Tag Archives: Security Review

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China

  • The Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items has applied since 1 December 2024 and provides the framework for licensing, declaration and compliance in this area.
    《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》自2024年12月1日起施行,为这一领域的许可、申报与合规提供了制度框架。
  • GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption.
    海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。
  • Licences for controlled items are applied for through MOFCOM’s unified business system, with technical descriptions and end-user certificates submitted and a review period of 45 working days; the customs declaration remarks column must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the control code.
    出口管制物项许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请,须提交技术说明、最终用户证明等材料,审查期限为45个工作日;报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写管制编码。
  • On 29 June 2026 MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities in the export-control control list, prohibiting export operators from exporting dual-use items to them and prohibiting foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them.
    2026年6月29日,商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单,禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。
  • Unreliable Entity List announcement No. 10 of 2025 listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches, with measures covering China-related import-export activity, new investment in China, and transactions or cooperation by organisations and individuals in China.
    不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单,措施涉及与中国有关的进出口活动、在华新增投资,以及中国境内组织和个人与其进行的交易与合作。
  • On 24 April 2026 seven EU entities were listed; the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, that the measures concern only dual-use items and do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about.
    2026年4月24日发布将7家欧盟实体列名;商务部新闻发言人表示,列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。
  • For buyers in China, screening should run on four dimensions — the control list, end-use, technical parameters and the customer’s ultimate use — with machine-tool control codes such as 2B201 as a worked example.
    对中国境内的采购方而言,筛查应从四个维度展开——对照管制清单、分析用途属性、审查技术参数、确认客户及最终用途——并以2B201类数控机床等管制编码为实操示例。

Export controls and the unreliable-entity list: a screening guide for foreign buyers in China | 出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

Overview

China’s export-control regime rests on a defined legal framework and a set of official listing and declaration procedures. For foreign-invested enterprises that buy, resell or re-export controlled goods in China, the practical task is not to interpret policy intent but to run a reliable screening and licensing process. This guide sets out the framework, the declaration and licensing mechanics, the recent listing actions announced by the Ministry of Commerce, and a four-dimension screening method that procurement and compliance teams can apply.

The tone throughout is deliberately procedural: the measures are described as they are published — by reference to the applicable laws and regulations, and to the stated purpose of safeguarding national security and interests and fulfilling non-proliferation and other international obligations.

The legal framework

The cornerstone is the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, which has applied since 1 December 2024. It sits alongside the Export Control Law and the rules governing the Unreliable Entity List. Together they define which items are controlled, how exports are licensed, and what obligations attach to entities that are listed.

At the border, GACC Announcement No. 77 of 2026 unifies declaration standards across general trade, express and cross-border e-commerce channels, with no exception or exemption. In other words, the channel a shipment travels through does not change the declaration obligation: the same control requirements apply to a conventional container, an express parcel and a cross-border e-commerce consignment.

Declaration and licensing mechanics

For controlled items, a licence is obtained through MOFCOM’s unified business system platform. The applicant submits supporting materials including a technical description and an end-user certificate, and the review period is 45 working days. Once a licence is in hand, the declaration stage carries its own requirement: the remarks column of the customs declaration must state that the goods are export-controlled items and give the applicable control code. Getting the code right is what allows the declaration to be processed as a controlled shipment rather than as ordinary cargo.

For procurement and logistics teams, the sequence is therefore: screen the item and the counterparty, apply for the licence in good time, and make sure the customs broker carries the control marking and code into the declaration. The 45-working-day review period is the planning constraint that most often catches companies out when they treat a controlled item like a routine purchase.

Recent listing actions

Several listing actions published by MOFCOM in 2026 and late 2025 are relevant to supply-chain screening.

Export-control control list — 20 Japanese entities (29 June 2026). MOFCOM listed 20 Japanese entities assessed as participating in enhancing Japan’s military strength. The measures prohibit export operators from exporting dual-use items to those entities, and prohibit foreign organisations and individuals from transferring or providing dual-use items originating in the People’s Republic of China to them. Related activities already under way are to be stopped immediately; where an export is genuinely necessary in special circumstances, the export operator is to apply to MOFCOM. The announcement took effect on the date of publication.

Unreliable Entity List — announcement No. 10 of 2025. This listed foreign entities including an anti-drone technology company and TechInsights and its branches. The measures prohibit those entities from engaging in China-related import-export activities, prohibit them from making new investment in China, and prohibit organisations and individuals in China from conducting related transactions or cooperation with them — in particular transmitting data or providing sensitive information to them.

Export-control control list — seven EU entities (24 April 2026). In its published question-and-answer, the MOFCOM spokesperson stated that the action under law targets only a small number of EU military-related entities, and that the measures concern only dual-use items, do not affect normal China-EU trade, and that law-abiding EU entities have nothing to worry about. Before the measures were announced, China had notified the European side through the bilateral export-control dialogue mechanism.

The screening method in practice

A workable screening process runs on four dimensions:

  1. Check the control list. Compare the item against the *Catalogue of Dual-Use Items and Technologies Subject to Import and Export Licence Administration*, verifying the model and performance parameters rather than relying on a generic product name.
  2. Analyse the end-use attribute. Assess whether the item could be used in military or weapons-of-mass-destruction-related fields.
  3. Review technical parameters. Precision, speed and power are the usual triggers — for example, high-precision five-axis machining centres.
  4. Confirm the customer and the ultimate use. Establish who the end user is and what the goods will actually be used for.

Machine tools offer a concrete illustration. Control code 2B201 covers numerically controlled machine tools including lathes, milling machines, grinding machines, multi-axis machining centres and roll-forming machine tools. Indicative parameters include: a lathe with a machining diameter greater than 35 mm and a positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm; a milling machine with positioning accuracy of less than 6 μm, or two or more contouring rotary axes, or five or more simultaneous axes; and a grinding machine with positioning accuracy of less than 4 μm. These thresholds are why screening by product category alone is unreliable — the same broad category can be controlled or uncontrolled depending on its specifications.

What this means for foreign-invested buyers

  • Screen before you commit. Run the four-dimension check at the sourcing and contracting stage, not at the declaration desk, so that a control finding does not derail a shipment already in motion.
  • Budget for the licence timeline. The 45-working-day review is a planning assumption, not a formality; build it into procurement lead times for controlled items.
  • Mind the counterparty. Listing measures can prohibit transactions and cooperation, not merely the physical export of goods; check counterparties against the relevant lists before onboarding.
  • Keep the reassurance in view. The official position is that measures of this kind target specific dual-use items and specific listed entities, and do not affect normal commercial dealings; the published Q&A on the EU listing states plainly that law-abiding entities have nothing to worry about.
  • Document everything. Technical descriptions, end-user certificates and the correct control code on the declaration are the evidence base that makes a compliant shipment defensible.

Sources

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

出口管制与不可靠实体清单动态:在华采购方的合规筛查要点

概述

中国的出口管制制度建立在明确的法律框架与一套官方的列名、申报程序之上。对在中国境内采购、转售或再出口受管制货物的外资企业而言,实务任务并非解读政策意图,而是运行一套可靠的筛查与许可流程。本文梳理制度框架、申报与许可操作机制、商务部近期公布的列名措施,以及采购与合规团队可以直接套用的四维度筛查方法。

全文基调刻意保持程序化:各项措施均按其公布时的表述呈现——依据相关法律法规有关规定,并出于维护国家安全和利益、履行防扩散等国际义务的既定目的。

法律框架

制度基石是《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制条例》,自2024年12月1日起施行。它与《出口管制法》以及不可靠实体清单相关规定共同构成体系,界定了哪些物项受管制、出口如何取得许可,以及被列名实体承担何种义务。

在口岸环节,海关总署2026年第77号公告统一了一般贸易、快件、跨境电商等全渠道申报标准,无例外豁免。换言之,货物走哪条通道并不改变申报义务:同一套管制要求,既适用于常规集装箱,也适用于快件包裹与跨境电商件。

申报与许可操作机制

对受管制物项,许可证通过商务部业务系统统一平台申请。申请人须提交包括技术说明和最终用户证明在内的材料,审查期限为45个工作日。取得许可证后,申报环节另有要求:报关单备注栏须标注”属于出口管制物项”并填写适用的管制编码。编码填对,申报才能作为受管制货物而非普通货物被处理。

对采购与物流团队而言,顺序因此是:筛查物项与交易对手,及时申请许可证,并确保报关代理把管制标注与编码带入申报。当企业把受管制物项当作常规采购处理时,45个工作日的审查期往往是最容易被打乱的计划约束。

近期列名措施

商务部在2026年及2025年末公布的多项列名措施,与供应链筛查相关。

出口管制管控名单——20家日本实体(2026年6月29日)。 商务部将参与提升日本军事实力的20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单。措施包括禁止出口经营者向上述实体出口两用物项,禁止境外组织和个人将原产于中华人民共和国的两用物项转移或提供给上述实体。正在开展的相关活动应当立即停止;特殊情况下确需出口的,出口经营者应当向商务部提出申请。本公告自公布之日起正式实施。

不可靠实体清单——2025年第10号公告。 该公告将反无人机技术公司、TechInsights公司及其分支机构等外国实体列入不可靠实体清单。措施包括禁止上述实体从事与中国有关的进出口活动,禁止上述实体在中国境内新增投资,以及禁止中国境内的组织、个人与上述实体进行有关交易、合作等活动——特别是向上述实体传输数据、提供敏感信息。

出口管制管控名单——7家欧盟实体(2026年4月24日)。 在公布的答记者问中,商务部新闻发言人表示,依法列名行为仅针对少数欧盟涉军实体,相关措施仅针对两用物项,不影响中欧正常经贸往来,诚信守法的欧盟实体完全无需担心。措施公布前,中方已通过双边出口管制对话机制向欧方通报有关情况。

实操中的筛查方法

一套可落地的筛查流程从四个维度展开:

  1. 对照管制清单。 将物项与《两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录》比对,核查型号与性能参数,而不是依赖笼统的产品名称。
  2. 分析用途属性。 评估该物项是否可能用于军事或大规模杀伤性武器相关领域。
  3. 审查技术参数。 精度、速度、功率通常是触发点——例如高精度五轴联动加工中心。
  4. 确认客户及最终用途。 弄清最终用户是谁、货物实际用于何处。

机床是一个具体例证。管制编码2B201涵盖数控机床,包括车床、铣床、磨床、多轴加工中心、滚压成形机床等。判定参数示例包括:车床加工直径大于35毫米且定位精度小于6微米;铣床定位精度小于6微米,或具有2个以上成形旋转轴,或5轴及以上联动;磨床定位精度小于4微米。这些阈值正是”仅按产品大类筛查”不可靠的原因——同一大类,规格不同,受管制与否也不同。

对在华外资采购方的含义

  • 先筛查、后承诺。 在寻源与签约阶段就完成四维度核查,而不是等到报关台前,以免管制结论打乱已在途的货物。
  • 为许可时限留出预算。 45个工作日审查期是计划假设,不是形式;受管制物项的采购提前期应把它计入。
  • 关注交易对手。 列名措施可能禁止交易与合作,而不只是禁止货物的物理出口;在准入新交易对手前,应对照相关名单核查。
  • 把握免责口径。 官方立场是:此类措施针对特定两用物项与特定列名实体,不影响正常商业往来;关于欧盟列名的公开答记者问明确表示,诚信守法实体完全无需担心。
  • 做好留档。 技术说明、最终用户证明,以及报关单上正确的管制编码,是让一票合规货物站得住脚的证据基础。

来源

  • 大众网 — 商务部将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=47025174
  • 大众网 — 商务部新闻发言人就将7家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单答记者问: http://news.gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=36742242
  • 商务部网站 — 不可靠实体清单工作机制公告2025年第10号: http://gzylhyzx.com/detail.html?newsId=10020276&qid=W7&cpid=T17
  • 两用物项出口管制与机床判定参数实务梳理: https://www.sohu.com/a/1082097684_122148066
  • 商务部 — 政策发布栏目: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: September 2026 Filing Practice and Local Support Mechanisms

  • On 14 September 2026, the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone Zhengding Area released a Filing Guide for Foreign-Investment Security Review that establishes a four-tier process: enterprise filing, zone service, hierarchical verification, and national final review.
    2026 年 9 月 14 日,中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区发布《外商投资安全审查申报指引》,确立”企业申报、片区服务、逐级核验、国家终审”四级流程。
  • The guide creates a “foreign-investment security-review service officer” system and a dedicated “security-review service window” (co-located with the foreign-investor complaint office); the investment-service bureau gives a preliminary assessment feedback within five working days of receiving an enquiry or initial materials.
    指引建立”外商投资安全审查服务官”制度与”安全审查服务专窗”(与外商投诉服务办公室合署);投资服务局在收到咨询或初步材料后 5 个工作日内给予初步研判反馈。
  • The filing basis is the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations, together with the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020). This article covers the service mechanism and recent practice, not the thresholds and timelines already detailed in the site’s general security-review guide.
    申报依据为《外商投资法》及其实施条例,以及《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号)。本文聚焦申报服务机制与近期实操口径,不重复站内安全审查总论已详述的门槛与时限。
  • A publicly documented case — the 27 April 2026 prohibition decision by the foreign-investment security-review working mechanism office (housed at the NDRC) on the foreign acquisition of the Manus project — illustrates the review’s scope and the “substance-over-form” piercing principle.
    一例公开案件——2026 年 4 月 27 日外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(设在国家发展改革委)就外资收购 Manus 项目作出的禁止投资决定——体现了审查范围与”实质重于形式”的穿透原则。
  • Outcomes fall into three categories — approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition — and non-compliance can lead to orders to divest equity or assets, restoration of the pre-investment state, and adverse credit records.
    审查结论分三类——通过、附条件通过、禁止投资——违规可能导致限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态及不良信用记录。
  • Practical readiness means using pre-filing consultation, preparing materials early, leveraging local coaching and pre-review, embedding conditions precedent in deal documents, and budgeting realistic timeline expectations.
    实操准备意味着善用申报前咨询、尽早备齐材料、借力地方辅导与预审、在交易文件中嵌入先决条件,并对时间轴作出务实预期。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: September 2026 Filing Practice and Local Support Mechanisms | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年 9 月申报实操与地方服务机制

Overview

China’s foreign-investment security review is the gate that no sizeable inbound transaction can structure around. The operative rules — the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020, effective January 2021) — set the reporting scope, the two-stage review timeline and the three possible outcomes. Those structural elements are set out in our general security-review guide and are not repeated here.

This article instead focuses on two developments from 2026 that change how foreign investors actually experience the filing: a concrete local filing-support mechanism published by the Zhengding pilot zone in September 2026, and a publicly documented prohibition decision that clarifies the review’s reach. The emphasis throughout is practical — how to engage the system efficiently and what to build into a transaction’s documentation.

The Zhengding pilot-zone filing guide (14 September 2026)

On 14 September 2026, the Management Committee of the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone Zhengding Area published the *Filing Guide for Foreign-Investment Security Review in the Zhengding Area*. The guide’s stated purpose is to implement the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations and the Security Review Measures, to standardise security-review filing within the zone, and to facilitate enterprises’ compliant filing while preventing and resolving national-security risks in the foreign-investment field.

Basis and scope. The guide cites as its basis: the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations; the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37); the Overall Plan for the China (Hebei) Pilot Free Trade Zone and related strategic upgrading documents; and the zone’s own implementation plans for aligning with international high-standard economic and trade rules and strengthening the security-review mechanism. It applies to foreign investors and relevant domestic parties within the zone whose investment falls within the scope of the Security Review Measures and requires filing with the national security-review working-mechanism office.

The four-tier principle. The guide organises the review work around the principle of “enterprise filing, zone service, hierarchical verification, and national final review.” The first two tiers are described in operational detail:

  1. *Zone coaching and pre-review.* The zone’s Investment Service Bureau acts as the lead service department. It establishes a “foreign-investment security-review service officer” system to provide guidance to key enterprises, and sets up a dedicated “security-review service window” (co-located with the zone’s foreign-investor complaint office) offering policy consultation, materials pre-review and process guidance as a one-stop service. Upon receiving an enterprise’s enquiry or initial materials, the Investment Service Bureau gives a preliminary assessment feedback within five working days and coaches the enterprise to complete its filing materials.
  2. *Municipal preliminary compliance verification.* The enterprise submits the complete filing materials to the municipal-level competent departments — the Shijiazhuang Development and Reform Commission and the Municipal Commerce Bureau. Those departments perform a preliminary compliance verification of the completeness and standardisation of the materials.

The upper tiers — hierarchical verification and national final review — follow the working-mechanism office’s statutory process under Order No. 37. The guide’s contribution is to make the local front-end service explicit and time-bound, so that enterprises in the zone have a named contact and a defined feedback clock before materials reach the national office.

A documented prohibition decision: the Manus project

The reach of the security review is illustrated by a publicly documented case. On 27 April 2026, the foreign-investment security-review working-mechanism office (housed at the National Development and Reform Commission) issued, in accordance with laws and regulations, a decision prohibiting foreign investment in the acquisition of the Manus project and ordered the parties to revoke the acquisition transaction. The decision was published on the NDRC government-information-disclosure page.

Two points from this case are relevant to transaction planning. First, the review scope explicitly covers important information-technology and internet products and services, as well as key technologies — sectors that frequently sit at the centre of cross-border technology and AI deals. Second, the case reflects the “substance-over-form” piercing principle: a transaction structured so that the underlying assets, technology or data originate within China may still fall within the review’s jurisdiction regardless of where the entities are incorporated. The working-mechanism office’s decision is a final decision under the Foreign Investment Law, and the three possible outcomes of any review are approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition.

This article states the case as a matter of public record and does not attach any value judgement to the parties or the commercial context. The point for practitioners is operational: the security-review gate applies to sensitive-sector control transactions wherever they are booked, and the piercing principle means entity location is not a reliable shield.

Practical filing playbook

1. Use pre-filing consultation early. The Security Review Measures expressly permit parties to consult the working-mechanism office before filing. For borderline transactions, this consultation should happen during structuring, not after a term sheet is signed.

2. Prepare the core materials. A filing requires a filing statement, an investment plan, a statement on whether the investment affects national security, and any other materials the office prescribes. The filing statement should set out the foreign investor’s name, domicile, business scope and the basic facts of the investment. Build the national-security-impact statement during due diligence, not at closing.

3. Leverage local coaching and pre-review. Where a zone such as Zhengding offers a service-officer system and a dedicated window with a five-working-day feedback clock, use it to de-risk the materials before they reach the municipal and national levels. Local pre-review reduces the risk of a defective filing that triggers delays.

4. Budget the timeline realistically. Under Order No. 37, the office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; a general review completes within 30 working days; a special review within 60 working days (extendable in exceptional cases). The investment may not be implemented during the review. Treat these as hard clocks when sequencing a deal.

5. Embed conditions precedent in deal documents. Where a sector is sensitive but potentially approvable, anticipate conditional approval and embed the necessary regulatory filings — including the security review — as conditions precedent to closing, with clear long-stop dates and termination rights.

6. Respect the consequences of non-compliance. Failing to file an in-scope investment, providing false materials, or breaching attached conditions can lead to orders to file, to divest equity or assets, to restore the pre-investment state, and to recording in the national credit-information system with joint disciplinary measures. These outcomes are enforceable and should be reflected in the deal’s risk allocation.

Related reading

  • Our general security-review guide, which details the reporting scope, the control definition, the statutory timeline and the outcomes.
  • The Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.

Sources

  • 中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》(2026-09-14):http://www.sjzzhbsq.gov.cn/columns/dc61a0a4-dd22-4dbc-a012-78b211e02b06/202609/14/d703655c-31b8-4189-ad9b-8e545f1cf4f0.html
  • 国家发展改革委政府信息公开《外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对外资收购 Manus 项目作出安全审查决定》(2026-04-27):https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?from=qcc&id=20623
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网《外商投资安全审查办法》(国务院公报):https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5582626.htm
  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年 9 月申报实操与地方服务机制

概述

中国外商投资安全审查是任何规模化入境交易都无法绕开的闸门。现行操作规则——《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)——界定了申报范围、两阶段审查时限与三类审查结论。这些结构性要素已在本站点安全审查总论中详述,此处不再重复。

本文转而聚焦 2026 年改变外资实际申报体验的两项进展:正定片区于 2026 年 9 月发布的具体地方申报服务机制,以及一例厘清审查辐射范围的公开禁止投资决定。全文贯穿实操导向——如何高效对接制度,以及应在交易文件中嵌入什么。

正定片区申报指引(2026 年 9 月 14 日)

2026 年 9 月 14 日,中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会发布《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》。指引载明的目的,是落实《外商投资法》及其实施条例与《外商投资安全审查办法》,规范片区内外商投资安全审查申报工作,便利和服务片区内外商投资企业依法依规办理安全审查申报,切实防范化解外商投资领域国家安全风险。

依据与范围。 指引列明的制定依据包括:《中华人民共和国外商投资法》及其实施条例;《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号);《中国(河北)自由贸易试验区总体方案》及相关战略提升文件;正定片区关于对接国际高标准经贸规则、强化安全审查机制的相关实施方案。指引适用于片区内投资行为属于《外商投资安全审查办法》规定范围、需向国家外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室申报安全审查的外国投资者及境内相关主体。

四级原则。 指引围绕”企业申报、片区服务、逐级核验、国家终审”的原则组织审查工作,并对前两级作出操作层面的细致描述:

  1. 片区辅导与预审。 正定片区投资服务局作为牵头服务部门,建立”外商投资安全审查服务官”制度,为重点企业提供指导服务;设立”安全审查服务专窗”(与正定片区外商投诉服务办公室合署办公),提供政策咨询、材料预审、流程指引等”一站式”服务。投资服务局在收到企业咨询或初步材料后,5 个工作日内给予初步研判反馈,辅导企业完善申报材料。
  2. 市级初步合规核验。 企业将完备的申报材料提交至石家庄市发展改革委、市商务局等市级主管部门。市级主管部门负责对申报材料的完整性、规范性进行初步合规核验。

更上级的逐级核验与国家终审,依第 37 号令下工作机制办公室的法定程序推进。指引的贡献在于,将地方前端服务明确化、时限化,使片区企业在材料送达国家办公室之前,即有具名对接人与明确的反馈时钟。

一例公开的禁止投资决定:Manus 项目

审查的辐射范围可由一例公开案件说明。2026 年 4 月 27 日,外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(设在国家发展改革委)依法依规对外资收购 Manus 项目作出禁止投资决定,要求当事人撤销该收购交易。该决定已在国家发展改革委政府信息公开页发布。

本案有两点与交易规划相关。其一,审查范围明确覆盖重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务,以及关键技术——这类领域常处于跨境科技与人工智能交易的核心。其二,本案体现”实质重于形式”的穿透原则:一项交易即便实体注册在境外,只要其底层资产、技术或数据源自中国境内,仍可能落入审查管辖。工作机制办公室的决定依《外商投资法》为最终决定,任何审查的结论均为三类之一:通过、附条件通过、禁止投资。

本文仅将本案作为公开记录陈述,不对当事人或商业背景作任何价值判断。对实务者的操作意义在于:安全审查闸门适用于敏感行业控制权交易,无论交易在何处记账;穿透原则意味着注册地并非可靠的规避屏障。

申报实操手册

1. 尽早善用申报前咨询。 《外商投资安全审查办法》明确允许当事人在申报前就有关问题向工作机制办公室咨询。对边界交易,咨询应在结构设计阶段进行,而非签署条款清单之后。

2. 备齐核心材料。 申报须提交申报书、投资方案、外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明,以及工作机制办公室规定的其他材料。申报书应载明外国投资者的名称、住所、经营范围与投资基本情况。国家安全影响说明应在尽调期间起草,而非交割阶段补做。

3. 借力地方辅导与预审。 在设有服务官制度与具名专窗(如正定片区 5 个工作日反馈时钟)的片区,应善用其于材料送达市、国家层级前完成风险前置化解。地方预审可降低因材料瑕疵引发延误的风险。

4. 对时间轴作出务实预期。 依第 37 号令,办公室自收到完备材料起 15 个工作日内决定是否需审查;一般审查 30 个工作日内完成;特别审查 60 个工作日内完成(特殊情况可延长)。审查期间不得实施投资。安排交易顺序时,应将上述时限视为硬性时钟。

5. 在交易文件中嵌入先决条件。 对敏感但可能获批的行业,预判附条件通过,将包括安全审查在内的必要监管申报设为交割先决条件,并设定明确的截止日期与终止权。

6. 尊重违规后果。 属于申报范围而未申报、提供虚假材料或违反附加条件,可能导致责令限期申报、限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入国家信用信息系统实施联合惩戒。这些后果可强制执行,应在交易的风险分配中予以体现。

相关阅读

  • 本站点安全审查总论,详述申报范围、控制权定义、法定时限与审查结论。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号),现行操作规章。
  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。

来源

  • 中国(河北)自由贸易试验区正定片区管理委员会《正定片区外商投资安全审查申报指引》(2026-09-14):http://www.sjzzhbsq.gov.cn/columns/dc61a0a4-dd22-4dbc-a012-78b211e02b06/202609/14/d703655c-31b8-4189-ad9b-8e545f1cf4f0.html
  • 国家发展改革委政府信息公开《外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对外资收购 Manus 项目作出安全审查决定》(2026-04-27):https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?from=qcc&id=20623
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 中国政府网《外商投资安全审查办法》(国务院公报):https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5582626.htm
  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf

Foreign M&A Rules in China: The 2026 Update and What It Means for Inbound Deals

  • China’s 2026 foreign-investment agenda puts foreign M&A management at the centre: the Action Plan (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) commits to revising the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, streamlining the M&A process and consideration-payment requirements, and strengthening cross-departmental coordination.
    2026 年外资议程将外资并购管理置于核心:《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)承诺修订外国投资者并购境内企业规定、优化并购流程与对价支付要求、强化部门协同。
  • At the 26th China International Fair for Investment and Trade (CIFIT) in Xiamen on 7 September 2026, MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Investment delivered a systematic reading of the “bring in” and “go global” policies, while the Investment Promotion Agency outlined overseas service platforms and overseas industrial parks as promotion mechanisms.
    2026 年 9 月 7 日厦门第 26 届投洽会上,商务部外资司系统解读”引进来””走出去”政策,商务部投资促进事务局介绍出海服务平台与境外产业园等促进机制。
  • The 15th Five-Year Plan explicitly deploys “improving foreign M&A management and widening the channels for foreign capital to invest in the securities market,” embedding the M&A easing into the五年规划 framework.
    “十五五”规划明确部署”完善外资并购管理,拓宽外资投资证券市场渠道”,将并购便利化写入五年规划框架。
  • Every inbound deal should run three compliance screens in parallel — the negative-list admission test, the merger-control (concentration) filing, and the foreign-investment security review — rather than treating them as sequential steps.
    每笔入境交易应并行推进三重合规核查——负面清单准入、经营者集中申报、外商投资安全审查——而非视为先后步骤。
  • Practical readiness now centres on the due-diligence checklist, consideration-and-payment arrangements, deal-structure design and approval-timeline management, because the current 10-Order rules still govern deals signed before the revision is published.
    实操准备当下聚焦于尽调清单、对价支付安排、交易结构设计与审批时间轴预期管理,因为现行 10 号令规则仍约束修订版出台前签署的交易。
  • Services opening to Hong Kong and Macao under CEPA is being advanced first, giving the two special administrative regions a front-running role in the two-way cross-border investment corridor.
    内地与香港、澳门 CEPA 服务业率先开放正加快推进,使港澳在双向跨境投资通道中扮演先行角色。

Foreign M&A Rules in China: The 2026 Update and What It Means for Inbound Deals | 中国外资并购规则:2026 年更新与对入境交易的影响

Overview

Foreign M&A has re-emerged as a priority instrument of China’s inbound-investment strategy in 2026. After a cycle dominated by negative-list cuts and the full removal of manufacturing access restrictions, the policy centre of gravity is shifting from “what is open” to “how smoothly capital can enter, combine and grow.” Three developments in 2026 give foreign acquirers a clearer map than at any point in the past two years: a concrete Action Plan commitment to revise the foreign-M&A rulebook, a high-visibility policy briefing at the September CIFIT in Xiamen, and a formal 15th Five-Year Plan deployment to improve M&A management and widen securities-market access for foreign capital.

This article focuses on the September 2026 dynamics and the practical deal-execution steps, pointing to companion pieces for the Action Plan text and the security-review filing details.

The September 2026 policy moment: CIFIT in Xiamen

The 26th China International Fair for Investment and Trade (CIFIT) was held in Xiamen, Fujian, from 8 to 11 September 2026. On 7 September, ahead of the main fair, the “Gateway to the World, Linking the Globe” two-way cross-border investment exchange and promotion session — a “Invest in China” themed side event — took place in Xiamen, hosted by MOFCOM and organised by the Investment Promotion Agency of MOFCOM and the Xiamen Municipal Commerce Bureau.

Two messages from that session matter for foreign M&A. First, MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Investment gave a systematic interpretation of the “bring in” and “go global” policies. On the “bring in” side, it reaffirmed the measures taken since 2025 to optimise the foreign-investment environment, including the June 2026 Action Plan and the upgrade of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macao to open the services sector to them first. On the “go global” side, it noted steady growth in outward investment and deeper mainland–Hong Kong cooperation.

Second, the Investment Promotion Agency outlined how it serves enterprises on both fronts: using the CIFIT national-level platform, relying on overseas industrial parks and other outbound-promotion mechanisms, and jointly building an outbound-service platform with leading clusters such as the Hong Kong International Business Hub in Shanghai, Suzhou Industrial Park and the Jimei district of Xiamen. The agency links Hong Kong’s financial, legal and professional-service strengths with the mainland’s projects, parks and enterprise resources, so that more foreign capital enters the mainland through Hong Kong and more mainland enterprises go global with Hong Kong’s support.

For foreign acquirers, the practical read is that the September 2026 policy narrative is explicitly two-way: inbound M&A is being eased and facilitated at the same time as outbound investment is being serviced through structured platforms.

The 15th Five-Year Plan deployment

The 15th Five-Year Plan, the first such plan of the 2026–2030 period, contains a dedicated passage on attracting and utilising foreign capital. Among its measures, it states the intent to “expand the ways of using foreign capital, improve foreign M&A management, and widen the channels for foreign capital to invest in the securities market.” It also calls for high-quality implementation of the foreign-investment security review and improvement of the full-calibre external-debt supervision system.

This language elevates foreign M&A from a transactional sub-topic to a plan-level commitment, pairs M&A management with securities-market access as a unified equity-investment channel, and — by placing the security review in the same paragraph — makes explicit that facilitation and gatekeeping advance together.

The Action Plan anchor for M&A modernisation

The Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment Utilisation (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97), issued by MOFCOM, the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance with State Council approval on 16 June 2026, is the operative anchor for the M&A changes. Its M&A-relevant commitments are specific: accelerate the revision and promulgation of the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimising the M&A management process and consideration-payment requirements; strengthen cross-departmental regulatory coordination on foreign M&A; and allow eligible foreign equity-investment institutions to participate, as strategic investors, in securities issuance by listed companies in industries unrelated to their own.

The first two commitments speak to the long-awaited revision of the 2006 Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises (the “10-Order”). The core frictions are well understood: obsolete ex-ante approval clauses that no longer apply after the Foreign Investment Law took effect in 2020, consideration and payment rules that need to operate without an approval gateway, and the interface between the 10-Order, the revised Strategic Investment Measures and the information-reporting regime. The 10-Order remains in force until the revised version is published, but the 2026 context reinforces the policy direction and gives deal teams a stable expectation.

Three compliance screens run in parallel

A recurring theme across the 2026 documents is that easing entry does not relax screening. Inbound M&A transactions should treat three checks as parallel workstreams from the earliest structuring stage:

  1. Negative-list admission test. Confirm whether the target sector is restricted or prohibited under the current negative list, including pilot negative lists in free-trade zones. A restricted sector may still be investable through a permitted structure, but the admission position must be cleared first.
  2. Merger-control (concentration) filing. Where the transaction meets the turnover or market-share notification thresholds under the Anti-Monopoly Law, a mandatory prior filing is required; plan it as a condition to closing.
  3. Foreign-investment security review. For investments in defence-related fields or in the ten categories of important sectors where the foreign investor would obtain actual control, a security-review filing may be mandatory before implementation.

These screens interact but are distinct. The negative list governs whether the sector is open; merger control governs competitive effects; the security review governs national-security effects. Running them in parallel prevents the common failure mode of discovering a blocking issue late in diligence. The detailed security-review filing practice — including the September 2026 local service mechanisms — is addressed in our companion article on the Zhengding pilot-zone filing guide.

Practical playbook for 2026 inbound deals

1. Build the due-diligence checklist around the three screens. Map the target against the negative list, the merger-control thresholds and the security-review scope before issuing a non-binding offer; flag any sector touching the ten important-sector categories or defence-related fields for early security-review screening.

2. Plan the consideration and payment structure. Under the current 10-Order, consideration may be cash, equity or a combination, subject to the pricing basis, payment period and valuation rules. Where a cross-border share swap is contemplated, confirm whether the consideration shares are of a listed or unlisted overseas company, because the 10-Order and the revised Strategic Investment Measures treat these differently. Do not assume the relaxed rules apply until the revision is published.

3. Design the deal structure for the right regime. A controlling acquisition of an unlisted domestic target, a strategic investment in a listed company, and a concentration filing may all be triggered by one transaction; determine which regime governs each leg and sequence the approvals accordingly.

4. Manage the approval timeline explicitly. Build a timeline reflecting information reporting (ongoing), merger-control filing (where thresholds are met) and security-review filing (where in scope). Treat the security-review period as a hard freeze during which the investment may not be implemented.

5. Use the strategic-investment channel where it fits. Eligible foreign equity-investment institutions may, under the Action Plan, participate as strategic investors in non-related-industry listed-company issuances; position around the qualification and lock-up conditions as the implementing rules mature.

6. Engage local service windows early. As the Zhengding pilot zone’s September 2026 guide illustrates, local investment-service bureaus increasingly offer pre-filing coaching and preliminary review, which can shorten the path to a complete, well-formed filing.

Related reading

  • The 2026 negative list and sector-restriction map.
  • The revised Strategic Investment Measures and the CSRC refinancing rules on strategic investors.
  • Our companion article on the September 2026 foreign-investment security-review filing practice and local support mechanisms.

Sources

  • 商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/wgtzgl/art/2026/art_0cfe31a63f9c4bd3869517bc10908c10.html
  • 商务部《第26届中国国际投资贸易洽谈会将于2026年9月8日至11日举办》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zwjg/sqfb/oy/art/2026/art_5268bb19fa5a4ad1a07056b791afb9d7.html
  • 中国政府网《中国”十五五”规划,为世界提供新机遇》:https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202609/content_7081427.htm
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 商务部:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/

中国外资并购规则:2026 年更新与对入境交易的影响

概述

2026 年,外资并购重新成为外资流入战略的关键工具。在经历以负面清单缩减、制造业准入限制全面取消为主的周期之后,政策重心正从”开放什么”转向”资本如何顺畅进入、整合与成长”。2026 年的三件进展为外国收购方提供了过去两年来最清晰的路线图:修订外资并购规则的《行动方案》具体承诺、9 月厦门投洽会上的高规格政策宣讲,以及将完善外资并购管理与拓宽外资证券市场渠道写入”十五五”规划的正式部署。

本文聚焦 2026 年 9 月的新动态与交易落地的实操步骤。我们刻意不再重复 6 月《行动方案》文本与 2006 年并购规定修订机理(相关姊妹篇已详述),并将安全审查申报细节指向另一篇专文。

2026 年 9 月的政策时刻:厦门投洽会

第 26 届中国国际投资贸易洽谈会于 2026 年 9 月 8 日至 11 日在福建厦门举行。9 月 7 日,在主体展会之前,”港通天下,链接全球”双向跨境投资交流宣介会暨出海企业高质量国际化发展对接会——投洽会”投资中国”系列专场活动之一——在厦门举办,由商务部主办,商务部投资促进事务局与厦门市商务局承办。

该场活动释放的两条信息对外资并购至关重要。其一,商务部外资司就”引进来””走出去”政策进行系统解读:在”引进来”方面,重申自 2025 年以来优化营商环境的一系列举措,包括 2026 年 6 月《行动方案》,以及升级内地与香港、澳门 CEPA、在服务业领域对港澳投资者率先开放;在”走出去”方面,指出对外投资稳步增长、内地与香港投资合作更加紧密。

其二,商务部投资促进事务局介绍了服务双向企业的路径:用好投洽会这一国家级平台,依托境外产业园等出海促进机制,并与上海虹桥国际商务区、苏州工业园区、厦门市集美区等头部集聚区共建出海服务平台,将香港的金融、法律与专业服务优势同内地的项目、园区与企业资源相连接,使更多外资借道香港进入内地、更多内地企业借助香港走向全球。

对外国收购方而言,2026 年 9 月的政策叙事是明确的双向并行:在放宽并便利入境并购的同时,通过结构化平台服务对外投资。

“十五五”规划的部署

“十五五”规划是 2026—2030 年期的首个五年规划,其中单列了吸引和利用外资的专章。在相关举措中,规划明确提出”拓展利用外资方式,完善外资并购管理,拓宽外资投资证券市场渠道”,并强调高质量实施外商投资安全审查、完善全口径外债监管体系。

这一表述将外资并购从交易层面的细分议题提升为规划级承诺,将并购管理与证券市场准入并置为统一的股权投资通道,并借由将安全审查置于同一段落,表明便利与把关同步推进。

并购现代化的《行动方案》支点

《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)由商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部经国务院同意于 2026 年 6 月 16 日联合印发,是并购变革的操作支点。其并购相关承诺具体明确:

  • 加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求;
  • 强化外资并购监管的部门协同;
  • 允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行。

前两项承诺指向市场期待已久的《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(”10 号令”,2006 年)修订。核心摩擦点已广为人知:2020 年《外商投资法》施行后已不再适用的部分事前审批条款;需要在无审批网关下运行的对价与支付规则;以及 10 号令、修订后的《战略投资管理办法》与信息报告制度之间的衔接。修订版出台前 10 号令仍然有效,但 2026 年的语境强化了政策方向,为交易团队提供了可稳定预期的依据。

三重合规核查并行推进

2026 年文件反复强调的主题是:放宽准入并不放松审查。入境并购交易应从最早的结构设计阶段起,将三项核查作为并行工作流:

  1. 负面清单准入测试。 确认标的行业在现行负面清单(含自贸区试点负面清单)下属于限制还是禁止。限制类行业仍可能通过合规结构投资,但准入立场须先予厘清。
  2. 经营者集中申报。 交易达到《反垄断法》营业额或市场份额申报门槛的,须履行强制事先申报,应将其设为交割先决条件。
  3. 外商投资安全审查。 对国防领域投资,或取得十类重要领域企业实际控制权的投资,可能须在实施前强制申报。

三项核查相互关联但彼此独立:负面清单管行业是否开放,经营者集中管竞争影响,安全审查管国家安全影响。并行推进可避免尽调后期才发现阻断性问题的常见失误。安全审查申报的详细实操——包括 2026 年 9 月的地方服务机制——见本站点关于正定片区申报指引的姊妹篇。

2026 年入境交易实操手册

1. 围绕三重核查构建尽调清单。 发出无约束力要约前,将标的对照负面清单、经营者集中门槛与安全审查范围逐一映射;凡触及十类重要领域或国防相关领域的,尽早启动安全审查筛查。

2. 规划对价与支付结构。 现行 10 号令下,对价可为现金、股权或二者组合,受定价依据、支付期限与评估规则约束。若考虑跨境换股,须确认对价股份是境外上市还是非上市公司股份,因 10 号令与修订后的《战略投资管理办法》处理不同。修订版出台前,切勿假设放宽规则已适用。

3. 为适用制度设计交易结构。 一笔交易可能同时触发未上市境内标的的控股式并购、上市公司战略投资与经营者集中申报;先判定各分支由哪套制度管辖,再安排审批顺序。

4. 显式管理审批时间轴。 构建涵盖信息报告(持续)、经营者集中申报(达标时)与安全审查申报(在范围内时)的时间轴。将安全审查期间视为硬性冻结期——审查期间不得实施投资。

5. 在契合处用足战略投资通道。 依《行动方案》,符合条件的外资股权投资机构可以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行;随实施规则成熟,围绕资格与锁定期条件提前布局。

6. 尽早对接地方服务专窗。 正如正定片区 2026 年 9 月指引所示,地方投资服务部门正越来越多地提供申报前辅导与初步预审,可缩短形成完整、规范申报材料的路径。

相关阅读

  • 2026 年负面清单与分行业限制地图。
  • 修订后的《战略投资管理办法》与证监会再融资战略投资者规则。
  • 本站点关于 2026 年 9 月外商投资安全审查申报实操与地方服务机制的姊妹篇。

来源

  • 商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/wgtzgl/art/2026/art_0cfe31a63f9c4bd3869517bc10908c10.html
  • 商务部《第26届中国国际投资贸易洽谈会将于2026年9月8日至11日举办》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zwjg/sqfb/oy/art/2026/art_5268bb19fa5a4ad1a07056b791afb9d7.html
  • 中国政府网《中国”十五五”规划,为世界提供新机遇》:https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202609/content_7081427.htm
  • 国家发展改革委:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/
  • 商务部:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide

  • China’s foreign-investment security review, governed by the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37, effective January 2021), applies to investments in defence-related fields and to investments that would give a foreign investor control over enterprises in ten categories of important sectors.
    中国外商投资安全审查制度以《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)为依据,适用于国防领域投资,以及将使外国投资者取得十类重要领域企业实际控制权的投资。
  • The review is mandatory-before-investment: parties must file before implementing an investment falling within the reporting scope, and the working mechanism may demand filing even where the investor has not self-reported.
    安全审查是”投资前强制”程序:属于申报范围的投资须在实施前申报,未自行申报的,工作机制办公室有权要求当事人申报。
  • The procedural timeline is predictable: a decision on whether security review is needed within 15 working days, a general review within 30 working days, and a special review within 60 working days, with investments on hold throughout.
    程序时限明确:是否启动安全审查的决定 15 个工作日内作出,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成,特别审查 60 个工作日内完成,审查期间当事人不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are final and enforceable: approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition; violations can result in orders to divest or restore the pre-investment state, plus adverse credit records.
    审查决定为最终决定且可强制执行:通过、附条件通过或禁止投资;违规后果包括限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入不良信用记录。
  • In the 2026 policy context, the authorities are simultaneously facilitating foreign M&A and data flows while maintaining the security-review gate, so transaction planning should run security-review screening in parallel with merger-control and negative-list checks.
    2026 年政策背景下,主管部门在便利外资并购与数据跨境流动的同时维持安全审查闸门,交易规划应将安全审查筛查与经营者集中、负面清单核查并行推进。
  • Practical steps: screen the target sector and the control threshold early, use the pre-filing consultation mechanism, and document the national-security-impact analysis thoroughly before signing binding agreements.
    实操要点:尽早筛查标的行业与控制权门槛,善用申报前咨询机制,并在签署约束性协议前完成影响国家安全的说明文件。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

Overview

Foreign investment security review is one of the three pillars of China’s foreign-investment management system under the Foreign Investment Law, alongside the negative-list regime and the information-reporting regime. The operative rules are the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (《外商投资安全审查办法》), jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce as Order No. 37 of 2020 and effective since 18 January 2021.

The regime’s design is deliberately gate-like rather than discretionary. The Measures define a reporting scope, set out a two-stage review process with fixed deadlines, and give the review decisions — approval, conditional approval or prohibition — the status of final decisions under the Foreign Investment Law. In the 2026 policy environment, where the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” is simultaneously easing foreign M&A procedures and data-crossing rules, the security review remains the one filter that foreign investors cannot structure around. Understanding its triggers and timeline is therefore a prerequisite for any sizeable inbound transaction.

Who must file and when

The reporting scope covers two categories. First, investments in defence-related fields: investment in the military industry and its supporting industries, and investment in the vicinity of military facilities and military-industrial facilities. Second, investments in ten categories of important sectors — important agricultural products, important energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies, and other important fields — where the investor would obtain actual control of the target enterprise.

“Actual control” is defined broadly and includes holding 50% or more of the equity; holding less than 50% but having voting power that can materially influence the resolutions of the board, shareholders’ meeting or general meeting; or any other situation where the foreign investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. This broad control definition means that some non-majority, governance-heavy structures may still trigger the filing duty.

Filing is required before the investment is implemented. The foreign investor or the domestic party (together, “the parties”) must proactively file with the working mechanism’s office before implementation. Even where the parties have not self-reported, the office may require filing if the investment falls within the reporting scope. The practical message for deal teams: treat the security-review screening as a mandatory checklist item before signing definitive agreements, not as an afterthought discovered during closing.

The process and timeline

The process has a predictable rhythm. Within 15 working days of receiving a complete filing, the working mechanism’s office decides whether a security review is needed and notifies the parties in writing. If no review is needed, the investment may proceed. If a review is needed, the office must complete the general review within 30 working days. Where the general review finds that the investment affects or may affect national security, a special review is launched, to be completed within 60 working days, extendable in exceptional circumstances. Throughout the review period, the parties may not implement the investment.

The system also contains relief valves. During the review, the parties may modify the investment plan — in which case the review clock restarts from receipt of the revised plan — or withdraw the investment, which terminates the review. Before filing, the parties may consult the working mechanism’s office on questions about the transaction. And a change to the investment plan after approval, where the change affects or may affect national security, requires re-filing.

Outcomes and consequences

The review can end in approval (the investment may proceed), conditional approval (the investment may proceed subject to conditions that the parties have committed to in writing), or prohibition (the investment may not be implemented; if already implemented, the parties must divest or take other measures to restore the pre-investment state). Decisions are final under Article 35 of the Foreign Investment Law.

Enforcement is multi-layered. The working mechanism’s office, together with relevant departments and local governments, supervises implementation; for conditional approvals, it can require evidence and conduct on-site inspections. Non-compliance carries escalating consequences: failing to file an in-scope investment leads to an order to file within a deadline and, if refused, an order to divest; providing false materials or concealing information can lead to revocation of the approval and restoration of the pre-investment state; violating conditions triggers a correction order and, if refused, divestment. Violations are recorded in the national credit information system with joint disciplinary measures.

2026 interaction with the facilitation agenda

The security review does not exist in a vacuum. In June 2026, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promised to accelerate the revision of the foreign M&A rules, allow eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in listed-company issuances, and streamline data-outbound flows through negative lists in pilot zones. None of these changes touches the security-review gate; if anything, the simultaneous easing of entry and tightening of control screens makes it more important to run security-review screening in parallel with merger-concentration filings and negative-list checks.

Foreign investors should also note the international context is one of converging practice: major economies all operate equivalent review regimes, and China’s framework mirrors this global trend of gatekeeping foreign investment in sensitive sectors. The compliance posture — early screening, thorough documentation, and timely filing — is the same that prudent investors apply in any jurisdiction with a mandatory review regime.

Practical checklist for inbound transactions

  1. Screen the sector and control threshold early. Map the target against the defence-related categories and the ten important-sector categories, and assess whether the post-investment control structure meets the actual-control definitions.
  2. Use the pre-filing consultation. The Measures expressly allow parties to consult the working mechanism’s office before filing; use this for borderline transactions.
  3. Prepare the national-security-impact analysis. The filing requires a statement on whether the investment affects national security; build this document during due diligence, not during closing.
  4. Run parallel screenings. Coordinate the security-review timeline with merger-concentration filing and negative-list clearance; the review stays on hold while other approvals proceed.
  5. Build in condition-readiness. For sensitive but approvable deals, anticipate conditional approval and prepare to comply with attached conditions, including evidence production and on-site inspections.

Related reading

  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.
  • The Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), which sets the facilitation context around the review gate.

Sources

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》: https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》: https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目: https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

概述

外商投资安全审查是《外商投资法》确立的外商投资管理制度三大支柱之一,与负面清单管理和信息报告制度并列。现行操作规则是《外商投资安全审查办法》,由国家发展改革委、商务部以 2020 年第 37 号令联合发布,自 2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行。

该制度的运行设计刻意采用”闸门式”而非自由裁量式:办法界定申报范围,设定两阶段审查流程和固定时限,并依《外商投资法》赋予审查决定——通过、附条件通过或禁止投资——最终决定地位。在 2026 年的政策环境下,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》同时放宽外资并购程序和数据跨境规则,但安全审查仍是外国投资者无法绕开的唯一过滤环节。因此,理解其触发条件与时限,是任何规模化入境交易的先决条件。

谁须申报、何时申报

申报范围涵盖两类。第一类,国防领域投资:投资军工、军工配套等关系国防安全的领域,以及在军事设施和军工设施周边地域投资。第二类,投资十类重要领域——重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术以及其他重要领域——并取得所投资企业实际控制权。

“实际控制权”的定义宽泛,包括持有企业 50% 以上股权;持股不足 50% 但其表决权能够对董事会、股东会或股东大会决议产生重大影响;以及其他能够对企业经营决策、人事、财务、技术等产生重大影响的情形。这一宽泛的控制权定义意味着,部分非控股但治理权重大的架构仍可能触发申报义务。

申报须在投资实施前完成。外国投资者或境内相关当事人(合称”当事人”)应在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报。即使当事人未自行申报,若投资属于申报范围,工作机制办公室也有权要求申报。对交易团队而言,实务提示是:把安全审查筛查作为签署确定性协议前的强制清单项,而非交割期间才发现的疏漏。

流程与时限

流程节奏清晰可预期。收到符合要求的申报材料后 15 个工作日内,工作机制办公室决定是否需要安全审查并书面通知当事人。无需审查的,投资即可实施;需要审查的,一般审查须在 30 个工作日内完成。一般审查认定投资影响或可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,须在 60 个工作日内完成,特殊情况下可延长。审查期间,当事人不得实施投资。

制度也包含疏导阀门。审查期间,当事人可以修改投资方案——此时审查期限自收到修改后方案之日起重新计算——或撤销投资,从而终止审查。申报前,当事人可以就交易问题向工作机制办公室咨询。审查通过后变更投资方案、影响或可能影响国家安全的,须重新申报。

决定与后果

审查结果有三种:通过(投资可以实施)、附条件通过(按当事人书面承诺的附加条件实施投资)、禁止投资(不得实施;已实施的须限期处分股权或资产等,恢复投资前状态)。依《外商投资法》第三十五条,审查决定为最终决定。

执行是多层次的。工作机制办公室会同有关部门、地方人民政府监督实施;对附条件通过的投资,可要求提供证明材料、开展现场检查核实条件落实情况。违规后果逐级加重:属于申报范围而未申报即实施的,责令限期申报,拒不申报的责令限期处分股权或资产;提供虚假材料或隐瞒信息的,撤销决定、恢复投资前状态;未按附加条件实施的,责令改正,拒不改正的责令处分。违规情形记入国家信用信息系统并实施联合惩戒。

与 2026 年便利化议程的互动

安全审查并非孤立存在。2026 年 6 月,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订外资并购规定、允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与上市公司发行、通过试点负面清单简化数据出境。这些变化均不触动安全审查闸门;恰恰相反,准入门槛的放宽与管控筛网的收紧并行,使得交易方更有必要将安全审查筛查与经营者集中申报、负面清单核查并行推进。

外国投资者也应注意到国际背景是实践趋同:主要经济体均运行同等审查机制,中国的框架与全球对敏感领域外资把关的趋势一致。合规姿态——尽早筛查、充分留档、及时申报——与审慎投资者在任何实行强制审查机制的法域采取的做法相同。

入境交易实操清单

  1. 尽早筛查行业与控制权门槛。将标的对照国防类与十类重要领域清单,评估投资后控制结构是否落入实际控制权定义。
  2. 善用申报前咨询。办法明确允许当事人在申报前向工作机制办公室咨询,边界交易应优先使用。
  3. 准备国家安全影响说明。申报须提交外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明;这份文件应在尽调期间起草,而非交割期间补做。
  4. 并行推进各项筛查。将安全审查时限与经营者集中申报、负面清单合规协调安排;其他审批推进期间审查保持冻结。
  5. 预置条件应对能力。对敏感但可获批的交易,预判附条件通过,并准备履行附加条件,包括提供证明材料与接受现场检查。

相关阅读

  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(2020 年第 37 号令),现行操作规章。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),构成审查闸门周边的便利化背景。

来源

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》:https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》:https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目:https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

Offshore-Listing Filings in August 2026: What the CSRC’s Feedback Focuses On

  • On 14 August 2026 the CSRC’s International Department published its feedback round for offshore-listing filings received 10–14 August: eight companies, several of them manufacturers planning A+H listings in Hong Kong, were asked for supplementary materials.
    2026 年 8 月 14 日,证监会国际司公示 8 月 10–14 日境外发行上市备案补充材料要求:8 家企业收到反馈,其中多家为计划 A+H 赴港上市的制造业公司。
  • Red-chip filers face intense scrutiny on the full chain of offshore-architecture building: 37-article SAFE registration, the pricing and tax paid on round-trip acquisitions of domestic entities, historical capital reductions, buybacks, control, shareholder look-through and equity incentives.
    红筹架构企业的问询覆盖架构搭建全链条:37 号文外汇登记、返程收购境内主体的对价与完税、历史减资、股份回购、控制权、股东穿透与股权激励。
  • For A+H candidates, the CSRC asks companies to justify the actual necessity of listing in Hong Kong, in addition to industry-specific questions on new energy, optical communications, equipment manufacturing, export controls and related-party transactions.
    对 A+H 候选企业,监管重点追问赴港上市的实际必要性,并结合新能源、光通信、装备制造等行业设置产业合规、出口管制、关联交易等专项问题。
  • Look-through practice has tightened: shareholders with connections to each other must be aggregated when calculating the 5% threshold, Chinese-natural-person investors surfacing behind offshore funds must be identified, and nominee holdings must be ruled out.
    穿透核查趋严:存在关联关系的 5% 以下股东须合并计算,境外基金背后浮现的中国籍自然人须补充身份信息,历史股权代持须排查。
  • The filing pipeline remains open but selective: the CSRC issued new filing notices in August (e.g. Tongcheng New Materials on 4 August), while 2026’s red-chip approvals have been far fewer than in 2025 — around one in Q1 versus over 20 a year earlier.
    备案通道仍然开放但趋于精选:证监会 8 月仍在核发备案通知书(如 8 月 4 日彤程新材),但 2026 年红筹备案通过数量远少于 2025 年——一季度约 1 家,上年同期超过 20 家。
  • For companies weighing offshore listing, the practical takeaway is to prepare the full evidence chain (SAFE registration, ODI filings, pricing documentation), justify the necessity of red-chip or A+H structures, and complete pre-filing communication with the CSRC before the formal filing.
    对权衡境外上市的企业,实操要点是:备齐完整证据链(外汇登记、ODI 备案、定价文件)、论证红筹或 A+H 架构的必要性,并在正式申报前与证监会完成预沟通。

Offshore-Listing Filings in August 2026: What the CSRC’s Feedback Focuses On | 2026 年 8 月境外上市备案:证监会问询聚焦什么

The August feedback round

On 14 August 2026, the International Department of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) published its round of supplementary-material requests for offshore-listing filings received between 10 and 14 August. Eight companies received feedback, several of them manufacturers planning A+H listings on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Every item in the feedback must be addressed item by item, verified by lawyers who then issue legal opinions. The round shows the current shape of the filing regime: it is open and processing deals, but the depth of review has grown, with questions tailored to each company’s architecture, industry and transaction history.

What red-chip filers are asked

For red-chip filers, the feedback concentrates on the full chain of offshore-architecture building. In the case of Yimai Gongpin, a red-chip filer in the August round, the CSRC asked about: the round-trip acquisition of domestic entities (Beijing Huoye, Suzhou Huoye and others) — including transaction consideration, pricing and tax clearance, and confirmation that the acquisitions comply with foreign M&A rules; a historical capital reduction at Shanghai Sheti — its pricing, internal decision-making and tax treatment, with checks against hollow capital and capital flight; a January 2026 share buyback and transfer — reasons, pricing basis and the near-12-month new-shareholder price differential; control identification after the cancellation of special voting rights; shareholder look-through — including the identification of two Chinese-natural-person investors surfaced behind Gaorong Capital and a check for nominee holdings; equity-incentive issues, including the ratification of an options plan in January 2026 and the treatment of departed employees and external advisors; and overseas fundraising projects — whether the planned expansion in Thailand and Vietnam requires ODI filing or approval.

What A+H and industry questions look like

Beyond architecture, the CSRC is probing the business case and sector compliance. For A+H candidates — companies splitting or already listed on the A-share market and planning H-share listings — the regulator asks them to justify the actual necessity of listing in Hong Kong, given the A-share market already provides financing. Industry-specific questions follow the filer’s sector: new energy, optical communications and equipment-manufacturing companies face questions on industry compliance, export controls and related-party transactions. The pattern signals that a listing application today is evaluated not just as a securities matter but as a full business-and-compliance review.

The state of the pipeline

The pipeline is open, but the numbers show a selective regime. In 2026’s first quarter, only one red-chip enterprise received filing approval (Manycore Tech, whose VIE operating entity contributed only 0.3–0.5% of group revenue), versus more than 20 in the same period of 2025 — a decline of more than 95%. Among Hong Kong-listed companies, the red-chip share has fallen from about 30% to below 5%. At the same time, the CSRC continues to issue filing notices for direct offshore listings: on 4 August 2026 it issued a filing notice to Tongcheng New Materials (H-share listing on the HKEX), published on 28 August. And the regulatory environment has been hardened by the State Council’s new regulation on outbound investment (State Council Order No. 837, effective 1 July 2026), which upgrades ODI from departmental rules to an administrative regulation, extends its scope to individuals and introduces tougher penalties. For VIE and red-chip structures, the practical message is not that the channel is closed — it is that necessity and full compliance must be demonstrated.

Practical guidance for companies

Companies planning offshore listings should take five steps. (1) Build the evidence chain before filing: 37-article SAFE registration for founders’ SPVs, ODI filings for corporate investors, FDI foreign-exchange registration for the round-trip WFOE, and clean documentation for every capital reduction, buyback and transfer — the CSRC is asking for the paper trail, not promises. (2) Justify the structure: prepare the commercial rationale for a red-chip or VIE arrangement (which negative-list restriction it addresses, what genuine overseas operations or foreign shareholding exist), because “necessity” has become the threshold question. (3) Run the look-through before it is asked: map every 5%+ shareholder, aggregate connected holdings, identify Chinese-natural-person investors behind offshore funds and resolve nominee arrangements. (4) Do the pre-filing communication: the CSRC’s consultation mechanism lets filers test questions before submitting, which is the cheapest way to surface the issues the feedback round will raise. (5) For A+H candidates, have the necessity answer ready: the regulator wants to know why Hong Kong in addition to the A-share market, and sector-specific compliance (export controls, related-party transactions) must be documented. The August round is a useful mirror: prepare as if every one of those questions will be asked, because for most filers, it will be.

Sources


2026 年 8 月境外上市备案:证监会问询聚焦什么

8 月的这轮反馈

2026 年 8 月 14 日,证监会国际司公示 8 月 10–14 日境外发行上市备案补充材料要求。本期 8 家企业收到反馈,其中多家为计划 A+H 赴港上市的制造业公司。所有问询事项都需企业逐项落实说明,由律师核查并出具法律意见。这轮反馈勾勒出备案制度的当前形态:通道开放、正常受理,但审核深度明显加大,问题因企业架构、行业与交易历史而异。

红筹企业被问什么

对红筹架构企业,反馈集中于架构搭建的全链条。以本期红筹申报企业易买工品为例,证监会要求说明:返程收购境内主体(北京火也、苏州火也等)的交易对价、定价与完税情况,并确认并购符合外资并购规定;上海摄提的历史减资——定价、内部决策与缴税,排查虚假出资、抽逃出资;2026 年 1 月股份回购及转让的原因与定价依据,以及近 12 个月新增股东的入股价差;取消特别表决权安排后的控制权认定;股东穿透——包括高榕资本背后浮现的两名中国籍自然人补充身份信息、排查历史股权代持;股权激励——2026 年 1 月经股东会、董事会追认期权计划的合法性,以及离职人员、外部顾问持股的合规性;境外募投——拟拓展泰国、越南等东南亚业务是否需履行境外投资审批备案。

A+H 与行业专项问题

除架构外,监管正在审视商业逻辑与行业合规。对 A+H 候选企业——已在 A 股市场融资、再计划 H 股上市的公司——监管要求论证赴港上市的实际必要性。行业专项问题则跟随申报企业所在行业展开:新能源、光通信、装备制造企业面临产业合规、出口管制、关联交易等专项问询。这传递的信号是:今天的上市申请不再仅仅是一桩证券事务,而是一场完整的经营与合规审查。

通道现状

备案通道开放,但数字显示监管趋于精选。2026 年一季度仅 1 家红筹企业获备案通过(群核科技,其 VIE 运营主体对集团收入贡献仅 0.3%–0.5%),上年同期超过 20 家,降幅超 95%;港股新上市公司中红筹占比从约三成降至不足 5%。与此同时,证监会对直接境外上市持续核发备案通知书:8 月 4 日向彤程新材出具备案通知书(拟发行 H 股并在港交所上市,8 月 28 日公示)。监管环境还因《国务院关于对外投资的规定》(国务院令第 837 号,2026 年 7 月 1 日施行)而进一步收紧——ODI 从部门规章升格为行政法规、适用范围扩至个人、处罚显著加重。对 VIE 与红筹架构,实务上的信息不是”通道关闭”,而是”必须论证必要性并做到全面合规”。

给企业的实操建议

计划境外上市的企业建议落实五步。(1)申报前备齐证据链:创始人的 37 号文外汇登记、企业投资者的 ODI 备案、返程 WFOE 的 FDI 外汇登记,以及历次减资、回购、转让的完整文件——证监会要的是纸面证据,不是承诺。(2)论证架构必要性:准备好红筹或 VIE 安排的商业理由(对应哪条负面清单限制、有哪些真实境外运营或外资持股),因为”必要性”已成为准入门槛式问题。(3)主动做穿透自查:摸清每个 5% 以上股东、合并计算关联持股、识别境外基金背后的中国籍自然人、清理代持安排。(4)用好预沟通机制:证监会的备案沟通渠道让申报方在正式申报前就能试探问题,这是以最低成本暴露问询点的方式。(5)A+H 候选企业提前备好”必要性”答案:监管想知道在 A 股之外为什么还要港股,行业合规(出口管制、关联交易)必须有据可查。8 月这轮反馈是一面很好的镜子:把每一个问题都当作会被问到来准备——对大多数申报企业而言,事实正是如此。

Sources

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains

  • On 5 August 2026 China’s Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 34 of 2026, strengthening export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: every export is now subject to case-by-case strict review and license-preference measures do not apply.
    2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部发布 2026 年第 34 号公告,加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。
  • The same day, MOFCOM placed seven US entities on its countermeasures list — six entities (including Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir and Altana Technologies) under Order No. 2 of 2026 and Compliance Testing LLC under Order No. 3 of 2026 — banning Chinese organisations and individuals from transacting or cooperating with them.
    同一天,商务部依据反外国制裁法将 7 家美国实体列入反制清单——2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司等 6 家美国实体列入,第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入——禁止我国境内组织、个人与其进行交易、合作等活动。
  • The August measures follow an earlier July batch (Order No. 30 of 2026 placing 14 EU entities on the export-control management list) and a June 2026 customs announcement tightening drone export declarations, showing a steady escalation of China’s export-control enforcement.
    8 月措施紧随此前批次:7 月第 30 号公告将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单,2026 年 6 月海关公告收紧无人机出口申报——显示中国出口管制执法的稳步升级。
  • For foreign companies, the compliance consequences are concrete: if you are a US or EU entity on the lists, your Chinese counterparties are prohibited from dealing with you; if you buy or re-export controlled drone components, you face case-by-case review and must not rely on licensing-preference pathways.
    对外国企业,合规后果具体而直接:若你是在列的美欧实体,你的中国对手方被禁止与你交易;若你采购或转口受管制无人机零部件,将面对逐案审查且不能依赖许可便利通道。
  • Supply-chain due diligence must now screen counterparties, end-users and goods against three instruments: the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, the export-control management list and the countermeasures list, under the Export Control Law, the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.
    供应链尽调现须对照三份清单筛查对手方、最终用户与货物:《两用物项出口管制清单》、出口管制管控名单与反制清单,依据《出口管制法》《两用物项出口管制条例》与《反外国制裁法》。
  • The Foreign Trade Law, revised and effective 1 March 2026, adds a further layer: it prohibits any person or organisation from providing agency, freight, customs, warehousing or platform services to evade measures against listed foreign persons or organisations.
    2026 年 3 月 1 日施行的新修订《对外贸易法》增加一层:禁止任何个人、组织为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持。

China’s Export Controls and Countermeasures in August 2026: The New Compliance Landscape for Global Supply Chains | 中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

The 5 August package

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce issued three measures on a single day. Announcement No. 34 of 2026 strengthens export controls on drones and related dual-use items to the United States: for drones, their key components and related technology listed in the Dual-Use Items Export Control List, every export to the US is subject to case-by-case strict review, and license-preference measures do not apply. Order No. 2 of 2026 places six US entities on the countermeasures list — Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, Responsible Business Alliance, Verite Group and Human Rights in China — and Order No. 3 of 2026 places Compliance Testing LLC on the list. For entities on the countermeasures list, Chinese organisations and individuals are prohibited from transacting or cooperating with them. The legal basis is the Export Control Law and the Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations for the first measure, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and its implementing regulations for the latter two.

The escalation context

The August package is the latest step in a sequence that global supply-chain teams should read as a pattern, not a one-off. On 24 July 2026, MOFCOM announced (Announcement No. 30 of 2026) that 14 EU entities were placed on the export-control management list. In June 2026, the GACC issued Announcement No. 78 of 2026 strengthening supervision of drone and other dual-use exports at the declaration stage: exports through express delivery or cross-border e-commerce channels may not use simplified declarations, and for goods whose technical parameters approach control standards, exporters must proactively declare that the goods are not controlled items. On 5 August the drone-specific US controls and the countermeasures against seven US entities followed. The cumulative picture: China’s export-control and countermeasure apparatus is being used with increasing frequency, and the dual-use control list, the management list and the countermeasures list are being updated as operational instruments, not as dormant legislation.

What the drone controls mean for global buyers

For companies that source drone components, drones or related technology from China, or that re-export such goods to the US, the practical changes are: (1) exports of listed items to the US now go through case-by-case strict review — no license-preference pathway; (2) exporters must verify the final destination and end-use more rigorously, which will slow down and add compliance cost to US-bound shipments; (3) for non-US destinations, controls continue to apply under the general dual-use regime, but the “no simplified declaration” rule for express and e-commerce channels announced in June applies regardless of destination; (4) buyers should expect Chinese suppliers to ask for more end-user and end-use documentation and to decline orders where the chain is unclear. For a global buyer, the lesson is to treat drones and dual-use electronics as controlled goods with a destination-sensitive compliance profile.

The countermeasures list and counterparty screening

The countermeasures list under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law has direct binding enforcement effect: Chinese organisations and individuals must not transact or cooperate with listed entities. For a foreign company, the question is not whether it agrees with the listings but whether it or any subsidiary appears on the list, and whether its Chinese counterparties will be forced to terminate relations. Compliance steps include: screen the company, its subsidiaries, its beneficial owners and its key counterparties against the countermeasures list and the export-control management list on a continuous basis; monitor updates to the lists (MOFCOM publishes them via announcements and the countermeasures list annex); and where a listed entity is involved anywhere in the transaction chain, assume the Chinese leg will be blocked. The revised Foreign Trade Law adds a service-layer prohibition: no one may provide agency, freight, forwarding, customs, warehousing or third-party trading-platform services to circumvent measures against listed foreign persons or organisations. This matters for freight forwarders, customs brokers, warehouses and platforms that handle transactions with listed entities — even non-US service providers routing through China face the prohibition.

The interplay with US sanctions and compliance dual-use

Foreign multinationals now operate in a genuinely two-way sanctions environment. US sanctions and export controls restrict what US persons and goods may do with Chinese entities; China’s export-control management list and countermeasures list restrict what Chinese entities may do with US and EU entities. A multinational that is simultaneously subject to US export controls (e.g., ITAR, EAR) and dealing with Chinese suppliers must map both regimes onto every transaction. Practical friction points include: US-origin components embedded in goods bought from Chinese suppliers; US persons serving on boards that approve transactions with listed Chinese entities; and Chinese suppliers refusing to route shipments through US-sanctioned logistics chains. The compliance function must therefore maintain a dual sanctions map and run both US and Chinese list screening in parallel.

Practical due-diligence framework

For foreign companies sourcing from or selling into China, the 2026 framework suggests a four-layer screen. Layer one, goods: confirm whether the product is on the Dual-Use Items Export Control List (and the annual licence-management catalogue), whether it approaches control thresholds, and what declaration obligations apply under the June 2026 customs announcement. Layer two, parties: screen counterparties, end-users and end-use against the export-control management list, the countermeasures list and, for completeness, China’s unreliable-entity list and the MOFCOM guidance. Layer three, services: verify that no Chinese freight, customs, warehousing or platform provider would be violating the Foreign Trade Law service prohibition by handling your transaction. Layer four, jurisdictions: map both US and Chinese control regimes onto the transaction chain and identify any conflict that makes a deal unexecutable. Documentation of the screening is itself a compliance asset — Chinese regulators increasingly expect written evidence that exporters and their counterparties verified end-users and end-use.

What to watch next

Several indicators will shape the next six months. First, whether the drone-specific US controls extend to other dual-use categories or other destinations. Second, whether the management list and countermeasures list grow further in response to foreign measures — the pattern since mid-2026 suggests regular additions. Third, the implementation guidance for the new Foreign Trade Law’s service-prohibition provisions, which may come through MOFCOM Q&As or administrative rules. Fourth, whether Chinese customs deepens declaration-level scrutiny of dual-use goods through further announcements in the 2026 series. For global supply-chain and compliance teams, the operating assumption should be that China’s export-control and countermeasure regime is now a routine, frequently updated component of cross-border trade compliance — to be screened continuously, not reviewed annually.

Sources


中国 2026 年 8 月出口管制与反制措施:全球供应链的新合规图景

8 月 5 日一揽子措施

2026 年 8 月 5 日,商务部同日发布三项措施。2026 年第 34 号公告加强对美国出口无人机相关两用物项的管制:列入《中华人民共和国两用物项出口管制清单》的无人机及关键零部件、相关技术对美国出口,逐案从严审核,不适用许可便利措施。2026 年第 2 号令将应用 DNA 科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟、维泰集团、”人权在中国组织”等 6 家美国实体列入反制清单;第 3 号令将美国合规性测试公司列入反制清单。对在列实体,我国境内组织、个人禁止与其交易、合作。法律依据:第一项依《出口管制法》与《两用物项出口管制条例》,后两项依《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定。

升级的脉络

8 月一揽子是序列中的最新一步,全球供应链团队应视为模式而非一次性事件。2026 年 7 月 24 日,商务部公告(2026 年第 30 号)将 14 家欧盟实体列入出口管制管控名单。2026 年 6 月,海关总署发布 2026 年第 78 号公告,在申报环节强化无人机等两用物项出口监管:经快件、跨境电商渠道出口的不得简化申报,技术指标接近管制标准的物项,出口经营者申报时应主动声明其不属于管制物项。8 月 5 日,无人机对美专项管制与对 7 家美实体反制接踵而至。累积图景:中国出口管制与反制体系正被更频繁地启用,两用物项管制清单、管控名单与反制清单作为操作性工具持续更新,而非沉睡立法。

无人机管制对全球买家的意义

对从中国采购无人机零部件、无人机或相关技术、或向美国转口此类货物的企业,实际变化是:(1)清单物项对美出口现走逐案从严审核——无许可便利通道;(2)出口商须更严格核验最终目的地与最终用途,对美运输将变慢并增加合规成本;(3)对非美目的地,一般两用物项管制继续适用,但 6 月公告的”快件与电商渠道不得简化申报”规则不分目的地适用;(4)买家应预期中国供应商索取更多最终用户与最终用途文件,并在链条不清时拒绝订单。对全球买家,教训是无人机与两用电子产品须作为受管制货物、按目的地敏感性配置合规。

反制清单与对手方筛查

《反外国制裁法》下的反制清单具有直接的商业约束力:中国境内组织、个人不得与在列实体交易、合作。对外国企业,问题不在于是否认同列名,而在于自身或任何子公司是否在列、以及中国对手方是否被迫终止关系。合规步骤包括:对公司、子公司、受益所有人及关键对手方连续筛查反制清单与出口管制管控名单;持续跟踪名单更新(商务部经公告与反制清单附件发布);交易链任何环节涉在列实体的,按”中国一侧将被封堵”预判。新修订《对外贸易法》增加服务层禁令:任何个人、组织不得为规避针对在列境外个人、组织的措施提供代理、货运、寄递、报关、仓储、第三方交易平台服务等支持、协助、便利。这对处理与在列实体交易的货代、报关行、仓库与平台意义重大——即便非美服务商经中国中转也面临禁令。

与美国制裁的相互作用与双重合规

跨国企业如今身处真正的双向制裁环境。美国制裁与出口管制限制美国主体与货物可与中国实体做什么;中国的出口管制管控名单与反制清单限制中国实体可与美欧实体做什么。同时受美国出口管制(如 ITAR、EAR)约束又与中国供应商交易的多国公司,必须把两套制度映射到每笔交易。实际摩擦点包括:从中国供应商采购货物中嵌入的美国原产部件;参与批准与在列中国实体交易的董事会的美国人士;以及中国供应商拒绝经美国制裁物流链转运。合规职能因此须维护双向制裁地图,并行运行美国与中国清单筛查。

实务尽调框架

对从中国采购或对华销售的外国企业,2026 年框架建议四层筛查。第一层,货物:确认产品是否在《两用物项出口管制清单》(及年度许可管理目录)之上、是否接近管制阈值、按 2026 年 6 月海关公告承担何种申报义务。第二层,主体:对照出口管制管控名单、反制清单,以及中国不可靠实体清单与商务部指引,筛查对手方、最终用户与最终用途。第三层,服务:核实无中国货代、报关、仓储或平台提供者会因处理你的交易而违反《对外贸易法》服务禁令。第四层,法域:把美中两套控制制度映射到交易链,识别使交易不可执行的冲突。筛查留痕本身即是合规资产——中国监管者日益期待出口商及对手方留存书面证据证明已核验最终用户与最终用途。

下一步看点

若干指标将塑造未来半年。其一,无人机对美专项管制是否扩展到其他两用物项类别或其他目的地。其二,管控名单与反制清单是否随外国措施进一步扩大——2026 年年中以来的模式提示将定期增列。其三,新《对外贸易法》服务禁令的实施指引,或经商务部问答或行政规则出台。其四,中国海关是否以 2026 年序列后续公告深化两用物项申报级审查。对全球供应链与合规团队,运营假设应是:中国出口管制与反制体系现已是跨境贸易合规的常规、高频更新组成部分——应持续筛查,而非年度复核。

Sources

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms

  • On 5 August 2026 MOFCOM enacted Order No. 2 (2026), placing six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and banning domestic organisations and individuals from transactions or cooperation with them.
    2026年8月5日,商务部令第2号将6家美国实体列入反制清单,禁止境内组织、个人与其交易或合作。
  • The listed entities include Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana Technologies, the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), Verite Group and Human Rights in China.
    被列入的实体包括应用DNA科学公司、地层水库公司、阿尔塔纳技术公司、责任商业联盟(RBA)、维泰集团与人权在中国组织。
  • A separate action the same day also listed Compliance Testing LLC, and the US drone-related dual-use export control was tightened — broadening the sanctions perimeter.
    同日另一行动还将美国合规性测试公司列入清单,并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制,拓宽制裁边界。
  • Foreign-invested firms must screen suppliers and partners against MOFCOM’s counter-sanctions and Unreliable Entity lists before contracting and on an ongoing basis.
    外商投资企业必须在签约前及持续地对供应商与合作伙伴对照商务部的反制清单与不可靠实体清单进行筛查。
  • The legal basis is the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law; violating a counter-sanctions listing can sever a company’s China supply chain and trigger liability.
    法律依据为《反外国制裁法》;违反反制清单可能切断企业在华供应链并引发责任。
  • Practical step: build a sanctioned-entity screening clause into procurement and partner contracts, with audit rights and termination triggers.
    实操建议:在采购与合作伙伴合同中嵌入受制裁实体筛查条款,含审计权与终止触发条件。

MOFCOM’s 2026 Counter-Sanctions List and Supplier Due Diligence for Foreign Firms | 商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

On 5 August 2026 the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) enacted Order No. 2 (2026) — the *Decision on Countermeasures Against Six US Entities Including Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.* The order, approved by the National Counter-Foreign Sanctions Coordination Mechanism, places six US entities on a counter-sanctions list and prohibits organisations and individuals within China from engaging in related transactions or cooperation with them. For any foreign-invested company with a China supply chain, this is a due-diligence event, not just a geopolitical headline.

What Order No. 2 does

The order responds to US sanctions against Chinese entities. Citing the *Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law* and its implementation provisions, MOFCOM decided to list the following six US entities and ban transactions/cooperation with them within China:

  1. Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.
  2. Stratum Reservoir, LLC
  3. Altana Technologies, Inc.
  4. Responsible Business Alliance (RBA)
  5. Verite Group, Inc.
  6. Human Rights in China (HRIC)

The prohibition is broad: “related transactions or cooperation” covers procurement, sales, licensing, auditing, certification and other commercial engagement. The effect is to cut the listed entities off from economic activity with China-based parties.

The widening sanctions perimeter

The same 5 August wave was not limited to the six. Reporting indicated a parallel listing of Compliance Testing LLC, and a tightening of US drone-related dual-use export controls. Together these show a broadening perimeter: certification bodies, audit/assurance groups, testing labs and supply-chain organisations can be drawn in, not only manufacturers. For foreign firms, the practical risk is that a trusted auditor, certifier or standards body in your supply chain quietly becomes a listed entity.

Why supplier due diligence must adapt

Traditional supplier due diligence focuses on financial health, quality and ESG. China’s counter-sanctions regime adds a sanctions-screening layer that foreign-invested firms cannot ignore:

  • Direct exposure. Buying from, selling to, or partnering with a listed entity is prohibited.
  • Indirect exposure. Using a listed entity as an auditor, certifier (e.g., RBA-style labour audits), testing lab or standards body can constitute “cooperation.”
  • Continuity risk. A previously-clean supplier or partner can be listed overnight, severing a production line or certification path.

MOFCOM also operates the Unreliable Entity List (UEL), a separate but related mechanism targeting foreign entities that harm Chinese sovereignty, security or development interests. Prudent supply-chain teams should screen against both the counter-sanctions list and the UEL.

Practical steps

  1. Screen at onboarding. Run every new supplier, distributor, auditor, certifier and lab against the current counter-sanctions and UEL lists before contracting.
  2. Screen continuously. Lists change fast; re-screen the active base on a set cadence and upon any geopolitical trigger.
  3. Contractualise it. Insert a sanctions-screening representation, audit right and termination-for-listing clause in procurement and partner agreements.
  4. Map dependencies. Identify where a single auditor/certifier (e.g., a labour-audit body) is mission-critical and build a fallback.
  5. Train procurement. Ensure buyers understand that “cooperation” includes certification and audit services, not just goods.
  6. Keep evidence. Document screenings and decisions to show compliance if challenged.

商务部2026反制清单与外资企业供应商尽调

2026年8月5日,商务部发布第2号令——《关于对应用DNA科学公司等6家美国实体采取反制措施的决定》。该令经国务院国家反外国制裁工作协调机制批准,将6家美国实体列入反制清单,并禁止境内组织、个人与其进行有关交易、合作。对任何拥有中国供应链的外商投资企业而言,这是一起尽调事件,而非仅是地缘政治新闻。

第2号令的内容

该令回应美国对中国实体的制裁。依据《反外国制裁法》及其实施规定,商务部决定将以下6家美国实体列入清单,并禁止境内与其交易、合作:

  1. 应用DNA科学公司(Applied DNA Sciences, Inc.)
  2. 地层水库公司(Stratum Reservoir, LLC)
  3. 阿尔塔纳技术公司(Altana Technologies, Inc.)
  4. 责任商业联盟(Responsible Business Alliance, RBA)
  5. 维泰集团(Verite Group, Inc.)
  6. 人权在中国组织(Human Rights in China, HRIC)

禁令范围很广:”有关交易、合作”涵盖采购、销售、许可、审计、认证及其他商业往来。效果是切断被列实体与在华主体的经济活动。

拓宽的制裁边界

8月5日这一波并非仅限6家。报道显示同时列入了美国合规性测试公司(Compliance Testing LLC),并收紧对美无人机相关两用物项出口管制。共同显示边界正在拓宽:认证机构、审计/保证团体、检测实验室与供应链组织都可能被纳入,不仅是制造商。对外资企业,实际风险在于供应链中可信的审计方、认证方或标准机构悄然成为被列实体。

供应商尽调须随之调整

传统供应商尽调聚焦财务健康、质量与ESG。中国的反制制裁制度新增了一层制裁筛查,外商投资企业不可忽视:

  • 直接敞口。 向被列实体采购、销售或与之合作均被禁止。
  • 间接敞口。 使用被列实体作为审计方、认证方(如RBA式劳工审计)、检测实验室或标准机构,可能构成”合作”。
  • 连续性风险。 原本清白的供应商或合作伙伴可能一夜之间被列,切断产线或认证路径。

商务部还运行不可靠实体清单(UEL)——一项针对损害中国主权、安全、发展利益的外国实体的独立但相关机制。审慎的供应链团队应同时对照反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。

实操步骤

  1. 准入即筛查。 签约前对每家新供应商、经销商、审计方、认证方与实验室对照现行反制清单与不可靠实体清单筛查。
  2. 持续筛查。 清单变化快;按固定节奏并在任何地缘触发时重新筛查活跃库。
  3. 合同化。 在采购与合作伙伴协议中嵌入制裁筛查陈述、审计权与”被列入即终止”条款。
  4. 梳理依赖。 识别单一审计/认证方(如劳工审计机构)为关键路径的环节,建立备用。
  5. 培训采购。 确保采购理解”合作”包括认证与审计服务,不止货物。
  6. 留存证据。 记录筛查与决策,以应对可能的合规质疑。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • MOFCOM Order No. 2 (2026), 5 August: six US entities listed; domestic transactions/cooperation banned.
    商务部2026年第2号令(8月5日):6家美实体被列入;禁止境内交易合作。
  • Six named: Applied DNA Sciences, Stratum Reservoir, Altana, RBA, Verite, HRIC.
    六家名单:应用DNA科学、地层水库、阿尔塔纳、RBA、维泰、人权在中国。
  • Perimeter widening: Compliance Testing LLC + drone dual-use controls added the same day.
    边界拓宽:同日新增合规性测试公司与无人机两用物项管制。
  • Screen two lists: counter-sanctions list AND the Unreliable Entity List.
    筛查两份清单:反制清单与不可靠实体清单。

Common Pitfalls

  • Thinking “goods only”: certification and audit services count as “cooperation” with a listed entity.
    以为”仅货物”:认证与审计服务也算与被列实体的”合作”。
  • One-time screening: lists move fast; a clean supplier today can be listed tomorrow.
    一次性筛查:清单变动快;今日清白的供应商明日可能被列。
  • Ignoring the UEL: the Unreliable Entity List is a separate, related risk many teams miss.
    忽视不可靠实体清单:这是独立的关联风险,许多团队遗漏。

Sources

Cybersecurity Review in China 2026: New Scrutiny for Foreign Security Vendors

  • On 6 August 2026 the Cybersecurity Review Office (under the Cyberspace Administration of China) announced a network-security review of products sold by Palo Alto Networks in China, citing protection of critical information infrastructure.
    2026年8月6日,国家网络安全审查办公室公告,依据《国家安全法》《网络安全法》和《网络安全审查办法》,对派拓公司(Palo Alto Networks)在华销售的产品实施网络安全审查。
  • The review signals heightened scrutiny of foreign cybersecurity vendors whose products plug into China’s critical information infrastructure (CII).
    该审查释放出对深度接入中国关键信息基础设施(CII)的外国网络安全厂商审查趋严的信号。
  • Under the Cybersecurity Review Measures, suppliers of network products and services to CII operators are subject to review; a completed review can lead to procurement restrictions for affected products.
    依据《网络安全审查办法》,向关键信息基础设施运营者提供网络产品和服务的供应商须接受审查;审查结论可导致相关产品采购受限。
  • China’s 2026 measures on cybersecurity and data governance — including the draft rules for large personal-information processors published on 7 August 2026 — continue to raise the compliance bar for foreign technology firms.
    中国2026年的网络安全与数据治理措施——包括2026年8月7日公布的《大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定(征求意见稿)》——持续提高外资科技企业的合规门槛。
  • The review comes amid a broader set of reciprocal measures, including export-control adjustments on drones and countermeasures against US entities announced by MOFCOM on 5 August 2026.
    该审查发生在更广泛的对等措施背景下,包括商务部2026年8月5日公布的无人机出口管制调整与针对美国实体的反制措施。
  • For foreign vendors, the practical implication is to design China offerings with review-readiness: data localisation, source-code and architecture transparency, and CII supply-chain documentation.
    对外国厂商而言,实际含义是在设计中国产品时就具备审查就绪性:数据本地化、源代码与架构透明度、以及CII供应链文档。

Cybersecurity Review in China 2026: New Scrutiny for Foreign Security Vendors | 中国2026年网络安全审查:外国安全厂商的新一轮审视

Why this matters now

On 6 August 2026, China’s Cybersecurity Review Office announced a network-security review of products that Palo Alto Networks sells in China. The announcement, published on the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) website, invokes the National Security Law, the Cybersecurity Law and the Cybersecurity Review Measures, and states the purpose as protecting critical information infrastructure and guarding against network-security risks. For foreign technology companies — especially cybersecurity vendors, cloud providers and equipment makers whose products sit inside Chinese enterprises’ networks — the review is a concrete reminder that China’s security review regime is an active, operational gate, not a dormant provision.

The review framework at work

The Cybersecurity Review Measures (effective 15 February 2022) establish the legal basis for reviewing network products and services that operators of critical information infrastructure (CII) intend to purchase, or that could affect national security. A review focuses on risks to the security and stable operation of CII; risks of illegal data collection, retention, use, processing and export; risks of products or services being illegally controlled or interrupted; and risks to supply-chain security. Where a review is opened, the outcome can range from conditions attached to procurement to prohibitions on use. The Palo Alto review sits in this framework: a foreign security vendor whose products are deployed in networks that may include CII must now demonstrate that its offering does not create unacceptable risks. For vendors, the review process itself demands cooperation — providing information, materials, technical documents and access for assessment — and non-cooperation can itself lead to a negative conclusion.

The broader 2026 context

The announcement is not isolated. On 7 August 2026, CAC published the draft Provisions on the Protection of Personal Information by Large Personal Information Processors, consolidating two earlier drafts, with a comment deadline of 7 September 2026. The draft extends obligations to processors handling personal information of 10 million or more individuals, deepening the regime that foreign platforms and data-heavy businesses must already navigate. On 5 August 2026, MOFCOM announced tightened export controls on drones and drone-related dual-use items to the United States (Announcement No. 34 of 2026), along with countermeasures against several US entities (Order No. 2 and Order No. 3 of 2026). Taken together, the sequence shows a government that is simultaneously building out its cybersecurity gate, its data-governance rulebook and its reciprocal-trade toolkit — all of which foreign technology firms must treat as a single, connected compliance environment.

Practical steps for foreign technology vendors

  1. Assess CII exposure. Determine whether your products or services are used by operators of critical information infrastructure in China; if so, map which products fall within review scope.
  2. Prepare review documentation. Assemble security designs, source-code access arrangements, data-flow maps, third-party component lists and supply-chain documentation in a review-ready format.
  3. Review data practices. Confirm that products deployed in China comply with personal-information protection and data-export rules, including the emerging large-processor obligations for relevant businesses.
  4. Structure local presence. Where possible, align with data localisation expectations and consider whether a local entity, local storage and local support improve the review posture.
  5. Monitor the political risk layer. Because security reviews can interact with broader reciprocity measures, maintain a watch on MOFCOM export-control and countermeasure announcements that may affect your group.
  6. Build in response discipline. If a review opens, cooperate within statutory timeframes, keep internal records consistent, and engage counsel familiar with the Cybersecurity Review Measures.

Risks and compliance notes

The highest risk for a foreign vendor is complacency: assuming that a sale to a Chinese enterprise is “just a commercial deal” when the product’s deployment may trigger review. Sales into government, finance, energy, transportation and telecom networks — classic CII sectors — deserve the most scrutiny. Also note that the review regime is evolving quickly; the large-processor draft shows that obligations can expand to new categories of actors. Finally, the interconnection with export controls and countermeasures means a vendor’s Chinese business can be affected by measures aimed at its home country; global compliance teams should model those scenarios. None of this argues against the Chinese market — it argues for entering it with the same security-review maturity that the market now expects.


中国2026年网络安全审查:外国安全厂商的新一轮审视

为什么当下重要

2026年8月6日,国家网络安全审查办公室宣布对派拓公司(Palo Alto Networks)在华销售的产品实施网络安全审查。公告发布于中央网信办(国家互联网信息办公室)官网,援引《国家安全法》《网络安全法》和《网络安全审查办法》,目的表述为保障关键信息基础设施安全稳定运行、防范网络安全风险隐患。对外资科技企业——尤其是产品部署在中国企业网络内部的安全厂商、云服务商与设备制造商——这次审查是一个具体提醒:中国的安全审查制度是一道活跃、运转中的闸门,而非沉睡的条款。

运行中的审查框架

《网络安全审查办法》(2022年2月15日施行)为审查关键信息基础设施(CII)运营者拟采购、或可能影响国家安全的网络产品与服务确立了法律依据。审查聚焦以下风险:关键信息基础设施安全稳定运行;非法收集、存储、使用、加工、传输、提供、公开、删除个人信息与重要数据;产品服务被非法控制或干扰;以及供应链安全。一旦启动审查,结论可能从附加采购条件到禁止使用。派拓审查正处在此框架中:产品可能部署于包含CII的网络中的外国安全厂商,现在必须证明其产品不会产生不可接受的风险。对厂商而言,审查过程本身要求配合——提供信息、材料、技术文档并接受评估——不配合本身即可导致不利结论。

2026年更宏观的背景

该公告并非孤立事件。2026年8月7日,国家网信办公布《大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定(征求意见稿)》,整合两份早前草案,意见反馈截止2026年9月7日。草案将义务扩展到处理1000万人以上个人信息的处理者,深化了外资平台与数据密集型企业本已必须应对的监管体系。2026年8月5日,商务部公布加强对美国无人机及无人机相关两用物项出口管制(2026年第34号公告),并对多家美国实体采取反制措施(2026年第2号、第3号令)。综合来看,这一系列动作显示政府正同步构建网络安全闸门、数据治理规则与对等贸易工具箱——外资科技企业必须将三者视为一个相互联通的整体合规环境。

外资科技厂商的操作步骤

  1. 评估CII敞口。 确定产品或服务是否被中国关键信息基础设施运营者使用;如是,梳理哪些产品落入审查范围。
  2. 准备审查文档。 以审查就绪格式汇编安全设计、源代码访问安排、数据流图、第三方组件清单与供应链文档。
  3. 复核数据实践。 确认部署于中国的产品符合个人信息保护与数据出境规则,包括相关业务将面对的新兴大型处理者义务。
  4. 构建本地存在。 在可行处与数据本地化预期对齐,评估本地实体、本地存储与本地支持是否改善审查姿态。
  5. 盯住政治风险层。 由于安全审查可能与更广泛的对等措施相互作用,持续关注可能影响集团的商务部出口管制与反制公告。
  6. 建立应对纪律。 一旦启动审查,在法定期限内配合、保持内部记录一致,并聘请熟悉《网络安全审查办法》的法律顾问。

风险与合规提示

外国厂商最大的风险是自满:当产品部署可能触发审查时,却把对中资企业的销售仅当作”一桩商业交易”。政府、金融、能源、交通与电信网络——典型的CII领域——的销售最值得审慎对待。还需注意,审查制度正在快速演进;大型处理者草案表明义务可以扩展到新的主体类别。最后,与出口管制和反制措施的相互关联意味着,厂商的中国业务可能受到针对其母国措施的影响;全球合规团队应建模这些情景。这些都不构成回避中国市场的理由——而是提示要以市场现在所期望的同样的安全审查成熟度进入这个市场。

Sources

  • 中央网信办官网《国家互联网信息办公室关于〈大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定(征求意见稿)〉公开征求意见的通知》(2026-08-07,意见反馈截止2026-09-07):https://www.cac.gov.cn/2026-08/07/c_1787851071612596.htm
  • 国家网络安全审查办公室2026-08-06公告:对派拓公司(Palo Alto Networks)在华销售的产品实施网络安全审查(据清华国际金融与经济研究中心2026年中美贸易争端大事记引述原文链接):https://cifer.pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1136/3737.htm
  • 商务部《政策》栏目:商务部公告2026年第34号 公布加强无人机相关两用物项对美国出口管制(2026-08-05);商务部令二〇二六年第2号、第3号 反制决定(2026-08-05):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/index.html
  • 商务部官网《政务公开》:商务部公告2026年第33号 对进口打印复印办公设备发起对外贸易国家安全立案调查(2026-08-05,与网络安全审查同批对等动向):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/index.html

Cybersecurity Review and Critical Information Infrastructure Procurement Compliance for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

  • The Cybersecurity Review regime applies whenever a Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) operator procures network products or services that may affect national security — and foreign-invested enterprises supplying those products are squarely within scope.
    当关键信息基础设施(CII)运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品与服务时,网络安全审查制度即被触发;向这些运营者供应产品的外商投资企业同样被直接纳入监管视野。
  • The legal backbone is the Cybersecurity Law (2017), the Regulation on CII Protection (State Council Decree No. 745, 2021) and the Cybersecurity Review Measures (CAC Decree No. 8, 2022), now reinforced by active enforcement against foreign-made security products in 2026.
    制度主干为《网络安全法》(2017)、《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令745号,2021)与《网络安全审查办法》(国家网信办等13部门令第8号,2022),并在2026年针对境外安全产品的执法中持续强化。
  • CII operators must “prioritise the procurement of secure and trustworthy” products and submit to security review before signing; using unreviewed or failed products triggers fines of 1–10 times the procurement value.
    CII运营者须”优先采购安全可信的网络产品”,并在签约前申报审查;使用未申报或审查未通过的产品,将面临采购金额一倍以上十倍以下的罚款。
  • A supplier need not be a CII operator itself — providing products or services to a CII operator can independently trigger a review, as the August 2026 review of a US network-security vendor’s China-sold products illustrates.
    供应商本身不必是CII运营者——仅为CII运营者提供产品即可能单独触发审查,2026年8月对某美国网络安全厂商在华销售产品的审查即为例证。
  • Foreign-invested enterprises should embed review-trigger analysis into procurement playbooks, vendor due diligence and contract clauses, and retain evidence of supplier commitments not to extract user data or interrupt supply.
    外商投资企业应将”审查触发”分析嵌入采购流程、供应商尽调与合同条款,并留存供应商”不非法获取用户数据、不中断供应”的承诺证据。
  • The review is risk-based and time-bound (generally 30 + 15 working days, with a special procedure extending to about 90), and explicitly states it is not intended to restrict or discriminate against foreign products and services.
    审查以风险为本且有明确时限(一般30+15个工作日,特别审查最长约90个工作日),并明确规定其目的不是限制或歧视国外产品与服务。

Cybersecurity Review and Critical Information Infrastructure Procurement Compliance for Foreign-Invested Enterprises | 网络安全审查与关键信息基础设施采购合规:外商投资企业的实务指南

Why this matters now

For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) selling network equipment, cloud services, security software or industrial control components into the China market, the question is no longer whether cybersecurity rules apply, but *when a procurement crosses the line into a national-security review*. China’s cybersecurity framework has matured from a set of principles into an operational, enforcement-driven regime. The clearest recent signal came on 6 August 2026, when the Cybersecurity Review Office announced a review of products sold in China by a US network-security vendor — the second time, after the 2023 review of a US memory-chip maker, that the measure was applied to specific foreign-made products rather than to entities. For FIEs on either side of a CII procurement — as the operator, the supplier, or both — the compliance calculus has sharpened.

This article explains the statutory triggers, the three pillars of the legal framework, what the review actually assesses, the 2026 enforcement signal, and the concrete steps an FIE should take. It does not address the separate (though related) regimes of data-export security assessment, standard contracts and certification, which are covered elsewhere on this site.

The statutory trigger: who and when

The trigger is defined in Article 2 of the Cybersecurity Review Measures: a CII operator procuring network products and services, or a platform operator conducting data-processing activities, that *may affect or may affect* national security must undergo cybersecurity review. The wording is deliberately forward-looking — the operator must pre-assess the risk before signing and file for review where the risk exists.

Two points matter for foreign suppliers in particular. First, the obligation to file sits with the CII operator (the buyer), not the supplier. Second, and often overlooked, a supplier can be pulled into a review even when it is not itself a CII operator: providing products or services *to* a CII operator is exactly the scenario the 2026 review targeted. The Measures (Article 21) also state that where foreign-investment security review or data-security review have separate rules, those apply alongside.

CII itself is defined broadly in the Regulation on CII Protection: public communications and information services, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, public services, e-government, defence science and industry, and other networks/systems whose disruption or data breach would seriously endanger national security, the public interest or social stability. Telecom, finance, energy, transport, healthcare and government IT are the obvious sectors — precisely the sectors where foreign technology is most often deployed.

The three pillars of the legal framework

Pillar one — the Cybersecurity Law (adopted 2016, effective 2017). Article 35 imposes the core duty: a CII operator procuring network products and services that may affect national security shall pass the security review organised by the cyberspace authority and relevant departments. Article 37 separately restricts CII operators from storing personal information and important data overseas or providing it abroad without assessment.

Pillar two — the Regulation on CII Protection (State Council Decree No. 745, effective 1 September 2021). This fills in the duty-holder detail: operators must build a dedicated security-management organ, conduct at least one security testing and risk assessment per year, and — critically for procurement — “prioritise the procurement of secure and trustworthy network products and services” and put any potentially security-affecting procurement through the national cybersecurity review. Article 19 makes this a positive legal obligation, not mere guidance.

Pillar three — the Cybersecurity Review Measures (CAC Decree No. 8, effective 15 February 2022). Thirteen departments jointly issued the Measures, which specify the review objects (core network devices, important communications products, high-performance computers and servers, large-capacity storage, large databases and application software, network-security devices, cloud-computing services, and other products/services materially affecting CII, network and data security). They set the 45-working-day baseline (30 + 15, with a special procedure of about 90 working days) and the penalty ladder.

What the review assesses

Article 10 of the Measures lists the national-security risk factors the review weighs:

  • the risk that products/services, once in use, lead to illegal control of, interference with or destruction of CII;
  • the risk that supply interruption harms the business continuity of CII;
  • the security, openness, transparency and source diversity of the product/service, and the risk of supply interruption for political, diplomatic or trade reasons;
  • the provider’s compliance with Chinese laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules;
  • the risk of core data, important data or large volumes of personal information being stolen, leaked, destroyed, illegally used or illegally exported;
  • for listings abroad, the risk that CII, core data, important data or large volumes of personal information fall under foreign-government influence or control; and
  • other factors endangering CII, network and data security.

For a foreign supplier, the most relevant factors are supply-chain continuity, transparency of the product’s architecture, and — increasingly — whether the product could become a vector for data extraction or remote control. The 2026 enforcement action against a foreign security vendor centred precisely on the paradox that a security product can itself become a security risk if compromised or externally controlled.

The 2026 enforcement signal

On 6 August 2026 the Cybersecurity Review Office announced a review, under the Cybersecurity Law and the Measures, of products sold in China by a US network-security company, citing the need to safeguard CII and prevent cybersecurity risks. Chinese regulators had, earlier in 2026, directed domestic institutions to stop using certain US and Israeli security products and to complete migration to domestic alternatives within the first half of the year. The pattern is consistent: reviews now target *products* (not just entities), focus on CII supply-chain security, and operate alongside a broader “secure and trustworthy” procurement preference in sensitive sectors.

The practical takeaway for FIEs is not panic but preparation. The Measures explicitly state the review is “not intended to restrict or discriminate against foreign products and services,” and China continues to welcome foreign products into its market. The differentiator is demonstrable supply-chain resilience, source transparency and contractual commitments.

Practical compliance steps for FIEs

  1. Map your exposure. Identify whether your customers include CII operators or platform operators handling large-scale personal information. If so, your products are in the review’s line of sight even when you are not the filer.
  2. Build review-trigger analysis into the sales cycle. Equip local teams to recognise when a customer’s procurement will require a filing, and pre-empt delays by surfacing the issue early.
  3. Harden the supplier commitments. The Measures let CII operators require providers to promise not to illegally obtain user data, not to illegally control or manipulate user equipment, and not to interrupt supply without just cause. Put these in writing and be able to evidence them.
  4. Localise where it reduces risk. Source diversity, in-country support, transparent architecture and local data handling are exactly the factors the review rewards. A wholly import-dependent supply chain is the weakest posture.
  5. Keep contracts review-aware. Where a contract is signed before review, include a condition that it takes effect only after the product passes review, to avoid the “use unreviewed product” penalty of 1–10 times procurement value.
  6. Coordinate with the FIE’s data-export posture. Cybersecurity review overlaps with data-export security assessment and PIPL compliance; treat them as one programme rather than three silos.

Related reading

  • Critical information infrastructure recognition and the annual self-assessment obligation.
  • Data-export pathways: security assessment, standard contract and certification compared.
  • PIPL compliance for foreign-invested enterprises operating in China.

网络安全审查与关键信息基础设施采购合规:外商投资企业的实务指南

为何重要

对于向中国市销售网络设备、云服务、安全软件或工业控制部件的外商投资企业(FIE)而言,问题已不再是”网络安全规则是否适用”,而是”一项采购何时越过红线、进入国家安全审查”。中国的网络安全框架已从原则性规定,发展为可操作、强执法的制度体系。最清晰的近期信号出现在2026年8月6日——网络安全审查办公室宣布对某美国网络安全厂商在华销售产品启动审查,这是继2023年对某美国存储芯片企业之后,第二次将审查直接指向特定境外制造的产品而非实体。无论外商投资企业处于CII采购的哪一端——作为运营者、供应商或兼而有之——合规逻辑都已显著收紧。

本文阐释法定触发条件、法律框架的三大支柱、审查究竟评估什么、2026年的执法信号,以及外商投资企业应采取的具体步骤。数据出境安全评估、标准合同与认证等相对独立(但相关)的制度,不在本文讨论范围,本站点另有专文。

法定触发:谁、何时

触发条件规定于《网络安全审查办法》第二条:关键信息基础设施运营者采购网络产品与服务,或网络平台运营者开展可能影响国家安全的数据处理活动,应当进行网络安全审查。措辞具有前瞻性——运营者须在签约前预判风险,并在风险存在时申报审查。

有两点对外国供应商尤为重要。其一,申报义务落在CII运营者(买方)身上,而非供应商。其二(也最常被忽视):供应商即便自身不是CII运营者,也可能被卷入审查——仅为CII运营者提供产品,正是2026年审查所针对的情形。《办法》第二十一条还规定,外商投资安全审查、数据安全审查另有规定的,应一并适用。

CII的定义见于《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》,范围宽泛:公共通信和信息服务、能源、交通、水利、金融、公共服务、电子政务、国防科技工业,以及其他一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或数据泄露可能严重危害国家安全、公共利益或社会稳定的网络设施与信息系统。电信、金融、能源、交通、医疗与政府IT是最典型的行业——也正是外国技术最常部署的领域。

法律框架的三大支柱

支柱一——《网络安全法》(2016通过,2017施行)。 第三十五条规定核心义务:CII运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品与服务,应当通过国家网信部门会同有关部门组织的国家安全审查。第三十七条另限制CII运营者未经评估不得将个人信息与重要数据境外存储或提供境外。

支柱二——《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令745号,2021年9月1日施行)。 细化义务主体:运营者须设立专门安全管理机构、每年至少开展一次网络安全检测与风险评估,且——对采购尤为关键——”优先采购安全可信的网络产品”,并将任何可能影响安全的采购纳入国家网络安全审查。第十九条将其确立为积极的法定义务,而非软性指引。

支柱三——《网络安全审查办法》(国家网信办等13部门令第8号,2022年2月15日施行)。 该办法明确审查对象(核心网络设备、重要通信产品、高性能计算机与服务器、大容量存储设备、大型数据库与应用软件、网络安全设备、云计算服务,以及对CII、网络与数据安全有重要影响的其他产品服务),设定45个工作日的基准时限(30+15,特别审查约90个工作日),并规定罚则梯度。

审查评估什么

《办法》第十条列举审查权衡的国家安全风险因素:

  • 产品服务投入使用后导致CII被非法控制、干扰或破坏的风险;
  • 供应中断损害CII业务连续性的风险;
  • 产品服务的安全性、开放性、透明性、来源多样性,以及因政治、外交、贸易因素导致供应中断的风险;
  • 提供者遵守中国法律、行政法规与部门规章的情况;
  • 核心数据、重要数据或大量个人信息被窃取、泄露、毁损、非法利用或非法出境的风险;
  • 赴国外上市情形下,CII、核心数据、重要数据或大量个人信息受外国政府影响或控制的风险;
  • 其他危害CII、网络与数据安全的因素。

对外国供应商而言,最相关的因素依次是供应链连续性、产品架构的透明度,以及——日益重要——产品是否会成为数据提取或远程控制的载体。2026年对某外国安全厂商的执法,恰恰聚焦于”安全产品本身可能因其被控制或存在后门而转化为安全风险”这一悖论。

2026年的执法信号

2026年8月6日,网络安全审查办公室依据《网络安全法》与《办法》,宣布对某美国网络安全公司在华销售产品启动审查,理由为保障CII安全、防范网络安全风险。在此之前的2026年内,中国监管部门已要求境内机构停止使用该厂商等部分美国、以色列安全产品,并在上半年内完成向国产替代的迁移。脉络一致:审查如今指向*产品*(而非仅实体),聚焦CII供应链安全,并与敏感行业”安全可信”采购偏好并行推进。

对外商投资企业的实务启示不是恐慌,而是准备。《办法》明确审查”不是要限制或歧视国外产品和服务”,中国仍欢迎国外产品进入市场。差异点在于可证明的供应链韧性、来源透明度与合同承诺。

外商投资企业的实务步骤

  1. 梳理暴露面。 识别客户是否包含CII运营者或处理大规模个人信息的平台运营者。若是,即便你不是申报方,产品也已进入审查视野。
  2. 将审查触发分析嵌入销售周期。 让本地团队能够识别客户采购何时需要申报,并及早暴露问题以避免延误。
  3. 夯实供应商承诺。 《办法》允许CII运营者要求提供者承诺不非法获取用户数据、不非法控制或操纵用户设备、无正当理由不中断供应。将这些承诺书面化并备可佐证材料。
  4. 以本地化降低风险。 来源多样性、本地支持、透明架构与本地数据处理,正是审查所鼓励的因素。完全依赖进口供应链是最弱姿态。
  5. 让合同”审查友好”。 若合同在审查前签署,应附条件约定”经审查通过后方可生效”,以规避”使用未审查产品”面临的采购金额一倍以上十倍以下罚款。
  6. 与数据出境合规协同。 网络安全审查与数据出境安全评估、个保法合规相互重叠,应作为一个整体项目而非三座孤岛来管理。

延伸阅读

  • 关键信息基础设施认定与年度自评估义务。
  • 数据出境路径比较:安全评估、标准合同与认证。
  • 外商投资企业在华的个保法合规。

Sources

  • 国家互联网信息办公室等十三部门:《网络安全审查办法》(令 第8号,2022年2月15日施行)— https://www.cac.gov.cn/2022-01/04/c_1642894602182845.htm
  • 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令 第745号,2021年9月1日施行)— https://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-08/17/c_1630785976988160.htm
  • 《中华人民共和国网络安全法》(主席令 第五十三号,2017年6月1日施行)— http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c12435/c12488/201905/t20190521_270249.html

Network Data Security Risk Assessment: The New Annual Obligation for Important Data Processors (Effective 20 August 2026)

  • The Measures for Network Data Security Risk Assessment, jointly issued by the CAC, MIIT and MPS, took effect on 20 August 2026.
    由国家网信办、工业和信息化部、公安部联合制定的《网络数据安全风险评估办法》于 2026 年 8 月 20 日起施行。
  • Important data processors must conduct a risk assessment at least once a year; when the security status of important data changes materially, a targeted assessment is required for the changed parts.
    重要数据处理者应当每年至少开展一次风险评估;重要数据安全状态发生重大变化时,还须针对变动部分及时开展专项评估。
  • Network data processors may conduct assessments themselves or entrust third-party institutions; in high-risk situations authorities may require assessment by a certified evaluation institution.
    网络数据处理者可自行开展风险评估,也可委托第三方机构;存在较大安全风险等情形时,有关部门可要求其委托通过认证的评估机构开展评估。
  • Important data processors must submit the risk assessment report to the relevant authority within 20 working days after completing the annual assessment.
    重要数据处理者应当在年度风险评估完成后的 20 个工作日内,按照有关主管部门要求报送风险评估报告。
  • The measures create a cross-department special working mechanism and prohibit repeated assessment of the same risk, easing the burden of multiple supervisors on the same data.
    办法建立跨部门专项工作机制,并规定对同一风险不得重复评估,化解多头监管、重复检查问题。
  • For foreign-invested enterprises that handle important data, the measures add a recurring compliance obligation that intersects with data classification, cybersecurity multilevel protection and cross-border data rules.
    对处理重要数据的外资企业而言,办法增加了一项周期性合规义务,并与数据分类分级、网络安全等级保护及跨境数据规则相互交织。

Network Data Security Risk Assessment: The New Annual Obligation for Important Data Processors (Effective 20 August 2026) | 网络数据安全风险评估:重要数据处理者新增的年度义务(2026 年 8 月 20 日施行)

Why this matters now

On 20 August 2026, the Measures for Network Data Security Risk Assessment (《网络数据安全风险评估办法》) came into force. They were jointly formulated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and issued as Decree No. 24. The Measures institutionalise a recurring “health check” on network data and data-processing activities: important data processors must now conduct a risk assessment at least annually, report the outcome, and adjust when the security posture of important data changes. For foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) that operate critical systems, hold important data, or sit within supply chains that handle it, the Measures add a standing, time-sensitive compliance obligation on top of data classification, multilevel protection (MLPS) and cross-border transfer rules.

What the Measures require

The Measures define network data security risk assessment as the identification, analysis and evaluation of security risks in network data and network data-processing activities. The core duties are as follows. First, important data processors must conduct an assessment at least once a year; if the security status of important data changes materially in a way that could adversely affect data security, they must promptly assess the changed part. Second, ordinary processors are encouraged to assess at least once every three years. Third, assessment may be performed in-house or by an entrusted third-party institution; where there is a larger security risk that could harm national security or the public interest, or where a data security incident has occurred, the authorities may require the processor to entrust a certified evaluation institution. Fourth, important data processors must submit the assessment report to the competent authority within 20 working days of completing the annual assessment; where no competent authority is identified, the report goes to the provincial or national cyberspace administration.

The Measures also build an institutional layer. Under the national data-security coordination mechanism, the CAC, together with the telecom and public-security authorities, will establish a special working mechanism to guide and supervise risk-assessment work. Assessment institutions are encouraged to obtain certification; the CAC Data and Technology Support Centre, the Third Research Institute of the MPS and Taier Certification have registered the Data Security Risk Assessment Service Certification Rules with the Certification and Accreditation Administration. A key procedural protection for business: the same risk must not be assessed repeatedly, which addresses the long-standing problem of overlapping checks by different regulators.

How it affects foreign-invested enterprises

For FIEs, the practical question is whether the company is an “important data processor” — a status driven by the Data Security Law’s framework of classified and graded data protection, industry rules on important-data catalogues and MLPS filing levels. A foreign-invested manufacturer with industrial control data, a data centre operator, a platform handling large volumes of personal information, or a company designated by a regulator as holding important data will likely fall within scope. For such companies, the annual assessment is a recurring milestone that should be embedded in the compliance calendar alongside MLPS level tests, data-export security assessments and PIPL audits. The assessment covers the entire lifecycle of the data — collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and deletion — so it overlaps with personal-information protection measures for platform operators. The report-submission duty (20 working days) and the possibility of being ordered to use a certified third party create real deadlines that HR, legal, IT and security functions need to coordinate.

Practical steps

  1. Determine whether you are an important data processor. Map data assets against the important-data catalogues of your sector and confirm classification and grading; treat MLPS filing level and regulator designation as strong signals.
  2. Establish an annual assessment cycle. Fix a yearly risk-assessment date, decide whether to use an in-house team or a certified third party, and align it with other compliance milestones.
  3. Trigger targeted assessments. Monitor for material changes — new data categories, new systems, security incidents, significant cross-border flows — and assess the changed parts promptly.
  4. Manage the report obligation. Prepare the assessment report and submit within 20 working days to the competent authority, or to the provincial/national CAC where the authority is unclear; keep records of the self-assessment basis.
  5. Coordinate with cross-border and MLPS work. Use the same data inventory for risk assessment, security assessment of outbound transfers, standard-contract filings and MLPS grading to avoid duplicative but divergent analysis.
  6. Prepare for certification demands. If your sector is under scrutiny, consider obtaining a certified evaluation institution early so you can respond quickly if the authorities require an independent assessment.

Compliance notes

The Measures do not create a new licensing regime; they formalise an obligation that already exists in substance under the Data Security Law and the Regulations on the Administration of Network Data Security. Failure to conduct the required assessment, or producing false reports, can attract enforcement under those laws, including orders to stop processing important data. Foreign parent groups should also note that risk assessment results feed into the same supervisory picture as cross-border transfers, so deficiencies identified here can surface in export-security assessments. Finally, the “no repeated assessment” rule protects companies from redundant checks but assumes the company can evidence its own assessment; documentation quality is therefore a compliance asset.


网络数据安全风险评估:重要数据处理者新增的年度义务(2026 年 8 月 20 日施行)/ Network Data Security Risk Assessment: The New Annual Obligation for Important Data Processors (Effective 20 August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 20 日,《网络数据安全风险评估办法》正式施行。该办法由国家互联网信息办公室、工业和信息化部、公安部联合制定,以三部门令第 24 号发布。办法将网络数据及数据处理活动的”定期体检”制度化:重要数据处理者必须每年至少开展一次风险评估、报送结果,并在重要数据安全态势变化时动态调整。对运营关键系统、持有重要数据、或身处处理重要数据的供应链中的外资企业而言,办法在数据分类分级、等级保护与跨境传输规则之上,新增了一项常设、有时限的合规义务。

办法要求什么

办法将网络数据安全风险评估界定为对网络数据和网络数据处理活动的安全风险进行识别、分析和评价。核心义务如下。其一,重要数据处理者应当每年至少开展一次评估;重要数据安全状态发生重大变化、可能对数据安全造成不利影响时,还须针对变化部分及时开展专项评估。其二,鼓励一般数据处理者至少每 3 年开展一次评估。其三,评估既可自行开展,也可委托第三方机构;当存在可能危害国家安全、公共利益等较大安全风险,或发生数据安全事件时,有关部门可要求数据处理者委托通过认证的评估机构开展评估。其四,重要数据处理者应当在年度评估完成后的 20 个工作日内,按有关主管部门要求报送评估报告;主管部门不明确的,向省级或国家网信部门报送。

办法还构建了制度层。在国家数据安全工作协调机制指导下,国家网信部门会同电信、公安等部门建立网络数据安全风险评估专项工作机制,指导监督评估工作。评估机构鼓励通过认证;国家网信办数据与技术保障中心、公安部第三研究所、泰尔认证中心等已向国家认证认可监督管理委员会备案《数据安全风险评估服务认证规则》。对企业的一项关键程序保护:对同一风险不得重复评估,破解了此前多头监管、重复检查的突出问题。

对外资企业的影响

对外资企业,首要问题是判定是否属于”重要数据处理者”——该身份由《数据安全法》的分类分级框架、行业重要数据目录规则与等级保护备案级别共同决定。拥有工业控制数据的外资制造企业、数据中心运营方、处理大量个人信息的平台,或被监管认定持有重要数据的企业,很可能落入范围。此类公司的年度评估是一项周期性里程碑,应嵌入合规日历,与等级保护测评、数据出境安全评估和 PIPL 审计并列。评估覆盖数据全生命周期——收集、存储、使用、加工、传输、提供、公开、删除——因此与平台运营者的个人信息保护措施相互重叠。报告报送义务(20 个工作日)以及被要求委托认证第三方评估的可能,形成了 HR、法务、IT 与安全部门需要协同的真实时限。

操作步骤

  1. 判定是否属于重要数据处理者。 对照本行业重要数据目录梳理数据资产并确认分类分级;将等级保护备案级别与监管认定视为强信号。
  2. 建立年度评估周期。 固定每年评估日期,决定使用内部团队还是认证第三方,并与其他合规节点对齐。
  3. 触发专项评估。 监测重大变化——新增数据类别、新系统、安全事件、重大跨境流动——并及时评估变化部分。
  4. 管理报告义务。 编制评估报告并在 20 个工作日内报送主管部门,或报送省级/国家网信部门;留存自评估依据的记录。
  5. 与跨境与等保工作协同。 使用同一数据台账开展风险评估、出境安全评估、标准合同备案与等保定级,避免重复但口径不一的分析。
  6. 为认证要求做好准备。 若所在行业受重点监管,可提前确定认证评估机构,以便监管要求独立评估时快速响应。

合规提示

办法不创设新的许可制度,而是将《数据安全法》与《网络数据安全管理条例》下已实质存在的义务成文化。未按规定开展评估或出具虚假报告,可能依据这些法律受到处理,包括责令停止处理重要数据。境外母公司还应注意,风险评估结果与跨境传输同处一套监管图景,此处发现的缺陷可能出现在出境安全评估中。最后,”不得重复评估”规则保护企业免于冗余检查,但前提是企业能证明自身评估;因此文档质量本身就是一项合规资产。

Sources