurisdictions on bringing private civil antitrust lawsuits, filling a gap in the 2021 text, and replaces the general “some jurisdictions…” wording with itemised jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction descriptions.
    在诉讼方面,新增主要司法辖区关于发起私人民事诉讼的规定,填补原指引空白;并将原指引中”有的司法辖区……”的笼统表述细化为对代表性司法辖区的逐一列明。
  • It also adds a chapter on service support and access to compliance resources, 15 recent global antitrust cases, and six practical appendices covering a risk self-check list, a dawn-raid response process and a merger notification process.
    还新增”服务保障与合规资源获取”专章、15 个近年全球反垄断典型案例,以及风险自查清单、突袭检查应对流程、并购申报流程等六个实操性附录。
  • Status matters: this is a consultation draft, not yet finalised or in force, and the operative text remains the 2021 guidelines.
    重要提示:这是征求意见稿,尚未定稿生效,现行有效文本仍是 2021 年版指引。

China’s Revised Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Digital Economy, FDI Screening and Private Litigation Signals for Cross-border Dealmaking (2026) | 中国修订企业境外反垄断合规指引:数字经济、外资安全审查与私人民事诉讼的新提示

Overview

On 22 September 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published a draft revision of the Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for public comment, with feedback due by 29 September 2026. The draft is the first systemic revision of the guidelines issued in 2021, which had five chapters and 27 articles; the revised text runs to 33 articles and six appendices. Because it is a consultation draft, the 2021 guidelines remain the operative text. The signals matter to cross-border dealmaking: the draft folds digital-economy enforcement into the core chapters, updates merger notification thresholds in the EU, the United States and Germany, adds private civil antitrust litigation to the risk map, and asks companies to watch foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.

Scope: who the guidelines speak to

The guidelines apply to Chinese companies doing business abroad and to companies operating in China whose activities may affect overseas markets, and the existing rules cover activities including exports, overseas investment and mergers and acquisitions. That scope is why the draft is worth reading even for groups that are not Chinese-owned: a China-based entity whose conduct reaches an overseas market can sit inside the same framework, and its compliance programme has to be built for the jurisdictions the draft now describes in detail.

What the consultation proposes

The regulator said the revision responds to five years of change: major jurisdictions have overhauled their antitrust rules, enforcement has intensified, digital platform conduct is scrutinised more closely, and cross-border merger review has tightened, while the 2021 text did not reflect digital-economy enforcement or the new merger-review landscape. It also noted that, as China’s trade scale and corporate globalisation have grown, some key industries and firms have faced overseas antitrust investigations or litigation, raising the challenges and risks of operating abroad.

Three revision priorities

Digital economy and updated merger thresholds

The draft embeds overseas enforcers’ digital-economy concerns in the chapters on monopoly agreements, abuse of market dominance and concentrations of undertakings. It updates the latest merger notification thresholds of major jurisdictions including the EU, the United States and Germany, and advises companies to pay attention to foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.

Private civil antitrust litigation

Against a high incidence of extraterritorial antitrust litigation and investigations, the draft adds, alongside administrative fines and criminal liability, the rules of major jurisdictions on bringing private civil antitrust lawsuits — filling a gap in the 2021 guidelines.

Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction detail

The draft selects representative jurisdictions: those with active antitrust enforcement, large volumes of Chinese investment and M&A, and distinctive antitrust regimes. It turns the 2021 text’s general “some jurisdictions…” wording into itemised descriptions, so that companies can identify risk effectively when investing, acquiring or operating in a given jurisdiction.

New chapter, cases and appendices

The draft adds a chapter on “service support and access to compliance resources”, covering professional service resources, support from social organisations, government service support, channels for obtaining compliance information and the building of a compliance resource library, and setting out how companies obtain remedies and raise issues with the authorities. It adds 15 typical cases from recent global antitrust litigation and investigations, describing the background, the outcome and the compliance lessons. Six appendices turn the guidance into a working toolkit: a self-check list of overseas antitrust risks, key points for building a compliance management system, a dawn-raid response process, an antitrust litigation response process, a merger notification and review process, and the concentration notification standards and features of selected jurisdictions.

Status: a draft, not yet in force

The document is a consultation draft. Comments close on 29 September 2026, and the text has not been finalised or brought into effect. The operative guidance remains the 2021 version. Readers should treat the draft as a signal of direction rather than as a current legal standard.

What it means for foreign-invested groups

For foreign-invested enterprises and their overseas parents, the draft is a map of how Chinese regulators classify and frame “overseas antitrust risk” in cross-border M&A and in global compliance programmes. Because it also flags foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review, groups designing two-way investment structures should place China-side security review and host-country-side review on the same timeline and condition list, rather than treating an antitrust filing as the only regulatory gate. In practice, a deal timetable should carry, side by side, the merger notification in each relevant jurisdiction, any security review triggered in the host country, and any China-side review that the structure brings into play. The draft’s value lies less in new prohibitions — it introduces none — than in the checklist discipline it imposes on how those threads are tracked.

Practical steps for deal teams

Map each target jurisdiction’s merger notification thresholds against the draft’s updated list; check whether the transaction touches digital-economy conduct that enforcers scrutinise; add private civil litigation exposure to the risk register; and use the six appendices as templates for the deal file. Keep a dated record of the thresholds applied, so that a later revision can be reconciled against the position taken at signing. Because the text is a draft, verify the final version before relying on any specific threshold.

Sources

  • 市场监管总局《关于公开征求〈企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)〉意见的公告》: https://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/art/2026/art_b417f77da67d45ab99242f19058171ab.html
  • State Administration for Market Regulation, “China’s market regulator to update antitrust compliance guidance for firms operating overseas”: https://english.samr.gov.cn/News/PressReleases/art/2026/art_d747dfe650644c61b38013c0be2441ca.html
  • 经济观察网《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引公开征求意见》: https://www.eeo.com.cn/2026/0922/1045576.shtml
  • 腾讯新闻《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引征求意见 新增数字经济监管与私人民事诉讼规定》: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260922A0AR2P00
  • 福建省商务厅 风险分析(《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》要点): https://swt.fujian.gov.cn/mqchzhfwpt/chzx/fxts/mrfxfx/202609/t20260923_7217514.htm
  • 国家市场监督管理总局: https://www.samr.gov.cn/

中国修订企业境外反垄断合规指引:数字经济、外资安全审查与私人民事诉讼的新提示

概述

2026 年 9 月 22 日,市场监管总局就《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为 2026 年 9 月 29 日。这是对 2021 年发布、共五章 27 条的原指引的首次系统性修订,修订后扩充至 33 条及 6 个附录。由于是征求意见稿,现行有效文本仍是 2021 年版指引。修订草案释放的信号与跨境交易相关:它将数字经济执法纳入各核心专章,更新欧盟、美国、德国等司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准,把私人民事诉讼纳入风险图景,并提示企业关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。

适用范围:指引面向谁

该指引适用于在境外从事经营活动的中国企业,以及在华经营、其行为可能影响境外市场的企业;现行规则覆盖的活动包括出口、境外投资和并购等。正是这一适用范围,使得修订草案对非中资背景的集团同样值得一读:一家位于中国、其行为触及境外市场的实体,可能处在同一框架之内,其合规体系需要针对草案如今逐一详述的司法辖区来搭建。

征求意见稿提出什么

市场监管总局表示,此次修订回应五年来的变化:全球主要司法辖区反垄断制度发生变革,执法力度持续加码,对数字平台行为的监管更严,跨境并购审查收紧,而 2021 年版文本未能反映数字经济领域的执法动向与并购审查的新变化。同时,随着外贸规模扩大与中国企业全球化进程加速,部分重点行业和企业遭遇境外反垄断调查或诉讼,”出海”挑战和风险增加。

三方面修订重点

数字经济与更新的申报标准

修订草案在垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位、经营者集中等专章中,列入境外反垄断执法机构对数字经济的关注。它明确了欧盟、美国、德国等主要司法辖区最新的经营者集中申报标准,并提示企业关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。

私人民事诉讼

针对域外反垄断诉讼和调查高发的趋势,修订草案在行政罚款与刑事责任之外,新增主要司法辖区关于发起私人民事诉讼的规定,填补了原指引在此领域的空白。

司法辖区的逐一列明

修订草案选取反垄断执法活跃、中国企业投资并购量大、反垄断法律制度有特殊性的代表性司法辖区,将原指引中”有的司法辖区……”的笼统表述细化为列举式描述,以便企业在相应司法辖区开展投资并购或从事经营行为时有效识别风险。

新增专章、案例与附录

修订草案新增”服务保障与合规资源获取”专章,内容含专业服务资源、社会团体支持、政府服务保障、合规信息获取渠道、合规资源库建设,列明企业获得救济、反映问题的方式和渠道。它新增 15 个近年全球反垄断诉讼和调查的典型案例,介绍案情背景、处罚结果及合规启示。六个附录把指引变成可用的工具箱:企业境外反垄断风险自查清单、合规管理制度建设要点、突袭检查应对流程、反垄断诉讼应对流程、并购申报和审查流程,以及部分司法辖区经营者集中申报标准及特点。

定位:这是草案,尚未生效

该文件是征求意见稿。意见反馈截止于 2026 年 9 月 29 日,文本尚未定稿生效,现行有效指引仍是 2021 年版。读者宜将草案视为方向性信号,而非现行法律标准。

对外资集团意味着什么

对外资企业及其境外母公司而言,修订草案呈现了中国监管机关对跨境并购与全球合规体系中”境外反垄断风险”的分类与应对框架。由于草案同时提示关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查,设计双向投资架构的集团,应将中国侧安全审查与东道国侧审查纳入同一时间表与条件清单,而不是把反垄断申报当作唯一的监管关卡。在实际操作中,交易时间表应当并列承载各相关司法辖区的经营者集中申报、东道国触发的安全审查,以及架构所牵动的中国侧审查。修订草案的价值不在于新增禁止性规定——它并未引入此类规定——而在于它要求以清单化的纪律跟踪上述各条线索。

交易团队的实操步骤

将各目标司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准与草案更新的清单逐项对照;核查交易是否涉及执法机构重点关注的数字经济行为;将私人民事诉讼风险纳入风险登记册;并以六个附录作为交易文件的模板。对适用的申报标准保留带日期的记录,以便后续修订时能与签约时的判断相互核对。由于文本尚为草案,在依赖任何具体申报标准前,应核实最终版本。

来源

  • 市场监管总局《关于公开征求〈企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)〉意见的公告》: https://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/art/2026/art_b417f77da67d45ab99242f19058171ab.html
  • 国家市场监督管理总局英文新闻稿《China’s market regulator to update antitrust compliance guidance for firms operating overseas》: https://english.samr.gov.cn/News/PressReleases/art/2026/art_d747dfe650644c61b38013c0be2441ca.html
  • 经济观察网《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引公开征求意见》: https://www.eeo.com.cn/2026/0922/1045576.shtml
  • 腾讯新闻《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引征求意见 新增数字经济监管与私人民事诉讼规定》: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260922A0AR2P00
  • 福建省商务厅 风险分析(《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》要点): https://swt.fujian.gov.cn/mqchzhfwpt/chzx/fxts/mrfxfx/202609/t20260923_7217514.htm
  • 国家市场监督管理总局: https://www.samr.gov.cn/

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines

  • On 27 August 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements for public comment, with feedback due by 10 September 2026.
    2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,意见反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。
  • The draft implements the “dual-penalty” rule introduced by the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law: legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may each be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear individual responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement.
    征求意见稿落地2022年《反垄断法》确立的”双罚制”:对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员,反垄断执法机构可以对其处一百万元以下罚款。
  • Individual responsibility attaches to those who organise, lead, decide, command, or instigate, approve or connive at the conclusion of a monopoly agreement; harsher treatment is reserved for agreements harming national interests in key areas such as people’s livelihoods, ecology, work safety, financial capital and data security.
    对达成垄断协议起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用,或授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议的个人追究责任;涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的垄断协议,将严格追究个人责任。
  • Aggravating factors include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into a monopoly agreement or obstructing others from withdrawing from one; co-operation with the investigation and proactive removal of harm may lead to lighter penalties; individual liability does not lapse on resignation or departure.
    教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议或妨碍他人停止参与等构成从重处罚情节;积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可依法从轻处罚;个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除。
  • For executives of foreign-invested companies and joint ventures operating in China, the guidelines signal that antitrust compliance can no longer be treated as a purely corporate matter — individual managers face personal exposure, mirroring the personal-liability regimes long applied to executives in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
    对在华经营的外资企业与合资企业高管而言,指引意味着反垄断合规不再只是企业层面的事务——管理者个人将面临直接责任风险,这与美国、英国、澳大利亚等长期对高管施加个人责任的制度形成呼应。

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines | 反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

Overview

On 27 August 2026, SAMR published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements (《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》) and invited public comment until 10 September 2026. The draft turns a provision of the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law into an operational enforcement framework. Article 56 of the amended law already stated that legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear personal responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement. The Guidelines explain who falls into that category, which factors matter, and how penalties are calibrated.

Why the Guidelines matter now

Price-fixing, output restriction and market-division agreements are widely regarded as the most damaging form of anti-competitive conduct, and they are typically the product of collusion among executives rather than of a company acting as an abstract legal person. Before the 2022 amendment, the Anti-Monopoly Law contained no explicit personal-liability rule, and in practice “the undertaking bears responsibility while individuals walk free” — a gap that diluted deterrence. The 2022 amendment introduced the “dual-penalty” structure; the draft Guidelines now give it operational shape.

The drafting note explains that Article 56 is framed in principle-level language and needs more specific rules on the circumstances of application, the factors for identifying responsible individuals, and the calibration of sanctions. The guidelines follow roughly four years of enforcement experience, including 2025 cases in which Shanghai and Tianjin market-regulation authorities applied the personal-liability clause to executives in pharmaceutical monopoly cases. Those cases operated as tentative breakthroughs; the Guidelines are designed to make the rule uniformly applicable.

Who bears individual responsibility

Under the draft, individual responsibility arises where the legal representative, principal responsible person or directly responsible personnel of an undertaking:

  • plays an organising, leading, deciding or commanding role in reaching the monopoly agreement; or
  • instigates, approves or connives at the conclusion of the agreement.

Responsibility is not limited to those who sign documents: executives who set the strategy, chairs who run the coordination meeting, sales directors who transmit the price signal and compliance officers who turn a blind eye can all fall within the draft’s language depending on the evidence. The reference to “instigating, approving or conniving” is deliberately broad, capturing passive as well as active involvement.

Calibration: aggravating and mitigating factors

The draft sets out factors that push penalties up or down:

  • Aggravating circumstances include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into concluding a monopoly agreement, and obstructing others from ceasing participation. Agreements that harm national interests in key areas — people’s livelihoods, the ecological environment, production safety, financial capital and data security — attract strict pursuit of personal liability.
  • Mitigating circumstances include actively co-operating with the investigation and voluntarily eliminating or mitigating the harmful consequences of the agreement.
  • No escape by resignation: individual liability is not extinguished by the person’s departure from the undertaking, meaning former executives of a company under investigation can still be pursued.

What this means in practice

  • A clearer compliance baseline for executives. The Guidelines supply the previously missing detail about who is at risk and what conduct triggers exposure. For multinationals with Chinese operations, antitrust training and certification for local executives, and board-level attention to pricing, output and territorial allocation decisions, become materially more important.
  • Personal exposure rather than corporate-only risk. Fines of up to RMB 1 million per individual sit alongside corporate fines that, under the law, can reach 10 per cent of the undertaking’s turnover in the previous year. For regional heads, country managers and joint-venture general managers, the calculus of joining a cartel conversation changes.
  • Interaction with leniency. The reference to active co-operation and harm removal as mitigating factors should be read together with the existing leniency (immunity) system for undertakings that self-report; companies and individuals alike need counsel on sequencing a leniency application and individual cooperation.
  • Joint ventures and intra-group arrangements deserve special review. Pricing and market-allocation discussions inside a JV board, or coordination between a parent and a Chinese partner, can raise monopoly-agreement questions in which individual executives of both sides are exposed. The same applies to trade associations that organise output or price coordination — the individuals behind them can now be targeted directly.
  • HR and compliance governance. Consider adding individual-liability clauses to employment contracts or code-of-conduct acknowledgements, ensuring that departing executives’ files are preserved, and reviewing directors’ and officers’ insurance arrangements in light of the new personal exposure.

Practical steps

  • Review the draft and, where appropriate, submit comments to SAMR before 10 September 2026 (the public-comment channel on SAMR’s website).
  • Audit existing pricing, output, market-allocation and bid-coordination practices, especially any engagement with trade associations or industry roundtables.
  • Deliver tailored antitrust training to legal representatives, general managers, sales and procurement heads, with sign-off records retained as evidence of a compliance culture.
  • Prepare internal escalation and “stop and call counsel” protocols for any invitation to fix prices or divide markets, including inside joint-venture governance bodies.
  • Monitor the final version of the Guidelines and any provincial enforcement guidance; expect SAMR and provincial bureaus to apply the personal-liability rule in the next wave of cartel investigations.

Sources

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

Related reading

  • see also: merger control and antitrust basics for foreign investors (38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • see also: SAMR’s enforcement approach to monopolistic conduct in the 2026 cycle (13-policy-updates)

反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

概述

2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。征求意见稿把2022年修订《反垄断法》中的一项条款转化为可操作的执法框架。修订后《反垄断法》第五十六条已经写明:经营者的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的,可以处一百万元以下罚款。指引要解决的是:谁属于这几类人、何种情形构成个人责任、处罚如何裁量。

为什么现在出台

联合涨价、限制产量、划分市场等垄断协议被世界各国公认为对市场竞争损害最严重的垄断行为,而其达成往往与经营者高管之间的合谋密切相关。2022年修法前,《反垄断法》对垄断协议的个人责任没有明确规定,实践中普遍出现”单位承担责任、个人免于追责”的情形,威慑力不足。2022年修法确立”双罚制”后,起草说明指出,第五十六条的表述较为原则,在具体适用情形、认定因素及处罚裁量上需要更明确、细化的规定,因此有必要制定本指引。

指引也建立在约四年的执法探索之上:2025年,上海市市场监督管理局在上海信谊联合医药等三家经营者垄断协议案中首次适用该条款,对责任人罚款五十万元;同年天津市市场监督管理局在原料药垄断案中对四名责任人分别罚款,并对组织垄断协议的自然人罚款五十万元。个案属于制度探索,指引则致力于让该制度普遍适用。

谁承担个人责任

依征求意见稿,经营者中的以下个人对达成垄断协议负有个人责任:

  • 起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用者;或
  • 授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议者。

责任不以签字为限:定调子的高管、主持会议的董事长、传递价格信号的销售总监、睁一只眼闭一只眼的合规负责人,都可能依证据落入文义范围。”授意、批准、纵容”的表述刻意宽泛,兼顾主动参与与消极放任。

裁量:从重与从轻因素

指引给出上下调节的裁量因素:

  • 从重情形:教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议;妨碍他人停止参与垄断协议。垄断协议涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的,将严格追究个人责任。
  • 从轻情形:积极配合调查、主动消除垄断协议危害后果等。
  • 离职不免责:相关个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除——被调查企业的前高管仍可能被追责。

对外资与合资企业的现实意义

  • 高管合规基线更清晰。 指引补齐了此前缺失的细节:谁有风险、何种行为触发责任。在华经营的外企需要更重视对本地高管的反垄断培训与签署确认,董事会层面也要关注定价、产量与区域划分类决策。
  • 个人风险与企业风险并立。 个人最高百万元罚款之外,企业可能面临上一年度营业额最高10%的罚款。对区域负责人、国家经理、合资企业总经理而言,参与卡特尔对话的成本结构已彻底改变。
  • 与宽大制度衔接。 “积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可从轻”应结合企业自首宽大制度一并理解;企业与个人都需要专业意见来安排自首申请与个人配合的先后顺序。
  • 合资企业与集团内安排需专项审查。 合资企业董事会内的定价与市场划分讨论、母公司与中方伙伴之间的协调,可能引致垄断协议问题,双方高管个人均处于风险中。组织限产定价的行业协会背后的个人,现在也可能被直接追责。
  • 人事与治理安排。 可在劳动合同或行为准则中加入个人责任条款,确保离职高管档案完整留存,并据新的个人敞口审视董监高责任保险安排。

实务建议

  • 研读征求意见稿,必要时于2026年9月10日前通过总局官网意见征集渠道反馈。
  • 排查既有定价、产量、市场划分与投标协同做法,尤其涉及行业协会或行业座谈会的活动。
  • 为法定代表人、总经理、销售与采购负责人定制反垄断培训,并留存签署记录作为合规文化证据。
  • 建立内部升级与”叫停并咨询律师”机制,覆盖任何被邀请固定价格或划分市场的场景,包括合资企业治理会议之内。
  • 跟踪指引最终稿与各省级执法指引;预计总局与省级局将在下一轮卡特尔调查中适用个人责任条款。

来源

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

相关阅读

  • 见:外资投资者应知的反垄断并购与经营者集中基础(38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • 见:市场监管总局2026年轮反垄断执法动态(13-policy-updates)

Merger Review as an Anti-“Involution” Tool: The SAMR’s Six Typical Cases of 21 August 2026

  • On 21 August 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published six typical cases of concentration review aimed at curbing “involution-style” competition, spanning online audio, photovoltaics, energy storage, lithium-battery materials, auto parts and coal logistics.
    2026 年 8 月 21 日,市场监管总局公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,聚焦整治”内卷式”竞争,覆盖在线音频、光伏、储能、锂电材料、汽车零部件与煤炭物流等领域。
  • Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five conditions: the SAMR found the deal could exclude or restrict competition in China’s online-audio and online-music platform markets, and attached targeted remedies.
    腾讯收购喜马拉雅案被附加 5 项限制性条件批准:市场监管总局认定该集中对中国境内在线音频播放平台市场、网络音乐播放平台市场可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,依法附加针对性条件。
  • The other five deals were cleared unconditionally: TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy, Jingjiang Industrial’s acquisition of East Group, Cangzhou Mingzhu’s JV in lithium separators, Ningbo Huaxiang’s auto-parts JV and Tiangchi Energy’s logistics JV — all framed as consolidating capacity to escape low-end price wars.
    其余五起案件无条件批准:TCL 中环收购一道新能源、荆江实业收购易事特、沧州明珠锂电隔膜合营、宁波华翔汽车零部件合营、天池能源物流合营——均被定位为整合产能、摆脱低端价格战。
  • Delegated review is now routine in these cases: local bureaus (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shaanxi, etc.) handled the case work under the SAMR’s delegation, with at least one deal cleared in 17 days.
    委托审查已成为这些案件的常规路径:北京、重庆、上海、广东、陕西等地市场监管部门受总局委托开展审查,其中一宗合营案仅用 17 天完成全流程审查。
  • For foreign companies, the signal is twofold: China’s merger control is being used proactively to reshape industry structure and police “involution”, and conditional approvals remain a live remedy — buyers should plan remedies into deal timelines where platform or market power is involved.
    对外国企业,信号有两层:中国经营者集中审查正被积极用于重塑行业结构、治理”内卷”;附条件批准仍是现行救济工具——涉平台或市场支配力交易时,买方应把救济条件纳入交易时间表筹划。

Merger Review as an Anti-“Involution” Tool: The SAMR’s Six Typical Cases of 21 August 2026 | 经营者集中审查作为治理”内卷”工具:市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日六起典型案例

The six cases at a glance

On 21 August 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published six typical cases from its 2026 concentration-review campaign, which it has framed as serving both quality improvement and competition protection. The cases span: Tencent Holdings’ acquisition of Ximalaya (online audio); TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy (photovoltaics); Jingjiang Industrial Investment Group’s acquisition of East Group (energy storage / AI plus new energy); Cangzhou Mingzhu’s new JV with an East-Guangzhou investment vehicle (lithium-battery separators and pipe materials); Ningbo Huaxiang Xinsandian’s JV with Zhejiang Anzhi Auto Technology (high-end suspension and air-spring auto parts); and Tiangchi Energy’s new logistics JV (coal supply-chain transport). Five were cleared unconditionally; one — Tencent/Ximalaya — was approved with conditions.

The conditional approval that matters

The Tencent/Ximalaya deal is the case with the most compliance-relevant detail. The transaction was filed on 11 June 2025 and accepted on 3 September 2025. After market investigation and analysis, the SAMR concluded that the concentration could have the effect of excluding or restricting competition in China’s online-audio platform market and online-music platform market. On 12 May 2026 it approved the deal subject to five conditions designed to address the identified competition concerns and stakeholder expectations — preserving the competitive structure of the online-audio and online-music markets, protecting the interests of undertakings and consumers, and guarding against platform anti-competitive conduct. The case shows that in platform-economy deals, conditional approval with behavioural remedies is a live, structural feature of Chinese merger control, not a theoretical possibility.

Why the other five were cleared

The five unconditional clearances share a logic: the transactions consolidate capacity in sectors where the regulator sees low-quality, homogenous “involution” as the main problem. TCL Zhonghuan acquiring Yidao New Energy integrates BC-cell technology and reduces inefficient supply in photovoltaics, pushing the sector from scale expansion to quality improvement. Jingjiang Industrial’s acquisition of East Group channels state capital and industrial platforms into transforming the target into an “AI plus new energy” services provider. Cangzhou Mingzhu’s JV strengthens regional lithium-battery-material supply; Ningbo Huaxiang’s JV focuses high-end auto parts and helps break dependence on external technology; and Tiangchi Energy’s JV vertically integrates coal production with logistics to secure outbound transport capacity. In each case the regulator’s analysis explicitly links the transaction to curing price wars and improving industry structure.

Delegated review as the operating model

A striking operational detail is the role of provincial bureaus. Under the SAMR’s delegation system, the case work was handled by local authorities: Beijing reviewed TCL Zhonghuan/Yidao (accepted 3 April, cleared 25 May), Chongqing handled Jingjiang/East Group (accepted 9 January, cleared 22 January), Shanghai handled the Ningbo Huaxiang JV, Guangdong the Cangzhou Mingzhu JV, and Shaanxi the Tiangchi Energy JV — with the Cangzhou deal completed in 17 days end to end. The message for deal teams is practical: delegation is now the default for many cases, so the relevant timetable and dialogue partner is often the provincial bureau, and streamlined simple-case processing can deliver genuinely fast clearances.

What foreign companies should take away

For foreign acquirers, the August package carries three lessons. First, policy intent: Chinese merger control is an active industrial-policy instrument — deals that consolidate capacity to exit “involution” are welcomed and cleared quickly, while deals that entrench market power face conditions. Second, remedy planning: in platform or market-power situations, conditional approval with behavioural remedies should be assumed possible; building remedy negotiation into the deal timeline, and structuring the transaction to address competition concerns early, reduces uncertainty. Third, process: expect provincial-bureau delegation and prepare filings accordingly — engage the right bureau, budget for delegated timelines, and use the streamlined track where the case qualifies as simple. The six cases are also a useful precedent library: the SAMR’s published reasoning shows how it weighs market definition, competitive effects and remedies in the sectors now subject to its “anti-involution” scrutiny. Deal teams should download and circulate the full text to their internal antitrust review checklists, since the reasoning style and the kinds of evidence the regulator cites are the best available guide to how future filings in these sectors will be assessed.

Sources


经营者集中审查作为治理”内卷”工具:市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日六起典型案例

六起案件一览

2026 年 8 月 21 日,市场监管总局公布 2026 年经营者集中反垄断监管效能提升专项行动的六起典型案例,覆盖:腾讯控股收购喜马拉雅股权案(在线音频);TCL 中环收购一道新能源股权案(光伏);湖北荆江实业投资集团收购易事特集团股权案(储能/”AI+新能源”);沧州明珠与广州增城东部中心新设合营企业案(锂电隔膜与管材);宁波华翔新三电与浙江安致汽车科技新设合营企业案(高端悬架与空气弹簧汽车零部件);新疆天池能源与新疆象道物流新设合营企业案(煤炭供应链物流)。其中五起无条件批准,一起——腾讯/喜马拉雅——附条件批准。

值得关注的附条件批准案

腾讯收购喜马拉雅案是合规信息量最大的一起。交易于 2025 年 6 月 11 日申报、9 月 3 日受理。经市场调查与分析,市场监管总局认定该集中对中国境内在线音频播放平台市场、网络音乐播放平台市场可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,于 2026 年 5 月 12 日附加 5 项限制性条件批准——条件直指竞争问题与各方关切,维护两个市场的公平竞争秩序,保障经营主体与消费者合法权益,防范平台反竞争行为。该案显示:平台经济交易中,附行为性救济条件的批准是中国经营者集中制度中现实、结构性的工具,而非理论可能。

其余五起为何无条件通过

五起无条件批准共享同一逻辑:交易整合了监管者眼中以低质同质”内卷”为主要问题的行业产能。TCL 中环收购一道新能源整合 BC 电池技术、减少光伏低效供给,推动行业从规模扩张转向质量提升。荆江实业收购易事特以国有资本与产业载体推动标的向”AI+新能源”综合服务商转型。沧州明珠合营强化区域锂电材料配套;宁波华翔合营聚焦高端汽车零部件、助力突破外部技术依赖;天池能源合营纵向整合煤炭生产与物流、保障出疆运力。每起案件中,监管分析都把交易与治理价格战、改善行业结构直接关联。

委托审查成为运营模式

一个引人注目的操作细节是省级部门的角色。在市场监管总局委托审查制度下,案件由地方部门承办:北京审查 TCL 中环/一道新能源(4 月 3 日受理、5 月 25 日批准),重庆承办荆江/易事特(1 月 9 日受理、1 月 22 日批准),上海承办宁波华翔合营,广东承办沧州明珠合营,陕西承办天池能源合营——沧州案全流程仅用 17 天。对交易团队的实操信息:委托已是许多案件的默认路径,相关时间表与对接方往往是省级部门,简化的简易案件处理可带来真正快速的批准。

外国企业应吸取什么

对外国收购方,8 月一揽子有三重启示。第一,政策意图:中国经营者集中审查是积极的产业政策工具——整合产能以退出”内卷”的交易受到欢迎并快速放行,而巩固市场支配力的交易将面临条件。第二,救济筹划:涉平台或市场支配力情形,应假设附行为性救济的条件批准可能发生;把救济谈判纳入交易时间表、尽早以交易结构回应竞争关切,可降低不确定性。第三,流程:预期省级委托并相应准备申报——对接正确部门、按委托时间表预算、符合简易条件的走简化通道。六起案例也是有用的先例库:总局公布的论证展示其在当前”反内卷”审视行业里如何权衡相关市场界定、竞争影响与救济。交易团队应下载并通读全文、并入内部反垄断审查清单——论证风格与监管引用的证据类型,是判断这些行业未来申报将如何被评估的最佳可得指南。

Sources

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing

  • Foreign acquisitions, mergers, or acquisitions of control over a Chinese business may trigger a concentration filing to SAMR; the regime is mandatory and suspensory.
    外资收购、合并或取得中国企业控制权可能触发向国家市场监督管理总局的经营者集中申报;该制度具有强制性与暂停性。
  • The 2024 thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024) are global RMB 12bn / China RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties), cutting notifiable deals by an estimated 30%.
    2024年阈值(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行)为全球120亿/中国40亿/两方各8亿元,预计减少约30%的申报量。
  • A minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a notifiable concentration; pure intra-group reorganizations are exempt.
    赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属应申报集中;纯集团内部重组可豁免。
  • SAMR review runs an ordinary 30+90 day (extendable 60) procedure or a simplified “double 20 days” procedure, with outcomes of unconditional clearance, remedies, or prohibition.
    SAMR审查分普通程序30+90日(可延长60)或简易程序”双20天”,结果含无条件批准、附加条件批准或禁止。
  • “Gun-jumping” (acting before clearance) risks divestiture, fines up to RMB 5 million, and up to 10% of prior-year turnover for serious violations under the 2022 AML amendment.
    “抢跑”(获批前实施)风险包括责令恢复原状、最高500万元罚款,及依2022年修法情节严重最高处上一年度营业额10%罚款。
  • Foreign investors must keep closing, control, and integration waiting for SAMR clearance, and carve out China if a global deal closes elsewhere first.
    外国投资者须使交割、控制权与整合等待SAMR批准,若全球交易先在其他法域关闭则应拆分中国部分。

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing | 反垄断与经营者集中申报

Overview

When a foreign investor acquires a Chinese company, merges with a local competitor, or takes control of a domestic business, the transaction may trigger a concentration filing (经营者集中申报) under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The filing is made to the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), the national antitrust enforcement authority. The regime is mandatory and suspensory: if thresholds are met, the deal may not close (and control may not be exercised) until clearance is granted. Getting this wrong exposes the parties to “gun-jumping” penalties that, since the 2022 AML amendment, can reach a percentage of turnover.

This article sets out the 2024 turnover thresholds, how SAMR reviews a concentration, the simplified versus ordinary procedure, and the practical risk of closing before clearance.

Turnover thresholds for concentration filing

The current notification thresholds are set by the State Council’s “Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings” (Order No. 773), revised and effective 26 January 2024. A concentration must be notified to SAMR in advance, and may not be implemented until cleared, where either of the following is met (based on the parties’ turnover in the previous accounting year):

  • Global test: the worldwide aggregate turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million; or
  • China test: the aggregate China turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million.

These thresholds were raised from the prior RMB 10 billion / RMB 2 billion / RMB 400 million, reducing the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30% and lowering transaction costs. Turnover of the relevant group (not just the target) counts, and special rules apply to banking, insurance, securities, and futures. Even below the thresholds, SAMR may call in a transaction if it is likely to eliminate or restrict competition (the “fall below but suspect” power).

A concentration is defined as: (a) a merger; (b) acquisition of control through equity or assets; or (c) acquisition of control or decisive influence through contracts. Note that acquiring a minority stake that confers control or decisive influence can still be a notifiable concentration. Two exemptions apply: where one party already holds >50% of the other, or where a common parent holds >50% of each — i.e., pure intra-group reorganizations.

SAMR review procedure

Upon submission, SAMR decides whether to accept the filing. Once accepted, the ordinary (non-simplified) review has two phases: an initial 30-day phase, and, if it proceeds, a further 90-day phase (extendable by 60 days in specified circumstances). A simplified procedure applies to non-controversial deals — for example, where the parties are not competitors in the same market, or one party acquires a sole control stake in a joint venture — with a compressed timetable (the regulator targets “double 20 days” for acceptance and review of simplified cases). SAMR may clear unconditionally, clear with behavioural or structural remedies (附加条件批准), or prohibit the concentration.

Parties should expect to submit a notification form, market definitions, turnover calculations, competitive-effects analysis, and (for foreign-to-China deals) information on global filings. Early pre-filing consultation with SAMR is common and reduces the risk of a long Phase 2. Since 2023, SAMR has also piloted delegated review to five provincial market-regulation bureaus for certain simplified cases, improving speed for deals centered in those regions.

Gun-jumping and enforcement risk

“Gun-jumping” means implementing a concentration — or exercising control — before clearance. The 2022 AML amendment significantly strengthened enforcement. Implementing a notifiable concentration without filing, or implementing before clearance, can result in an order to restore the prior state (divestiture / undo the deal), a fine of up to RMB 5 million for the undertaking, and — importantly — for the 2022 amendment’s proportional penalty regime, fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s turnover in the prior year where the violation is serious. Responsible individuals may also be fined. Even signing and partially closing (e.g., taking board control, consolidating financials, or integrating the business) before clearance can be caught.

The lesson for foreign investors: structure the timetable so that closing, control, and integration wait for SAMR clearance. Use a long-stop date and conditions precedent, and keep the businesses separate (no joint management, no shared systems, no consolidated reporting) until the green light. Where a global deal must close elsewhere first, carve out the China leg or ring-fence the Chinese target to avoid premature exercise of control in China.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early using worldwide and China turnover of the whole group for the prior year; remember the RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties) 2024 thresholds.
  • Map the control question — a minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a concentration.
  • Plan for suspension — make SAMR clearance a condition precedent; do not close, integrate, or exercise control in China before approval.
  • Consider simplified procedure if markets don’t overlap, and use pre-filing consultation to compress the timeline.
  • Watch the gun-jumping traps — no board control, consolidation, or integration pre-clearance; carve out China if the global deal closes earlier.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Cybersecurity & MLPS (等保) for FIEs — M&A can reset system grading and trigger new filings.
  • see also: Foreign-related dispute resolution — litigation vs. arbitration — challenging or enforcing merger decisions.
  • see also: CIETAC & international arbitration — arbitrating competition and shareholder disputes.

反垄断与经营者集中申报

概述

当外国投资者收购中国企业、与本土竞争者合并,或取得境内企业的控制权时,该交易可能触发《反垄断法》项下的经营者集中申报。申报向国家市场监督管理总局(SAMR)——反垄断执法机构——提出。该制度具有强制性与暂停性:一旦达到阈值,在获得批准前不得实施集中(亦不得行使控制权)。若处理不当,当事人将面临”抢跑”(gun-jumping)处罚;自 2022 年《反垄断法》修订后,罚款可达营业额的一定比例。

本文列明 2024 年营业额阈值、SAMR 如何审查集中、简易与普通程序的区分,以及”获批前Closing”的实务风险。

经营者集中申报的营业额阈值

现行申报阈值由《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(第 773 号令)设定,于 2024 年 1 月 26 日修订施行。集中达到以下任一标准(按参与者上一会计年度营业额计算),须事先向 SAMR 申报,未申报不得实施:

  • 全球标准:参与集中的所有经营者全球合计营业额超过120 亿元人民币,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元;或
  • 中国标准:参与集中的所有经营者中国境内合计营业额超过40 亿元,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元。

上述阈值较此前的 100 亿 / 20 亿 / 4 亿元上调,预计减少约 30% 的申报量,降低交易成本。计算以相关集团(而非仅标的)营业额为准,银行、保险、证券、期货等行业另有特别办法。即便未达阈值,若具有或可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,SAMR 仍可主动要求申报(”未达阈值但有嫌疑”权力)。

集中指:(一)经营者合并;(二)通过股权或资产取得控制权;(三)通过合同取得控制权或决定性影响。注意:取得赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍可能构成应申报集中。两类豁免适用:一方已持有另一方 50% 以上表决权股份,或同一未参与集中的经营者持有各方 50% 以上表决权股份——即纯集团内部重组。

SAMR 审查程序

受理申报后,SAMR 决定是否予以立案。立案后,普通程序分两阶段:初始30 日审查期;若进一步审查,再加90 日(特定情形下可延长 60 日)。简易程序适用于无争议的 Deal——例如当事方不在同一市场竞争,或一方取得合营企业单独控制权——时间表压缩(监管目标为简易程序”受理与审查双 20 天”)。SAMR 可无条件批准、附行为性或结构性条件批准(附加条件批准),或禁止集中。

当事人应准备申报书、相关市场界定、营业额计算、竞争效果分析,以及(外资赴华交易)全球申报信息。与 SAMR 的事前商谈十分常见,可降低进入第二阶段的风险。自 2023 年起,SAMR 还试点将部分简易案件委托五个省级市场监管部门审查,提升区域集中交易的效率。

抢跑与执法风险

“抢跑”指在未获批准前实施集中或行使控制权。2022 年《反垄断法》修订显著强化了执法。应申报而未申报,或在获批前实施集中,可能导致责令恢复原状(剥离/撤销交易)、对经营者最高500 万元罚款;更重要的是,依 2022 年修订的比例罚款机制,情节严重的可被处上一年度营业额 10% 以下的罚款。直接责任人员亦可能被罚。即便签约并部分 closing(如取得董事会控制、合并财务报表或整合业务),也可能被认定为抢跑。

对外国投资者的启示:时间表应安排为交割、控制权与整合均等待 SAMR 批准。使用最晚截止日与先决条件,在绿灯前保持标的独立(不共同管理、不共享系统、不合并报告)。若全球交易须在其他法域先 closing,应拆分中国部分或对中国标的”隔离”,以避免在中国境内过早行使控制权。

下一步建议

  • 尽早做阈值测试:使用整个集团上一年度的全球与中国营业额;牢记 2024 年 120 亿 / 40 亿 / 8 亿(两方)标准。
  • 厘清控制权问题——赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属集中。
  • 规划暂停性:将 SAMR 批准设为先决条件;获批前不在华交割、整合或行使控制权。
  • 考虑简易程序:若市场不重叠,并利用事前商谈压缩周期。
  • 警惕抢跑陷阱:获批前不得董事会控制、合并报表或整合;若全球先 closing,拆分中国部分。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:网络安全与等保(外资适用)— 并购可能重置系统定级并触发新备案。
  • 参见:涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁 — 对集中决定的异议与执行。
  • 参见:贸仲与涉外仲裁 — 仲裁竞争与股东纠纷。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

  • From 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s refined delegated-review system adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original provincial bureaus and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,市场监管总局完善后的经营者集中委托审查制度在原 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个受委托部门。
  • Delegated simple-case bureaus now total eight, and the delegated average acceptance and completion times have both stayed within roughly 20 days, materially faster than national review.
    简易案件受委托省级部门增至 8 个;受委托部门平均受理与审结时间均在约 20 天内,明显快于全国审查。
  • Zhejiang handles simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi from August 2026, giving regional companies near-by filing and review.
    2026 年 8 月起,浙江受委托承担浙江、福建、江西三省区域内经营者集中简易案件审查,区域企业可就近申报办理。
  • The SAMR also published six typical concentration cases on 21 August 2026, showing how review supports restructuring in platforms, PV, batteries, auto parts and coal logistics while curbing “involutionary” competition.
    市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、锂电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。
  • For foreign-invested groups, the changes affect where and how quickly qualifying deals are cleared, but the mandatory prior-filing threshold and substantive standards are unchanged.
    对外资集团而言,变化影响合格交易的审查地点与速度;强制事先申报门槛与实体标准不变。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026) | 经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)

Why this matters now

On 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s Announcement on Further Improving the Delegated Review System for Concentrations of Undertakings took effect. The system, which began as a pilot in August 2022 and was formalised in July 2025, now adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original delegated provincial bureaus — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi — and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases. A week later, on 21 August 2026, the SAMR published six typical cases of concentration review used to support restructuring in platform, solar-PV, battery, auto-parts and coal-logistics sectors while curbing “involutionary” competition. For foreign-invested enterprises and their advisers, the combination of wider delegation, faster regional clearance and clearer enforcement signals changes the practical geography of merger control in China.

What the expanded delegation changes

The delegated-review system is a division of work within China’s unitary concentration-review regime: the SAMR remains the reviewing authority, receives filings through the central business system, and delegates qualifying cases to provincial bureaus, which conduct the review and report back. The August 2026 changes operate on three axes. First, scope: in addition to simple cases, certain non-simple cases may now be delegated to the five original bureaus. The delegation criteria for non-simple cases include a combined market share of 15–25% in the same relevant market; or 25–35% shares in upstream and downstream markets respectively; or 25–35% shares in each relevant market for parties without horizontal or vertical relationships. Second, coverage: Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan join as delegated bureaus for simple cases, bringing the total to eight, each responsible for a defined regional territory. Zhejiang, for example, reviews simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi. Third, procedure: the SAMR has upgraded its concentration-review business system, revised the working handbook for provincial bureaus, and retained the rule that non-simple delegated cases must still have documents such as clearance decisions issued under the SAMR’s authority, while decisions with conditions or prohibitions are issued centrally by the SAMR.

Operationally, the delegated bureaus report average acceptance and completion times of about 16 and 18 days respectively — both within roughly 20 days — under the “double twenty” working standard, and simple cases account for about 90% of all concentration filings. For companies in the covered regions, the practical effect is faster, closer review: the Zhejiang bureau published a consultation phone line and a pre-filing consultation mechanism, and the entire process runs online.

The typical cases and enforcement signals

The six typical cases published on 21 August 2026 illustrate how the SAMR balances support for restructuring with restraint on harmful competition. Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five restrictive conditions (May 2026) to protect competition in online-audio and online-music markets; TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy was cleared unconditionally to consolidate solar-PV capacity; Hubei Jingjiang’s acquisition of East Group was cleared to support transformation into an “AI + new energy” services provider; and joint-venture cases in battery separators, automotive air-suspension components and coal logistics were cleared to integrate regional capacity and reduce low-level duplication. For foreign-invested companies, the enforcement posture is double-sided: genuine restructuring that improves efficiency and quality is supported, but transactions that entrench dominance or enable coordinated “involutionary” behaviour will attract conditions or prohibition — and the delegated bureaus apply the same substantive standards as the SAMR.

Practical steps

  1. Check whether delegation affects your filing. Determine whether your transaction meets the simple-case thresholds and whether the relevant market or parties sit in a delegated bureau’s territory; if so, expect local filing and faster clearance.
  2. Use pre-filing consultation. The business system and delegated bureaus (for example Zhejiang’s published hotline) allow pre-filing discussion of whether a filing is needed and how to frame the transaction.
  3. Plan the timeline around the “double twenty” standard. For qualifying cases, acceptance and completion are each targeted within 20 days; align signing, closing and financing steps accordingly.
  4. Treat simple-case status carefully. Simple-case filing is faster but still requires full and accurate notification; mischaracterisation invites correction and delay.
  5. Watch the substantive lines. The typical cases show that restrictive conditions and prohibitions are live tools for platform and network effects; conduct a realistic competition assessment before filing.
  6. Maintain group-wide notification discipline. The delegation does not lower the mandatory filing thresholds — turnover-based thresholds remain — and failure to file before closing (“gun-jumping”) remains a serious violation.

Compliance notes

The delegated-review system is administrative division of work, not decentralisation of substantive standards. The SAMR still issues conditional-approval and prohibition decisions; delegated bureaus act within their mandates and under the SAMR’s supervision. For foreign investors, the important practical change is speed and location of review, plus a clearer picture of how the SAMR treats sector restructuring. Nothing in the August 2026 changes alters the prior-filing obligation, the notification thresholds, or the penalties for closing before approval. Keep the transaction diary, engage the business system early, and treat the six typical cases as a practical guide to how restructuring proposals will be framed and assessed.


经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)/ Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 1 日,《市场监管总局关于进一步完善经营者集中委托审查制度的公告》正式施行。这一始于 2022 年 8 月试点、2025 年 7 月转正的制度,如今在原北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件的委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个简易案件受委托部门。一周后,市场监管总局于 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。对外资企业及其顾问而言,委托扩容、区域快速审结与更清晰的执法信号,共同改变了中国经营者集中的实务版图。

扩容改变了什么

委托审查制度是中国单一集中的审查体制内的分工:市场监管总局是审查机关,通过全国经营者集中业务系统统一接收申报,将符合条件的案件转受委托省级部门办理,后者审查并报告,总局作出决定。2026 年 8 月的调整沿三条轴展开。其一,范围:除简易案件外,部分非简易案件现在可委托原 5 个省级部门审查。非简易案件委托标准包括:同一相关市场合计份额 15%–25%;上下游市场份额均 25%–35%;无横向纵向关系者在每个相关市场份额均 25%–35%。其二,覆盖面:辽宁、浙江、四川加入简易案件受委托名单,受委托部门增至 8 个,各负责相应区域。例如,浙江受理浙江、福建、江西三省的简易案件。其三,程序:总局升级经营者集中反垄断业务系统、修订省级审查工作手册;非简易案件委托仍以总局名义出具批准文书,附条件批准或禁止的由总局统一发布决定。

运营层面,受委托部门在”双二十”工作标准下,平均受理约 16 天、审结约 18 天,均不超过约 20 天;简易案件约占全部申报的九成。对覆盖区域内的企业,实际效果是更快、更近的审查:浙江省局公布咨询电话并实行申报前商谈机制,全流程线上办理。

典型案例与执法信号

2026 年 8 月 21 日公布的六起典型案例展示总局如何在支持重组与遏制有害竞争之间平衡。腾讯收购喜马拉雅股权案于 2026 年 5 月附加五项限制性条件批准,以保护在线音频、网络音乐市场竞争;TCL 中环收购一道新能源案无条件批准,以整合光伏产能;湖北荆江收购易事特案批准,支持转型”AI+新能源”综合服务商;电池隔膜、汽车空气悬架部件与煤炭物流的新设合营案均无条件批准,以整合区域产能、减少低水平重复。对外资企业,执法姿态是双面的:改善效率与质量的真实重组受到支持,但固化支配地位或促成协同性”内卷”的交易将面临条件或禁止——受委托部门适用与总局一致的实体标准。

操作步骤

  1. 核验委托是否影响申报。 判断交易是否满足简易案件门槛,以及相关市场或当事方是否位于受委托部门辖区;若是,将属地申报并更快审结。
  2. 利用申报前商谈。 业务系统与受委托部门(如浙江公布的咨询电话)支持申报前讨论是否需要申报及如何构架交易。
  3. 按”双二十”标准排期。 合格案件受理与审结各目标 20 天内;据此安排签约、交割与融资节点。
  4. 审慎对待简易地位。 简易申报更快,但仍需完整准确申报;错误定性将招致更正与延误。
  5. 关注实体红线。 典型案例显示,对平台与网络效应,限制性条件与禁止是活跃工具;申报前应作现实竞争评估。
  6. 保持集团申报纪律。 委托不降低强制申报门槛——营业额门槛不变——交割前未申报(抢跑)仍是严重违规。

合规提示

委托审查是行政分工,不是实体标准的分散化。总局仍统一作出附条件批准与禁止决定;受委托部门在其职责内、在总局监督下行事。对外资投资者,实际变化主要是审查速度与地点,以及对总局如何处理行业重组的更清晰图景。2026 年 8 月的调整不改变事先申报义务、申报门槛或未批先交的处罚。保留交易台账、尽早接入业务系统,并将六起典型案例视为理解重组方案如何被构架与评估的实务指南。

Sources

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026)

  • A concentration must be notified to SAMR before closing if it meets the turnover thresholds; failing to file or closing early triggers investigation and penalties.
    达到营业额标准的经营者集中,须在实施前事先向市场监管总局申报;未申报或获批前实施将面临调查与处罚。
  • Current thresholds (raised in the 2024 revision): global aggregate turnover > RMB 12bn, or China aggregate > RMB 4bn with at least two parties each > RMB 0.8bn in China.
    现行标准(2024 年修订提高):全球合计营业额 > 120 亿元,或中国境内合计 > 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内各 > 8 亿元。
  • The industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (effective 1 Oct 2025) consolidates prior guidance into one filing playbook — conditions, materials, workflow.
    市场监管行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)将既往零散指引整合为统一申报手册——申报条件、材料、流程。
  • From 1 August 2026, SAMR delegates part of non-simplified-case review to five provincial bureaus (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, Shaanxi), shortening timelines for non-problematic deals.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,总局将部分非简易案件委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查,加速无竞争问题交易的落地。
  • Foreign-to-foreign deals can also be caught when they acquire control of, or decisive influence over, a China-business; the same thresholds and suspensory rule apply.
    外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,同样触发;适用相同标准与「停表」规则。
  • Practical tip: run a control-and-turnover test at term sheet; use SAMR’s pre-filing consultation and the online system to compress the clock.
    实操提示:在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额测试;善用总局商谈与在线系统压缩周期。

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026) | 中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

China’s merger-control regime is built on the *Anti-Monopoly Law* and the *State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings*. The core rule is suspensory: where a concentration reaches the notification thresholds, the parties must file with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and may not implement it before clearance. Implementing early — or not filing at all — exposes the parties to investigation and fines.

The thresholds were raised in the 2024 revision. A concentration must be notified if: (a) the aggregate global turnover of all parties in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion; or (b) the aggregate China turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion. SAMR is required to assess the thresholds against economic development and may adjust them.

To make filing predictable, SAMR issued the industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (released 26 September 2025, effective 1 October 2025). It is the first SAMR industry standard to set out concentration notification in a single, structured document, integrating four prior guidance papers (now repealed). It clarifies what constitutes a concentration (merger; acquisition of control via equity/assets; control or decisive influence via contract), the materials required (notification form, simplified-case requirements, appendices on control and turnover calculation), and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For foreign investors, this means a clearer, more standardised path to clearance.

A notable efficiency change took effect on 1 August 2026. SAMR expanded its delegated-review system: certain non-simplified cases may be entrusted to the provincial bureaus of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi, within defined market-share bands (e.g., combined share 15–25% in the same relevant market). Simple cases remain delegated to an expanded set of provincial bureaus. The policy aim is “complexity分流” — fast-track deals with no competition concerns so investment closes sooner, while SAMR retains the sensitive matters.

Cross-border relevance is direct. A foreign-to-foreign transaction that acquires control of, or decisive influence over, a Chinese business is not exempt. The same thresholds and the same standstill obligation apply, and SAMR coordinates with foreign enforcers where relevant. Parties should therefore (1) screen control and turnover at the term-sheet stage, (2) consider a pre-filing consultation for novel structures, and (3) use the online system to reduce avoidable back-and-forth. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest way to keep a deal on schedule.


中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

中国的经营者集中制度以《反垄断法》与《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》为框架。核心规则是「事前审查、停表」:达到申报标准的集中,须事先向市场监管总局(SAMR)申报,未获批准不得实施;抢跑或未申报将触发调查与罚款。

申报标准已在 2024 年修订提高。满足以下之一即须申报:(a)参与集中的所有经营者上一会计年度全球合计营业额超过 120 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元;或(b)中国境内合计营业额超过 40 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元。总局应根据经济发展情况评估标准实施。

为提升可预期性,总局发布行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 9 月 26 日发布,2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)。这是首部以行业标准形式系统规定经营者集中申报的文件,整合了此前的 4 部申报指导性文件(同步废止),统一明确申报条件(构成集中的情形、控制权判断、营业额计算)、申报材料(申报表、简易案件要求、控制权与营业额计算附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对外资而言,这意味着更清晰、标准化的获批路径。

一项提效变化于 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效。总局完善委托审查制度:符合份额区间(如同一相关市场份额合计 15%–25%)的部分非简易案件,可委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查;简易案件受托省级局相应扩容。政策意图是「繁简分流」——让无竞争问题的交易加速落地,敏感事项仍由总局把关。

跨境适用性直接。外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,并不豁免;同样适用该标准与停表义务,总局在必要时与境外执法机构协调。交易方应:(1)在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额筛查;(2)对新颖结构善用商谈;(3)用在线系统减少无效往返。早而规范的申报,是让交易按期完成的最低成本方式。

Filing Playbook for Foreign Investors

Start with the control test. Acquisition of a China business — even as part of a global transaction — can constitute a concentration if it confers control or decisive influence. Map the target’s China revenue and the parties’ global and China turnover against the thresholds before signing. If the deal is close to a threshold, model both the global and the Chinaaggregate tests; the lower of the two can still trigger.

Use the 2025 *Specification* as your template. It consolidates what to submit (notification form, simplified-case annexes, control and turnover appendices) and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For straightforward, non-problematic deals, consider the simplified procedure and the expanded provincial delegation effective 1 August 2026, which can shift routine non-simplified review to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing or Shaanxi within defined share bands.

Mind the standstill. Do not close, integrate or exercise control before clearance — interim integration (sharing confidential info, appointing managers, consolidating accounts) can be read as early implementation. Build a conditionality and long-stop that reflects the review period, keep the CSRC/security-review workstreams in view if the deal is also an inbound acquisition, and document a clean competition narrative. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest insurance for deal certainty.

外资申报实操手册

从控制权测试入手。取得中国业务控制权或决定性影响的交易——即便作为全球交易一部分——可能构成集中。签约前将标的中国营收与各党全球/中国营业额对照标准;若接近阈值,同时建模全球与境内合计两种测试,较低者亦可能触发。

以 2025 年《申报规范》为模板。它整合了提交内容(申报表、简易案件附件、控制权与营业额附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对清晰无问题的交易,可考虑简易程序及 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效的省级委托扩容——在既定份额区间内将常规非简易案件移至北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西。

遵守停表。获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制;过渡期整合(共享机密信息、委派管理人、合并账务)可能被认定为提前实施。设定反映审查周期的条件与长停,若同时属 inbound 并购则留意证监会/安审工作流,并备好清晰竞争叙事。早而规范的申报,是交易确定性的最低成本保险。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Suspensory rule: file with SAMR before closing once thresholds are met; early closing triggers investigation and fines.
  • Thresholds: global aggregate > RMB 12bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China); or China aggregate > RMB 4bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China).
  • Concentration: merger; equity/asset acquisition of control; control/decisive influence by contract.
  • 2025 standard: *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* effective 1 Oct 2025 consolidates prior guidance.
  • Delegation: from 1 Aug 2026, part of non-simplified cases delegated to Beijing/Shanghai/Guangdong/Chongqing/Shaanxi.
  • Standstill: no closing, integration or control exercise before clearance.
  • Cross-border: foreign-to-foreign deals acquiring control of a China business are equally caught.

实务速查

  • 停表规则: 达阈值须向 SAMR 申报后方可交割;抢跑触发调查与罚款。
  • 标准: 全球合计 > 120 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国);或中国合计 > 40 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国)。
  • 集中: 合并;取得控制权的股权/资产收购;依合同取得控制或决定性影响。
  • 2025 标准: 《经营者集中申报规范》2025 年 10 月 1 日施行,整合既往指引。
  • 委托: 2026 年 8 月 1 日起部分非简易案件委托北京/上海/广东/重庆/陕西。
  • 停表: 获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制。
  • 跨境: 取得中国业务控制权的外资间交易同样被纳入。

Sources

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review

  • China’s 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 empowers SAMR to review concentrations that fall below the notification thresholds where they may eliminate or restrict competition.
    中国2022年修订的《反垄断法》授权市场监管总局对未达申报标准、但可能排除限制竞争的集中进行审查。
  • “Killer” or “sniping” (掐尖式) acquisitions—buying a nascent rival to discontinue or absorb it—are a stated SAMR enforcement priority, especially in the platform economy.
    “扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购——收购新生竞争对手以停用或吸收之——是市场监管总局明确的执法重点,尤其在平台经济领域。
  • Below-threshold deals are not a safe harbour; the authority can call them in, impose remedies, or unwind completed transactions.
    未达门槛的交易并非安全港;监管可主动立案,附加救济,或撤销已完成的交易。
  • The theory targets potential competition: a small or pre-revenue target’s future trajectory is what makes the deal reviewable.
    该理论针对潜在竞争:标的虽小或尚无营收,其未来轨迹正使交易具有可审查性。
  • As of 2026, the focus has extended from platforms to biotech, semiconductors, and AI, where a startup’s talent or IP is the real asset.
    截至2026年,重点已从平台延伸至生物医药、半导体及人工智能,其中初创企业的人才或知识产权才是真正资产。
  • Entrants should document a genuine, pro-competitive rationale and preserve standalone-viability evidence for any acquisition of an early-stage rival.
    准入者应就收购早期竞争对手记录真实、促进竞争的理据,并保存其独立存续可行性的证据。

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review | 中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

The Legal Hook: Below-Threshold Review

A defining innovation of the 2022 《反垄断法》 amendment is explicit authority for the enforcer to examine concentrations that do not meet the turnover notification thresholds yet “have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” This closes the gap that previously let small, strategic acquisitions escape scrutiny simply because the target’s revenue was negligible. SAMR may, on its own initiative or following a complaint, open a below-threshold review—even after closing.

What Is a “Killer” or “Sniping” Acquisition?

The term “killer acquisition” (and its Chinese framing 掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购) describes a dominant firm buying an emerging competitor chiefly to shut it down, shelf the product, or absorb its talent and IP rather than to compete with it. The competitive harm is forward-looking: the market loses a future rival, and innovation is chilled. In platform and deep-tech contexts, the acquired asset is often pre-revenue, so classic turnover-based thresholds would never catch it—hence the below-threshold power is the relevant tool.

Why 2026 Makes This Salient

Entering 2026, several forces elevate below-threshold scrutiny:

  • Platform precedent. SAMR’s platform-economy guidance names eliminating potential competition as a core concern, and 掐尖式并购 is repeatedly cited in enforcement rhetoric.
  • Deep-tech race. In semiconductors, AI, and biotech, acquisitions of tiny startups for their talent or patents are strategically loaded; the real value is not current sales but future capability.
  • Talent and data. Buying a team or dataset to neutralize a rival’s trajectory is exactly the harm the below-threshold rule targets.

How SAMR Assesses These Deals

The authority looks beyond current overlap to potential competition:

  • Would the target, absent the deal, likely have become a significant rival?
  • Is the acquirer a dominant or strategically placed firm?
  • Does the transaction remove a nascent competitive constraint?
  • Is there a genuine efficiency or pro-competitive rationale, or merely elimination?

Evidence of “shelving” intent—internal plans to discontinue the product, retain talent only, or refuse to invest—sharpens the case against the deal.

Remedies and Consequences

For below-threshold deals found anticompetitive, SAMR may:

  • Prohibit the transaction;
  • Order divestiture or restructuring of the acquired asset;
  • Impose behavioural remedies (e.g., keep the product alive, license the technology, maintain investment);
  • Unwind a completed concentration and impose turnover-based fines.

Because the acquirer may already have integrated the target, unwinding is disruptive and value-destroying—so the ex ante risk calculus matters more than the (often low) notification threshold.

2026 Practice Notes

  • The below-threshold power is used selectively, not as a dragnet; cases cluster in platform, tech, and innovation-heavy sectors.
  • SAMR signals intent through guidelines and public statements more than through a fixed numerical trigger, so sector context governs.
  • Acquirers of early-stage rivals should expect that a deal’s *strategic logic*, not its size, determines scrutiny.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Do not assume “small = safe.” A below-threshold acquisition of a rival still invites review if its trajectory matters.
  2. Document pro-competitive rationale. Business plans, investment commitments, and roadmaps showing the target will thrive post-deal are protective.
  3. Preserve standalone-viability evidence. Demonstrate the target was not on a clear path to become a rival, or that the deal genuinely accelerates its offering.
  4. Consider voluntary engagement. Where a deal is sensitive, a proactive explanation to SAMR can pre-empt a contested proceeding.
  5. Contract for remediation. Allocate unwinding and remedy risk in the SPA, with appropriate long-stop dates.

Bottom Line

The below-threshold review power reframes China’s merger control: size is no longer the sole gate. For 2026, any acquisition by a dominant or strategically placed firm of an early-stage innovator—especially in platforms, AI, semiconductors, or biotech—should be planned as if scrutinised for its effect on future competition, with the evidentiary file built accordingly.


中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

法律抓手:未达门槛的审查

2022年《反垄断法》修订的一项标志性创新,是明确授权执法机关审查未达营业额申报标准、但”具有或者可能具有排除、限制竞争效果”的经营者集中。这填补了此前的漏洞——即小型战略性收购仅因标的营收微薄便可逃避审查。市场监管总局可主动或依举报,开展未达门槛审查,甚至在交割后启动。

何为”扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购?

“扼杀式收购”(中文亦称掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购)指支配企业收购新兴竞争对手,主要目的为关停、搁置产品,或吸收其人才与知识产权,而非与之竞争。其竞争损害是前瞻性的:市场失去一个未来竞争对手,创新受抑。在平台与深科技场景中,被收购资产常处于尚无营收阶段,经典营业额门槛本无从捕获——因此未达门槛的审查权才是适用工具。

2026年为何凸显

进入2026年,多重力量抬升了未达门槛审查:

  • 平台先例。 市场监管总局平台经济指引将消除潜在竞争列为核心关切,”掐尖式并购”在执法论述中屡被援引。
  • 深科技竞赛。 在半导体、人工智能与生物医药领域,为人才或专利而收购微型初创企业具有战略载荷;真正价值不在当前销售,而在未来能力。
  • 人才与数据。 收购团队或数据集以中性化对手轨迹,正是未达门槛规则所欲针对的损害。

市场监管总局如何评估此类交易

监管超越当前重叠,审视潜在竞争:

  • 若交易不发生,标的是否可能成为重要竞争对手?
  • 收购方是否为支配或具战略地位的企业?
  • 交易是否消除了新生的竞争约束?
  • 是否存在真实的效率或促进竞争理据,抑或仅为消除?

“搁置”意图的证据——内部关停产品、仅留人才、拒绝投入的计划——会使案件对交易更为不利。

救济与后果

对认定具反竞争效果的未达门槛交易,市场监管总局可:

  • 禁止交易;
  • 责令剥离或重组被收购资产;
  • 附加行为性救济(如保持产品存续、许可技术、维持投入);
  • 撤销已完成的集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。

由于收购方可能已整合标的,撤销具有破坏性且摧毁价值——因此事前的风险权衡,比(往往很低的)申报门槛更关键。

2026年实践要点

  • 未达门槛审查权被选择性使用,而非撒网;案件集中于平台、科技及创新密集型行业。
  • 市场监管总局更多通过指引与公开表态释放意图,而非固定数值触发,故行业语境决定一切。
  • 收购早期竞争对手者须预期:决定审查的是交易的*战略逻辑*,而非其规模。

准入者实务指引

  1. 勿假定”小即安全”。 未达门槛但轨迹重要的竞品收购,仍会招致审查。
  2. 记录促进竞争的理据。 商业计划、投入承诺及标的交易后仍将壮大的路线图,具有保护作用。
  3. 保存独立存续可行性证据。 证明标的并非清晰走向成为竞争对手,或交易确实加速了其产品供给。
  4. 考虑主动沟通。 交易敏感时,主动向市场监管总局说明可避免陷入争议的程序。
  5. 在合同中约定补救。 于协议中分配撤销与救济风险,并设置适当的最晚截止日。

要点总结

未达门槛审查权重塑了中国经营者集中制度:规模不再是唯一关口。就2026年而言,任何支配或具战略地位企业对早期创新者的收购——尤其在平台、人工智能、半导体或生物医药领域——都应按”审查其对未来竞争的影响”来规划,并据此构建证据案卷。

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