Category Archives: Market Entry / 市场准入

Beijing links its FTZ policy pool to 11 zones outside the fence: the FTZ Linkage Development Zones Work Plan

  • In late August / early September 2026, Beijing’s “Two Zones” (Beijing FTZ + national comprehensive demonstration zone for further opening of the services sector) leading group printed and distributed the Work Plan on Building the Beijing FTZ Linkage Development Zones (document 两区〔2026〕1号, dated 6 August 2026).
    2026年8月底至9月初,”两区”工作领导小组印发《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》(两区〔2026〕1号,成文日期2026年8月6日),对外发布。
  • The Plan designates 11 linkage development zones with a total area of 119.20 square kilometres across seven districts hosting FTZ clusters (Haidian, Changping, Chaoyang, Shunyi, Tongzhou, Daxing, E-Town) and four further districts (Fengtai, Shijingshan, Mentougou, Huairou), anchored on four industries: medicine & health, artificial intelligence, integrated circuits and commercial aerospace.
    方案确定11个联动发展区、总面积119.20平方公里,覆盖海淀、昌平、朝阳、顺义、通州、大兴、亦庄七个自贸组团所在区及丰台、石景山、门头沟、怀柔四区,聚焦医药健康、人工智能、集成电路、商业航天四大产业。
  • The design is an “industry + region” linkage system: rather than replicating FTZ policies everywhere, each linkage zone is paired with specific FTZ clusters so that policy strengths (e.g. data cross-border flows, stem-cell and gene-therapy opening, biomedical special-items customs clearance) can spill over to businesses located outside the FTZ.
    方案首创”产业+区域”联动体系:并非在各地复制自贸政策,而是让各联动区与特定自贸组团结对,使数据跨境流动、干细胞与基因诊疗技术开发应用开放、生物医药特殊物品通关等政策红利外溢到区外企业。
  • For medicine & health, the Plan builds a “Changping R&D and pilot-testing — E-Town, Daxing and Mentougou manufacturing — Tongzhou medical-industry synergy — Huairou enablement and innovation validation — Shunyi trade circulation” chain, sharing review-and-approval, cross-border finance, foreign-related legal and IP services.
    医药健康领域构建”昌平研发中试—亦庄、大兴、门头沟智造—通州医产协同—怀柔赋能及创新验证—顺义贸易流通”联动体系,共享审评审批、跨境金融、涉外法律、知识产权等服务。
  • For foreign investors, the linkage zones are a location-strategy signal: companies in life sciences, AI, chips and aerospace that need Beijing FTZ-type openness but do not want to locate inside the FTZ now have a formal mechanism to tap the same policy pool, with zone-level co-ordination bodies to follow.
    对外资投资者而言,联动发展区是一个选址信号:需要北京自贸区式开放、又不愿把实体落在自贸区内的生命科学、人工智能、芯片与航天企业,如今有了接入同一政策池的正式机制,后续将建立区级协调机构。

Beijing links its FTZ policy pool to 11 zones outside the fence: the FTZ Linkage Development Zones Work Plan | 北京”政策破墙”:11个自贸联动发展区如何把自贸红利带给区外企业

Overview

In early September 2026, Beijing publicised the Work Plan on Building the China (Beijing) Pilot Free Trade Zone Linkage Development Zones (《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》), a document of the “Two Zones” leading group (两区〔2026〕1号, dated 6 August 2026). The Plan responds to a concrete problem: companies inside the Beijing FTZ enjoy institutional openness — data cross-border flows, opening of stem-cell and gene-therapy technology development and application, and customs facilitation for special biomedical items — while companies immediately outside, which often form the same industrial chain, do not. Rather than expanding the FTZ’s physical border, Beijing is building a linkage mechanism so that FTZ policy strengths spill over to chosen zones outside it.

The “industry + region” design

The Plan selects four industries with international competitiveness as the anchor: the trillion-yuan-class medicine & health sector, the hundred-billion-yuan-class AI and integrated-circuit sectors, and the future-industry commercial aerospace sector. It then defines 11 linkage development zones covering 119.20 square kilometres:

  • the seven districts that host FTZ clusters — Haidian, Changping, Chaoyang, Shunyi, Tongzhou, Daxing and E-Town (亦庄/Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area); and
  • four further districts — Fengtai, Shijingshan, Mentougou and Huairou.

Zones were chosen on the principles of “sound industrial base, strong policy demand, clear spatial boundaries and workable management mechanisms”. The core working method is institutional docking (制度对接), industrial interconnection (产业互联) and platform integration (平台融通) between the FTZ clusters and the linkage zones.

Four industry chains

Medicine & health. Anchored on the Changping and E-Town clusters with Shunyi as the trade hub, the Plan builds the chain “Changping R&D and pilot-testing — E-Town, Daxing and Mentougou intelligent manufacturing — Tongzhou medical-industry synergy — Huairou enablement and innovation validation — Shunyi trade circulation“. Concretely:

  • Changping linkage zone co-operates on R&D and pilot-testing for medicine & health and synthetic biology;
  • E-Town linkage zone handles commercialisation of science results and industrialisation co-ordination;
  • Daxing linkage zone shares drug and device manufacturing and review-and-approval resources;
  • Mentougou linkage zone provides cardiovascular innovative drug-device R&D and smart-manufacturing resources;
  • Tongzhou linkage zone deepens medical-industry integration;
  • Huairou linkage zone supplies basic research and validation-and-transformation support.

The Plan also calls for joint breakthroughs on core technology bottlenecks in innovative drugs, synthetic biology and high-end medical devices; shared laboratories, medical-device prototype workshops, large-science facilities and pilot bases; and shared services in review and approval, cross-border finance, foreign-related law and IP.

Artificial intelligence. Anchored on Haidian and E-Town, the chain runs “Haidian original innovation — Shijingshan humanoid-robot training — Shunyi intelligent-driving vehicle R&D — E-Town, Chaoyang, Fengtai and Mentougou application — Mentougou computing power”, with shared computing resources, a co-ordinated AI computing-power scheduling platform, high-quality industry datasets and intelligent annotation platforms.

Integrated circuits. The chain runs “Haidian design — E-Town and Shunyi manufacturing — Chaoyang optoelectronics — Huairou original innovation and testing”, with industry-university-research innovation consortia, expanded advanced-process chip supply, and shared hardware-emulation, testing-validation and optoelectronic-packaging platforms.

Commercial aerospace. The chain runs “Haidian constellation R&D — Fengtai satellite application services — E-Town rocket R&D — Shijingshan deep-space exploration”, with result-transformation and supply-demand matching mechanisms and shared public services for test validation, pilot transformation and prototype manufacturing.

Why the linkage zones exist

Beijing’s “Two Zones” office explains the motivation in three layers:

  • Beijing FTZ enterprises need partners outside the FTZ for R&D innovation, high-end equipment, public platforms and application scenarios;
  • companies outside the FTZ have strong demand for FTZ-type policies — data cross-border flows, openness of stem-cell and gene-therapy technology development and application, and customs clearance of special biomedical items;
  • the linkage zones serve as Beijing’s own higher-level autonomous opening, implementing the central document on upgrading the free-trade-pilot-zone strategy.

The result is a systematic answer to a common complaint of foreign and domestic high-tech firms: “the policy is across the street but not for us”.

What this means for investors

  • A formal route to FTZ-type policy without FTZ location. Companies that anchor R&D or manufacturing in Haidian, Daxing, Mentougou, Huairou and other linkage zones can expect the same review-and-approval, cross-border data and customs facilitation agenda to be extended through zone-level co-ordination — worth verifying case by case with the relevant district.
  • Life-sciences value chain re-mapping. The medicine & health chain maps clear roles: R&D and pilot-testing in Changping, manufacturing in E-Town/Daxing/Mentougou, medical-industry synergy in Tongzhou, validation support in Huairou, trade in Shunyi. Foreign drug and device firms planning Beijing operations can now choose a site by chain position rather than by proximity alone.
  • AI and chip players should watch computing and dataset platforms. Shared AI computing-power scheduling and industry-dataset/annotation platforms imply subsidised or co-ordinated infrastructure; firms whose work is compute-heavy should evaluate Mentougou and the co-ordination platforms.
  • Implementation pace will be district-specific. The Plan is framework-level; each linkage zone is expected to develop concrete implementation measures, project pipelines and service packages. Early movers engaging district authorities now may shape those packages.

Practical steps

  • Map your Beijing operations against the four chains to identify which linkage zone matches your activity.
  • Approach the relevant district’s “Two Zones” office to confirm which FTZ policy items have been (or will be) extended to the linkage zone and through which procedures.
  • For biomedical firms, review the stem-cell/gene-therapy and special-items customs facilitation pipeline, and whether your planned site can access the shared review-and-approval services.
  • For AI/chip firms, evaluate the shared computing, dataset and testing platforms as location or co-operation options.
  • Track each linkage zone’s implementation measures as they are released during late 2026.

Sources

  • 北京市人民政府门户网站 — “两区”工作领导小组关于印发《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》的通知(两区〔2026〕1号): https://www.beijing.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengcefagui/202609/t20260904_4850659.html
  • 北京市商务局 — 《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》政策解读: https://sw.beijing.gov.cn/zwxx/2024zcjd/202609/t20260904_4850606.html
  • 央视网 — 设立11个自贸试验区联动发展区 协同布局四大重点产业: https://city.news.cctv.com/2026/09/01/ARTIsH2heuLNbNftPbkl2M9b260901.shtml
  • 人民网北京频道 — 北京划定11个自由贸易试验区联动发展区: https://bj.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0904/c14540-41686517.html

Related reading

  • see also: how FTZ setups work and typical incentives for foreign investors (ftz-setup-basics)
  • see also: Beijing’s services-sector opening and “Two Zones” agenda (beijing-two-zones-opening)

北京”政策破墙”:11个自贸联动发展区如何把自贸红利带给区外企业

概述

2026年9月初,北京对外发布《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》(两区〔2026〕1号,成文日期2026年8月6日)。方案回应一个具体难题:北京自贸区内企业享有制度型开放——数据跨境流动、干细胞与基因诊疗技术开发应用开放、生物医药特殊物品通关便利——而仅一街之隔、往往同处一条产业链的区外企业却享受不到。北京的选择不是扩大自贸区物理边界,而是建立联动机制,让自贸政策红利外溢到精选的区外区域。

“产业+区域”的设计

方案筛选出四大具有国际竞争力的产业作为联动核心:万亿级的医药健康、千亿级的人工智能与集成电路、未来产业的商业航天。据此确定11个联动发展区,总面积119.20平方公里:

  • 7个自贸组团所在区——海淀、昌平、朝阳、顺义、通州、大兴、亦庄;
  • 4个其他区——丰台、石景山、门头沟、怀柔。

选区的原则是”产业基础好、政策诉求强、空间边界清、管理机制顺”。核心工作方法是自贸组团与联动区之间的制度对接、产业互联、平台融通。

四条产业链

医药健康。 以昌平组团、亦庄组团为基点,顺义组团为枢纽,构建”昌平研发中试—亦庄、大兴、门头沟智造—通州医产协同—怀柔赋能及创新验证—顺义贸易流通“联动体系。具体分工:

  • 昌平联动区协同开展医药健康与合成生物产业研发中试;
  • 亦庄联动区承接科技成果落地与产业化协作;
  • 大兴联动区共享药品药械制造、审评审批资源;
  • 门头沟联动区提供心血管创新药械研发智造资源;
  • 通州联动区深化医产融合发展;
  • 怀柔联动区提供基础研究与验证转化支撑。

方案要求围绕创新药、合成生物、高端医疗器械开展协同攻关,共享实验室、医疗器械样机制作平台、大科学装置、中试基地,并提供审评审批、跨境金融、涉外法律、知识产权等服务。

人工智能。 以海淀组团、亦庄组团为基点,构建”海淀策源—石景山人形机器人训练—顺义智能驾驶汽车研发—亦庄、朝阳、丰台、门头沟应用—门头沟算力”联动体系,共享算力资源与平台设施,共建人工智能算力资源协同调度平台、高质量行业数据集和智能化标注平台。

集成电路。 构建”海淀设计—亦庄、顺义制造—朝阳光电—怀柔原始创新及测试”联动体系,组建产学研创新联合体,提升先进制程芯片规模化供给能力,共享公共硬件仿真平台、集成电路测试验证平台、光电芯片封装测试验证平台。

商业航天。 构建”海淀星座研发—丰台卫星应用服务—亦庄火箭研发—石景山深空探测”联动体系,建立研发成果转化与供需对接机制,共享试验验证、中试转化、打样制造等全链条公共服务。

为什么要设联动发展区

北京”两区”工作领导小组办公室从三个层面解释动因:

  • 自贸区内企业在研发创新攻坚、高端设备配套、公共平台共享、应用场景拓展上需要与区外企业协作;
  • 区外企业对数据跨境流动、干细胞与基因诊疗技术开发和应用开放、生物医药特殊物品通关等政策需求强烈;
  • 设立联动区是落实《中共中央、国务院关于实施自由贸易试验区提升战略的意见》、服务全产业链创新发展、探索更高水平自主开放的重要抓手。

方案系统回应了内外资高科技企业的常见抱怨:”政策就在街对面,但不适用于我们。”

对投资者的意义

  • 不落自贸区也能接入自贸政策池的正式通道。 把研发或制造布局在海淀、大兴、门头沟、怀柔等联动区的企业,可望通过区级协调获得与自贸区同向的审评审批、跨境数据与通关便利——具体条目与程序需与所在区逐一核实。
  • 生命科学价值链重新布局。 医药健康链的角色划分清晰:昌平做研发中试、亦庄/大兴/门头沟做智造、通州做医产协同、怀柔做验证支撑、顺义做贸易。计划布局北京的外资药械企业可按链上位置选址,而非只看远近。
  • AI与芯片企业应关注算力与数据平台。 共享算力调度、行业数据集与标注平台意味着有组织的基础设施供给;算力密集型企业应评估门头沟及协同平台。
  • 落地节奏因区而异。 方案是框架性的;各联动区将出台具体实施办法、项目清单与服务包。现在与区级部门接洽的先行者可能影响这些配套的成型。

实务建议

  • 对照四条产业链梳理自身北京业务,判断匹配哪个联动区。
  • 联系所在区”两区”办,确认哪些自贸政策条目已(或将)延伸到联动区、通过何种程序。
  • 生物医药企业核查干细胞/基因治疗与特殊物品通关便利管线,确认计划选址能否接入共享审评审批服务。
  • AI与芯片企业把共享算力、数据集与测试平台作为选址或合作选项评估。
  • 跟踪2026年下半年各联动区陆续发布的实施办法。

来源

  • 北京市人民政府门户网站 — “两区”工作领导小组关于印发《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》的通知(两区〔2026〕1号): https://www.beijing.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengcefagui/202609/t20260904_4850659.html
  • 北京市商务局 — 《中国(北京)自由贸易试验区联动发展区建设工作方案》政策解读: https://sw.beijing.gov.cn/zwxx/2024zcjd/202609/t20260904_4850606.html
  • 央视网 — 设立11个自贸试验区联动发展区 协同布局四大重点产业: https://city.news.cctv.com/2026/09/01/ARTIsH2heuLNbNftPbkl2M9b260901.shtml
  • 人民网北京频道 — 北京划定11个自由贸易试验区联动发展区: https://bj.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0904/c14540-41686517.html

相关阅读

  • 见:自贸区落地机制与外资企业典型激励(ftz-setup-basics)
  • 见:北京服务业扩大开放与”两区”议程(beijing-two-zones-opening)

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines

  • On 27 August 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements for public comment, with feedback due by 10 September 2026.
    2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,意见反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。
  • The draft implements the “dual-penalty” rule introduced by the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law: legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may each be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear individual responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement.
    征求意见稿落地2022年《反垄断法》确立的”双罚制”:对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员,反垄断执法机构可以对其处一百万元以下罚款。
  • Individual responsibility attaches to those who organise, lead, decide, command, or instigate, approve or connive at the conclusion of a monopoly agreement; harsher treatment is reserved for agreements harming national interests in key areas such as people’s livelihoods, ecology, work safety, financial capital and data security.
    对达成垄断协议起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用,或授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议的个人追究责任;涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的垄断协议,将严格追究个人责任。
  • Aggravating factors include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into a monopoly agreement or obstructing others from withdrawing from one; co-operation with the investigation and proactive removal of harm may lead to lighter penalties; individual liability does not lapse on resignation or departure.
    教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议或妨碍他人停止参与等构成从重处罚情节;积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可依法从轻处罚;个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除。
  • For executives of foreign-invested companies and joint ventures operating in China, the guidelines signal that antitrust compliance can no longer be treated as a purely corporate matter — individual managers face personal exposure, mirroring the personal-liability regimes long applied to executives in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
    对在华经营的外资企业与合资企业高管而言,指引意味着反垄断合规不再只是企业层面的事务——管理者个人将面临直接责任风险,这与美国、英国、澳大利亚等长期对高管施加个人责任的制度形成呼应。

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines | 反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

Overview

On 27 August 2026, SAMR published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements (《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》) and invited public comment until 10 September 2026. The draft turns a provision of the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law into an operational enforcement framework. Article 56 of the amended law already stated that legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear personal responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement. The Guidelines explain who falls into that category, which factors matter, and how penalties are calibrated.

Why the Guidelines matter now

Price-fixing, output restriction and market-division agreements are widely regarded as the most damaging form of anti-competitive conduct, and they are typically the product of collusion among executives rather than of a company acting as an abstract legal person. Before the 2022 amendment, the Anti-Monopoly Law contained no explicit personal-liability rule, and in practice “the undertaking bears responsibility while individuals walk free” — a gap that diluted deterrence. The 2022 amendment introduced the “dual-penalty” structure; the draft Guidelines now give it operational shape.

The drafting note explains that Article 56 is framed in principle-level language and needs more specific rules on the circumstances of application, the factors for identifying responsible individuals, and the calibration of sanctions. The guidelines follow roughly four years of enforcement experience, including 2025 cases in which Shanghai and Tianjin market-regulation authorities applied the personal-liability clause to executives in pharmaceutical monopoly cases. Those cases operated as tentative breakthroughs; the Guidelines are designed to make the rule uniformly applicable.

Who bears individual responsibility

Under the draft, individual responsibility arises where the legal representative, principal responsible person or directly responsible personnel of an undertaking:

  • plays an organising, leading, deciding or commanding role in reaching the monopoly agreement; or
  • instigates, approves or connives at the conclusion of the agreement.

Responsibility is not limited to those who sign documents: executives who set the strategy, chairs who run the coordination meeting, sales directors who transmit the price signal and compliance officers who turn a blind eye can all fall within the draft’s language depending on the evidence. The reference to “instigating, approving or conniving” is deliberately broad, capturing passive as well as active involvement.

Calibration: aggravating and mitigating factors

The draft sets out factors that push penalties up or down:

  • Aggravating circumstances include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into concluding a monopoly agreement, and obstructing others from ceasing participation. Agreements that harm national interests in key areas — people’s livelihoods, the ecological environment, production safety, financial capital and data security — attract strict pursuit of personal liability.
  • Mitigating circumstances include actively co-operating with the investigation and voluntarily eliminating or mitigating the harmful consequences of the agreement.
  • No escape by resignation: individual liability is not extinguished by the person’s departure from the undertaking, meaning former executives of a company under investigation can still be pursued.

What this means in practice

  • A clearer compliance baseline for executives. The Guidelines supply the previously missing detail about who is at risk and what conduct triggers exposure. For multinationals with Chinese operations, antitrust training and certification for local executives, and board-level attention to pricing, output and territorial allocation decisions, become materially more important.
  • Personal exposure rather than corporate-only risk. Fines of up to RMB 1 million per individual sit alongside corporate fines that, under the law, can reach 10 per cent of the undertaking’s turnover in the previous year. For regional heads, country managers and joint-venture general managers, the calculus of joining a cartel conversation changes.
  • Interaction with leniency. The reference to active co-operation and harm removal as mitigating factors should be read together with the existing leniency (immunity) system for undertakings that self-report; companies and individuals alike need counsel on sequencing a leniency application and individual cooperation.
  • Joint ventures and intra-group arrangements deserve special review. Pricing and market-allocation discussions inside a JV board, or coordination between a parent and a Chinese partner, can raise monopoly-agreement questions in which individual executives of both sides are exposed. The same applies to trade associations that organise output or price coordination — the individuals behind them can now be targeted directly.
  • HR and compliance governance. Consider adding individual-liability clauses to employment contracts or code-of-conduct acknowledgements, ensuring that departing executives’ files are preserved, and reviewing directors’ and officers’ insurance arrangements in light of the new personal exposure.

Practical steps

  • Review the draft and, where appropriate, submit comments to SAMR before 10 September 2026 (the public-comment channel on SAMR’s website).
  • Audit existing pricing, output, market-allocation and bid-coordination practices, especially any engagement with trade associations or industry roundtables.
  • Deliver tailored antitrust training to legal representatives, general managers, sales and procurement heads, with sign-off records retained as evidence of a compliance culture.
  • Prepare internal escalation and “stop and call counsel” protocols for any invitation to fix prices or divide markets, including inside joint-venture governance bodies.
  • Monitor the final version of the Guidelines and any provincial enforcement guidance; expect SAMR and provincial bureaus to apply the personal-liability rule in the next wave of cartel investigations.

Sources

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

Related reading

  • see also: merger control and antitrust basics for foreign investors (38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • see also: SAMR’s enforcement approach to monopolistic conduct in the 2026 cycle (13-policy-updates)

反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

概述

2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。征求意见稿把2022年修订《反垄断法》中的一项条款转化为可操作的执法框架。修订后《反垄断法》第五十六条已经写明:经营者的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的,可以处一百万元以下罚款。指引要解决的是:谁属于这几类人、何种情形构成个人责任、处罚如何裁量。

为什么现在出台

联合涨价、限制产量、划分市场等垄断协议被世界各国公认为对市场竞争损害最严重的垄断行为,而其达成往往与经营者高管之间的合谋密切相关。2022年修法前,《反垄断法》对垄断协议的个人责任没有明确规定,实践中普遍出现”单位承担责任、个人免于追责”的情形,威慑力不足。2022年修法确立”双罚制”后,起草说明指出,第五十六条的表述较为原则,在具体适用情形、认定因素及处罚裁量上需要更明确、细化的规定,因此有必要制定本指引。

指引也建立在约四年的执法探索之上:2025年,上海市市场监督管理局在上海信谊联合医药等三家经营者垄断协议案中首次适用该条款,对责任人罚款五十万元;同年天津市市场监督管理局在原料药垄断案中对四名责任人分别罚款,并对组织垄断协议的自然人罚款五十万元。个案属于制度探索,指引则致力于让该制度普遍适用。

谁承担个人责任

依征求意见稿,经营者中的以下个人对达成垄断协议负有个人责任:

  • 起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用者;或
  • 授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议者。

责任不以签字为限:定调子的高管、主持会议的董事长、传递价格信号的销售总监、睁一只眼闭一只眼的合规负责人,都可能依证据落入文义范围。”授意、批准、纵容”的表述刻意宽泛,兼顾主动参与与消极放任。

裁量:从重与从轻因素

指引给出上下调节的裁量因素:

  • 从重情形:教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议;妨碍他人停止参与垄断协议。垄断协议涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的,将严格追究个人责任。
  • 从轻情形:积极配合调查、主动消除垄断协议危害后果等。
  • 离职不免责:相关个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除——被调查企业的前高管仍可能被追责。

对外资与合资企业的现实意义

  • 高管合规基线更清晰。 指引补齐了此前缺失的细节:谁有风险、何种行为触发责任。在华经营的外企需要更重视对本地高管的反垄断培训与签署确认,董事会层面也要关注定价、产量与区域划分类决策。
  • 个人风险与企业风险并立。 个人最高百万元罚款之外,企业可能面临上一年度营业额最高10%的罚款。对区域负责人、国家经理、合资企业总经理而言,参与卡特尔对话的成本结构已彻底改变。
  • 与宽大制度衔接。 “积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可从轻”应结合企业自首宽大制度一并理解;企业与个人都需要专业意见来安排自首申请与个人配合的先后顺序。
  • 合资企业与集团内安排需专项审查。 合资企业董事会内的定价与市场划分讨论、母公司与中方伙伴之间的协调,可能引致垄断协议问题,双方高管个人均处于风险中。组织限产定价的行业协会背后的个人,现在也可能被直接追责。
  • 人事与治理安排。 可在劳动合同或行为准则中加入个人责任条款,确保离职高管档案完整留存,并据新的个人敞口审视董监高责任保险安排。

实务建议

  • 研读征求意见稿,必要时于2026年9月10日前通过总局官网意见征集渠道反馈。
  • 排查既有定价、产量、市场划分与投标协同做法,尤其涉及行业协会或行业座谈会的活动。
  • 为法定代表人、总经理、销售与采购负责人定制反垄断培训,并留存签署记录作为合规文化证据。
  • 建立内部升级与”叫停并咨询律师”机制,覆盖任何被邀请固定价格或划分市场的场景,包括合资企业治理会议之内。
  • 跟踪指引最终稿与各省级执法指引;预计总局与省级局将在下一轮卡特尔调查中适用个人责任条款。

来源

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

相关阅读

  • 见:外资投资者应知的反垄断并购与经营者集中基础(38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • 见:市场监管总局2026年轮反垄断执法动态(13-policy-updates)

Hainan’s International Education Innovation Island: New Openings for Foreign Education Providers in 2026

  • Hainan’s Lingshui Li’an International Education Innovation Pilot Zone has attracted 30 well-known domestic and foreign universities and obtained approval for 24 Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions and programmes, with over 15,000 students expected on campus in 2026.
    海南陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区已引进国内外知名高校 30 所,获批中外合作办学机构及项目 24 个,2026 年园区师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人。
  • The zone’s “five mutuals and one shared” model — mutual learning, disciplinary exchange, curriculum sharing, credit recognition and co-governance — has opened 337 shared courses to more than 7,000 cross-registration students.
    试验区”五互一共”人才培养模式(中外互鉴、文理互通、学科互融、课程互选、学分互认、管理共商)已累计开放共享课程 337 门,选课学生超 7000 人次。
  • Hainan’s goal is 50 undergraduate-and-above Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions or programmes and a 50,000-student campus by 2030, making it the clearest test bed in China for foreign universities seeking an independent or joint footprint.
    海南提出到 2030 年实现本科层次及以上中外合作办学机构(项目)达到 50 个、园区师生规模超 5 万人,成为境外高校在华独立办学或合作办学最明确的试验田。
  • Six new Sino-foreign programmes were approved in 2026, including Xi’an Jiaotong University with UBC and China University of Political Science and Law with the University of Ottawa, signalling continued pipeline growth.
    2026 年已新增获批西安交通大学与加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学、中国政法大学与加拿大渥太华大学等 6 个中外合作办学项目,项目储备持续扩容。
  • The national “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026) adds vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science-engineering-medicine-agriculture universities to the opening-up pilot list, extending education-opening beyond Hainan.
    2026 年 6 月印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》将职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学纳入对外开放试点,教育开放从海南向全国扩围。
  • Practical implications for foreign education providers: Hainan offers the deepest regulatory opening (independent campuses and degree-credit recognition), while the national pilot signals opportunities in vocational and professional training in major cities.
    对境外教育机构的实操启示:海南提供最深的制度开放(独立办学与学历学分互认),全国试点则预示着主要城市职业技能与职业培训领域的机会。

Hainan’s International Education Innovation Island: New Openings for Foreign Education Providers in 2026 | 海南国际教育创新岛:2026 年境外教育机构的新机遇

Overview

For foreign education providers weighing entry into China, the single most consequential laboratory right now is Hainan. On 19 August 2026, at the Hainan provincial government’s “Start of the 15th Five-Year Plan” press series, the provincial education department and the management authority of the Lingshui Li’an International Education Innovation Pilot Zone (黎安试验区) laid out the zone’s progress and targets. The numbers are striking: 30 well-known domestic and foreign universities already enrolled, 24 Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions and programmes approved by the Ministry of Education, and a projected campus community of more than 15,000 students in 2026, drawing students from over 50 countries and regions.

The significance of Li’an extends well beyond the numbers. It is the only one of Hainan Free Trade Port’s 13 key parks with education-opening as its core mission, and it has been designated the flagship vehicle of Hainan’s “international education innovation island” strategy, which has now been written into the national education development plan for the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030). In plain terms: if a foreign university wants to test a genuinely independent campus or a deep joint programme in China, Hainan is currently the most legally and institutionally permissive jurisdiction in the country to do so.

The “five mutuals and one shared” model

The institutional heart of Li’an is what the zone calls the “five mutuals and one shared” talent-training model: mutual learning between Chinese and foreign education systems, interpenetration of arts and sciences disciplines, integration of academic fields, cross-selection of courses, mutual recognition of credits, and co-governance of campus management. In practice, this means that a student admitted to one partner university can take shared courses across the zone’s entire campus network. To date, 337 shared courses have been opened, with more than 7,000 student course selections covering all resident universities.

For foreign partner universities, the model has a direct commercial and academic implication: credit recognition across institutions is operational, and the zone operates a dual-degree pattern in which graduates receive both the Chinese partner’s degree certificate and the foreign partner’s degree certificate. Data from the 2026 graduating cohort illustrate the value proposition: of 273 graduates, 61 secured postgraduate admission (including 8 to Peking University and Tsinghua University) and 157 went abroad for further study, of whom 92 entered QS top-50 universities. For a foreign university, partnering in Li’an is not a marginal experiment but a visible channel into the Chinese higher-education market with credible output metrics.

The 2030 roadmap

The zone’s stated target is to reach 50 undergraduate-and-above Sino-foreign cooperative education institutions or programmes by 2030 and a campus community exceeding 50,000 students. In 2026 alone, six new programmes were approved, including Xi’an Jiaotong University with the University of British Columbia and China University of Political Science and Law with the University of Ottawa. The recruitment strategy is deliberately top-tier: the zone targets universities ranked in the world’s top 50 overall or top 10 in their discipline for new partnerships.

This roadmap matters for foreign investors in the education sector because it defines the pipeline: expect continued approvals of cooperative programmes and institutions, continued expansion of the independent-campus pilot pioneered by Hainan Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences (the first overseas higher-education institution allowed to operate an independent campus in Hainan) and Hainan Lausanne Hospitality Management School, and continued refinement of cross-border education services, international degree recognition and education-qualification access — the three frontier areas Hainan says it will push on during the 15th Five-Year Plan.

The national opening-up pilot beyond Hainan

Hainan is not the only door. The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》), jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance in June 2026, explicitly proposes to “steadily expand opening-up pilots for vocational skills training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level universities specialising in science, engineering, medicine and agriculture.” This extends the education-opening agenda beyond Hainan to select institutions and pilots on the mainland, alongside parallel openings in biotech, wholly foreign-owned hospitals and value-added telecommunications that were already being trialled.

For foreign education providers, the practical read is a two-tier opportunity map. In Hainan, the deepest regulatory opening is available now — independent campuses, degree-credit mutual recognition and a state-backed recruitment pipeline. On the mainland, the near-term openings are most realistic in vocational skills training and professional education, where the Action Plan names specific institutional categories, and where provincial authorities in pilot regions such as Beijing are being asked to move first.

What foreign providers should prepare

  1. Verify the regulatory route per target. Independent campus (Hainan), Sino-foreign cooperative institution (approval by the Ministry of Education), cooperative programme (approval or filing) and vocational training institution (local licensing) each follow different approval tracks.
  2. Engage early with the zone or provincial authorities. Li’an’s management bureau runs a structured intake for new partners, and the pipeline is being managed against the 2030 targets.
  3. Prepare quality-assurance documentation. Approval processes assess faculty, curriculum, degree arrangements and sustainability plans; comparable documentation used in the home jurisdiction accelerates review.
  4. Model the dual-degree and credit-recognition mechanics. The zone’s cross-registration system means foreign partners should align curricula with shared-course and credit-transfer standards from the outset.
  5. Monitor the national pilot list. The Action Plan’s vocational and professional education pilots are expected to translate into local implementation rules in 2026-2027; registration of interest with provincial education departments in pilot regions is advisable.

Related reading

  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (2026), which anchors the national education-opening pilots.
  • Hainan’s 15th Five-Year Plan for education development and the Li’an Pilot Zone’s published targets.
  • The State Council’s framework for Hainan Free Trade Port construction and the island-wide closure operation, which underpins the zone’s special customs, tax and talent regimes.

Sources

  • 海南省人民政府《”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会——《海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划》专场》: https://www.hainan.gov.cn/hainan/zxxx/202608/022333331af84bac828452fc6f164a4a.shtml
  • 海南省营商环境建设厅《〈经济日报〉整版关注海南:”家门口留学”到底香不香》: https://db.hainan.gov.cn/xwdt/yszx/202608/t20260819_4131097.html
  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》: https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html

海南国际教育创新岛:2026 年境外教育机构的新机遇

概述

对正在权衡进入中国市场的境外教育机构而言,当前最重要的试验田就是海南。2026 年 8 月 19 日,在海南省人民政府”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会上,省教育厅与陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区管理局披露了园区的进展与目标。数据相当可观:已引进国内外知名高校 30 所,获批教育部审批的中外合作办学机构及项目 24 个,2026 年园区师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人,生源覆盖全球 50 多个国家和地区。

黎安试验区的意义远超数字本身。它是海南自贸港 13 个重点园区中唯一以教育对外开放为核心使命的园区,被确立为海南”国际教育创新岛”战略的旗舰载体,而这一战略已写入国家教育发展”十五五”规划。简言之:如果一所境外高校想在中国试水真正意义上的独立校园或深度联合办学项目,海南目前是制度与法律上最为开放的窗口。

“五互一共”培养模式

黎安的制度核心是”五互一共”人才培养模式:中外互鉴、文理互通、学科互融、课程互选、学分互认、管理共商。实务上,这意味着入读园区内任何一所合作大学的学生,可以在整个园区的课程网络内跨校选课。截至目前,累计开放共享课程 337 门,选课学生超 7000 人次,覆盖全部入驻高校。

对外方合作高校而言,这一模式具有直接的学术与商业含义:跨机构学分互认已经落地运行,园区推行双学位模式,毕业生同时获得中方高校毕业证书、学位证书和外方高校学位证书。2026 届毕业生的数据说明了价值:273 名毕业生中,61 人保研(其中 8 人升入北京大学、清华大学),157 人出国(境)深造,其中 92 人进入 QS 排名前 50 高校。对境外高校来说,在黎安合作办学不是边缘试验,而是以可信产出指标进入中国高等教育市场的显性通道。

2030 路线图

园区公布的目标是:到 2030 年,本科层次及以上中外合作办学机构(项目)达到 50 个,师生规模超 5 万人。仅 2026 年就新增获批 6 个中外合作办学项目,包括西安交通大学与加拿大不列颠哥伦比亚大学、中国政法大学与加拿大渥太华大学等。引校策略明确走顶尖路线:新增合作瞄准综合排名世界前 50 或学科排名前 10 的高校。

这份路线图对教育领域的外国投资者意义重大,因为它界定了项目储备节奏:预计合作办学机构和项目的审批将持续放量,由海南比勒费尔德应用科学大学(中国境内第一所境外高校在琼独立办学的高校)和海南洛桑旅游大学开创的独立办学试点将持续扩围,跨境教育服务、国际学历互认、国际教育资格准入——海南承诺”十五五”期间重点突破的三个前沿领域——将持续细化。

海南之外的全国开放试点

海南并非唯一入口。商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部 2026 年 6 月联合印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确提出”稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点”,把教育开放议程从海南扩展到内地指定机构和试点,与已先行试点的生物技术、外商独资医院、增值电信等开放举措形成联动。

对境外教育机构而言,实操读法是一张双层机会地图。在海南,最深度的制度开放现在即可获得——独立办学、学历学分互认、国家支持的生源通道。在内地,近期最现实的开放点在职业技能培训与职业教育领域,行动方案点名了具体机构类别,并要求北京等试点地区先行先试。

境外机构应做的准备

  1. 按目标核验监管路径。独立办学(海南)、中外合作办学机构(教育部审批)、合作办学项目(审批或备案)、职业技能培训机构(地方许可)各有不同审批通道。
  2. 尽早与园区或省级主管部门接洽。黎安管理局对新合作方有结构化引入流程,项目储备正对照 2030 目标管理。
  3. 准备质量保障材料。审批环节评估师资、课程、学位安排与可持续性方案;与母国同类材料可加速评审。
  4. 设计双学位与学分互认机制。园区的跨校选课系统意味着外方合作方应从立项之初就按共享课程与学分转换标准对齐课程体系。
  5. 跟踪全国试点清单。行动方案中的职业与专业教育试点预计 2026—2027 年转化为地方实施细则;建议向试点地区省级教育部门登记合作意向。

相关阅读

  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年),是全国教育开放试点的制度锚点。
  • 海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划与黎安试验区公布的各项目标。
  • 国务院海南自由贸易港建设总体方案及全岛封关运作安排,是园区特殊海关、税收与人才制度的基础。

来源

  • 海南省人民政府《”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会——《海南省”十五五”教育事业发展规划》专场》:https://www.hainan.gov.cn/hainan/zxxx/202608/022333331af84bac828452fc6f164a4a.shtml
  • 海南省营商环境建设厅《〈经济日报〉整版关注海南:”家门口留学”到底香不香》:https://db.hainan.gov.cn/xwdt/yszx/202608/t20260819_4131097.html
  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》:https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide

  • China’s foreign-investment security review, governed by the Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 37, effective January 2021), applies to investments in defence-related fields and to investments that would give a foreign investor control over enterprises in ten categories of important sectors.
    中国外商投资安全审查制度以《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令 2020 年第 37 号,2021 年 1 月施行)为依据,适用于国防领域投资,以及将使外国投资者取得十类重要领域企业实际控制权的投资。
  • The review is mandatory-before-investment: parties must file before implementing an investment falling within the reporting scope, and the working mechanism may demand filing even where the investor has not self-reported.
    安全审查是”投资前强制”程序:属于申报范围的投资须在实施前申报,未自行申报的,工作机制办公室有权要求当事人申报。
  • The procedural timeline is predictable: a decision on whether security review is needed within 15 working days, a general review within 30 working days, and a special review within 60 working days, with investments on hold throughout.
    程序时限明确:是否启动安全审查的决定 15 个工作日内作出,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成,特别审查 60 个工作日内完成,审查期间当事人不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are final and enforceable: approval, approval with conditions, or prohibition; violations can result in orders to divest or restore the pre-investment state, plus adverse credit records.
    审查决定为最终决定且可强制执行:通过、附条件通过或禁止投资;违规后果包括限期处分股权或资产、恢复投资前状态,并记入不良信用记录。
  • In the 2026 policy context, the authorities are simultaneously facilitating foreign M&A and data flows while maintaining the security-review gate, so transaction planning should run security-review screening in parallel with merger-control and negative-list checks.
    2026 年政策背景下,主管部门在便利外资并购与数据跨境流动的同时维持安全审查闸门,交易规划应将安全审查筛查与经营者集中、负面清单核查并行推进。
  • Practical steps: screen the target sector and the control threshold early, use the pre-filing consultation mechanism, and document the national-security-impact analysis thoroughly before signing binding agreements.
    实操要点:尽早筛查标的行业与控制权门槛,善用申报前咨询机制,并在签署约束性协议前完成影响国家安全的说明文件。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Practical Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

Overview

Foreign investment security review is one of the three pillars of China’s foreign-investment management system under the Foreign Investment Law, alongside the negative-list regime and the information-reporting regime. The operative rules are the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (《外商投资安全审查办法》), jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce as Order No. 37 of 2020 and effective since 18 January 2021.

The regime’s design is deliberately gate-like rather than discretionary. The Measures define a reporting scope, set out a two-stage review process with fixed deadlines, and give the review decisions — approval, conditional approval or prohibition — the status of final decisions under the Foreign Investment Law. In the 2026 policy environment, where the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” is simultaneously easing foreign M&A procedures and data-crossing rules, the security review remains the one filter that foreign investors cannot structure around. Understanding its triggers and timeline is therefore a prerequisite for any sizeable inbound transaction.

Who must file and when

The reporting scope covers two categories. First, investments in defence-related fields: investment in the military industry and its supporting industries, and investment in the vicinity of military facilities and military-industrial facilities. Second, investments in ten categories of important sectors — important agricultural products, important energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies, and other important fields — where the investor would obtain actual control of the target enterprise.

“Actual control” is defined broadly and includes holding 50% or more of the equity; holding less than 50% but having voting power that can materially influence the resolutions of the board, shareholders’ meeting or general meeting; or any other situation where the foreign investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. This broad control definition means that some non-majority, governance-heavy structures may still trigger the filing duty.

Filing is required before the investment is implemented. The foreign investor or the domestic party (together, “the parties”) must proactively file with the working mechanism’s office before implementation. Even where the parties have not self-reported, the office may require filing if the investment falls within the reporting scope. The practical message for deal teams: treat the security-review screening as a mandatory checklist item before signing definitive agreements, not as an afterthought discovered during closing.

The process and timeline

The process has a predictable rhythm. Within 15 working days of receiving a complete filing, the working mechanism’s office decides whether a security review is needed and notifies the parties in writing. If no review is needed, the investment may proceed. If a review is needed, the office must complete the general review within 30 working days. Where the general review finds that the investment affects or may affect national security, a special review is launched, to be completed within 60 working days, extendable in exceptional circumstances. Throughout the review period, the parties may not implement the investment.

The system also contains relief valves. During the review, the parties may modify the investment plan — in which case the review clock restarts from receipt of the revised plan — or withdraw the investment, which terminates the review. Before filing, the parties may consult the working mechanism’s office on questions about the transaction. And a change to the investment plan after approval, where the change affects or may affect national security, requires re-filing.

Outcomes and consequences

The review can end in approval (the investment may proceed), conditional approval (the investment may proceed subject to conditions that the parties have committed to in writing), or prohibition (the investment may not be implemented; if already implemented, the parties must divest or take other measures to restore the pre-investment state). Decisions are final under Article 35 of the Foreign Investment Law.

Enforcement is multi-layered. The working mechanism’s office, together with relevant departments and local governments, supervises implementation; for conditional approvals, it can require evidence and conduct on-site inspections. Non-compliance carries escalating consequences: failing to file an in-scope investment leads to an order to file within a deadline and, if refused, an order to divest; providing false materials or concealing information can lead to revocation of the approval and restoration of the pre-investment state; violating conditions triggers a correction order and, if refused, divestment. Violations are recorded in the national credit information system with joint disciplinary measures.

2026 interaction with the facilitation agenda

The security review does not exist in a vacuum. In June 2026, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promised to accelerate the revision of the foreign M&A rules, allow eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in listed-company issuances, and streamline data-outbound flows through negative lists in pilot zones. None of these changes touches the security-review gate; if anything, the simultaneous easing of entry and tightening of control screens makes it more important to run security-review screening in parallel with merger-concentration filings and negative-list checks.

Foreign investors should also note the international context is one of converging practice: major economies all operate equivalent review regimes, and China’s framework mirrors this global trend of gatekeeping foreign investment in sensitive sectors. The compliance posture — early screening, thorough documentation, and timely filing — is the same that prudent investors apply in any jurisdiction with a mandatory review regime.

Practical checklist for inbound transactions

  1. Screen the sector and control threshold early. Map the target against the defence-related categories and the ten important-sector categories, and assess whether the post-investment control structure meets the actual-control definitions.
  2. Use the pre-filing consultation. The Measures expressly allow parties to consult the working mechanism’s office before filing; use this for borderline transactions.
  3. Prepare the national-security-impact analysis. The filing requires a statement on whether the investment affects national security; build this document during due diligence, not during closing.
  4. Run parallel screenings. Coordinate the security-review timeline with merger-concentration filing and negative-list clearance; the review stays on hold while other approvals proceed.
  5. Build in condition-readiness. For sensitive but approvable deals, anticipate conditional approval and prepare to comply with attached conditions, including evidence production and on-site inspections.

Related reading

  • The Foreign Investment Law (2020), which establishes the security review at law level.
  • The Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment (Order No. 37 of 2020), the operative regulation.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), which sets the facilitation context around the review gate.

Sources

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文): https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》: https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》: https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目: https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

中国外商投资安全审查:2026 年实务指南

概述

外商投资安全审查是《外商投资法》确立的外商投资管理制度三大支柱之一,与负面清单管理和信息报告制度并列。现行操作规则是《外商投资安全审查办法》,由国家发展改革委、商务部以 2020 年第 37 号令联合发布,自 2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行。

该制度的运行设计刻意采用”闸门式”而非自由裁量式:办法界定申报范围,设定两阶段审查流程和固定时限,并依《外商投资法》赋予审查决定——通过、附条件通过或禁止投资——最终决定地位。在 2026 年的政策环境下,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》同时放宽外资并购程序和数据跨境规则,但安全审查仍是外国投资者无法绕开的唯一过滤环节。因此,理解其触发条件与时限,是任何规模化入境交易的先决条件。

谁须申报、何时申报

申报范围涵盖两类。第一类,国防领域投资:投资军工、军工配套等关系国防安全的领域,以及在军事设施和军工设施周边地域投资。第二类,投资十类重要领域——重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术以及其他重要领域——并取得所投资企业实际控制权。

“实际控制权”的定义宽泛,包括持有企业 50% 以上股权;持股不足 50% 但其表决权能够对董事会、股东会或股东大会决议产生重大影响;以及其他能够对企业经营决策、人事、财务、技术等产生重大影响的情形。这一宽泛的控制权定义意味着,部分非控股但治理权重大的架构仍可能触发申报义务。

申报须在投资实施前完成。外国投资者或境内相关当事人(合称”当事人”)应在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报。即使当事人未自行申报,若投资属于申报范围,工作机制办公室也有权要求申报。对交易团队而言,实务提示是:把安全审查筛查作为签署确定性协议前的强制清单项,而非交割期间才发现的疏漏。

流程与时限

流程节奏清晰可预期。收到符合要求的申报材料后 15 个工作日内,工作机制办公室决定是否需要安全审查并书面通知当事人。无需审查的,投资即可实施;需要审查的,一般审查须在 30 个工作日内完成。一般审查认定投资影响或可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,须在 60 个工作日内完成,特殊情况下可延长。审查期间,当事人不得实施投资。

制度也包含疏导阀门。审查期间,当事人可以修改投资方案——此时审查期限自收到修改后方案之日起重新计算——或撤销投资,从而终止审查。申报前,当事人可以就交易问题向工作机制办公室咨询。审查通过后变更投资方案、影响或可能影响国家安全的,须重新申报。

决定与后果

审查结果有三种:通过(投资可以实施)、附条件通过(按当事人书面承诺的附加条件实施投资)、禁止投资(不得实施;已实施的须限期处分股权或资产等,恢复投资前状态)。依《外商投资法》第三十五条,审查决定为最终决定。

执行是多层次的。工作机制办公室会同有关部门、地方人民政府监督实施;对附条件通过的投资,可要求提供证明材料、开展现场检查核实条件落实情况。违规后果逐级加重:属于申报范围而未申报即实施的,责令限期申报,拒不申报的责令限期处分股权或资产;提供虚假材料或隐瞒信息的,撤销决定、恢复投资前状态;未按附加条件实施的,责令改正,拒不改正的责令处分。违规情形记入国家信用信息系统并实施联合惩戒。

与 2026 年便利化议程的互动

安全审查并非孤立存在。2026 年 6 月,《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订外资并购规定、允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与上市公司发行、通过试点负面清单简化数据出境。这些变化均不触动安全审查闸门;恰恰相反,准入门槛的放宽与管控筛网的收紧并行,使得交易方更有必要将安全审查筛查与经营者集中申报、负面清单核查并行推进。

外国投资者也应注意到国际背景是实践趋同:主要经济体均运行同等审查机制,中国的框架与全球对敏感领域外资把关的趋势一致。合规姿态——尽早筛查、充分留档、及时申报——与审慎投资者在任何实行强制审查机制的法域采取的做法相同。

入境交易实操清单

  1. 尽早筛查行业与控制权门槛。将标的对照国防类与十类重要领域清单,评估投资后控制结构是否落入实际控制权定义。
  2. 善用申报前咨询。办法明确允许当事人在申报前向工作机制办公室咨询,边界交易应优先使用。
  3. 准备国家安全影响说明。申报须提交外商投资是否影响国家安全的说明;这份文件应在尽调期间起草,而非交割期间补做。
  4. 并行推进各项筛查。将安全审查时限与经营者集中申报、负面清单合规协调安排;其他审批推进期间审查保持冻结。
  5. 预置条件应对能力。对敏感但可获批的交易,预判附条件通过,并准备履行附加条件,包括提供证明材料与接受现场检查。

相关阅读

  • 《外商投资法》(2020 年),在法律层面确立安全审查制度。
  • 《外商投资安全审查办法》(2020 年第 37 号令),现行操作规章。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),构成审查闸门周边的便利化背景。

来源

  • 商务部《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号原文):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/dl/file/20211203230801.pdf
  • 渭南市对外经济技术合作局《中华人民共和国外商投资法》:https://wnzs.weinan.gov.cn/tzzn/yhzc/1946047401564852225.html
  • 洞口县商务局《外商投资办事指南》:https://www.dongkou.gov.cn/dongkou/tzgg/202608/fd4c261c8deb48baa48e8cef772dbcd4.shtml
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 国家发展改革委 投资项目在线审批监管平台《外商投资安全审查办法》条目:https://new.tzxm.gov.cn/zckd/flfg/index_1.shtml

A New On-Ramp for Foreign Capital: Strategic Investment in A-Share Listed Companies in 2026

  • The June 2026 “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” opens the door for eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance by listed companies in “non-related industries” — removing the industry-relevance test that previously limited foreign PE participation.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,取消了此前限制外资 PE 参与的行业相关性要求。
  • The same Action Plan commits to accelerating the revision of the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises (the “2006 Measures”, known as Order No. 10), promising streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements.
    同一《行动方案》承诺加快修订《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(2006 年 10 号令),优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求。
  • The revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) already lowered the minimum shareholding threshold for strategic investment via agreement transfer and tender offer from 10% to 5%, added the tender-offer route, and allowed cross-border share swaps using shares of unlisted overseas companies in private placements and tender offers.
    修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)已把协议转让、要约收购方式战略投资的最低持股比例由 10% 降至 5%,新增要约收购路径,并允许定向发行、要约收购中以境外非上市公司股份实施跨境换股。
  • Together, these moves create a clearer pathway for foreign PE, sovereign funds and long-term capital to invest in A-share listed companies without needing a same-industry strategic partner narrative.
    综合来看,这些举措为外资 PE、主权基金和长期资本投资 A 股上市公司开辟了更清晰通道,不再需要”同行业战略资源”的叙事前提。
  • Practical implications: review the capital-investor versus industrial-investor distinction under CSRC rules, prepare governance-participation and lock-up undertakings, and align cross-border share-swap structures with the still-pending revision of Order No. 10.
    实操要点:对照证监会规则区分”资本投资者”与”产业投资者”,准备参与治理与锁定期承诺,并将跨境换股架构与仍在修订中的 10 号令做好衔接。

A New On-Ramp for Foreign Capital: Strategic Investment in A-Share Listed Companies in 2026 | 外资入市新通道:2026 年 A 股上市公司战略投资

Overview

For years, foreign equity investment institutions seeking to take meaningful stakes in Chinese listed companies faced a structural mismatch. The strategic-investment regime under the Measures for Strategic Investment by Foreign Investors in Listed Companies required either a “same or related industry” relationship or a path through the narrower private-placement rules, and the legacy rules on foreign M&A (the 2006 Measures, commonly called “Order No. 10”) had not kept pace with the market. Foreign PE funds that could bring capital, governance discipline and global resources often found themselves unable to fit the strategic-investor mould because their “strategic resources” did not map to the target’s industry.

That mismatch is now being dismantled from two directions. First, the revised Strategic Investment Measures, effective December 2024, lowered the minimum stake for strategic investment via agreement transfer and tender offer from 10% to 5%, added tender offers as a permitted route, extended eligibility to foreign natural persons, relaxed asset requirements for non-controlling investors, and — critically — allowed cross-border share swaps using shares of unlisted overseas companies in private placements and tender offers. Second, the “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》), issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the NDRC and the Ministry of Finance in June 2026, explicitly states that eligible foreign equity investment institutions may participate as strategic investors in securities issuance by listed companies in “non-related industries,” and commits to accelerating the revision of Order No. 10.

What the “non-related industry” change means

Under the CSRC’s refinancing rules, strategic investors in a lock-up private placement are split into two categories: industrial investors and capital investors. Industrial investors must hold “important strategic resources in the same or related industries” of the listed company. Capital investors — long-term institutional investors that hold a prescribed threshold, participate in corporate governance and contribute strategic resources in practice — were defined without clearly including foreign equity investment institutions.

The Action Plan’s language cuts through this uncertainty. By allowing eligible foreign equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of non-related industries, it signals that foreign PE and sovereign-wealth-type investors can qualify as capital investors without needing an industry-adjacent story. In practice, this is the clearest regulatory recognition to date that professional long-term capital — willing to hold, participate in governance and integrate resources — is itself a legitimate form of strategic value.

The Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office’s August 2026 briefing on foreign-investment policy describes this as the “crossing of boundaries” for strategic investment, noting that the change opens the A-share market to incremental foreign capital and reserves policy space for long-term investors such as foreign sovereign funds.

The pending revision of Order No. 10

The Action Plan also promises to “accelerate the revision and promulgation of the provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimise M&A procedures and consideration-payment requirements, and strengthen cross-departmental regulatory coordination.” The reference is to Order No. 10, the 2006 Measures on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.

Three frictions make the revision consequential. First, the cross-border share-swap clause in Order No. 10 still requires that shares used as consideration be shares of an overseas listed company, whereas the revised Strategic Investment Measures already allow unlisted overseas company shares in private placements and tender offers — an inconsistency the revision is expected to reconcile. Second, the coordination between Order No. 10’s procedural requirements and the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting regime needs streamlining. Third, the interface between Order No. 10 and the strategic-investment regime overlaps and should be clarified.

For foreign investors structuring deals today, the practical guidance is to build transactions with the expectation that Order No. 10 will be revised, while complying with the current rules: foreign M&A continues to require information reporting, and the revised Strategic Investment Measures already govern strategic investment thresholds, lock-ups and payment methods.

Practical checklist for foreign investors

  1. Determine which regime applies. Strategic investment in a listed company (revised Strategic Investment Measures), M&A of an unlisted domestic target (Order No. 10, pending revision), and concentration filing under the Anti-Monopoly Law may all be triggered; map them before structuring.
  2. Classify the investor role. Under the CSRC’s strategic-investor framework for refinancing, document how the investor qualifies as a capital investor — long-term holding intent, shareholding threshold, governance participation and actual resource contribution.
  3. Prepare the lock-up and governance undertakings. Strategic investment typically entails a 12-month lock-up (or longer for controlling positions) and governance commitments; align these with the issuer’s board arrangements.
  4. Review consideration methods. Where cross-border share swaps are contemplated, confirm whether the consideration shares are listed or unlisted and which regime governs, given the divergence between Order No. 10 and the Strategic Investment Measures.
  5. Anticipate the Order No. 10 revision. Monitor the MOFCOM and SAMR consultation pipeline; the Action Plan signals that streamlined procedures and flexible consideration-payment requirements are coming.

Related reading

  • The Strategic Investment Measures (revised, effective December 2024) and the CSRC’s refinancing rules on strategic investors.
  • The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026), including its M&A and strategic-investment commitments.
  • The Anti-Monopoly Law’s merger-concentration filing thresholds, which apply to foreign M&A regardless of the strategic-investment route.

Sources

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》: https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

外资入市新通道:2026 年 A 股上市公司战略投资

概述

多年来,希望在中国的上市公司中取得有意义持股的外资股权投资机构一直面临结构性错配。现行《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》下的战略投资制度要求”同行业或相关行业”关系,或只能走更窄的定向发行规则;而关于外资并购的旧规(2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》,俗称”10 号令”)也未能跟上市场变化。能够带来资本、治理纪律和全球资源的外资 PE 基金,往往因为其”战略资源”无法对应标的企业所处行业,而无法契合战略投资者身份。

这一错配正从两个方向被拆除。其一,修订后的《战略投资管理办法》自 2024 年 12 月施行,把协议转让、要约收购方式战略投资的最低持股比例由 10% 降至 5%,新增要约收购路径,将外国自然人纳入投资者范围,降低非控股投资者的资产要求,并——关键之处——允许定向发行、要约收购中以境外非上市公司股份实施跨境换股。其二,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部 2026 年 6 月印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确表示,允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,并承诺加快修订 10 号令。

“非相关行业”突破意味着什么

根据证监会再融资规则,锁定价格定向发行中的战略投资者分为两类:产业投资者和资本投资者。产业投资者须持有上市公司”同行业或者相关行业重要战略性资源”。资本投资者——长期持股、达到规定持股比例、参与公司治理并实际导入战略资源的长期机构投资者——其定义并未明确包含外资股权投资机构。

《行动方案》的表述一举扫除这一不确定性。允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构参与”非相关行业”上市公司证券发行,意味着外资 PE 和主权基金类投资者可以在不编造行业相邻叙事的前提下,以资本投资者身份获得资格。实务上,这是迄今对”专业长期资本本身就是一种合法战略价值形态”最清晰的监管认可。

上海市人民政府外事办公室 2026 年 8 月的涉外政策简报将此举描述为战略投资的”跨界”,指出这一变化为 A 股引入增量外资打开通道,并为外国主权基金等长期资本预留了政策空间。

10 号令修订在即

《行动方案》同时承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求,强化部门监管协同”。所指正是 10 号令——2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》。

三处摩擦使修订势在必行。其一,10 号令关于跨境换股的条款仍要求作为支付手段的股权必须是”境外上市公司股权”,而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》已允许定向发行、要约收购使用境外非上市公司股份,两者存在规范冲突,预计通过修订实现制度衔接。其二,10 号令的程序性要求与《外商投资法》框架下的信息报告制度需要理顺。其三,10 号令与战略投资制度的适用范围存在重叠,应予以澄清。

对当前正在设计交易的外国投资者,实务指引是:在预期 10 号令将修订的前提下构建交易,同时遵守现行规则——外资并购继续需要信息报告,战略投资的持股门槛、锁定期与支付方式则已由修订后的《战略投资管理办法》规范。

外国投资者实操清单

  1. 确定适用制度。上市公司战略投资(修订版《战略投资管理办法》)、未上市境内标的并购(10 号令,修订在即)以及《反垄断法》下的经营者集中申报可能同时触发;构架前先逐项梳理。
  2. 界定投资者角色。按证监会再融资战略投资者框架,书面论证投资者如何符合资本投资者条件——长期持股意图、持股比例门槛、参与治理与实际资源导入。
  3. 准备锁定期与治理承诺。战略投资通常涉及 12 个月锁定期(控股地位更长)与治理承诺;与发行人的董事会安排对齐。
  4. 审查对价方式。在考虑跨境换股时,确认对价股份是上市还是非上市、由哪套制度管辖,注意 10 号令与《战略投资管理办法》的差异。
  5. 预判 10 号令修订。跟踪商务部、市场监管总局征求意见动态;《行动方案》已释放流程简化、对价支付要求灵活化的信号。

相关阅读

  • 《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月修订施行)与证监会再融资战略投资者规则。
  • 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月),含其并购与战略投资承诺。
  • 《反垄断法》经营者集中申报标准,无论是否走战略投资路径,外资并购均须适用。

来源

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 天津市商务局《商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部关于印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉的通知》:https://shangwuju.tj.gov.cn/tjsswjzz/zwdt/wzdt/wzgl/zcfg/202608/t20260820_7355374.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

Cross-Border Share Swaps and Red-Chip Structures: The 2026 Revision Window

  • The June 2026 “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” promises to accelerate the revision of the 2006 Measures on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises (Order No. 10), with streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements — directly affecting the legal environment for cross-border share swaps and red-chip restructurings.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订 2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(10 号令),优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求——直接影响跨境换股与红筹架构的法律环境。
  • A known friction point: Order No. 10 still requires that shares used as consideration in a cross-border share swap be shares of an overseas listed company, while the revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) already allow unlisted overseas company shares in private placements and tender offers — an inconsistency the revision is expected to resolve.
    已知摩擦点:10 号令仍要求跨境换股的对价股份须为境外上市公司股份,而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)已允许定向发行、要约收购使用境外非上市公司股份——这一规范冲突预计通过修订解决。
  • Red-chip structures, while less dominant since the 2023 offshore-listing filing regime, remain attractive for accessing overseas investors and non-Hong Kong listings; the pending revision of Order No. 10 and new rules for resident individuals’ overseas investment will shape the next generation of these structures.
    红筹架构自 2023 年境外上市备案新规后优势有所下降,但在吸引境外投资者、赴港以外市场上市等方面仍有价值;10 号令修订在即以及境内居民个人境外投资新办法,将塑造下一代红筹架构。
  • For investors structuring cross-border M&A or listings in 2026, the practical guidance is to run parallel scenario models — listed-share swaps under current rules, unlisted-share swaps once the revision lands, and direct investment via FDI — and to keep transaction documents flexible enough to switch lanes.
    对 2026 年设计跨境并购或上市架构的投资者,实务指引是并行建立情景模型——现行规则下的上市股份换股、修订落地后的非上市股份换股、以及直接 FDI 投资——并保持交易文件足够灵活以便切换通道。

Cross-Border Share Swaps and Red-Chip Structures: The 2026 Revision Window | 跨境换股与红筹架构:2026 年修订窗口期

Overview

For foreign investors and Chinese companies raising capital offshore, the structuring question has always been: which vehicle, and through which regulatory gate? The 2026 answer is in motion. The “Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment” (June 2026) commits to “accelerating the revision and promulgation of the provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises” — the 2006 Measures, commonly known as Order No. 10 — with streamlined procedures and more flexible consideration-payment requirements. In parallel, the revised Strategic Investment Measures, effective December 2024, already modernised the strategic-investment lane. Between the two, the regulatory architecture for cross-border share swaps and holding-company structures is being rebuilt in real time.

Order No. 10 has been the backbone of cross-border share-swap structuring for two decades. Its core mechanics — approval or filing for foreign investors acquiring domestic enterprises, and the use of overseas-listed-company shares as consideration — created the original framework for red-chip and SPV structures. Two decades of market evolution, however, have left the rules showing their age in three specific places, and each is on the 2026 revision agenda.

The three frictions the revision must resolve

First, the cross-border share-swap clause. Order No. 10’s Article 28 requires that shares used as consideration in a share swap be shares of an overseas listed company, excluding unlisted overseas company shares (except special-purpose vehicles). The revised Strategic Investment Measures, by contrast, explicitly allow strategic investment through private placements and tender offers to use unlisted overseas company shares as consideration. A Chinese company that wants to acquire an overseas business by issuing its own shares to the overseas target’s shareholders, or a foreign investor that wants to pay for a stake in a Chinese company with shares of an unlisted overseas affiliate, currently faces two inconsistent rulebooks. The revision is expected to align the two.

Second, the interplay with the offshore-listing filing regime. Since the CSRC’s 2023 rules brought red-chip and H-share listings into one filing framework, the compliance cost and time of red-chip structures have risen. The filing regime, however, does not prohibit the structure; it makes it transparent. And with the State Council’s June 2026 regulation on outbound investment tasking the NDRC to draft rules for resident individuals’ overseas investment, the personal-investment layer of red-chip structures is also being redrawn. How Order No. 10’s related-party merger clause will be revised will signal the policy stance on the next generation of these structures.

Third, coordination with the Foreign Investment Law. Order No. 10’s procedural requirements and the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting regime need to be rationalised. The Action Plan’s reference to “strengthening cross-departmental regulatory coordination” points directly at this: investors should not need to file the same transaction under overlapping regimes with inconsistent thresholds and timetables.

What this means for structure choices in 2026

For a foreign investor acquiring a Chinese business or a Chinese company doing an offshore capital raise, the practical read is that the lane selection window is open but not yet settled:

  • Direct FDI remains the baseline. For most operating investments, a straightforward WFOE or JV under the negative-list-plus-reporting regime continues to be the default, fastest and most predictable structure.
  • Listed-share swaps remain usable today. Where a share swap is the right consideration structure and the target shares are overseas-listed, current rules support it; transaction documents should nonetheless be drafted with fallback clauses in case the revision changes the applicable lane mid-transaction.
  • Unlisted-share swaps should be modelled, not assumed. Where the consideration is unlisted overseas company shares, the current inconsistency means structuring should either use the strategic-investment lane (private placements and tender offers in listed-company contexts) or defer the swap leg until the revised Order No. 10 clarifies the position.
  • Red-chip listings should be built for transparency. The 2023 filing regime, the pending resident-individual outbound investment rules and the Order No. 10 revision together mean that red-chip structures must be documented for filing and disclosure from day one, rather than retro-fitted at listing.

Practical checklist for 2026 structurings

  1. Run parallel scenario models. Build the same deal as (a) direct FDI, (b) share swap under current rules, and (c) share swap under the expected revised rules, and compare tax, timing and regulatory exposure.
  2. Pin the applicable gate. Confirm whether the transaction involves a listed-company strategic investment (Strategic Investment Measures), an unlisted-target acquisition (Order No. 10), or a securities-market purchase (QFII / Stock Connect channels), and identify which filings are mandatory today.
  3. Keep documents flexible. Include condition precedent and alternative-consideration clauses so the transaction can switch from a share swap to cash or to a different vehicle class without renegotiating the entire deal.
  4. Prepare the information-reporting file. Regardless of structure, the Foreign Investment Law’s information-reporting duty applies to establishment, change and merger events; build the reporting schedule into the closing plan.
  5. Monitor the revision pipeline. The MOFCOM revision of Order No. 10, the NDRC rules for resident-individual overseas investment, and provincial implementations of the Action Plan’s M&A facilitation will each change the structuring calculus; track them through official channels.

Related reading

  • The 2006 Measures on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Order No. 10), pending revision.
  • The revised Strategic Investment Measures (effective December 2024) and the CSRC’s offshore-listing filing rules (2023).
  • The State Council’s regulation on outbound investment (effective July 2026) and the draft NDRC implementing measures.

Sources

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网): https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》: https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

跨境换股与红筹架构:2026 年修订窗口期

概述

对外国投资者和在境外融资的中国公司而言,架构问题始终是:选哪个载体,过哪道监管门?2026 年的答案正在变化之中。《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026 年 6 月)承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定”——即俗称 10 号令的 2006 年规定——优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求。与之并行,修订后的《战略投资管理办法》已于 2024 年 12 月落地,使战略投资通道现代化。两者之间,跨境换股与控股架构的监管体系正在实时重建。

十多年来,10 号令一直是跨境换股架构的支柱。其核心机制——外国投资者并购境内企业的审批或备案、以境外上市公司股份作为对价——创造了红筹与特殊目的公司(SPV)架构的最初框架。然而,二十年的市场演进让规则在三处显出老态,而每一处都在 2026 年修订议程之上。

修订必须解决的三处摩擦

第一,跨境换股条款。10 号令第 28 条要求换股支付手段的股权须为境外上市公司股权,排除了境外非上市公司股权(特殊目的公司除外)。而修订后的《战略投资管理办法》明确允许定向发行、要约收购方式的战略投资使用境外非上市公司股份作为对价。一家想通过向境外标的企业股东发行自身股份来收购境外业务的中国公司,或者想以境外未上市关联公司股份支付中国公司股权对价的外国投资者,如今面对的是两套不一致的规则。预计修订将实现制度衔接。

第二,与境外上市备案制度的互动。自证监会 2023 年新规把红筹与 H 股上市纳入同一备案框架后,红筹架构的合规成本和时间有所上升。但备案制度并不禁止这一结构,只是使其透明化。随着国务院 2026 年 6 月对外投资规定要求发改委起草境内居民个人境外投资具体管理办法,红筹架构的个人投资层也在被重绘。10 号令关联并购条款将如何修订,将释放政策层对下一代红筹架构的态度信号。

第三,与《外商投资法》的协调。10 号令的程序性要求与《外商投资法》的信息报告制度需要理顺。《行动方案》中”强化部门监管协同”的表述直指此处:投资者不应在门槛与时间表不一致的重叠制度下重复申报同一交易。

对 2026 年架构选择的意义

对收购中国业务的外国投资者或进行境外融资的中国公司,实操读法是:通道选择窗口已开,但尚未定型。

  • 直接 FDI 仍是基线。对大多数经营性投资,负面清单加信息报告体制下的直接外商独资企业或合资公司,继续是默认、最快、最可预期的结构。
  • 上市股份换股今天仍可用。换股是合适的对价结构且标的股份为境外上市公司的,现行规则支持;但交易文件仍应起草回退条款,以防修订在交易中途改变适用通道。
  • 非上市股份换股应建模而非假设。对价涉及境外非上市股份的,当前的不一致意味着构架应要么走战略投资通道(上市公司语境下的定向发行、要约收购),要么推迟换股环节直至修订后的 10 号令澄清立场。
  • 红筹上市应面向透明构建。2023 年备案制度、居民个人境外投资新规与 10 号令修订共同意味着:红筹架构必须从第一天起就按备案与披露要求留档,而非上市时追溯补做。

2026 年构架实操清单

  1. 并行建立情景模型。把同一笔交易分别构建为(a)直接 FDI、(b)现行规则下的换股、(c)预期修订规则下的换股,比较税务、时间与监管敞口。
  2. 锁定适用闸门。确认交易涉及上市公司战略投资(《战略投资管理办法》)、未上市标的并购(10 号令)还是证券市场购买(QFII / 互联互通通道),并识别当下哪些申报是强制性的。
  3. 保持文件灵活。加入先决条件与替代对价条款,使交易无需重谈即可从换股切换为现金或不同载体类别。
  4. 备好信息报告档案。无论何种架构,《外商投资法》的信息报告义务适用于设立、变更与并购事件;把申报时间表纳入交割计划。
  5. 跟踪修订管道。商务部对 10 号令的修订、发改委居民个人境外投资办法以及《行动方案》并购便利化在各省的落实,都将改变构架计算;通过官方渠道跟踪。

相关阅读

  • 《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(10 号令,2006 年),修订在即。
  • 修订版《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(2024 年 12 月施行)与证监会 2023 年境外上市备案规则。
  • 国务院《对外投资的规定》(2026 年 7 月施行)及发改委征求意见稿。

来源

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(中国政府网):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 3 期,总第 155 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260818/ce3cd5fcab334d1ea3a994e97d178583.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室《〈上海资讯周报〉涉外资讯一站式服务(2026 年 8 月第 2 期,总第 154 期)》:https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260811/bd3b73a6e882435e92bd4f7213129b46.html
  • 商务部《商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发〈利用外资固稳促优行动方案〉》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2026/art_6321e5e42c6246319e12876d5a6786f2.html
  • 商务部《凌激副部长兼国际贸易谈判副代表出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施》:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn:8443/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html

China’s Draft Outbound Investment Management Measures: Key Changes in the 2026 Revision

  • China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published the Draft Outbound Investment Management Measures on 21 August 2026, opening a public-comment window that runs to 20 September 2026.
    国家发展改革委于 2026 年 8 月 21 日发布《对外投资管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》,公开征求意见至 2026 年 9 月 20 日。
  • The draft replaces the 2017 Outbound Investment Management Measures (NDRC Order No. 11) and operationalises the State Council’s Regulation on Outbound Investment (State Council Order No. 837), in force since 1 July 2026.
    修订稿将取代 2017 年《企业境外投资管理办法》(发改委令 2017 年第 11 号),并把 2026 年 7 月 1 日施行的《国务院关于对外投资的规定》(国务院令第 837 号)细化为部门规章。
  • The investor scope broadens from enterprises and non-enterprise organisations to include resident individuals, while the approval-and-filing architecture for sensitive and non-sensitive projects is kept largely intact.
    投资者范围由境内企业、非企业组织扩展至居民个人,但敏感类项目核准、非敏感类项目备案的分类监管框架基本保持稳定。
  • New and tightened reporting duties stand out: overseas re-investment reporting drops the RMB 300 million threshold and must be filed 20 working days ahead, joined by a new annual report and a pre-project report for large, diplomatically sensitive deals.
    报告义务显著增多:境外再投资报告取消 3 亿元门槛并须提前 20 个工作日报送,新增年度报告,以及对金额大、涉及外交关系项目的”前期工作情况报告”。
  • A dedicated investment-protection chapter formalises security review and reciprocal countermeasures, giving the authorities a statutory basis to respond when foreign parties impose discriminatory or restrictive measures on Chinese investors.
    新增”对外投资保护”专章,将安全审查与对等反制写入规章,为在境外投资受外国歧视性或限制性措施影响时采取应对举措提供制度依据。
  • Penalties are materially strengthened — fines, confiscation of unlawful gains, a three-year suspension of acceptance, and one-to-three-year bans — bringing the rules’ enforcement teeth in line with the parent State Council regulation.
    法律责任明显加重:罚款、没收违法所得、三年内不受理、一至三年禁入,使规章的执行力与上位行政法规保持一致。
  • Cross-border financial-market channels — QDII, Stock Connect and Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect — remain explicitly exempt from approval, filing and reporting, preserving existing outbound investment pathways.
    合格境内机构投资者(QDII)、港股通、跨境理财通等境外金融市场投资渠道明确豁免核准、备案与报告,既有对外投融资通路得以保留。

China’s Draft Outbound Investment Management Measures: Key Changes in the 2026 Revision | 中国《对外投资管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》解读:2026 年修订要点

Overview

On 21 August 2026, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published the *Outbound Investment Management Measures (Draft for Revision and Public Comment)* (the “Draft”). The public-comment window runs from 21 August to 20 September 2026. Once adopted, the Draft will replace the *Outbound Investment Management Measures* (NDRC Order No. 11 of 2017, the “2017 Measures”) and serve as the implementing departmental rule for the *Regulation of the State Council on Outbound Investment* (State Council Order No. 837 of 2026, the “837 Order”), which took effect on 1 July 2026.

The Draft keeps the 2017 Measures’ six-chapter structure but expands from 66 to 76 articles and adds a dedicated chapter on investment protection. Its revision follows four stated principles: alignment with higher-level law, problem orientation, overall continuity, and coordinated linkage.

Background: from “enterprise outbound” to “outbound investment”

The 2017 Measures governed outbound investment mainly by enterprises and, by reference, non-enterprise organisations such as public institutions and social groups. Since then, China’s outbound investment has grown in both volume and complexity: investors are more diverse, structures more layered, and the external environment more contested. The 837 Order, China’s first administrative regulation dedicated to outbound investment, broadened the statutory concept of “outbound investment” and explicitly recognised investors as including domestic enterprises, other organisations and resident individuals.

The Draft translates that higher-level framework into operable rules. In the words of NDRC-affiliated researchers, the shift from “enterprise outbound investment” to “outbound investment” signals a move toward a legalised, institutionalised and predictable regime — one that aligns with international expectations on transparency while giving investors a clearer, more stable rule set.

What stays the same

The core access framework is deliberately preserved:

  • Sensitive projects remain subject to approval by the NDRC.
  • Non-sensitive projects continue under a graded filing system, with large non-sensitive projects (those at or above the RMB 300 million threshold) handled at the NDRC level and smaller ones at provincial level.
  • The scope of approval/filing, the procedures, statutory timelines, validity, changes and extensions are carried over largely unchanged.

This continuity is intentional: it keeps the compliance baseline familiar for investors and regulators alike and lowers the cost of transition.

What changes

The Draft’s substantive changes cluster around four areas.

1. Broader investor scope. Investors now expressly include resident individuals, not only enterprises and other organisations. Individuals’ outbound investment will follow procedures to be specified separately, but the principle of market-based outbound investment is confirmed for all investor types.

2. A fuller reporting system. Several reporting duties are new or revised:

  • *Overseas re-investment reporting* drops the previous RMB 300 million threshold, must be submitted 20 working days in advance, and explicitly covers round-trip (return) investment.
  • A new annual information report gives the authorities a periodic, portfolio-level view of an investor’s outbound footprint.
  • A new pre-project work report applies to a small number of projects that are large and bear on China’s diplomatic relations with relevant countries.
  • The major adverse-situation report is now triggered “immediately” and its scope is widened to capture foreign discriminatory or restrictive actions.

All such reports are characterised as notification-type obligations — not administrative licences — that are completed upon submission, without waiting for a reply.

3. Formalised security review and reciprocal countermeasures. A new investment-protection chapter writes the 837 Order’s security-review and countermeasure provisions into the departmental rule. Where a foreign organisation or individual imposes discriminatory or restrictive measures on a Chinese investor’s outbound investment, the NDRC may, at the investor’s request and within its remit, take responsive measures — including restricting that foreign party’s investment in China or transactions and cooperation with Chinese parties.

4. Stronger enforcement. Penalties are materially upgraded to match the 837 Order: fines, confiscation of unlawful gains, a three-year suspension of acceptance of new outbound-investment filings, and one-to-three-year bans in serious cases.

Channels that remain open

To preserve existing outbound-financing pathways, the Draft confirms that investment through Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII), Stock Connect and Cross-boundary Wealth Management Connect in overseas financial markets is exempt from the approval, filing and reporting rules. Two “safety valves” remain: the rules still apply when an investor obtains control of the investee or acquires a 10% integer multiple equity or voting stake — situations generally treated as direct outbound investment.

Practical implications

For Chinese outbound investors, the Draft widens the door (notably for individuals) while lengthening the compliance to-do list. Companies should expect to build reporting routines — re-investment, annual, pre-project and adverse-event notifications — into their investment-lifecycle governance rather than treating them as one-off filings. Embedding compliance review at the feasibility stage, and maintaining both internal legal and external advisory support, becomes the pragmatic default.

For foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in China and for foreign investors with Chinese counterparties, three linkages matter. First, the countermeasure provisions mean that restrictive measures imposed abroad on Chinese investors can, in turn, constrain the relevant foreign party’s China-facing activities — a factor for any multinational with cross-border investment exposure. Second, the security-review framework intersects with broader inbound and outbound screening, relevant where deals touch sensitive sectors or assets. Third, the explicit exemption of QDII, Stock Connect and Wealth Management Connect preserves channels that foreign financial institutions in China frequently use or facilitate, supporting cross-border capital flows in both directions.

Related reading

The Draft is the latest step in a sequence of 2026 investment-policy moves, alongside the 837 Order (effective 1 July 2026) and ongoing updates to export-control and countermeasure instruments. Readers tracking China’s investment regime should monitor the NDRC’s forthcoming supporting documents and Q&A, expected after the comment period closes on 20 September 2026.

Sources


中国《对外投资管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》解读:2026 年修订要点

概览

2026 年 8 月 21 日,国家发展改革委发布《对外投资管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》(以下简称”修订稿”),公开征求意见期为 8 月 21 日至 9 月 20 日。修订稿施行后将取代 2017 年《企业境外投资管理办法》(国家发展改革委令 2017 年第 11 号,以下简称”2017 年办法”),并成为《国务院关于对外投资的规定》(国务院令 2026 年第 837 号,以下简称”837 号令”)的实施性部门规章。837 号令已于 2026 年 7 月 1 日施行。

修订稿沿用 2017 年办法六章结构,但条文由 66 条增至 76 条,并新增”对外投资保护”专章。此次修订遵循四项原则:对标对表、问题导向、总体延续、衔接联动。

背景:从”企业境外投资”到”对外投资”

2017 年办法主要规范境内企业以及参照执行的事业单位、社会团体等非企业组织的境外投资。此后,我国对外投资在规模与复杂度上持续上升:投资主体更加多元,交易结构更趋多层,外部环境也更趋复杂。837 号令作为我国首部专门规范对外投资的行政法规,拓宽了”对外投资”的法定内涵,并明确投资者包括境内企业、其他组织和居民个人。

修订稿将上述上位法框架转化为可操作的规则。据国家发改委相关研究机构解读,从”企业境外投资”到”对外投资”的名称之变,折射出制度升级——对外投资决策正转向法定化、制度化、可预期的发展轨道,既对接国际经贸规则对透明度的要求,也为投资者提供了更清晰、更稳定的规则环境。

保持不变的部分

核心准入框架被有意保留:

  • 敏感类项目仍由发改委核准。
  • 非敏感类项目继续实行分级备案,其中金额较大(达到 3 亿元及以上门槛)的非敏感项目由发改委层级办理,较小的由省级层面办理。
  • 核准与备案的适用范围、办理程序、法定时限、效力、变更与延期等核心内容基本延续。

这种延续性是有意为之:既让投资者与监管部门维持熟悉的合规基线,也降低了制度转换成本。

主要变化

修订稿的实质性变化集中在四个方面。

一、投资者范围扩大。 投资者明确扩展至居民个人,不再限于企业与其他组织。居民个人的对外投资将另行制定具体办理程序,但各类投资者按市场化原则开展对外投资的原则得到确认。

二、报告体系更完整。 多项报告义务为新增或调整:

  • *境外再投资报告*取消原 3 亿元门槛,须提前 20 个工作日报送,并明确覆盖返程投资。
  • 新增对外投资信息年度报告,使管理部门得以周期性、组合式地掌握投资者境外布局。
  • 新增前期工作情况报告,适用于少数金额大、关乎我国与相关国家外交关系的项目。
  • 重大不利情况报告改为”立即”报送,情形亦扩展至境外歧视性或限制性措施。

上述各项报告均属告知性事项,非行政许可,投资者按规定提交即完成程序,无需等待管理部门回复。

三、安全审查与对等反制入规。 新增的”对外投资保护”专章将 837 号令中的安全审查与反制条款写入部门规章。当外国组织或个人对中国投资者的对外投资采取歧视性或限制性措施时,国家发改委可应投资者请求,在职责范围内采取应对举措——包括限制该外国组织、个人在境内投资,或限制境内组织、个人与其进行交易、合作等活动。

四、法律责任加重。 处罚力度与 837 号令对标、明显升级:罚款、没收违法所得、三年内不受理新的对外投资核准备案申请,情节严重时一至三年禁入。

保留的通路

为延续既有对外投融资渠道,修订稿明确,投资者通过合格境内机构投资者(QDII)、港股通、跨境理财通在境外金融市场投资的,豁免核准、备案与报告义务。同时保留两道”安全阀”:当投资者取得被投资企业控制权,或取得股权、表决权比例达到10% 的整数倍时,仍适用本办法——这类情形通常被视为对外直接投资。

实务影响

对 outbound 投资者而言,修订稿在拓宽大门(尤其是向居民个人)的同时,也拉长了合规待办清单。企业应把再投资报告、年度报告、前期工作报告、重大不利情况报告等嵌入投资全周期治理,而非视作一次性申报。在可行性研究阶段即引入合规审查,并统筹内部法务与外部专业支持,将成为务实的默认做法。

对在华外商投资企业与有中国交易对手的外国投资者,有三重关联值得关注。其一,反制条款意味着,境外对中国投资者采取的限制性措施,可能反过来约束相关外国主体在華活动——这是任何具有跨境投资敞口的跨国公司的考量因素。其二,安全审查框架与更广泛的内外双向筛查相交织,在交易涉及敏感行业或资产时尤其相关。其三,明确豁免 QDII、港股通与跨境理财通,保留了外资金融机构在华常用或协助的渠道,支撑双向跨境资金流动。

延伸阅读

修订稿是 2026 年投资政策序列的最新一步,与 7 月 1 日施行的 837 号令,以及持续更新的出口管制与反制工具相衔接。关注中国投资制度的读者,可留意发改委在 9 月 20 日征求意见期结束后将同步起草的配套文件与常见问题解答。

Sources

Lingang’s 15th Five-Year Plan: Offshore Business Goes Full-Scenario

  • On 21 August 2026 the Lingang Special Area (Shanghai FTZ) published its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), making offshore business the centrepiece of the area’s next-stage opening.
    2026 年 8 月 21 日,《中国(上海)自由贸易试验区临港新片区发展”十五五”规划》正式发布,离岸业务成为新片区下一阶段开放的核心内容。
  • The plan calls for expanding the offshore-trade financial-services pilot from the single “offshore trade” scenario to full-scenario “offshore business” — covering offshore service outsourcing, offshore treasury management and offshore investment and financing — through “specialised companies plus open first line, controlled second line” design.
    规划提出推进离岸贸易金融服务综合改革试点扩围,通过”专营公司+一线放开、二线管住”的制度设计,把试点从单一的”离岸贸易”场景升级为覆盖离岸服务外包、离岸资金管理、离岸投融资等的全场景”离岸业务”。
  • Multinationals’ product distribution centres, commodity traders and global production processors are encouraged to set up offshore-business specialised companies in Lingang, with banks providing payment, settlement and financing support and offshore-trade stamp-duty relief available.
    规划支持跨国集团产品分销中心、大宗商品贸易商、全球生产加工企业等在临港设立离岸业务专营公司,鼓励区内金融机构提供资金支付、结算、融资服务,并可用足离岸贸易印花税优惠政策。
  • The pilot already has results: Lingang’s offshore-trade volume reached USD 32.7 billion in 2025 (+32.1%) and USD 19.4 billion in H1 2026 (+29.1%), under the “no document review, settle on instruction, settle in seconds” model.
    试点已有成绩:在”免审单、凭指令、秒结算”模式下,2025 年新片区离岸贸易规模达 327.37 亿美元(+32.1%),2026 年上半年 194.13 亿美元(+29.08%)。
  • A first corporate free-trade-zone offshore bond was issued on 13 August 2026 (Shanghai Electric’s offshore subsidiary, RMB 1.5 billion), bringing cumulative offshore-bond issuance to 17 tranches of about RMB 7.1 billion.
    2026 年 8 月 13 日,上海电气境外子公司发行 15 亿元自贸离岸债——全市场首单企业类自贸离岸债——自贸离岸债累计发行达 17 笔、规模约 71 亿元。
  • For foreign companies, the practical angle is a gateway to run global order, treasury and trade settlement from China: an offshore-business entity in Lingang can centralise cross-border treasury, financing and service-fee settlement with fast, instruction-based money flows.
    对外资企业,实操价值在于获得了”在中国境内运营全球订单、财资与贸易结算”的门户:在临港设立离岸业务主体,可依托按指令即付的资金流转集中处理跨境财资、融资与服务费结算。

Lingang’s 15th Five-Year Plan: Offshore Business Goes Full-Scenario | 临港”十五五”规划:离岸业务走向全场景

The plan and its headline direction

On 21 August 2026, the Lingang Special Area of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone released its 15th Five-Year Development Plan (2026–2030). The plan is organised around deepening higher-level opening-up with cross-border and offshore business as the focus. Its headline direction is the expansion of the offshore-trade financial-services pilot from the single “offshore trade” scenario to full-scenario “offshore business”: through a design of “specialised companies plus an open first line and a controlled second line”, the area will first develop offshore-trade financial services built on an existing base such as commodity trading, and then extend the model to more trade scenarios. Multinationals’ product distribution centres, commodity traders and global production processors are explicitly invited to establish offshore-business specialised companies in Lingang to participate in global production, sales and service activities, with onshore banks encouraged to provide payment, settlement and financing for their offshore operations, improving the free-flow convenience of funds coming from and going outside China. The offshore-trade stamp-duty relief remains available.

The offshore-finance agenda

The plan also maps a broader offshore-finance agenda: steadily exploring offshore-finance pilot business, accelerating the landing and ecosystem-building of the expanded offshore-business financial-services pilot, optimising offshore-trade financial services, developing free-trade-zone offshore bonds at a high quality, developing offshore reinsurance in an orderly way, and actively advancing treasury-centre construction. It calls for accelerating the construction of the Shanghai international reinsurance centre, using the policy convenience for investing cross-border reinsurance inflow premiums abroad, and steadily expanding the scale of non-resident M&A lending. The preferred approach is “physical agglomeration, subject restriction and account isolation” — concentrating offshore business in designated areas and entities with separated accounts, so that global financial resources can be gathered without blurring the onshore-offshore boundary.

What the pilot has already delivered

The expansion builds on a running pilot. Lingang launched the offshore-trade financial-services comprehensive reform pilot in June 2025, pioneering an offshore fund-management model of “no document review, settle on instruction, settle in seconds” — settlement that used to take three days now takes three seconds. At the 2026 Lujiazui Forum the expansion plan was announced: the pilot moves from the single offshore-trade scenario to full-scenario offshore business, covering offshore service outsourcing, offshore treasury management and offshore investment and financing, and four banks (ICBC, Bank of China, SPDB and HSBC) were licensed as the first batch of expanded-pilot offshore-business financial institutions. The numbers show the traction: offshore-trade volume in the area reached USD 32.7 billion in 2025, up 32.1%, and USD 19.4 billion in the first half of 2026, up 29.08%. On the debt side, free-trade-zone offshore bonds have accelerated: on 13 August 2026 Shanghai Electric’s offshore subsidiary issued RMB 1.5 billion of FTZ offshore bonds — the first corporate FTZ offshore bond in the market — taking cumulative issuance to 17 tranches of about RMB 7.1 billion, with banks innovating on dual-tenor structures and rolling issuance plans.

Why this matters for foreign companies

For foreign companies, the significance is a practical one: China is offering a credible location to run global treasury and trade operations from inside its borders. A multinational that sets up an offshore-business specialised company in Lingang can consolidate cross-border treasury collection, offshore M&A financing and cross-border service-fee settlement in one vehicle, with instruction-based, near-instant money movement. A global trading house can use Lingang as the booking and settlement centre for orders executed worldwide, matching the efficiency of Singapore or Hong Kong treasury hubs while keeping the China operation inside the FTZ framework. The plan’s “specialised company” concept means the vehicle is distinct from the regular onshore operating entity — it is designed for offshore activity, with the account isolation giving both sides a clear boundary.

Practical steps for interested companies

Foreign companies should weigh five steps. (1) Assess fit: the model suits multinationals with global order management, cross-border procurement or commodity trading that currently route settlement through Hong Kong or Singapore. (2) Review the vehicle design: an offshore-business specialised company in Lingang (wholly foreign-owned is permitted) with clear offshore-activity scope, and the appropriate account structure under the FTU framework. (3) Engage the licensed banks early: the four expanded-pilot banks offer the “settle on instruction” flow, and bank onboarding determines how quickly the model works. (4) Model the tax and duty picture: offshore-trade stamp-duty relief, the plan’s encouragement of treasury-centre construction and the broader FTZ incentives should be modelled together. (5) Watch the implementation notices: the 15th Five-Year Plan sets direction, but the operating rules — application conditions for specialised-company status, eligible activity lists, settlement procedures — will be detailed in implementing measures that follow; companies that position early can shape their structures as the rules land.

Sources


临港”十五五”规划:离岸业务走向全场景

规划与主攻方向

2026 年 8 月 21 日,中国(上海)自由贸易试验区临港新片区发布《发展”十五五”规划》(2026–2030)。规划以跨境和离岸为重点,深化更高水平对外开放,主攻方向是推进离岸贸易金融服务综合改革试点扩围:通过”专营公司+一线放开、二线管住”的制度设计,先发展基于大宗商品交易等既有基础的离岸贸易金融服务,再适时把管理模式扩至更多贸易场景。规划明确支持跨国集团产品分销中心、大宗商品贸易商、全球生产加工企业在临港设立离岸业务专营公司,深度参与全球性生产、销售、服务等活动;鼓励区内金融机构为其提供资金支付、结算、融资等金融服务,提升外来外去资金进出自由便利度;并继续用好离岸贸易印花税优惠政策。

离岸金融议程

规划同时勾画了更宽的离岸金融路线图:稳步探索离岸金融试点业务,加快离岸业务金融服务综合改革试点扩围场景落地与生态拓展,优化离岸贸易金融服务,高质量发展自贸离岸债,有序发展离岸再保险,积极推进财资中心建设;加快上海国际再保险中心建设,用好跨境再保险分入业务收入境外投资便利化政策,稳步扩大非居民并购贷款业务规模。实现路径是”物理集聚、主体限定、账户隔离”——把离岸业务集中在指定区域与主体、以账户隔离运行,在集聚全球优质金融要素的同时守住在岸与离岸的边界。

试点已交出的成绩单

扩围建立在已运行的试点之上。临港 2025 年 6 月率先启动离岸贸易金融服务综合改革试点,首创”免审单、凭指令、秒结算”离岸资金管理模式——过去需要三天的结算现在三秒完成。2026 年陆家嘴论坛上宣布扩围:试点由”离岸贸易”单一场景升级为全场景”离岸业务”,覆盖离岸服务外包、离岸资金管理、离岸投融资等,工商银行、中国银行、浦发银行、汇丰银行四家试点银行获授牌成为扩围后首批离岸业务金融服务机构。数据印证动能:2025 年新片区离岸贸易规模 327.37 亿美元、同比增长 32.1%;2026 年上半年 194.13 亿美元、增长 29.08%。债务端,自贸离岸债明显提速:8 月 13 日上海电气境外子公司发行 15 亿元自贸离岸债——全市场首单企业类自贸离岸债——累计发行达 17 笔、规模约 71 亿元,银行还在双期限结构、滚动发行计划上持续创新。

为什么对外资企业重要

对外资企业,意义在于一个实打实的选择:中国开始提供可信的”在中国境内运营全球财资与贸易”的落点。跨国公司在临港设立离岸业务专营公司,可在一个主体内集中处理跨境财资归集、海外并购融资与跨境技术服务费结算,资金按指令近乎实时流动。全球贸易商可以把临港作为全球订单的记账与结算中心,在保持中国业务处于自贸区框架内的同时,匹配新加坡或香港财资枢纽的效率。规划中的”专营公司”概念意味着这个载体与常规在岸经营主体相区分——专为离岸活动而设,账户隔离让两边边界清晰。

给有意企业的实操步骤

外资企业可从五步入手。(1)评估匹配度:该模式适合目前经香港或新加坡结算的全球订单管理、跨境采购或大宗商品贸易企业。(2)设计载体:在临港设立离岸业务专营公司(外资独资可行),明确离岸业务范围,并按自贸区分账核算单元(FTU)框架搭建账户结构。(3)尽早对接持牌银行:四家扩围试点银行提供”凭指令结算”流程,银行接入速度决定模式跑起来多快。(4)测算税负与成本:离岸贸易印花税优惠、规划对财资中心建设的鼓励,以及自贸区既有激励应一起建模。(5)盯住配套细则:规划定方向,但运行规则——专营公司认定条件、可开展业务清单、结算程序——将在后续实施细则中明确;提前卡位的企业可以在规则落地时按自己的结构去适配。

Sources

Services Take Centre Stage: China’s Market-Access Opening as of Late August 2026

  • At a State Council Information Office press conference on 28 August 2026, the Ministry of Commerce confirmed that services are now the centrepiece of market-access opening, with work under way to steadily and prudently expand market access and opening fields with services as the focus.
    在 2026 年 8 月 28 日国新办新闻发布会上,商务部确认服务业已成为市场准入开放的重心,正稳妥有序推动以服务业为重点扩大市场准入和开放领域。
  • The MOFCOM is building National Service Trade Innovation and Development Demonstration Zones in 17 regions (the overall plan was issued in April 2026), positioning them as comprehensive reform-and-opening platforms for services trade in the 15th Five-Year period.
    商务部正在北京等 17 个地区建设国家服务贸易创新发展示范区(总体方案 2026 年 4 月印发),将其定位为”十五五”时期服务贸易综合改革开放平台。
  • The demonstration zones will explore a more open institutional environment for the cross-border movement of funds, people, technology and data, steadily expand services market opening, simplify licensing approval procedures and improve risk-prevention mechanisms.
    示范区将探索优化资金、人员、技术、数据等要素跨境流动的制度环境,稳步有序扩大服务市场开放,简化有关许可审批程序,完善风险防控机制。
  • The cross-border services-trade negative list will be improved to remove barriers to cross-border services trade, and the factor flows closely linked to services trade — people, capital and data — will be made more convenient and secure.
    将完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,破除跨境服务贸易壁垒,推动与服务贸易密切相关的人员、资金、数据等要素便利、安全地跨境流动。
  • Regional positioning is differentiated: Shanghai will lift its full-chain transport-services capacity, Guangzhou will leverage the Greater Bay Area core-engine role in finance and foreign-related law, and Chengdu will build biomedicine innovation chains and digital-content export clusters.
    各地定位差异化:上海提升全链条运输服务能级,广州发挥大湾区核心引擎功能创新发展金融、涉外法律等服务,成都着力打造生物医药创新链、数字文创出口集群。
  • For foreign service providers, the practical takeaway is a widening, more predictable entry landscape: services sectors are the frontier of liberalisation, demonstration zones offer pilot ground for new licences, and the services negative list defines the boundary.
    对外资服务提供商,实操启示是:准入图景更宽、更可预期——服务业是开放的先行领域,示范区为新牌照提供试验场,跨境服务贸易负面清单划定边界。

Services Take Centre Stage: China’s Market-Access Opening as of Late August 2026 | 服务业站上 C 位:2026 年 8 月底的市场准入开放图景

The 28 August press conference

On 28 August 2026, the State Council Information Office held a press conference on the development of China’s services trade and the preparation of the 2026 China International Fair for Trade in Services (CIFTIS). The MOFCOM officials used the platform to set out the services-focused opening agenda. Vice Minister Yan Dong said that in the 15th Five-Year period, as global industrial chains reconfigure and digital and green transformation accelerates, the MOFCOM will implement a services quality-and-capacity upgrading action, speed up innovation in services trade, and — the key phrase — “steadily and prudently promote the expansion of market access and opening fields with services as the focus”. He also committed to improving the cross-border services-trade negative-list system, removing barriers to cross-border services trade, and making the factor flows closely related to services trade — people, capital and data — more convenient and secure.

The demonstration-zone mechanism

The flagship mechanism is the National Service Trade Innovation and Development Demonstration Zones. The MOFCOM issued the overall plan in April 2026, and 17 regions — Beijing among them — are now building demonstration zones as “comprehensive reform-and-opening platforms for services trade in the 15th Five-Year period”. The MOFCOM services-trade director, Kong Dejun, described three positioning goals. First, innovation highlands: zones should build on their location, resources and industrial strengths to push integrated innovation along industry and supply chains and expand services exports. Second, competitive operators: zones should widen financing channels, upgrade the public-service capacity of services-trade platforms, and cultivate leading services-export firms with international competitiveness. Third, policy-innovation sources: zones should explore an enabling institutional environment for the cross-border movement of funds, people, technology and data, steadily and orderly expand services market opening, simplify licensing approval procedures and improve risk-prevention mechanisms.

What this means on the ground

The differentiated positioning is concrete. Beijing will raise its full-chain transport-services capacity; Shanghai will open up the full international services chain for aircraft; Guangzhou will use its Greater Bay Area core-engine role to innovate in finance and foreign-related legal services; Chengdu will build a biomedicine innovation chain and digital-content export clusters. For foreign service providers, the pattern is clear: services are the frontier of liberalisation, and the demonstration zones are where new licences and new business forms get their first trial. The cross-border services-trade negative list — the mirror image of the goods negative list — will be the document that defines what is open by default and what remains restricted, and its “non-prohibited means open” logic is the most important single rule for foreign providers to internalise.

Practical guidance for foreign service providers

Foreign services companies should take four steps. (1) Map your sector against the services negative list: if your activity is not on the list, it is open by default under the filing/registration regime; if it is listed, check the specific restriction (ownership cap, licensing condition, local-presence requirement). (2) Identify the pilot ground: if your business is in a restricted or pilot area, the demonstration zones and the earlier services-opening pilots (e.g. the 119-task services-opening round) are the places where access is being tested first — engaging a zone can put you ahead of the national timeline. (3) Watch the factor-flow agenda: the commitment to make people, capital and data flow more conveniently is not a slogan — the demonstration zones are authorised to explore field-level data-export negative lists and simplified procedures, which directly affect how a services firm operates across borders. (4) Use the CIFTIS channel: the fair, held annually in Beijing, is the de facto annual checkpoint where services-opening measures and zone achievements are presented — a useful intelligence and networking event for entry planning.

Sources


服务业站上 C 位:2026 年 8 月底的市场准入开放图景

8 月 28 日的发布会

2026 年 8 月 28 日,国务院新闻办公室举行发布会,介绍中国服务贸易发展和 2026 年服贸会筹备情况。商务部官员借此平台阐明了以服务业为重点的开放议程。副部长鄢东表示,”十五五”时期,在全球产业链加速重构、数智化和绿色转型加快的背景下,商务部将深入实施服务业提质扩能行动,加快服务贸易创新发展,并——关键表述——”稳妥有序推动以服务业为重点扩大市场准入和开放领域”。他还承诺完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,破除跨境服务贸易壁垒,推动与服务贸易密切相关的人员、资金、数据等要素便利、安全地跨境流动。

示范区机制

旗舰机制是国家服务贸易创新发展示范区。商务部 2026 年 4 月印发总体方案,北京等 17 个地区正在建设示范区,定位为”十五五”时期服务贸易综合改革开放平台。商务部服贸司司长孔德军阐述了三个定位目标。其一,创新发展高地:示范区应立足区位、资源与产业优势,推进产业链供应链集成创新,扩大服务出口。其二,培育竞争优势主体:拓宽企业融资渠道,提升服务贸易平台载体公共服务能力,培育具有国际竞争力的服务出口领军企业。其三,政策创新策源地:探索优化资金、人员、技术、数据等要素跨境流动的制度环境,稳步有序扩大服务市场开放,简化有关许可审批程序,完善风险防控机制。

落地意味着什么

差异化定位已经具体化。北京提升全链条运输服务能级;上海打通飞机国际服务链条;广州发挥粤港澳大湾区核心引擎功能,创新发展金融、涉外法律等服务;成都打造生物医药创新链、数字文创出口集群。对外资服务提供商,图景清晰:服务业是开放先行领域,示范区是新牌照与新业态的试验场。跨境服务贸易负面清单——货物负面清单的镜像——将界定”默认开放”与”仍受限”的边界,其”未禁止即开放”的逻辑是外资服务商最需要内化的单一规则。

给外资服务商的实操建议

外资服务企业建议落实四步。(1)对照服务贸易负面清单定位本行业:业务不在清单上即默认开放,走备案/登记制;在清单上则核对其体的限制(持股上限、许可条件、本地存在要求)。(2)找到试验场:业务处于受限或试点领域时,示范区和此前的服务业开放试点(如 119 项服务业开放试点任务)是准入最先被测试的地方——接入一个示范区可能让你领先全国时间表。(3)盯住要素流动议程:让人员、资金、数据更便利流动不是口号——示范区获授权探索字段级数据出境负面清单与简化程序,直接影响服务企业的跨境运营方式。(4)用好服贸会渠道:每年在北京举办的服贸会实际上是服务业开放措施与示范区成果的年度检阅点——是入华规划中很有价值的信息与社交场合。

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One-Stop Government Service for Foreign Business: The Chancheng International Service Zone

  • Foshan’s Chancheng district has opened the first district-level government international service zone in Foshan, a one-stop counter covering 96 high-frequency foreign-related services for foreign companies and expatriate talent.
    佛山市禅城区开设佛山市首个区级政务国际服务专区,一站式受理外资企业与外籍人才高频涉外业务 96 项。
  • The zone is run by 14 government departments — organisation, administration, economy & science, public security, market regulation, taxation, social security, customs and others — under a “3+1” international service framework built around foreign investment, expatriate employment, cross-border trade and talent settlement.
    专区由区委组织部、行政服务中心联动经科、公安、市监、税务、社保、海关等 14 个职能单位共建,围绕外商投资、外籍就业、跨境贸易、人才安居四大场景搭建”3+1″国际化服务体系。
  • In 2026 the zone has handled over 1,800 foreign-related transactions, and the time to set up a foreign-invested enterprise has been cut by more than 40%.
    2026 年以来,专区累计办理涉外业务超 1800 宗,外资企业开办时限压缩超 40%。
  • Corporate services span the full life cycle — setup registration, equity changes, foreign-investment filing and import-export tax refunds — while expatriate services cover work permits, residence permits, social insurance, talent housing and professional-title evaluation.
    企业服务覆盖全生命周期——设立登记、股权变更、外资备案、进出口退税等;外籍人才服务覆盖工作许可、居留许可、社保申领、人才安居、职称评审等。
  • A bilingual (English, German and more) service team provides one-on-one accompaniment and point-to-point policy answers, with dedicated “Xiaochan” liaisons paired with foreign-invested enterprises.
    双语(含英语、德语等)服务团队提供一对一陪同办理与点对点政策答疑,”小禅”专员与外资企业结对服务。
  • For foreign companies, the practical value is a single accountable window: instead of navigating multiple departments, setup, licensing, employment and tax matters can be handled in one place, with regular Monday-to-Friday availability for the highest-frequency work-permit and residence items.
    对外资企业,实操价值在于一个”找得到人”的窗口:设立、许可、用工与税务事项可在一处办理,最高频的工作许可与居留业务已实现周一至周五常态化一站式服务。

One-Stop Government Service for Foreign Business: The Chancheng International Service Zone | 外资一站式政务服务:禅城国际服务专区

What the zone is

In 2026, Foshan’s Chancheng district opened the first district-level government international service zone in the city — a single physical counter where foreign-invested enterprises and expatriate talent can handle 96 high-frequency foreign-related matters. The zone is built by the district’s organisation department and administrative service centre together with 14 functional departments — economy and science, public security, market regulation, taxation, social security, customs and others — under a “3+1” international service framework. It is organised around four core scenarios: foreign investment, expatriate employment, cross-border trade and talent settlement, and it operationalises a set of “one thing” (yi jian shi) integrated reforms for foreign-related services. The model matters because it moves the burden of navigation from the user to the government: where a foreign company previously had to learn which department handled which step, the zone assembles the departments behind one counter.

What the zone covers

The service scope splits into three layers. For foreign-invested enterprises, the zone covers the full life cycle: company setup registration, equity changes, foreign-investment information filing and import-export tax refunds, alongside other registration and licensing matters. For expatriate talent, it covers the highest-frequency items: the foreigner work permit, work-type residence permits, social insurance enrolment, talent housing applications and professional-title evaluation. For both, the zone offers accompaniment services: a bilingual (English, German and other languages) team provides one-on-one assistance during the process and point-to-point policy answers, and dedicated “Xiaochan” liaisons are paired with individual foreign-invested enterprises for ongoing support. The highest-frequency items — work permits, residence permits and professional-title evaluation — are available every working day (Monday to Friday) as routine one-stop services.

Results so far

The numbers show the model working. In 2026 the zone has handled more than 1,800 foreign-related transactions, and the time needed to set up a foreign-invested enterprise has been cut by more than 40%. The gains come from two directions: the “one thing” integration collapses multiple visits into one (registration, licensing and employment matters that previously required separate trips to separate departments), and the dedicated bilingual staff reduce the failure-and-retry cycle that foreign applicants often face with language and unfamiliar procedures. Similar models are spreading across China — from the Lingang special area in Shanghai to border cities like Heihe, where a “one thing” reform package for foreign enterprises has helped 18 foreign companies set up in 2026, up 80% year on year, with a “rapid clearance plus licence” channel for Russian investors.

Why it matters for foreign companies

For a foreign company entering a Chinese city for the first time, the practical value of such a zone is accountability: there is a single physical place, with staff who speak a shared language, that owns the setup process end to end. The traditional pattern — business registration at the market-regulation bureau, work permits at the HRSS department, residence permits at the immigration office, tax registration at the tax bureau, customs filing at customs — multiplies the number of unfamiliar counters a new investor must find. A one-stop zone compresses that into one visit and, just as importantly, provides an ongoing point of contact after setup: the “Xiaochan” pairing means a company has a named liaison inside the government for follow-up questions on licensing, incentives or compliance.

Practical guidance for foreign companies

Foreign companies should use such zones deliberately. (1) Route the setup through the zone: check whether the city where you are registering has an international service zone or equivalent one-stop window, and use it as the primary channel rather than going department by department. (2) Bundle the employment steps: where work permits and residence permits are offered as a routine combined service, file both together to avoid residence gaps. (3) Use the accompaniment service: even with English support, bring prepared documentation (passport pages, apostilled corporate documents, translations) to cut the retry cycle. (4) Keep the liaison: after setup, maintain the contact with the assigned liaison or service team — they are the fastest route to answers on annual reporting, changes and incentives. (5) Check what is actually on the list: zones vary in scope (96 items in Chancheng), so confirm that the specific matter you need — e.g. professional-title evaluation or customs filing — is in scope before relying on it.

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外资一站式政务服务:禅城国际服务专区

专区是什么

2026 年,佛山市禅城区开设佛山市首个区级政务国际服务专区——一个让外资企业与外籍人才集中办理 96 项高频涉外业务的实体窗口。专区由区委组织部、行政服务中心联动经科、公安、市监、税务、社保、海关等 14 个职能单位共建,搭建”3+1″国际化服务体系,围绕外商投资、外籍就业、跨境贸易、人才安居四大核心场景,落地多项涉外”一件事”集成改革。这个模式的意义在于把”找部门”的负担从办事人转移到政府:过去外资企业要弄清楚每个环节归哪个部门,现在专区把所有部门聚合到一个窗口后面。

专区覆盖什么

服务范围分三层。对外资企业,专区覆盖全生命周期:公司设立登记、股权变更、外资备案、进出口退税,以及其他登记与许可事项。对外籍人才,覆盖最高频事项:外国人来华工作许可、工作类居留许可、社保申领、人才安居申请与职称评审。对两者,专区都提供陪同服务:双语(含英语、德语等)团队在办理过程中一对一协助、点对点答疑,”小禅”专员与外资企业结对提供持续支持。最高频的工作许可、居留许可与职称评审业务已实现每个工作日(周一至周五)常态化一站式办理。

迄今的成绩

数字说明模式奏效。2026 年以来,专区累计办理涉外业务超 1800 宗,外资企业开办时限压缩超 40%。成效来自两个方向:”一件事”集成把多次跑动合并为一次(登记、许可、用工事项过去要分别跑不同部门),而专职双语人员减少了外国申请者常因语言与流程陌生而陷入的”失败—重试”循环。类似模式正在全国扩散——从上海临港新片区到黑河等边境城市,黑河的”一件事”改革已帮助 2026 年 18 家外资企业落户、同比增长 80%,并为俄罗斯投资者开通”极速通关+办照”通道。

为什么对外资企业重要

对外资企业,这类专区的实操价值是”找得到人”:一个实体地点、一群会说共同语言的员工、对设立流程端到端负责。传统模式——市场监管局办登记、人社部门办工作许可、出入境办居留、税务局办税务登记、海关办报关备案——让新投资者必须找到多个陌生窗口。一站式专区把这一切压缩为一次到访,更重要的是它提供了设立后的持续联系点:”小禅”结对意味着企业在政府内部有一个具名联系人,可随时跟进许可、激励或合规问题。

给外资企业的实操建议

外资企业应有意识地利用这类专区。(1)把设立流程走专区:注册前先查所在城市是否有国际服务专区或等效一站式窗口,把它作为主渠道而不是逐部门跑。(2)捆绑用工事项:凡提供工作许可与居留许可常规联办的城市,两项一起办,避免居留空档。(3)用好陪同服务:即使有英语支持,也备好材料(护照页、加签的公司文件、翻译件)以减少重试。(4)保留联系人:设立后持续联系对接专员或服务团队——这是获取年报、变更与激励政策答案最快的渠道。(5)核对清单范围:专区覆盖范围因城而异(禅城 96 项),依赖之前先确认所需事项(如职称评审或海关备案)确实在清单内。

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