Category Archives: Green Energy / 绿色能源

Green Power Trading for Foreign-Invested Enterprises: Power Purchase Agreement Routes, the Renewable Energy Certificate Question, and What a Zero-Carbon Factory Claim Needs

  • On 22 October 2026 an official of the Ministry of Commerce’s foreign investment administration said the ministry would support foreign-invested enterprises in participating in renewable energy trading on equal terms — a statement of direction, not a new set of trading rules.
    2026 年 10 月 22 日,商务部外国投资管理司负责人表示将支持外资企业平等参与可再生能源交易——这是方向性表态,不是新的交易规则。
  • The same briefing disclosed that inbound investment in the energy-saving, environmental-protection and clean-production sector grew 11.1 per cent year on year in the first nine months of 2026, and that several foreign-invested Zero-Carbon Factory projects have been commissioned using green electricity throughout.
    同场发布会披露,2026 年 1—9 月节能环保清洁产业引资同比增长 11.1%,一批外资零碳工厂相继落地,且全部使用绿色电力。
  • Nothing in the statement changes how a transaction is executed: purchases still run through the electricity trading institutions and local energy authorities under the medium- and long-term market rules, the green power trading pilot launched in 2021, and the certificate system.
    该表态不改变交易执行方式:采购仍按电力中长期交易规则、2021 年启动的绿电交易试点以及绿证制度,通过电力交易机构与地方能源主管部门办理。
  • Three routes exist and they are not interchangeable: a Power Purchase Agreement or monthly listing through a trading centre, purchase of certificates separately from physical power, and self-generation or distributed self-consumption.
    存在三条路径且不可互换:通过交易中心的长期购电协议或月度挂牌交易、与物理电量分离的绿证购买、以及自建或分布式自用。
  • The double-counting risk is the one that survives audit: buying a certificate does not mean buying green power, and a company that claims the same megawatt-hour in its electricity reporting and again in its certificate reporting will fail review.
    双重计算是审计中最容易被抓的问题:买证不等于买绿电,把同一兆瓦时既计入用电报告又计入绿证报告,复核时无法通过。
  • For exports, green procurement is worth only what the receiving regime will accept, so the evidence chain matters as much as the purchase itself.
    对出口而言,绿色采购的价值取决于接收方是否认可,因此凭证链的重要性不亚于采购本身。
  • Three contract terms deserve scrutiny before signature: the annual deviation assessment, curve matching against actual load, and mark-ups where power is passed through a landlord or park operator.
    签约前应重点审查三项条款:年度偏差考核、与实际负荷的曲线匹配、以及经由业主或园区转供时的加价。

Green Power Trading for Foreign-Invested Enterprises: Power Purchase Agreement Routes, the Renewable Energy Certificate Question, and What a Zero-Carbon Factory Claim Needs | 外资企业平等参与绿电交易:三条采购路径、绿证与绿电的双重计算,以及零碳工厂声明需要什么

Overview

At a State Council Information Office briefing on 22 October 2026, the official heading the foreign investment administration at the Ministry of Commerce said the ministry would support foreign-invested enterprises in participating in renewable energy trading on equal terms, alongside continued work on cross-border data flows. The same briefing disclosed that inbound investment in the energy-saving, environmental-protection and clean-production sector rose 11.1 per cent year on year in the first nine months of 2026, and that several foreign-invested zero-carbon factories have been commissioned, all running entirely on green electricity.

The two halves belong together. The numbers describe what has happened: foreign capital is putting money into clean production in China, and some of those plants are designed around renewable electricity from the day they switch on. The statement describes an intention about the next stage — that a foreign-invested user should not face a different door when it goes to buy that electricity.

What the statement is not is a rule. It creates no trading product, quota, preferential price or dedicated channel. Execution continues under the framework in force: the basic rules for medium- and long-term electricity trading, the pilot launched in 2021, the certificate system extended to full coverage of renewable generation in 2023, and the consumption responsibility weight system. A company that reads the sentence as a new entitlement will look for a form that does not exist.

What the statement does, and does not, do

It is a statement about equal treatment. The word used is “equal participation” (平等参与). For a manufacturer once told that a green power product was open to domestic users but not straightforwardly to it, this signals how such cases should be handled — to the executing bodies as much as to the market.

It confirms that no additional eligibility test is intended for foreign-invested users. That matters because green power products are often allocated through annual or monthly arrangements in which eligibility is settled locally. A statement at this level is useful in a conversation with a trading centre or a local energy authority; it is not a document those bodies must cite.

It does not create a purchase obligation, a renewable ratio for foreign-invested firms, or a new certificate category; companies should not infer a deadline. The consumption responsibility weight system, which does create obligations, is a separate instrument with its own addressees and measures.

No dedicated foreign-invested green power market has been announced.

Three routes, and how they differ

Route one: trading. A user buys electricity with renewable attributes attached through a trading centre, either as a longer-term agreement structured as a Power Purchase Agreement or through a monthly listing. It is the only route in which the attribute travels with the physical energy, and it produces the cleanest evidence: a trade record, a settlement statement and a certificate for the same volume.

Route two: certificates. A user buys renewable energy certificates separately from physical power — the unbundled model. It is faster, more liquid and available in small volumes, which suits a site whose load is unpredictable or whose meter the landlord controls. The trade-off is evidential: a certificate proves an attribute was bought, not that the electrons at that site came from a wind farm.

Route three: self-generation or distributed self-consumption. A factory with roof space or land installs capacity and consumes the output. This is the strongest claim, because generation and consumption coincide physically. It is also the route with the most friction: grid connection approval, limits on selling surplus power to a third party at the same site, and capital committed for years rather than for a contract term.

The double-counting problem

The failure that recurs in audit is arithmetic, not contractual. A company buys certificates for a volume, reports that volume as renewable in its electricity disclosure, and then also reports the certificates as an instrument holding — the same megawatt-hour in two ledgers.

The discipline is to decide, once, which ledger the attribute lives in. If the claim is made on a consumption basis, the certificate is retired against that consumption and does not reappear as an asset; if it is held as an instrument, it cannot simultaneously support a consumption claim. Retirement tracking exists for this reason, and a company running its own spreadsheet alongside it will eventually produce two numbers that do not reconcile.

The evidence chain for exports

For a manufacturer exporting to Europe, or supplying a brand committed to 100 per cent renewable electricity, procurement is only half the exercise; the other half is whether the receiving regime accepts the data.

Under the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, importers must account for the embedded emissions of covered goods, and the question for a Chinese plant is whether actual data can displace default values. That depends on the rules for those goods and on the emissions scope — direct emissions from production, and indirect emissions from purchased electricity where counted. Green procurement affects the indirect side, and only as far as the rules permit an actual-data claim. That is a reason to keep records in the shape the receiving regime asks for, not a reason to delay.

Brand programmes impose their own tests. A 100 per cent renewable electricity commitment is normally assessed on market boundary and vintage: the certificate must come from the same market as the consumption, and from a matching generation period. The cheapest certificates available globally will not count, however defensible the spend looks.

Three contract terms to read closely

Annual deviation assessment. Contracts typically test whether actual consumption matched the contracted volume, with a tolerance band and a charge for the excess. For a plant ramping production or running seasonal campaigns, a band set for a steady-state factory produces a charge in year one. Model the load before agreeing the band, and negotiate the treatment of a shutdown in advance.

Curve matching. A contract may specify a curve rather than a flat volume. Where the contracted curve diverges from the site’s actual profile, the difference settles at spot or penalty prices, and the attribute may not attach to the diverging volume. Flat products are simpler; shaped products are cheaper only if the shape is right.

Pass-through mark-ups. Where the user is a tenant and the landlord buys wholesale and resells, the attribute can be marked up, diluted or lost. The lease and the energy supply agreement must state the volume passed through, the transfer mechanism and the price formula, or the tenant pays a premium for a claim it cannot substantiate.

Procurement checklist

Verify the account number and registered user name first; a mismatch between contracting entity and account holder blocks settlement. Confirm consumption history at monthly granularity, since contract shape and deviation band depend on it. Confirm the declaration timetable with the trading centre — a missed window may fall after the reporting year closes.

Set the retirement policy before the first purchase and write down which ledger the attribute sits in; keep the trade record, settlement statement and retirement certificate together for the same volume. Maintain an internal carbon ledger with one line per site per month: the audit question is never whether green power was bought, but whether the volume, the instrument and the retirement can be shown for that site in that year.

Outlook

The direction is clear enough: renewable electricity is being treated as a normal input rather than a special concession, and the investment data suggest some foreign-invested plants already buy it that way. What has not changed is the machinery — trading happens in the market that exists, certificates are retired in the system that exists, and obligations arise from the instruments that create them. The companies that benefit most will treat the statement as a reason to start now, using available routes, rather than to wait for a channel that has not been announced.

Related reading

  • Green power procurement and carbon compliance for foreign firms (No. 228) — the trading and certificate architecture in detail.
  • Renewable energy consumption responsibility weight mandates (No. 371) — the obligation side, including the implementing measures.

Sources

  • State Council Information Office, press conference on high-quality commerce development during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (22 October 2026): https://www.scio.gov.cn/live/2026/39833/index.html
  • Ministry of Commerce, policy releases and foreign investment data: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
  • National Development and Reform Commission: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • National Energy Administration, green power trading and certificate policy: https://www.nea.gov.cn/
  • The State Council, policy library: https://www.gov.cn/

外资企业平等参与绿电交易:三条采购路径、绿证与绿电的双重计算,以及零碳工厂声明需要什么

概述

2026 年 10 月 22 日,在国务院新闻办公室举行的一场发布会上,商务部外国投资管理司负责人表示,将做好支持外资企业平等参与可再生能源交易、持续提升数据跨境流动便利化水平等工作。同场发布会披露:2026 年 1—9 月,节能环保清洁产业引资同比增长 11.1%;一批外资零碳工厂相继落地,且全部使用绿色电力。

这两半内容本应放在一起读。数据描述已经发生的事:外资正在把钱投进中国的清洁生产环节,其中一些工厂从投产第一天起就围绕可再生能源电力设计。表态描述下一阶段的取向:一家外资用电企业去买这部分电时,不应面对一扇与境内企业不同的门。

需要说清的是,这个表态不是规则。它没有创设交易品种、配额、优惠电价,也没有开设专门通道。执行仍按现行框架:电力中长期交易基本规则、2021 年启动的试点、2023 年扩展到可再生能源发电全口径的绿证制度,以及消纳责任权重制度。把这句话读成”新权利落地”的企业,会去找一份并不存在的申请表。

这个表态做了什么、没做什么

它是关于平等对待的表态,用词是”平等参与”。对曾经被告知”这类产品对境内用户开放、对外资不太顺”的制造企业来说,这是指向个案处理方式的信号——既是给市场的,也是给执行机构的。

它确认了不打算对外资用电企业另设资格门槛。这一点重要,因为绿电产品往往通过年度或月度安排分配,资格认定在地方层面完成。这个层级的表态,在与交易中心或地方能源主管部门沟通时有用;但它不是这些机构必须援引的文件。

它没有创设绿电采购义务、没有对外资企业设定可再生能源比例、也没有新增绿证品类,企业不应据此推断出截止日期。真正创设义务的是可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度,那是独立的一套工具,有自己的适用对象与实施办法。

也没有专门面向外资的绿电市场被宣布。

三条路径及其差别

路径一:交易。 用电企业通过交易机构购买附带可再生能源属性的电量,形式可以是结构上属于长期购电协议的多年期交易,也可以是月度挂牌。这是唯一让属性与物理电量同行的路径,凭证链也最干净:成交记录、结算单、以及就同一电量核发的绿证。

路径二:绿证。 在物理电量之外单独购买绿证,即证电分离。它更快、流动性更好、可小批量购买,适合负荷难以预测、或电表由业主掌控的场地。代价在证据上:绿证证明买到了属性,不证明这个场地用的电子来自某座风电场。

路径三:自建或分布式自用。 有屋顶或场地的工厂自建装机并消纳所发电力。这是最强的主张,因为发电与用电在物理上重合。摩擦也最多:并网审批、同一场地向第三方售电的限制、以及以年计而非以合同条款计的资金投入。

双重计算问题

审计中反复出现的失误是算术问题,不是合同问题。企业为某一电量购买了绿证,在用电披露中把这部分报为可再生能源,随后又把绿证作为持有工具再报一次——同一兆瓦时进了两本账。

纪律只有一条:一次性地确定属性记在哪本账上。如果主张建立在用电基础上,绿证就对应这部分用电核销,不再作为资产出现;如果绿证是作为工具持有,它就不能同时支撑用电主张。核销追踪系统的存在正是为此;企业若在系统之外另跑一张表,早晚会算出两个对不上的数字。

出口场景下的凭证链

对出口欧洲、或为已承诺百分之百使用可再生能源电力的品牌供货的制造商来说,采购只是事情的一半,另一半是接收方是否接受企业提供的数据。

按欧盟碳边境调节机制,进口商须就纳入范围货物的嵌入排放作出申报;对中国工厂而言,问题在于能否以实际数据替代默认值。这取决于该机制对具体货物的核算规则,也取决于排放口径——生产的直接排放,以及纳入计算时外购电力对应的间接排放。绿色采购只影响间接一侧,且只在规则允许以实际数据申报的范围内起作用。这是按接收方要求的形态留痕的理由,不是推迟采购的理由。

品牌方的要求有自己的口径。百分之百可再生能源电力的承诺,通常按市场边界与年份评估:凭证须来自与用电相同的市场,发电期与用电期对应。在全球范围挑最便宜的绿证,会发现它们不被计入,无论这笔支出在报告里多么说得通。

三个需要细读的合同条款

年度偏差考核。 合同通常考核实际用电量与合同电量是否匹配,设定允许区间,并对超出部分计收费用。对正在爬产或做季节性促销的工厂,按稳态工厂设定的区间会在第一年就产生费用。签约前先做负荷测算,并就停产的处理方式谈妥。

曲线匹配。 合同可能约定曲线而非平坦电量。当约定曲线与场地实际负荷形态不一致时,差额按现货价或违约价结算,绿色属性可能不附着于差额电量。平坦型产品更简单;分时型产品只有曲线对得上时才更便宜。

转供加价。 用电企业是租户、由业主批量购电再转售时,绿色属性可能被加价、被稀释、或者干脆丢失。租赁合同与供能协议必须写明转供电量、属性转移机制与价格公式;否则租户为一项自己无法举证的主张付了溢价。

采购落地清单

先核验用电户号与户名,签约主体与户名不一致会卡住结算。再按月度颗粒度确认用电历史,合同形态与偏差区间都取决于它。与交易中心确认申报时点:错过一个窗口,可能就落在报告年度结束之后。

在第一次采购之前确定核销政策,写清属性记在哪本账上;成交记录、结算单与核销凭证按同一电量放在同一处。维护一份内部碳台账,每场地每月一行:审计要问的从来不是有没有买绿电,而是这个场地这一年的电量、凭证与核销记录能否拿出来。

展望

方向足够清楚:可再生能源电力被当作常规投入品,而不是特殊照顾;投资数据也显示一部分外资工厂已经这么采购。没有变的是机制——交易在既有的市场里发生,绿证在既有的系统里核销,义务由创设义务的那套工具产生。受益最多的,是把这次表态当作”现在就用现有路径启动”的理由、而不是”等一个尚未宣布的通道”的理由的企业。

延伸阅读

  • 《外资企业的绿电采购与碳合规》(第 228 篇)——交易与绿证架构的详细展开。
  • 《可再生能源电力消纳责任权重》(第 371 篇)——义务一侧,含实施办法。

来源

  • 国务院新闻办公室·”十五五”商务高质量发展新闻发布会(2026-10-22):https://www.scio.gov.cn/live/2026/39833/index.html
  • 商务部·政策发布与外资数据:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
  • 国家发展和改革委员会:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 国家能源局·绿电交易与绿证政策:https://www.nea.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网·政策库:https://www.gov.cn/

Green and Low-Carbon Provisions in the Opinion on Developing New Quality Productive Forces

  • The green and low-carbon provisions sit in the third part of the Opinion, “focusing on innovating the development model”, which calls for building a green, low-carbon and circular economic system and for advancing the energy revolution.
    绿色低碳条款位于《意见》第三方面”着力推进发展方式创新”,提出构建绿色低碳循环发展经济体系,积极推进能源革命。
  • The text calls for building a power system with a high proportion of renewable energy and for improving policies on the consumption and regulation of new energy.
    文件提出构建高比例可再生能源电力系统,完善新能源消纳和调控政策措施。
  • “Orderly development of advanced nuclear fission energy” appears alongside renewables, but nuclear power remains a sector governed by the negative list; specific access is subject to the current negative list.
    “有序发展先进核裂变能”与可再生能源并列出现,但核电仍属《外商投资准入负面清单》管理领域,具体准入以现行负面清单为准。
  • The clause adds “all-round international co-operation”, framing the energy transition as an area open to cross-border participation.
    条款包含”全方位加强国际合作”,将能源转型定位为可跨境参与的领域。
  • According to public reports, the 2025 edition of the Catalogue of Industries for Encouraging Foreign Investment contains 1,679 entries, 205 more than the 2022 edition, and takes effect on 1 February 2026.
    据公开报道,《鼓励外商投资产业目录(2025 年版)》总条目 1679 条,比 2022 年版净增 205 条,自 2026 年 2 月 1 日施行。
  • Per public reports, the catalogue guides foreign investment towards advanced manufacturing, modern services and the central, western and north-eastern regions and Hainan, fields that include green equipment and environmental services.
    据公开报道,该目录引导外资投向先进制造业、现代服务业以及中西部地区、东北地区和海南省,其中涵盖绿色装备与环境服务等领域。
  • For foreign investors, the practical read is that green-sector opportunities are framed by encouraged-catalogue entries and sector restrictions together, not by the energy clause alone.
    对外资而言,实务判断应同时看鼓励目录条目与分行业准入限制,而非仅凭能源条款。

Green and Low-Carbon Provisions in the Opinion on Developing New Quality Productive Forces | 《关于发展新质生产力的意见》绿色低碳条款解读

Overview

The Opinion on Developing New Quality Productive Forces, issued in October 2026, sets out a framework for China’s economic development. This article looks only at one dimension of it: the green and low-carbon provisions, and what they mean in practice for foreign companies active in green industries. It does not cover the Opinion’s wider structure or its provisions on foreign venture capital and data flows, which are addressed separately.

The relevant text sits in the third part of the Opinion, “focusing on innovating the development model”. It is short but specific, and it is best read alongside the existing investment framework rather than in isolation.

What the green and low-carbon clauses say

The third part opens by setting a direction: “focusing on innovating the development model; build a green, low-carbon and circular economic system, improve the policy toolbox for green development, and actively advance the energy revolution.”

The energy paragraph then elaborates. Focused on the carbon-peaking and carbon-neutrality goals, the text calls for:

  • the orderly development of advanced nuclear fission energy;
  • building a power system with a high proportion of renewable energy;
  • improving policies for the consumption and regulation of new energy;
  • organising demonstration and roll-out of major application scenarios, and accelerating the greening of energy use across production and daily life;
  • advancing the revolution in energy consumption, supply, technology and systems, and strengthening international co-operation in all respects.

Two features stand out. First, the clause pairs generation-side language — renewable power and nuclear fission — with consumption-side language — new-energy consumption and regulation. Second, it closes with “all-round international co-operation”, which places the energy transition within a cross-border frame rather than a purely domestic one. That closing phrase is the main hook for foreign participation, and it is a statement of direction rather than a list of specific openings.

Sector boundaries: nuclear power and the negative list

The phrase “orderly development of advanced nuclear fission energy” should be read carefully. It appears in a paragraph about the energy mix, and it signals that advanced nuclear fission is part of the long-term energy picture. It does not, by itself, change the rules on who may invest in nuclear power.

Nuclear power remains a sector governed by the Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment and the Negative List for Foreign Investment Access. Foreign investment in nuclear power is restricted, and specific access is subject to the current negative list. A reader should therefore treat the energy paragraph as a technology-and-supply statement, not as a statement that nuclear operations are open to foreign investment. Where a project touches nuclear, the applicable rule is the negative list as it stands, not the energy clause.

The same discipline applies to the renewable-energy language. The Opinion states a direction — a power system with a high proportion of renewables, and improved consumption and regulation policies. It does not, in this text, set out capacity targets or consumption ratios. Investors should rely on the specific implementing documents that follow, not on inferred numbers.

The encouraged-investment catalogue as the practical frame

For a foreign company in green industries, the operative document is the Catalogue of Industries for Encouraging Foreign Investment. According to public reports, the 2025 edition contains 1,679 entries in total, a net increase of 205 over the 2022 edition, with 303 entries revised. Of these, the national catalogue has 619 entries (100 added, 131 revised) and the catalogue for central and western regions and other areas has 1,060 entries (105 added, 172 revised). The catalogue guides foreign investment towards advanced manufacturing, modern services and the central, western and north-eastern regions and Hainan. It takes effect on 1 February 2026, when the 2022 edition is repealed.

These figures are reported by the media and should be treated as publicly reported information rather than as text of the Opinion. Their significance for green industries is that encouraged-catalogue entries are the main mechanism through which green manufacturing, new-energy equipment and environmental services are signalled as welcome areas. A company should check whether its activity appears in the catalogue, and should read that against the sector restrictions in the negative list.

Practical implications for foreign green-industry investors

The following are practical observations, not official commitments:

  • Read the two lists together. The encouraged catalogue and the negative list work as a pair. An activity can be encouraged in general and still restricted in a specific sub-sector; the negative list governs the restriction.
  • Match the technology to the direction. The Opinion’s language points to renewable generation, new-energy consumption and regulation, and demonstration scenarios. A company whose technology fits one of these directions has a clearer policy reference point.
  • Treat nuclear separately. Given that nuclear power is governed by the negative list, a nuclear-related project should be assessed under that regime rather than under the energy paragraph.
  • Watch for implementing documents. The Opinion sets direction. Capacity targets, consumption rules and incentive details will come through separate implementing documents; those, not the Opinion alone, will carry the operational detail.
  • Use the regional dimension. The encouraged catalogue’s regional sections indicate that investment in the central, western and north-eastern regions and Hainan is a specific focus, which may be relevant to siting decisions.

Related considerations

The Opinion also frames the transition as one that runs across consumption, supply, technology and systems, and it links this to international co-operation. For a foreign investor, the practical consequence is that green-industry opportunities in China are defined by the interaction of a policy direction, the encouraged-investment catalogue and the sector restrictions in the negative list. None of these alone is decisive. The Opinion provides the direction; the lists provide the operational boundaries; and the implementing documents that follow will provide the specifics.

Sources

  • 中国政府网:《关于发展新质生产力的意见》全文:https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202610/content_7082824.htm
  • 中国网:新华社受权发布《关于发展新质生产力的意见》(含能源革命条款):https://big5.china.com.cn/gate/big5/news.china.com.cn/2026-10/10/content_118727382.shtml
  • 央视网:关于《关于发展新质生产力的意见》的报道:https://big5.cctv.com/gate/big5/news.cctv.cn/2026/10/09/ARTID24yrFP8npsds5YwTvhn261009.shtml

《关于发展新质生产力的意见》绿色低碳条款解读

概述

2026 年 10 月印发的《关于发展新质生产力的意见》,为中国的经济发展确立了框架。本文只聚焦其中一个维度:绿色低碳条款,以及它们对在华经营绿色产业的外资企业在实务上的含义。本文不涉及《意见》的整体结构,也不涉及其关于外资创业投资与数据流动的表述,这些内容另文处理。

相关条文位于《意见》第三方面”着力推进发展方式创新”。文字简短但指向明确,宜与现行投资制度框架对照阅读,而非孤立理解。

绿色低碳条款说了什么

第三方面开篇定下方向:”着力推进发展方式创新。构建绿色低碳循环发展经济体系,优化绿色发展政策工具箱,积极推进能源革命。”

能源段落随后展开。围绕碳达峰碳中和目标,文件提出:

  • 有序发展先进核裂变能;
  • 构建高比例可再生能源电力系统;
  • 完善新能源消纳和调控政策措施;
  • 组织重大应用场景示范和推广,加速全社会生产生活用能绿色化进程;
  • 推动能源消费、供给、技术、体制革命,全方位加强国际合作。

有两点较为突出。其一,该条将发电侧表述——可再生能源电力与核裂变能——与消费侧表述——新能源消纳与调控——并列。其二,它以”全方位加强国际合作”收尾,将能源转型置于跨境框架之内,而非纯粹的国内议题。这一收尾表述是外资参与的主要切入点,属于方向性表述,而非具体开放清单。

分行业边界:核电与负面清单

“有序发展先进核裂变能”一语需要审慎理解。它出现在关于能源结构的段落中,表明先进核裂变能属于长期能源图景的一部分。但它本身并不改变谁可以投资核电的规则。

核电仍属《外商投资准入负面清单》管理领域。外资进入核电受到限制,具体准入以现行负面清单为准。因此,读者应将能源段落视为技术与供给层面的表述,而非核电运营对外资开放的表述。凡涉及核电的项目,适用规则是现行负面清单,而非能源条款本身。

同样的纪律适用于可再生能源表述。《意见》表明的是方向——高比例可再生能源电力系统,以及完善的消纳与调控政策。就本文而言,它并未给出装机目标或消纳比例数字。投资者应依据后续具体实施文件,而非推断出的数字。

鼓励类目录作为实务框架

对绿色产业外资企业而言,起实际作用的是《鼓励外商投资产业目录》。据公开报道,2025 年版总条目 1679 条,比 2022 年版净增 205 条,修改 303 条。其中,全国目录 619 条(增加 100 条、修改 131 条),中西部等地区目录 1060 条(增加 105 条、修改 172 条)。该目录引导外资投向先进制造业、现代服务业以及中西部地区、东北地区和海南省,自 2026 年 2 月 1 日施行,2022 年版同时废止。

上述数据来自媒体报道,应视为公开报道信息,而非《意见》原文。其对绿色产业的意义在于:鼓励类目录条目,是绿色制造、新能源装备与环境服务被标示为欢迎领域的主要机制。企业应核查自身业务是否列入目录,并将其与负面清单中的分行业限制对照阅读。

外资绿色产业投资者的实务含义

以下为实务观察,不构成官方承诺:

  • 两份清单对照阅读。 鼓励类目录与负面清单是一组配套文件。某一业务可能总体受鼓励,却在具体子行业受限制;限制以负面清单为准。
  • 让技术与方向匹配。 《意见》的表述指向可再生能源发电、新能源消纳与调控,以及示范场景。技术与上述某一方向契合的企业,政策参照点更清晰。
  • 核电单独评估。 鉴于核电由负面清单管理,涉核项目应按该制度评估,而非按能源段落评估。
  • 关注实施文件。 《意见》确定方向。装机目标、消纳规则与激励细节将通过单独的实施文件落地;承载操作细节的是这些文件,而非《意见》本身。
  • 善用区域维度。 鼓励类目录的区域部分表明,投向中西部地区、东北地区和海南省是一项具体侧重,这可能与选址决策相关。

相关考虑

《意见》还将转型表述为贯穿消费、供给、技术与体制的过程,并将其与国际合作相联结。对境外投资者而言,实务上的结论是:中国的绿色产业机会,由政策方向、鼓励类目录与负面清单中的分行业限制三者互动界定。三者中的任何一项单独都不具决定性。《意见》提供方向,两份清单提供操作边界,后续实施文件将提供具体细节。

来源

  • 中国政府网:《关于发展新质生产力的意见》全文:https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202610/content_7082824.htm
  • 中国网:新华社受权发布《关于发展新质生产力的意见》(含能源革命条款):https://big5.china.com.cn/gate/big5/news.china.com.cn/2026-10/10/content_118727382.shtml
  • 央视网:关于《关于发展新质生产力的意见》的报道:https://big5.cctv.com/gate/big5/news.cctv.cn/2026/10/09/ARTID24yrFP8npsds5YwTvhn261009.shtml

China’s renewable consumption mandates take effect: Order No. 42 of 2026 explained

  • Four central bodies — NDRC, MIIT, MOHURD and MOT — issued Order No. 42 of 2026 on 5 June 2026, publishing the Measures for Renewable Energy Minimum Consumption Share Targets and the Renewable Energy Power Consumption Responsibility Weight System, effective 1 August 2026.
    国家发展改革委、工业和信息化部、住房城乡建设部、交通运输部于2026年6月5日以2026年第42号令公布《可再生能源消费最低比重目标和可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度实施办法》,自2026年8月1日起施行。
  • The Measures build two overlapping layers of obligation: minimum consumption-share targets for energy users in key energy-consuming industries, and renewable power consumption responsibility weights for each provincial-level region.
    《办法》构建两层叠加的约束体系:对重点用能行业能源用户设定可再生能源消费最低比重目标,对各省级行政区域设定可再生能源电力消纳责任权重。
  • For the first time, non-electric consumption is brought into the minimum-share assessment — including renewable heating and cooling, green hydrogen/ammonia/methanol and biofuel — extending the regime beyond the previous single focus on green power purchases.
    非电消费首次被纳入最低比重目标考核——涵盖可再生能源供热(制冷)、可再生能源制氢氨醇等综合利用、生物燃料——突破了此前单一考核绿电消费的格局。
  • The weights are optimised through region- and tier-based differentiation, strengthened medium- and long-term guidance, and firmer mandatory requirements, while the obsolete “excess consumption” and “incentive indicator” concepts are deleted.
    权重制度从实行分区分档、加强中长期引领、强化刚性要求三方面优化,同时删除”超额消纳量””激励性指标”等不再适用的内容。
  • Key industries already facing green-power share requirements include electrolytic aluminium, steel, cement, polysilicon and new data centres at national hub nodes; monitoring and assessment will expand across industry, construction and transport.
    已对电解铝、钢铁、水泥、多晶硅和国家枢纽节点新建数据中心等提出绿色电力消费比例要求;监测考核将向工业、建筑、交通等消费侧重点领域扩展。
  • For foreign-invested manufacturers and data-centre operators in China, the practical effect is a shift of compliance pressure to the electricity buyer: renewable-power purchase, on-site green generation, storage-supported consumption and green certificates all become levers for meeting hard, measurable targets.
    对在华外资制造商与数据中心运营者而言,实际影响是合规压力下移至用电方:购买绿电、就地绿电生产、以储能支撑消纳以及绿证,都成为满足硬性可度量目标的工具。

China’s renewable consumption mandates take effect: Order No. 42 of 2026 explained | 可再生能源消费硬考核落地:2026年第42号令实施办法解读

Overview

On 5 June 2026 the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) and the Ministry of Transport (MOT) jointly issued Order No. 42 of 2026, publishing the Measures for Renewable Energy Minimum Consumption Share Targets and the Renewable Energy Power Consumption Responsibility Weight System (可再生能源消费最低比重目标和可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度实施办法). The Measures took effect on 1 August 2026.

The legal base is the Energy Law and the Renewable Energy Law. The policy intent is to guide society toward preferring and actively consuming renewable energy, promote its high-quality development, and support the carbon-peak and carbon-neutrality goals. The mechanism turns those macro objectives into quantified, assessable obligations at two levels: energy users in key industries, and provincial-level regions.

Two layers of obligation

Layer 1 — Minimum consumption share targets for energy users

The Measures establish a minimum-share system for energy users in key energy-consuming industries. The minimum renewable share is expressed as the share of renewables in an energy user’s total energy consumption, split into two categories:

  • Electricity minimum-share targets, covering all renewable power-generation types; and
  • Non-electric minimum-share targets, covering renewable heating and cooling, comprehensive utilisation such as green hydrogen/ammonia/methanol produced from renewables, and biofuels.

The central energy authority, together with the relevant departments, determines the key industries, issues targets year by year, and monitors, evaluates and assesses compliance. Industries already facing green-power share requirements include electrolytic aluminium, steel, cement, polysilicon and new data centres at national computing-hub nodes. Going forward, assessment is expected to focus on industry, construction and transport — the main consumption-side sectors. The state encourages enterprises in key industries to go above the minimum, and encourages localities with the right conditions to set minimum shares for government bodies, public institutions and state-owned enterprises.

Layer 2 — Consumption responsibility weights for provincial regions

The renewable power consumption responsibility weight system sets, for every provincial-level region, an explicit target for the share of electricity the region consumes that must come from renewables. The Measures optimise the weight system in three ways:

  • Region- and tier-based differentiation (分区分档), so weights reflect each region’s resource endowment and consumption reality;
  • stronger medium- and long-term guidance, anchoring multi-year expectations for investors; and
  • firmer mandatory requirements, turning consumption responsibility into a hard constraint that protects priority consumption of green power.

Outdated concepts such as “excess consumption” (超额消纳量) and “incentive indicators” (激励性指标) are deleted.

Why the non-electric expansion matters

Until now, China’s assessment of green consumption focused on green power. The 2026 Measures, for the first time, fold non-electric renewable consumption into the minimum-share assessment. The reasoning, per the National Energy Administration, is that renewable non-electric utilisation is essential to relieving grid-consumption pressure in resource-rich regions with limited local demand and to expanding end-use decarbonisation. For companies, this means:

  • renewable heating and cooling can count toward targets;
  • green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol produced from renewable power qualify as non-electric renewable consumption; and
  • biofuel use counts as well.

For foreign investors, the significance is that the decarbonisation compliance toolbox is now broader: a manufacturer that cannot buy enough green power may still move toward its target through on-site renewable heat, green-hydrogen projects or biofuel substitution.

What changed for the market

NDRC’s Energy Research Institute frames the Measures as building a “consumption-end + absorption-end” guarantee system for the first time, closing the loop through target setting, responsibility allocation, implementation paths and supervision. Key market consequences:

  • Compliance pressure moves to the buyer. Unlike earlier eras that pushed storage or generation obligations onto new renewable plants, the new regime pushes consumption targets onto electricity users. Industrial users now need green-power purchase agreements (PPAs), on-site generation, storage-supported consumption, or green certificates to demonstrate compliance.
  • Storage demand is stimulated indirectly. Industrial users that must consume a minimum renewable share may install storage to time-shift green power, and grid-side long-duration storage is needed to help provinces meet absorption weights.
  • New-economy sectors are pulled in. Computing infrastructure, 5G base stations and charging infrastructure are expected to be drawn into assessment, directing clean electricity toward covering incremental electricity demand.
  • “Green builds green.” New-energy manufacturing itself — polysilicon, lithium-battery manufacturing — faces green-consumption requirements, building a low-carbon supply chain for clean-energy equipment.

What this means for foreign-invested enterprises

For foreign manufacturers, data-centre operators and industrial investors in China, the Measures are a compliance milestone:

  • Data centres and heavy industry are in scope now or soon. Polysilicon, steel, cement, electrolytic aluminium and new national-hub data centres already face green-power share requirements; industry, construction and transport are the declared next frontier. Foreign plants in these sectors should treat renewable procurement as a compliance item, not an ESG option.
  • The toolbox is wider than PPAs. On-site renewable heat, green hydrogen/ammonia/methanol, biofuels and storage-supported green-power consumption can all contribute. Model each option against your load profile.
  • Provincial weight differences matter for site selection. Because weights are set region by region, the effective cost of meeting a target differs across provinces. Renewable resource endowment, grid conditions and local green-power prices should feed into any new-plant location decision.
  • Green certificates and PPAs become verifiable instruments. Expect more rigorous monitoring and assessment; keep the certificates, contracts and consumption data that demonstrate compliance in a form regulators can audit.

Practical steps

  • Determine whether your facility or project falls within a designated key energy-consuming industry and which year-by-year targets apply.
  • Map current electricity and heat consumption against the target; quantify the gap in renewable share terms.
  • Evaluate procurement routes: green-power PPAs, on-site solar or wind, storage-supported consumption, and green certificates, including cost and availability in your province.
  • For data-centre and manufacturing expansions, model renewable-consumption cost into the site-selection process rather than treating it as an afterthought.
  • Build a compliance evidence file — contracts, certificates and monthly consumption data — ahead of the monitoring and assessment cycles.

Sources

  • 中国政府网(国务院公报) — 可再生能源消费最低比重目标和可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度实施办法(国家发展改革委等四部门令2026年第42号全文): https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2026/issue_12926/202608/content_7078436.html
  • 中国发展门户网 — 最低比重目标制度首次建立——可再生能源电力消纳迎硬考核: https://cn.chinagate.cn/environment/2026-08/26/content_118664400.shtml
  • 中国发展门户网 — 可再生能源消费最低比重目标与消纳责任权重制度相关报道: https://cn.chinagate.cn/environment/2026-08/19/content_118654154.shtml

Related reading

  • see also: The new power system “15th Five-Year” plan — targets and entry points (330-new-power-system-15th-fyp)
  • see also: China’s carbon market enters its next phase (311-carbon-market-expansion)

可再生能源消费硬考核落地:2026年第42号令实施办法解读

概述

2026年6月5日,国家发展改革委、工业和信息化部、住房城乡建设部、交通运输部联合发布2026年第42号令,公布《可再生能源消费最低比重目标和可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度实施办法》,自2026年8月1日起施行。

其法律依据是《能源法》与《可再生能源法》。政策意图是引导全社会优先使用和主动消费可再生能源,推动可再生能源高质量发展,助力实现碳达峰碳中和。该机制将宏观目标转化为两个层面可量化、可考核的义务:重点用能行业的能源用户,以及省级行政区域。

两层义务

第一层——能源用户消费最低比重目标

《办法》建立重点用能行业能源用户的可再生能源消费最低比重制度。最低比重指国家规定能源用户消费的可再生能源在其总能源消费中应达到的最低比例,分为两类:

  • 电力消费最低比重目标,涵盖全部可再生能源发电种类;
  • 非电消费最低比重目标,涵盖可再生能源供热(制冷)、可再生能源制氢氨醇等综合利用、生物燃料等可再生能源非电利用种类。

国务院能源主管部门会同有关部门确定重点用能行业,按年下达目标,并进行监测、评价和考核。已对电解铝、钢铁、水泥、多晶硅和国家枢纽节点新建数据中心等提出绿色电力消费比例要求。未来考核重点将聚焦工业、建筑和交通等消费侧重点领域。国家支持重点企业在此基础上进一步提升消费比例,鼓励具备条件的地区对政府部门、事业单位、国有企业提出最低比重目标。

第二层——省级消纳责任权重

可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度,是对每个省级行政区域设定明确的可再生能源电量消纳目标,以刚性约束保障绿色电力优先消纳。《办法》从三方面优化权重制度:

  • 分区分档,使权重反映各地区资源禀赋与消纳实际;
  • 加强中长期引领,为投资者锚定多年预期;
  • 强化刚性要求,把消纳责任变为保护绿电优先消纳的硬约束。

同时删除”超额消纳量””激励性指标”等不再适用的内容。

非电扩围为何重要

此前中国对绿色消费的考核聚焦绿电。2026年《办法》首次将非电可再生能源消费纳入最低比重目标考核。国家能源局给出的理由是:在资源富集地区本地消纳能力有限、大规模远距离外送制约增多的背景下,拓展可再生能源非电利用途径,既是缓解电网消纳压力、破解电力消纳瓶颈的需要,也是深入推进可再生能源安全可靠替代的内在要求。对企业而言,这意味着:

  • 可再生能源供热(制冷)可以计入目标;
  • 由可再生能源电力制取的绿氢、绿氨、绿醇属合格的非电可再生能源消费;
  • 生物燃料使用同样计入。

对外国投资者而言,关键是脱碳合规工具箱变宽了:买不到足够绿电的制造商,仍可通过就地可再生热能、绿氢项目或生物燃料替代向目标靠拢。

市场影响

国家发展改革委能源研究所将《办法》概括为首次从”消费端+消纳端”双维度构建可再生能源保障体系,通过目标设定、责任分工、实现路径与考核监管形成全链条闭环。主要市场影响:

  • 合规压力下移至用电方。 与早期把储能或发电义务压给新建新能源电站不同,新机制把消费目标压到用电户身上。工业企业如今需要绿电交易协议(PPA)、就地发电、储能支撑消纳或绿证来证明合规。
  • 间接带动储能需求。 须满足最低消费比重的工业企业可能加装储能以移峰填谷消纳绿电;电网侧长时储能则是省份完成消纳权重的需要。
  • 新经济领域被纳入。 算力设施、5G基站、充电基础设施预计将进入考核,推动清洁电力覆盖全社会用电增量。
  • “以绿造绿”。 多晶硅、锂电池制造等新能源制造业本身也要满足绿色消费要求,为清洁能源装备构建上下游协同减碳的绿色产业链供应链。

对外资企业的意义

对在华外资制造商、数据中心运营者与工业投资者而言,《办法》是一座合规里程碑:

  • 数据中心与重工业现在或即将入考。 多晶硅、钢铁、水泥、电解铝和国家枢纽节点新建数据中心已面临绿电比例要求;工业、建筑与交通被明确列为下一站。上述行业的外资工厂应把可再生电力采购当作合规事项,而非ESG选项。
  • 工具箱不止PPA。 就地可再生热能、绿氢氨醇、生物燃料与储能支撑的绿电消费均可作贡献。请结合自身负荷画像逐项测算。
  • 省级权重差异影响选址。 权重分省设定,各地达标成本不同。可再生资源禀赋、电网条件与当地绿电价格都应纳入新厂选址决策。
  • 绿证与PPA成为可核验凭证。 监测考核将更严格;请以监管可审计的形式留存合同、绿证与消费数据。

实务建议

  • 判断本企业或项目是否属于重点用能行业范围,以及适用的分年度目标。
  • 对照目标梳理当前电力与热力消费,量化可再生占比缺口。
  • 评估采购路径:绿电PPA、就地光伏或风电、储能支撑消费与绿证,并比较所在省份的成本与可获得性。
  • 数据中心与制造扩建中,把可再生消费成本纳入选址模型,而非事后补救。
  • 在监测考核周期到来前建立合规证据档案——合同、绿证与逐月消费数据。

来源

  • 中国政府网(国务院公报) — 可再生能源消费最低比重目标和可再生能源电力消纳责任权重制度实施办法(国家发展改革委等四部门令2026年第42号全文): https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2026/issue_12926/202608/content_7078436.html
  • 中国发展门户网 — 最低比重目标制度首次建立——可再生能源电力消纳迎硬考核: https://cn.chinagate.cn/environment/2026-08/26/content_118664400.shtml
  • 中国发展门户网 — 可再生能源消费最低比重目标与消纳责任权重制度相关报道: https://cn.chinagate.cn/environment/2026-08/19/content_118654154.shtml

相关阅读

  • 见:新型电力系统”十五五”规划——目标与切入点(330-new-power-system-15th-fyp)
  • 见:全国碳市场进入新阶段(311-carbon-market-expansion)

Renewable energy & green investment incentives

  • There is no foreign-ownership cap on renewable power generation, and solar/wind equipment manufacturing is fully open to foreign investment.
    可再生能源发电无外资股比上限,光伏与风电设备制造对外资完全开放。
  • The binding constraint is provincial planning and grid absorption, not ownership — the practical vehicle is a locally incorporated project company.
    真正约束在于省级规划与电网消纳而非所有权——实务载体是本地设立的项目公司。
  • Since 2021, major wind and solar projects run under grid parity with no feed-in subsidy; revenue rests on power-purchase terms, green-power trading, and green certificates (绿证).
    自2021年起主要风光项目在平价上网下运行、无度电补贴;收入取决于购电条款、绿电交易与绿证。
  • China operates a national ETS (administered by MEE) covering power-sector emissions and expanding to more sectors, plus a restarted voluntary CCER offset market.
    中国运行由生态环境部管理的全国碳市场(ETS),覆盖电力行业并扩至更多行业,另设已重启的自愿减排CCER市场。
  • Green finance levers include green loans, green bonds, and carbon-reduction instruments secured against subsidy/settlement receivables.
    绿色金融杠杆包括绿色信贷、绿色债券,以及以补贴/结算应收为担保的碳减排支持工具。
  • NEA/NDRC encourage foreign-related capital and Belt-and-Road partnerships, opening third-market renewable routes with Chinese counterparts.
    国家能源局与发改委鼓励涉外资本及”一带一路”合作,为外资在第三方市场与中方开展可再生能源项目打开路径。

Renewable energy & green investment incentives | 可再生能源与绿色投资激励

Overview

China hosts the world’s largest and fastest-growing renewable-energy system — by the end of 2025 total renewable installed capacity exceeded 2.3 billion kW, and wind and solar alone reached about 1.84 billion kW, surpassing thermal power as the single largest power source. For foreign investors, the sector is broadly open: manufacturing of solar and wind equipment is unrestricted, and power-generation projects are open to domestic and foreign capital alike.

This article outlines foreign-investor access to wind/solar, green-incentive and financing levers, and participation in the carbon market. It is informational; confirm current subsidy, tariff, and ETS detail with qualified PRC advisers.

Foreign-investor access to wind and solar

There is no foreign-ownership cap on renewable power generation; foreign-funded enterprises may invest in wind, solar, biomass, and hydropower projects on the same footing as domestic firms, typically through a locally incorporated project company. The National Energy Administration (NEA) and the NDRC set the planning and pricing framework, while provincial authorities handle project filing/approval and grid-connection. Equipment manufacturing (PV modules, wind turbines) is fully open and globally competitive; the constraint is usually grid absorbption and provincial planning, not ownership.

Foreign access is also shaped by the foreign-investment negative list (负面清单). Renewable power generation is not on the restricted or prohibited lists, so a wholly foreign-owned enterprise is permitted for generation; the restrictions that remain are sectoral — for example, certain grid assets, distribution-network ownership, and power-grid operation are treated differently and are not the natural vehicle for a generation-focused entrant. This is precisely why the practical structure is a project company that builds and operates generation assets but does not own the transmission backbone. Confirming the negative-list status early avoids designing a holding structure that later runs into a sector cap.

Green incentives & the “grid-parity” era

Since 2021 China’s major wind and solar projects have operated under grid parity (平价上网) without feed-in subsidies, so the investment case rests on power-purchase terms, green-power trading, and green certificates (绿证) rather than direct subsidies. The NEA’s 2022 “High-quality development of new energy” plan and subsequent guidance promote integrated development (solar + storage, deser/Gobi/wasteland bases, “sand-desert-gobi-wasteland” large bases), distributed PV, and rural energy pilots. Local governments may add land, tax, and financing support within the law.

Within the grid-parity framework the economics increasingly depend on scale and co-location. Large “sand-desert-gobi-wasteland” base projects benefit from low land cost and dedicated transmission, while distributed PV competes on avoiding retail tariffs. Provincial pilots for green-electricity direct trading and the growing green-certificate market let developers monetise the environmental attribute separately from the kilowatt-hour, which is especially relevant where the host off-taker has its own renewable-consumption obligation. Foreign investors should also watch the gradual shift — in some provinces — from a fixed benchmark on-grid tariff toward more market-based electricity pricing, which transfers some volume and price risk from the off-taker or utility to the project and rewards better generation forecasting and storage co-location.

Financing, private capital, and “going out”

The NEA and NDRC actively encourage private and foreign-related capital into new energy, including participation in large bases, solar thermal, biomass, and heating projects, and support for green finance, carbon-reduction instruments, and eligible local-government bonds. For developers, financing levers include green loans, green bonds, and renewable-power-price-claim loans secured against subsidy/settlement receivables. Chinese new-energy firms are also steered to “go global” under the Belt and Road, which opens partnership routes for foreign players in third markets.

Carbon market & green-power consumption

China operates a national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) administered under the ecology/environment authority (MEE), covering power-sector emissions with expansion planned to more sectors; a separate voluntary GHG-voluntary-offset (CCER) market supports project-based offsets. Green certificates (绿证) certify renewable generation and are increasingly used to meet green-power consumption obligations for key energy-using industries; the NEA and related bodies are building the world’s largest green-certificate market and pursuing international mutual recognition. Foreign investors should weigh ETS compliance, green-certificate revenue, and power-purchase structuring together.

For foreign participants the ETS and CCER are primarily a revenue-and-risk overlay rather than a core generation licence. As the scheme expands beyond power to industries such as steel, cement, and aluminium, more counterparties will need certificates, deepening market liquidity. The voluntary CCER market, restarted after a multi-year pause, allows project-based offsets — forestry, methane utilisation, and eligible renewable projects may issue CCERs that compliance entities buy. Practical market entry often runs through a Chinese partner or a domestically registered trading entity, since account opening and trading follow domestic rules. Treat green certificates and CCER as complementary but distinct: the certificate proves renewable origin for consumption obligations, while the CCER is a tradable emission offset that retires against a compliance entity’s allowance gap.

Practical example

Consider “NordSolar,” a Danish renewable developer that wants to build a 50 MW distributed rooftop-PV-plus-storage system on the warehouses of a Chinese logistics group in Zhejiang province, selling power directly to the host off-taker under a third-party-investment (TPI, 合同能源管理 / energy-management contract) model.

The first step was incorporation: NordSolar set up a wholly foreign-owned project company in the local free-trade zone, which — because generation has no foreign-ownership cap — could hold the generation assets and sign the grid-connection and power-purchase arrangements directly. The provincial energy bureau’s annual construction plan and a grid-absorption study confirmed the 50 MW fit within the local distribution-grid capacity, which is the real gate on the deal, not the nationality of the investor.

Second, revenue was modelled without any feed-in subsidy. Instead the project stacked three streams: (a) the TPI tariff charged to the host — typically a discount to the retail electricity price, agreed contractually; (b) green-power trading and green-certificate (绿证) revenue from the renewable generation; and (c) potential capacity or ancillary-service value from the co-located storage. The levelised cost was most sensitive to the host’s load curve, so NordSolar modelled on-site self-consumption first and grid export second, sizing the battery to capture the self-consumption arbitrage rather than for wholesale arbitrage.

Third, financing used a green loan secured against the project company and its settlement receivables, with a structure eligible for the carbon-reduction support instruments referenced by the NEA and NDRC. Because storage was co-located, the project also qualified for integrated-development treatment under the new-energy high-quality plan, improving its bankability.

Finally, NordSolar tracked the national ETS and the CCER restart. Although the project’s own emissions were negligible, the host’s compliance obligations and the certificate market affected the value of the green-power contract; NordSolar priced a modest green premium into the TPI tariff to reflect the host’s own ESG and renewable-consumption targets, turning a soft commitment into a contracted revenue line.

The takeaway: the binding constraint was provincial planning and grid absorption, not foreign ownership. A local project company, subsidy-free revenue stacking, and green finance turned an open-but-thin-margin sector into a bankable deal.

What to do next

  • Confirm the provincial plan and grid-absorption study before committing capital — provincial planning, not ownership, is the binding constraint.
  • Assume no feed-in subsidy; model revenue on grid-parity power price, green-power trading, and green certificates.
  • Incorporate a local project company; foreign ownership of generation is permitted but the entity drives permits and grid connection.
  • Explore green finance: green loans/bonds and subsidy-receivable financing for eligible projects.
  • Track the ETS sector expansion and CCER restart to value carbon and certificate streams.
  • Consider Belt-and-Road partnerships for third-market renewable projects with Chinese counterparts.

Sources

  • National Energy Administration (NEA) — policy interpretation on high-quality new-energy development: https://www.nea.gov.cn/2022-05/30/c_1310608538.htm
  • NEA — supporting private/non-state capital in new-energy construction: https://www.nea.gov.cn/20250506/6c9892f4b33b4056afb57a7bf7622290/c.html
  • NDRC — official portal (pricing, planning, green incentives): https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) — official portal (national ETS administration): https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • NEA — official portal: https://www.nea.gov.cn

Related reading

  • see also: Automotive & EV market entry (46-automotive-ev-market-entry)
  • see also: Financial services & fintech licensing (44-financial-services-fintech-licensing)
  • see also: Import-export licensing & customs clearance (50-import-export-customs-clearance)

可再生能源与绿色投资激励

概述

中国拥有全球规模最大、增长最快的可再生能源体系——截至 2025 年底,可再生能源总装机突破 23 亿千瓦,其中风电光伏合计约 18.4 亿千瓦,历史性超过火电成为第一大电源。对外国投资者而言,该 sector 大体开放:光伏与风电设备制造不受限制,发电项目对内资与外资一视同仁。

本文勾勒外资对风光电的准入、绿色激励与融资杠杆,以及参与碳市场的路径。本文仅为信息参考,具体补贴、电价与碳市场细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

外资对风电与光伏的准入

可再生能源发电无外资股比上限;外资企业可与内资企业同等投资风电、光伏、生物质与水电项目,通常经由本地设立的项目公司。国家能源局(NEA)与发改委设定规划与电价框架,省级部门负责项目核准/备案与并网。设备制造(光伏组件、风机)完全开放且具全球竞争力;约束通常在于电网消纳与省级规划,而非所有权。

外资准入亦受外商投资准入负面清单(负面清单)塑造。可再生能源发电未被列入限制或禁止清单,故发电可设外商独资企业;剩余的限制具有行业性——例如部分电网资产、配电网所有权与电网运营被区别对待,并非以发电为核心的进入者之自然载体。正因为如此,实务结构通常是设立一个建设并运营发电资产、但不持有输电主干的项目公司。尽早确认负面清单状态,可避免设计出后续遭遇行业股比上限的持股结构。

绿色激励与”平价上网”时代

自 2021 年起,中国主要风光项目在平价上网(无度电补贴)下运行,投资测算因此取决于购电条款、绿电交易与绿证(绿证),而非直接补贴。国家能源局 2022 年”新能源高质量发展”方案及后续引导,推进集成发展(光伏+储能、沙戈荒基地、沙漠戈壁荒漠大型基地)、分布式光伏与乡村能源试点。地方政府可在法律框架内叠加土地、税收与融资支持。

在平价上网框架下,经济性日益取决于规模与协同布局。大型”沙戈荒”基地项目受益于低土地成本与专用输送通道,而分布式光伏则靠规避零售电价取胜。各省绿电直接交易试点与不断扩大的绿证市场,让开发商得以将环境属性与千瓦时本身分开变现,这在用电方自身负有可再生能源消纳责任时尤为关键。外资还应关注部分省份由固定标杆上网电价逐步转向更市场化电价的趋势——这把部分电量与价格风险从用电方或电网转移到项目侧,更考验发电预测与储能协同能力。

融资、民营资本与”走出去”

国家能源局与发改委积极鼓励民营及涉外资本进入新能源,包括参与大型基地、光热、生物质与供热项目,并支持绿色金融、碳减排工具及符合条件的地方政府债券。对开发商而言,融资杠杆包括绿色信贷、绿色债券,以及以补贴/结算应收为担保的再生能源电价确权贷款。中国新能源企业亦被引导在”一带一路”下”走出去”,为外资在第三方市场的合作打开路径。

碳市场与绿电消费

中国运行由国家生态环境主管部门(MEE)管理的全国碳排放权交易体系(ETS),目前覆盖电力行业排放并计划扩至更多行业;另设温室气体自愿减排(CCER)市场支撑项目级抵消。绿证(绿证)认证可再生发电量,并日益用于满足重点用能行业的绿电消费责任;国家能源局等正建设全球最大绿证市场并推动国际互认。外资投资者应将 ETS 合规、绿证收益与购电结构一并权衡。

对外资参与者而言,ETS 与 CCER 主要是收益与风险叠加层,而非核心发电许可。随着体系由电力扩至钢铁、水泥、铝等行业,更多交易对手将需要配额,市场流动性随之加深。暂停数年后重启的自愿减排 CCER 市场允许项目级抵消——林业、甲烷利用与符合条件的可再生项目可签发 CCER,由履约企业购买。实务进入常经由中方合作伙伴或境内注册交易主体进行,因开户与交易遵循国内规则。应将绿证与 CCER 视作互补但不同:绿证证明用于消纳责任的可再生来源,而 CCER 是可抵减履约企业配额缺口的可交易排放抵消。

实操示例

以丹麦可再生能源开发商”NordSolar”为例,其拟在浙江某物流集团仓库屋顶建设 50 MW”分布式光伏+储能”系统,按第三方投资(TPI,合同能源管理)模式将电力直供用能方。

第一步是设立实体:NordSolar 在当地区自贸片区设立外商独资项目公司——因发电无外资股比上限,该公司可直接持有发电资产并签署并网与购售电安排。省能源局的年度建设计划与电网消纳研究确认 50 MW 落在当地配电网容量之内,这才是交易的真正门槛,而非投资者国籍。

第二步,收入在毫无度电补贴下建模,转由三条流叠加:(a)向用能方收取的合同能源管理电价——通常较零售电价打折、合同约定;(b)来自可再生发电的绿电交易与绿证(绿证)收益;(c)协同储能可能带来的容量或辅助服务价值。平准化成本对用能方负荷曲线最敏感,故 NordSolar 先按就地自用、再按上网建模,并将电池容量定位于捕捉自用套利,而非批发套利。

第三步,融资采用以项目公司及其结算应收为担保的绿色信贷,结构符合发改委与国家能源局提及的碳减排支持工具。因储能协同,项目亦适用新能源高质量发展方案下的集成发展待遇,提升可融资性。

最后,NordSolar 跟踪全国 ETS 与 CCER 重启。尽管项目自身排放可忽略,但用能方的履约义务与绿证市场影响绿电合同价值;NordSolar 在合同能源管理电价中计入适度绿色溢价,反映用能方自身的 ESG 与可再生能源消纳目标,把软性承诺变成合同收入项。

结论是:约束在于省级规划与电网消纳,而非外资所有权。本地项目公司、无补贴下的收入叠加与绿色金融,把一个开放但薄利的行业变成了可融资的交易。

下一步建议

  • 在投入资本前确认省级规划与电网消纳研究——约束在于省级规划而非所有权。
  • 假定无度电补贴;以平价电价、绿电交易与绿证建模收入。
  • 设立本地项目公司;发电外资所有权虽被允许,但实体驱动许可与并网。
  • 探索绿色金融:符合条件的项目可用绿色信贷/债券及补贴应收融资。
  • 跟踪 ETS 行业扩围与 CCER 重启,以评估碳与绿证收益流。
  • 考虑以”一带一路”合作,与中方在第三方市场开展可再生能源项目。

来源

  • 国家能源局(NEA)——新能源高质量发展方案政策解读:https://www.nea.gov.cn/2022-05/30/c_1310608538.htm
  • 国家能源局——支持民营等非公资本参与新能源建设:https://www.nea.gov.cn/20250506/6c9892f4b33b4056afb57a7bf7622290/c.html
  • 国家发展和改革委员会(NDRC)——官方门户(电价、规划、绿色激励):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 生态环境部(MEE)——官方门户(全国碳市场管理):https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)——官方门户:https://www.nea.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 参见:汽车与新能源汽车入华(46-automotive-ev-market-entry)
  • 参见:金融服务与金融科技牌照(44-financial-services-fintech-licensing)
  • 参见:进出口许可与海关清关(50-import-export-customs-clearance)

The New Power System “15th Five-Year” Plan: Targets, Opportunities and Foreign-Investor Entry Points in China’s Green Power Economy

  • On 3 August 2026 the NDRC and the National Energy Administration issued the New Power System Construction “15th Five-Year” Plan (Fa Gai Neng Yuan [2026] No. 942), the first dedicated five-year roadmap for the power sector, targeting initial completion of the new power system by 2030.
    2026 年 8 月 3 日,国家发展改革委、国家能源局印发《新型电力系统建设”十五五”规划》(发改能源〔2026〕942 号),这是电力行业首份专项五年规划,目标到 2030 年初步建成新型电力系统。
  • The Plan sets concrete 2030 targets: non-fossil energy generation reaching 50% of total electricity, over 2.8 billion kW of new-energy capacity integrated at high level, 160 GW of pumped storage, 300 GW-plus of new energy storage and 40 million-plus charging piles.
    规划设定具体 2030 目标:非化石能源发电量占比达 50%,实现 28 亿千瓦以上新能源高水平消纳,抽水蓄能装机约 1.6 亿千瓦,新型储能超 3 亿千瓦,充电桩总量增至 4000 万个以上。
  • The new power system is a 10-dimension build covering supply, grid, storage, demand, market and digitalisation — with “calculation-power electricity” (electrical power for data centres) named as a key demand-side driver, targeting 80 TWh of computing-power electricity by 2030.
    新型电力系统建设覆盖电源、电网、储能、负荷、市场与数字化十大维度,”算电融合”被列为关键负荷侧动力,到 2030 年算力用电量预计达 8000 亿千瓦时。
  • For foreign investors, the Plan opens concrete commercial entry points: new-energy storage manufacturing and operation, virtual power plants and demand response, grid digitalisation, charging infrastructure, green power direct supply to industrial parks and data centres, and participation in the national unified electricity market.
    对外国投资者,规划打开具体商业入口:新型储能制造与运营、虚拟电厂与需求响应、电网数字化、充电基础设施、工业园区与数据中心绿电直供,以及参与全国统一电力市场。
  • The Plan maintains a binding national average new-energy utilisation rate of around 90%, with differentiated utilisation-rate guidance by region, meaning green-power purchase and consumption strategies must be location-specific.
    规划保持全国新能源利用率 90% 左右的约束性导向,并按区域资源禀赋实行分档利用率管控,绿电采购与消纳策略须按地点定制。
  • Institutional mechanisms support the transition: a full-cycle monitoring and early-warning system from planning to grid connection, nine major special projects including wind-solar bases, UHV expansion, storage and computing-power green-power packages, and continued power market reform.
    制度机制支撑转型:建立”规划—建设—并网—消纳”全周期监测预警机制,实施风光基地、特高压扩容、储能建设、算力绿电配套等九大专项工程,并持续推进全国统一电力市场化改革。

The New Power System “15th Five-Year” Plan: Targets, Opportunities and Foreign-Investor Entry Points in China’s Green Power Economy | 新型电力系统”十五五”规划:目标、机遇与外国投资者在中国绿电经济中的切入点

The Plan and its significance

On 3 August 2026 the National Development and Reform Commission and the National Energy Administration issued the New Power System Construction “15th Five-Year” Plan (Fa Gai Neng Yuan [2026] No. 942), the first dedicated five-year programme for the power sector and the guiding document for China’s electricity industry through 2030. The strategic target is the initial completion of a new power system by 2030 — a system that is secure and reliable, green and low-carbon, resilient and intelligent. The Plan is structured around ten dimensions spanning generation supply, grid, storage, load, market, technology and security governance, and it explicitly places electricity as the leading force in economic development: “rather than let development wait for electricity, let electricity wait for development.” For foreign investors, the Plan is the definitive map of where China’s power-related capital expenditure will flow between 2026 and 2030.

The headline 2030 targets

The Plan sets quantified targets that define the size of the opportunity. On generation: non-fossil power capacity reaches 65% of installed capacity and 50% of generation; conventional hydro reaches about 410 GW; nuclear about 110 GW; biomass, CSP, geothermal and ocean energy about 65 GW. On grid and integration: more than 2.8 billion kW of wind and solar capacity is integrated at a high level; the west-to-east power transmission capacity rises to 420 GW. On storage and flexibility: about 160 GW of pumped storage; more than 300 GW of new energy storage; virtual power plants and vehicle-to-grid each reach 50 GW of dispatchable capacity. On demand and charging: more than 40 million charging piles, supporting more than 110 million electric vehicles. On markets and efficiency: the national new-energy utilisation rate is maintained around 90%, with differentiated utilisation guidance by region. On computing: computing-power electricity consumption reaches 80 TWh by 2030, about 6% of total electricity use. These are not aspirational numbers; they are the planning basis for the nine major special projects that follow.

The ten dimensions and the nine special projects

The Plan’s ten dimensions organise the work: (1) optimised green supply — “desert-gobi-wasteland” large wind-solar bases and distributed PV, coal power transitioning to a regulating role; (2) grid upgrading — UHV DC and 750 kV backbone expansion, main-grid-subgrid-microgrid integration; (3) flexible adjustment — independent and shared storage, pumped storage, virtual power plants; (4) demand-side — computing-power coordination, green power direct supply to data centres and industrial parks, nationwide charging networks; (5) electricity-security support; (6) digital and intelligent upgrade; (7) cross-sector integration (electricity-heat, electricity-hydrogen, electricity-transport); (8) unified electricity market reform; (9) technology and equipment; and (10) security governance and regulation. The nine major special projects include wind-solar base construction, UHV capacity expansion, storage construction and a computing-power green-power package, each with funding and assessment support. For a foreign supplier of grid equipment, storage systems, charging hardware or control software, these dimensions translate directly into pipeline demand over the next four years.

Where foreign investors can enter

Foreign investment in the new power system can take several routes. First, manufacturing and operation of new energy storage: with more than 300 GW of new storage targeted, the domestic storage value chain — cells, PCS, BMS, EMS, system integration — is one of the largest single equipment markets in the world, and foreign technology holders have historically participated through JVs and technology licensing. Second, virtual power plants and demand response: aggregated flexible loads, EV charging and industrial demand response are being commercialised through market mechanisms, and foreign aggregators with proven software can partner with domestic utilities and platforms. Third, grid digitalisation: dispatch software, grid modelling, and the “digital twin” of the Yangshan-style smart platforms that the Plan generalises — foreign advanced-grid software and hardware vendors have a genuine opening. Fourth, charging infrastructure and vehicle-to-grid: with 40 million-plus piles planned, charge-point operators, and V2G technology providers can enter through JVs with local operators. Fifth, green power procurement and PPAs: the market-based electricity market and green certificate system let foreign-invested manufacturers sign green-power agreements, an increasingly important element of EU CBAM and supply-chain decarbonisation strategies. Sixth, computing-power green power: the Plan explicitly supports green electricity direct supply to computing parks, which foreign data-centre operators and cloud providers can structure into their China procurement.

The market and utilisation-rate framework

Foreign investors should note two structural features. First, the utilisation-rate framework: the Plan maintains a national average utilisation rate around 90% but introduces differentiated guidance by region and a full-cycle “planning–construction–grid-connection–consumption” monitoring and early-warning mechanism. This means green-power availability and pricing differ materially across provinces, and a company’s decarbonisation and PPA strategy must be built province by province, not nationally. Second, the market reform track: the Plan continues the push toward a unified national electricity market, with pricing reform for new-energy generation and greater reliance on market mechanisms for storage and flexibility. Foreign-invested manufacturers should treat electricity market participation — long-term agreements, ancillary services, capacity mechanisms — as part of their China energy strategy, not as an optional add-on.

What has not changed: the security and state-control framework

The Plan is ambitious on market mechanisms but unambiguous on the structure of the sector: electricity grid remains a state-controlled strategic asset, and foreign participation runs through equipment supply, technology, storage, charging, demand-side aggregation, green power procurement and selected services — not through ownership of grid assets or base-load generation. The encouraged-catalogue and negative-list regimes continue to define what is open and at what equity ratio. Foreign investors should therefore structure participation around the value chain rather than around asset ownership, and should verify the current status of each activity under the negative list and sector licences before committing.

Practical steps for foreign investors in 2026–2030

First, map your technology or service to the ten dimensions and the nine projects, and identify the province-level implementation plans that will follow — provincial NDRC and energy bureau documents are where the concrete project lists will appear. Second, for manufacturers, locate within the new-energy equipment supply chain where China’s local content requirements and standards apply, and structure JV or licensing relationships accordingly. Third, for investors in storage, virtual power plants and charging, assess the market-based revenue streams (peak-valley spreads, ancillary services, capacity payments) that the reform track is creating. Fourth, for corporate decarbonisation, build a province-specific green power procurement model using direct green power trading, certificates and the emerging long-term agreements. Fifth, monitor the nine special projects as they are rolled out — funding mechanisms, procurement calendars and standards-setting will determine the practical window for foreign suppliers.

Outlook

The New Power System “15th Five-Year” Plan is the clearest statement yet of where China’s power sector is heading and how much capital will be deployed to get there. For foreign investors, it converts a diffuse set of green-energy ambitions into quantified, project-linked demand across storage, grid digitalisation, charging, virtual power plants, green-power markets and computing-power integration. The window is open now, and it is defined less by policy text than by the provincial project pipelines and market mechanisms that the Plan is already activating.

Sources


新型电力系统”十五五”规划:目标、机遇与外国投资者在中国绿电经济中的切入点

规划及其意义

2026 年 8 月 3 日,国家发展改革委、国家能源局印发《新型电力系统建设”十五五”规划》(发改能源〔2026〕942 号),这是电力行业首份专项五年规划,也是 2030 年前中国电力工业的纲领性文件。战略目标是到 2030 年初步建成新型电力系统——安全可靠、绿色低碳、坚强韧性、智能灵活。规划贯通电源、电网、储能、负荷、市场、技术与安全治理十大维度,并把电力置于经济发展的先导地位:”宁让电等发展、不让发展等电”。对外国投资者,规划是 2026—2030 年中国电力相关资本开支流向的权威地图。

2030 年核心目标

规划以量化目标界定机会规模。电源侧:非化石能源发电装机占比达 65%、发电量占比达 50%;常规水电约 4.1 亿千瓦;核电约 1.1 亿千瓦;生物质、光热、地热、海洋能约 6500 万千瓦。电网与消纳:实现 28 亿千瓦以上风光新能源高水平消纳;西电东送整体输送能力提升至 4.2 亿千瓦。储能与调节:抽水蓄能约 1.6 亿千瓦;新型储能超 3 亿千瓦;虚拟电厂与车网互动可调规模均达 5000 万千瓦。负荷与充电:充电桩总量增至 4000 万个以上,支撑超 1.1 亿辆电动汽车。市场与效率:全国新能源利用率稳定在 90% 左右,按区域分档管控。算力:2030 年算力用电量达 8000 亿千瓦时,约占全社会用电量 6%。这些不是愿景数字,而是其后九大专项工程的规划基础。

十大维度与九大专项工程

规划的十大维度组织工作:(1)优化绿色供给——”沙戈荒”大型风光基地与分布式光伏,煤电转向调节兜底;(2)电网升级——特高压直流与 750 千伏骨干网架,主配微一体化;(3)灵活调节——独立与共享储能、抽水蓄能、虚拟电厂;(4)负荷侧——算电融合、数据中心与工业园区绿电直供、全域充电网络;(5)电力安全保供;(6)数字化智慧升级;(7)跨域融合(电热、电氢、电交通);(8)统一电力市场化改革;(9)技术与装备;(10)安全治理与监管。九大专项工程含风光基地、特高压扩容、储能建设、算力绿电配套等,各有资金与考核支撑。对电网设备、储能系统、充电硬件或控制软件的境外供应商,这些维度在未来四年直接转化为管线需求。

外国投资者可进入之处

外国投资进入新型电力系统有若干路径。其一,新型储能制造与运营:以超 3 亿千瓦新型储能为目标,国内储能价值链——电芯、PCS、BMS、EMS、系统集成——是全球最大的单体装备市场之一,外国技术持有者历来通过合资与技术许可参与。其二,虚拟电厂与需求响应:聚合灵活负荷、电动汽车充电与工业需求响应正通过市场机制商业化,有成熟软件的外国聚合商可与国内电力公司与平台合作。其三,电网数字化:调度软件、电网建模与规划推广的智能平台——外国先进电网软硬件厂商有真实窗口。其四,充电基础设施与车网互动:4000 万以上充电桩规划下,运营商与 V2G 技术提供者可经与本地运营商合资进入。其五,绿电采购与购电协议:市场化电力市场与绿证体系让外资制造商可签绿电协议,这是欧盟 CBAM 与供应链脱碳战略中日益重要的环节。其六,算力绿电:规划明确支持算力园区绿电直供,外国数据中心与云服务运营商可纳入其在华采购结构。

市场与利用率框架

外国投资者应关注两个结构性特征。其一,利用率框架:规划保持全国平均利用率 90% 左右,但引入分档差异化指导与”规划—建设—并网—消纳”全周期监测预警机制。这意味着各省绿电可得性与价格差异显著,企业脱碳与 PPA 策略须逐省构建,而非全国统一。其二,市场改革轨道:规划持续推进全国统一电力市场,改革新能源发电定价,储能与灵活性更多依赖市场机制。外资制造商应把电力市场参与——长期协议、辅助服务、容量机制——纳入在华能源战略,而非可选附加项。

未变之处:安全与国资框架

规划对市场机制雄心勃勃,但对行业结构毫不含糊:电网仍是国家控制的战略资产,外国参与通过设备供应、技术、储能、充电、需求侧聚合、绿电采购与部分服务展开——而非拥有电网资产或基荷电源。鼓励目录与负面清单继续定义开放范围与股比。外国投资者应围绕价值链而非资产所有权构建参与,并在投入前核验各活动在负面清单与行业许可下的当前状态。

2026—2030 外国投资者实操

其一,把技术或服务映射到十大维度与九大项目,关注随之而来的省级实施方案——省发改委与能源局文件是具体项目清单所在。其二,制造商:辨识新能源装备供应链中本地化要求与标准适用环节,相应构建合资或许可关系。其三,储能、虚拟电厂与充电投资者:评估改革轨道正在创造的市场化收入流(峰谷价差、辅助服务、容量补偿)。其四,企业脱碳:用绿电直接交易、绿证与新成长的长协,构建逐省绿电采购模型。其五,跟踪九大专项工程落地——资金机制、采购节奏与标准制定将决定外国供应商的实操窗口。

展望

《新型电力系统建设”十五五”规划》是迄今最清晰的中国电力部门走向与资本投入量级声明。对外国投资者,它把分散的绿色能源雄心转化为跨储能、电网数字化、充电、虚拟电厂、绿电市场与算电融合的量化和项目挂钩需求。窗口期就在当下,其边界更多由规划正在激活的省级项目管线与市场机制界定,而非政策文本本身。

Sources

China’s Carbon Market Enters Its Next Phase: Industry Expansion, Penalty Reform and Carbon Footprints (August 2026)

  • On 13 August 2026, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment said China’s national carbon-emission trading market will expand from power, steel, cement and aluminium smelting to petrochemical and chemical sectors, covering about 80% of national CO2 emissions.
    2026 年 8 月 13 日,生态环境部表示全国碳排放权交易市场将在发电、钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼四个行业基础上扩大到石化、化工等高排放行业,实现对全国约 80% 二氧化碳排放的有效管控。
  • Cumulative turnover of the national carbon market exceeded 930 million tonnes by the end of July 2026.
    截至 2026 年 7 月底,全国碳排放权交易市场累计成交量突破 9.3 亿吨。
  • China is also building carbon-footprint data and standards systems and a carbon-labelling certification mechanism to address carbon-related trade barriers.
    中国正推动碳足迹数据与标准体系建设、健全碳标识认证和管理机制,以应对涉碳贸易壁垒。
  • On 15 August 2026, revised penalties in the Interim Regulation on the Administration of Carbon Emission Trading took effect, adding a correction window and raising fines for quota-compliance failures and obstructing inspection.
    2026 年 8 月 15 日起,修订后的《碳排放权交易管理暂行条例》罚则生效,增设整改窗口、上调配额清缴违约与阻碍检查的罚款。
  • For foreign-invested enterprises, the expansion signals which industries will face mandatory carbon compliance next, and the carbon-footprint agenda affects exporters facing carbon-related border measures.
    对外资企业,扩容预示哪些行业将面临强制碳合规,碳足迹议程则影响面临涉碳边境措施的出口企业。

China’s Carbon Market Enters Its Next Phase: Industry Expansion, Penalty Reform and Carbon Footprints (August 2026) | 全国碳市场进入新阶段:行业扩容、罚则改革与碳足迹(2026 年 8 月)

Why this matters now

Two August 2026 developments reset the compliance landscape for China’s carbon market. First, at a State Council Information Office press conference on 13 August 2026, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) confirmed that the national carbon-emission trading market will be expanded from the four existing industries — power, steel, cement and aluminium smelting — to petrochemical and chemical sectors, targeting effective control of about 80% of national CO2 emissions. Cumulative market turnover had exceeded 930 million tonnes by the end of July 2026. Second, on 15 August 2026, amendments to the Interim Regulation on the Administration of Carbon Emission Trading took effect under State Council Decision No. 843, revising the penalty provisions: a correction window was added for quota-compliance failures, with a two-tier fine, and penalties for obstructing supervision were raised while individual liability was introduced. Together, the two developments tell foreign-invested enterprises which sectors will face mandatory carbon compliance next, and how non-compliance will be priced.

Industry expansion and the market’s trajectory

The national carbon market covers about 3,500 key emitting units across power, steel, cement and aluminium smelting, and had achieved effective control of more than 60% of national carbon emissions. The next phase brings petrochemical and chemical industries into scope, lifting coverage to about 80%. For multinational groups, the direction matters for at least three reasons. First, petrochemical and chemical facilities in China — including foreign-invested refining and chemicals operations — will eventually face quota allocation, annual emissions reporting, verification and compliance surrender, a significant operational obligation. Second, the voluntary emissions-reduction market (CCER) continues to provide incentives for emission-reduction and carbon-sink projects, creating monetisation options for qualifying projects. Third, MEE is simultaneously advancing carbon-footprint data and standards systems, a carbon-labelling certification mechanism, and international alignment of carbon-related standards — directly relevant to exporters facing carbon border adjustment mechanisms in major destination markets. The repeated official formulation — “emitting carbon has a cost, reducing carbon has a return” — captures the policy intent.

Penalty reform under State Council Decision No. 843

State Council Decision No. 843 (published 13 August, effective 15 August 2026) modified 12 administrative regulations to align with the Ecological Environment Code, including the first formal amendment of the Interim Regulation on the Administration of Carbon Emission Trading. Two changes matter most for compliance. First, for a key emitting unit that fails to surrender its full quota on time, the new provision creates a correction window: the authority orders rectification within a time limit and imposes a fine of RMB 1 million to 5 million; if the unit still fails to surrender after the window, the fine becomes 5–10 times the average transaction price of the month preceding the surrender deadline, and production rectification may be ordered. The old quota-verification (deduction of next year’s allocation) mechanism is removed. Second, the penalty for refusing or obstructing supervision rises from RMB 20,000–200,000 to RMB 50,000–200,000, and for the first time imposes an individual fine of RMB 5,000–50,000 on the directly responsible managers and personnel. The reform therefore combines a more graduated, correction-friendly structure with sharper enforcement teeth and individual accountability.

What this means for foreign-invested enterprises

For foreign-invested enterprises, the August 2026 picture has several layers. Operators in power, steel, cement and aluminium smelting already face carbon-market obligations; the penalty reform raises the cost of sloppy surrender or obstruction, and the two-tier fine rewards timely correction. Groups with petrochemical or chemical assets in China should begin readiness work now — data quality, emissions monitoring, and understanding quota-allocation mechanics — because entry into the market is the direction of travel, even if the timing of inclusion is not yet fixed. Exporters in carbon-intensive value chains should track the carbon-footprint and carbon-labelling agenda, because it will feed into product-level carbon data that customers and border regulators will increasingly request. And for financial groups, the MEE’s stated direction of “cautiously advancing” bank and securities institutions’ participation in the carbon market, and exploring carbon pledge and repurchase products, signals developing carbon-finance opportunities.

Practical steps

  1. Map your carbon exposure. Determine whether any Chinese entity in the group is a key emitting unit today or likely to be included in the petrochemical/chemical expansion.
  2. Prepare data and verification infrastructure. Emissions monitoring, statistical accounting and annual reporting processes should be robust before inclusion, since the new penalty structure punishes data failures and late surrender.
  3. Model surrender and correction procedures. Understand the new correction window and two-tier fine; plan compliance calendars so surrender is completed on time and corrections, if needed, are within the window.
  4. Engage the carbon-footprint agenda. If you export carbon-intensive products, build the product-level carbon data and certification readiness that customers and border regimes will expect.
  5. Assess CCER opportunities. Evaluate whether your assets — renewable energy, energy efficiency, carbon sinks — qualify for voluntary reduction credits.
  6. Monitor implementing rules. The market expansion, sectoral inclusion timelines and quota-allocation rules will be set out in follow-up regulations; track the relevant industrial and provincial notices.

Compliance notes

The August 2026 statements set direction and amend penalties; they do not yet place petrochemical and chemical companies inside the market. Until the sector-specific inclusion rules issue, those industries do not have quota obligations. But the direction is unambiguous, and readiness investment is prudent. For companies already inside the market, the revised penalties are in force from 15 August 2026: review surrender timing, data quality and inspection cooperation. Finally, the carbon-market regime interacts with the energy-consumption dual-control framework and with carbon-footprint requirements abroad, so treat carbon compliance as an integrated, cross-border function rather than a China-only obligation.


全国碳市场进入新阶段:行业扩容、罚则改革与碳足迹(2026 年 8 月)/ China’s Carbon Market Enters Its Next Phase: Industry Expansion, Penalty Reform and Carbon Footprints (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月的两项进展重置中国碳市场的合规图景。其一,2026 年 8 月 13 日国新办新闻发布会上,生态环境部确认全国碳排放权交易市场将从发电、钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼四个现有行业扩大到石化、化工等高排放行业,目标实现对全国约 80% 二氧化碳排放的有效管控;截至 7 月底累计成交量已突破 9.3 亿吨。其二,2026 年 8 月 15 日,依国务院第 843 号令修改后的《碳排放权交易管理暂行条例》罚则生效:配额清缴违约增设整改窗口与两档罚款,阻碍监管的罚款上调并首次引入个人罚则。两项进展共同告诉外资企业:哪些行业将面临下一轮强制碳合规,以及违规将如何定价。

行业扩容与市场轨迹

全国碳市场覆盖发电、钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼四个行业约 3500 家重点排放单位,已实现对全国 60% 以上碳排放的有效管控。下一阶段将石化、化工纳入范围,覆盖率升至约 80%。对外资集团,方向至少在三层意义上重要。其一,在华石化与化工设施(包括外资炼化与化学品运营)最终将面临配额分配、年度排放报告、核查与履约清缴,这是一项重大的运营义务。其二,全国自愿减排交易市场(CCER)继续为减排与碳汇项目提供激励,为合格项目创造货币化选项。其三,生态环境部同步推进碳足迹数据与标准体系、碳标识认证机制及涉碳标准的国际衔接——直接关系到面临主要目的市场碳边境调节机制的出口企业。官方反复表述的”排碳有成本、减碳有收益”概括了政策意图。

国务院第 843 号令下的罚则改革

国务院第 843 号令(8 月 13 日公布、8 月 15 日施行)为配套《生态环境法典》修改 12 部行政法规,其中首次正式修订《碳排放权交易管理暂行条例》。两项变化对合规最重要。其一,对未按期足额清缴配额的重点排放单位,新条款设立整改窗口:监管责令限期改正并处 100 万–500 万元罚款;限期仍未清缴的,处清缴时限前 1 个月市场平均成交价 5–10 倍罚款,并可责令停产整治。旧有的核减下一年度配额机制删除。其二,拒绝、阻碍监督检查的罚款从 2 万–20 万元上调至 5 万–20 万元,并首次对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员处 5000 元–5 万元个人罚款。改革因此兼具更梯度、更容错的结构与更硬的执法牙齿和个人问责。

对外资企业的意义

对外资企业,2026 年 8 月的图景有多层。发电、钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼的运营者已面临碳市场义务;罚则改革提高了怠于清缴或阻碍检查的成本,两档罚款奖励及时整改。在华拥有石化或化工资产的外资集团应立即开展准备——数据质量、排放监测、理解配额分配机制——因为进入市场是大势所趋,即使纳入时点未定。处于碳密集价值链的出口企业应跟踪碳足迹与碳标识议程,因为它将进入客户与边境监管日益要求的产品级碳数据。对金融集团,生态环境部”稳慎推进银行、证券机构参与全国碳市场、探索碳质押与碳回购”的表述,预示着碳金融机会正在发展。

操作步骤

  1. 梳理碳敞口。 判断集团内任何在华主体当前是否为重点排放单位,或可能被纳入石化/化工扩容。
  2. 准备数据与核查基础设施。 纳入前就应具备稳健的排放监测、统计核算与年度报告流程,因为新罚则严惩数据失败与迟延清缴。
  3. 建模清缴与整改程序。 理解新整改窗口与两档罚款;安排合规日历确保按期清缴,如需整改则在窗口内完成。
  4. 参与碳足迹议程。 若出口碳密集产品,提前建设客户与边境机制将要求的产品级碳数据与认证准备。
  5. 评估 CCER 机会。 评估资产(可再生能源、能效、碳汇)是否符合自愿减排核证资格。
  6. 跟踪实施规则。 市场扩容、行业纳入时点与配额分配规则将由后续法规明确;跟踪相关行业与省级通知。

合规提示

2026 年 8 月的表态设定方向并修订罚则,并未将石化、化工企业立即放入市场。在行业纳入规则出台前,这些行业没有配额义务。但方向明确,准备投入是审慎之举。对已在市场内的企业,修订后的罚则自 2026 年 8 月 15 日起生效:审视清缴时点、数据质量与检查配合。最后,碳市场制度与能耗双控框架及境外碳足迹要求互动,应将碳合规视为一体化、跨境的职能,而非仅中国的义务。

Sources

Foreign Firms’ Green Power Procurement and Carbon Market Compliance

  • China has built a unified national green-power trading framework and a nationwide Green Electricity Certificate (GEC) system; foreign-invested enterprises registered in China can open accounts and procure GECs like any domestic user.
    中国已建立全国统一的绿色电力交易框架与覆盖全国的绿色电力证书(绿证)制度;在境内合法注册的外商投资企业与境内用户一样可开设账户并采购绿证。
  • The 2024 “Green Power Trading Chapter” folds green-power trading into the medium- and long-term electricity market, letting users buy renewable attributes together with the power they consume.
    2024年《绿色电力交易专章》将绿色电力交易融入电力中长期交易,使用户可随所用电量一并购买可再生能源环境属性。
  • The 2026 “Implementation Rules for GEC Administration (Trial)” set a full-lifecycle regime — account opening, issuance, transfer and cancellation — and require, from 1 January 2026, that the GEC’s generation year match the consumption year.
    2026年《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》建立了账户、核发、划转、核销的全生命周期机制,并要求自2026年1月1日起绿证电量生产年份与消费年份保持一致。
  • The State Council’s 2026 opinion on a unified national electricity market calls for a mandatory-plus-voluntary green-power consumption system and studies linking GECs into carbon accounting.
    国务院办公厅2026年关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见提出建立强制与自愿相结合的绿证消费制度,并研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算的可行路径。
  • Foreign investors should treat green-power procurement as part of ESG and carbon-compliance strategy: GECs are the recognised proof of renewable consumption and increasingly feed into carbon disclosures.
    外资投资者应将绿电采购纳入ESG与碳合规战略:绿证是公认的可再生能源消费凭证,并日益衔接碳披露。
  • Cross-border green-power trading with Hong Kong and Macao follows the same green-power trading principles, giving Greater Bay Area users a practical cross-boundary option.
    与港澳的跨境绿电交易参照同一绿色电力交易原则,为粤港澳大湾区用户提供切实可行的跨境选项。

Foreign Firms’ Green Power Procurement and Carbon Market Compliance | 外资企业绿电采购、绿证与碳市场履约

Why this matters now

As multinational groups face tightening Scope 2 (purchased electricity) disclosure and supply-chain decarbonisation requirements, China’s rapid build-out of a green-power market has become directly relevant to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating on the mainland. Two developments converge: a mature, unified green-power trading mechanism, and a standardised Green Electricity Certificate (GEC) system that serves as the recognised proof of renewable consumption. For an FIE, buying green power in China is no longer a niche procurement choice — it is a core instrument for meeting global ESG commitments, customer requirements and emerging carbon-accounting rules.

The green-power trading framework

The “Green Power Trading Chapter” of the Basic Rules for Medium- and Long-Term Electricity Trading (NDRC and NEA, Fa Gai Neng Yuan [2024] No. 1123, July 2024) embeds green-power trading within the broader electricity market. Its design principles are straightforward: renewable generation and eligible users trade green power under medium- and long-term contracts, and the GEC is the foundational certificate evidencing renewable production, consumption and environmental attributes. Provincial authorities guide users to participate on a “within-province primary, cross-region supplementary” basis, and cross-border green-power trading with Hong Kong and Macao follows the same principles.

The Green Electricity Certificate system

The GEC is the national voucher for renewable environmental attributes. The Implementation Rules for GEC Administration (Trial) (NEA, issued late 2025 and published January 2026) codify the full lifecycle:

  • Accounts. Power users — including business entities lawfully registered in China — may open a unique real-name GEC account on the national GEC issuance-and-trading system or any GEC trading platform. Foreign-related users with renewable energy exchange with China may also register with valid documentation.
  • Issuance. One GEC is issued per 1,000 kWh of renewable generation, monthly, covering wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, marine and eligible hydro.
  • Transfer. GECs are transferred in real time from seller to buyer upon transaction completion; green-power trading volumes carry their GECs and cannot be re-traded.
  • Cancellation. GECs are cancelled upon expiry (two years), upon declaration of green-power consumption, or upon CCER registration — and from 1 January 2026 the GEC generation year must match the consumption year, raising the bar for time-matched claims.

The 2026 unified electricity market opinion

The State Council’s 2026 opinion on improving the unified national electricity market strengthens the green dimension. It calls for improving the nationally unified GEC market, giving GECs a fuller role as the basis for renewable production, consumption and environmental-attribute recognition, and accelerating a mandatory-plus-voluntary green-power consumption system. It also promotes green-power consumption certification using blockchain, strengthens traceability, and studies viable paths to incorporate GECs into carbon-emission accounting — a signal that green-power proof may increasingly offset carbon obligations.

Carbon-market linkage and compliance posture

Green-power procurement does not sit in isolation from China’s carbon regime. The national carbon-emissions trading market (ETS) covers large emitters, and the policy direction is toward *dual control* — shifting from controlling energy intensity to controlling total carbon emissions — which raises the strategic value of renewable-consumption evidence. For an FIE, the practical chain is: buy green power and receive GECs (proof of renewable consumption), account for residual emissions through the ETS where applicable, and document both for global Scope 2 and supply-chain disclosures. The 2026 opinion’s study of incorporating GECs into carbon accounting is the thread to watch: if GECs become an accepted offset against carbon obligations, early movers with clean procurement records gain a measurable compliance advantage. Foreign groups should therefore build green-power procurement into the China ESG playbook now, rather than treating it as an ad-hoc purchase.

Practical steps for foreign-invested enterprises

  1. Open a GEC account early. A lawfully registered FIE can register directly; group entities should consolidate procurement to maximise matching and traceability.
  2. Buy green power through the trading centre. Sign medium- and long-term green-power contracts and let the associated GECs flow to your account automatically.
  3. Match year and attribute. From 2026, align the GEC generation year with your consumption year and keep cancellation records as ESG evidence.
  4. Connect to carbon strategy. Track the evolving linkage between GECs and carbon accounting; prepare to use GECs in both disclosures and any future offset mechanism.
  5. Use GBA cross-border options. For Greater Bay Area operations, explore Hong Kong–Macao cross-border green-power arrangements under the same trading principles.

Related reading

Green-power procurement sits beside China’s national carbon-emissions trading market and the dual-control transition on carbon emissions. FIEs should read the three together: buy green power (GEC), account for residual emissions (carbon market), and document both for global reporting.


外资企业绿电采购、绿证与碳市场履约

为何当下值得关注

随着跨国集团面临日益收紧的范围二(外购电力)披露与供应链脱碳要求,中国快速建成的绿色电力市场已与在岸运营的外商投资企业(FIE)直接相关。两股趋势交汇:成熟的全国统一绿色电力交易机制,以及作为可再生能源消费公认凭证的标准化绿色电力证书(绿证)制度。对外资企业而言,在中国采购绿电已不再是小众采购选择,而是履行全球ESG承诺、满足客户要求并衔接新兴碳核算规则的核心工具。

绿色电力交易框架

《电力中长期交易基本规则——绿色电力交易专章》(国家发展改革委、国家能源局,发改能源〔2024〕1123号,2024年7月)将绿色电力交易嵌入更广泛的电力市场。其设计原则清晰:可再生能源发电企业与符合条件的用户以中长期合同交易绿电,绿证作为证明可再生能源生产、消费与环境属性的基础凭证。地方政府按照”省内为主、跨省区为辅”引导用户参与,与港澳的跨境绿电交易参照同一原则执行。

绿色电力证书制度

绿证是中国可再生能源环境属性的国家级凭证。《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》(国家能源局,2025年底印发、2026年1月发布)对全生命周期作出规范:

  • 账户。 电力用户——包括在境内合法注册的经营主体——可在国家绿证核发交易系统或任一绿证交易平台开设唯一实名绿证账户;与中国境内有可再生能源电量交换的国外用户亦可凭有效证件注册。
  • 核发。 每1000千瓦时可再生能源电量核发1个绿证,按月核发,覆盖风电、太阳能、生物质、地热、海洋能及符合条件的水电。
  • 划转。 交易完成后绿证由卖方账户实时划转至买方;绿色电力交易电量对应的绿证随交易划转且不得再次交易。
  • 核销。 绿证在有效期届满(两年)、声明绿色电力消费或完成CCER登记时核销;自2026年1月1日起,绿证电量生产年份须与消费年份一致,提高了年份匹配要求的门槛。

2026年统一电力市场意见

国务院办公厅2026年关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见强化了绿色维度。其提出完善全国统一的绿证市场,进一步发挥绿证作为可再生能源电力生产、消费与环境属性认定的基础凭证作用,并加快建立强制与自愿相结合的绿证消费制度。意见还倡导以区块链等技术开展绿电消费认证、强化溯源,并研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算的可行路径——这预示着绿电凭证可能日益用于抵减碳义务。

碳市场衔接与合规姿态

绿电采购并非孤立于中国碳制度之外。全国碳排放权交易市场(ETS)覆盖重点排放单位,政策方向正转向”双控”——由管控能耗强度转向管控碳排放总量——这提升了可再生能源消费凭证的战略价值。对外资企业而言,实操链条是:采购绿电并取得绿证(可再生能源消费凭证)、在适用时通过ETS核算剩余排放,并为全球范围二与供应链披露留痕。2026年意见关于”研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算”的提法值得持续跟踪:若绿证成为可抵减碳义务的认可凭证,拥有清洁采购记录的先行者将获得可量化的合规优势。因此,外资集团应将绿电采购纳入在华ESG打法,而非将其视为临时采购。

外商投资企业实务步骤

  1. 尽早开设绿证账户。 依法注册的FIE可直接注册;集团内主体宜统筹采购以提升匹配度与可追溯性。
  2. 通过交易中心购买绿电。 签订中长期绿电合同,使对应绿证自动流入本方账户。
  3. 对齐年份与属性。 2026年起使绿证生产年份与消费年份一致,并留存核销记录作为ESG证据。
  4. 衔接碳战略。 跟踪绿证与碳核算的衔接演进,为在披露与潜在抵减机制中运用绿证做好准备。
  5. 善用大湾区跨境选项。 大湾区运营可依据同一交易原则探索与港澳的跨境绿电安排。

延伸阅读

绿电采购与中国全国碳排放权交易市场及碳双控转型并列。外资企业应将三者一并研读:购买绿电(绿证)、核算剩余排放(碳市场)、并为全球报告留痕。

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局:《电力中长期交易基本规则——绿色电力交易专章》(发改能源〔2024〕1123号)— https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202408/content_6970133.htm
  • 国家能源局:《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》解读(2026-01-07)— https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260107/3f7a58d6f6a54b1a96b29e0f50cbd04d/c.html
  • 国务院办公厅:《关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见》(2026年国务院公报)— https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2026/issue_12586/202602/content_7059937.html

New-type storage — foreign participation pathways

  • Document 114 (发改价格〔2026〕114号, Jan 2026) is the first national-level rule to explicitly create a capacity-price mechanism for grid-side standalone new-type storage, treating it on a par with coal power as a capacity resource.
    114号文(发改价格〔2026〕114号,2026年1月)是首个在国家层面明确建立电网侧独立新型储能容量电价机制的规则,将其与煤电同等视为容量资源。
  • New-type storage can now earn a “three-in-one” revenue: capacity price + energy arbitrage + ancillary services; the capacity price is benchmarked to local coal capacity price and scaled by peak-shifting ability.
    新型储能如今可获得”三位一体”收入:容量电价+能量价差+辅助服务;容量电价以当地煤电容量价为基准,按顶峰能力折算。
  • Pumped hydro is refined under a “stock-stable, increment-active” principle: pre-633-file plants keep government pricing; post-633-file plants get a unified capacity price plus market-revenue sharing.
    抽水蓄能在”存量保稳、增量促活”原则下完善:633号文前开工者延续政府定价;之后开工者获统一容量电价加市场收益分享。
  • A reliable-capacity compensation mechanism will follow once spot markets run continuously, paying all qualified resources by the same “peak capability” yardstick — moving from “classified compensation” to “equal pay for equal work.”
    现货市场连续运行后将建立可靠容量补偿机制,以同一”顶峰能力”标尺补偿所有合格资源——由”分类补偿”走向”同工同酬”。
  • No foreign-ownership cap exists on storage investment; foreign capital enters via local project companies and can supply equipment (lithium, flow, compressed-air, flywheel) or invest in projects.
    储能投资无外资股比上限;外资经由本地项目公司进入,可提供设备(锂电、液流、压缩空气、飞轮)或投资项目。
  • Technology choice now competes on function, not just cost: short-duration storage suits high-frequency regulation, long-duration (flow, compressed air) suits peak-shifting and wins more capacity value.
    技术路线如今按功能而非仅成本竞争:短时储能适合高频调频,长时(液流、压缩空气)适合削峰填谷、获更多容量价值。
  • User affordability assessment is a new gate: projects lacking it cannot be planned, approved, or given capacity payment — disciplining over-build.
    用户承受能力评估成为新门槛:未开展评估的项目不得纳入规划及核准、不得给予容量电费或可靠容量补偿。

New-type storage — foreign participation pathways | 新型储能(电化学/抽水蓄能)外资参与路径

Overview

China is building the world’s largest renewable system, and variability makes storage a strategic pillar of the new power system. In January 2026 the NDRC and NEA issued Document 114 (发改价格〔2026〕114号), overhauling the capacity-price mechanism for regulating resources — coal, gas, pumped hydro and, for the first time at national level, grid-side standalone new-type storage. For foreign investors, storage is open (no ownership cap) and now has a clearer revenue floor.

This article explains the 2026 pricing reform, the pumped-hydro and new-storage mechanics, the foreign-participation pathway, and where capital can win. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2026 capacity-price reform (Document 114)

Document 114’s logic: as renewables become the largest installed source, the system needs regulating capacity that “shows up” at peak. It classifies and improves capacity prices for coal, gas, pumped hydro and grid-side standalone new storage, and previews a reliable-capacity compensation mechanism.

  • Coal and gas. Regions raise the fixed-cost recovery via capacity price to at least 50% (coal: RMB 165/kW-year baseline); gas can get a comparable mechanism.
  • Pumped hydro. Pre-633-file (发改价格〔2021〕633号) plants keep government pricing; post-633-file plants get a provincially set unified capacity price (every 3–5 years, cost-recovery basis, with duration折减) plus a share of market revenue.
  • Grid-side standalone new-type storage. For the first time nationally, plants serving system security, not in behind-the-meter pairing, and on a provincial list, may receive a capacity price. The price is benchmarked to the local coal capacity price and scaled by peak-shifting ability (ratio = full-power discharge duration ÷ longest net-load-peak duration, capped at 1), adjusted for market and system needs.

The “three-in-one” revenue for new storage

The reform gives grid-side standalone storage a composite income:

  1. Capacity price — a stable, regulated floor scaled to peak capability.
  2. Energy arbitrage — charge/discharge spread in the electricity market.
  3. Ancillary services — regulation, peak-shifting and other system-value payments.

A reliable-capacity compensation mechanism follows once spot markets run continuously: qualified resources (coal, gas, eligible grid-side storage, later pumped hydro) are paid by the same “reliable capacity” yardstick, ending type-by-type capacity pricing — “equal pay for equal work.” This rewards genuine peak contribution regardless of technology.

Pumped hydro: stock-stable, increment-active

Pumped hydro, the largest existing flexible resource, is refined rather than reinvented:

  • Stock (pre-633). Continue government pricing; after the operating term, re-price to cover necessary upgrades and O&M.
  • Increment (post-633). Unified capacity price + market-revenue sharing, with the share set by the province; revenue mix shifts from high capacity-fee share toward diversified market income, pushing cost discipline and siting quality.

For foreign investors, pumped hydro is capital-intensive and long-cycle; the clearer price path improves bankability but the asset itself is usually a domestic-led, grid-adjacent play.

Foreign-participation pathway

There is no foreign-ownership cap on storage investment or equipment manufacturing. Foreign capital typically enters via:

  • Equipment supply. Lithium, flow (vanadium), compressed-air, flywheel and BMS/PCS technologies — China’s storage manufacturing is large but foreign IP in long-duration chemistry, safety and power electronics remains attractive for local JV or supply agreements.
  • Project investment. A locally incorporated project company builds and operates a grid-side standalone storage plant, joins the provincial list, and earns the three-in-one revenue. Because there is no ownership cap, the entity can be wholly foreign-owned.
  • Integrated plays. Pair storage with wind/solar (see the wind-solar article) or green-hydrogen bases (see the green-hydrogen article) to capture co-located value.

The practical gate is no longer ownership but user affordability assessment: provinces must assess user capacity to pay, and projects without it cannot be planned, approved, or granted capacity payment. This disciplines over-build and ties approvals to genuine system need.

Where capital can win

  • Long-duration storage. Flow and compressed-air gain more capacity value under the peak-ability scaling — a differentiated play versus lithium’s frequency strength.
  • Safety and power electronics. PCS, BMS and fire-safety IP are recurring needs as fleets scale.
  • Project development with offtake certainty. Plants sited where the grid needs peak capacity, on the provincial list, capture the capacity floor plus market upside.
  • Cross-border technology transfer. Foreign long-duration or safety IP localised via JV meets both the speed and compliance bar.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming storage revenue is just energy arbitrage. The 2026 reform adds a capacity floor and ancillary services — model all three.
  • Ignoring the user-affordability gate. Projects without the assessment cannot be approved or paid.
  • Competing on cell cost alone. Technology choice now competes on function (duration, response) under a uniform capacity yardstick.
  • Over-building without grid need. The assessment discipline reduces speculative permits.
  • Treating pumped hydro as a quick entry. It is capital-heavy and long-cycle; the clearer price helps bankability, not speed.

What to do next

  • Decide the entry mode — equipment supply, project investment, or integrated with renewables/H2.
  • For projects, incorporate a local company and target the provincial grid-side standalone storage list.
  • Model the three-in-one revenue (capacity + arbitrage + ancillary) under Document 114.
  • Pre-clear the user-affordability assessment with provincial authorities before committing capital.
  • Choose technology by function: short-duration for frequency, long-duration for peak value.
  • Track the rollout of the reliable-capacity compensation mechanism in spot-market-running regions.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于完善发电侧容量电价机制的通知》(发改价格〔2026〕114号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202601/t20260130_1403525_ext.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策解读 完善发电侧容量电价机制答记者问(2026-01):https://gbdy.ndrc.gov.cn/gbdyzcjd/202601/t20260130_1403528.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 能源价格与新型储能政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 新型储能电站建设与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

新型储能(电化学/抽水蓄能)外资参与路径

概述

中国正在建设全球最大的可再生能源体系,而波动性使储能成为新型电力系统的战略支柱。2026年1月,发改委与能源局发布114号文(发改价格〔2026〕114号),重构调节性资源的容量电价机制——煤电、气电、抽水蓄能,并首次在国家层面纳入电网侧独立新型储能。对外国投资者,储能开放(无股比上限)且如今有了更清晰的收益底。

本文解释2026年电价改革、抽水蓄能与新型储能机制、外资参与路径与资本可胜出之处。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2026年容量电价改革(114号文)

114号文的逻辑:随可再生成为第一大装机电源,系统需要”顶峰时能顶上”的调节容量。它分类完善煤电、气电、抽水蓄能与电网侧独立新型储能的容量电价,并预告可靠容量补偿机制。

  • 煤电与气电。 各地通过容量电价回收煤电机组固定成本比例提至不低于50%(煤电基准165元/千瓦·年);气电可建可比机制。
  • 抽水蓄能。 633号文(发改价格〔2021〕633号)前开工者延续政府定价;之后开工者获省级统一容量电价(每3–5年、按成本回收、按时长折减)加市场收益分享。
  • 电网侧独立新型储能。 首次在国家层面,对服务系统安全、未参与配储、纳入省级清单的电站可给予容量电价。电价以当地煤电容量价为基准,按顶峰能力折算(比例=满功率放电时长÷全年最长净负荷高峰持续时长,上限1),并考虑市场与系统需求。

新型储能的”三位一体”收入

改革赋予电网侧独立储能复合收入:

  1. 容量电价 —— 按顶峰能力折算的稳定管制底价。
  2. 能量价差 —— 电力市场中的充放电价差。
  3. 辅助服务 —— 调频、调峰等系统价值支付。

现货市场连续运行后将建立可靠容量补偿机制:合格资源(煤电、气电、合格电网侧储能,后续含抽水蓄能)按同一”可靠容量”标尺补偿,终结按类型分别定价——”同工同酬”。这不论技术、只奖真实顶峰贡献。

抽水蓄能:存量保稳、增量促活

作为既有最大灵活资源,抽水蓄能是完善而非重塑:

  • 存量(633前)。 延续政府定价;经营期满后按弥补必要技改与运维重新核价。
  • 增量(633后)。 统一容量电价+市场收益分享,分享比例由省级定;收入结构从高容量电费占比转向多元化市场收入,倒逼成本约束与选址质量。

对外资,抽水蓄能资本密集、周期长;更清晰的价格路径提升可融资性,但资产本身通常为国内主导、邻近电网的玩法。

外资参与路径

储能投资与设备制造均无外资股比上限。外资通常经以下方式进入:

  • 设备供应。 锂电、液流(钒)、压缩空气、飞轮及BMS/PCS技术——中国储能制造规模大,但国外在长时化学、安全与功率电子上的IP仍具本地合资或供货吸引力。
  • 项目投资。 本地设立项目公司建设运营电网侧独立储能电站,进入省级清单,赚取三位一体收入。因无所有权上限,实体可为外商独资。
  • 一体化玩法。 将储能与风光(见风光篇)或绿氢基地(见绿氢篇)配对,捕捉协同价值。

实务门槛不再是所有权,而是用户承受能力评估:各省须评估用户支付能力,未开展评估的项目不得纳入规划及核准、不得给予容量电费或可靠容量补偿。这约束过度建设,把核准与真实系统需求挂钩。

资本可胜出之处

  • 长时储能。 液流与压缩空气在顶峰能力折算下获更多容量价值——与锂电的调频强项形成差异化。
  • 安全与功率电子。 随装机扩张,PCS、BMS与消防安全IP是持续需求。
  • 有承购确定性的项目开发。 落在电网需顶峰容量处、进入省级清单的电站,可获容量底价加市场上行。
  • 跨境技术转移。 经合资本地化的国外长时或安全IP,同时满足速度与合规门槛。

常见误读

  • 以为储能收益仅是能量价差。 2026改革新增容量底价与辅助服务——三者须一并建模。
  • 忽视用户承受能力门槛。 未评估的项目不得核准或获付费。
  • 仅以电芯成本竞争。 在统一容量标尺下,技术路线如今按功能(时长、响应)竞争。
  • 不顾电网需求过度建设。 评估纪律减少投机性核准。
  • 把抽水蓄当快速入口。 其资本重、周期长;更清晰的价格助可融资性,而非速度。

下一步建议

  • 决定进入模式——设备供应、项目投资,或与可再生/氢一体化。
  • 对项目,设立本地公司并瞄准省级电网侧独立储能清单。
  • 依114号文建模三位一体收入(容量+价差+辅助服务)。
  • 在投入资本前,与省级部门预先厘清用户承受能力评估。
  • 按功能选技术:短时用于调频,长时用于顶峰价值。
  • 跟踪现货市场运行区域可靠容量补偿机制的落地。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于完善发电侧容量电价机制的通知》(发改价格〔2026〕114号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202601/t20260130_1403525_ext.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策解读 完善发电侧容量电价机制答记者问(2026-01):https://gbdy.ndrc.gov.cn/gbdyzcjd/202601/t20260130_1403528.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 能源价格与新型储能政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 新型储能电站建设与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

National carbon market expansion — impact on foreign-invested enterprises

  • In March 2025 the national ETS first expanded beyond power: steel, cement and aluminium smelting were added, lifting covered CO2 to over 60% of national emissions and adding about 1,500 entities and ~3 billion tonnes of new coverage.
    2025年3月,全国碳市场首次扩围至电力之外:纳入钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼,覆盖二氧化碳占全国总量超60%,新增约1500家企业与约30亿吨新增覆盖。
  • The 2024, 2025 and 2026 compliance years are the “start-up phase”: 2024 allocations equalled verified emissions (no deficit), and 2025–2026 are balanced overall with capped surplus/deficit rates — no contractionary shock to foreign-invested plants.
    2024、2025、2026履约年度为”启动实施阶段”:2024年配额等于经核查排放(无缺口),2025–2026整体盈亏平衡、盈缺率受限——对外资工厂无收缩性冲击。
  • Only direct process emissions are covered (fuel combustion + industrial-process reactions); indirectly purchased electricity/heat is excluded, protecting electricity-intensive but low-direct-emission operations.
    仅覆盖直接过程排放(化石燃料燃烧+工业过程反应);外购电力/热力导致的间接排放不纳入,保护高电耗但直接排放低的运营。
  • Allocation is free and intensity-based; from 2027 the scheme deepens, with sector totals and progressively tighter caps, and paid allocation is to be introduced over time.
    配额为免费且基于强度;2027年起深化,逐步设行业总量并适度收紧,并适时引入有偿分配。
  • Foreign-invested manufacturers in steel/cement/aluminium must register, file monthly key-parameter electronic evidence, report and verify annually, and complete first clearance — with data-quality obligations enforced via blockchain/big-data oversight.
    钢铁/水泥/铝冶炼的外资制造企业须登记、按月报送关键参数信息化存证、年度报告与核查,并完成首次清缴——数据质量义务由区块链/大数据监管执行。
  • Downstream effects reach auto and other exporters: green certificates, CBAM exposure and supply-chain decarbonisation requests flow through to suppliers, including foreign firms.
    下游效应触及汽车等出口商:绿证、CBAM敞口与供应链脱碳要求传导至包括外资在内的供应商。
  • Next sectors in preparation are chemical, petrochemical, civil aviation and paper; by 2027 the ETS is to basically cover major industrial emitting sectors.
    后续准备行业为化工、石化、民航、造纸;到2027年碳市场基本覆盖工业主要排放行业。

National carbon market expansion — impact on foreign-invested enterprises | 全国碳市场扩容(钢铁/建材/有色)对外资企业影响

Overview

China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), run under the ecology/environment authority (MEE), began with the power sector in 2021. In March 2025 it achieved its first expansion: steel, cement and aluminium smelting were brought into the market. For foreign-invested manufacturers in these sectors — and for any foreign firm whose Chinese supply chain touches them — the ETS is now a direct compliance cost and a strategic signal.

This article explains the 2025/2026 expansion, the allocation and compliance mechanics, the foreign-enterprise obligations, and how to respond. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2025 expansion

On 26 March 2025 the MEE released the *Work Plan for Covering Steel, Cement and Aluminium Smelting in the National ETS*. Approved by the State Council, the move added three high-emitting sectors. Coverage now exceeds 60% of national CO2 emissions; about 1,500 new key emitters are added, with roughly 3 billion tonnes of new covered emissions. The covered gases expand to CO2, CF4 and C2F6.

The expansion follows a “implement while refining” two-phase approach: 2024–2026 is the start-up phase (launch and bedding-in), and from 2027 is the deepening phase. A November 2025 allocation plan (《2024、2025年度…配额总量和分配方案》) set the rules for the first two years.

Allocation and the no-shock design

Crucially for business planning, the first years are deliberately non-punitive:

  • 2024. Allocations to steel, cement and aluminium enterprises equalled verified actual emissions — every enterprise had zero deficit and paid no compliance cost.
  • 2025–2026. Each sector is overall balanced; a performance-coefficient band caps every enterprise’s surplus/deficit rate within a small range, so there is no contractionary effect on sector development.
  • Intensity-based, free allocation. Allocation tracks actual output and is benchmarked by industry; lower-intensity firms earn higher surplus rates, creating an incentive to abate. Only direct emissions (fuel combustion, industrial-process reactions) are covered; indirectly purchased electricity/heat is excluded.
  • “Grasp the large, release the small.” Only the most emissions-concentrated producers are included — e.g., BF-BOF long-process steel, clinker lines, aluminium electrolysis — capturing 98%+ of each sector’s full-process emissions, while smaller segments (independent EAF short-process, steel rolling) are not yet included.

From 2027 the scheme deepens: explicit sector totals, progressively tighter caps, and — per the August 2025 opinion on building a stronger national carbon market — a gradual shift to paid allocation alongside free.

Foreign-enterprise obligations

A foreign-invested enterprise in steel, cement or aluminium that meets the threshold is a “key emitting entity” and must:

  • Register on the national ETS management platform and be included in the provincial key-emitter list.
  • File monthly electronic evidence of key carbon-accounting parameters via the management platform; provincial ecology/environment authorities technically review the data.
  • Report and verify annually greenhouse-gas emissions; the 2025 allocation is issued in H1 2026 (pre-allocation) with true-up by year-end.
  • Complete first clearance — the 2024 allowances are cleared within the year of the plan’s release.
  • Meet data-quality duties under a strengthened MRV system, with blockchain/big-data/”three-tier review”/flight inspections enforcing accuracy and punishing fabrication.

Foreign ownership does not change these duties; a China legal entity carries them. The practical risk is not the cost today (near-zero in 2024, balanced in 2025–2026) but the trajectory: tightening caps and paid allocation from 2027 onward mean early abatement investment protects against future liability.

Downstream and cross-sector effects

The ETS radiates beyond the three sectors:

  • Auto and other exporters. Steel, aluminium and cement are upstream inputs; their carbon costs and green-premium requests flow to suppliers. Foreign auto and machinery firms with China plants face both their own ETS exposure (if in covered segments) and supply-chain decarbonisation requests from EU/brand customers.
  • Green certificates and green power. Covered entities and their customers increasingly use 绿证 to evidence renewable consumption; the 2026 green-certificate lifecycle rules broaden availability.
  • CBAM interaction. The EU’s CBAM indirectly raises carbon cost on steel/aluminium enclosures and inputs; Chinese producers’ ETS compliance and certificates become part of export cost competitiveness.
  • Next sectors. MEE has started preparatory work on chemical, petrochemical, civil aviation and paper, targeting basic coverage of major industrial emitting sectors by 2027.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming the ETS is someone else’s problem. If you operate a covered plant in China, you are the key emitter regardless of foreign ownership.
  • Expecting a 2024–2026 cost shock. The design deliberately avoids contraction; the real cost arrives from 2027 with tighter caps and paid allocation.
  • Ignoring monthly evidence filing. Data quality is enforced by tech-enabled oversight; gaps trigger penalties.
  • Confusing direct and indirect emissions. Only direct process emissions are covered now; purchased power is excluded — plan abatement on the right boundary.
  • Treating ETS in isolation. Green certificates, CBAM and supply-chain requests are linked; manage them together.

What to do next

  • Confirm whether your China entity is a covered key emitter in steel/cement/aluminium; register on the national ETS platform.
  • Stand up a data-quality system: monthly key-parameter electronic evidence, annual reporting, and verification readiness.
  • Model the 2027+ trajectory — tightening caps and paid allocation — into capex for abatement now.
  • Use green certificates and green-power procurement to manage renewable-consumption and export-customer requests.
  • If exporting to the EU, integrate ETS compliance and CBAM exposure into product cost.
  • Track MEE’s next-sector preparations (chemical, petrochemical, aviation, paper) for future exposure.

Sources

  • 生态环境部 — 《2024、2025年度全国碳排放权交易市场钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业配额总量和分配方案》答记者问(2025-11):https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/zbft/202511/t20251119_1134197.shtml
  • 国务院 — 全国碳市场首次扩围(钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼)新闻发布(2025-03):https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202503/content_7015718.htm
  • 生态环境部(MEE)门户网站 — 全国碳排放权交易市场管理:https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • 光明日报 — 首次扩围报道(2025-03-27):https://news.gmw.cn/2025-03/27/content_37929458.htm

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)

全国碳市场扩容(钢铁/建材/有色)对外资企业影响

概述

中国全国碳排放权交易体系(ETS)由生态环境主管部门(MEE)管理,2021年以电力行业起步。2025年3月实现首次扩围:纳入钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼。对身处这些行业的外资制造企业——以及任何中国供应链触及它们的外国公司——ETS如今是直接的合规成本与战略信号。

本文解释2025/2026扩围、配额与履约机制、外资企业义务与应对。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2025年扩围

2025年3月26日,生态环境部发布《全国碳排放权交易市场覆盖钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业工作方案》。经国务院办公厅,纳入三个高排放行业。覆盖二氧化碳占全国总量超60%;新增约1500家重点排放单位,新增覆盖排放约30亿吨。覆盖气体扩展至CO2、CF4与C2F6。

扩围按”边实施、边完善”两阶段:2024–2026为启动实施阶段,2027年起为深化完善阶段。2025年11月的《2024、2025年度…配额总量和分配方案》设定了前两年规则。

配额与无冲击设计

对经营规划至关重要的是,最初几年刻意非惩罚性:

  • 2024年。 钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼企业配额等于经核查实际排放——每家企业无缺口、无需支付履约成本。
  • 2025–2026年。 各行业整体盈亏平衡;以绩效系数带将每家企业盈缺率控制在较小范围内,不对行业发展产生收缩性效应。
  • 基于强度、免费分配。 配额与实际产出挂钩并按行业基准;强度越低企业盈余率越高,形成减排激励。仅覆盖直接排放(化石燃料燃烧、工业过程反应);外购电力/热力导致的间接排放不纳入。
  • “抓大放小”。 仅纳入排放最集中的生产者——如高炉-转炉长流程钢铁、熟料线、铝电解——覆盖各行业全流程排放98%以上,而较小环节(独立电炉短流程、钢压延)暂不纳入。

2027年起深化:明确行业总量、逐步适度收紧,并依2025年8月《关于推进绿色低碳转型 加强全国碳市场建设的意见》逐步引入有偿分配(与免费并行)。

外资企业义务

钢铁、水泥或铝冶炼中达到门槛的外商投资企业,属”重点排放单位”,须:

  • 登记 于全国碳市场管理平台,并纳入省级重点排放单位名录。
  • 按月报送 关键核算参数的信息化存证;省级生态环境主管部门技术审核。
  • 年度报告与核查 温室气体排放;2025年配额于2026年上半年预分配、年底多退少补核定清缴。
  • 完成首次清缴 —— 2024年配额在方案发布当年内清缴。
  • 履行数据质量义务 —— 在强化的MRV体系下,以区块链/大数据/”三级联审”/飞行检查 enforcement,造假受罚。

外资所有权不改变这些义务;由中国法律实体承担。现实风险不是当下的成本(2024近零、2025–2026平衡),而是趋势:2027年起收紧的配额与有偿分配意味着提早的减排投资可防范未来负债。

下游与跨行业效应

ETS辐射超出三个行业:

  • 汽车等出口商。 钢铁、铝、水泥是上游投入;其碳成本与绿色溢价请求传导至供应商。在中国设厂的外资汽车与机械企业,既面临自身(若处覆盖环节)ETS敞口,也面临来自欧/品牌客户的供应链脱碳要求。
  • 绿证与绿电。 覆盖实体及其客户日益用绿证证明可再生消费;2026年绿证全生命周期规则扩大可得性。
  • 与CBAM互动。 欧盟CBAM通过钢铝外壳与投入间接抬高碳成本;中国生产者的ETS合规与绿证成为出口成本竞争力的一部分。
  • 后续行业。 生态环境部已启动化工、石化、民航、造纸前期准备,目标2027年基本覆盖工业主要排放行业。

常见误读

  • 以为ETS与己无关。 若在中国运营覆盖行业工厂,无论外资与否你就是重点排放单位。
  • 预期2024–2026成本冲击。 设计刻意避免收缩;真实成本自2027年随收紧与有偿分配而来。
  • 忽视按月存证。 数据质量由技术赋能监管执行;缺口触发处罚。
  • 混淆直接与间接排放。 当前仅覆盖直接过程排放;外购电力不纳入——在正确边界上规划减排。
  • 孤立看待ETS。 绿证、CBAM与供应链请求相互关联;应统一管理。

下一步建议

  • 确认中国实体是否属钢铁/水泥/铝的覆盖重点排放单位;在全国碳市场平台登记。
  • 建立数据质量体系:按月关键参数信息化存证、年度报告与核查准备。
  • 将2027+趋势——收紧配额与有偿分配——建模进当前减排资本开支。
  • 用绿证与绿电采购管理可再生消费与出口客户请求。
  • 若出口欧盟,将ETS合规与CBAM敞口纳入产品成本。
  • 跟踪生态环境部后续行业准备(化工、石化、民航、造纸)以预判未来敞口。

来源

  • 生态环境部 — 《2024、2025年度全国碳排放权交易市场钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业配额总量和分配方案》答记者问(2025-11):https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/zbft/202511/t20251119_1134197.shtml
  • 国务院 — 全国碳市场首次扩围(钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼)新闻发布(2025-03):https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202503/content_7015718.htm
  • 生态环境部(MEE)门户网站 — 全国碳排放权交易市场管理:https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • 光明日报 — 首次扩围报道(2025-03-27):https://news.gmw.cn/2025-03/27/content_37929458.htm

相关阅读

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)

Green hydrogen — foreign investment opportunities and demonstration zones

  • Green hydrogen is a 2026 policy priority: the “15th Five-Year Plan” names hydrogen and green fuels as new growth points, and Inner Mongolia alone targets large-scale green-H2 clusters with costs of RMB 17–20/kg (about 60% of the national average).
    绿氢是2026年政策重点:”十五五”规划将氢能、绿色燃料列为新增长点;仅内蒙古即瞄准规模化绿氢集群,成本17–20元/公斤(约全国均价的60%)。
  • Green-power direct connection (绿电直连, 发改能源〔2025〕650号 and 〔2026〕688号) is the key enabler — it gives electrolytic hydrogen 100% physical green-power traceability and removes the public-grid “middle leg,” cutting cost and certifying origin.
    绿电直连(发改能源〔2025〕650号、〔2026〕688号)是关键赋能手段——为电解制氢提供100%物理绿电溯源,去掉公共电网”中转”,降本并认证来源。
  • By February 2026, 84 green-direct-connection projects had been approved nationwide (32.59 GW of renewable capacity); at least eight large green-H2 projects advanced in 2026 across Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Heilongjiang and Hubei.
    截至2026年2月,全国已审批84个绿电直连项目(可再生装机3259万千瓦);2026年新疆、内蒙古、广东、黑龙江、湖北等地至少8个大型绿氢项目推进。
  • Demonstration is moving from pilot to scale: the world’s largest green-hydrogen-ammonia project (Oriental Energy, Chifeng) shipped its first green ammonia export in 2026 and holds ISCC GHG certification — a template for export-oriented green fuels.
    示范正从试点走向规模:全球最大绿氢制氨项目(远景赤峰)2026年首发绿氨出海并获ISCC GHG认证——是可出口绿色燃料的范本。
  • Foreign investors enter via local project companies and partnerships; the sector has no generation-ownership cap, and green-direct-connection rules explicitly welcome foreign-related and private capital in new energy.
    外资经由本地项目公司与合作进入;该领域无发电所有权上限,且绿电直连规则明确欢迎涉外与民营资本进入新能源。
  • Watch the cost and certification stack: electrolyser capex, renewable power price (as low as RMB 0.15–0.21/kWh in the west), green-certificate/ISCC traceability, and provincial pilots (Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Xinjiang) defining上网 electricity ratios.
    关注成本与认证栈:电解槽资本开支、可再生电价(西部低至0.15–0.21元/千瓦时)、绿证/ISCC溯源,以及界定上网电量比例的内蒙古、吉林、新疆等省级试点。
  • Opportunities span the value chain: green-H2 for refining/chemicals, green ammonia/methanol/Sustainable Aviation Fuel, hydrogen pipelines and equipment, and “wind-solar-hydrogen-storage” integrated bases.
    机会覆盖价值链:炼化/化工绿氢、绿氨/绿醇/可持续航空燃料、氢管网与装备,以及”风光氢储”一体化基地。

Green hydrogen — foreign investment opportunities and demonstration zones | 绿氢/氢能产业:外资投资机会与示范区

Overview

Hydrogen — especially green hydrogen produced from renewable power — has moved from pilot exploration to ordered scale-up in China. The “15th Five-Year Plan” explicitly names hydrogen and green fuels as new growth points, and 2026 is seeing a wave of large green-direct-connection (绿电直连) hydrogen projects. For foreign investors, the sector is open and policy-backed, but success hinges on mastering the green-power-direct-connection mechanism, the cost stack, and international certification for export.

This article outlines the 2026 policy push, demonstration clusters, the foreign-investor access path, and where capital can win. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2026 policy push

Two national instruments anchor green hydrogen:

  • Green-power direct connection. The NDRC/NEA *Notice on Orderly Promoting Green-Power Direct Connection* (发改能源〔2025〕650号, May 2025) defined the model and standards; a September 2025 transmission-and-distribution price notice clarified the cost rules (capacity/demand-based payment, no system-reserve or transmission energy charge on downside power). The 2026 multi-user version (发改能源〔2026〕688号) extends it to several off-takers. For electrolytic hydrogen this is decisive: dedicated lines deliver 100% green power with clear physical traceability, solving both the cost (power is 60–80% of green-H2 cost) and the origin-certification problem for export markets.
  • “15th Five-Year Plan” and local pilots. The national plan lays out green-H2 demonstration bases in Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Xinjiang. Inner Mongolia alone has issued 19 hydrogen policies covering the full “produce–store–transport–use” chain, built 8 green-H2 projects (≈80,000 t/yr capacity), and in early 2026 reported output of 12,694 t in 2025 (3.6× YoY) at RMB 17–20/kg — about 60% of the national average. Provinces such as Jilin and Xinjiang have issued their own green-direct-connection implementation schemes, with defined caps on grid-fed electricity ratios (e.g., Inner Mongolia: ≤40% in 2027, ≤20% from 2028 for grid-connected hydrogen-based green-fuel projects).

Demonstration at scale

By February 2026 the NEA had disclosed 84 approved green-direct-connection projects (32.59 GW of renewable capacity). At least eight large green-H2 projects advanced in 2026:

  • Xinjiang Iwu off-grid wind-solar hydrogen — 690 MW renewable + 160 MW/320 MWh storage, ~30,000 t/yr green H2, RMB 2.459 billion.
  • Baowu Qingneng (Yangjiang) green-H2 park — Guangdong’s only green-power-supplied demonstration park, 1.5 GW offshore-wind direct hydrogen, 80,000 t/yr, RMB 11.09 billion.
  • Oriental Energy (Chifeng) 1.52 Mt green ammonia — world’s largest, 100% green-direct-connection, first green-ammonia export shipped in 2026 with ISCC GHG certification.
  • Heilongjiang Huanan 1.2 GW off-grid wind hydrogen + methanol — ~300,000 t/yr green methanol.
  • Inner Mongolia Arunqi wind-hydrogen SAF — 1 GW wind, 35,000 t/yr green aviation kerosene.
  • Hubei Daye, Inner Mongolia Dengkou, and others — varied off-grid/grid-connected configurations.

The pattern: large “wind-solar-hydrogen-storage” integrated bases in resource-rich western/northern provinces, with downstream products (H2, ammonia, methanol, SAF) aimed at both domestic decarbonisation and export.

Foreign-investor access

Hydrogen production and renewable generation are not on the restricted negative list; there is no foreign-ownership cap on generation, and green-direct-connection rules explicitly welcome foreign-related and private capital in new energy. The practical vehicle is a locally incorporated project company (often in an FTZ or demonstration zone) that builds renewable generation, electrolysers and (optionally) downstream plants, and signs green-direct-connection and offtake arrangements.

Foreign capital can enter as: (a) an equity investor in a Chinese project company or JV; (b) an equipment/technology supplier (electrolysers, compressors, fuel cells, ammonia synthesis); or (c) an offtaker/partner for green fuels (shipping, aviation, chemicals) seeking certified green molecules. The 2026 environment is unusually welcoming because local governments compete to attract green-industry anchor projects with land, grid and fiscal support (some western regions offer up to ~20% investment subsidies).

Where capital can win

  • Electrolyser and balance-of-plant supply. China’s electrolyser manufacturing is cost-competitive; foreign IP in high-efficiency stacks, membranes and controls can partner locally.
  • Green-fuel offtake and certification. Export-oriented green ammonia/methanol/SAF needs ISCC/equivalent certification and traceable green power — a service and trading niche.
  • Integrated bases and pipelines. Inner Mongolia’s provincial hydrogen-pipeline plan (“one trunk, two loops, four outlets”) and storage/transport equipment are open to investment.
  • Demonstration-zone first-movers. Bases in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang and Guangdong offer the clearest policy certainty and infrastructure.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming grid parity alone solves green-H2 economics. Power cost is necessary but not sufficient; electrolyser utilisation, capex and offtake certainty matter more.
  • Ignoring green-direct-connection rules. Without dedicated-line traceability, export-market certification (ISCC/CBAM) is hard.
  • Over-looking provincial caps on grid-fed ratios. Some provinces limit how much a green-H2 project may export to the grid.
  • Treating hydrogen as a single market. Downstream products (H2/NH3/MeOH/SAF) have very different offtakers and certification needs.
  • Underestimating certification and logistics. Export green fuels requires ISCC GHG and traceable power; pipelines/trucks add cost.

What to do next

  • Target resource-rich, policy-certain bases (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Guangdong) for a project company.
  • Master the green-direct-connection application: dedicated line, traceability, and provincial grid-fed-ratio caps.
  • Build the cost stack: renewable power price, electrolyser capex/utilisation, and offtake contracts.
  • Secure ISCC/equivalent certification early if aiming at export; align traceable green power.
  • Consider equipment supply + offtake partnership rather than sole-project ownership.
  • Track the 2026 green-direct-connection project approvals and provincial pilot rules.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号)及2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 氢能、新型能源体系与绿电直连政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿电直连项目审批与可再生能源规划:https://www.nea.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 我国绿证全生命周期管理机制全面细化(2026-01-07):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gdxw/2026-01/07/content_458646.html

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

绿氢/氢能产业:外资投资机会与示范区

概述

氢——尤其由可再生电力生产的绿氢——在中国已从试点探索走向有序规模化。国家”十五五”规划明确将氢能、绿色燃料列为新增长点,2026年正涌现一批大型绿电直连制氢项目。对外国投资者,该领域开放且有政策支撑,但成败取决于掌握绿电直连机制、成本栈与出口所需的国际认证。

本文勾勒2026年政策推动、示范集群、外资准入路径与资本可胜出之处。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2026年政策推动

两项国家级文件锚定绿氢:

  • 绿电直连。 发改委/能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号,2025年5月)明确了模式与标准;2025年9月输配电价通知细化成本规则(按容/需量缴纳,下网电量不再缴系统备用费与输配电量电费)。2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号)扩展至多个用户。对电解制氢这具决定性:专用线路送达100%绿电并清晰物理溯源,同时解决成本(电力占绿氢成本60–80%)与出口市场的来源认证问题。
  • “十五五”与地方试点。 国家规划在内蒙古、甘肃、新疆布局绿氢示范基地。仅内蒙古即出台19项氢能政策,覆盖”制储输用”全链,建成8个绿氢项目(约8万吨/年产能),2026年初披露2025年产量12694吨(同比增3.6倍),成本17–20元/公斤——约全国均价的60%。吉林、新疆等省出台各自绿电直连实施方案,并界定上网电量比例上限(如内蒙古:并网型氢基绿色燃料项目2027年前上网≤40%、2028年起≤20%)。

规模化示范

截至2026年2月,能源局披露全国已审批84个绿电直连项目(可再生装机3259万千瓦)。2026年至少8个大型绿氢项目推进:

  • 新疆伊吾离网风光制氢 —— 69万千瓦可再生+16万千瓦/32万千瓦时储能,约3万吨/年绿氢,投资24.59亿元。
  • 宝武清能(阳江)绿氢产业园 —— 广东唯一绿电直供示范园,1.5GW海上风电直连制氢,8万吨/年,投资110.9亿元。
  • 远景赤峰152万吨绿氨 —— 全球最大、100%绿电直连,2026年首发绿氨出海并获ISCC GHG认证。
  • 黑龙江桦南1.2GW离网风电制氢+甲醇 —— 约30万吨/年绿色甲醇。
  • 内蒙古阿荣旗风光制氢SAF —— 1GW风电,3.5万吨/年绿色航空煤油。
  • 湖北大冶、内蒙古磴口等 —— 多样的离网/并网配置。

模式是:资源富集的西部/北部省份建设大型”风光氢储”一体化基地,下游产品(氢、氨、甲醇、SAF)兼顾国内脱碳与出口。

外资准入

氢生产与可再生发电不在负面清单限制之列;发电无外资股比上限,且绿电直连规则明确欢迎涉外与民营资本进入新能源。务实载体是本地设立的项目公司(常在自贸片区或示范区),建设可再生发电、电解槽及(可选)下游装置,并签署绿电直连与购售安排。

外资可进入为:(a)中国项目公司或合资企业的股权投资者;(b)设备/技术供应商(电解槽、压缩机、燃料电池、合成氨);(c)寻求认证绿色分子的绿燃料(航运、航空、化工)承购方或伙伴。2026年环境格外友好,因地方政府以土地、电网与财政支持(西部部分地区最高约20%投资补助)竞逐绿色产业锚定项目。

资本可胜出之处

  • 电解槽与辅助系统供应。 中国电解槽制造具成本竞争力;国外在高效率电堆、膜与控制系统上的IP可本地合作。
  • 绿燃料承购与认证。 出口型绿氨/绿醇/SAF需要ISCC/等效认证与可溯源绿电——一个服务与贸易利基。
  • 一体化基地与管网。 内蒙古省级氢管网规划(”一干双环四出口”)及储运装备对外开放投资。
  • 示范区先行者。 内蒙古、甘肃、新疆、广东的基地提供最清晰的政策确定性与基础设施。

常见误读

  • 以为平价上网 alone 解决绿氢经济性。 电力成本必要但不充分;电解槽利用率、资本开支与承购确定性更重要。
  • 忽视绿电直连规则。 无专用线溯源,出口市场认证(ISCC/CBAM)困难。
  • 忽视省级上网比例上限。 部分省份限制绿氢项目向电网送电的比例。
  • 把氢当作单一市场。 下游产品(氢/氨/醇/SAF)的承购方与认证需求截然不同。
  • 低估认证与物流。 出口绿色燃料需ISCC GHG与可溯源绿电;管输/槽车增加成本。

下一步建议

  • 瞄准资源富集、政策确定的基地(内蒙古、甘肃、新疆、广东)设立项目公司。
  • 吃透绿电直连申请:专用线路、溯源与省级上网比例上限。
  • 构建成本栈:可再生电价、电解槽资本开支/利用率与承购合同。
  • 若瞄准出口,尽早取得ISCC/等效认证;对齐可溯源绿电。
  • 考虑设备供应+承购合作,而非 sole 项目持股。
  • 跟踪2026年绿电直连项目审批与省级试点规则。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号)及2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 氢能、新型能源体系与绿电直连政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿电直连项目审批与可再生能源规划:https://www.nea.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 我国绿证全生命周期管理机制全面细化(2026-01-07):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gdxw/2026-01/07/content_458646.html

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