Tag Archives: Supplier Due Diligence

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China

  • The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items has applied since 1 December 2024 and provides the framework for licensing, declaration and compliance in this area.
    《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》自2024年12月1日起施行,为这一领域的许可、申报与合规提供了制度框架。
  • GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption.
    海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。
  • Licences for controlled items are applied for through MOFCOM’s unified business system, with technical descriptions and end-user certificates submitted and a review period of 45 working days; the customs declaration remarks column must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the control code.
    出口管制物项许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请,须提交技术说明、最终用户证明等材料,审查期限为45个工作日;报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写管制编码。
  • On 29 June 2026 MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities in the export-control control list, prohibiting export operators from exporting dual-use items to them and prohibiting foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them.
    2026年6月29日,商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单,禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。
  • Unreliable Entity List announcement No. 10 of 2025 listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches, with measures covering China-related import-export activity, new investment in China, and transactions or cooperation by organisations and individuals in China.
    不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单,措施涉及与中国有关的进出口活动、在华新增投资,以及中国境内组织和个人与其进行的交易与合作。
  • On 24 April 2026 seven EU entities were listed; the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, that the measures concern only dual-use items and do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about.
    2026年4月24日发布将7家欧盟实体列名;商务部新闻发言人表示,列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。
  • For buyers in China, screening should run on four dimensions — the control list, end-use, technical parameters and the customer’s ultimate use — with machine-tool control codes such as 2B201 as a worked example.
    对中国境内的采购方而言,筛查应从四个维度展开——对照管制清单、分析用途属性、审查技术参数、确认客户及最终用途——并以2B201类数控机床等管制编码为实操示例。

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China | 出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

Overview

China’s export-control regime rests on a defined legal framework and a set of official listing and declaration procedures. For foreign-invested enterprises that buy, resell or re-export controlled goods in China, the practical task is not to interpret policy intent but to run a reliable screening and licensing process. This guide sets out the framework, the declaration and licensing mechanics, the recent listing actions announced by the Ministry of Commerce, and a four-dimension screening method that procurement and compliance teams can apply.

The tone throughout is deliberately procedural: the measures are described as they are published — by reference to the applicable laws and regulations, and to the stated purpose of safeguarding national security and interests and fulfilling non-proliferation and other international obligations.

The legal framework

The cornerstone is the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, which has applied since 1 December 2024. It sits alongside the Export Control Law and the rules governing the Unreliable Entity List. Together they define which items are controlled, how exports are licensed, and what obligations attach to entities that are listed.

At the border, GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption. In other words, the channel a shipment travels through does not change the declaration obligation: the same control requirements apply to a conventional container, an express parcel and a cross-border e-commerce consignment.

Declaration and licensing mechanics

For controlled items, a licence is obtained through MOFCOM’s unified business system platform. The applicant submits supporting materials including a technical description and an end-user certificate, and the review period is 45 working days. Once a licence is in hand, the declaration stage carries its own requirement: the remarks column of the customs declaration must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the applicable control code. Getting the code right is what allows the declaration to be processed as a controlled shipment rather than as ordinary cargo.

For procurement and logistics teams, the sequence is therefore: screen the item and the counterparty, apply for the licence in good time, and make sure the customs broker carries the control marking and code into the declaration. The 45-working-day review period is the planning constraint that most often catches companies out when they treat a controlled item like a routine purchase.

Recent listing actions

Several listing actions published by MOFCOM in 2026 and late 2025 are relevant to supply-chain screening.

Export-control control list — 20 Japanese entities (29 June 2026). MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities assessed as participating in enhancing Japan’s military strength. The measures prohibit export operators from exporting dual-use items to those entities, and prohibit foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in the People’s Republic of China to them. Related activities already under way are to be stopped immediately; where an export is genuinely necessary in special circumstances, the export operator is to apply to MOFCOM. The announcement took effect on the date of publication.

Unreliable Entity List — announcement No. 10 of 2025. This listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches. The measures prohibit those entities from engaging in China-related import-export activities, prohibit them from making new investment in China, and prohibit organisations and individuals in China from conducting related transactions or cooperation with them — in particular transmitting data or providing sensitive information to them.

Export-control control list — seven EU entities (24 April 2026). In its published question-and-answer, the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action under law targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, and that the measures concern only dual-use items, do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about. Before the measures were announced, China had notified the European side through the bilateral export-control dialogue mechanism.

The screening method in practice

A workable screening process runs on four dimensions:

  1. Check the control list. Compare the item against the *Catalogue of Dual-Use Items and Technologies Subject to Import and Export Licence Administration*, verifying the model and performance parameters rather than relying on a generic product name.
  2. Analyse the end-use attribute. Assess whether the item could be used in military or weapons-of-mass-destruction-related fields.
  3. Review technical parameters. Precision, speed and power are the usual triggers — for example, high-precision five-axis machining centres.
  4. Confirm the customer and the ultimate use. Establish who the end user is and what the goods will actually be used for.

Machine tools offer a concrete illustration. Control code 2B201 covers numerically controlled machine tools including lathes, milling machines, grinding machines, multi-axis machining centres and roll-forming machine tools. Indicative parameters include: a lathe with a machining diameter greater than 35 mm and a positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm; a milling machine with positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm, or two or more contouring rotary axes, or five or more simultaneous axes; and a grinding machine with positioning accuracy of less than 4 μm. These thresholds are why screening by product category alone is unreliable — the same broad category can be controlled or uncontrolled depending on its specifications.

What this means for foreign-invested buyers

  • Screen before you commit. Run the four-dimension check at the sourcing and contracting stage, not at the declaration desk, so that a control finding does not derail a shipment already in motion.
  • Budget for the licence timeline. The 45-working-day review is a planning assumption, not a formality; build it into procurement lead times for controlled items.
  • Mind the counterparty. Listing measures can prohibit transactions and cooperation, not merely the physical export of goods; check counterparties against the relevant lists before onboarding.
  • Keep the reassurance in view. The official position is that measures of this kind target specific dual-use items and specific listed entities, and do not affect normal commercial dealings; the published Q&A on the EU listing states plainly that law-abiding entities have nothing to worry about.
  • Document everything. Technical descriptions, end-user certificates and the correct control code on the declaration are the evidence base that makes a compliant shipment defensible.

Sources

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

概述

中国的出口管制制度建立在明确的法律框架与一套官方的列名、申报程序之上。对在中国境内采购、转售或再出口受管制货物的外资企业而言,实务任务并非解读政策意图,而是运行一套可靠的筛查与许可流程。本文梳理制度框架、申报与许可操作机制、商务部近期公布的列名措施,以及采购与合规团队可以直接套用的四维度筛查方法。

全文基调刻意保持程序化:各项措施均按其公布时的表述呈现——依据相关法律法规有关规定,并出于维护国家安全和利益、履行防扩散等国际义务的既定目的。

法律框架

制度基石是《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》,自2024年12月1日起施行。它与《出口管制法》以及不可靠实体清单相关规定共同构成体系,界定了哪些物项受管制、出口如何取得许可,以及被列名实体承担何种义务。

在口岸环节,海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。换言之,货物走哪条通道并不改变申报义务:同一套管制要求,既适用于常规集装箱,也适用于快件包裹与跨境电商件。

申报与许可操作机制

对受管制物项,许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请。申请人须提交包括技术说明和最终用户证明在内的材料,审查期限为45个工作日。取得许可证后,申报环节另有要求:报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写适用的管制编码。编码填对,申报才能作为受管制货物而非普通货物被处理。

对采购与物流团队而言,顺序因此是:筛查物项与交易对手,及时申请许可证,并确保报关代理把管制标注与编码带入申报。当企业把受管制物项当作常规采购处理时,45个工作日的审查期往往是最容易被打乱的计划约束。

近期列名措施

商务部在2026年及2025年末公布的多项列名措施,与供应链筛查相关。

出口管制管控名单——20家日本实体(2026年6月29日)。 商务部将参与提升日本军事实力的20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单。措施包括禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。正在开展的相关活动应当立即停止;特殊情况下确需出口的,出口经营者应当向商务部提出申请。本公告自公布之日起正式实施。

不可靠实体清单——2025年第10号公告。 该公告将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单。措施包括禁止上述实体从事与中国有关的进出口活动,禁止上述实体在中国境内新增投资,以及禁止中国境内的组织、个人与上述实体进行有关交易、合作等活动——特别是向上述实体传输数据、提供敏感信息。

出口管制管控名单——7家欧盟实体(2026年4月24日)。 在公布的答记者问中,商务部新闻发言人表示,依法列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。措施公布前,中方已通过双边出口管制对话机制向欧方通报有关情况。

实操中的筛查方法

一套可落地的筛查流程从四个维度展开:

  1. 对照管制清单。 将物项与《两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录》比对,核查型号与性能参数,而不是依赖笼统的产品名称。
  2. 分析用途属性。 评估该物项是否可能用于军事或大规模杀伤性武器相关领域。
  3. 审查技术参数。 精度、速度、功率通常是触发点——例如高精度五轴联动加工中心。
  4. 确认客户及最终用途。 弄清最终用户是谁、货物实际用于何处。

机床是一个具体例证。管制编码2B201涵盖数控机床,包括车床、铣床、磨床、多轴加工中心、滚压成形机床等。判定参数示例包括:车床加工直径大于35毫米且定位精度小于6微米;铣床定位精度小于6微米,或具有2个以上成形旋转轴,或5轴及以上联动;磨床定位精度小于4微米。这些阈值正是”仅按产品大类筛查”不可靠的原因——同一大类,规格不同,受管制与否也不同。

对在华外资采购方的含义

  • 先筛查、后承诺。 在寻源与签约阶段就完成四维度核查,而不是等到报关台前,以免管制结论打乱已在途的货物。
  • 为许可时限留出预算。 45个工作日审查期是计划假设,不是形式;受管制物项的采购提前期应把它计入。
  • 关注交易对手。 列名措施可能禁止交易与合作,而不只是禁止货物的物理出口;在准入新交易对手前,应对照相关名单核查。
  • 把握免责口径。 官方立场是:此类措施针对特定两用物项与特定列名实体,不影响正常商业往来;关于欧盟列名的公开答记者问明确表示,诚信守法实体完全无需担心。
  • 做好留档。 技术说明、最终用户证明,以及报关单上正确的管制编码,是让一票合规货物站得住脚的证据基础。

来源

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

Japan-origin dichlorosilane faces 80.8%–99.2% provisional deposits: what MOFCOM’s Announcement No. 37 means for chip-material procurement

  • On 7 September 2026 the Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 37 of 2026, giving a preliminary determination that imports of dichlorosilane (DCS) originating in Japan are dumped and are causing substantial injury to the domestic industry, with dumping margins of 80.8% to 99.2%.
    2026年9月7日,商务部发布2026年第37号公告,初步认定原产于日本的进口二氯二氢硅存在倾销、国内产业受到实质损害且存在因果关系,倾销幅度为80.8%至99.2%。
  • Provisional measures take the form of deposits: from 8 September 2026 importers must post customs deposits at the company-specific rates — Shin-Etsu Chemical 99.2%, Denal Silane 80.8%, and all other Japanese companies 99.2% — calculated on the customs value plus import-stage VAT.
    临时措施采用保证金形式:自2026年9月8日起,进口经营者须按公司税率向海关提供保证金——信越化学工业99.2%、德纳尔硅烷80.8%、其他日本公司99.2%——以海关审定的计税价格乘保证金比率再乘(1+进口环节增值税税率)计算。
  • The product sits inside tariff line 28539090 and is a key semiconductor wet-process material: DCS is used for thin-film deposition (epitaxial, silicon carbide, silicon nitride, silicon oxide and polysilicon films) in logic, memory, analogue and other chip manufacturing.
    被调查产品归在税则号列28539090项下,是芯片制造的关键湿法材料:二氯二氢硅主要用于薄膜沉积工艺(外延膜、碳化硅膜、氮化硅膜、氧化硅膜和多晶硅膜),覆盖逻辑、存储、模拟及其他芯片生产。
  • Customs followed on 7 September with Announcement No. 133, requiring importers of goods under 28539090 to declare DCS under the dedicated commodity code 28539090.61 from 8 September 2026, so the provisional measure can be applied at entry.
    海关总署9月7日同步发布2026年第133号公告:自2026年9月8日起,进口税则号列28539090项下商品时,”二氯二氢硅”应申报商品编号28539090.61,以便临时反倾销措施在进口环节落地执行。
  • Interested parties had 10 days from the announcement to submit written comments; the investigation continues toward a final determination, so the deposit rates are provisional and may change — imports remain lawful, but cash-flow and pricing assumptions have shifted materially.
    利害关系方可在公告发布之日起10天内提交书面评论;调查将继续推进至终裁,保证金比率属于临时措施、可能调整——进口仍然合法,但现金流与定价假设已发生实质变化。
  • For semiconductor and specialty-chemical buyers in China, the immediate work is supplier due diligence: confirm the origin and producer of each DCS supply, re-price landed costs with the deposit factored in, and check contract clauses on pass-through of provisional trade-remedy charges.
    对中国境内的半导体及特种化学品采购方,当务之急是供应商尽调:逐笔确认二氯二氢硅的原产地与生产商、把保证金计入到岸成本重估、并核查合同中临时贸易救济费用的转嫁条款。

Japan-origin dichlorosilane faces 80.8%–99.2% provisional deposits: what MOFCOM’s Announcement No. 37 means for chip-material procurement | 日本产二氯二氢硅面临80.8%–99.2%保证金:商务部37号公告对芯片材料采购的影响

Overview

On 7 September 2026, the Ministry of Commerce (商务部) published Announcement No. 37 of 2026 (商务部公告2026年第37号), the preliminary determination in the anti-dumping investigation on imports of dichlorosilane (DCS, 二氯二氢硅) originating in Japan. The investigation was opened on 7 January 2026 at the application of the domestic industry. The preliminary finding: the Japanese imports are dumped, the domestic DCS industry has suffered substantial injury, and a causal link exists between the two.

Provisional anti-dumping measures took effect the next day. For semiconductor manufacturers, specialty-gas distributors and electronics supply-chain buyers in China, the announcement converts a trade-remedy docket into an immediate procurement-cost and supplier-verification exercise.

The product and why it matters

Dichlorosilane (chemical formula SiH2Cl2) is a colourless, flammable, toxic gas with a distinctive odour, traded at purity above 99%. Its principal use is thin-film deposition in chip manufacturing — epitaxial films, silicon carbide films, silicon nitride films, silicon oxide films and polysilicon films — serving logic, memory, analogue and other chip production. It is also used to synthesise silicon-based precursors and polysilazane.

The investigated product falls under tariff line 28539090; other products under that line are outside the scope. The concentration of DCS in advanced semiconductor process flows is why a materials case of this size draws attention across the electronics supply chain rather than only in chemicals.

The provisional measure: deposits, not duties

Because the case is at the preliminary stage, the measure takes the form of customs deposits (保证金) rather than duties. From 8 September 2026, importers of Japanese-origin DCS must post deposits at the company-specific rates:

ProducerDeposit rate
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd. (信越化学工业株式会社)99.2%
Denal Silane Co., Ltd. (德纳尔硅烷株式会社)80.8%
All other Japanese companies99.2%

The deposit is levied ad valorem on the customs-determined duty-paying value of the imported goods, calculated as:

Deposit = customs value × deposit rate × (1 + import-stage VAT rate)

Deposits are not final duties. The investigation continues; the final determination may confirm, adjust or terminate the measures, and deposit treatment will follow the final outcome under the Anti-dumping Regulations.

The declaration mechanics: Announcement No. 133

On the same day, the General Administration of Customs (海关总署) issued Announcement No. 133 of 2026, aligning the declaration system with the provisional measure. From 8 September 2026, importers or their agents declaring goods under 28539090 must report DCS under the dedicated commodity code 28539090.61. The coding split is what allows the customs system to apply the deposit automatically at entry; mis-declaration risks the goods being treated outside (or inside) the measure incorrectly, with retroactive consequences once the declaration is corrected.

Procedure from here

Interested parties had 10 days from the announcement to submit written comments to the investigating authority. The next procedural milestone is the final determination, which will decide whether definitive anti-dumping duties are imposed, at what rates, and how the deposits are settled. MOFCOM’s spokesperson stressed that China applies trade-remedy measures prudently and with restraint, and that the investigation will protect the procedural rights of all interested parties.

What this means for procurement and supply-chain teams

  • Verify origin and producer line by line. The measure is origin-specific (Japan) and producer-specific (named rates plus a residual rate). Mixed-supplier inventories need clear documentation of which lots are Japanese-origin and which producer supplied them; non-Japanese DCS and non-DCS goods under 28539090 remain outside the measure.
  • Re-price landed cost with the deposit. At a 99.2% deposit rate on customs value plus VAT, the cash locked per shipment roughly doubles the landed-cost exposure during the provisional period. Contract clauses on who bears provisional trade-remedy charges — buyer or seller — should be checked and, where needed, renegotiated.
  • Declare under 28539090.61. Confirm brokers and forwarders are using the new commodity code for DCS from 8 September 2026 onward; declaration errors are the most common friction point in the first weeks of a coding-based measure.
  • Use the comment window if you are an interested party. Importers and downstream users with a stake in the case could submit comments during the 10-day window and monitor the final determination.
  • Stress-test alternative supply. For fabs and gas suppliers, the case is a reminder that single-origin dependence on process materials carries regulatory exposure; qualification of alternative grades or origins takes months and should start before it is urgent.

Sources

  • 中华人民共和国商务部 — 商务部公告2026年第37号 公布对原产于日本的进口二氯二氢硅反倾销调查的初步裁定(2026年9月7日,贸易救济局): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_01c15948864a45d186abb146fe30a42b.html
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 海关总署公告2026年第133号(关于二氯二氢硅商品编号申报要求的公告,2026年9月7日): http://dzs.customs.gov.cn/customs/2026-09/07/article_2026090722322660947.html
  • 经济日报 — 商务部:初步认定原产于日本的二氯二氢硅存在倾销(2026年9月7日,新华社通稿): http://bgimg.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202609/t20260907_3198977.shtml

Related reading

  • see also: supplier due diligence fundamentals for China procurement (supplier-due-diligence-basics)
  • see also: customs valuation and declaration compliance (customs-valuation-declaration)

日本产二氯二氢硅面临80.8%–99.2%保证金:商务部37号公告对芯片材料采购的影响

概述

2026年9月7日,商务部发布2026年第37号公告,公布对原产于日本的进口二氯二氢硅(DCS)反倾销调查的初步裁定。本案于2026年1月7日应国内产业申请立案。初步结论:日本进口产品存在倾销,国内二氯二氢硅产业受到实质损害,且倾销与实质损害之间存在因果关系。

临时措施于次日生效。对中国境内的半导体制造商、特种气体经销商和电子供应链采购方而言,这份公告把一桩贸易救济案件变成了即时的采购成本与供应商核验课题。

产品及其重要性

二氯二氢硅(化学分子式SiH2Cl2)在常温常压下为无色、易燃、有毒气体,交易纯度大于99%。其主要用途是芯片制造中的薄膜沉积——外延膜、碳化硅膜、氮化硅膜、氧化硅膜和多晶硅膜——覆盖逻辑、存储、模拟及其他芯片生产;同时可用于合成硅基系列前驱体和聚硅氮烷。

被调查产品归在税则号列28539090项下,该号列项下其他产品不在调查范围之内。二氯二氢硅在先进半导体工艺中的集中应用,是本案在电子供应链而非仅化工行业内引发关注的原因。

临时措施:保证金而非关税

由于案件处于初裁阶段,措施采用保证金而非关税形式。自2026年9月8日起,进口原产于日本的二氯二氢硅须按公司税率提供保证金:

生产商保证金比率
信越化学工业株式会社99.2%
德纳尔硅烷株式会社80.8%
其他日本公司99.2%

保证金以海关审定的计税价格从价计征,计算公式为:

保证金金额 = 计税价格 × 保证金征收比率 ×(1 + 进口环节增值税税率)

保证金不是最终关税。调查将继续进行;终裁将决定是否征收确定性反倾销税、税率多少以及保证金如何结算,均按《反倾销条例》处理。

申报操作:133号公告

同日,海关总署发布2026年第133号公告,使申报系统与临时措施对接。自2026年9月8日起,申报28539090项下商品的进口货物收货人或其代理人,申报”二氯二氢硅”时应填报专用商品编号28539090.61。编码拆分让海关系统能够在进口环节自动适用保证金;申报错误是编码型措施实施初期最常见的摩擦点,更正申报后还可能产生追溯问题。

后续程序

利害关系方可在公告发布之日起10天内提交书面评论。下一个程序节点是终裁,将决定是否征收确定性反倾销税、税率以及保证金的处理方式。商务部新闻发言人表示,中方一贯审慎、克制使用贸易救济措施,将继续依法开展调查,充分保障各利害关系方权利。

对采购与供应链团队的启示

  • 逐笔核验原产地与生产商。 措施按原产地(日本)和生产商(点名税率+其他公司税率)适用;混合供应商库存需要清晰单据区分日本原产批次与非日本原产批次,28539090项下非二氯二氢硅商品不在措施范围。
  • 把保证金计入到岸成本。 按99.2%比率乘计税价格再加进口环节增值税,临时措施期间每批货物锁定的现金约为原有到岸成本敞口的一倍;应核查合同中临时贸易救济费用由买方还是卖方承担的条款,必要时重新谈判。
  • 按28539090.61申报。 确认报关行与货代自2026年9月8日起对二氯二氢硅使用新商品编号。
  • 利害关系方用好评论窗口。 与案件有利害关系的进口商和下游用户可在10天窗口内提交评论意见,并跟踪终裁进展。
  • 对替代供应做压力测试。 对晶圆厂和气体供应商而言,本案提醒:工艺材料对单一原产地的依赖存在监管敞口;替代等级或替代原产地的验证需要数月,应提前启动。

来源

  • 中华人民共和国商务部 — 商务部公告2026年第37号(2026年9月7日,贸易救济局): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_01c15948864a45d186abb146fe30a42b.html
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 海关总署公告2026年第133号(二氯二氢硅商品编号申报要求,2026年9月7日): http://dzs.customs.gov.cn/customs/2026-09/07/article_2026090722322660947.html
  • 经济日报 — 商务部:初步认定原产于日本的二氯二氢硅存在倾销(2026年9月7日): http://bgimg.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202609/t20260907_3198977.shtml

相关阅读

  • 见:中国采购的供应商尽职调查基础(supplier-due-diligence-basics)
  • 见:海关估价与申报合规(customs-valuation-declaration)

Reefer containers for food exports face a new fitness-inspection regime from 1 October: GACC Announcement No. 136

  • On 8 September 2026 the General Administration of Customs (GACC) issued Announcement No. 136 of 2026 on container fitness inspection for exports of perishable foods and frozen products; the new regime applies to exports from 1 October 2026.
    海关总署2026年9月8日发布2026年第136号公告,规范装运出口易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品的集装箱适载检验工作;新机制自2026年10月1日起适用于相关出口业务。
  • The scope is defined by a dynamic product-code list: the tariff codes of perishable and frozen foods subject to fitness inspection are published on the GACC portal (at the import-export food safety page), and the list is dynamically managed — mixed consignments must be checked code by code.
    适用范围采用动态编码目录管理:须实施集装箱适载检验的易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品编码在海关总署门户网站(进出口食品安全栏目)公布并动态调整——拼柜混装业务必须逐项核对编码。
  • The inspection model shifts from “pre-inspection by enterprises plus sampling by customs” to “enterprise compliance assurance plus customs review and spot checks”: before loading, the carrier, container-stuffing unit or its agent submits an application via the China International Trade Single Window and uploads a Container Fitness Conformity Declaration.
    适载检验模式由”企业预检+海关抽检”优化为”企业合规保证+海关审核抽查”:装运前,承运人、装箱单位或其代理人通过中国国际贸易单一窗口出境集装箱适载检验模块提交申请,并上传《出口集装箱适载符合性声明》。
  • Fitness-inspection results are valid for 21 days and expire automatically; at export declaration, customs validates the result electronically, and declarations that fail validation are rejected — meaning a missed or expired inspection stops the shipment at the border paperwork stage.
    适载检验结果21天内有效,逾期自动失效;出口申报时海关对检验结果进行校验核销,校验不通过的报关单依法退单——漏检或过期即意味着货物卡在报关环节。
  • Food producers and exporters carry the primary self-inspection duty: they must self-check containers and use only boxes that are clean, hygienic, refrigerated and sealed-tight (清洁、卫生、制冷、密固) as fitted for the goods.
    食品生产经营者承担自检主体责任:必须对集装箱自检,选用清洁、卫生、制冷、密固合格且与拟装货物相适应的集装箱装运。
  • Applications go to the customs office where the container is stored, not the port of export — a detail that matters for stuffing inland; the change operationalises the Commodity Inspection Law and its implementation regulations for cold-chain exports.
    检验申请提交给集装箱存放地海关而非出口口岸海关——内陆装箱场景尤须注意;本次调整是《进出口商品检验法》及其实施条例在冷链出口环节的落地操作。

Reefer containers for food exports face a new fitness-inspection regime from 1 October: GACC Announcement No. 136 | 出口食品冷冻品集装箱适载检验新规10月1日实施:海关总署136号公告解读

Overview

On 8 September 2026, the General Administration of Customs (海关总署) published Announcement No. 136 of 2026 (海关总署公告2026年第136号) on the fitness inspection of containers used to ship perishable foods and frozen products for export, with an official policy interpretation released on 9–10 September. The regime takes effect for exports from 1 October 2026 and supersedes inconsistent prior rules.

The legal basis is the Commodity Inspection Law (《进出口商品检验法》) and its implementation regulations: containers carrying export perishable food and frozen products must pass cleanliness, hygiene, refrigeration and tightness fitness inspection before loading; uninspected or failed containers may not be used. The announcement re-engineers how that statutory requirement is administered.

Who does what under the new regime

Food producers and exporters hold the primary responsibility: they must self-inspect containers and select only those that are clean, hygienic, refrigerated and tight (清洁、卫生、制冷、密固) and suited to the goods — for refrigerated units, the cooling performance and temperature capability must match the cargo.

Carriers, container-stuffing units or their agents must, before loading, submit a fitness-inspection application through the China International Trade Single Window (中国国际贸易单一窗口) outbound-container fitness-inspection module to the customs office at the container’s storage location, uploading the Export Container Fitness Conformity Declaration (《出口集装箱适载符合性声明》).

Customs reviews the conformity declaration and conducts spot checks of containers; only upon a passing outcome may the container be loaded with the export food or frozen products.

The product-code scope

The perishable and frozen food codes subject to fitness inspection are published on the GACC portal (via the import-export food safety pages, at jckspj.customs.gov.cn) and are dynamically managed. Because the list moves, consignment screening must be code-based rather than category-based — mixed containers that mix covered and non-covered goods are the classic miss.

The 21-day validity and export validation

Fitness-inspection results are valid for 21 days and expire automatically. At export declaration, the customs information system validates and writes off the inspection result; declarations that fail validation are rejected (退单) under the law. Operationally, this means the inspection must be timed against the shipping schedule — a container inspected too early relative to vessel space and stuffing dates will need re-inspection, and a shipment presented without a valid result stops at the declaration stage.

Why the model changed

The official interpretation explains the shift: under the Commodity Inspection Law’s conformity-assessment framework, the previous model of enterprise pre-inspection plus customs sampling is replaced by enterprise compliance assurance plus customs review and spot checks. The conformity declaration formalises the enterprise’s assurance, and customs resources concentrate on risk-based verification. The system also adds electronic validation at export, closing the loop between inspection and declaration.

What this means for food FIEs and exporters

  • Build the timeline backwards from vessel cut-off. The 21-day validity window plus the customs review and spot-check cycle means inspection bookings should track stuffing dates, not booking dates.
  • File at the storage-location customs office. For inland stuffing — a growing pattern for Central and Western China food producers — the application goes where the container sits, not where the vessel sails.
  • Prepare the conformity declaration as a controlled document. It is the enterprise’s compliance assurance on record; errors or overbroad statements create exposure if a spot check contradicts it.
  • Re-check the code list at every consignment. Dynamic management means yesterday’s classification of a SKU is not today’s; assign the check to the documentation step, not to habit.
  • Brief carriers and stuffing contractors. The filing obligation sits with the carrier, stuffing unit or agent — foreign-invested food exporters should ensure their logistics contracts assign the task and the deadline explicitly.

Sources

  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 海关总署公告2026年第136号(关于装运出口易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品集装箱适载检验工作的公告)正式文本PDF(2026年9月8日): http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/attachDir/2026/09/%E6%B5%B7%E5%85%B3%E6%80%BB%E7%BD%B2%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E8%A3%85%E8%BF%90%E5%87%BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%98%93%E8%85%90%E7%83%82%E5%8F%98%E8%B4%A8%E9%A3%9F%E5%93%81%E3%80%81%E5%86%B7%E5%86%BB%E5%93%81%E9%9B%86%E8%A3%85%E7%AE%B1%E9%80%82%E8%BD%BD%E6%A3%80%E9%AA%8C%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E7%9A%84%E5%85%AC%E5%91%8A.pdf
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 政务公开·海关总署公告栏目(136号公告发布及2026年9月9日官方政策解读条目): http://gec.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/index.html
  • 海关总署进出口食品安全局 — 实施集装箱适载检验的易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品编码公布页面(公告指定编码目录入口): http://jckspj.customs.gov.cn/spj/zcfg18/index.html

Related reading

  • see also: food export registration and filing for FIE producers (food-export-registration)
  • see also: cold-chain logistics compliance for imported foods (cold-chain-import-compliance)

出口食品冷冻品集装箱适载检验新规10月1日实施:海关总署136号公告解读

概述

2026年9月8日,海关总署发布2026年第136号公告,规范装运出口易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品集装箱的适载检验工作,并于9月9日至10日发布官方政策解读。新机制自2026年10月1日起适用于相关出口业务,此前规定与公告不一致的以公告为准。

法律依据是《进出口商品检验法》及其实施条例:装运出口易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品的集装箱须经清洁、卫生、冷藏、密固等适载检验,未经检验或检验不合格的不准装运。公告重构了这一法定要求的执行方式。

新机制下的分工

食品生产经营者承担自检主体责任:必须对集装箱自检,只选用清洁、卫生、制冷、密固合格且与拟装货物相适应的集装箱——冷藏箱还须核对制冷效能与温度能否达到拟装货物要求。

承运人、装箱单位或其代理人须在装运前通过中国国际贸易单一窗口出境集装箱适载检验模块,向集装箱存放地海关提交检验申请,并上传《出口集装箱适载符合性声明》。

海关对符合性声明进行审核、对集装箱进行抽查;合格后方可装运出口相关货物。

商品编码范围

须实施适载检验的易腐烂变质食品、冷冻品编码在海关总署门户网站公布(进出口食品安全栏目,jckspj.customs.gov.cn),并动态管理。目录会变,因此拼柜筛查必须按编码进行、不能按品类经验判断——覆盖与不覆盖商品混装的柜子是最典型的漏判场景。

21天有效期与出口校验

适载检验结果21天内有效,逾期自动失效。出口申报时,海关信息化系统对检验结果自动校验核销;校验不通过的出口报关单依法退单。操作上,检验时点要对着船期倒排——过早检验会遇到过期,无有效结果的货物在申报环节即被拦下。

模式为何调整

官方解读说明了变化逻辑:按照《进出口商品检验法》关于合格评定程序的规定,适载检验模式由“企业预检+海关抽检”优化为“企业合规保证+海关审核抽查”。符合性声明把企业的合规保证落到书面,海关资源集中到风险抽查;系统还在出口环节增加自动校验,把检验与申报闭环衔接。

对食品外资企业与出口方的启示

  • 从船期截关倒排时间线。 21天有效期叠加审核抽查周期,检验预约应跟踪装箱日期而非订舱日期。
  • 在存放地海关申报。 对内陆装箱——中西部食品产区日益普遍的模式——申请提交给箱子所在地的海关,而非出运口岸。
  • 把符合性声明当作受控文件管理。 它是企业合规保证的书面记录;抽查结果与声明不符时,夸大或错误的表述会形成风险敞口。
  • 每票货物重新核对编码目录。 动态管理意味着昨天的SKU归类未必适用今天;把核对动作固定在制单环节,而非依赖经验。
  • 向承运人与装箱承包商交底。 申报义务在承运人、装箱单位或其代理人——外资食品出口商应在物流合同中明确任务归属与时限。

来源

  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 海关总署公告2026年第136号正式文本PDF(2026年9月8日): http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/attachDir/2026/09/%E6%B5%B7%E5%85%B3%E6%80%BB%E7%BD%B2%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E8%A3%85%E8%BF%90%E5%87%BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%98%93%E8%85%90%E7%83%82%E5%8F%98%E8%B4%A8%E9%A3%9F%E5%93%81%E3%80%81%E5%86%B7%E5%86%BB%E5%93%81%E9%9B%86%E8%A3%85%E7%AE%B1%E9%80%82%E8%BD%BD%E6%A3%80%E9%AA%8C%E5%B7%A5%E4%BD%9C%E7%9A%84%E5%85%AC%E5%91%8A.pdf
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署 — 政务公开·海关总署公告栏目(含官方政策解读条目): http://gec.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/index.html
  • 海关总署进出口食品安全局 — 适载检验商品编码公布页面(公告指定入口): http://jckspj.customs.gov.cn/spj/zcfg18/index.html

相关阅读

  • 见:外资食品生产企业出口注册与备案(food-export-registration)
  • 见:进口食品冷链物流合规(cold-chain-import-compliance)

Product Standards, Testing & GB Compliance when Sourcing from China: a buyer’s checklist

  • China operates a dual-track standards system: mandatory national standards (强制性国家标准, “GB” without a slash) are legally binding, while recommended standards (推荐性, “GB/T”) are voluntary unless referenced by regulation or contract.
    中国实行双轨标准体系:强制性国家标准(不带斜杠的”GB”)具法律约束力,推荐性标准(”GB/T”)原则上自愿,但若被法规或合同引用则须执行。
  • A foreign buyer’s first job is to confirm which GB applies to the product, whether it is mandatory, and which version is currently in force — using the official National Public Service Platform for Standards (全国标准信息公共服务平台).
    外资买家的首要任务是确认产品适用哪项 GB、是否强制、现行版本为何——通过官方”全国标准信息公共服务平台”查询。
  • Product testing should be done by laboratories accredited under CNAS (中国合格评定国家认可委员会) and, for China-market release, by CMA-recognised inspection bodies (检验检测机构资质认定) — verify credentials on the national accreditation platform before relying on a report.
    产品检测应由 CNAS(中国合格评定国家认可委员会)认可的实验室,以及面向中国市场的 CMA(检验检测机构资质认定)机构完成——在依赖报告前于国家认可平台核验资质。
  • Beyond CCC (covered separately), many products face mandatory GB safety/EMC/energy or food-contact requirements; the 2026 SAMR drive tightened CCC supervision and pushed “same line, same standard, same quality” for domestic and export goods.
    除 CCC(另文专述)外,众多产品还须满足强制性 GB 安全/电磁兼容/能效或食品接触要求;2026 年市场监管总局强化 CCC 监管,并推进内外贸产品”同线同标同质”。
  • Counterfeit or non-representative test reports are a real risk — always match the laboratory’s scope (CNAS/CMA) to the exact standard and product, and keep the original, dated report in the file.
    虚假或不具代表性的检测报告是真实风险——务必将实验室的 CNAS/CMA 范围与确切标准及产品对应,并留存带日期的原件。
  • Build standards compliance into the supplier contract: specify the applicable GB version, require valid test reports, and define incoming-inspection and recall responsibilities.
    将标准合规写入供应商合同:明确适用 GB 版本、要求有效检测报告,并约定进货检验与召回责任。
  • For regulated sectors (food, cosmetics, medical devices, toys, electronics), layer GB compliance with the sector regulator’s filing/marketing-authorisation rules — standards are necessary but not sufficient.
    对食品、化妆品、医疗器械、玩具、电子等受监管行业,须将 GB 合规与行业主管部门的备案/上市许可规则叠加——标准合规是必要非充分条件。

Product Standards, Testing & GB Compliance when Sourcing from China: a buyer’s checklist | 在华采购的产品标准、检测与国标(GB)合规:买家清单

Overview

When a foreign buyer sources from China, price and lead time matter — but a product that fails to meet Chinese (or destination) standards can mean rejected shipments, recalls, fines, and reputational damage. Compulsory Product Certification (CCC) grabs the headlines, yet the broader landscape of national standards (GB), mandatory versus recommended status, and third-party testing is where many sourcing compliance gaps actually hide.

This guide gives foreign-invested enterprises and procurement teams a practical map of China’s standards and testing regime, the official query tools, and a due-diligence checklist — grounded in the Standardization Law, SAMR/CNCA rules, and CNAS accreditation.

China’s standards hierarchy

China’s technical standards form a hierarchy:

  • National standards (国家标准, “GB”): mandatory (强制性, “GB”) or recommended (推荐性, “GB/T”). Mandatory GB cover health, safety, environmental protection and fundamental matters and are legally binding.
  • Industry standards (行业标准), local standards (地方标准), and group/enterprise standards (团体/企业标准) sit below national ones and cannot lower mandatory requirements.

The key buyer takeaway: a product may need to conform to a mandatory GB before it can be sold in China or, in some cases, before it can be exported (where the destination references the Chinese standard). Always confirm the current, in-force version — standards are revised, and using a superseded version is a common compliance miss.

Finding the right standard

Use the official, free platforms to identify applicable standards:

  • National Public Service Platform for Standards Information (全国标准信息公共服务平台) — std.samr.gov.cn / www.samr.gov.cn: search mandatory and recommended national standards, see status (in force / to be abolished), and replacement relationships.
  • Full-text open GB system (国家标准全文公开系统) — free access to most GB texts.

When screening a supplier, ask for the specific GB numbers and versions the product is built to, and cross-check them against the platform. Beware suppliers who answer only with “meets CE/FCC” — those are foreign certifications and do not substitute for applicable Chinese GB where one exists.

Testing and laboratory accreditation

A test report is only as good as the lab behind it. Two marks matter:

  • CNAS (中国合格评定国家认可委员会, China National Accreditation Service): accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025 confirms the lab’s technical competence for specific tests. Check scope at www.cnas.org.cn.
  • CMA (检验检测机构资质认定, China Inspection Body & Laboratory Mandatory Approval): required for reports used for China-market supervision, filing or release; a CMA mark is what makes a report legally effective domestically.

For products destined for the Chinese market, prefer a CNAS + CMA lab whose accredited scope explicitly covers your product’s standard and test items. For export-only goods, a CNAS-accredited (or foreign ILAC-MRA) lab is usually sufficient, but confirm the importing country’s acceptance.

Beyond CCC: mandatory GB requirements

CCC (covered in a separate guide) applies to a defined catalogue. But many products outside the CCC catalogue still face mandatory GB safety, EMC, energy-efficiency or food-contact requirements. In 2026 SAMR tightened CCC supervision — moving 16 products (e.g., small-power motors, motor-vehicle safety glass) from self-declaration to third-party certification, strengthening post-certification surveillance, and advancing the “same line, same standard, same quality” (同线同标同质) action so domestic and export goods meet comparable requirements. The lesson: CCC is not the whole of conformity — map the full set of mandatory GB that touch your product.

Common pitfalls

  • Superseded versions: a report citing an old GB edition that has been replaced.
  • Wrong scope: a CNAS/CMA certificate that does not cover your exact product or test method.
  • “Factory self-test” passed off as independent: insist on an independent, accredited lab for conformity evidence.
  • Representative-sample gaps: the tested sample differs from mass-produced units (factory vs. production line).
  • Mismatch with destination rules: Chinese GB satisfied, but the destination market (EU/US/etc.) requires its own marks — plan for both.

A buyer’s due-diligence checklist

  1. Identify applicable standards via the national platform; note mandatory vs recommended and the in-force version.
  2. Require the supplier’s GB conformance matrix listing each applicable GB, version, and status.
  3. Demand independent test reports from CNAS (and CMA for China-market) labs whose scope matches.
  4. Verify lab credentials on CNAS/CNCA platforms before accepting reports.
  5. Check CCC scope — if the product is in the CCC catalogue, CCC is mandatory alongside GB.
  6. Contract the requirements: specify GB version, report validity, incoming inspection, and recall/rectification responsibility.
  7. Keep an audit file with dated originals; re-test on material or design change.
  8. Layer sector rules (food, cosmetics, medical devices, toys, electronics) on top of GB.

What to do next

  1. Build a standards register for your China-sourced product lines.
  2. Audit existing suppliers against the checklist; flag gaps.
  3. Specify GB conformance in new RFQs and contracts.
  4. Pre-shipment verification: independent re-test or document review for high-risk items.
  5. Monitor revisions of key GBs via the standards platform.

Sources

Related reading

  • Compulsory Product Certification (CCC) & Sourcing Compliance for Foreign Buyers
  • Supplier Due Diligence in China: a practical checklist
  • Export Control & Dual-Use Items: what foreign buyers must check

在华采购的产品标准、检测与国标(GB)合规:买家清单

概述

外资买家在华采购,价格与交期固然重要;但不符合中国(或目的地)标准的产品,可能意味着退运、召回、罚款与声誉受损。强制性产品认证(CCC)最引人注目,然而更广阔的国家标准(GB)、强制与推荐属性,以及第三方检测版图,才是许多采购合规漏洞真正的藏身之处。

本指南为外商投资企业及采购团队提供中国标准与检测体系、官方查询工具及尽调清单的务实地图——依据《标准化法》、市场监管总局/国家认监委规则及 CNAS 认可体系。

中国标准体系层级

中国技术标准呈层级结构:

  • 国家标准(”GB”): 分强制性(”GB”)与推荐性(”GB/T”)。强制性 GB 涉及健康、安全、环保与基础事项,具法律约束力。
  • 行业标准、地方标准、团体/企业标准位于国标之下,且不得低于强制性要求。

买家要点:产品在中国销售前(某些出口情形亦同)可能须符合强制性 GB。务必确认现行有效版本——标准会修订,使用已被替代的旧版是常见合规疏漏。

找到适用的标准

使用官方免费平台识别适用标准:

  • 全国标准信息公共服务平台——std.samr.gov.cn / www.samr.gov.cn:检索强制与推荐性国家标准,查看状态(现行/即将废止)及替代关系。
  • 国家标准全文公开系统——免费查阅绝大多数 GB 文本。

审核供应商时,要求其提供产品所依具体 GB 编号与版本,并与平台交叉核对。警惕仅以”符合 CE/FCC”作答的供应商——这些是外国认证,在有适用中国 GB 时不能替代。

检测与实验室认可

检测报告的价值取决于出具它的实验室。两个标志至关重要:

  • CNAS(中国合格评定国家认可委员会): 依据 ISO/IEC 17025 的认可,确认实验室对特定测试的技术能力,范围见 www.cnas.org.cn。
  • CMA(检验检测机构资质认定): 用于中国市场监督、备案或放行的报告必须具备;CMA 标志使报告在国内具法律效力。

面向中国市场的产品,宜优先选择CNAS + CMA且认可范围明确覆盖你产品标准与测试项的实验室。纯出口货物通常 CNAS 认可(或外国 ILAC-MRA)实验室即可,但须确认进口国接受。

超越 CCC:强制性 GB 要求

CCC(另文专述)适用于既定目录。但目录外众多产品仍须满足强制性 GB 安全、电磁兼容、能效或食品接触要求。2026 年市场监管总局强化 CCC 监管——将小功率电动机、机动车安全玻璃等 16 种产品由自我声明转为第三方认证,加强获证后监督,推进”同线同标同质”行动,使内外贸产品满足可比要求。启示:CCC 不等于全部符合性——须梳理触及你产品的全部强制性 GB。

常见陷阱

  • 版本被替代: 报告引用已被替代的旧版 GB。
  • 范围不符: CNAS/CMA 证书未覆盖你的确切产品或测试方法。
  • “工厂自检”冒充独立: 符合性证据应坚持由独立认可实验室出具。
  • 代表性样本缺口: 受检样品与量产不一致(工厂样 vs 产线样)。
  • 与目的地规则错配: 满足中国 GB,但目的地市场(欧盟/美国等)另有标志要求——须两者兼顾。

买家尽调清单

  1. 识别适用标准(经国家平台),注明强制/推荐与现行版本。
  2. 要求供应商提供 GB 符合性矩阵,列明每项适用 GB、版本与状态。
  3. 要求独立检测报告,来自范围匹配的 CNAS(中国市场另需 CMA)实验室。
  4. 在 CNAS/认监委平台核验实验室资质后再接受报告。
  5. 核查 CCC 范围——产品若属 CCC 目录,CCC 与 GB 须同时满足。
  6. 将要求写入合同:明确 GB 版本、报告有效期、进货检验与召回/整改责任。
  7. 留存带日期的原件审计档案;材料或设计变更时重测。
  8. 叠加行业规则(食品、化妆品、医疗器械、玩具、电子)于 GB 之上。

下一步建议

  1. 建立标准台账,覆盖在华采购的产品线。
  2. 按清单审计现有供应商,标注缺口。
  3. 在新 RFQ 与合同中明确 GB 符合性。
  4. 发货前验证: 高风险项做独立重测或文件复核。
  5. 通过标准平台监控关键 GB 的修订。

来源

相关阅读

  • 在华采购的强制产品认证(CCC)与合规清单
  • 在华供应商尽职调查:实操清单
  • 出口管制与两用物项:从中国采购的外资买家必须核查什么

Supplier Sanctions & Export Control Compliance Screening: Navigating the Unreliable Entity List and Export Controls When Sourcing in China

  • The Unreliable Entity List (UEL) empowers Chinese authorities to restrict foreign entities that endanger China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests, through import/export bans, investment bans, and transaction/data-transfer prohibitions.
    不可靠实体清单(UEL)赋予中国监管部门对危害中国主权、安全或发展利益的外国实体施加限制的权力,措施包括进出口禁令、投资禁令以及交易与数据传输禁令。
  • In 2025, China’s UEL Working Mechanism listed 11 U.S. firms led by Skydio (Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 7, 4 Apr 2025) and later added entities including a counter-UAS technology company and TechInsights (Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 10, 9 Oct 2025), with strict domestic transaction and data-transfer bans.
    2025年,中国不可靠实体清单工作机制将Skydio领衔的11家美国企业列入清单(公告〔2025〕7号,2025-04-04),随后又将某反无人机技术公司及TechInsights等列入(公告〔2025〕10号,2025-10-09),并禁止境内组织与个人与其交易、合作及传输数据。
  • Export controls in China operate through the Export Control Law (2020) and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (State Council Order No. 792, effective 1 Dec 2024), which intersect directly with supplier due diligence.
    中国的出口管制以《出口管制法》(2020)及《两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令792号,2024-12-01施行)为框架,与供应商尽调直接交叉联动。
  • Even a foreign importer can be exposed: if your Chinese supplier or in-country counterparty is listed or constrained by export controls, your supply, technology transfer, and cross-border data flows are directly affected.
    即便是外资进口方亦难置身事外:若你的中国供应商或在华交易对手被列入清单或受出口管制约束,你的供货、技术转让与跨境数据流动都将受到直接影响。
  • A sound supplier due-diligence program must screen against the UEL, entity/export-control lists, end-user and end-use reviews, and multilateral sanctions regimes (UN / U.S. / EU, etc.).
    一套健全的供应商尽调程序必须比对不可靠实体清单、实体/出口管制清单、最终用户与最终用途审查,并交叉核对多边制裁名单(联合国、美国、欧盟等)。
  • Establish a standing list-screening workflow and an Internal Compliance Program (ICP): screen before contracting, re-screen during performance, and retain records for inspection.
    建立常态化名单筛查流程与内部合规程序(ICP):签约前查清单、履约中定期重筛、并保留筛查记录备查。

Supplier Sanctions & Export Control Compliance Screening: Navigating the Unreliable Entity List and Export Controls When Sourcing in China | 供应商制裁与出口管制合规筛查:在华采购面对不可靠实体清单与出口管制

Overview

For foreign companies sourcing from, manufacturing in, or partnering with suppliers in China, the compliance perimeter is no longer defined only by the destination country’s rules. China has built its own sanction-style toolkit — the Unreliable Entity List (UEL) and a modern export-control regime — that reaches foreign entities and, crucially, the Chinese counterparties you rely on. This article explains how these mechanisms work, what the 2025 enforcement cases show, and how foreign buyers should embed sanctions and export-control screening into supplier due diligence.

The core message is simple: compliant, law-abiding entities have nothing to fear, but ignorance is not a defense. A foreign buyer that fails to screen its Chinese suppliers against the UEL and export-control lists can find a key supply line severed, a technology transfer blocked, or a data-transfer arrangement rendered unlawful overnight. Screening is now a baseline obligation, not a luxury.

The Unreliable Entity List Mechanism

The UEL is established under the *Regulations on the Unreliable Entity List* (《不可靠实体清单规定》), issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). It targets foreign entities — not individuals in the ordinary sense, but companies, other organizations, and senior responsible persons — whose conduct endangers China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests.

Listing is triggered by activities such as: (1) endangering China’s national security or interests in international economic, trade, or scientific activities; (2) violating normal market transaction principles by boycotting or cutting off supplies to a Chinese entity; or (3) taking discriminatory measures against a Chinese entity that cause serious damage.

Once listed, an entity may face a graduated set of measures, individually or in combination:

  • Prohibition or restriction on import/export activities related to China;
  • Prohibition or restriction on new investment in China;
  • Prohibition or restriction on transactions, cooperation, or related activities with domestic organizations and individuals, including the transmission of data;
  • Entry restrictions or visa bans for responsible persons; and
  • Other necessary measures as specified by the authorities.

The UEL Working Mechanism, coordinated by MOFCOM’s Bureau of Security and Control, publishes the listings and the specific measures attached to each. The regime is deliberately flexible: the state can calibrate the response to the perceived threat, from a targeted data-transfer ban to a full import/export and investment freeze.

2025 Case Practice

The UEL moved from framework to active enforcement in 2025, and the cases are directly relevant to supply-chain and sourcing decisions.

Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 7 (4 April 2025). The UEL Working Mechanism added 11 U.S. entities, with Skydio Inc. as the most prominent name, to the Unreliable Entity List. The measures imposed included a prohibition on import/export activities related to China and a prohibition on new investment in China. For buyers, the signal was clear: drone and certain dual-use supply chains touching these named entities face hard legal barriers inside China.

Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 10 (9 October 2025). The Working Mechanism added further entities, including a counter-unmanned-aerial-system (counter-UAS) technology company and TechInsights Inc., to the list. The attached measures went further: domestic organizations and individuals were prohibited from transacting or cooperating with the listed entities and were explicitly prohibited from transmitting data to them. This is the first cluster of cases where the data-transfer prohibition was foregrounded, underscoring that “cooperation” under the UEL is read broadly to cover information and data flows, not just physical goods.

The trajectory matters: the UEL is expanding in scope (from export/interdiction conduct to analysis, technology, and data services) and in instrument (from trade and investment bans to transaction and data-flow bans). Foreign buyers whose suppliers, sub-suppliers, or service providers have any affiliation with listed entities inherit that risk.

Export Control Interplay

China’s export-control system is the second pillar. The *Export Control Law* (《出口管制法》), in force since 2020, provides the overarching legal basis. It is implemented in detail for dual-use items by the *Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items* (《两用物项出口管制条例》, State Council Order No. 792), which took effect on 1 December 2024. Together they require licensing for the export of controlled items, technologies, and related technical data, and they impose end-user and end-use verification obligations.

For a foreign buyer, the linkage is two-way:

  • If your Chinese supplier exports controlled dual-use items or technologies to you, the supplier needs a license and must confirm the end user and end use. As the overseas recipient, you become part of the control chain: you may be asked to provide end-user statements and to accept no-rediversion undertakings.
  • If your supplier is itself constrained — by being a listed UEL entity, or by restrictions on certain transactions — the export or technology transfer to you may simply be unlawful for them, regardless of your own jurisdiction’s permissions.

A dedicated treatment of the export-control and dual-use framework is provided in this library’s companion article, *Export Control and Dual-Use Items* (see 采购供应-供应商尽调-66). The two compliance lenses — sanctions-style UEL screening and export-control licensing — should be run as one integrated workflow.

Why This Matters for Foreign Buyers

A common misconception is that these tools are aimed at Chinese exporters, so an overseas importer is safe. That is incorrect for three reasons:

  1. Your supply risk is your counterparty’s legal risk. If a Chinese supplier is on the UEL or is barred from a transaction, it cannot lawfully ship to you, transfer the technology, or even exchange the data needed to fulfill the contract. Your production line, not theirs, stops.
  2. Data and technology are in scope. The UEL’s transaction and data-transfer prohibitions mean that routine activities — sharing design files, sending test data, engaging in joint R&D, or even certain cloud-based collaboration — can become prohibited when a listed entity is anywhere in the chain.
  3. Multilateral exposure compounds. A supplier may be clean under Chinese law but sanctioned by the U.S. or EU, or vice versa. A buyer caught between overlapping regimes can face secondary-sanction or compliance conflicts that require careful structuring, not avoidance.

The reassuring corollary: entities that operate lawfully, respect market principles, and have no disqualifying affiliations are not targets. The system is designed to screen out bad actors, not to obstruct genuine trade. The practical task is therefore to *prove* you have screened — through process, not just intent.

Building a Supplier Due-Diligence Screening Program

An effective program integrates sanctions and export-control screening into the ordinary procurement lifecycle rather than treating it as a one-off checkbox. The minimum screening layers are:

  • UEL screening. Check every Chinese (and where relevant, foreign) supplier, sub-supplier, and key service provider against the current Unreliable Entity List published by MOFCOM’s Bureau of Security and Control.
  • Entity / export-control list comparison. Cross-reference suppliers against China’s export-control controlled-item and end-user lists, and, for completeness, against the U.S. Entity List, the EU and UN sanctions lists that may bear on your supply chain.
  • End-user and end-use review. For any controlled or sensitive item, obtain and verify the ultimate consignee and intended use; reject transactions where the end use is military, unauthorized, or rediversion-prone.
  • Multilateral sanctions cross-check. Confirm suppliers are not on UN, U.S., or EU sanctions rosters, and map any conflicts between regimes before contracting.
  • Data-export and sensitive-information controls. Identify which contractual activities involve transmitting data to or from China, classify the data, and gate those flows on the screening result — especially where a listed entity could be involved.

Operational Recommendations

  • Stand up an Internal Compliance Program (ICP). Document your screening methodology, risk appetite, escalation paths, and record-keeping. A written ICP is what regulators and counterparties will expect to see.
  • Screen before you sign. Make list screening a hard gate in vendor onboarding. Do not execute supply, technology, or data agreements until the counterparty clears all layers.
  • Re-screen during performance. Lists change — as the 2025 cases show, rapidly. Schedule periodic re-screening (e.g., quarterly) and event-driven re-screening whenever a supplier’s ownership, affiliation, or product mix changes.
  • Apply extra review to sensitive deals. Transactions involving dual-use technologies, defense-adjacent items, critical data, or R&D collaboration should trigger a heightened assessment and senior sign-off.
  • Keep the evidence. Retain screening logs, the lists used, timestamps, and decisions. In a dispute or inspection, the record — not the recollection — is what protects you.

Sources

  • Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism, Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 7 (Skydio and 11 U.S. entities) — https://www.mofcom.gov.cn (official portal)
  • Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism, Announcement 〔2025〕 No. 10 (counter-UAS technology company, TechInsights, et al.) — https://www.mofcom.gov.cn (official portal)
  • *Regulations on the Unreliable Entity List* (《不可靠实体清单规定》) — https://www.mofcom.gov.cn (official portal)
  • MOFCOM Bureau of Security and Control (export control and UEL publications) — https://www.mofcom.gov.cn (official portal)
  • Export Control Law & Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (see this library’s article 采购供应-供应商尽调-66) — https://www.mofcom.gov.cn (official portal)

供应商制裁与出口管制合规筛查:在华采购面对不可靠实体清单与出口管制

概述

对于在中国采购、生产或与本地供应商合作的外资企业而言,合规边界早已不再只由目的地国家的规则所界定。中国已建立起自身的”类制裁”工具箱——不可靠实体清单与现代化的出口管制体系——其约束对象既包括外国实体,也关键性地覆盖你所依赖的中国交易对手。本文说明这些机制如何运作、2025年执法案例释放了什么信号,以及外资买家应如何将制裁与出口管制筛查嵌入供应商尽职调查。

核心结论很朴素:诚信守法的实体无需担忧,但”不知情”不能成为抗辩理由。一家未将其中国供应商与不可靠实体清单、出口管制清单做比对的外资买家,可能一夜之间发现关键供货线被切断、技术转让被阻断,或数据跨境安排变得违法。筛查如今是底线义务,而非锦上添花。

不可靠实体清单机制

不可靠实体清单依据《不可靠实体清单规定》(由商务部发布)设立,针对危害中国主权、安全或发展利益的外国实体——并非通常意义上的自然人,而是企业、其他组织以及相关责任人员。

列入清单的触发行为包括:(一)在与中国有关的国际经贸、科技活动中危害中国国家安全或利益;(二)违反正常市场交易原则,中断对中国的供应或对中国实体实施抵制;(三)对中国实体采取歧视性措施并造成严重损害。

一旦被列入,相关实体可能面临逐项或组合使用的梯度化措施:

  • 禁止或限制与中国有关的进出口活动;
  • 禁止或限制在华新增投资;
  • 禁止或限制与境内组织、个人进行交易、合作或相关活动,包括数据传输;
  • 对责任人员实施入境限制或签证禁令;
  • 主管部门规定的其他必要措施。

不可靠实体清单工作机制由商务部安全与管制局统筹协调,对外公布列入决定及每项所附的具体措施。该制度刻意保持灵活性:国家可依据所认定的威胁程度,从针对性的数据传输禁令到全面的进出口与投资冻结,精准校准应对力度。

2025年执法实践

2025年,不可靠实体清单从制度框架迈入活跃执法阶段,相关案例与供应链及采购决策直接相关。

公告〔2025〕7号(2025年4月4日)。 不可靠实体清单工作机制将11家美国实体列入清单,其中最为引人注目的是Skydio公司。所附措施包括禁止与中国有关的进出口活动、禁止在华新增投资。对买家而言,信号十分明确:凡触及这些被点名实体的无人机及特定两用物项供应链,在中国境内都将面临硬性法律壁垒。

公告〔2025〕10号(2025年10月9日)。 工作机制进一步将多家实体列入,包括某反无人机技术公司及TechInsights公司等。所附措施更进一步:禁止境内组织、个人与列入实体进行交易或合作,并明确禁止向其传输数据。这是首批将数据传输禁令置于突出位置的案例群,凸显UEL项下的”合作”被宽泛解读为涵盖信息与数据流动,而不仅限于实物货物。

趋势本身值得重视:不可靠实体清单在范围上持续扩张(从抵制、断供行为延伸至分析、技术与数据服务),在手段上持续升级(从贸易与投资禁令延伸至交易与数据流禁令)。那些供应商、次级供应商或服务商与被列实体存在任何关联的外资买家,将继承这一风险。

出口管制的联动

出口管制体系是第二根支柱。2020年起施行的《出口管制法》提供了顶层法律依据;针对两用物项的细化实施,则由《两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令792号,2024年12月1日施行)承载。二者共同要求对受管制物项、技术及相关技术数据的出口实行许可管理,并施加最终用户与最终用途核实义务。

对外资买家而言,这一联动是双向的:

  • 若你的中国供应商向你出口受管制的两用物项或技术,供应商须取得许可并确认最终用户与最终用途。作为境外接收方,你被纳入管制链条:你可能需要提供最终用户声明,并接受不转移的承诺。
  • 若你的供应商自身受约束——无论是因为被列入不可靠实体清单,还是因特定交易受限——其对你的出口或技术转让,无论你所在法域是否允许,对其而言都可能直接构成违法。

本库配套文章《出口管制与两用物项》(见采购供应-供应商尽调-66)对出口管制与两用物项框架作了专门阐述。两套合规视角——类制裁式的UEL筛查与出口管制许可——应作为同一集成流程一并运行。

对外资买家的意义

一种常见误解是:这些工具针对的是中国出口商,因此海外进口方高枕无忧。这种判断在三点上不成立:

  1. 你的供应风险即交易对手的法律风险。 若某中国供应商身列UEL或被禁止某项交易,它便无法合法地向你发货、转让技术,甚至无法交换履行合同所需的数据。停摆的是你的产线,而非它的。
  2. 数据与技术均在射程之内。 UEL项下的交易与数据传输禁令意味着,诸多日常活动——共享设计文件、发送测试数据、联合研发,乃至某些基于云端的协作——只要被列实体出现在链条任何环节,便可能沦为被禁止行为。
  3. 多边暴露会叠加。 某供应商可能在中国法下清白,却受美国或欧盟制裁,反之亦然。夹在相互重叠的管制体系之间的买家,可能面临次级制裁或合规冲突,需要审慎的结构安排,而非回避。

令人安心的一面是:依法经营、尊重市场原则、不具任何失格关联的实体并非目标。该制度旨在筛除不良主体,而非阻碍正当贸易。因此,务实要务是通过”流程”而非仅”意愿”来证明你已开展筛查。

构建供应商尽调筛查体系

一套有效的体系,应将制裁与出口管制筛查融入常规采购生命周期,而非视作一次性勾选。最低限度的筛查层级包括:

  • 不可靠实体清单筛查。 将每一家中国(及相关情形下外国的)供应商、次级供应商及关键服务商,与商务部安全与管制局发布的现行不可靠实体清单逐一比对。
  • 实体/出口管制清单比对。 将供应商与中国出口管制受控物项及最终用户清单交叉核对;为求完整,亦应比对美国实体清单、欧盟及联合国制裁名单中可能波及你供应链的部分。
  • 最终用户与最终用途审查。 对任一受管制或敏感物项,获取并核实最终收货方与预期用途;对军事用途、未经授权用途或易转用用途的交易予以拒止。
  • 多边制裁交叉核对。 确认供应商不在联合国、美国或欧盟制裁名单之上,并在签约前厘清各管制体系之间可能存在的冲突。
  • 数据出境与敏感信息管控。 识别哪些合同活动涉及向中国境内外传输数据,对数据分类分级,并以筛查结果作为这些流动的前置闸门——尤其在可能涉及被列实体的情形下。

操作建议

  • 建立内部合规程序(ICP)。 将筛查方法、风险偏好、升级路径与记录保存要求形成书面文件。一份成文的ICP,正是监管者与交易对手所期待看到的。
  • 签约前先筛查。 将名单筛查设为供应商准入的硬性关卡。在交易对手通过全部层级之前,不得签署供货、技术或数据相关协议。
  • 履约中定期重筛。 名单会变——正如2025年案例所示,且变动迅速。安排周期性重筛(如每季度一次),并在供应商股权、关联或产品结构发生变动时触发事件驱动式重筛。
  • 对敏感交易加重审查。 涉及两用技术、防务相关物项、关键数据或研发协作的交易,应触发升级评估并交由高层签批。
  • 留存证据。 保存筛查日志、所用清单、时间戳及决策记录。在争议或检查中,保护你的不是记忆,而是记录。

来源

  • 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告〔2025〕7号(Skydio等11家美国企业)— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn(官方门户)
  • 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告〔2025〕10号(反无人机技术公司、TechInsights等)— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn(官方门户)
  • 《不可靠实体清单规定》— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn(官方门户)
  • 商务部安全与管制局(出口管制、不可靠实体清单发布)— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn(官方门户)
  • 出口管制法及两用物项条例(详见本库文章 采购供应-供应商尽调-66)— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn(官方门户)

相关阅读

  • 本库配套文章:《出口管制与两用物项》(采购供应-供应商尽调-66),系统阐述中国出口管制与两用物项框架及供应商应对。
  • 本库供应商尽职调查系列:采购供应-供应商尽调-51 / 62,涵盖一般性供应商准入与风险评估流程。

Export Control & Dual-Use Items: What Foreign Buyers Sourcing from China Must Check

  • China’s export-control regime is now unified under the Export Control Law (2020) and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (State Council Decree No.792), effective 1 December 2024.
    中国的出口管制制度现已在《出口管制法》(2020)与《两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024年12月1日施行)下统一。
  • “Dual-use items” are goods, technology and services with both civilian and military uses — the control net covers export, re-export, transit, transshipment and even certain overseas-to-overseas transfers of China-origin items.
    “两用物项”指兼具民用与军事用途的货物、技术和服务——管制网覆盖出口、再出口、过境、转运,甚至含中国成分物项的境外向境外转移。
  • The unified Dual-Use Items Export Control List (MOFCOM/MIIT/GACC/State Cryptography Administration Notice 2024 No.51) took effect the same day and replaced multiple older lists.
    统一的《两用物项出口管制清单》(商务部/工信部/海关总署/国家密码局2024年第51号公告)同日施行,取代多份旧清单。
  • Licences come in three forms: single licence (single end-user, one export, ≤1 year), general licence (multiple exports/users, ≤3 years, for compliant exporters), and a registration-and-filing pathway for specified low-risk situations.
    许可分三类:单项许可(单一最终用户、一次出口、≤1年)、通用许可(多次出口/用户、≤3年,面向合规出口商)、以及针对特定低风险情形的登记填报凭证方式。
  • End-user and end-use management is central: applicants must submit end-user/end-use certificates and cannot change them; a Control List and a Watch List can restrict counterparties.
    最终用户与最终用途管理是核心:申请须提交最终用户/用途证明且不得擅自变更;管控名单与关注名单可限制交易对手。
  • The regulation abolished the old exporter-registration prerequisite — exporters can now apply for a licence directly — a genuine trade-facilitation step.
    条例取消了旧的出口经营者登记前置——出口商现可直接申请许可——是实实在在的贸易便利化举措。
  • For foreign buyers this matters even when they are the importer: your Chinese supplier’s licence status, catalogue classification and end-user paperwork determine whether goods can lawfully leave China.
    对外资买家而言,即便你是进口方也息息相关:中国供应商的许可状态、清单归类与最终用户材料,决定货物能否合法离境。
  • Build export-control screening into supplier due diligence — classification check, licence verification, end-use statements, re-export awareness and an internal compliance programme (ICP).
    将出口管制筛查纳入供应商尽调——归类核查、许可核验、最终用途声明、再出口意识与内部合规制度(ICP)。

Export Control & Dual-Use Items: What Foreign Buyers Sourcing from China Must Check | 出口管制与两用物项:从中国采购的外资买家必须核查什么

Overview

When a foreign company buys from China, the usual worries are price, quality and delivery. Export control is a quieter risk that can stop a shipment cold — and it applies to a surprisingly broad range of ordinary industrial goods, not just obvious “weapons parts”. Certain sensors, chemicals, machine tools, advanced materials, software and encryption can all be dual-use items. Since 1 December 2024, China runs a single, modernised framework for these items. This article explains the legal architecture, the licence types, end-user rules, the re-export reach, and — crucially — how a buyer folds export-control checks into supplier due diligence so a purchase order is not derailed at the border.

The legal framework

Two instruments anchor the system:

  • Export Control Law of the PRC (2020) — the umbrella statute establishing a unified export-control system through control lists and export licensing.
  • Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items (国务院令第792号) — signed 30 September 2024, effective 1 December 2024, 6 chapters and 50 articles. It consolidates previously scattered rules (nuclear dual-use, missile-related, biological dual-use, certain chemicals) into one coherent regulation, and simultaneously repealed the older stand-alone regulations.

On the same day, the unified Dual-Use Items Export Control List (Notice 2024 No.51, jointly by MOFCOM, MIIT, GACC and the State Cryptography Administration) took effect, replacing multiple legacy lists and folding in commercial-encryption controls.

What counts as a “dual-use item”

A dual-use item (两用物项) is a good, technology or service with both civilian and military applications — or one that could help enhance military potential, especially anything usable to design, develop, produce or deploy weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The definition expressly includes related technical data. Because “technology and services” are covered, sending a Chinese engineer’s technical drawings or providing certain technical support abroad can itself be a controlled “export”.

The three licence pathways

Article 15 of the regulation sets out how a controlled item may lawfully leave China:

  • Single licence (单项许可): one exporter, one specified item, a single export to a single end-user; valid ≤1 year; auto-expires once the export completes.
  • General licence (通用许可): multiple exports to one or multiple end-users within the stated scope; valid ≤3 years; available only to exporters with a well-run internal compliance programme, a track record and relatively fixed channels/end-users.
  • Registration-and-filing (登记填报信息获得出口凭证): for specified low-risk situations (e.g. re-export after repair/testing, exhibition goods returned unchanged, civil-aircraft parts repair) the exporter registers information before each export and self-declares.

MOFCOM must generally decide a single-licence application within 45 working days (identification, expert consultation or on-site verification time is excluded).

End-user and end-use management

This is the heart of the system. Applicants must submit end-user and end-use certificates and may not change the declared end-user/end-use without re-applying. The regime uses two lists:

  • Control List (管控名单): importers/end-users who breach end-use requirements or pose national-security risks can be listed, and transactions with them can be prohibited or restricted; listed parties lose access to general licences and filing conveniences.
  • Watch List (关注名单): parties who refuse end-use verification can be listed, and dealing with them forfeits licensing conveniences.

Re-export, transit and the long reach

The regulation reaches beyond a simple China-to-abroad shipment. Re-export, transit, transshipment and through-transport of controlled items are within scope. Article 49 also allows MOFCOM to require overseas operators to comply when they transfer, to specified destinations/parties, items that contain, integrate or are mixed with specified China-origin dual-use items, or that are produced abroad using specified China-origin controlled technology. Foreign buyers who re-export goods with Chinese content should therefore assess China-origin controls in addition to their home-country rules.

Trade-facilitation upside

It is not all restriction. The 2024 regulation abolished the exporter-registration prerequisite: exporters no longer need prior “dual-use exporter registration” and may apply for a licence directly. It also increases policy transparency, codifies the general-licence convenience, and provides a filing route for low-risk cases such as repairs and exhibitions — reducing friction for compliant, legitimate trade.

Folding export control into supplier due diligence

Add an export-control gate to onboarding and to each significant PO:

  1. Classification check — is the item (or its technology/software/encryption) on the current Dual-Use Items List, or under temporary control? Ask the supplier for its classification; when unsure, the supplier can seek a MOFCOM ruling.
  2. Licence verification — confirm the supplier holds the correct single/general licence, or qualifies for filing, before shipment.
  3. End-use documentation — provide accurate end-user/end-use statements; understand that changing them mid-stream can void the licence.
  4. Screen counterparties — check that neither you nor downstream users are on the Control/Watch lists.
  5. Re-export awareness — if you will re-export goods containing Chinese content, evaluate China-origin controls alongside your own jurisdiction’s.
  6. Internal Compliance Programme (ICP) — favour suppliers with a functioning ICP; a general licence itself signals maturity.
  7. Customs interface — remember GACC will not release controlled goods without the licence; missing paperwork means detention.

What to do next

  • Map your China-sourced items and technology transfers against the 2024 Dual-Use Items List; flag anything sensitive early.
  • Require suppliers to confirm classification and hold the correct licence before you place binding orders.
  • Standardise end-user/end-use certificates in your procurement templates; never misstate them.
  • Screen all counterparties against the Control List and Watch List; re-screen periodically.
  • For goods with Chinese content that you will re-export, assess China-origin re-export exposure in your compliance review.
  • Prefer suppliers with an internal compliance programme; treat a general licence as a positive due-diligence signal.

Sources

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)— http://www.npc.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024-12-01 施行)— https://www.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 司法部、商务部负责人就《两用物项出口管制条例》答记者问 — https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zcjd/202410/t20241019_508011.html
  • 商务部 工业和信息化部 海关总署 国家密码局 2024年第51号公告(发布《两用物项出口管制清单》)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 中国出口管制信息网(商务部安全与管制局)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn

Related reading

  • see also: 采购供应-供应商尽调 (the broader supplier vetting checklist)
  • see also: 采购供应-供应商尽调 (compulsory product certification / CCC)
  • see also: 进口清关-进出口清关 (import-export licensing & customs clearance)

出口管制与两用物项:从中国采购的外资买家必须核查什么

概述

外资企业从中国采购时,通常关心的是价格、质量与交期。出口管制是一种更隐蔽的风险,可能让一票货戛然而止——而且它适用于范围惊人的普通工业品,绝不只是显而易见的”武器零件”。某些传感器、化学品、机床、先进材料、软件与加密都可能是两用物项。自 2024 年 12 月 1 日起,中国以统一、现代化的框架管理这些物项。本文说明法律架构、许可类型、最终用户规则、再出口的延伸效力,以及——最关键的——买家如何把出口管制核查纳入供应商尽调,避免订单在口岸受阻。

法律框架

两部文件构成制度基石:

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)——统领性法律,通过管制清单与出口许可建立统一出口管制制度。
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号)——2024 年 9 月 30 日签署、2024 年 12 月 1 日施行,共 6 章 50 条。它把此前分散的规则(核两用、导弹相关、生物两用、部分化学品)整合为一部统一条例,并同时废止相关旧行政法规。

同日,统一的《两用物项出口管制清单》(2024 年第 51 号公告,商务部、工信部、海关总署、国家密码局联合发布)施行,取代多份旧清单并纳入商用密码管制。

什么算”两用物项”

两用物项指兼具民用与军事用途——或有助于提升军事潜力,尤其可用于设计、开发、生产或使用大规模杀伤性武器及其运载工具——的货物、技术和服务,其定义明确包括相关技术资料。因涵盖”技术和服务”,向境外发送中国工程师的技术图纸或提供某些技术支持,本身即可能构成受控”出口”。

三条许可路径

条例第 15 条规定受控物项合法离境的方式:

  • 单项许可:一个出口商、一项特定物项、向单一最终用户一次出口;有效期≤1 年;完成出口后自动失效。
  • 通用许可:在载明范围内向单一或多个最终用户多次出口;有效期≤3 年;仅面向内部合规制度运行良好、有出口记录、渠道及最终用户相对固定的出口商。
  • 登记填报凭证:对特定低风险情形(如进境检修/试验/检测后复运、参展原样复运、民用飞机零部件维修等),出口商每次出口前登记信息并自行填报。

商务部原则上应自受理单项许可申请起 45 个工作日内决定(鉴别、征询专家或实地核查时间不计入)。

最终用户与最终用途管理

这是制度核心。申请须提交最终用户与最终用途证明,且不得擅自变更所申报的最终用户/用途,否则须重新申请。制度设两份名单:

  • 管控名单:违反最终用途要求或危害国家安全的进口商/最终用户可被列入,与其交易可被禁止或限制;被列入者丧失通用许可与填报便利。
  • 关注名单:不配合最终用途核查者可被列入,与其交易不享受许可便利。

再出口、过境与长臂效力

条例的效力超出简单的”中国—境外”出运。受控物项的再出口、过境、转运、通运均在管制范围。第 49 条还允许商务部要求境外经营者遵守:当其向特定目的地/对象转移含有、集成或混有特定中国成分两用物项、或使用特定中国原产受控技术在境外制造的物项时。因此,再出口含中国成分货物的外资买家,除本国规则外,还应评估中国成分的管制。

贸易便利化的一面

制度并非只有限制。2024 年条例取消了出口经营者登记前置:出口商无需事先登记即可直接申请许可;同时提升政策透明度、明确通用许可便利,并为维修、参展等低风险情形提供填报路径——为合规、正当贸易减少摩擦。

把出口管制纳入供应商尽调

在准入及每一笔重要订单中加入出口管制关卡:

  1. 归类核查——该物项(或其技术/软件/加密)是否列入现行两用物项清单或临时管制?向供应商索取归类;不确定时供应商可向商务部咨询。
  2. 许可核验——出运前确认供应商持有正确的单项/通用许可,或符合填报条件。
  3. 最终用途材料——提供真实的最终用户/用途声明;理解中途变更可能使许可失效。
  4. 筛查交易对手——确认你与下游用户均不在管控/关注名单。
  5. 再出口意识——若将再出口含中国成分货物,须与本司法辖区规则一并评估中国成分管制。
  6. 内部合规制度(ICP)——优先选择有运行良好 ICP 的供应商;通用许可本身即成熟度信号。
  7. 海关接口——海关不凭许可不放行受控货物;材料缺失即被扣留。

下一步建议

  • 将你在华采购物项与技术转移与 2024 年两用物项清单比对;尽早标出敏感项。
  • 在下达约束性订单前,要求供应商确认归类并持有正确许可。
  • 在采购模板中标准化最终用户/用途证明;切勿虚报。
  • 对所有交易对手比对管控名单与关注名单;定期复筛。
  • 对将再出口的含中国成分货物,在合规审查中评估中国成分再出口敞口。
  • 优先选择有内部合规制度的供应商;将通用许可视为尽调正向信号。

来源

  • 《中华人民共和国出口管制法》(2020)— http://www.npc.gov.cn
  • 《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》(国务院令第792号,2024-12-01 施行)— https://www.gov.cn
  • 司法部、商务部负责人就《两用物项出口管制条例》答记者问 — https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zcjd/202410/t20241019_508011.html
  • 商务部 工业和信息化部 海关总署 国家密码局 2024年第51号公告(发布《两用物项出口管制清单》)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 中国出口管制信息网(商务部安全与管制局)— https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 参见:采购供应-供应商尽调(更完整的供应商尽调清单)
  • 参见:采购供应-供应商尽调(强制产品认证 CCC)
  • 参见:进口清关-进出口清关(进出口许可与海关清关)

Compulsory Product Certification (CCC) & Sourcing Compliance for Foreign Buyers

  • China Compulsory Certification (CCC, 中国强制性产品认证) is a statutory safety mark: products in the CCC catalogue cannot be imported, sold or used in China without a valid CCC certificate and the CCC mark.
    中国强制性产品认证(CCC)是法定安全标志:列入 CCC 目录的产品,未取得有效 CCC 证书并标注 CCC 标志的,不得进口、销售或在其他经营活动中使用。
  • CCC is administered by the Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA, 国家认证认可监督管理委员会) and implemented mainly by CQC (中国质量认证中心) and other CNCA-designated bodies.
    CCC 由国家认证认可监督管理委员会(CNCA)主管,主要由中国质量认证中心(CQC)等 CNCA 指定机构实施。
  • SAMR Notice 2025 No.57 shifts 16 product categories from enterprise self-declaration to third-party CCC; certification bodies began accepting applications on 2026-07-01, with conversion to complete by 2026-12-31 and full effect from 2027-01-01.
    市场监管总局 2025 年第 57 号公告将 16 类产品的认证模式由企业自我声明调整为第三方 CCC;指定机构自 2026-07-01 起受理委托,2026-12-31 前完成证书转换,2027-01-01 起全面施行。
  • Foreign manufacturers must obtain CCC through CNCA-approved bodies — there is no “foreign exemption”; importers bear the clearance risk if the mark is missing.
    外国制造商须通过 CNCA 批准的机构取得 CCC——不存在”外资豁免”;缺少标志的进口清关风险由进口方承担。
  • Customs (GACC) checks CCC at the border; missing or false certification can mean detention, return or penalties.
    海关总署在口岸核查 CCC;缺失或虚假认证可能导致扣留、退运或处罚。
  • Build a “CCC checklist” into supplier due diligence: confirm catalogue status, valid certificate number, correct model coverage, and mark affixation before PO.
    将”CCC 清单”纳入供应商尽调:下单前确认是否列入目录、证书编号有效、型号覆盖正确、标志加贴规范。
  • CCC is distinct from voluntary marks (e.g. energy label, CEL) and from food/medical device registration; treat each as a separate gate.
    CCC 不同于自愿性标志(如能效标识)及食品/医疗器械注册,应作为相互独立的准入关卡分别管理。

Compulsory Product Certification (CCC) & Sourcing Compliance for Foreign Buyers | 在华采购的强制产品认证(CCC)与合规清单

Overview

When a foreign buyer sources finished goods or components in China, product certification is a quiet but decisive gate. A supplier may manufacture perfectly, yet if the product falls in the CCC catalogue and lacks certification, it cannot leave the factory for sale or cross the border for import. This article explains what CCC is, who runs it, the 2026 regulatory shift that just changed the rules for 16 categories, and how to fold CCC verification into a sourcing compliance checklist. It is the natural companion to our supplier due-diligence article.

What CCC is

China Compulsory Certification (CCC, 中国强制性产品认证) is the unified statutory conformity-assessment system for products touching safety, health, environmental protection or national security. Established under the Regulation on Certification and Accreditation of the PRC, it replaced the older CCIB and CCEE marks. A product in the CCC catalogue must carry a valid CCC certificate and the CCC mark before it is manufactured for sale, imported, or otherwise placed on the Chinese market. The catalogue spans electronics, IT and AV equipment, lighting, household appliances, automotive parts and safety accessories, wires and cables, tyres, fire products, toys, and more.

Who administers it

  • CNCA (国家认证认可监督管理委员会, certification and accreditation regulator) sets rules, approves certification bodies and laboratories, and publishes the catalogue and implementation rules.
  • CQC (中国质量认证中心) is the principal designated certification body; other CNCA-approved bodies cover specific scopes.
  • SAMR (State Administration for Market Regulation) issues the catalogue-adjustment notices and enforces market surveillance.
  • GACC (General Administration of Customs) verifies CCC at import clearance via the customs declaration and the certification query system.

The 2026 regulatory shift (SAMR 2025 No.57)

This is the most relevant recent change for buyers. The State Administration for Market Regulation Notice 2025 No.57 (issued 2025-12-28) moves 16 product categories from the lighter “enterprise self-declaration” path to third-party CCC certification. The affected families include:

  • Vehicle & safety parts: automotive safety glass, seat belts, external lighting and light-signalling devices, indirect vision devices, seats and headrests, tachographs, reflective markings.
  • Circuit protection: fuses (熔断体).
  • Small-power motors: small-power motors.
  • Electric tools: electric drills, electric grinders, electric rotary hammers.
  • Welding machines: DC arc welders, TIG/MIG-MAG welders, plasma cutters.

Key dates buyers must track:

  • 2026-07-01: designated bodies begin accepting CCC applications for these 16 categories (self-declarations no longer accepted/generated for them).
  • 2026-12-31: enterprises must complete conversion to CCC certificates and cancel the corresponding self-declarations.
  • 2027-01-01: the 16 products require a CCC certificate and mark to be produced, sold, imported or used; prior self-declarations are uniformly cancelled.

Practical effect: if you source any of these items, a self-declaration that was acceptable in 2025 is not sufficient from July 2026 onward — insist on a full third-party CCC certificate.

Foreign manufacturers & importers

There is no foreign exemption. A product made overseas for the China market must still obtain CCC through a CNCA-approved body (foreign factories apply via the same designated bodies; CQC and others accept overseas manufacturer applications and may conduct factory inspections). The importer carries the clearance risk: customs will query the CCC database, and a missing or mismatched certificate blocks release. Plan lead time — certification plus factory inspection can take weeks to months depending on product complexity.

Customs interface

At the border, GACC cross-checks the declaration against the CCC certificate database. Missing certification → goods detained or returned; falsified certificate → penalties and potential market-regulation enforcement. Some products also need a CCC exemption (免办) for temporary import, R&D, or parts used in exported finished goods — applied for through the competent authority, not assumed.

Folding CCC into supplier due diligence

Add a standing CCC gate to your onboarding packet:

  1. Catalogue check — is the HS code / product type in the current CCC catalogue?
  2. Certificate validity — valid CCC number, not expired, not revoked; verify on the CNCA/CQC query system.
  3. Model coverage — the certificate must cover the exact model/variant you buy (minor revisions can fall outside).
  4. Mark affixation — the CCC mark must be physically applied per rules.
  5. Traceability — keep the certificate on file and re-check at each renewal.
  6. Separate the gates — energy-efficiency labels, radio-model (SRRC), network-access (NAL), food/cosmetic/medical-device registration are distinct from CCC; manage each.

What to do next

  • Screen your China-sourced SKUs against the current CCC catalogue now; flag the 16 newly-shifted categories.
  • For the 16 categories, require a full third-party CCC certificate (not self-declaration) on POs from 2026-07-01; convert by 2026-12-31.
  • Verify every certificate on the CNCA/CQC public query before accepting goods.
  • Build the CCC gate into the supplier onboarding checklist alongside credit, litigation and AEO checks.
  • For temporary/export-only imports, apply for 免办 (CCC exemption) through the proper channel rather than assuming it.

Sources

  • 国家认证认可监督管理委员会 CNCA — https://www.cnca.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 市场监管总局 2025 年第 57 号公告(调整 CCC 目录内部分产品认证模式)— https://www.cnca.gov.cn/zwxx/gg/2025/art/2026/art_27223a9fb4d146b58b9a7fcb14d5a41a.html
  • 中国质量认证中心 CQC — https://www.cqc.com.cn (official portal)
  • 国家市场监督管理总局 SAMR — https://www.samr.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署(进口验证/CCC 核查)— http://www.customs.gov.cn (official portal)

Related reading

  • see also: 采购供应-供应商尽调 (the broader supplier vetting checklist)
  • see also: 进口清关-进出口清关 (customs clearance for sourced goods)
  • see also: 电商数字-数据出境 (when supplier/product data crosses borders)

在华采购的强制产品认证(CCC)与合规清单

概述

当外资采购方在中国采购成品或零部件时,产品认证是一道低调却决定性的关卡。供应商可能生产得毫无瑕疵,但若产品落入 CCC 目录却未获认证,它既不能出厂销售,也无法通关进口。本文说明 CCC 是什么、由谁主管、2026 年刚改变 16 类产品规则的监管调整,以及如何把 CCC 核验纳入采购合规清单。它是本库”供应商尽调”文章的自然搭档。

CCC 是什么

中国强制性产品认证(China Compulsory Certification, CCC)是针对涉及安全、健康、环保或国家安全的产品建立的统一法定合格评定制度,依《中华人民共和国认证认可条例》设立,取代了此前的 CCIB 与 CCEE 标志。列入 CCC 目录的产品,须取得有效 CCC 证书并加贴 CCC 标志,方可生产销售、进口或进入中国市场。目录涵盖电子电器、音视频与 IT 设备、照明、家电、汽车零件与安全附件、电线电缆、轮胎、消防产品、玩具等。

由谁主管

  • CNCA(国家认证认可监督管理委员会)制定规则、批准认证机构与实验室,并发布目录与实施规则。
  • CQC(中国质量认证中心)是主要的指定认证机构;其他 CNCA 批准的机构覆盖特定范围。
  • SAMR(国家市场监督管理总局)发布目录调整公告并实施市场监督。
  • GACC(海关总署)在进口通关环节通过报关与认证核查系统验证 CCC。

2026 年监管调整(总局 2025 年第 57 号)

这是对采购方最相关的近期变化。市场监管总局 2025 年第 57 号公告(2025-12-28 发布)将 16 类产品由较轻的”企业自我声明”路径调整为第三方 CCC 认证。涉及品类包括:

  • 车辆及安全附件:汽车安全玻璃、汽车安全带、机动车外部照明及光信号装置、机动车辆间接视野装置、汽车座椅及座椅头枕、汽车行驶记录仪、车身反光标识。
  • 电路开关及保护:熔断体。
  • 小功率电动机:小功率电动机。
  • 电动工具:电钻、电动砂轮机、电锤。
  • 电焊机:直流弧焊机、TIG/MIG-MAG 弧焊机、等离子弧切割机。

采购方须关注的节点:

  • 2026-07-01:指定机构开始受理这 16 类产品的 CCC 委托(不再接受/生成相关自我声明)。
  • 2026-12-31:企业须完成 CCC 证书转换并主动注销相应自我声明。
  • 2027-01-01:这 16 类产品须取得 CCC 证书并标注标志方可生产、销售、进口或使用;原自我声明统一注销。

实务影响:若你采购上述任一类产品,2025 年尚可接受的自我声明自 2026 年 7 月起不再充分——必须要求完整的第三方 CCC 证书。

外国制造商与进口方

不存在外资豁免。为面向中国市场生产而制造的境外产品,仍须通过 CNCA 批准的机构取得 CCC(外国工厂向同一批指定机构申请;CQC 等接受境外制造商申请并可实施工厂检查)。进口方承担清关风险:海关将比对 CCC 数据库,证书缺失或不符将阻断放行。需预留周期——认证加工厂检查依产品复杂度可能耗时数周至数月。

与海关的接口

在口岸,海关总署将报关与 CCC 证书数据库交叉核对。认证缺失 → 货物被扣留或退运;证书造假 → 处罚并可能触发市场监管执法。部分产品(临时进口、研发、用于出口成品的零部件)可申请 CCC 免办,须通过主管部门办理,不可想当然。

把 CCC 纳入供应商尽调

在准入包中加入常设 CCC 关卡:

  1. 目录核查——该 HS 编码/产品类型是否列入现行 CCC 目录?
  2. 证书有效性——CCC 编号有效、未过期、未撤销;在 CNCA/CQC 查询系统核验。
  3. 型号覆盖——证书须覆盖你采购的确切型号/变体(微小改动可能不在范围内)。
  4. 标志加贴——CCC 标志须按规则实物加贴。
  5. 可追溯——留存证书并在每次续证时复核。
  6. 分而治之——能效标识、无线电型号核准(SRRC)、入网许可(NAL)、食品/化妆品/医疗器械注册均不同于 CCC,须分别管理。

下一步建议

  • 立即将你在华采购的 SKU 与现行 CCC 目录比对,标出 16 类新调整品类。
  • 对这 16 类,自 2026-07-01 起在订单中要求完整第三方 CCC 证书(非自我声明);2026-12-31 前完成转换。
  • 收货前在 CNCA/CQC 公开查询核验每一份证书。
  • 将 CCC 关卡与信用、诉讼、AEO 核查一并纳入供应商准入清单。
  • 对临时进口/仅出口产品,通过正规渠道申请 CCC 免办,而非想当然豁免。

来源

  • 国家认证认可监督管理委员会 CNCA — https://www.cnca.gov.cn
  • 市场监管总局 2025 年第 57 号公告(调整 CCC 目录内部分产品认证模式)— https://www.cnca.gov.cn/zwxx/gg/2025/art/2026/art_27223a9fb4d146b58b9a7fcb14d5a41a.html
  • 中国质量认证中心 CQC — https://www.cqc.com.cn
  • 国家市场监督管理总局 SAMR — https://www.samr.gov.cn
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署(进口验证/CCC 核查)— http://www.customs.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 参见:采购供应-供应商尽调(更完整的供应商尽调清单)
  • 参见:进口清关-进出口清关(所购货物的海关清关)
  • 参见:电商数字-数据出境(当供应商/产品数据跨境时)

Supplier Due Diligence in China: a practical checklist

  • Supplier due diligence in China is not optional — weak vetting is the leading cause of product-recall, IP-leakage and payment-fraud losses for foreign buyers.
    在华供应商尽调不是可选项——尽调薄弱是外资采购方遭遇产品召回、IP 泄露与货款欺诈损失的首要原因。
  • Start with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) enterprise credit portal (国家企业信用信息公示系统) to confirm a supplier’s legal existence, registered capital, business scope and any “abnormal operation” (经营异常) flag.
    先从市场监管总局的企业信用信息公示系统核验供应商的合法存续、注册资本、经营范围及是否被列入”经营异常名录”。
  • Cross-check litigation and enforceement records on the Supreme People’s Court judgment document site (裁判文书网) and the Credit China portal (信用中国) for dishonest-actor (失信) listings.
    在最高人民法院裁判文书网与”信用中国”平台交叉核验诉讼与失信被执行人记录。
  • For imported-input or export-oriented supply, verify the supplier’s AEO customs certification status (海关 AEO 认证) and any record of customs violations.
    对涉进口料件或出口导向的供应,核查其海关 AEO 认证状态及是否有海关违规记录。
  • Protect your IP upstream: confirm the supplier is not already a defendant in patent/trademark suits and lock ownership of tooling, moulds and designs by contract.
    前置保护 IP:确认供应商未已卷入专利/商标诉讼,并通过合同锁定模具、治具与设计成果的所有权。
  • Red flags include refusal to provide a unified social credit code (统一社会信用代码), consistently low registered capital against large orders, and pressure for 100% advance payment.
    红旗信号包括拒提供统一社会信用代码、注册资本偏低却接大额订单、以及催促 100% 预付款。
  • Combine official databases with at least one on-site visit and a sealed-sample QC test before committing volume orders.
    将官方数据库核查,与至少一次实地走访及封样质检结合,再下量产物料订单。

Supplier Due Diligence in China: a practical checklist | 在华供应商尽职调查:实操清单

Overview

For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) building a supply chain in China, supplier due diligence is the single most under-rated control. The country offers world-class manufacturing depth, but the supplier population is vast and uneven: alongside tier-1 factories sit shell companies, sub-contractors operating outside their licensed scope, and intermediaries whose only asset is a WeChat account. A disciplined, document-backed vetting process protects against four concrete risks — product quality and recall exposure, IP leakage, contractual non-performance, and payment fraud.

This article sets out a practical, repeatable checklist: which official databases to query, what contractual and on-site steps to take, and which warning signs should stop a deal. It is written for procurement and sourcing managers at foreign firms, and pairs naturally with the customs, IP and company-setup articles in this library.

Why due diligence matters here

China’s company law makes incorporation easy and cheap, which is a feature for entrepreneurs but a risk for buyers. A supplier can be legally registered with a nominal registered capital and still lack the assets, licences or workforce to perform. Because many transactions are intermediated and relationship-based, foreign buyers are frequent targets of advance-fee fraud and quality substitution. The cost of a bad supplier is rarely limited to the failed batch: it flows into brand damage, recall and cross-border liability. Diligence is therefore not a compliance checkbox but a core purchasing competence.

What to check — the core files

Begin with identity and status. The National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System (国家企业信用信息公示系统, run by SAMR) is the authoritative free source for a supplier’s uniform social credit code, legal representative, registered and paid-in capital, establishment date, business scope, branch structure, and any administrative penalty or “abnormal operation” listing. A supplier that will not disclose its credit code, or appears only as a recently capitalised micro-firm, warrants caution.

Then assess legal exposure. The China Judgments Online (裁判文书网, Supreme People’s Court) and the Credit China portal (信用中国, which aggregates dishonest-debtor / 失信被执行人 and major tax-violation blacklists) reveal litigation history, enforced judgments and trustworthiness ratings. A pattern of sued-as-defendant cases, especially in contract or product-liability disputes, is a material signal.

For trade-exposed supply, check customs AEO status via the General Administration of Customs: AEO-certified enterprises enjoy simplified clearance and are generally more disciplined; a history of customs penalties is a red flag for export-bound or import-dependent lines.

Tools, databases and third-party services

Official portals are free but can be cumbersome. Many FIEs use them in combination with commercial intelligence platforms (e.g., Qichacha / Tianyancha / Qixin) that consolidate court, credit, patent and bidding records into a single supplier profile. Treat these as a screen, not a substitute: always trace any alarming finding back to the underlying official record before acting. Industry associations and Chamber of Commerce networks are also useful for reputational references on mid-size manufacturers.

On-site verification and sample testing

No remote check replaces a factory visit. A physical audit should confirm: the entity actually operates at the registered address; the workforce and equipment match the claimed capacity; quality certifications (ISO 9001, industry-specific) are valid and in the supplier’s own name; and environmental/social-insurance compliance is visibly maintained. Before volume commitment, require a sealed-sample QC test at an independent lab, and retain the samples as a benchmark for incoming inspection.

Contractual and IP protections

Diligence must be converted into contract terms. Specify quality standards and acceptance criteria, tie payment to inspection milestones (avoid 100% advance), and explicitly assign ownership of tooling, moulds, drawings and any jointly developed IP to the buyer. Include audit rights, recall/indemnity clauses, and governing-law/jurisdiction terms consistent with the dispute-resolution article in this library. Where the supplier will handle your trademarked or patented product, add confidentiality and non-use undertakings.

Common red flags

  • Refusal or inability to provide the unified social credit code.
  • Registered capital far below the scale of the order, or a company incorporated only weeks before a large contract.
  • Business scope that does not include the product being sourced (operating outside licensed scope is a compliance breach).
  • Pressure for full advance payment, or insistence on personal-account settlement.
  • A “factory” that is actually a trading intermediary with no production assets.
  • Prior defendant history in product-liability or IP-infringement suits.

What to do next

  • Build a standard supplier-onboarding packet: credit-code check + litigation/credit check + business-scope confirmation, filed before first PO.
  • Run at least one unannounced on-site audit per critical supplier per year.
  • Lock IP and tooling ownership in writing; never rely on relationship assurance.
  • Tie payments to inspected milestones; cap any advance at a defensible percentage.
  • Keep a rejected-supplier list shared across your China procurement team.

Sources

  • 国家企业信用信息公示系统(市场监管总局)— https://www.gsxt.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 中国裁判文书网(最高人民法院)— https://wenshu.court.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 信用中国 — https://www.creditchina.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署(AEO 认证)— http://www.customs.gov.cn (official portal)
  • 市场监管总局 SAMR — https://www.samr.gov.cn (official portal)

Related reading

  • see also: 进口清关-进出口清关 (customs clearance for sourced goods)
  • see also: 知识产权-商标 (protecting your brand against supplier misuse)
  • see also: 电商数字-数据出境 (when supplier data crosses borders)

在华供应商尽职调查:实操清单

概述

对在中国搭建供应链的外商投资企业(FIE)而言,供应商尽职调查是最被低估的一道管控。中国拥有世界一流的制造纵深,但供应商群体庞杂且良莠不齐:与一线工厂并存的,有空壳公司、超出许可范围经营的转包方,以及唯一资产只是一个微信账号的中间商。一套有据可查、可重复的尽调流程,能防范四类具体风险——产品质量与召回暴露、IP 泄露、合同违约,以及货款欺诈。

本文给出一份实用、可复用的清单:该查哪些官方数据库、该采取哪些合同与实地步骤、哪些预警信号应叫停交易。它面向外资企业的采购与寻源经理,并与本库中的海关、知识产权、公司设立等文章天然互补。

为何在华尽调尤为关键

中国《公司法》让公司设立简便且成本低,这对创业者是好事,对采购方却是风险。一家供应商可以合法注册、认缴资本名义化,却并无履约所需的资产、牌照或人手。由于大量交易经由中介、依赖关系,外资买方常成为预付款欺诈与以次充好问题的目标。劣质供应商的代价很少止步于那批货:它会蔓延至品牌损害、召回与跨境责任。因此尽调不是合规勾选,而是核心采购能力。

该查什么——核心档案

从身份与状态入手。国家企业信用信息公示系统(市场监管总局运营)是核验供应商统一社会信用代码、法定代表人、注册资本与实缴、成立日期、经营范围、分支机构,以及任何行政处罚或”经营异常”列名的权威免费来源。拒披露信用代码、或仅为近期低资本微企的供应商,须警惕。

继而评估法律风险。中国裁判文书网(最高人民法院)与信用中国平台(聚合失信被执行人、重大税收违法黑名单)可揭示诉讼史、强制执行与守信状况。若呈”作为被告频发”、尤其是合同或产品责任纠纷,是重大信号。

对涉贸供应,经海关总署核查海关 AEO 认证状态:AEO 企业享通关便利、通常更守规;有海关处罚史,对出口或进口依赖型产线都是红旗。

工具、数据库与第三方服务

官方平台免费但操作繁琐。许多 FIE 将其与商业情报平台(如企查查、天眼查、启信)配合使用,把法院、信用、专利与招投标记录整合为单一供应商画像。把它们当筛查手段,而非替代:对任何告警发现,行动前务必回溯至底层官方记录。行业协会与商会网络,也对中型制造企业的声誉参考很有价值。

实地核验与样品检测

远程核查无法替代工厂走访。实地审计应确认:该主体确实在注册地经营;人员与设备匹配其宣称产能;质量认证(ISO 9001 及行业特定)有效且落在供应商自身名下;环保与社保合规可见地维持。量产前,要求独立实验室做封样质检,并留存样品作为来料检验基准。

合同与 IP 保护

尽调必须转化为合同条款。明确质量标准与验收准则,把付款与检验节点挂钩(避免 100% 预付),并以书面形式将模具、治具、图纸及任何共同开发 IP 的所有权指定给买方。纳入审计权、召回/赔偿条款,以及与本库争议解决文章一致的准据法与管辖约定。当供应商将处理你方商标或专利产品时,追加保密与不使用的承诺。

常见红旗信号

  • 拒绝或无法提供统一社会信用代码。
  • 注册资本远低于订单规模,或公司在大额合同前仅成立数周。
  • 经营范围不含所采购产品(超范围经营即违规)。
  • 施压要求全额预付,或坚持以个人账户结算。
  • “工厂”实为无生产资产的贸易中介。
  • 曾有产品责任或 IP 侵权”被告”历史。

下一步建议

  • 建立标准供应商准入包:信用代码核查 + 诉讼/信用核查 + 经营范围确认,首单前归档。
  • 每年对关键供应商至少做一次不预先通知的实地审计。
  • 书面锁定 IP 与模具所有权;绝不依赖关系承诺。
  • 付款与检验节点挂钩;任何预付款封顶在可控比例。
  • 维护一份采购团队共享的”拒用供应商名单”。

来源

  • 国家企业信用信息公示系统(市场监管总局)— https://www.gsxt.gov.cn
  • 中国裁判文书网(最高人民法院)— https://wenshu.court.gov.cn
  • 信用中国 — https://www.creditchina.gov.cn
  • 中华人民共和国海关总署(AEO 认证)— http://www.customs.gov.cn
  • 市场监管总局 SAMR — https://www.samr.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 参见:进口清关-进出口清关(所购货物的海关清关)
  • 参见:知识产权-商标(防范供应商滥用你的品牌)
  • 参见:电商数字-数据出境(当供应商数据跨境时)

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains

  • On 5 August 2026 China’s Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 34 of 2026, strengthening export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: every export is now subject to case-by-case strict review and license-preference measures do not apply.
    2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部发布 2026 年第 34 号公告,加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。
  • The same day, MOFCOM placed seven US entities on its countermeasures list — six entities (including Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir and Altana Technologies) under Order No. 2 of 2026 and Compliance Testing LLC under Order No. 3 of 2026 — banning Chinese organisations and individuals from transacting or cooperating with them.
    同一天,商务部依据反外国制裁法将 7 家美国实体列入反制清单——2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司等 6 家美国实体列入,第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入——禁止我国境内组织、个人与其进行交易、合作等活动。
  • The August measures follow an earlier July batch (Order No. 30 of 2026 placing 14 EU entities on the export-control management list) and a June 2026 customs announcement tightening drone export declarations, showing a steady escalation of China’s export-control enforcement.
    8 月措施紧随此前批次:7 月第 30 号公告将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单,2026 年 6 月海关公告收紧无人机出口申报——显示中国出口管制执法的稳步升级。
  • For foreign companies, the compliance consequences are concrete: if you are a US or EU entity on the lists, your Chinese counterparties are prohibited from dealing with you; if you buy or re-export controlled drone components, you face case-by-case review and must not rely on licensing-preference pathways.
    对外国企业,合规后果具体而直接:若你是在列的美欧实体,你的中国对手方被禁止与你交易;若你采购或转口受管制无人机零部件,将面对逐案审查且不能依赖许可便利通道。
  • Supply-chain due diligence must now screen counterparties, end-users and goods against three instruments: the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, the export-control management list and the countermeasures list, under the Export Control Law, the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.
    供应链尽调现须对照三份清单筛查对手方、最终用户与货物:《两用物项出口管制清单》、出口管制管控名单与反制清单,依据《出口管制法》《两用物项出口管制条例》与《反外国制裁法》。
  • The Foreign Trade Law, revised and effective 1 March 2026, adds a further layer: it prohibits any person or organisation from providing agency, freight, customs, warehousing or platform services to evade measures against listed foreign persons or organisations.
    2026 年 3 月 1 日施行的新修订《对外贸易法》增加一层:禁止任何个人、组织为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持。

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains | 中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

The 5 August package

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce issued three measures on a single day. Announcement No. 34 of 2026 strengthens export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: for drones, their key components and related technology listed in the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, every export to the US is subject to case-by-case strict review, and license-preference measures do not apply. Order No. 2 of 2026 places six US entities on the countermeasures list — Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, Responsible Business Alliance, Verite Group and Human Rights in China — and Order No. 3 of 2026 places Compliance Testing LLC on the list. For entities on the countermeasures list, Chinese organisations and individuals are prohibited from transacting or cooperating with them. The legal basis is the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations for the first measure, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and its implementing regulations for the latter two.

The escalation context

The August package is the latest step in a sequence that global supply-chain teams should read as a pattern, not a one-off. On 24 July 2026, MOFCOM announced (Announcement No. 30 of 2026) that 14 EU entities were placed on the export-control management list. In June 2026, the GACC issued Announcement No. 78 of 2026 strengthening supervision of drone and other dual-use exports at the declaration stage: exports through express delivery or cross-border e-commerce channels may not use simplified declarations, and for goods whose technical parameters approach control standards, exporters must proactively declare that the goods are not controlled items. On 5 August the drone-specific US controls and the countermeasures against seven US entities followed. The cumulative picture: China’s export-control and countermeasure apparatus is being used with increasing frequency, and the dual-use control list, the management list and the countermeasures list are being updated as operational instruments, not as dormant legislation.

What the drone controls mean for global buyers

For companies that source drone components, drones or related technology from China, or that re-export such goods to the US, the practical changes are: (1) exports of listed items to the US now go through case-by-case strict review — no license-preference pathway; (2) exporters must verify the final destination and end-use more rigorously, which will slow down and add compliance cost to US-bound shipments; (3) for non-US destinations, controls continue to apply under the general dual-use regime, but the “no simplified declaration” rule for express and e-commerce channels announced in June applies regardless of destination; (4) buyers should expect Chinese suppliers to ask for more end-user and end-use documentation and to decline orders where the chain is unclear. For a global buyer, the lesson is to treat drones and dual-use electronics as controlled goods with a destination-sensitive compliance profile.

The countermeasures list and counterparty screening

The countermeasures list under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law has direct binding enforcement effect: Chinese organisations and individuals must not transact or cooperate with listed entities. For a foreign company, the question is not whether it agrees with the listings but whether it or any subsidiary appears on the list, and whether its Chinese counterparties will be forced to terminate relations. Compliance steps include: screen the company, its subsidiaries, its beneficial owners and its key counterparties against the countermeasures list and the export-control management list on a continuous basis; monitor updates to the lists (MOFCOM publishes them via announcements and the countermeasures list annex); and where a listed entity is involved anywhere in the transaction chain, assume the Chinese leg will be blocked. The revised Foreign Trade Law adds a service-layer prohibition: no one may provide agency, freight, forwarding, customs, warehousing or third-party trading-platform services to circumvent measures against listed foreign persons or organisations. This matters for freight forwarders, customs brokers, warehouses and platforms that handle transactions with listed entities — even non-US service providers routing through China face the prohibition.

The interplay with US sanctions and compliance dual-use

Foreign multinationals now operate in a genuinely two-way sanctions environment. US sanctions and export controls restrict what US persons and goods may do with Chinese entities; China’s export-control management list and countermeasures list restrict what Chinese entities may do with US and EU entities. A multinational that is simultaneously subject to US export controls (e.g., ITAR, EAR) and dealing with Chinese suppliers must map both regimes onto every transaction. Practical friction points include: US-origin components embedded in goods bought from Chinese suppliers; US persons serving on boards that approve transactions with listed Chinese entities; and Chinese suppliers refusing to route shipments through US-sanctioned logistics chains. The compliance function must therefore maintain a dual sanctions map and run both US and Chinese list screening in parallel.

Practical due-diligence framework

For foreign companies sourcing from or selling into China, the 2026 framework suggests a four-layer screen. Layer one, goods: confirm whether the product is on the Dual-Use Items Export Control List (and the annual licence-management catalogue), whether it approaches control thresholds, and what declaration obligations apply under the June 2026 customs announcement. Layer two, parties: screen counterparties, end-users and end-use against the export-control management list, the countermeasures list and, for completeness, China’s unreliable-entity list and the MOFCOM guidance. Layer three, services: verify that no Chinese freight, customs, warehousing or platform provider would be violating the Foreign Trade Law service prohibition by handling your transaction. Layer four, jurisdictions: map both US and Chinese control regimes onto the transaction chain and identify any conflict that makes a deal unexecutable. Documentation of the screening is itself a compliance asset — Chinese regulators increasingly expect written evidence that exporters and their counterparties verified end-users and end-use.

What to watch next

Several indicators will shape the next six months. First, whether the drone-specific US controls extend to other dual-use categories or other destinations. Second, whether the management list and countermeasures list grow further in response to foreign measures — the pattern since mid-2026 suggests regular additions. Third, the implementation guidance for the new Foreign Trade Law’s service-prohibition provisions, which may come through MOFCOM Q&As or administrative rules. Fourth, whether Chinese customs deepens declaration-level scrutiny of dual-use goods through further announcements in the 2026 series. For global supply-chain and compliance teams, the operating assumption should be that China’s export-control and countermeasure regime is now a routine, frequently updated component of cross-border trade compliance — to be screened continuously, not reviewed annually.

Sources


中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

8 月 5 日一揽子措施

2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部同日发布三项措施。2026 年第 34 号公告加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟、维泰集团、”人权在中国组织”等 6 家美国实体列入反制清单;第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入反制清单。对在列实体,我国境内组织、个人禁止与其交易、合作。法律依据:第一项依《出口管制法》与《两用物项出口管制条例》,后两项依《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定。

升级的脉络

8 月一揽子是序列中的最新一步,全球供应链团队应视为模式而非一次性事件。2026 年 7 月 24 日,商务部公告(2026 年第 30 号)将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单。2026 年 6 月,海关总署发布 2026 年第 78 号公告,在申报环节强化无人机等两用物项出口监管:经快件、跨境电商渠道出口的不得简化申报,技术指标接近管制标准的物项,出口经营者申报时应主动声明其不属于管制物项。8 月 5 日,无人机对美专项管制与对 7 家美实体反制接踵而至。累积图景:中国出口管制与反制体系正被更频繁地启用,两用物项管制清单、管控名单与反制清单作为操作性工具持续更新,而非沉睡立法。

无人机管制对全球买家的意义

对从中国采购无人机零部件、无人机或相关技术、或向美国转口此类货物的企业,实际变化是:(1)清单物项对美出口现走逐案从严审核——无许可便利通道;(2)出口商须更严格核验最终目的地与最终用途,对美运输将变慢并增加合规成本;(3)对非美目的地,一般两用物项管制继续适用,但 6 月公告的”快件与电商渠道不得简化申报”规则不分目的地适用;(4)买家应预期中国供应商索取更多最终用户与最终用途文件,并在链条不清时拒绝订单。对全球买家,教训是无人机与两用电子产品须作为受管制货物、按目的地敏感性配置合规。

反制清单与对手方筛查

《反外国制裁法》下的反制清单具有直接的商业约束力:中国境内组织、个人不得与在列实体交易、合作。对外国企业,问题不在于是否认同列名,而在于自身或任何子公司是否在列、以及中国对手方是否被迫终止关系。合规步骤包括:对公司、子公司、受益所有人及关键对手方连续筛查反制清单与出口管制管控名单;持续跟踪名单更新(商务部经公告与反制清单附件发布);交易链任何环节涉在列实体的,按”中国一侧将被封堵”预判。新修订《对外贸易法》增加服务层禁令:任何个人、组织不得为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持、协助、便利。这对处理与在列实体交易的货代、报关行、仓库与平台意义重大——即便非美服务商经中国中转也面临禁令。

与美国制裁的相互作用与双重合规

跨国企业如今身处真正的双向制裁环境。美国制裁与出口管制限制美国主体与货物可与中国实体做什么;中国的出口管制管控名单与反制清单限制中国实体可与美欧实体做什么。同时受美国出口管制(如 ITAR、EAR)约束又与中国供应商交易的多国公司,必须把两套制度映射到每笔交易。实际摩擦点包括:从中国供应商采购货物中嵌入的美国原产部件;参与批准与在列中国实体交易的董事会的美国人士;以及中国供应商拒绝经美国制裁物流链转运。合规职能因此须维护双向制裁地图,并行运行美国与中国清单筛查。

实务尽调框架

对从中国采购或对华销售的外国企业,2026 年框架建议四层筛查。第一层,货物:确认产品是否在《两用物项出口管制清单》(及年度许可管理目录)之上、是否接近管制阈值、按 2026 年 6 月海关公告承担何种申报义务。第二层,主体:对照出口管制管控名单、反制清单,以及中国不可靠实体清单与商务部指引,筛查对手方、最终用户与最终用途。第三层,服务:核实无中国货代、报关、仓储或平台提供者会因处理你的交易而违反《对外贸易法》服务禁令。第四层,法域:把美中两套控制制度映射到交易链,识别使交易不可执行的冲突。筛查留痕本身即是合规资产——中国监管者日益期待出口商及对手方留存书面证据证明已核验最终用户与最终用途。

下一步看点

若干指标将塑造未来半年。其一,无人机对美专项管制是否扩展到其他两用物项类别或其他目的地。其二,管控名单与反制清单是否随外国措施进一步扩大——2026 年年中以来的模式提示将定期增列。其三,新《对外贸易法》服务禁令的实施指引,或经商务部问答或行政规则出台。其四,中国海关是否以 2026 年序列后续公告深化两用物项申报级审查。对全球供应链与合规团队,运营假设应是:中国出口管制与反制体系现已是跨境贸易合规的常规、高频更新组成部分——应持续筛查,而非年度复核。

Sources

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms

  • On 5 August 2026 MOFCOM enacted Order No. 2 (2026), placing six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and banning domestic organisations and individuals from transactions or cooperation with them.
    2026年8月5日,商务部令第2号将6家美国实体列入反制清单,禁止境内组织、个人与其交易或合作。
  • The listed entities include Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), Verite Group and Human Rights in China.
    被列入的实体包括应用DNA科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟(RBA)、维泰集团与人权在中国组织。
  • A separate action the same day also listed Compliance Testing LLC, and the US drone-related dual-use export control was tightened — broadening the sanctions perimeter.
    同日另一行动还将美国合规性测试公司列入清单,并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制,拓宽制裁边界。
  • Foreign-invested firms must screen suppliers and partners against MOFCOM’s counter-sanctions and Unreliable Entity lists before contracting and on an ongoing basis.
    外商投资企业必须在签约前及持续地对供应商与合作伙伴对照商务部的反制清单与不可靠实体清单进行筛查。
  • The legal basis is the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law; violating a counter-sanctions listing can sever a company’s China supply chain and trigger liability.
    法律依据为《反外国制裁法》;违反反制清单可能切断企业在华供应链并引发责任。
  • Practical step: build a sanctioned-entity screening clause into procurement and partner contracts, with audit rights and termination triggers.
    实操建议:在采购与合作伙伴合同中嵌入受制裁实体筛查条款,含审计权与终止触发条件。

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms | 商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) enacted Order No. 2 (2026) — the *Decision on Countermeasures Against Six US Entities Including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.* The order, approved by the National Counter-Foreign Sanctions Coordination Mechanism, places six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and prohibits organisations and individuals within China from engaging in related transactions or cooperation with them. For any foreign-invested company with a China supply chain, this is a due-diligence event, not just a geopolitical headline.

What Order No. 2 does

The order responds to US sanctions against Chinese entities. Citing the *Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law* and its implementation provisions, MOFCOM decided to list the following six US entities and ban transactions/cooperation with them within China:

  1. Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.
  2. Stratum Reservoir, LLC
  3. Altana Technologies, Inc.
  4. Responsible Business Alliance (RBA)
  5. Verite Group, Inc.
  6. Human Rights in China (HRIC)

The prohibition is broad: “related transactions or cooperation” covers procurement, sales, licensing, auditing, certification and other commercial engagement. The effect is to cut the listed entities off from economic activity with China-based parties.

The widening sanctions perimeter

The same 5 August wave was not limited to the six. Reporting indicated a parallel listing of Compliance Testing LLC, and a tightening of US drone-related dual-use export controls. Together these show a broadening perimeter: certification bodies, audit/assurance groups, testing labs and supply-chain organisations can be drawn in, not only manufacturers. For foreign firms, the practical risk is that a trusted auditor, certifier or standards body in your supply chain quietly becomes a listed entity.

Why supplier due diligence must adapt

Traditional supplier due diligence focuses on financial health, quality and ESG. China’s counter-sanctions regime adds a sanctions-screening layer that foreign-invested firms cannot ignore:

  • Direct exposure. Buying from, selling to, or partnering with a listed entity is prohibited.
  • Indirect exposure. Using a listed entity as an auditor, certifier (e.g., RBA-style labour audits), testing lab or standards body can constitute “cooperation.”
  • Continuity risk. A previously-clean supplier or partner can be listed overnight, severing a production line or certification path.

MOFCOM also operates the Unreliable Entity List (UEL), a separate but related mechanism targeting foreign entities that harm Chinese sovereignty, security or development interests. Prudent supply-chain teams should screen against both the counter-sanctions list and the UEL.

Practical steps

  1. Screen at onboarding. Run every new supplier, distributor, auditor, certifier and lab against the current counter-sanctions and UEL lists before contracting.
  2. Screen continuously. Lists change fast; re-screen the active base on a set cadence and upon any geopolitical trigger.
  3. Contractualise it. Insert a sanctions-screening representation, audit right and termination-for-listing clause in procurement and partner agreements.
  4. Map dependencies. Identify where a single auditor/certifier (e.g., a labour-audit body) is mission-critical and build a fallback.
  5. Train procurement. Ensure buyers understand that “cooperation” includes certification and audit services, not just goods.
  6. Keep evidence. Document screenings and decisions to show compliance if challenged.

商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

2026年8月5日,商务部发布第2号令——《关于对应用DNA科学公司等6家美国实体采取反制措施的决定》。该令经国务院国家反外国制裁工作协调机制批准,将6家美国实体列入反制清单,并禁止境内组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作。对任何拥有中国供应链的外商投资企业而言,这是一起尽调事件,而非仅是地缘政治新闻。

第2号令的内容

该令回应美国对中国实体的制裁。依据《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定,商务部决定将以下6家美国实体列入清单,并禁止境内与其交易、合作:

  1. 应用DNA科学公司(Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.)
  2. 地层水库公司(Stratum Reservoir, LLC)
  3. 阿尔塔纳技术公司(Altana Technologies, Inc.)
  4. 责任商业联盟(Responsible Business Alliance, RBA)
  5. 维泰集团(Verite Group, Inc.)
  6. 人权在中国组织(Human Rights in China, HRIC)

禁令范围很广:”有关交易、合作”涵盖采购、销售、许可、审计、认证及其他商业往来。效果是切断被列实体与在华主体的经济活动。

拓宽的制裁边界

8月5日这一波并非仅限6家。报道显示同时列入了美国合规性测试公司(Compliance Testing LLC),并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制。共同显示边界正在拓宽:认证机构、审计/保证团体、检测实验室与供应链组织都可能被纳入,不仅是制造商。对外资企业,实际风险在于供应链中可信的审计方、认证方或标准机构悄然成为被列实体。

供应商尽调须随之调整

传统供应商尽调聚焦财务健康、质量与ESG。中国的反制制裁制度新增了一层制裁筛查,外商投资企业不可忽视:

  • 直接敞口。 向被列实体采购、销售或与之合作均被禁止。
  • 间接敞口。 使用被列实体作为审计方、认证方(如RBA式劳工审计)、检测实验室或标准机构,可能构成”合作”。
  • 连续性风险。 原本清白的供应商或合作伙伴可能一夜之间被列,切断产线或认证路径。

商务部还运行不可靠实体清单(UEL)——一项针对损害中国主权、安全、发展利益的外国实体的独立但相关机制。审慎的供应链团队应同时对照反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。

实操步骤

  1. 准入即筛查。 签约前对每家新供应商、经销商、审计方、认证方与实验室对照现行反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。
  2. 持续筛查。 清单变化快;按固定节奏并在任何地缘触发时重新筛查活跃库。
  3. 合同化。 在采购与合作伙伴协议中嵌入制裁筛查陈述、审计权与”被列入即终止”条款。
  4. 梳理依赖。 识别单一审计/认证方(如劳工审计机构)为关键路径的环节,建立备用。
  5. 培训采购。 确保采购理解”合作”包括认证与审计服务,不止货物。
  6. 留存证据。 记录筛查与决策,以应对可能的合规质疑。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • MOFCOM Order No. 2 (2026), 5 August: six US entities listed; domestic transactions/cooperation banned.
    商务部2026年第2号令(8月5日):6家美实体被列入;禁止境内交易合作。
  • Six named: Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana, RBA, Verite, HRIC.
    六家名单:应用DNA科学、地层水库、阿尔塔纳、RBA、维泰、人权在中国。
  • Perimeter widening: Compliance Testing LLC + drone dual-use controls added the same day.
    边界拓宽:同日新增合规性测试公司与无人机两用物项管制。
  • Screen two lists: counter-sanctions list AND the Unreliable Entity List.
    筛查两份清单:反制清单与不可靠实体清单。

Common Pitfalls

  • Thinking “goods only”: certification and audit services count as “cooperation” with a listed entity.
    以为”仅货物”:认证与审计服务也算与被列实体的”合作”。
  • One-time screening: lists move fast; a clean supplier today can be listed tomorrow.
    一次性筛查:清单变动快;今日清白的供应商明日可能被列。
  • Ignoring the UEL: the Unreliable Entity List is a separate, related risk many teams miss.
    忽视不可靠实体清单:这是独立的关联风险,许多团队遗漏。

Sources