Tag Archives: Antitrust & Merger

China’s Revised Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Digital Economy, FDI Screening and Private Litigation Signals for Cross-border Dealmaking (2026)

  • On 22 September 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation released a draft revision of the Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for public comment, with feedback due by 29 September 2026 — the first systemic revision of the 2021 guidelines, which had five chapters and 27 articles.
    市场监管总局于 2026 年 9 月 22 日就《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为 2026 年 9 月 29 日;这是对 2021 年发布、共五章 27 条的原指引的首次系统性修订。
  • The revised draft expands to 33 articles and six appendices.
    修订后扩充至 33 条及 6 个附录。
  • Three priorities: rising overseas antitrust attention to the digital economy, a high incidence of extraterritorial antitrust litigation and investigations, and insufficient corporate familiarity with the rules of different jurisdictions.
    三方面重点:境外反垄断执法对数字经济的关注持续升温、域外反垄断诉讼和调查数量高发、企业对不同司法辖区规则辨识度不足。
  • The draft embeds digital-economy enforcement points in the monopoly-agreement, abuse-of-dominance and concentration chapters, updates the latest merger notification thresholds of the EU, the United States and Germany, and flags foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.
    修订草案在垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位、经营者集中等专章中列入境外执法机构对数字经济的监管要点,更新欧盟、美国、德国等主要司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准,并提示关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。
  • On litigation, it adds the rules of major jurisdictions on bringing private civil antitrust lawsuits, filling a gap in the 2021 text, and replaces the general “some jurisdictions…” wording with itemised jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction descriptions.
    在诉讼方面,新增主要司法辖区关于发起私人民事诉讼的规定,填补原指引空白;并将原指引中”有的司法辖区……”的笼统表述细化为对代表性司法辖区的逐一列明。
  • It also adds a chapter on service support and access to compliance resources, 15 recent global antitrust cases, and six practical appendices covering a risk self-check list, a dawn-raid response process and a merger notification process.
    还新增”服务保障与合规资源获取”专章、15 个近年全球反垄断典型案例,以及风险自查清单、突袭检查应对流程、并购申报流程等六个实操性附录。
  • Status matters: this is a consultation draft, not yet finalised or in force, and the operative text remains the 2021 guidelines.
    重要提示:这是征求意见稿,尚未定稿生效,现行有效文本仍是 2021 年版指引。

China’s Revised Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines: Digital Economy, FDI Screening and Private Litigation Signals for Cross-border Dealmaking (2026) | 中国修订企业境外反垄断合规指引:数字经济、外资安全审查与私人民事诉讼的新提示

Overview

On 22 September 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published a draft revision of the Outbound Antitrust Compliance Guidelines for public comment, with feedback due by 29 September 2026. The draft is the first systemic revision of the guidelines issued in 2021, which had five chapters and 27 articles; the revised text runs to 33 articles and six appendices. Because it is a consultation draft, the 2021 guidelines remain the operative text. The signals matter to cross-border dealmaking: the draft folds digital-economy enforcement into the core chapters, updates merger notification thresholds in the EU, the United States and Germany, adds private civil antitrust litigation to the risk map, and asks companies to watch foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.

Scope: who the guidelines speak to

The guidelines apply to Chinese companies doing business abroad and to companies operating in China whose activities may affect overseas markets, and the existing rules cover activities including exports, overseas investment and mergers and acquisitions. That scope is why the draft is worth reading even for groups that are not Chinese-owned: a China-based entity whose conduct reaches an overseas market can sit inside the same framework, and its compliance programme has to be built for the jurisdictions the draft now describes in detail.

What the consultation proposes

The regulator said the revision responds to five years of change: major jurisdictions have overhauled their antitrust rules, enforcement has intensified, digital platform conduct is scrutinised more closely, and cross-border merger review has tightened, while the 2021 text did not reflect digital-economy enforcement or the new merger-review landscape. It also noted that, as China’s trade scale and corporate globalisation have grown, some key industries and firms have faced overseas antitrust investigations or litigation, raising the challenges and risks of operating abroad.

Three revision priorities

Digital economy and updated merger thresholds

The draft embeds overseas enforcers’ digital-economy concerns in the chapters on monopoly agreements, abuse of market dominance and concentrations of undertakings. It updates the latest merger notification thresholds of major jurisdictions including the EU, the United States and Germany, and advises companies to pay attention to foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review regimes.

Private civil antitrust litigation

Against a high incidence of extraterritorial antitrust litigation and investigations, the draft adds, alongside administrative fines and criminal liability, the rules of major jurisdictions on bringing private civil antitrust lawsuits — filling a gap in the 2021 guidelines.

Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction detail

The draft selects representative jurisdictions: those with active antitrust enforcement, large volumes of Chinese investment and M&A, and distinctive antitrust regimes. It turns the 2021 text’s general “some jurisdictions…” wording into itemised descriptions, so that companies can identify risk effectively when investing, acquiring or operating in a given jurisdiction.

New chapter, cases and appendices

The draft adds a chapter on “service support and access to compliance resources”, covering professional service resources, support from social organisations, government service support, channels for obtaining compliance information and the building of a compliance resource library, and setting out how companies obtain remedies and raise issues with the authorities. It adds 15 typical cases from recent global antitrust litigation and investigations, describing the background, the outcome and the compliance lessons. Six appendices turn the guidance into a working toolkit: a self-check list of overseas antitrust risks, key points for building a compliance management system, a dawn-raid response process, an antitrust litigation response process, a merger notification and review process, and the concentration notification standards and features of selected jurisdictions.

Status: a draft, not yet in force

The document is a consultation draft. Comments close on 29 September 2026, and the text has not been finalised or brought into effect. The operative guidance remains the 2021 version. Readers should treat the draft as a signal of direction rather than as a current legal standard.

What it means for foreign-invested groups

For foreign-invested enterprises and their overseas parents, the draft is a map of how Chinese regulators classify and frame “overseas antitrust risk” in cross-border M&A and in global compliance programmes. Because it also flags foreign investment security review and foreign subsidy review, groups designing two-way investment structures should place China-side security review and host-country-side review on the same timeline and condition list, rather than treating an antitrust filing as the only regulatory gate. In practice, a deal timetable should carry, side by side, the merger notification in each relevant jurisdiction, any security review triggered in the host country, and any China-side review that the structure brings into play. The draft’s value lies less in new prohibitions — it introduces none — than in the checklist discipline it imposes on how those threads are tracked.

Practical steps for deal teams

Map each target jurisdiction’s merger notification thresholds against the draft’s updated list; check whether the transaction touches digital-economy conduct that enforcers scrutinise; add private civil litigation exposure to the risk register; and use the six appendices as templates for the deal file. Keep a dated record of the thresholds applied, so that a later revision can be reconciled against the position taken at signing. Because the text is a draft, verify the final version before relying on any specific threshold.

Sources

  • 市场监管总局《关于公开征求〈企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)〉意见的公告》: https://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/art/2026/art_b417f77da67d45ab99242f19058171ab.html
  • State Administration for Market Regulation, “China’s market regulator to update antitrust compliance guidance for firms operating overseas”: https://english.samr.gov.cn/News/PressReleases/art/2026/art_d747dfe650644c61b38013c0be2441ca.html
  • 经济观察网《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引公开征求意见》: https://www.eeo.com.cn/2026/0922/1045576.shtml
  • 腾讯新闻《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引征求意见 新增数字经济监管与私人民事诉讼规定》: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260922A0AR2P00
  • 福建省商务厅 风险分析(《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》要点): https://swt.fujian.gov.cn/mqchzhfwpt/chzx/fxts/mrfxfx/202609/t20260923_7217514.htm
  • 国家市场监督管理总局: https://www.samr.gov.cn/

中国修订企业境外反垄断合规指引:数字经济、外资安全审查与私人民事诉讼的新提示

概述

2026 年 9 月 22 日,市场监管总局就《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为 2026 年 9 月 29 日。这是对 2021 年发布、共五章 27 条的原指引的首次系统性修订,修订后扩充至 33 条及 6 个附录。由于是征求意见稿,现行有效文本仍是 2021 年版指引。修订草案释放的信号与跨境交易相关:它将数字经济执法纳入各核心专章,更新欧盟、美国、德国等司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准,把私人民事诉讼纳入风险图景,并提示企业关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。

适用范围:指引面向谁

该指引适用于在境外从事经营活动的中国企业,以及在华经营、其行为可能影响境外市场的企业;现行规则覆盖的活动包括出口、境外投资和并购等。正是这一适用范围,使得修订草案对非中资背景的集团同样值得一读:一家位于中国、其行为触及境外市场的实体,可能处在同一框架之内,其合规体系需要针对草案如今逐一详述的司法辖区来搭建。

征求意见稿提出什么

市场监管总局表示,此次修订回应五年来的变化:全球主要司法辖区反垄断制度发生变革,执法力度持续加码,对数字平台行为的监管更严,跨境并购审查收紧,而 2021 年版文本未能反映数字经济领域的执法动向与并购审查的新变化。同时,随着外贸规模扩大与中国企业全球化进程加速,部分重点行业和企业遭遇境外反垄断调查或诉讼,”出海”挑战和风险增加。

三方面修订重点

数字经济与更新的申报标准

修订草案在垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位、经营者集中等专章中,列入境外反垄断执法机构对数字经济的关注。它明确了欧盟、美国、德国等主要司法辖区最新的经营者集中申报标准,并提示企业关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查制度。

私人民事诉讼

针对域外反垄断诉讼和调查高发的趋势,修订草案在行政罚款与刑事责任之外,新增主要司法辖区关于发起私人民事诉讼的规定,填补了原指引在此领域的空白。

司法辖区的逐一列明

修订草案选取反垄断执法活跃、中国企业投资并购量大、反垄断法律制度有特殊性的代表性司法辖区,将原指引中”有的司法辖区……”的笼统表述细化为列举式描述,以便企业在相应司法辖区开展投资并购或从事经营行为时有效识别风险。

新增专章、案例与附录

修订草案新增”服务保障与合规资源获取”专章,内容含专业服务资源、社会团体支持、政府服务保障、合规信息获取渠道、合规资源库建设,列明企业获得救济、反映问题的方式和渠道。它新增 15 个近年全球反垄断诉讼和调查的典型案例,介绍案情背景、处罚结果及合规启示。六个附录把指引变成可用的工具箱:企业境外反垄断风险自查清单、合规管理制度建设要点、突袭检查应对流程、反垄断诉讼应对流程、并购申报和审查流程,以及部分司法辖区经营者集中申报标准及特点。

定位:这是草案,尚未生效

该文件是征求意见稿。意见反馈截止于 2026 年 9 月 29 日,文本尚未定稿生效,现行有效指引仍是 2021 年版。读者宜将草案视为方向性信号,而非现行法律标准。

对外资集团意味着什么

对外资企业及其境外母公司而言,修订草案呈现了中国监管机关对跨境并购与全球合规体系中”境外反垄断风险”的分类与应对框架。由于草案同时提示关注外商投资安全审查与外国补贴审查,设计双向投资架构的集团,应将中国侧安全审查与东道国侧审查纳入同一时间表与条件清单,而不是把反垄断申报当作唯一的监管关卡。在实际操作中,交易时间表应当并列承载各相关司法辖区的经营者集中申报、东道国触发的安全审查,以及架构所牵动的中国侧审查。修订草案的价值不在于新增禁止性规定——它并未引入此类规定——而在于它要求以清单化的纪律跟踪上述各条线索。

交易团队的实操步骤

将各目标司法辖区的经营者集中申报标准与草案更新的清单逐项对照;核查交易是否涉及执法机构重点关注的数字经济行为;将私人民事诉讼风险纳入风险登记册;并以六个附录作为交易文件的模板。对适用的申报标准保留带日期的记录,以便后续修订时能与签约时的判断相互核对。由于文本尚为草案,在依赖任何具体申报标准前,应核实最终版本。

来源

  • 市场监管总局《关于公开征求〈企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)〉意见的公告》: https://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/art/2026/art_b417f77da67d45ab99242f19058171ab.html
  • 国家市场监督管理总局英文新闻稿《China’s market regulator to update antitrust compliance guidance for firms operating overseas》: https://english.samr.gov.cn/News/PressReleases/art/2026/art_d747dfe650644c61b38013c0be2441ca.html
  • 经济观察网《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引公开征求意见》: https://www.eeo.com.cn/2026/0922/1045576.shtml
  • 腾讯新闻《市场监管总局修订境外反垄断合规指引征求意见 新增数字经济监管与私人民事诉讼规定》: https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260922A0AR2P00
  • 福建省商务厅 风险分析(《企业境外反垄断合规指引(修订草案征求意见稿)》要点): https://swt.fujian.gov.cn/mqchzhfwpt/chzx/fxts/mrfxfx/202609/t20260923_7217514.htm
  • 国家市场监督管理总局: https://www.samr.gov.cn/

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines

  • On 27 August 2026, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements for public comment, with feedback due by 10 September 2026.
    2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,意见反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。
  • The draft implements the “dual-penalty” rule introduced by the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law: legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may each be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear individual responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement.
    征求意见稿落地2022年《反垄断法》确立的”双罚制”:对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员,反垄断执法机构可以对其处一百万元以下罚款。
  • Individual responsibility attaches to those who organise, lead, decide, command, or instigate, approve or connive at the conclusion of a monopoly agreement; harsher treatment is reserved for agreements harming national interests in key areas such as people’s livelihoods, ecology, work safety, financial capital and data security.
    对达成垄断协议起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用,或授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议的个人追究责任;涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的垄断协议,将严格追究个人责任。
  • Aggravating factors include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into a monopoly agreement or obstructing others from withdrawing from one; co-operation with the investigation and proactive removal of harm may lead to lighter penalties; individual liability does not lapse on resignation or departure.
    教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议或妨碍他人停止参与等构成从重处罚情节;积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可依法从轻处罚;个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除。
  • For executives of foreign-invested companies and joint ventures operating in China, the guidelines signal that antitrust compliance can no longer be treated as a purely corporate matter — individual managers face personal exposure, mirroring the personal-liability regimes long applied to executives in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
    对在华经营的外资企业与合资企业高管而言,指引意味着反垄断合规不再只是企业层面的事务——管理者个人将面临直接责任风险,这与美国、英国、澳大利亚等长期对高管施加个人责任的制度形成呼应。

China moves antitrust personal liability from principle to practice: the draft Monopoly Agreement Individual Liability Guidelines | 反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

Overview

On 27 August 2026, SAMR published the Draft Guidelines on the Application of Individual Liability for Monopoly Agreements (《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》) and invited public comment until 10 September 2026. The draft turns a provision of the 2022 Anti-Monopoly Law into an operational enforcement framework. Article 56 of the amended law already stated that legal representatives, principal responsible persons and directly responsible personnel of an undertaking may be fined up to RMB 1 million where they bear personal responsibility for concluding a monopoly agreement. The Guidelines explain who falls into that category, which factors matter, and how penalties are calibrated.

Why the Guidelines matter now

Price-fixing, output restriction and market-division agreements are widely regarded as the most damaging form of anti-competitive conduct, and they are typically the product of collusion among executives rather than of a company acting as an abstract legal person. Before the 2022 amendment, the Anti-Monopoly Law contained no explicit personal-liability rule, and in practice “the undertaking bears responsibility while individuals walk free” — a gap that diluted deterrence. The 2022 amendment introduced the “dual-penalty” structure; the draft Guidelines now give it operational shape.

The drafting note explains that Article 56 is framed in principle-level language and needs more specific rules on the circumstances of application, the factors for identifying responsible individuals, and the calibration of sanctions. The guidelines follow roughly four years of enforcement experience, including 2025 cases in which Shanghai and Tianjin market-regulation authorities applied the personal-liability clause to executives in pharmaceutical monopoly cases. Those cases operated as tentative breakthroughs; the Guidelines are designed to make the rule uniformly applicable.

Who bears individual responsibility

Under the draft, individual responsibility arises where the legal representative, principal responsible person or directly responsible personnel of an undertaking:

  • plays an organising, leading, deciding or commanding role in reaching the monopoly agreement; or
  • instigates, approves or connives at the conclusion of the agreement.

Responsibility is not limited to those who sign documents: executives who set the strategy, chairs who run the coordination meeting, sales directors who transmit the price signal and compliance officers who turn a blind eye can all fall within the draft’s language depending on the evidence. The reference to “instigating, approving or conniving” is deliberately broad, capturing passive as well as active involvement.

Calibration: aggravating and mitigating factors

The draft sets out factors that push penalties up or down:

  • Aggravating circumstances include instigating, coercing or deceiving others into concluding a monopoly agreement, and obstructing others from ceasing participation. Agreements that harm national interests in key areas — people’s livelihoods, the ecological environment, production safety, financial capital and data security — attract strict pursuit of personal liability.
  • Mitigating circumstances include actively co-operating with the investigation and voluntarily eliminating or mitigating the harmful consequences of the agreement.
  • No escape by resignation: individual liability is not extinguished by the person’s departure from the undertaking, meaning former executives of a company under investigation can still be pursued.

What this means in practice

  • A clearer compliance baseline for executives. The Guidelines supply the previously missing detail about who is at risk and what conduct triggers exposure. For multinationals with Chinese operations, antitrust training and certification for local executives, and board-level attention to pricing, output and territorial allocation decisions, become materially more important.
  • Personal exposure rather than corporate-only risk. Fines of up to RMB 1 million per individual sit alongside corporate fines that, under the law, can reach 10 per cent of the undertaking’s turnover in the previous year. For regional heads, country managers and joint-venture general managers, the calculus of joining a cartel conversation changes.
  • Interaction with leniency. The reference to active co-operation and harm removal as mitigating factors should be read together with the existing leniency (immunity) system for undertakings that self-report; companies and individuals alike need counsel on sequencing a leniency application and individual cooperation.
  • Joint ventures and intra-group arrangements deserve special review. Pricing and market-allocation discussions inside a JV board, or coordination between a parent and a Chinese partner, can raise monopoly-agreement questions in which individual executives of both sides are exposed. The same applies to trade associations that organise output or price coordination — the individuals behind them can now be targeted directly.
  • HR and compliance governance. Consider adding individual-liability clauses to employment contracts or code-of-conduct acknowledgements, ensuring that departing executives’ files are preserved, and reviewing directors’ and officers’ insurance arrangements in light of the new personal exposure.

Practical steps

  • Review the draft and, where appropriate, submit comments to SAMR before 10 September 2026 (the public-comment channel on SAMR’s website).
  • Audit existing pricing, output, market-allocation and bid-coordination practices, especially any engagement with trade associations or industry roundtables.
  • Deliver tailored antitrust training to legal representatives, general managers, sales and procurement heads, with sign-off records retained as evidence of a compliance culture.
  • Prepare internal escalation and “stop and call counsel” protocols for any invitation to fix prices or divide markets, including inside joint-venture governance bodies.
  • Monitor the final version of the Guidelines and any provincial enforcement guidance; expect SAMR and provincial bureaus to apply the personal-liability rule in the next wave of cartel investigations.

Sources

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

Related reading

  • see also: merger control and antitrust basics for foreign investors (38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • see also: SAMR’s enforcement approach to monopolistic conduct in the 2026 cycle (13-policy-updates)

反垄断”双罚制”落地提速:《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》解读

概述

2026年8月27日,市场监管总局就《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》向社会公开征求意见,反馈截止日期为2026年9月10日。征求意见稿把2022年修订《反垄断法》中的一项条款转化为可操作的执法框架。修订后《反垄断法》第五十六条已经写明:经营者的法定代表人、主要负责人和直接责任人员对达成垄断协议负有个人责任的,可以处一百万元以下罚款。指引要解决的是:谁属于这几类人、何种情形构成个人责任、处罚如何裁量。

为什么现在出台

联合涨价、限制产量、划分市场等垄断协议被世界各国公认为对市场竞争损害最严重的垄断行为,而其达成往往与经营者高管之间的合谋密切相关。2022年修法前,《反垄断法》对垄断协议的个人责任没有明确规定,实践中普遍出现”单位承担责任、个人免于追责”的情形,威慑力不足。2022年修法确立”双罚制”后,起草说明指出,第五十六条的表述较为原则,在具体适用情形、认定因素及处罚裁量上需要更明确、细化的规定,因此有必要制定本指引。

指引也建立在约四年的执法探索之上:2025年,上海市市场监督管理局在上海信谊联合医药等三家经营者垄断协议案中首次适用该条款,对责任人罚款五十万元;同年天津市市场监督管理局在原料药垄断案中对四名责任人分别罚款,并对组织垄断协议的自然人罚款五十万元。个案属于制度探索,指引则致力于让该制度普遍适用。

谁承担个人责任

依征求意见稿,经营者中的以下个人对达成垄断协议负有个人责任:

  • 起到组织、领导、决策、指挥作用者;或
  • 授意、批准、纵容达成垄断协议者。

责任不以签字为限:定调子的高管、主持会议的董事长、传递价格信号的销售总监、睁一只眼闭一只眼的合规负责人,都可能依证据落入文义范围。”授意、批准、纵容”的表述刻意宽泛,兼顾主动参与与消极放任。

裁量:从重与从轻因素

指引给出上下调节的裁量因素:

  • 从重情形:教唆、胁迫、诱骗他人达成垄断协议;妨碍他人停止参与垄断协议。垄断协议涉及民生保障、生态环境、安全生产、金融资本、数据安全等重点领域、危害国家利益的,将严格追究个人责任。
  • 从轻情形:积极配合调查、主动消除垄断协议危害后果等。
  • 离职不免责:相关个人责任不因其离职等情形而免除——被调查企业的前高管仍可能被追责。

对外资与合资企业的现实意义

  • 高管合规基线更清晰。 指引补齐了此前缺失的细节:谁有风险、何种行为触发责任。在华经营的外企需要更重视对本地高管的反垄断培训与签署确认,董事会层面也要关注定价、产量与区域划分类决策。
  • 个人风险与企业风险并立。 个人最高百万元罚款之外,企业可能面临上一年度营业额最高10%的罚款。对区域负责人、国家经理、合资企业总经理而言,参与卡特尔对话的成本结构已彻底改变。
  • 与宽大制度衔接。 “积极配合调查、主动消除危害后果可从轻”应结合企业自首宽大制度一并理解;企业与个人都需要专业意见来安排自首申请与个人配合的先后顺序。
  • 合资企业与集团内安排需专项审查。 合资企业董事会内的定价与市场划分讨论、母公司与中方伙伴之间的协调,可能引致垄断协议问题,双方高管个人均处于风险中。组织限产定价的行业协会背后的个人,现在也可能被直接追责。
  • 人事与治理安排。 可在劳动合同或行为准则中加入个人责任条款,确保离职高管档案完整留存,并据新的个人敞口审视董监高责任保险安排。

实务建议

  • 研读征求意见稿,必要时于2026年9月10日前通过总局官网意见征集渠道反馈。
  • 排查既有定价、产量、市场划分与投标协同做法,尤其涉及行业协会或行业座谈会的活动。
  • 为法定代表人、总经理、销售与采购负责人定制反垄断培训,并留存签署记录作为合规文化证据。
  • 建立内部升级与”叫停并咨询律师”机制,覆盖任何被邀请固定价格或划分市场的场景,包括合资企业治理会议之内。
  • 跟踪指引最终稿与各省级执法指引;预计总局与省级局将在下一轮卡特尔调查中适用个人责任条款。

来源

  • 人民日报(人民网吉林频道)— 市场监管总局发布《垄断协议个人责任适用指引(征求意见稿)》: https://jl.people.com.cn/n2/2026/0831/c349771-41682074.html
  • 央视新闻 — 事关垄断协议个人责任追责范围等 市场监管总局公开征求意见(反馈截止2026年9月10日): https://finance.cctv.cn/2026/08/28/ARTI5rL9FjtOSM6uoFF6fJzU260828.shtml
  • 央广网 — 反垄断执法开始向穿透式追责到人转变: https://www.cnr.cn/jingji/ycbd/20260828/t20260828_527796366.shtml

相关阅读

  • 见:外资投资者应知的反垄断并购与经营者集中基础(38-anti-monopoly-merger-control)
  • 见:市场监管总局2026年轮反垄断执法动态(13-policy-updates)

Merger Review as an Anti-“Involution” Tool: The SAMR’s Six Typical Cases of 21 August 2026

  • On 21 August 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published six typical cases of concentration review aimed at curbing “involution-style” competition, spanning online audio, photovoltaics, energy storage, lithium-battery materials, auto parts and coal logistics.
    2026 年 8 月 21 日,市场监管总局公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,聚焦整治”内卷式”竞争,覆盖在线音频、光伏、储能、锂电材料、汽车零部件与煤炭物流等领域。
  • Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five conditions: the SAMR found the deal could exclude or restrict competition in China’s online-audio and online-music platform markets, and attached targeted remedies.
    腾讯收购喜马拉雅案被附加 5 项限制性条件批准:市场监管总局认定该集中对中国境内在线音频播放平台市场、网络音乐播放平台市场可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,依法附加针对性条件。
  • The other five deals were cleared unconditionally: TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy, Jingjiang Industrial’s acquisition of East Group, Cangzhou Mingzhu’s JV in lithium separators, Ningbo Huaxiang’s auto-parts JV and Tiangchi Energy’s logistics JV — all framed as consolidating capacity to escape low-end price wars.
    其余五起案件无条件批准:TCL 中环收购一道新能源、荆江实业收购易事特、沧州明珠锂电隔膜合营、宁波华翔汽车零部件合营、天池能源物流合营——均被定位为整合产能、摆脱低端价格战。
  • Delegated review is now routine in these cases: local bureaus (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shaanxi, etc.) handled the case work under the SAMR’s delegation, with at least one deal cleared in 17 days.
    委托审查已成为这些案件的常规路径:北京、重庆、上海、广东、陕西等地市场监管部门受总局委托开展审查,其中一宗合营案仅用 17 天完成全流程审查。
  • For foreign companies, the signal is twofold: China’s merger control is being used proactively to reshape industry structure and police “involution”, and conditional approvals remain a live remedy — buyers should plan remedies into deal timelines where platform or market power is involved.
    对外国企业,信号有两层:中国经营者集中审查正被积极用于重塑行业结构、治理”内卷”;附条件批准仍是现行救济工具——涉平台或市场支配力交易时,买方应把救济条件纳入交易时间表筹划。

Merger Review as an Anti-“Involution” Tool: The SAMR’s Six Typical Cases of 21 August 2026 | 经营者集中审查作为治理”内卷”工具:市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日六起典型案例

The six cases at a glance

On 21 August 2026 the State Administration for Market Regulation published six typical cases from its 2026 concentration-review campaign, which it has framed as serving both quality improvement and competition protection. The cases span: Tencent Holdings’ acquisition of Ximalaya (online audio); TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy (photovoltaics); Jingjiang Industrial Investment Group’s acquisition of East Group (energy storage / AI plus new energy); Cangzhou Mingzhu’s new JV with an East-Guangzhou investment vehicle (lithium-battery separators and pipe materials); Ningbo Huaxiang Xinsandian’s JV with Zhejiang Anzhi Auto Technology (high-end suspension and air-spring auto parts); and Tiangchi Energy’s new logistics JV (coal supply-chain transport). Five were cleared unconditionally; one — Tencent/Ximalaya — was approved with conditions.

The conditional approval that matters

The Tencent/Ximalaya deal is the case with the most compliance-relevant detail. The transaction was filed on 11 June 2025 and accepted on 3 September 2025. After market investigation and analysis, the SAMR concluded that the concentration could have the effect of excluding or restricting competition in China’s online-audio platform market and online-music platform market. On 12 May 2026 it approved the deal subject to five conditions designed to address the identified competition concerns and stakeholder expectations — preserving the competitive structure of the online-audio and online-music markets, protecting the interests of undertakings and consumers, and guarding against platform anti-competitive conduct. The case shows that in platform-economy deals, conditional approval with behavioural remedies is a live, structural feature of Chinese merger control, not a theoretical possibility.

Why the other five were cleared

The five unconditional clearances share a logic: the transactions consolidate capacity in sectors where the regulator sees low-quality, homogenous “involution” as the main problem. TCL Zhonghuan acquiring Yidao New Energy integrates BC-cell technology and reduces inefficient supply in photovoltaics, pushing the sector from scale expansion to quality improvement. Jingjiang Industrial’s acquisition of East Group channels state capital and industrial platforms into transforming the target into an “AI plus new energy” services provider. Cangzhou Mingzhu’s JV strengthens regional lithium-battery-material supply; Ningbo Huaxiang’s JV focuses high-end auto parts and helps break dependence on external technology; and Tiangchi Energy’s JV vertically integrates coal production with logistics to secure outbound transport capacity. In each case the regulator’s analysis explicitly links the transaction to curing price wars and improving industry structure.

Delegated review as the operating model

A striking operational detail is the role of provincial bureaus. Under the SAMR’s delegation system, the case work was handled by local authorities: Beijing reviewed TCL Zhonghuan/Yidao (accepted 3 April, cleared 25 May), Chongqing handled Jingjiang/East Group (accepted 9 January, cleared 22 January), Shanghai handled the Ningbo Huaxiang JV, Guangdong the Cangzhou Mingzhu JV, and Shaanxi the Tiangchi Energy JV — with the Cangzhou deal completed in 17 days end to end. The message for deal teams is practical: delegation is now the default for many cases, so the relevant timetable and dialogue partner is often the provincial bureau, and streamlined simple-case processing can deliver genuinely fast clearances.

What foreign companies should take away

For foreign acquirers, the August package carries three lessons. First, policy intent: Chinese merger control is an active industrial-policy instrument — deals that consolidate capacity to exit “involution” are welcomed and cleared quickly, while deals that entrench market power face conditions. Second, remedy planning: in platform or market-power situations, conditional approval with behavioural remedies should be assumed possible; building remedy negotiation into the deal timeline, and structuring the transaction to address competition concerns early, reduces uncertainty. Third, process: expect provincial-bureau delegation and prepare filings accordingly — engage the right bureau, budget for delegated timelines, and use the streamlined track where the case qualifies as simple. The six cases are also a useful precedent library: the SAMR’s published reasoning shows how it weighs market definition, competitive effects and remedies in the sectors now subject to its “anti-involution” scrutiny. Deal teams should download and circulate the full text to their internal antitrust review checklists, since the reasoning style and the kinds of evidence the regulator cites are the best available guide to how future filings in these sectors will be assessed.

Sources


经营者集中审查作为治理”内卷”工具:市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日六起典型案例

六起案件一览

2026 年 8 月 21 日,市场监管总局公布 2026 年经营者集中反垄断监管效能提升专项行动的六起典型案例,覆盖:腾讯控股收购喜马拉雅股权案(在线音频);TCL 中环收购一道新能源股权案(光伏);湖北荆江实业投资集团收购易事特集团股权案(储能/”AI+新能源”);沧州明珠与广州增城东部中心新设合营企业案(锂电隔膜与管材);宁波华翔新三电与浙江安致汽车科技新设合营企业案(高端悬架与空气弹簧汽车零部件);新疆天池能源与新疆象道物流新设合营企业案(煤炭供应链物流)。其中五起无条件批准,一起——腾讯/喜马拉雅——附条件批准。

值得关注的附条件批准案

腾讯收购喜马拉雅案是合规信息量最大的一起。交易于 2025 年 6 月 11 日申报、9 月 3 日受理。经市场调查与分析,市场监管总局认定该集中对中国境内在线音频播放平台市场、网络音乐播放平台市场可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,于 2026 年 5 月 12 日附加 5 项限制性条件批准——条件直指竞争问题与各方关切,维护两个市场的公平竞争秩序,保障经营主体与消费者合法权益,防范平台反竞争行为。该案显示:平台经济交易中,附行为性救济条件的批准是中国经营者集中制度中现实、结构性的工具,而非理论可能。

其余五起为何无条件通过

五起无条件批准共享同一逻辑:交易整合了监管者眼中以低质同质”内卷”为主要问题的行业产能。TCL 中环收购一道新能源整合 BC 电池技术、减少光伏低效供给,推动行业从规模扩张转向质量提升。荆江实业收购易事特以国有资本与产业载体推动标的向”AI+新能源”综合服务商转型。沧州明珠合营强化区域锂电材料配套;宁波华翔合营聚焦高端汽车零部件、助力突破外部技术依赖;天池能源合营纵向整合煤炭生产与物流、保障出疆运力。每起案件中,监管分析都把交易与治理价格战、改善行业结构直接关联。

委托审查成为运营模式

一个引人注目的操作细节是省级部门的角色。在市场监管总局委托审查制度下,案件由地方部门承办:北京审查 TCL 中环/一道新能源(4 月 3 日受理、5 月 25 日批准),重庆承办荆江/易事特(1 月 9 日受理、1 月 22 日批准),上海承办宁波华翔合营,广东承办沧州明珠合营,陕西承办天池能源合营——沧州案全流程仅用 17 天。对交易团队的实操信息:委托已是许多案件的默认路径,相关时间表与对接方往往是省级部门,简化的简易案件处理可带来真正快速的批准。

外国企业应吸取什么

对外国收购方,8 月一揽子有三重启示。第一,政策意图:中国经营者集中审查是积极的产业政策工具——整合产能以退出”内卷”的交易受到欢迎并快速放行,而巩固市场支配力的交易将面临条件。第二,救济筹划:涉平台或市场支配力情形,应假设附行为性救济的条件批准可能发生;把救济谈判纳入交易时间表、尽早以交易结构回应竞争关切,可降低不确定性。第三,流程:预期省级委托并相应准备申报——对接正确部门、按委托时间表预算、符合简易条件的走简化通道。六起案例也是有用的先例库:总局公布的论证展示其在当前”反内卷”审视行业里如何权衡相关市场界定、竞争影响与救济。交易团队应下载并通读全文、并入内部反垄断审查清单——论证风格与监管引用的证据类型,是判断这些行业未来申报将如何被评估的最佳可得指南。

Sources

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing

  • Foreign acquisitions, mergers, or acquisitions of control over a Chinese business may trigger a concentration filing to SAMR; the regime is mandatory and suspensory.
    外资收购、合并或取得中国企业控制权可能触发向国家市场监督管理总局的经营者集中申报;该制度具有强制性与暂停性。
  • The 2024 thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024) are global RMB 12bn / China RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties), cutting notifiable deals by an estimated 30%.
    2024年阈值(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行)为全球120亿/中国40亿/两方各8亿元,预计减少约30%的申报量。
  • A minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a notifiable concentration; pure intra-group reorganizations are exempt.
    赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属应申报集中;纯集团内部重组可豁免。
  • SAMR review runs an ordinary 30+90 day (extendable 60) procedure or a simplified “double 20 days” procedure, with outcomes of unconditional clearance, remedies, or prohibition.
    SAMR审查分普通程序30+90日(可延长60)或简易程序”双20天”,结果含无条件批准、附加条件批准或禁止。
  • “Gun-jumping” (acting before clearance) risks divestiture, fines up to RMB 5 million, and up to 10% of prior-year turnover for serious violations under the 2022 AML amendment.
    “抢跑”(获批前实施)风险包括责令恢复原状、最高500万元罚款,及依2022年修法情节严重最高处上一年度营业额10%罚款。
  • Foreign investors must keep closing, control, and integration waiting for SAMR clearance, and carve out China if a global deal closes elsewhere first.
    外国投资者须使交割、控制权与整合等待SAMR批准,若全球交易先在其他法域关闭则应拆分中国部分。

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing | 反垄断与经营者集中申报

Overview

When a foreign investor acquires a Chinese company, merges with a local competitor, or takes control of a domestic business, the transaction may trigger a concentration filing (经营者集中申报) under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The filing is made to the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), the national antitrust enforcement authority. The regime is mandatory and suspensory: if thresholds are met, the deal may not close (and control may not be exercised) until clearance is granted. Getting this wrong exposes the parties to “gun-jumping” penalties that, since the 2022 AML amendment, can reach a percentage of turnover.

This article sets out the 2024 turnover thresholds, how SAMR reviews a concentration, the simplified versus ordinary procedure, and the practical risk of closing before clearance.

Turnover thresholds for concentration filing

The current notification thresholds are set by the State Council’s “Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings” (Order No. 773), revised and effective 26 January 2024. A concentration must be notified to SAMR in advance, and may not be implemented until cleared, where either of the following is met (based on the parties’ turnover in the previous accounting year):

  • Global test: the worldwide aggregate turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million; or
  • China test: the aggregate China turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million.

These thresholds were raised from the prior RMB 10 billion / RMB 2 billion / RMB 400 million, reducing the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30% and lowering transaction costs. Turnover of the relevant group (not just the target) counts, and special rules apply to banking, insurance, securities, and futures. Even below the thresholds, SAMR may call in a transaction if it is likely to eliminate or restrict competition (the “fall below but suspect” power).

A concentration is defined as: (a) a merger; (b) acquisition of control through equity or assets; or (c) acquisition of control or decisive influence through contracts. Note that acquiring a minority stake that confers control or decisive influence can still be a notifiable concentration. Two exemptions apply: where one party already holds >50% of the other, or where a common parent holds >50% of each — i.e., pure intra-group reorganizations.

SAMR review procedure

Upon submission, SAMR decides whether to accept the filing. Once accepted, the ordinary (non-simplified) review has two phases: an initial 30-day phase, and, if it proceeds, a further 90-day phase (extendable by 60 days in specified circumstances). A simplified procedure applies to non-controversial deals — for example, where the parties are not competitors in the same market, or one party acquires a sole control stake in a joint venture — with a compressed timetable (the regulator targets “double 20 days” for acceptance and review of simplified cases). SAMR may clear unconditionally, clear with behavioural or structural remedies (附加条件批准), or prohibit the concentration.

Parties should expect to submit a notification form, market definitions, turnover calculations, competitive-effects analysis, and (for foreign-to-China deals) information on global filings. Early pre-filing consultation with SAMR is common and reduces the risk of a long Phase 2. Since 2023, SAMR has also piloted delegated review to five provincial market-regulation bureaus for certain simplified cases, improving speed for deals centered in those regions.

Gun-jumping and enforcement risk

“Gun-jumping” means implementing a concentration — or exercising control — before clearance. The 2022 AML amendment significantly strengthened enforcement. Implementing a notifiable concentration without filing, or implementing before clearance, can result in an order to restore the prior state (divestiture / undo the deal), a fine of up to RMB 5 million for the undertaking, and — importantly — for the 2022 amendment’s proportional penalty regime, fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s turnover in the prior year where the violation is serious. Responsible individuals may also be fined. Even signing and partially closing (e.g., taking board control, consolidating financials, or integrating the business) before clearance can be caught.

The lesson for foreign investors: structure the timetable so that closing, control, and integration wait for SAMR clearance. Use a long-stop date and conditions precedent, and keep the businesses separate (no joint management, no shared systems, no consolidated reporting) until the green light. Where a global deal must close elsewhere first, carve out the China leg or ring-fence the Chinese target to avoid premature exercise of control in China.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early using worldwide and China turnover of the whole group for the prior year; remember the RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties) 2024 thresholds.
  • Map the control question — a minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a concentration.
  • Plan for suspension — make SAMR clearance a condition precedent; do not close, integrate, or exercise control in China before approval.
  • Consider simplified procedure if markets don’t overlap, and use pre-filing consultation to compress the timeline.
  • Watch the gun-jumping traps — no board control, consolidation, or integration pre-clearance; carve out China if the global deal closes earlier.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Cybersecurity & MLPS (等保) for FIEs — M&A can reset system grading and trigger new filings.
  • see also: Foreign-related dispute resolution — litigation vs. arbitration — challenging or enforcing merger decisions.
  • see also: CIETAC & international arbitration — arbitrating competition and shareholder disputes.

反垄断与经营者集中申报

概述

当外国投资者收购中国企业、与本土竞争者合并,或取得境内企业的控制权时,该交易可能触发《反垄断法》项下的经营者集中申报。申报向国家市场监督管理总局(SAMR)——反垄断执法机构——提出。该制度具有强制性与暂停性:一旦达到阈值,在获得批准前不得实施集中(亦不得行使控制权)。若处理不当,当事人将面临”抢跑”(gun-jumping)处罚;自 2022 年《反垄断法》修订后,罚款可达营业额的一定比例。

本文列明 2024 年营业额阈值、SAMR 如何审查集中、简易与普通程序的区分,以及”获批前Closing”的实务风险。

经营者集中申报的营业额阈值

现行申报阈值由《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(第 773 号令)设定,于 2024 年 1 月 26 日修订施行。集中达到以下任一标准(按参与者上一会计年度营业额计算),须事先向 SAMR 申报,未申报不得实施:

  • 全球标准:参与集中的所有经营者全球合计营业额超过120 亿元人民币,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元;或
  • 中国标准:参与集中的所有经营者中国境内合计营业额超过40 亿元,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元。

上述阈值较此前的 100 亿 / 20 亿 / 4 亿元上调,预计减少约 30% 的申报量,降低交易成本。计算以相关集团(而非仅标的)营业额为准,银行、保险、证券、期货等行业另有特别办法。即便未达阈值,若具有或可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,SAMR 仍可主动要求申报(”未达阈值但有嫌疑”权力)。

集中指:(一)经营者合并;(二)通过股权或资产取得控制权;(三)通过合同取得控制权或决定性影响。注意:取得赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍可能构成应申报集中。两类豁免适用:一方已持有另一方 50% 以上表决权股份,或同一未参与集中的经营者持有各方 50% 以上表决权股份——即纯集团内部重组。

SAMR 审查程序

受理申报后,SAMR 决定是否予以立案。立案后,普通程序分两阶段:初始30 日审查期;若进一步审查,再加90 日(特定情形下可延长 60 日)。简易程序适用于无争议的 Deal——例如当事方不在同一市场竞争,或一方取得合营企业单独控制权——时间表压缩(监管目标为简易程序”受理与审查双 20 天”)。SAMR 可无条件批准、附行为性或结构性条件批准(附加条件批准),或禁止集中。

当事人应准备申报书、相关市场界定、营业额计算、竞争效果分析,以及(外资赴华交易)全球申报信息。与 SAMR 的事前商谈十分常见,可降低进入第二阶段的风险。自 2023 年起,SAMR 还试点将部分简易案件委托五个省级市场监管部门审查,提升区域集中交易的效率。

抢跑与执法风险

“抢跑”指在未获批准前实施集中或行使控制权。2022 年《反垄断法》修订显著强化了执法。应申报而未申报,或在获批前实施集中,可能导致责令恢复原状(剥离/撤销交易)、对经营者最高500 万元罚款;更重要的是,依 2022 年修订的比例罚款机制,情节严重的可被处上一年度营业额 10% 以下的罚款。直接责任人员亦可能被罚。即便签约并部分 closing(如取得董事会控制、合并财务报表或整合业务),也可能被认定为抢跑。

对外国投资者的启示:时间表应安排为交割、控制权与整合均等待 SAMR 批准。使用最晚截止日与先决条件,在绿灯前保持标的独立(不共同管理、不共享系统、不合并报告)。若全球交易须在其他法域先 closing,应拆分中国部分或对中国标的”隔离”,以避免在中国境内过早行使控制权。

下一步建议

  • 尽早做阈值测试:使用整个集团上一年度的全球与中国营业额;牢记 2024 年 120 亿 / 40 亿 / 8 亿(两方)标准。
  • 厘清控制权问题——赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属集中。
  • 规划暂停性:将 SAMR 批准设为先决条件;获批前不在华交割、整合或行使控制权。
  • 考虑简易程序:若市场不重叠,并利用事前商谈压缩周期。
  • 警惕抢跑陷阱:获批前不得董事会控制、合并报表或整合;若全球先 closing,拆分中国部分。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:网络安全与等保(外资适用)— 并购可能重置系统定级并触发新备案。
  • 参见:涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁 — 对集中决定的异议与执行。
  • 参见:贸仲与涉外仲裁 — 仲裁竞争与股东纠纷。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

  • From 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s refined delegated-review system adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original provincial bureaus and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,市场监管总局完善后的经营者集中委托审查制度在原 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个受委托部门。
  • Delegated simple-case bureaus now total eight, and the delegated average acceptance and completion times have both stayed within roughly 20 days, materially faster than national review.
    简易案件受委托省级部门增至 8 个;受委托部门平均受理与审结时间均在约 20 天内,明显快于全国审查。
  • Zhejiang handles simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi from August 2026, giving regional companies near-by filing and review.
    2026 年 8 月起,浙江受委托承担浙江、福建、江西三省区域内经营者集中简易案件审查,区域企业可就近申报办理。
  • The SAMR also published six typical concentration cases on 21 August 2026, showing how review supports restructuring in platforms, PV, batteries, auto parts and coal logistics while curbing “involutionary” competition.
    市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、锂电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。
  • For foreign-invested groups, the changes affect where and how quickly qualifying deals are cleared, but the mandatory prior-filing threshold and substantive standards are unchanged.
    对外资集团而言,变化影响合格交易的审查地点与速度;强制事先申报门槛与实体标准不变。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026) | 经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)

Why this matters now

On 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s Announcement on Further Improving the Delegated Review System for Concentrations of Undertakings took effect. The system, which began as a pilot in August 2022 and was formalised in July 2025, now adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original delegated provincial bureaus — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi — and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases. A week later, on 21 August 2026, the SAMR published six typical cases of concentration review used to support restructuring in platform, solar-PV, battery, auto-parts and coal-logistics sectors while curbing “involutionary” competition. For foreign-invested enterprises and their advisers, the combination of wider delegation, faster regional clearance and clearer enforcement signals changes the practical geography of merger control in China.

What the expanded delegation changes

The delegated-review system is a division of work within China’s unitary concentration-review regime: the SAMR remains the reviewing authority, receives filings through the central business system, and delegates qualifying cases to provincial bureaus, which conduct the review and report back. The August 2026 changes operate on three axes. First, scope: in addition to simple cases, certain non-simple cases may now be delegated to the five original bureaus. The delegation criteria for non-simple cases include a combined market share of 15–25% in the same relevant market; or 25–35% shares in upstream and downstream markets respectively; or 25–35% shares in each relevant market for parties without horizontal or vertical relationships. Second, coverage: Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan join as delegated bureaus for simple cases, bringing the total to eight, each responsible for a defined regional territory. Zhejiang, for example, reviews simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi. Third, procedure: the SAMR has upgraded its concentration-review business system, revised the working handbook for provincial bureaus, and retained the rule that non-simple delegated cases must still have documents such as clearance decisions issued under the SAMR’s authority, while decisions with conditions or prohibitions are issued centrally by the SAMR.

Operationally, the delegated bureaus report average acceptance and completion times of about 16 and 18 days respectively — both within roughly 20 days — under the “double twenty” working standard, and simple cases account for about 90% of all concentration filings. For companies in the covered regions, the practical effect is faster, closer review: the Zhejiang bureau published a consultation phone line and a pre-filing consultation mechanism, and the entire process runs online.

The typical cases and enforcement signals

The six typical cases published on 21 August 2026 illustrate how the SAMR balances support for restructuring with restraint on harmful competition. Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five restrictive conditions (May 2026) to protect competition in online-audio and online-music markets; TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy was cleared unconditionally to consolidate solar-PV capacity; Hubei Jingjiang’s acquisition of East Group was cleared to support transformation into an “AI + new energy” services provider; and joint-venture cases in battery separators, automotive air-suspension components and coal logistics were cleared to integrate regional capacity and reduce low-level duplication. For foreign-invested companies, the enforcement posture is double-sided: genuine restructuring that improves efficiency and quality is supported, but transactions that entrench dominance or enable coordinated “involutionary” behaviour will attract conditions or prohibition — and the delegated bureaus apply the same substantive standards as the SAMR.

Practical steps

  1. Check whether delegation affects your filing. Determine whether your transaction meets the simple-case thresholds and whether the relevant market or parties sit in a delegated bureau’s territory; if so, expect local filing and faster clearance.
  2. Use pre-filing consultation. The business system and delegated bureaus (for example Zhejiang’s published hotline) allow pre-filing discussion of whether a filing is needed and how to frame the transaction.
  3. Plan the timeline around the “double twenty” standard. For qualifying cases, acceptance and completion are each targeted within 20 days; align signing, closing and financing steps accordingly.
  4. Treat simple-case status carefully. Simple-case filing is faster but still requires full and accurate notification; mischaracterisation invites correction and delay.
  5. Watch the substantive lines. The typical cases show that restrictive conditions and prohibitions are live tools for platform and network effects; conduct a realistic competition assessment before filing.
  6. Maintain group-wide notification discipline. The delegation does not lower the mandatory filing thresholds — turnover-based thresholds remain — and failure to file before closing (“gun-jumping”) remains a serious violation.

Compliance notes

The delegated-review system is administrative division of work, not decentralisation of substantive standards. The SAMR still issues conditional-approval and prohibition decisions; delegated bureaus act within their mandates and under the SAMR’s supervision. For foreign investors, the important practical change is speed and location of review, plus a clearer picture of how the SAMR treats sector restructuring. Nothing in the August 2026 changes alters the prior-filing obligation, the notification thresholds, or the penalties for closing before approval. Keep the transaction diary, engage the business system early, and treat the six typical cases as a practical guide to how restructuring proposals will be framed and assessed.


经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)/ Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 1 日,《市场监管总局关于进一步完善经营者集中委托审查制度的公告》正式施行。这一始于 2022 年 8 月试点、2025 年 7 月转正的制度,如今在原北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件的委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个简易案件受委托部门。一周后,市场监管总局于 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。对外资企业及其顾问而言,委托扩容、区域快速审结与更清晰的执法信号,共同改变了中国经营者集中的实务版图。

扩容改变了什么

委托审查制度是中国单一集中的审查体制内的分工:市场监管总局是审查机关,通过全国经营者集中业务系统统一接收申报,将符合条件的案件转受委托省级部门办理,后者审查并报告,总局作出决定。2026 年 8 月的调整沿三条轴展开。其一,范围:除简易案件外,部分非简易案件现在可委托原 5 个省级部门审查。非简易案件委托标准包括:同一相关市场合计份额 15%–25%;上下游市场份额均 25%–35%;无横向纵向关系者在每个相关市场份额均 25%–35%。其二,覆盖面:辽宁、浙江、四川加入简易案件受委托名单,受委托部门增至 8 个,各负责相应区域。例如,浙江受理浙江、福建、江西三省的简易案件。其三,程序:总局升级经营者集中反垄断业务系统、修订省级审查工作手册;非简易案件委托仍以总局名义出具批准文书,附条件批准或禁止的由总局统一发布决定。

运营层面,受委托部门在”双二十”工作标准下,平均受理约 16 天、审结约 18 天,均不超过约 20 天;简易案件约占全部申报的九成。对覆盖区域内的企业,实际效果是更快、更近的审查:浙江省局公布咨询电话并实行申报前商谈机制,全流程线上办理。

典型案例与执法信号

2026 年 8 月 21 日公布的六起典型案例展示总局如何在支持重组与遏制有害竞争之间平衡。腾讯收购喜马拉雅股权案于 2026 年 5 月附加五项限制性条件批准,以保护在线音频、网络音乐市场竞争;TCL 中环收购一道新能源案无条件批准,以整合光伏产能;湖北荆江收购易事特案批准,支持转型”AI+新能源”综合服务商;电池隔膜、汽车空气悬架部件与煤炭物流的新设合营案均无条件批准,以整合区域产能、减少低水平重复。对外资企业,执法姿态是双面的:改善效率与质量的真实重组受到支持,但固化支配地位或促成协同性”内卷”的交易将面临条件或禁止——受委托部门适用与总局一致的实体标准。

操作步骤

  1. 核验委托是否影响申报。 判断交易是否满足简易案件门槛,以及相关市场或当事方是否位于受委托部门辖区;若是,将属地申报并更快审结。
  2. 利用申报前商谈。 业务系统与受委托部门(如浙江公布的咨询电话)支持申报前讨论是否需要申报及如何构架交易。
  3. 按”双二十”标准排期。 合格案件受理与审结各目标 20 天内;据此安排签约、交割与融资节点。
  4. 审慎对待简易地位。 简易申报更快,但仍需完整准确申报;错误定性将招致更正与延误。
  5. 关注实体红线。 典型案例显示,对平台与网络效应,限制性条件与禁止是活跃工具;申报前应作现实竞争评估。
  6. 保持集团申报纪律。 委托不降低强制申报门槛——营业额门槛不变——交割前未申报(抢跑)仍是严重违规。

合规提示

委托审查是行政分工,不是实体标准的分散化。总局仍统一作出附条件批准与禁止决定;受委托部门在其职责内、在总局监督下行事。对外资投资者,实际变化主要是审查速度与地点,以及对总局如何处理行业重组的更清晰图景。2026 年 8 月的调整不改变事先申报义务、申报门槛或未批先交的处罚。保留交易台账、尽早接入业务系统,并将六起典型案例视为理解重组方案如何被构架与评估的实务指南。

Sources

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026)

  • A concentration must be notified to SAMR before closing if it meets the turnover thresholds; failing to file or closing early triggers investigation and penalties.
    达到营业额标准的经营者集中,须在实施前事先向市场监管总局申报;未申报或获批前实施将面临调查与处罚。
  • Current thresholds (raised in the 2024 revision): global aggregate turnover > RMB 12bn, or China aggregate > RMB 4bn with at least two parties each > RMB 0.8bn in China.
    现行标准(2024 年修订提高):全球合计营业额 > 120 亿元,或中国境内合计 > 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内各 > 8 亿元。
  • The industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (effective 1 Oct 2025) consolidates prior guidance into one filing playbook — conditions, materials, workflow.
    市场监管行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)将既往零散指引整合为统一申报手册——申报条件、材料、流程。
  • From 1 August 2026, SAMR delegates part of non-simplified-case review to five provincial bureaus (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, Shaanxi), shortening timelines for non-problematic deals.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,总局将部分非简易案件委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查,加速无竞争问题交易的落地。
  • Foreign-to-foreign deals can also be caught when they acquire control of, or decisive influence over, a China-business; the same thresholds and suspensory rule apply.
    外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,同样触发;适用相同标准与「停表」规则。
  • Practical tip: run a control-and-turnover test at term sheet; use SAMR’s pre-filing consultation and the online system to compress the clock.
    实操提示:在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额测试;善用总局商谈与在线系统压缩周期。

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026) | 中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

China’s merger-control regime is built on the *Anti-Monopoly Law* and the *State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings*. The core rule is suspensory: where a concentration reaches the notification thresholds, the parties must file with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and may not implement it before clearance. Implementing early — or not filing at all — exposes the parties to investigation and fines.

The thresholds were raised in the 2024 revision. A concentration must be notified if: (a) the aggregate global turnover of all parties in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion; or (b) the aggregate China turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion. SAMR is required to assess the thresholds against economic development and may adjust them.

To make filing predictable, SAMR issued the industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (released 26 September 2025, effective 1 October 2025). It is the first SAMR industry standard to set out concentration notification in a single, structured document, integrating four prior guidance papers (now repealed). It clarifies what constitutes a concentration (merger; acquisition of control via equity/assets; control or decisive influence via contract), the materials required (notification form, simplified-case requirements, appendices on control and turnover calculation), and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For foreign investors, this means a clearer, more standardised path to clearance.

A notable efficiency change took effect on 1 August 2026. SAMR expanded its delegated-review system: certain non-simplified cases may be entrusted to the provincial bureaus of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi, within defined market-share bands (e.g., combined share 15–25% in the same relevant market). Simple cases remain delegated to an expanded set of provincial bureaus. The policy aim is “complexity分流” — fast-track deals with no competition concerns so investment closes sooner, while SAMR retains the sensitive matters.

Cross-border relevance is direct. A foreign-to-foreign transaction that acquires control of, or decisive influence over, a Chinese business is not exempt. The same thresholds and the same standstill obligation apply, and SAMR coordinates with foreign enforcers where relevant. Parties should therefore (1) screen control and turnover at the term-sheet stage, (2) consider a pre-filing consultation for novel structures, and (3) use the online system to reduce avoidable back-and-forth. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest way to keep a deal on schedule.


中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

中国的经营者集中制度以《反垄断法》与《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》为框架。核心规则是「事前审查、停表」:达到申报标准的集中,须事先向市场监管总局(SAMR)申报,未获批准不得实施;抢跑或未申报将触发调查与罚款。

申报标准已在 2024 年修订提高。满足以下之一即须申报:(a)参与集中的所有经营者上一会计年度全球合计营业额超过 120 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元;或(b)中国境内合计营业额超过 40 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元。总局应根据经济发展情况评估标准实施。

为提升可预期性,总局发布行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 9 月 26 日发布,2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)。这是首部以行业标准形式系统规定经营者集中申报的文件,整合了此前的 4 部申报指导性文件(同步废止),统一明确申报条件(构成集中的情形、控制权判断、营业额计算)、申报材料(申报表、简易案件要求、控制权与营业额计算附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对外资而言,这意味着更清晰、标准化的获批路径。

一项提效变化于 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效。总局完善委托审查制度:符合份额区间(如同一相关市场份额合计 15%–25%)的部分非简易案件,可委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查;简易案件受托省级局相应扩容。政策意图是「繁简分流」——让无竞争问题的交易加速落地,敏感事项仍由总局把关。

跨境适用性直接。外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,并不豁免;同样适用该标准与停表义务,总局在必要时与境外执法机构协调。交易方应:(1)在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额筛查;(2)对新颖结构善用商谈;(3)用在线系统减少无效往返。早而规范的申报,是让交易按期完成的最低成本方式。

Filing Playbook for Foreign Investors

Start with the control test. Acquisition of a China business — even as part of a global transaction — can constitute a concentration if it confers control or decisive influence. Map the target’s China revenue and the parties’ global and China turnover against the thresholds before signing. If the deal is close to a threshold, model both the global and the Chinaaggregate tests; the lower of the two can still trigger.

Use the 2025 *Specification* as your template. It consolidates what to submit (notification form, simplified-case annexes, control and turnover appendices) and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For straightforward, non-problematic deals, consider the simplified procedure and the expanded provincial delegation effective 1 August 2026, which can shift routine non-simplified review to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing or Shaanxi within defined share bands.

Mind the standstill. Do not close, integrate or exercise control before clearance — interim integration (sharing confidential info, appointing managers, consolidating accounts) can be read as early implementation. Build a conditionality and long-stop that reflects the review period, keep the CSRC/security-review workstreams in view if the deal is also an inbound acquisition, and document a clean competition narrative. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest insurance for deal certainty.

外资申报实操手册

从控制权测试入手。取得中国业务控制权或决定性影响的交易——即便作为全球交易一部分——可能构成集中。签约前将标的中国营收与各党全球/中国营业额对照标准;若接近阈值,同时建模全球与境内合计两种测试,较低者亦可能触发。

以 2025 年《申报规范》为模板。它整合了提交内容(申报表、简易案件附件、控制权与营业额附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对清晰无问题的交易,可考虑简易程序及 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效的省级委托扩容——在既定份额区间内将常规非简易案件移至北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西。

遵守停表。获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制;过渡期整合(共享机密信息、委派管理人、合并账务)可能被认定为提前实施。设定反映审查周期的条件与长停,若同时属 inbound 并购则留意证监会/安审工作流,并备好清晰竞争叙事。早而规范的申报,是交易确定性的最低成本保险。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Suspensory rule: file with SAMR before closing once thresholds are met; early closing triggers investigation and fines.
  • Thresholds: global aggregate > RMB 12bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China); or China aggregate > RMB 4bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China).
  • Concentration: merger; equity/asset acquisition of control; control/decisive influence by contract.
  • 2025 standard: *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* effective 1 Oct 2025 consolidates prior guidance.
  • Delegation: from 1 Aug 2026, part of non-simplified cases delegated to Beijing/Shanghai/Guangdong/Chongqing/Shaanxi.
  • Standstill: no closing, integration or control exercise before clearance.
  • Cross-border: foreign-to-foreign deals acquiring control of a China business are equally caught.

实务速查

  • 停表规则: 达阈值须向 SAMR 申报后方可交割;抢跑触发调查与罚款。
  • 标准: 全球合计 > 120 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国);或中国合计 > 40 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国)。
  • 集中: 合并;取得控制权的股权/资产收购;依合同取得控制或决定性影响。
  • 2025 标准: 《经营者集中申报规范》2025 年 10 月 1 日施行,整合既往指引。
  • 委托: 2026 年 8 月 1 日起部分非简易案件委托北京/上海/广东/重庆/陕西。
  • 停表: 获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制。
  • 跨境: 取得中国业务控制权的外资间交易同样被纳入。

Sources

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review

  • China’s 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 empowers SAMR to review concentrations that fall below the notification thresholds where they may eliminate or restrict competition.
    中国2022年修订的《反垄断法》授权市场监管总局对未达申报标准、但可能排除限制竞争的集中进行审查。
  • “Killer” or “sniping” (掐尖式) acquisitions—buying a nascent rival to discontinue or absorb it—are a stated SAMR enforcement priority, especially in the platform economy.
    “扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购——收购新生竞争对手以停用或吸收之——是市场监管总局明确的执法重点,尤其在平台经济领域。
  • Below-threshold deals are not a safe harbour; the authority can call them in, impose remedies, or unwind completed transactions.
    未达门槛的交易并非安全港;监管可主动立案,附加救济,或撤销已完成的交易。
  • The theory targets potential competition: a small or pre-revenue target’s future trajectory is what makes the deal reviewable.
    该理论针对潜在竞争:标的虽小或尚无营收,其未来轨迹正使交易具有可审查性。
  • As of 2026, the focus has extended from platforms to biotech, semiconductors, and AI, where a startup’s talent or IP is the real asset.
    截至2026年,重点已从平台延伸至生物医药、半导体及人工智能,其中初创企业的人才或知识产权才是真正资产。
  • Entrants should document a genuine, pro-competitive rationale and preserve standalone-viability evidence for any acquisition of an early-stage rival.
    准入者应就收购早期竞争对手记录真实、促进竞争的理据,并保存其独立存续可行性的证据。

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review | 中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

The Legal Hook: Below-Threshold Review

A defining innovation of the 2022 《反垄断法》 amendment is explicit authority for the enforcer to examine concentrations that do not meet the turnover notification thresholds yet “have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” This closes the gap that previously let small, strategic acquisitions escape scrutiny simply because the target’s revenue was negligible. SAMR may, on its own initiative or following a complaint, open a below-threshold review—even after closing.

What Is a “Killer” or “Sniping” Acquisition?

The term “killer acquisition” (and its Chinese framing 掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购) describes a dominant firm buying an emerging competitor chiefly to shut it down, shelf the product, or absorb its talent and IP rather than to compete with it. The competitive harm is forward-looking: the market loses a future rival, and innovation is chilled. In platform and deep-tech contexts, the acquired asset is often pre-revenue, so classic turnover-based thresholds would never catch it—hence the below-threshold power is the relevant tool.

Why 2026 Makes This Salient

Entering 2026, several forces elevate below-threshold scrutiny:

  • Platform precedent. SAMR’s platform-economy guidance names eliminating potential competition as a core concern, and 掐尖式并购 is repeatedly cited in enforcement rhetoric.
  • Deep-tech race. In semiconductors, AI, and biotech, acquisitions of tiny startups for their talent or patents are strategically loaded; the real value is not current sales but future capability.
  • Talent and data. Buying a team or dataset to neutralize a rival’s trajectory is exactly the harm the below-threshold rule targets.

How SAMR Assesses These Deals

The authority looks beyond current overlap to potential competition:

  • Would the target, absent the deal, likely have become a significant rival?
  • Is the acquirer a dominant or strategically placed firm?
  • Does the transaction remove a nascent competitive constraint?
  • Is there a genuine efficiency or pro-competitive rationale, or merely elimination?

Evidence of “shelving” intent—internal plans to discontinue the product, retain talent only, or refuse to invest—sharpens the case against the deal.

Remedies and Consequences

For below-threshold deals found anticompetitive, SAMR may:

  • Prohibit the transaction;
  • Order divestiture or restructuring of the acquired asset;
  • Impose behavioural remedies (e.g., keep the product alive, license the technology, maintain investment);
  • Unwind a completed concentration and impose turnover-based fines.

Because the acquirer may already have integrated the target, unwinding is disruptive and value-destroying—so the ex ante risk calculus matters more than the (often low) notification threshold.

2026 Practice Notes

  • The below-threshold power is used selectively, not as a dragnet; cases cluster in platform, tech, and innovation-heavy sectors.
  • SAMR signals intent through guidelines and public statements more than through a fixed numerical trigger, so sector context governs.
  • Acquirers of early-stage rivals should expect that a deal’s *strategic logic*, not its size, determines scrutiny.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Do not assume “small = safe.” A below-threshold acquisition of a rival still invites review if its trajectory matters.
  2. Document pro-competitive rationale. Business plans, investment commitments, and roadmaps showing the target will thrive post-deal are protective.
  3. Preserve standalone-viability evidence. Demonstrate the target was not on a clear path to become a rival, or that the deal genuinely accelerates its offering.
  4. Consider voluntary engagement. Where a deal is sensitive, a proactive explanation to SAMR can pre-empt a contested proceeding.
  5. Contract for remediation. Allocate unwinding and remedy risk in the SPA, with appropriate long-stop dates.

Bottom Line

The below-threshold review power reframes China’s merger control: size is no longer the sole gate. For 2026, any acquisition by a dominant or strategically placed firm of an early-stage innovator—especially in platforms, AI, semiconductors, or biotech—should be planned as if scrutinised for its effect on future competition, with the evidentiary file built accordingly.


中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

法律抓手:未达门槛的审查

2022年《反垄断法》修订的一项标志性创新,是明确授权执法机关审查未达营业额申报标准、但”具有或者可能具有排除、限制竞争效果”的经营者集中。这填补了此前的漏洞——即小型战略性收购仅因标的营收微薄便可逃避审查。市场监管总局可主动或依举报,开展未达门槛审查,甚至在交割后启动。

何为”扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购?

“扼杀式收购”(中文亦称掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购)指支配企业收购新兴竞争对手,主要目的为关停、搁置产品,或吸收其人才与知识产权,而非与之竞争。其竞争损害是前瞻性的:市场失去一个未来竞争对手,创新受抑。在平台与深科技场景中,被收购资产常处于尚无营收阶段,经典营业额门槛本无从捕获——因此未达门槛的审查权才是适用工具。

2026年为何凸显

进入2026年,多重力量抬升了未达门槛审查:

  • 平台先例。 市场监管总局平台经济指引将消除潜在竞争列为核心关切,”掐尖式并购”在执法论述中屡被援引。
  • 深科技竞赛。 在半导体、人工智能与生物医药领域,为人才或专利而收购微型初创企业具有战略载荷;真正价值不在当前销售,而在未来能力。
  • 人才与数据。 收购团队或数据集以中性化对手轨迹,正是未达门槛规则所欲针对的损害。

市场监管总局如何评估此类交易

监管超越当前重叠,审视潜在竞争:

  • 若交易不发生,标的是否可能成为重要竞争对手?
  • 收购方是否为支配或具战略地位的企业?
  • 交易是否消除了新生的竞争约束?
  • 是否存在真实的效率或促进竞争理据,抑或仅为消除?

“搁置”意图的证据——内部关停产品、仅留人才、拒绝投入的计划——会使案件对交易更为不利。

救济与后果

对认定具反竞争效果的未达门槛交易,市场监管总局可:

  • 禁止交易;
  • 责令剥离或重组被收购资产;
  • 附加行为性救济(如保持产品存续、许可技术、维持投入);
  • 撤销已完成的集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。

由于收购方可能已整合标的,撤销具有破坏性且摧毁价值——因此事前的风险权衡,比(往往很低的)申报门槛更关键。

2026年实践要点

  • 未达门槛审查权被选择性使用,而非撒网;案件集中于平台、科技及创新密集型行业。
  • 市场监管总局更多通过指引与公开表态释放意图,而非固定数值触发,故行业语境决定一切。
  • 收购早期竞争对手者须预期:决定审查的是交易的*战略逻辑*,而非其规模。

准入者实务指引

  1. 勿假定”小即安全”。 未达门槛但轨迹重要的竞品收购,仍会招致审查。
  2. 记录促进竞争的理据。 商业计划、投入承诺及标的交易后仍将壮大的路线图,具有保护作用。
  3. 保存独立存续可行性证据。 证明标的并非清晰走向成为竞争对手,或交易确实加速了其产品供给。
  4. 考虑主动沟通。 交易敏感时,主动向市场监管总局说明可避免陷入争议的程序。
  5. 在合同中约定补救。 于协议中分配撤销与救济风险,并设置适当的最晚截止日。

要点总结

未达门槛审查权重塑了中国经营者集中制度:规模不再是唯一关口。就2026年而言,任何支配或具战略地位企业对早期创新者的收购——尤其在平台、人工智能、半导体或生物医药领域——都应按”审查其对未来竞争的影响”来规划,并据此构建证据案卷。

Sources

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market

  • Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
    数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范,该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。
  • Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
    巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查,即便标的规模小或尚无营收。
  • VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
    采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖;”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。
  • Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
    在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济,正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
    截至2026年,审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态,以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。
  • Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
    准入者应预判:任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购,都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

The Platform Antitrust Framework

China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.

Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review

Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:

  • Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
  • Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
  • Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
  • Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).

These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.

VIE Structures Are In Scope

A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.

Substantive Theories SAMR Applies

In platform cases SAMR weighs:

  • Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
  • Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
  • Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
  • Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.

Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.

2026 Trajectory

Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:

  • Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
  • AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
  • Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.

The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
  2. Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
  3. Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
  4. Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
  5. Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.

Stakes

Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.


中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

平台反垄断框架

中国转向平台经济反垄断,以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场,阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时,如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言,定义的不是 bare AML 文本,而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。

平台并购为何受到更高审查

平台收购引发独特关切:

  • 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者,可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
  • 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河,并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
  • 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
  • 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品(见下篇)。

这些理论意味着,市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠,更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。

VIE 结构在管辖之内

一种长期误解认为可变利益实体(VIE)结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确:采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查,达标须申报,且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞,并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。

市场监管总局适用的实质理论

在平台案件中,市场监管总局考量:

  • 跨边市场界定(如匹配、支付、配送),承认多边性;
  • 支配地位,由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断;
  • 消除潜在竞争,包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购;
  • 纵向封阻,即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。

结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济,如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。

2026年走向

至2026年,平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至:

  • 算法驱动的整合,合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切;
  • 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购,就加深护城河进行评估;
  • 超级应用生态,就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。

其内在逻辑是:平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判,而不只看今日的份额。

准入者实务指引

  1. 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
  2. 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
  3. 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
  4. 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免;达标即申报。
  5. 标的涉大规模或重要数据时,统筹数据安全审查。

利害关系

误判审查的平台交易,面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济,或被禁止。无论外资还是内资,陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作,是审慎之道。

Sources

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice

  • A concentration is notifiable to SAMR when the parties’ turnover meets the State Council thresholds; the deal is suspensory and cannot close before clearance.
    当各方营业额达到国务院标准时,集中须向市场监管总局申报;交易具有暂停效力,获批前不得交割。
  • The State Council raised the notification thresholds in its 2024 revision, recalibrating the global and China turnover benchmarks to current economic scale.
    国务院在2024年修订中上调了申报标准,使全球及中国营业额基准与当前经济规模重新校准。
  • SAMR operates a simplified (简易) procedure for non-issue, non-rivalrous transactions, materially shortening review time versus the standard track.
    市场监管总局对无非竞争关切的集中适用简易程序,相较标准程序显著缩短审查时间。
  • The 2022 AML introduced a stop-the-clock (停钟) mechanism; incomplete filings or further-review needs pause the statutory clock.
    2022年《反垄断法》引入”停钟”机制;申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限暂停计算。
  • Gun-jumping—closing or integrating before clearance—draws substantially higher fines under the 2022 amendments, making procedural discipline essential.
    抢跑——在获批前交割或整合——依2022年修订面临显著提高的罚款,程序纪律因而至关重要。
  • As of 2026, expect tighter scrutiny of minority acquisitions that confer decisive influence and of filings’ substantive accuracy.
    截至2026年,须预期对赋予决定性影响的少数股权收购,以及申报实质准确性,将受到更严审视。

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice | 中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

When a Filing Is Required

Under the 《反垄断法》 and SAMR’s implementing rules, a “concentration” ( merger; acquisition of control; or acquisition of decisive influence over another undertaking) must be notified where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s thresholds. The original thresholds, set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, turned on combined global turnover and China turnover. In its 2024 revision, the State Council raised these thresholds to reflect China’s enlarged economic scale—reducing filings for routine small deals while keeping strategically significant transactions within scope. Because the precise figures are set by State Council regulation and periodically adjusted, deal teams should confirm the current thresholds against the latest SAMR guidance at the time of signing.

The Suspensory Principle

The cardinal rule: a notifiable concentration is suspensory. The parties may sign, but they may not implement the concentration—no control change, no asset integration, no voting-rights exercise—until SAMR clears it. Premature implementation (“gun-jumping”) is an independent violation under the 2022 AML, carrying far higher fines than under the prior regime. This makes the filing not a formality but a gating condition in the SPA.

Two Procedures: Standard and Simplified

SAMR administers two tracks:

TrackApplicabilityTypical duration
Standard (普通)Likely competitive concerns or complex factsUp to 30 days initial + extended phase
Simplified (简易)No substantive concern; e.g., low combined share, non-competitors, passive minorityMaterially shorter, often cleared within the initial phase

The simplified procedure applies where the combined market share is low, the parties are not actual or potential competitors in the same market, or the acquisition is a passive minority stake. Choosing the correct track—and presenting a clean, complete file—directly affects clearance speed.

The Stop-the-Clock Mechanism

A defining feature of the 2022 AML is the stop-the-clock (停钟) rule, operationalised in SAMR’s 经营者集中审查规定. The statutory review clock pauses when:

  • The notifying party fails to provide required materials and SAMR requests supplementation; or
  • A circumstance arises requiring further review (e.g., third-party opposition, new evidence).

Practically, a careless or incomplete filing can double the effective timeline. Diligent, complete first submission is the cheapest insurance against clock-stoppage.

Substantive Assessment

SAMR assesses whether the concentration would eliminate or restrict competition, considering market share, concentration ratios, entry barriers, efficiencies, and failing-firm defences. Remedies—structural (divestiture) or behavioural (access, non-discrimination)—may be imposed. For market entrants, the key is to demonstrate that the combination does not foreclose rivals or raise barriers in the relevant China market.

2026 Filing Practice

Entering 2026, SAMR’s practice shows:

  • Tighter look at “decisive influence” acquisitions—minority stakes that nonetheless confer control-like influence are caught.
  • Greater demands for data accuracy in notifications, with scrutiny of market definition.
  • Continued use of simplified procedure for clean, non-rivalrous deals, keeping routine inbound acquisitions efficient.
  • Coordination with security and data reviews where the target sits in a sensitive sector.

Practical Steps for Filers

  1. Screen early. Test the transaction against current thresholds at term-sheet stage.
  2. Choose the track correctly. Mislabeling a standard case as simplified invites rejection and delay.
  3. Prepare a complete file. Accurate turnover, market definition, and supporting evidence prevent clock-stoppage.
  4. Sequence with other regimes. Where security or data review applies, align filing timelines.
  5. Contractual protection. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and allocate gun-jumping risk in the SPA.

Exposure and Remedies

Beyond clearance denial, SAMR may unwind completed unlawful concentrations and impose turnover-based fines. The 2022 amendments raised these ceilings, and responsible individuals can be penalised. For foreign acquirers, disciplined filing practice—correct track, complete file, no pre-clearance integration—is the difference between a routine clearance and a value-destroying remediation.


中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

何时需要申报

依据《反垄断法》及市场监管总局实施规则,”经营者集中”(合并;取得控制权;或取得对其他经营者的决定性影响)于各方营业额达到国务院标准时须申报。原始门槛由国务院2008年规定设定,以合计全球营业额与中国营业额为准。在2024年修订中,国务院上调了这些门槛,以反映中国扩大的经济规模——在减少常规小规模交易申报的同时,将具有战略意义的交易保留在范围内。由于具体数字由国务院规定设定并定期调整,交易团队应在签约时对照市场监管总局最新指引确认现行门槛。

暂停原则

首要规则是:须申报的集中具有暂停效力。各方可以签约,但在市场监管总局批准前,不得实施集中——不得变更控制、不得整合资产、不得行使表决权。提前实施(”抢跑”)依2022年《反垄断法》构成独立违法,罚款远高于此前制度。这使得申报不再是形式,而是协议中的一项先决条件。

两种程序:标准与简易

市场监管总局设有两条路径:

路径适用情形通常时长
标准(普通)可能存在竞争关切或事实复杂初始30日+延长阶段
简易无非实质关切,如合计份额低、非竞争者、被动少数股权显著更短,常在初始阶段内审结

简易程序适用于合计市场份额低、各方非同一市场现实或潜在竞争者,或收购为被动少数股权等情形。选择正确的路径并提交干净、完整的案卷,直接影响获批速度。

停钟机制

2022年《反垄断法》的标志性特征是“停钟”规则,由市场监管总局《经营者集中审查规定》落实。在以下情形,法定审查时限暂停:

  • 申报方未提供所需材料,市场监管总局要求补充;或
  • 出现需进一步审查的情形(如第三方异议、新证据)。

实践中,草率或不完整的申报可能使实际时间表翻倍。勤勉、完整地首次提交,是防止停钟最廉价的保障。

实质审查

市场监管总局评估集中是否排除、限制竞争,考量市场份额、集中度、进入壁垒、效率及困境企业抗辩等。可能附加救济——结构性(剥离)或行为性(开放接入、非歧视)。对准入者而言,关键在于证明该结合不会在中国相关市场封阻竞争对手或抬高壁垒。

2026年申报实践

进入2026年,市场监管总局的实践显示:

  • 对”决定性影响”收购审查更严——虽为少数股权但赋予类控制性影响的交易亦被纳入。
  • 对申报数据准确性要求更高,并审视市场界定。
  • 继续对干净、非竞争类交易适用简易程序,使常规 inbound 收购保持高效。
  • 与安全和数据审查统筹,当标的位于敏感行业时。

申报者实务步骤

  1. 尽早筛查。 在条款书阶段即对照现行门槛测试交易。
  2. 正确选择路径。 将标准案件误标为简易将招致退回与延误。
  3. 备妥完整案卷。 准确的营业额、市场界定及佐证可防止停钟。
  4. 与其他制度统筹。 如涉及安全或数据审查,须对齐申报时间表。
  5. 合同保护。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,并在协议中分配抢跑风险。

风险与救济

除不予批准外,市场监管总局可撤销已完成的违法集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。2022年修订提高了这些上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外国收购方而言,纪律化的申报实践——正确路径、完整案卷、获批前不整合——决定着是顺利获批还是陷入摧毁价值的补救。

Sources

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework

  • China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
    中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石,主要由市场监管总局执行,其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。
  • Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
    经营者集中具有暂停效力:达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割,而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。
  • The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
    2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制,提高了处罚幅度,并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。
  • The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
    2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断,与市场准入壁垒直接相关。
  • As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
    截至2026年,执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议,以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。
  • Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
    外资投资者进入中国市场时,应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

The Statutory Foundation

China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.

Three Pillars of Enforcement

  1. Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
  2. Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
  3. Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.

For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.

Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover

A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.

The 2022 Amendments: What Changed

The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:

  • Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
  • Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
  • Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
  • “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.

These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.

Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus

SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.

Fair Competition Review and Market Entry

The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.

Practical Compliance for Entrants

  1. Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
  2. Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
  3. Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
  4. Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
  5. Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.

Penalties and Exposure

Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.


中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

法律基础

中国竞争法是《反垄断法》,于2007年通过,2022年作重大修订,修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中,并授权国家市场监督管理总局(市场监管总局)作为国家级主要执法机构,会同省级市场监管部门执法。

执法的三大支柱

  1. 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
  2. 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位(如不公平定价、排他、搭售)。
  3. 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。

对市场准入者而言,三者均具意义:第一项管控交易,第二项约束市场行为,第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。

经营者集中:暂停效力且以营业额为触发

“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权,以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时,交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛(由国务院2008年规定设定,并于2024年修订中上调)以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大,在减少小规模交易申报的同时,仍将战略性交易纳入范围。

2022年修订:变化何在

2022年修订显著加强了制度:

  • 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限可暂停,从而延长实际审查时间。
  • 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制,将面临显著提高的罚款。
  • 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素,并提高处罚。
  • 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口,由市场监管总局指引落实。

这些变化意味着,时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。

平台经济与行为监管重点

市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架:”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年,市场监管总局持续关注平台行为,以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。

公平竞争审查与市场准入

《公平竞争审查条例》(2024年8月1日施行)要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言,这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时,公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致,却是一条被认可的救济路径。

准入者实务合规

  1. 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
  2. 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表;在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
  3. 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款,避免触犯行为规则。
  4. 监测支配力指标;若份额超过约50%,须以更高谨慎对待行为。
  5. 遇地方规则阻碍准入时,运用公平竞争审查。

处罚与风险敞口

违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言,暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织,使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题,而非后台形式。

Sources