Category Archives: Market Entry / 市场准入

National security review of foreign investment

  • Security review is a stand-alone ex-ante screening under the Foreign Investment Law (Art. 35) and the 2020 Security Review Measures (Order No. 37, effective 18 January 2021) — it can block or condition a deal even where the negative list permits it.
    安全审查是依据《外商投资法》(第 35 条)与 2020 年《安审办法》(第 37 号令,2021 年 1 月 18 日施行)的独立事前审查——即便负面清单允许也可阻止或附条件批准交易。
  • Two conditions must both be met: the investment is in a covered sensitive sector (defence, important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT/finance/key tech) and the investor acquires actual control.
    须同时满足两条件:投资落入受涵盖敏感领域(军工、重要农业/能源/装备/基础设施/运输/文化/信息技术/金融/关键技术),且投资者取得实际控制权。
  • “Actual control” is defined broadly — 50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech — and is wider than the merger-control test.
    “实际控制”界定宽泛——50% 以上股权、重大表决影响,或对决策/人事/财务/技术的重大影响——且宽于经营者集中标准。
  • Procedure runs preliminary (15 working days) → general (30) → special (60, extendable); a transaction may not close while under review.
    程序为初步审查(15 个工作日)→ 一般审查(30)→ 特别审查(60,可延长);审查期间交易不得交割。
  • The decision (pass / pass-with-conditions / prohibition) is final — there is no administrative-appeal route on the merits.
    决定(通过/附条件通过/禁止)为最终决定——实体上无行政复议途径。
  • Non-compliance (failure to file, misrepresentation, ignoring conditions) can lead to ordered divestment, credit-system inclusion and joint punishment.
    违规(拒不申报、弄虚作假、不执行附加条件)可导致责令剥离、纳入信用信息系统及联合惩戒。
  • Security review runs alongside — not instead of — the negative list, merger control and sector licensing; screen it early as it can be the longest and most consequential gate.
    安全审查与负面清单、经营者集中、行业许可并行而非替代;尽早筛查,因其可能时限最长、决定最具决定性。

National security review of foreign investment | 外商投资安全审查

Overview

China’s foreign-investment national security review (国家安全审查) is a stand-alone ex-ante screening that can block or condition a deal even where the negative list permits it. Its legal basis is the Foreign Investment Law (Art. 35) and the Security Review Measures (《外商投资安全审查办法》), issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM as Order No. 37 on 19 December 2020 and in force since 18 January 2021. This article sets out what triggers a review, how “control” is defined, the three-stage procedure and its timelines, and the consequences of non-compliance.

The mechanism is deliberately narrow in scope but broad in effect: it catches only investments in defined sensitive sectors that acquire actual control, yet a review decision is final and can prohibit the deal or force divestment. For a foreign acquirer, the review is the single most consequential gate, because it can override both the negative list and a cleared merger-control filing.

Scope: which investments are caught

Two conditions must both be met. First, the investment must fall within a covered field. The Measures list: investment in defence, defence-support and other national-defence-related fields, and investment in the perimeter of military and defence facilities; and investment in important agriculture, important energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important cultural products and services, important information-technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies, and other important fields.

Second, the investor must acquire actual control of the invested enterprise. Control is defined broadly: holding 50% or more of the equity; holding less than 50% but with voting rights that can materially influence board or shareholder resolutions; or any other situation enabling the foreign investor to exert a material influence on the enterprise’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. Note that this control test is wider than the control test used for merger-control notification, so a deal can require security review even when no merger filing is triggered. The review office may also require filing where it deems an investment within scope, and other authorities, enterprises, social organisations or the public may propose a review.

Procedure and timeline

The review has three stages. Stage one — preliminary review: within 15 working days of receiving a compliant submission, the review office decides whether to open a formal review. Stage two — general review: within 30 working days of opening, the office issues a pass decision or proceeds to the next stage. Stage three — special review: a 60-working-day phase that is not triggered for every case; only matters not cleared at general review enter it, and the period may be extended in special circumstances. Time spent supplementing materials is excluded from the clock.

A transaction may not close (交割) while under review; if it has closed before a decision, the office may unwind or order divestment if a national-security effect is found. Foreign investors uncertain whether their deal is in scope may consult the review office before filing. Referrals can also come from the office itself, or from other authorities, enterprises, social organisations or the public.

Outcomes and enforcement

The decision is one of three types: pass; pass with conditions (the investor must implement the附加条件); or prohibition (the investment may not proceed). Because the decision is final, there is no administrative-appeal route on the merits.

Non-compliance is penalised: failure to file, misrepresentation, or ignoring附加条件 can lead to an order to divest equity or assets within a set period, inclusion in the national credit-information system, and joint punishment under relevant rules. The review office sits within the NDRC, with the NDRC and MOFCOM jointly leading the inter-agency mechanism, and will typically consult the relevant sector regulator (for example agriculture, industry, the central bank or the securities regulator) during the review.

Interaction with other regimes

Security review operates alongside — not instead of — the negative list, merger control and sector licensing. A deal may need all of them: negative-list compliance for the sector, SAMR merger clearance where turnover thresholds are met, and security review where a covered sensitive sector and control are present. Investors should therefore screen a proposed acquisition against the security-review scope early, because its timeline can be the longest and its decision the most consequential.

A further point for acquirers: the control test here is intentionally wider than the merger-control test. A minority stake that gives the foreign investor a negative right over business plans, budgets or key personnel can constitute “actual control” for security-review purposes even though it would not confer control for antitrust notification. Transactions should be screened on both tests independently.

What to do next

Common misreads

Two errors are especially costly. The first is assuming “no 50% stake, no review” — the control test is broader, and a minority stake with negative rights over plans, budgets or key personnel can still constitute actual control for security-review purposes. The second is closing the transaction before the review concludes, on the belief that clearance is procedural; the law bars closing while under review, and a completed deal can be unwound. A third, milder error is conflating security review with merger control: the two have different scopes, different control tests and different agencies, and a cleared merger filing does not satisfy or predict the security-review outcome.

  • Screen the target sector against the covered fields (defence, important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT/finance/key tech) before negotiating control.
  • Assess “actual control” using the broad test — 50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech.
  • File before implementation if both conditions are met; do not close the transaction while review is pending.
  • Expect a possible 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions); build it into your long-stop and financing timeline.
  • Coordinate security review with merger control (SAMR) and any sector licence so the three workstreams run in parallel, not in sequence.
  • Consult the review office pre-filing if scope is genuinely uncertain — the consultation is permitted and can prevent a mis-step.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Foreign M&A in China: process & approvals
  • see also: FIE admission rules: approval vs. filing
  • see also: Industry restrictions by sector: a quick map

外商投资安全审查

概述

中国外商投资安全审查是一项独立的事前审查,即便负面清单允许,也可阻止或附条件批准一项交易。其法律依据是《外商投资法》(第三十五条)与《外商投资安全审查办法》——由国家发展改革委、商务部于 2020 年 12 月 19 日以第 37 号令发布,自 2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行。本文说明何种情形触发审查、”控制”如何界定、三阶段程序与时限,以及违规后果。

该机制范围刻意收窄但效力广泛:仅涵盖特定敏感领域且取得控制权的投资,但审查决定为最终决定,可禁止交易或强制剥离。对外国收购方,审查是最具决定性的关卡,因其可凌驾于负面清单与已通过的经营者集中申报之上。

范围:何种投资被纳入

须同时满足两个条件。其一,投资须落入受涵盖领域。《办法》列举:军工、军工配套等关系国防安全的领域,以及在军事设施和军工设施周边地域投资;以及关系国家安全的重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术以及其他重要领域。

其二,投资者须取得所投资企业的实际控制权。控制权界定宽泛:持有企业 50% 以上股权;持股不足 50% 但所享表决权能对董事会、股东会或股东大会决议产生重大影响;或其他导致外国投资者能对企业的经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。注意该控制标准宽于经营者集中申报的控制标准,故一项交易即便未触发反垄断申报,仍可能需安全审查。审查办亦可对认定属范围内的投资要求申报,其他机关、企业、社会团体、社会公众可提出建议。

程序与时限

审查分三阶段。第一阶段——初步审查:收到符合要求的材料之日起 15 个工作日内,决定是否启动审查。第二阶段——一般审查:启动之日起 30 个工作日内作出决定通过或进入下一阶段。第三阶段——特别审查:60 个工作日的阶段,并非每案必经;仅一般审查未通过者进入,特殊情况下可延长。补充材料时间不计入期限。

审查期间交易不得交割;若决定作出前已交割,审查办认定存在国家安全影响的,有权撤销交易或责令剥离。外国投资者不确定交易是否属审查范围的,可在申报前咨询审查办。审查也可由审查办主动要求,或由有关机关、企业、社会团体、社会公众提出建议。

结果与执行

决定分三类:通过;附条件通过(须按附加条件实施);禁止(不得实施)。因决定为最终决定,实体上无行政复议途径。

违规受罚:拒不申报、弄虚作假、不执行附加条件等,可责令期限内处分股权或资产,纳入国家信用信息系统,并依规定实施联合惩戒。审查办设在国家发展改革委,由发改委、商务部牵头跨部门机制,审查中通常会征询相关行业监管机关(如农业、工业、央行、证券监管)意见。

与其他制度的关系

安全审查与负面清单、经营者集中、行业许可并行而非替代。一项交易可能三者皆需:行业层面符合负面清单,达到营业额门槛时通过市场监管总局经营者集中审查,且涉受涵盖敏感领域并取得控制权时通过安全审查。因此投资者应尽早以安全审查范围为拟议收购做筛查,因其时限可能最长、决定最具决定性。

对收购方的进一步要点:此处控制标准有意宽于经营者集中标准。使外国投资者对企业经营计划、预算或关键人员享否决权的少数股权,即便不构成反垄断意义上的控制,仍可能构成安全审查下的”实际控制”。交易应分别在两项标准下独立筛查。

下一步建议

常见误读

两类错误代价尤高。其一,以为”无 50% 股权即无审查”——控制标准更宽,对计划、预算或关键人员享否决权的少数股权仍可能构成安全审查下的实际控制。其二,在审查结束前交割,误以为 clearance 是程序性的;法律禁止审查期间交割,已完成交易可被撤销。其三(较轻),混淆安全审查与经营者集中:二者范围、控制标准、机关均不同,已通过的经营者集中申报既不满足也不预示安全审查结果。

  • 在谈判控制权前,将目标行业对照受涵盖领域(军工、重要农业/能源/装备/基础设施/运输/文化/信息技术/金融/关键技术)筛查。
  • 用宽泛标准评估”实际控制”——50% 以上股权、重大表决影响,或对决策/人事/财务/技术的重大影响。
  • 两条件均满足的,在实施前申报;审查未决期间不得交割。
  • 预期可能的 15 + 30 + 60 工作日路径(可延长);纳入长止期与融资时间表。
  • 将安全审查与经营者集中(市场监管总局)及行业许可并行推进,而非串行。
  • 范围确不确定时,申报前咨询审查办——咨询被允许,可避免失误。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:外资并购中国企业的流程与审批
  • 参见:外资企业准入:审批与备案
  • 参见:分行业外资限制速览地图

Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026)

  • China’s Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment Utilisation, issued on 16 June 2026, commits to accelerating the revision of the 2006 Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“the 10-Order”).
    2026 年 6 月 16 日印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订 2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(”10 号令”)。
  • The Action Plan also allows qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-related industries, widening foreign access to China’s A-share capital market.
    行动方案允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,拓宽外资进入 A 股资本市场的路径。
  • The planned revision is expected to remove obsolete approval clauses, modernise consideration and payment rules, and align cross-share-swap and strategic-investment frameworks with the Foreign Investment Law and the new strategic-investment measures.
    修订预计将删除过时审批条款,现代化对价与支付规则,并使跨境换股、战投框架与《外商投资法》及新战投办法相衔接。
  • Provincial government and media commentary in August 2026 underscores the Action Plan as a shift from “admission” to “post-admission operations” for foreign investment.
    2026 年 8 月地方政府与媒体解读普遍强调,行动方案标志外资政策从”准入”转向”准营”。
  • For foreign acquirers, the expected revision and strategic-investment relaxation could reduce transaction friction, but the current rules and mandatory filings remain fully applicable today.
    对外国收购方,预期的修订与战投放宽可能降低交易摩擦,但现行规则与强制申报在当下完全适用。

Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026) | 中国外资并购:修订 2006 年并购规定与新的战略投资通道(2026 年)

Why this matters now

The Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment Utilisation (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》, Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97), issued on 16 June 2026 by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance with State Council approval, is the first comprehensive foreign-investment policy document of the “15th Five-Year Plan” period. Among its fifteen measures, two provisions speak directly to foreign M&A. First, the Action Plan commits to “accelerating the revision of the Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors and optimising the merger-control process and consideration-payment requirements”. Second, it allows qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate, as strategic investors, in securities issuance of listed companies in industries unrelated to their own, opening a broader channel for foreign capital into the A-share market. Analysts in August 2026 — including commentary published through the Shanghai municipal foreign-affairs weekly — read the Action Plan as marking the shift from “admission” to “post-admission operations” in China’s foreign-investment regime, with M&A modernisation at its centre.

The 2006 M&A Measures and why revision matters

The Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “10-Order”, 2006, amended 2009) remain the most important ministerial regulation in foreign M&A, nearly two decades after issuance. Since the Foreign Investment Law took effect in 2020, the pre-approval clauses of the 10-Order that conflict with the new framework — including the approval of affiliated acquisitions — are no longer implemented, but other provisions on transaction-consideration pricing basis, payment deadlines, payment forms and valuation models remain effective. The revision is urgent on three levels. First, with pre-approval gone, the commercial department has fully exited ex-ante examination of foreign M&A, so the 10-Order’s approval provisions must be formally deleted. Second, the consideration and payment rules — pricing basis, payment period, payment form, valuation method — need to be re-expressed so they operate without an approval gateway. Third, the cross-share-swap and strategic-investment frameworks need to align with the Foreign Investment Law and the new strategic-investment measures, since the current text was written for a different regulatory era. The Action Plan’s commitment to “optimise merger-control process and consideration-payment requirements” is precisely the mandate for this modernisation.

Strategic investment by foreign equity-investment institutions

The second M&A-relevant measure — allowing qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-related industries — addresses a long-standing gap. The strategic-investment regime for foreign investors had historically been tied to related industries and controlled through specific approval and lock-up mechanics. Opening non-related-industry issuance to qualified foreign PE/VC institutions gives long-term foreign capital a clearer, more flexible path into A-share issuances, complementing the QFII and Stock Connect channels. For foreign institutional investors and for listed Chinese companies seeking strategic foreign capital, this is a structural widening of the market, provided the qualification criteria and lock-up rules are finalised in the implementing rules.

Practical implications for foreign acquirers

For foreign acquirers in 2026, the practical position is: the reform direction is clear, but the current rules govern today’s deals. Until the revised 10-Order is published, transactions must comply with the existing consideration, valuation and payment rules, and with the mandatory concentration-filing thresholds under the Anti-Monopoly Law for transactions that meet the notification standards. Companies should also note the interaction with the strategic-investment measures for listed-company deals, the security-review framework for transactions in sensitive sectors, and the data-export and PIPL implications for deals involving data-heavy targets. The August 2026 commentary consistently emphasises that the Action Plan’s benefit is predictability and the modernisation pipeline, not an immediate relaxation of today’s obligations.

Practical steps

  1. Treat current rules as the operative baseline. Structure 2026 deals under the existing 10-Order consideration, valuation and payment rules; do not rely on the expected revision.
  2. Assess concentration-filing exposure. Map the transaction against the turnover-based notification thresholds and, where the deal meets them, plan the mandatory prior filing.
  3. Screen for security review and sector restrictions. For sensitive sectors, run the national-security review assessment and confirm the negative-list treatment before committing.
  4. Prepare for strategic-investment opportunities. Institutional investors should monitor the implementing rules for the non-related-industry strategic-investment channel and position around the qualification and lock-up conditions.
  5. Model cross-share-swap structures. Where a share swap is contemplated, plan for the current foreign-exchange and securities-registration treatment, and revisit the structure once the revised measures issue.
  6. Coordinate with data and governance diligence. For targets holding personal information or important data, run data-export, PIPL and governance diligence alongside the legal merger work.

Compliance notes

Nothing in the Action Plan or the August 2026 commentary has changed the operative legal text: the 2006 M&A Measures, the Anti-Monopoly Law filing thresholds, the strategic-investment measures for listed companies and the security-review rules all remain in force. Foreign investors should not read the reform signals as a licence to adopt unapproved structures today. The revision timeline is not fixed, and its content may differ from expectations; M&A teams should build transactions that are robust under current law and adjustable if the new rules arrive before closing. As with all China cross-border M&A, document retention, valuation support and filing discipline remain the backbone of a defensible deal.


中国外资并购:修订 2006 年并购规定与新的战略投资通道(2026 年)/ Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 6 月 16 日,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部经国务院同意联合印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97 号),这是”十五五”开局之年外资领域的首份综合性政策文件。在 15 条举措中,有两条直接指向外资并购。其一,行动方案承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求”。其二,允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,为外资进入 A 股资本市场开辟更宽通道。2026 年 8 月的分析(包括上海外办周报刊发的解读)普遍把行动方案视为外资政策从”准入”转向”准营”的标志,并购现代化居于中心。

2006 年并购规定及修订为何重要

《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(”10 号令”,2006 年发布、2009 年修订)在发布近二十年后仍是最重要的外资并购部门规章。2020 年《外商投资法》施行后,10 号令中与上位法冲突的事前审批条款(包括关联并购审批)已不再实施,但关于交易对价定价依据、支付期限、支付形式、评估模式等条款仍然有效。修订在三层意义上紧迫。其一,事前审批取消后,商务部门已全面退出外资并购的事前审查,10 号令的审批条款须明确删除。其二,对价与支付规则——定价依据、支付期限、支付形式、评估方式——需要重新表述,使其在无审批网关的情况下落地执行。其三,跨境换股与战略投资框架须与《外商投资法》及新战投办法衔接,因为现行文本写就于不同的监管时代。行动方案”优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求”的承诺,正是这一现代化的授权。

外资股权投资机构参与战略投资

第二项与并购相关的举措——允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行——回应了一个长期空白。外国投资者的战投制度历史上与关联行业绑定,并受特定审批与锁定期机制控制。向符合条件的外资 PE/VC 开放非相关行业发行,为长期外资进入 A 股发行提供了更清晰、更灵活的路径,补充 QFII 与互联互通渠道。对外资机构投资者以及寻求战略外资的中国上市公司,这是市场结构的拓宽——前提是资格标准与锁定期规则在实施规则中最终明确。

对外国收购方的实操含义

对 2026 年的外国收购方,现实立场是:改革方向清晰,但现行规则支配当下的交易。在修订版 10 号令发布前,交易必须遵守现有的对价、估值与支付规则,并在交易达到申报标准时履行《反垄断法》下的强制集中申报。企业还应留意与上市公司交易战投办法的互动、敏感行业交易的安全审查框架,以及对持有大量个人数据或重要数据标的交易的数据出境与 PIPL 影响。2026 年 8 月的解读一致强调,行动方案的收益是可预期性与现代化管线,而非当下义务的立即放宽。

操作步骤

  1. 以现行规则为操作基准。 2026 年交易按现有 10 号令对价、估值与支付规则构架;不要依赖预期中的修订。
  2. 评估集中申报敞口。 将交易对照营业额申报门槛,达标的规划强制事先申报。
  3. 筛查安全审查与行业限制。 敏感行业在承诺前进行国家安全审查评估并确认负面清单待遇。
  4. 为战投机会做准备。 机构投资者应跟踪非相关行业战投通道的实施规则,并围绕资格与锁定期条件定位。
  5. 建模跨境换股结构。 若考虑换股,按现行外汇与证券登记待遇规划,并在修订版办法出台后重新审视结构。
  6. 与数据与治理尽调协同。 对持有个人信息或重要数据的标的,在法律并购工作之外同步开展数据出境、PIPL 与治理尽调。

合规提示

行动方案与 2026 年 8 月的解读均未改变现行法律文本:2006 年并购规定、《反垄断法》申报门槛、上市公司战投办法与安全审查规则全部仍然有效。外国投资者不应将改革信号解读为今天就可采用未经批准的结构。修订时间表未定,内容可能与预期不同;并购团队应构建在现行法律下稳健、若新规在交割前出台则可调整的交易。与所有中国跨境并购一样,文档留存、估值支撑与申报纪律仍是可辩护交易的主干。

Sources

Foreign Investor M&A of Chinese Enterprises: The 2026 Reform Direction

  • China is revising the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises to streamline procedure and payment terms, with stronger inter-agency coordination.
    中国正修订外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程与对价支付要求,并强化部门协同。
  • The 2026 “stabilise and optimise foreign investment” action plan explicitly tasks MOFCOM with accelerating the revised M&A provisions.
    2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确由商务部加快修订出台相关并购规定。
  • M&A is distinct from greenfield: it triggers the security-review gateway, the anti-monopoly concentration notification, and the foreign-investment information report, often in parallel.
    并购不同于绿地投资:它往往同时触发安全审查、反垄断经营者集中申报与外商投资信息报告。
  • Equity or asset deals, VIE/restructuring, and foreign-invested M&A of domestic targets each carry specific filing and timing obligations.
    股权或资产收购、VIE/重组、外资并购境内标的,各有特定的申报与时限义务。
  • Payment flexibility is a stated reform direction — allowing more staggered or in-kind consideration to ease deal execution.
    支付灵活性是明确的改革方向——允许更分期或以非现金对价,便利交易执行。
  • Investors should build a parallel-compliance checklist (access + security + merger control + filing) at LOI stage to avoid post-signing blockers.
    建议投资人在 LOI 阶段即建立并行合规清单(准入 + 安审 + 经营者集中 + 信息报告),避免签约后卡壳。

Foreign Investor M&A of Chinese Enterprises: The 2026 Reform Direction | 外资并购境内企业:2026 改革方向

Foreign direct investment into China is not only greenfield. Acquiring an existing Chinese company — by equity or asset purchase, or via contractual control — is a core route for multinationals seeking speed, local licences and teams. The regulatory treatment of such deals is now being refreshed.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (Commerce, NDRC and Finance ministries, No. 97 [2026]) states plainly: “accelerate the revision and issuance of provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimise the M&A management process and consideration-payment requirements, and strengthen inter-department regulatory coordination.” This is the clearest signal yet that the M&A rulebook for foreign buyers is being modernised after years of incremental practice.

Why does M&A deserve its own discipline? Because a single transaction can sit at the intersection of several regimes. If the target operates in a sensitive field or the buyer gains control, the *Foreign Investment Security Review* gateway opens. If turnover thresholds are met, the *Anti-Monopoly Law* concentration-notification suspensory rule applies (see the companion note on merger control). Separately, the deal must be reflected in the foreign-investment information report. Coordinating these workstreams — rather than sequencing them ad hoc — is what the action plan means by “inter-agency coordination.”

The reform direction favours facilitation. Officials have described goals including more flexible consideration: allowing staged cash payments, and exploring in-kind or structured consideration where permitted, so that deals do not stall on rigid payment mechanics. The plan also emphasises “access after admission” — solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem so that, once a deal is cleared, the combined entity can actually operate, obtain licences and integrate supply chains.

For a foreign buyer, the practical playbook is: (1) at LOI, map the target’s licences and restricted businesses against the negative list and any security-review scope; (2) model the control and turnover tests for merger control early; (3) agree a conditionality and long-stop structure that reflects possible review periods; (4) prepare the information report and any sector approvals in parallel; and (5) engage local commerce authorities, who are being equipped with “investment service” channels under the plan. Done well, an M&A can close faster than building from scratch — and the 2026 reforms are designed to make that the default.


外资并购境内企业:2026 改革方向

外商来华直接投资不止绿地投资。通过股权或资产收购、或以合同控制方式并购一家现存中国企业,是跨国企业获取速度、本地牌照与团队的核心路径。此类交易的监管规则正在更新。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、发改委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97 号)明确写道:「加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求,强化部门监管协同。」这是迄今最明确的信号:外资并购规则书将在多年渐进实践后被现代化。

为何并购需要独立纪律?因为一宗交易可能同时落在多个制度交叉点上。若标的处于敏感领域或买方取得控制,则触发《外商投资安全审查》闸口;若达营业额标准,则适用《反垄断法》经营者集中「停表」申报(参见经营者集中专文);此外,交易还须反映在外商投资信息报告中。协调这些工作流——而非临时串行——正是方案中「部门协同」的含义。

改革方向偏向便利。官方描述的取向包括更灵活的对价:允许分期现金支付,并在允许范围内探索非现金或结构化对价,使交易不因僵化的支付机制卡顿。方案还强调「准入之后准营」——解决「大门开、小门不开」,让交易获批后合并实体真能运营、拿照、整合供应链。

对外国买方,实操手册是:(1)在 LOI 阶段即将标的牌照与受限业务对照负面清单及安审范围;(2)尽早做控制权与营业额测试;(3)约定反映可能审查周期的条件与长停结构;(4)并行准备信息报告与行业审批;(5)对接地方商务主管部门——方案正为其配备「投资服务」通道。做得好,并购可比从零建设更快完成,而 2026 年改革旨在让这成为默认路径。

Structuring the Deal Around the Reform

Use the reform to compress execution. Where the revised rules permit staged or in-kind consideration, negotiate a payment schedule that matches the target’s cash-flow and approval milestones, rather than a single upfront close. This reduces the buyer’s exposure if a review runs long, and aligns consideration with value realised. Confirm with counsel which consideration forms are expressly permitted, since the detailed provisions are still being finalised.

Run a parallel-clearance matrix. For an inbound acquisition, lay out, on one page: (1) negative-list and security-review scope; (2) merger-control thresholds; (3) sector approvals (e.g., telecom, healthcare, education); (4) the foreign-investment information report; and (5) any antitrust filings in other jurisdictions. Assign owners and deadlines to each, and set a single long-stop. The action plan’s emphasis on “inter-agency coordination” means the authorities are building shared channels — use the local commerce “investment service” window to pre-align rather than discover gaps at signing.

Finally, plan integration before close. “Access after admission” is the watchword: once cleared, the combined entity must be able to obtain licences, hire, and move goods. Buyers who prepare the post-clearance licensing and supply-chain steps in parallel — not after — capture the speed advantage that M&A is supposed to deliver.

围绕改革设计交易

用改革压缩执行。若修订规则允许分期或以物对价,应谈一个与标的现金流及审批里程碑匹配的支付节奏,而非一次性前置交割。这降低审查拖长时买方风险,并使对价与实现价值对齐。与律师确认哪些对价形式被明文允许,因细则仍在制定。

跑并行核准矩阵。对 inbound 并购,在一页上列明:(1)负面清单与安审范围;(2)经营者集中阈值;(3)行业审批(电信、医疗、教育等);(4)外商投资信息报告;(5)其他司法辖区反垄断申报。各指派负责人与期限,设单一长停。方案强调「部门协同」意味着当局正建共享通道——善用地方商务「投资服务」窗口预先对齐,而非签约时才发现缺口。

最后,交割前规划整合。「准入之后准营」是关键词:获批后合并实体须能拿照、用人、运货。买方若能并行准备交割后牌照与供应链步骤——而非事后——才能拿到并购本应带来的速度优势。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Reform anchor: the 2026 action plan tasks MOFCOM with revising the foreign-investor acquisition rules and easing payment terms.
  • Access vs operation: M&A sits at the intersection of negative list, security review, merger control and the information report.
  • Payment: staged and in-kind consideration are being explored to ease deal execution.
  • Parallel matrix: one page covering access, security, merger control, sector approvals and the information report.
  • Long-stop: set a single deadline that reflects possible review periods; avoid unconditional closing.
  • Service window: use the local commerce “investment service” channel to pre-align licences.
  • Goal: capture M&A’s speed by preparing post-clearance licensing in parallel, not after.

实务速查

  • 改革锚点: 2026 方案责成商务部修订外资并购规则并放宽对价支付。
  • 准入与运营: 并购处于负面清单、安审、经营者集中与信息报告的交叉点。
  • 对价: 探索分期与以物对价以便利交易执行。
  • 并行矩阵: 一页覆盖准入、安审、经营者集中、行业审批与信息报告。
  • 长停: 设反映可能审查周期的单一期限;避免无条件交割。
  • 服务窗口: 用地方商务「投资服务」通道预先对齐牌照。
  • 目标: 并行准备交割后牌照以拿到并购的速度,而非事后。

Bottom Line

The 2026 reform makes foreign-invested M&A in China faster and more predictable, not looser on scrutiny. The practical edge goes to buyers who pre-clear the three gates — market access, security review and merger control — and who use the local commerce service window to align licences before signing. Treat filing as a gating workstream, not paperwork, and the deal will close on schedule; treat it as an afterthought, and a cleared deal can still stall at the operating stage.

底线

2026 年改革让中国外资并购更快、更可预期,而非放松审查。实务优势属于预先理清三道闸口——市场准入、安全审查、经营者集中——并用地方商务服务窗在签约前对齐牌照的买方。把申报当作闸口工作流而非文书,交易才能按期交割;若当事后,获批的交易仍可能在运营阶段卡壳。

Sources

National Security Review of Foreign M&A in 2026: Scope, Process and the Meta–Manus Precedent

  • The Foreign Investment Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM, issued 19 Dec 2020, effective 18 Jan 2021) are the legal basis; the review working-mechanism office sits in the NDRC, led by NDRC and MOFCOM.
    《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委、商务部,2020年12月19日发布,2021年1月18日施行)是法律依据;安全审查工作机制办公室设在发改委,由发改委、商务部牵头。
  • Review is mandatory where the investment is in a covered sector (defence; important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT-internet/finance/key tech) AND the foreign investor obtains actual control (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
    当投资位于受涵盖领域(国防;重要农产品/能源/装备/基础设施/运输/文化/信息技术互联网/金融/关键技术)且外国投资者取得实际控制权(50%以上股权、重大表决影响、或对决策/人事/财务/技术重大影响)时须审查。
  • The timeline: 15 working days to decide whether to review, then 30 working days general review, then 60 working days special review (extendable); implementation is prohibited until a clearance decision.
    时间线:15个工作日决定是否审查,再30个工作日一般审查,再60个工作日特别审查(可延长);作出核准决定前不得实施投资。
  • On 27 April 2026 the working-mechanism office issued a prohibition decision on Meta’s ~USD 2bn acquisition of AI firm Manus — the first publicly halted foreign acquisition in the AI field under the Measures.
    2026年4月27日,工作机制办公室就Meta约20亿美元收购AI企业Manus作出禁止投资决定——是该《办法》下首例被公开叫停的AI领域外资收购案。
  • The Manus case turned on “technology origin” (R&D-location standard) and asset-in-China control: moving core tech/IP offshore without filing triggered review and a forced unwind, with repayment of the ~USD 2bn consideration.
    Manus案聚焦”技术原产地”(研发地标准)与境内资产控制:未申报即将核心技术/知识产权转移境外触发审查并被强制撤销,须退还约20亿美元对价。
  • Practical rule: screen security review before merger control — its control test is broader, it can prohibit where antitrust would clear, and non-filing carries corrective orders, credit blacklisting and joint punishment.
    实务规则:先于经营者集中筛查安全审查——其控制标准更宽、可在反垄断通过时禁止,且未申报将招致责令申报、信用黑名单与联合惩戒。

National Security Review of Foreign M&A in 2026: Scope, Process and the Meta–Manus Precedent | 2026年外资并购国家安全审查:范围、程序与Meta–Manus先例

The legal backbone

China’s foreign-investment national security review is founded on the *Foreign Investment Law* (Art. 35) and implemented through the *Measures for Foreign Investment Security Review* (外商投资安全审查办法), issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOFCOM on 19 December 2020 and effective 18 January 2021. The security-review working mechanism is led by the NDRC and MOFCOM, with its office housed in the NDRC. The mechanism coordinates and guides review work and, where needed, can require a party to file even where the party has not self-identified a trigger.

For a foreign acquirer, the single most important behavioural point is sequencing: security review can prohibit a deal that merger control would have cleared, and its “actual control” test is broader than antitrust’s. Screen it first.

When review is mandatory

Review is required before implementation where the investment falls in a covered scope AND the foreign investor obtains actual control:

  • Covered scope — investment in defence and defence-supporting areas, and around military facilities; or investment in important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important culture, important IT and internet products/services, important financial services, key technologies and other important areas.
  • Actual control — the investor holds 50%+ equity; or holds under 50% but its voting rights can materially influence board/shareholder resolutions; or other circumstances where the investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology.

Where the deal is in scope but control is not obtained, filing is generally not mandated — though the mechanism may still call it in. And where a deal is below the merger-control turnover thresholds, security review can still be triggered independently by scope and control. This is the trap: size alone never settles the security question.

The process and its clock

The procedure is staged. Upon receiving a complete filing, the working-mechanism office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; the parties may not implement the investment before that decision. If a review proceeds, general review is completed within 30 working days. If general review finds a possible national-security effect, a special review is launched and completed within 60 working days (extendable in special circumstances, with written notice). Decisions are: pass; prohibit; or pass with conditions (where conditions can eliminate the effect and the party accepts them in writing). During all review stages, implementation is suspended, and the parties may modify or withdraw the scheme.

A prohibited decision requires the party to unwind — dispose of equity/assets and take other necessary steps to restore the pre-investment state and eliminate the national-security effect. Non-filing where filing was required draws a corrective order to file; refusal leads to an order to dispose of equity/assets and restore the prior state, plus inclusion in the national credit system as a bad-records entry and joint punishment under relevant rules.

The 2026 Meta–Manus precedent

The most consequential 2026 development is the Meta–Manus case. Manus is a general-purpose AI agent product launched in China in March 2025 and quickly became a high-profile domestic AI success. In December 2025, US tech giant Meta announced a roughly USD 2 billion acquisition. On 8 January 2026, MOFCOM spokesperson He Yadong said authorities would assess the transaction’s consistency with export-control, technology import/export and outward-investment rules; on 2 April 2026 MOFCOM reiterated that relevant conduct must comply with Chinese law and procedures. On 27 April 2026, the NDRC security-review working-mechanism office issued a prohibition decision on the foreign acquisition of the Manus project, requiring the parties to rescind the transaction.

This is the first AI-field foreign acquisition publicly halted under the Measures in the nearly six years since their issuance. The stated logic: although the transacting entities were formally offshore, Manus’s core technology, team and data were deeply rooted in China; restructuring the entity offshore while moving core code, documentation and IP out of China without filing constituted, in substance, transferring key Chinese assets to foreign control — squarely within the covered “key technologies / important IT and internet” scope with actual control obtained.

The case also invoked the export-control dimension: China applies a “technology origin” (technology nationality by R&D location) standard, so moving China-developed technology offshore can constitute a de facto technology export requiring a licence. Parties that fail to obtain one risk civil, administrative or even criminal liability under export-control law. For foreign acquirers, the lesson is that the form of an offshore red-chip-style restructuring does not remove the substance of China-based assets from review.

Interaction with merger control and the negative list

Security review operates alongside — not instead of — merger control and the negative list. A strategic investment in a listed company, for example, must respect the negative list (no prohibited sectors; restricted sectors meet list conditions) and, if it constitutes a concentration above the thresholds, clear SAMR; and if it affects national security, clear security review. The three gates are independent: a pass from one does not substitute for another, and security review can override the others. This is why the deal team should run a security-review scope-and-control screen at term-sheet stage, in parallel with the antitrust analysis.

What to do next

  • Screen the target’s sector against the covered-security list; if in scope and control is likely, assume a mandatory filing.
  • Map “actual control” broadly — minority stakes with veto/influence rights can qualify; do not assume only majority ownership triggers review.
  • File and wait: no implementation before the 15-working-day decision, and stay suspended through general/special review.
  • For China-origin technology or data assets, assess export-control licensing alongside security review — offshore restructuring does not escape either.
  • Expect the security screen to run in parallel with, and potentially override, merger control and sector licensing.
  • Build the long-stop around the full 15+30+60 (extendable) path, and reserve the right to modify or withdraw the scheme during review.

Cross-border structuring lessons

The Meta–Manus outcome reframes how offshore restructurings are read in China. Moving an operating company’s domicile or IP offshore, while the technology, team and data remain in China, does not remove the assets from the security-review and export-control net — the “technology origin” standard looks to where R&D occurred, not where the entity is registered. Acquirers should therefore map China-based intangible assets and key personnel explicitly, and treat any transfer of them as a potential review and licensing event, not a purely corporate step.

Coordination across agencies

Security review does not sit alone. In the Manus matter, MOFCOM assessed consistency with export-control, technology import/export and outward-investment rules alongside the NDRC security review — a multi-agency lens. Deal teams should expect the same: a sensitive technology or data transaction will be examined by the security-review mechanism, the export-control authority and, if a concentration, SAMR, often on overlapping facts. Building one consistent factual and legal narrative across all three is cheaper than retrofitting it after a challenge.

A practical pre-filing screen

Before term sheet, run four questions: (1) Is the target in a covered-security sector (defence, key tech, IT/internet, energy, infrastructure, finance, etc.)? (2) Will the foreign investor obtain actual control — including minority veto or material-influence rights? (3) Does the deal move China-origin technology, data or IP offshore, triggering export-control licensing? (4) Could it also be a concentration above the SAMR thresholds? If any answer is yes, build the review/licence track into the deal timeline and budget, and keep implementation suspended until clearance. This screen, done early, prevents the late rediscovery that doomed the Manus transaction.


2026年外资并购国家安全审查:范围、程序与Meta–Manus先例

法律主干

中国外商投资国家安全审查以《外商投资法》(第35条)为基础,通过《外商投资安全审查办法》实施。该办法由国家发展改革委、商务部于2020年12月19日联合发布,2021年1月18日施行。安全审查工作机制由发改委、商务部牵头,办公室设在发改委,负责组织协调指导审查工作,并在必要时可要求当事人申报,即便当事人未自行识别触发情形。

对外国收购方而言,最关键的行为要点是排序:安全审查可在经营者集中通过时禁止交易,且其”实际控制”标准宽于反垄断。应首先筛查。

何时须审查

当投资落入受涵盖范围且外国投资者取得实际控制权时,须在实施前审查:

  • 受涵盖范围——军工、军工配套及军事设施周边;或重要农产品、能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域。
  • 实际控制——投资者持股50%以上;或持股不足50%但表决权对董事会/股东会决议产生重大影响;或其他对经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。

交易在范围内但未取得控制权的,一般不强制申报——但机制仍可要求申报。而未达经营者集中营业额门槛的交易,亦可因范围与控制独立触发安全审查。这就是陷阱:规模本身从不决定安全问题。

程序与时钟

程序分阶段。收到齐备材料后,工作机制办公室于15个工作日内决定是否审查;当事人在该决定前不得实施投资。若进入审查,一般审查于30个工作日内完成。若一般审查认为可能影响国家安全,启动特别审查并于60个工作日内完成(特殊情况可延长并书面通知)。决定为:通过、禁止、或附条件通过(条件可消除影响且当事人书面接受)。各审查阶段均暂停实施,当事人可修改或撤销方案。

禁止决定要求当事人撤销——处分股权/资产并采取其他必要措施,恢复投资前状态、消除国家安全影响。应申报而未申报的,责令申报;拒不申报的,责令处分股权/资产恢复前状,并作为不良信用记录纳入国家信用系统、依规定联合惩戒。

2026年Meta–Manus先例

2026年最具影响的进展是Meta–Manus案。Manus是2025年3月在中国发布的通用AI智能体产品,迅速成为国内AI标杆。2025年12月,美国科技巨头Meta宣布约20亿美元收购。2026年1月8日,商务部发言人何亚东表示将同相关部门评估该交易与出口管制、技术进出口、对外投资规则的一致性;2026年4月2日商务部重申相关行为须遵守中国法律与程序。2026年4月27日,发改委外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室就外资收购Manus项目作出禁止投资决定,要求当事人撤销交易。

这是该《办法》发布近6年来首例被公开叫停的AI领域外资收购案。其逻辑:尽管交易主体形式在境外,Manus核心技术、团队与数据深植中国;在境外重组实体并将核心代码、文档与知识产权移出中国而未申报,实质上构成将中国关键技术资产转移给外国控制——正落入”关键技术/重要信息技术互联网”受涵盖范围并取得实际控制。

该案亦触及出口管制维度:中国采用”技术原产地”(按研发地认定技术国籍)标准,将中国研发技术转移境外可构成事实上的技术出口,须申领许可。未获许可者面临出口管制法下的民事、行政乃至刑事责任。对外国收购方的启示是:离岸红筹式重组的形式,并不使基于中国的资产脱离审查。

与安全审查、负面清单的衔接

安全审查与经营者集中、负面清单并行而非替代。例如对上市公司战略投资,须遵守负面清单(禁止领域不得投资、限制领域满足清单条件),若构成达门槛的集中须通过SAMR,若影响国家安全须通过安全审查。三道关口相互独立:一道通过不替代另一道,安全审查可推翻其他。因此交易团队应在条款书阶段并行启动安全审查的范围与控制筛查与反垄断分析。

下一步

  • 将目标行业对照受涵盖安全清单筛查;若在范围内且可能取得控制,按强制申报处理。
  • 广义界定”实际控制”——具否决权/影响力的少数股权亦可触发;勿假设仅控股才触发审查。
  • 先申报后等待:15个工作日决定前不得实施,并贯穿一般/特别审查保持暂停。
  • 对中国原产地技术或数据资产,将出口管制许可与安全审查并行评估——离岸重组不脱逃任一者。
  • 预期安全筛查与经营者集中、行业许可并行,且可能推翻后两者。
  • 长停日围绕完整15+30+60(可延长)路径设定,并保留审查期间修改或撤销方案的权利。

跨境重组的启示

Meta–Manus的结果重塑了中国对离岸重组的解读。将运营主体的注册地或知识产权移至境外,而技术、团队与数据仍留在中国,并不能使资产脱离安全审查与出口管制之网——”技术原产地”标准看研发发生地,而非实体注册地。因此收购方应明确梳理基于中国的无形资产与关键人员,并将任何转移视为潜在的审查与许可事件,而非纯粹的公司行为。

跨机构协调

安全审查并不孤立。在Manus案中,商务部就出口管制、技术进出口、对外投资规则的一致性,与发改委安全审查一并评估——一种多机构视角。交易团队应预期同样情形:敏感技术或数据交易将被安全审查机制、出口管制主管部门,以及(若构成集中)SAMR就重叠事实审查。在三方面构建一致的事实与法律叙事,远比事后补建更省成本。

实务申报前筛查

签约前自问四题:(1)目标是否处受涵盖安全领域(国防、关键技术、信息技术互联网、能源、基础设施、金融等)?(2)外国投资者是否会取得实际控制——含少数否决权或重大影响权?(3)交易是否将中国原产地技术、数据或知识产权转移境外,触发出口管制许可?(4)是否同时构成达SAMR门槛的集中?任一为是,即将审查/许可轨道纳入交易时间表与预算,并在核准前保持实施暂停。此筛查若早做,可避免Manus交易那种后期才发现的窘境。

Sources

Strategic Investment in Chinese Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (2024 Rules in Force for 2026)

  • The revised Measures (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; published 1 Nov 2024, effective 2 Dec 2024) are the governing rule for foreign strategic investment in A-share listed companies.
    修订后的《办法》(六部门,第3号令,2024;2024年11月1日公布,2024年12月2日施行)是外国投资者对A股上市公司战略投资的主管规则。
  • Qualifying methods are three: directed new issue, agreement transfer, and tender offer — all requiring medium-to-long-term holding of A-shares.
    合格方式三种:上市公司定向发行新股、协议转让、要约收购——均须中长期持有A股。
  • The 2024 revision allows foreign natural persons, eases asset thresholds (USD 50m owned / USD 3bn managed for non-controlling; USD 100m / USD 500m for controlling), and permits overseas unlisted-company equity in directed issues and tender offers (cross-border share swap).
    2024修订允许外国自然人、放宽资产门槛(非控股实有5000万美元/管理3亿美元;控股1亿/5亿美元),并允许定向发行与要约收购中使用境外非上市公司股权(跨境换股)。
  • The holding-ratio requirement for agreement transfer / tender offer is cut from 10% to 5% (and eliminated for directed issues); the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (or longer if other rules require).
    协议转让/要约收购的持股比例要求由10%降至5%(定向发行取消比例);锁定期由3年降至12个月(其他规则有更长要求从其规定)。
  • No commerce-department approval is needed; the deal runs through information reporting and securities-market rules, with interfaces to security review and merger control preserved.
    无需商务部门审批;交易经信息报告与证券市场规则办理,安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。
  • Restrictions bind: no investment in negative-list prohibited sectors; restricted sectors must meet the list’s equity/management conditions; and security review applies where national security is or may be affected.
    限制有效:不得投资负面清单禁止领域;限制领域须满足清单股权/管理条件;影响或可能影响国家安全的须通过安全审查。

Strategic Investment in Chinese Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (2024 Rules in Force for 2026) | 外国投资者对上市公司战略投资(2024规则2026年适用)

The rule that governs listed-company stake-building

For a foreign investor taking a strategic stake in a Chinese A-share listed company, the governing instrument is the revised *Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors*. Adopted at the 13th ministerial executive meeting of MOFCOM on 15 August 2024, agreed by CSRC, SASAC, the State Taxation Administration, SAMR and SAFE, it was promulgated as six-agency Order No. 3 of 2024 on 1 November 2024 and took effect on 2 December 2024, repealing the 2005 version. In 2026 it is the live framework, and every foreign strategic investment in a listed company routes through it.

“Strategic investment” here means a foreign investor acquiring and medium-to-long-term holding A-shares through a listed company’s directed new issue (定向发行), agreement transfer (协议转让) or tender offer (要约收购), or other legally permitted means. The statutory principles are clear: comply with law, no harm to national security or public interest, open/fair/just treatment, medium-to-long-term investment (no speculation), and no exclusion or restriction of competition.

Who qualifies, and how

A foreign investor is a foreign natural person, enterprise or other organisation. To qualify, the investor must be lawfully established and operating, financially sound, creditworthy, with mature management experience, sound governance and internal controls; a foreign natural person must have corresponding risk-identification and risk-bearing capacity. Asset thresholds were eased in 2024: a non-controlling investor needs owned tangible assets of no less than USD 50 million or managed tangible assets of no less than USD 3 billion; a controlling investor needs USD 100 million owned or USD 500 million managed. The investor must not have suffered criminal punishment or a major regulatory penalty at home or abroad in the prior three years.

Crucially, the 2024 revision allows foreign natural persons to make strategic investment (previously excluded). It also permits cross-border share swaps: where the investor uses equity in an overseas company, or its own newly issued shares, as consideration, the overseas company must be lawfully established in a jurisdiction with a sound company-law system and its management must not have had a major regulatory penalty in three years; for agreement-transfer structures, that overseas company must itself be listed.

Three methods and the relaxed thresholds

The three permitted methods each carry a tailored path:

  • Directed new issue — the foreign investor subscribes new A-shares as a pre-determined or competitively determined issuer. The 2024 revision eliminates the prior 10% minimum holding requirement for this method.
  • Agreement transfer — the acquired stake must be no less than 5% of issued shares (cut from 10%).
  • Tender offer — the预定的 acquired stake must be no less than 5% (cut from 10%).

The lock-up was cut from no less than three years to no less than twelve months (longer if the Securities Law, the Acquisition Management Measures or the Securities Issuance Registration Measures require). Shares acquired via strategic investment may not be transferred within 12 months; transfers before expiry are permitted only for death, legal-person termination or court enforcement, subject to securities rules.

These changes directly lower the cost and raise the flexibility of a foreign strategic position — a 5% agreement-transfer stake with a one-year lock is a fundamentally different proposition from the old 10%/three-year regime.

Information reporting, not approval

Post-Foreign-Investment-Law, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval. The investor and the listed company file foreign-investment information after completion (and after each shareholding change exceeding 5% or a change in foreign control/relative-control status). Securities-market disclosure and other obligations under the Securities Law and CSRC/ exchange rules apply.

Intermediaries (financial advisers, sponsors or law firms registered in China) must conduct due diligence and issue opinions on compliance — notably whether the investment affects national security, touches the negative list, and meets the qualification conditions. If the opinion finds non-compliance, the securities registration and clearing institution will not process the relevant procedures. This makes intermediary selection and a clean due-diligence file decisive to a successful closing.

Negative list and security interfaces

Two hard limits bind. First, the negative list: a foreign investor may not strategically invest in a listed company in a sector the negative list prohibits; where the list restricts a sector, the investment must satisfy the list’s equity and senior-management conditions. Second, security review: if the investment affects or may affect national security, the *Foreign Investment Security Review Measures* apply (see the dedicated article in this series). Third, merger control: if the strategic investment constitutes a concentration reaching the State Council thresholds, SAMR notification is required before implementation.

The 2024 revision also clarifies carve-outs: QFII/RQFII investments, Stock Connect (沪深港通) investments, shares obtained when a foreign-invested joint-stock company lists on A-shares, and certain foreign-natural-person secondary-market or incentive purchases are outside the Measures but remain subject to other rules. A foreign investor’s aggregate holdings through multiple channels (including QFII/RQFII and Connect) must still respect the sector limits and control caps.

What to do next

  • Confirm the target’s sector against the negative list before structuring — prohibited sectors are out, restricted sectors need list-compliant conditions.
  • Choose the method by intent: directed issue (no min ratio, flexible), agreement transfer or tender offer (≥5%, one-year lock).
  • Prepare the asset-evidence package (USD 50m/USD 3bn, or USD 100m/USD 500m if controlling) and the three-year clean-record proof.
  • Engage a China-registered intermediary early for the compliance opinion; non-compliant opinions block registration.
  • Route the filing through information reporting, not commerce approval, and respect disclosure duties.
  • Screen security review and merger control in parallel; they can override an otherwise clean strategic investment.

Post-investment obligations and the reporting cadence

After closing, the obligations continue. The investor and the listed company must file foreign-investment information upon completion, and again each time the foreign shareholding changes by more than 5% or the foreign control / relative-control status changes. Securities-law disclosure duties (change-of-interest reports, tender-offer documents, voting-right disclosures) run in parallel. The 12-month lock-up bars transfer except for death, legal-person termination or court enforcement; breaches can draw warnings, fines or a prohibition on exercising voting or disposing shares until cured.

Aggregation with QFII and Connect holdings

A subtle trap is aggregation. The Measures carve out QFII/RQFII and Stock Connect investments, but the intermediary’s due-diligence opinion must state the investor’s and its concert parties’ total holdings across all channels — including those carve-outs — to confirm the sector limits and control caps are respected. A foreign investor that holds 4% via QFII and seeks a 5% strategic agreement-transfer stake therefore approaches, and must plan around, the relevant sector ceiling and any control test. Modelling the combined position before signing avoids a last-minute structure change.

A short worked example

A foreign investment fund (not a natural person) wishes a 5% strategic stake in an A-share manufacturer via agreement transfer, with no board control. It must evidence USD 50m owned or USD 3bn managed, a clean three-year record, and engage a China-registered intermediary for the compliance opinion. Post-closing, it files investment information and respects the 12-month lock-up. Because it holds no board seat and under 50%, “actual control” is unlikely — but if the manufacturer is in a negative-list restricted sector, the investment must still meet the list’s equity/senior-management conditions, and the 5% stake plus any QFII holding must be aggregated for the sector ceiling. The structure is lawful and light, exactly the 2024 revision’s intent.


外国投资者对上市公司战略投资(2024规则2026年适用)

管辖上市公司入股的规则

外国投资者对中国A股上市公司进行战略入股,主管文件为修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》。该办法于2024年8月15日经商务部第13次部务会议审议通过,并经证监会、国资委、税务总局、市场监管总局、外汇局同意,2024年11月1日以六部门2024年第3号令公布,2024年12月2日施行,同时废止2005年版。2026年它是现行框架,一切外国投资者对上市公司的战略投资均经此办理。

此处”战略投资”指外国投资者通过上市公司定向发行新股、协议转让、要约收购或其他法定方式,取得并中长期持有A股股份。法定原则明确:遵守法律,不危害国家安全与社会公共利益,公开、公平、公正,中长期投资(不得炒作),不妨碍公平竞争、不排除限制竞争。

谁合格、如何投资

外国投资者指外国的自然人、企业或其他组织。合格须依法设立经营、财务稳健、资信良好、具成熟管理经验、治理与内控健全;外国自然人须具备相应风险识别与承担能力。资产门槛在2024年放宽:非控股股东实有资产总额不低于5000万美元或管理实有资产总额不低于3亿美元;控股股东实有资产总额不低于1亿美元或管理不低于5亿美元。近3年未受境内外刑事处罚或监管重大处罚。

关键的是,2024修订允许外国自然人战略投资(此前排除)。亦允许跨境换股:投资者以持有境外公司股权或以其增发股份作为支付手段的,境外公司须依法设立、注册地具完善公司法律制度、管理层近3年未受重大处罚;协议转让方式下该境外公司须为上市公司。

三种方式与放宽门槛

三种允许方式各有路径:

  • 定向发行——外国投资者作为董事会预先确定或竞价确定的发行对象认购新股。2024修订取消此方式原10%最低持股要求。
  • 协议转让——取得股份比例不得低于已发行股份5%(由10%降至5%)。
  • 要约收购——预定收购比例不得低于已发行股份5%(由10%降至5%)。

锁定期由不低于3年降至不低于12个月(若《证券法》《收购管理办法》《证券发行注册管理办法》有更长要求从其规定)。战略投资取得A股12个月内不得转让;期满前仅因死亡、法人终止或司法扣划等方可转让,并须遵守证券规则。

这些变化直接降低了外国战略持仓的成本、提升了灵活性——5%协议转让加一年锁定期,与旧制10%/3年全然不同。

信息报告而非审批

《外商投资法》后,战略投资不再需商务审批。投资者与上市公司在完成后(及每次持股变动超5%或外资控股/相对控股地位变化后)报送外商投资信息。证券法及证监会、交易所规则下的信息披露等义务适用。

中介机构(中国注册的财务顾问、保荐机构或律所)须尽职调查并就合规性出具意见——尤其是否影响国家安全、是否触及负面清单、是否符合资格条件。若意见认定不合规,证券登记结算机构不予办理相关手续。这使得中介机构选择与干净的尽调档案成为成功交割的关键。

负面清单与安全审查接口

两道硬约束。其一,负面清单:外国投资者不得对负面清单禁止领域上市公司战略投资;限制领域须满足清单股权与高管条件。其二,安全审查:影响或可能影响国家安全的,适用《外商投资安全审查办法》(见本系列专文)。其三,经营者集中:若战略投资构成达国务院门槛的集中,须在实施前通知SAMR。

2024修订亦明确排除情形:QFII/RQFII投资、沪深港通投资、外商投资股份公司A股上市取得股份、以及符合证监会规定的外国自然人二级市场或股权激励取得,不在本办法范围但仍受其他规则约束。外国投资者经多通道(含QFII/RQFII与互联互通)的合计持股仍须遵守行业限制与控制上限。

下一步

  • 架构设计前将目标行业对照负面清单——禁止领域排除,限制领域须满足清单条件。
  • 按意图选方式:定向发行(无最低比例、灵活)、协议转让或要约收购(≥5%、一年锁定期)。
  • 准备资产证明包(5000万/3亿,或控股1亿/5亿)及三年无处罚记录。
  • 尽早聘请中国注册中介机构出具合规意见;不合规意见将阻断登记。
  • 经信息报告而非商务审批路径申报,并遵守披露义务。
  • 并行筛查安全审查与经营者集中,二者可推翻原本干净的战略投资。

投资后义务与申报节奏

交割后义务仍在继续。投资者与上市公司须于完成后报送外商投资信息,并在外国持股变动超5%或外资控股/相对控股地位变化后再次报送。证券法下的披露义务(权益变动报告、要约收购文件、表决权披露)并行适用。12个月锁定期禁止转让,仅死亡、法人终止或司法扣划除外;违约可招致警告、罚款或暂停表决权与处分权直至纠正。

与QFII及互联互通持股的合并计算

一个隐蔽陷阱是合并计算。《办法》排除QFII/RQFII与沪深港通投资,但中介尽调意见须列示投资者及其一致行动人经所有通道(含上述排除)的合计持股,以确认遵守行业限制与控制上限。故通过QFII持有4%、又拟以协议转让战略持股5%的外国投资者,已逼近且须筹划相关行业上限与控制测试。签约前建模合并持仓,可避免临门更改结构。

简例演示

某外国投资基金(非自然人)拟以协议转让取得某A股制造商5%战略股,不谋董事会控制。它须证明实有5000万美元或管理3亿美元、三年无处罚记录,并聘请中国注册中介出具合规意见。交割后报送投资信息、遵守12个月锁定期。因其无董事席位且低于50%,”实际控制”大概率不触发——但若制造商处负面清单限制领域,投资仍须满足清单股权/高管条件,且5%持股与任何QFII持仓须合并计算行业上限。该结构合法且轻量,正是2024修订的用意。

Sources

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review

  • The notifiable thresholds (Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024) are: worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China; sub-threshold deals with competition concerns can still be called in.
    申报门槛(第773号令,2024年1月26日施行):全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元,或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元;未达门槛但有竞争关切的交易仍可被要求申报。
  • In 2025 SAMR concluded 706 concentrations (+9.8%); in May 2025–April 2026 it cleared 232 involving private firms with total value RMB 353.4bn, averaging 26.72 days to conclude (15.64 days acceptance / 18.9 days conclusion for simplified cases).
    2025年SAMR审结706件(+9.8%);2025年5月至2026年4月审结涉民营企业232起、总额3534亿元,平均审结26.72天(简易案件受理15.64天/审结18.9天)。
  • Delegated review became formal in August 2025 and was refined in March 2026; provincial bureaus have cleared deals in as little as 11 days (e.g., Qingyuan Desheng & Shengli Steel).
    委托审查于2025年8月转为正式、2026年3月完善;省级局最快11天审结(如清远德晟与圣力钢制品案)。
  • SAMR issued the Concentration Filing Norms and Non-Horizontal Review Guidelines, plus a penalty-discretion baseline, giving parties a transparent, predictable filing environment.
    SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》及处罚裁量基准,为企业提供透明可预期的申报环境。
  • A June 2026 special enforcement campaign (June–December) will explore “green channels” for specific industries and strengthen compliance reminders and local guidance windows.
    2026年6月启动的专项行动(6–12月)将探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”,并强化申报提醒与地方指导窗口。
  • Gun-jumping is policed: in 2025 SAMR publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95m in fines, and below-threshold deals with competition risk can be called in.
    “抢跑”受监管:2025年SAMR公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元,且有竞争风险的未达门槛交易可被要求申报。

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review | 2026年经营者集中申报:门槛、简易案件与委托审查

When a filing is required

Under the *Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings* (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified to SAMR before implementation where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures use sector-specific calculation rules. A concentration is notifiable even where it does not meet these thresholds if there is evidence it may eliminate or restrict competition — SAMR may require a filing.

The 2024 revision raised the earlier levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30%, lowering transaction costs for smaller mergers while keeping scrutiny on competitively risky ones.

Throughput and the simplified track

SAMR’s 2025 performance was substantial: 706 concentrations lawfully concluded, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. The agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” in automotive, photovoltaic and lithium-battery fields to support restructuring.

The simplified track targets a “double 20-day” standard (acceptance and review). In the May 2025–April 2026 window, SAMR concluded 232 concentrations involving private firms, with total transaction value of RMB 353.4 billion; average acceptance time was 17.13 days and average conclusion time 26.72 days. For simplified cases, average acceptance was just 15.64 days and average conclusion 18.9 days — better than the internal “double 20” requirement. For a foreign acquirer, this means a clean, below-concern deal can clear in roughly three to four weeks.

Delegated review: closer to the market

A notable 2025–2026 reform is delegated review. In August 2025, SAMR moved the pilot delegated review with selected provincial market-regulation bureaus to formal delegated review; in March 2026 it issued an announcement further refining the system. Delegated bureaus use their proximity to bring faster, more localised service. Examples: the Chongqing bureau concluded the Zhejiang Jirun Automobile / Maichi Zhixing joint-venture case in 18 days from filing to clearance; the Guangdong bureau handled the Qingyuan Desheng Investment / Shengli Steel new joint-venture case in just 11 days of review. For foreign investors with deals centred in a delegated province, this can materially shorten the clock.

Transparency and compliance tooling

To make filing predictable, SAMR has issued the *Concentration Filing Norms* and the *Non-Horizontal Concentration Review Guidelines*, opened the operator-concentration antitrust business system with a 6,000-plus-case historical library for real-time query, and released a penalty-discretion baseline (trial) with a self-calculation tool so parties “see and understand at a glance”. It also warned of and acted on “gun-jumping”: in 2025 it publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95 million in fines, and in key fields (semiconductors, shipping, minerals) conditionally approved 5 and prohibited 1 to protect supply-chain competition.

The June 2026 efficacy campaign

On 30 June 2026, SAMR launched a special enforcement campaign (June–December) to raise operator-concentration antitrust regulatory efficacy. Its three pillars matter to deal-makers:

  1. Regulatory capacity — explore “green channels” for specific industries, strengthen complex-issue research, and support delegated provincial bureaus with expert backing.
  2. Full-chain efficacy — maintain the simplified “double 20-day” standard, optimise the business system, publish typical cases, and handle major-merger reviews with close listening to relevant parties.
  3. Compliance guidance — improve filing reminders, issue policy guidance, run targeted training for firms above the threshold, and support local “filing guidance windows”.

For foreign acquirers, the practical signals are: faster, more transparent review; a realistic prospect of industry-specific fast lanes; and a clear expectation that below-threshold but competition-risky deals will still be scrutinised.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early; if close to the line, assume a filing and budget the timeline.
  • Prefer the simplified track where the deal is clean (no overlap or minor overlap); target the ~3–4 week clearance.
  • Check whether your province runs delegated review; if so, file there to use local proximity.
  • Use SAMR’s case library and filing norms to pre-assess overlap and prepare a tight submission.
  • Do not close before clearance — gun-jumping draws public penalties even for foreign parties.
  • Watch for industry “green channels” announced in the 2026 campaign when planning sensitive-sector deals.

What to submit and how long it really takes

A filing package centres on the notification form, the parties’ audited turnover, the transaction documents (SPA, shareholder agreements), and a competitive-effects analysis where overlap exists. SAMR’s published norms and the 6,000-plus case library let counsel benchmark whether a deal is “simple” (little or no horizontal overlap, no vertical foreclosure) and thus eligible for the simplified track. For a clean deal, the realistic clock is acceptance (~15 days) plus review (~20 days) — about a month — though parties should still build buffer for information requests.

Sector sensitivity: semiconductors, minerals, pharma

2025–2026 enforcement shows where scrutiny concentrates. SAMR prohibited one deal and conditionally approved five in semiconductors, shipping and minerals, protecting supply-chain competition. In the May 2025–April 2026 window, notable conditional approvals included the Synopsys–Ansys (新思科技收购安似科技) and Bunge–Viterra (邦吉收购蔚特) cases, and the Chilean copper / Chilean chemical joint venture (lithium carbonate supply) — conditioned to secure stable, reasonably priced supply for downstream Chinese firms, including private new-energy buyers. The lesson: deals touching critical inputs or semiconductor capacity should expect a substantive review even if turnover is modest.

Avoiding gun-jumping penalties

“Gun-jumping” — closing or integrating before clearance — is actively policed, with RMB 6.95m in fines across four cases in 2025 and public naming. Foreign parties are not exempt. The safe pattern is to sign subject to a condition precedent (merger-control clearance), keep the businesses separate until approval, and resist operational integration (shared pricing, combined sales forces, unified procurement) during the pending period. Where a deal is below the thresholds but competitively sensitive, assume SAMR may call it in and pre-empt by consulting the agency.

Filing readiness: a pre-filing checklist

To avoid avoidable delay, assemble the package before signing. Confirm the correct turnover figures from audited statements for the relevant fiscal year; map the overlap matrix (horizontal shares, vertical relationships) across the parties’ product markets; prepare the transaction documents and any remedy proposals; and decide whether to request the simplified track. Where a party is foreign, localise the turnover evidence and appoint a China-registered agent if needed. Engagement with SAMR or the delegated provincial bureau ahead of formal filing — using the published norms and case library — often surfaces a fatal overlap early, when it is still cheap to restructure rather than after a prohibition.

Looking ahead from the 2026 campaign

The June–December 2026 efficacy campaign signals a steady-state direction: faster, more transparent, and more sector-aware review. The exploration of industry “green channels” means that, later in 2026, certain strategic sectors may get a dedicated fast lane, while the emphasis on filing reminders and local guidance windows lowers the cost of getting it right the first time. For foreign acquirers, the trend is favourable — provided the deal is genuinely clean and the submission is well-prepared. The agency’s message is consistent: support lawful consolidation, police the rest.


2026年经营者集中申报:门槛、简易案件与委托审查

何时需要申报

依《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行),上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,须在实施前通知SAMR。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。即使未达上述门槛,若有证据证明可能排除、限制竞争,SAMR亦可要求申报。

2024年修订将原有标准(100亿/20亿/4亿)提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元,SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%,在降低中小并购交易成本的同时,保留对具竞争风险交易的审查。

审结量与简易案件

SAMR 2025年表现突出:依法审结经营者集中706件,同比增长9.8%,83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。该局在汽车、光伏、锂电池领域”快审不降质”以支持重组。

简易案件目标为”双20天”(受理与审查)。2025年5月至2026年4月,SAMR审结涉民营企业经营者集中232起,交易总额3534亿元;平均受理17.13天、平均审结26.72天。简易案件平均受理仅15.64天、审结18.9天,优于内部”双20″要求。对外国收购方而言,这意味着干净、无竞争关切的交易约三至四周即可通过。

委托审查:更贴近市场

2025–2026年一项显著改革是委托审查。2025年8月,SAMR将试点委托审查转为正式委托;2026年3月发布公告进一步完善制度。受委托省级局发挥贴近优势,提供更快速、本地化服务。例证:重庆市局审结浙江吉润汽车与迈驰智行新设合营企业案,自申报到审结仅18天;广东省局审查清远德晟投资与圣力钢制品新设合营企业案,审查阶段仅11天。对交易集中于受委托省份的外国投资者,此举可显著缩短周期。

透明度与合规工具

为提升申报可预期性,SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》,开放经营者集中反垄断业务系统(6000余件历史案例库实时查询),并发布处罚裁量基准(试行)及”行政处罚自算器”,使企业”一看就懂、一算便知”。该局亦警示并查处”抢跑”:2025年公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元;在半导体、航运、矿产等关键领域附条件批准5件、禁止1件,以保障产业链竞争。

2026年6月效能专项行动

2026年6月30日,SAMR启动经营者集中反垄断监管效能提升专项行动(6–12月)。其三大支柱对交易方重要:

  1. 监管基础能力——探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”,加强复杂问题研究,以外部专家支撑受委托省级局。
  2. 全链条质效——认真执行简易案件”双20天”,优化业务系统,做好典型案例公开,充分听取相关方对重大并购审查意见。
  3. 合规指导——完善申报提醒,发布政策指引,对达申报标准企业开展专项培训,支持有条件地区建立申报指导窗口。

对外国收购方的实务信号是:审查更快更透明;特定行业快车道可期待;未达门槛但有竞争风险的交易仍将被审查。

下一步

  • 尽早做门槛测试;若接近临界,按需申报并排期。
  • 交易干净(无重叠或轻微重叠)时优先走简易案件,目标约3–4周通过。
  • 查核所在省份是否实行委托审查;若是,就地申报以利用就近优势。
  • 利用SAMR案例库与申报规范预先评估重叠并准备精炼材料。
  • 未获核准前不得交割——”抢跑”即便对外方也招致公开处罚。
  • 规划敏感行业交易时,关注2026专项行动中宣布的行业”绿色通道”。

应提交什么及真实耗时

申报材料以申报表、各方经审计营业额、交易文件(SPA、股东协议)及存在重叠时的竞争影响分析为核心。SAMR已发布的规范与6000余件案例库,使律师可基准判断交易是否”简单”(横向重叠小或无、无纵向封锁)从而适用简易案件。对干净交易,现实时钟为受理(约15天)加审查(约20天)——约一个月,但仍应为信息补充请求留出缓冲。

行业敏感性:半导体、矿产、医药

2025–2026年执法显示审查集中于何处。SAMR在半导体、航运、矿产领域禁止1件、附条件批准5件,以保障产业链竞争。2025年5月至2026年4月,显著附条件批准包括新思科技收购安似科技、邦吉收购蔚特,以及智利铜业与智利化工新设合营企业案(碳酸锂供应)——附条件以确保下游中国企业(含民营新能源买方)获得稳定、合理价格的供应。启示:触及关键投入或半导体产能的交易,即便营业额不大,也应预期实质审查。

避免”抢跑”处罚

“抢跑”——核准前交割或整合——被积极监管,2025年4起案件罚款695万元并公开点名。外国当事方不豁免。安全做法是签署以经营者集中核准为先决条件的协议,核准前保持业务分离,并在待审期抵制运营整合(共享定价、合并销售队伍、统一采购)。对未达门槛但有竞争敏感性的交易,应预期SAMR可能要求申报,并主动与当局沟通以防患未然。

申报准备:申报前清单

为避免无谓延误,应在签约前备齐材料。依经审计报表确认相关会计年度的正确营业额;绘制各方产品市场的重叠矩阵(横向份额、纵向关系);准备交易文件与可能的救济方案;并决定是否申请简易案件。当事人一方为外国的,应本土化营业额证据,必要时委任中国注册代理人。在正式申报前借助已发布规范与案例库与SAMR或受委托省级局沟通,往往能尽早暴露致命重叠——此时重构成本低,远胜禁止之后。

自2026专项行动看未来

2026年6–12月效能专项行动指向一个稳态方向:更快、更透明、更具行业意识。对特定行业”绿色通道”的探索意味着,2026年下半年某些战略行业或获专属快车道;而强调申报提醒与地方指导窗口,降低了”一次做对”的成本。对外国收购方,趋势有利——前提是交易确属干净、申报准备充分。该局信号一致:支持合法整合,监管其余。

Sources

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines

  • Since the Foreign Investment Law (2020), acquiring a domestic firm is no longer a commerce-approval event; it runs through the negative list, information reporting, plus merger control and security review where triggered.
    自《外商投资法》(2020)以来,并购境内企业不再是商务审批事件——经负面清单、信息报告办理,并在触发时通过经营者集中与安全审查。
  • Merger-control thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024): worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China.
    经营者集中门槛(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行):全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元,或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元。
  • SAMR cleared 706 concentrations in 2025 (up 9.8%); 83% closed at the 30-day preliminary stage, with a “double 20-day” simplified track for straightforward cases.
    市场监管总局2025年审结经营者集中706件(增长9.8%);83%在30天初步审查阶段结案,简易案件推行”双20天”审查目标。
  • Security review is mandatory where the target is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor obtains actual control — and its control test is broader than merger control’s.
    当目标位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时须通过安全审查——其控制标准宽于经营者集中标准。
  • The 2024 strategic-investment rules (six-agency Order No. 3, effective 2 Dec 2024) ease listed-company investment: foreign natural persons allowed, lower asset thresholds, tender offers added, lock-up cut to 12 months, no commerce approval.
    2024年战投规则(六部门第3号令,2024年12月2日施行)放宽上市公司投资:允许外国自然人、降低资产门槛、新增要约收购、锁定期降至12个月、无需商务审批。
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.
    将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进;未获所有强制核准前不得交割,并在条款书阶段启动两项审查。

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines | 2026年外资并购中国:审查地图与时间线

The post-2020 deal frame

Acquiring a Chinese company as a foreign investor now sits inside the Foreign Investment Law regime rather than the older approval-based M&A rules. The behavioural shift is decisive: the deal is no longer a commerce-department approval event by itself. Instead, the investor incorporates or transfers under company law, clears any negative-list condition, files foreign-investment information, and — where triggered — separately clears merger control (antitrust) with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and national security review with the NDRC-led mechanism. Understanding which gates actually apply, and running them in parallel, is the core of a smooth closing.

Gate 1 — the negative list and information reporting

The 2024 national negative list for foreign investment contains 29 items and took effect on 1 November 2024. If the target’s sector is on the list, the acquisition must satisfy its conditions (equity caps, Chinese-control requirements, etc.); if off the list, the deal is treated on equal terms with domestic M&A. Cross-border share swaps are permitted but conditioned — generally the foreign equity used as consideration should be in a listed overseas company, though the 2024 strategic-investment rules relaxed this for certain directed-issue and tender-offer structures. Post-deal, the foreign investor files investment information rather than seeking approval.

Gate 2 — merger control (antitrust) filing

A foreign acquirer must notify SAMR before implementing a concentration that meets the thresholds. Under the revised State Council regulation (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures are calculated with sector-specific rules.

The 2024 revision raised the prior levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30% and reduce transaction costs. A deal must not close before clearance; “gun-jumping” draws penalties. SAMR runs a simplified track with a “double 20-day” target (acceptance and review) for straightforward cases, and has moved pilot delegated review with provincial bureaus to formal delegated review (trial delegation转为正式委托 in August 2025, refined by an announcement in March 2026).

The throughput is real: in 2025 SAMR lawfully concluded 706 concentration cases, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. In key fields such as automotive, photovoltaics and lithium batteries, the agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” to support restructuring.

Gate 3 — national security review

Where the acquisition is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor acquires actual control, security review is required before implementation. The *Measures for Foreign Investment Security Review* (NDRC and MOFCOM, issued 19 December 2020, effective 18 January 2021) define the covered scope: national defence and surrounding areas; and important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important culture, important IT and internet products/services, important financial services, key technologies and other important areas — where the investor obtains actual control.

The “actual control” test is broader than merger control’s: it includes holding 50%+ equity; holding under 50% but with voting rights that materially influence board/shareholder resolutions; or other circumstances where the investor materially influences business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. Procedure runs preliminary (15 working days to decide whether to review) → general review (30 working days) → special review (60 working days, extendable); the decision is final and may prohibit, condition or clear the deal. Because it can override a cleared merger filing, security review is the gate an acquirer must screen first — and, as the 2026 Meta–Manus prohibition showed, it is actively enforced (see the dedicated article in this series).

Listed-company strategic investment (2024 update)

Where the target is a listed company, the foreign investor must also comply with the revised *Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors* (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; published 1 November 2024, effective 2 December 2024). The revision materially lowers the bar: foreign natural persons are allowed; asset thresholds are eased (non-controlling investors need only USD 50m owned or USD 3bn managed; controlling investors need USD 100m owned or USD 500m managed); cross-border share swaps are eased for directed issues and tender offers; the strategic-investment methods add tender offers; the holding-ratio requirement for agreement-transfer/tender-offer is cut from 10% to 5% (and eliminated for directed issues); and the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (or longer if other rules require). Importantly, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval — it is handled through information reporting and securities-market rules, with security-review and merger-control interfaces preserved.

A realistic timeline

A straightforward, unrestricted, below-threshold acquisition can complete in roughly 2–4 months: due diligence and SPA, the foreign-investment information report and company-law filings, and any sector licence. Add merger control where thresholds are met — the simplified track targets about 20 days for review plus filing time; the standard track can run longer. Add security review where scope and control are present — the 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions) can extend well beyond a year for sensitive cases. The three workstreams should run in parallel, but closing is gated by the slowest mandatory clearance.

Do not sequence the clearances serially. Begin merger-control and security-review analyses at term-sheet stage, because the documents and substantive analysis overlap with diligence; locking the structure before the reviews are scoped risks a late redesign. Build the long-stop date around the special-review maximum, not the preliminary-review minimum.

What to do next

  • Screen the target sector against the 2024 negative list; if restricted, confirm the equity/control condition can be met before signing.
  • Run a merger-control threshold test early (worldwide >RMB 12bn & two parties >RMB 800m China; or China aggregate >RMB 4bn & two parties >RMB 800m China).
  • Test security-review scope and “actual control” (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
  • For listed targets, apply the 2024 strategic-investment rules and route through information reporting, not commerce approval.
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand.
  • Set the long-stop around the special-review maximum, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.

Common misreads

Three mistakes recur. First, sequencing the clearances serially (merger control, then security review, then licence) when they should run in parallel — serial handling is the usual cause of a missed long-stop. Second, assuming that because a deal is below the merger-control thresholds no ex-ante review applies at all; security review can still be triggered by a covered sector and control, independent of size. Third, underestimating “actual control” for security review — a minority stake with veto rights can count — which leads teams to skip the screen and discover the gap late. Scoping both reviews at term-sheet stage is the single best defence.


2026年外资并购中国:审查地图与时间线

2020年后的交易框架

外国投资者收购中国公司现今置于《外商投资法》框架下,而非旧有的审批式并购规则。行为变化是决定性的:交易本身不再是商务部门审批事件。投资者依据公司法设立或转让,清除任何负面清单条件,报送外商投资信息,并在触发时分别通过市场监管总局(SAMR)的经营者集中(反垄断)审查与发改委牵头机制的国家安全审查。厘清究竟哪些关口适用并并行推进,是顺利交割的核心。

关口一——负面清单与信息报告

2024年全国外资负面清单含29条,于2024年11月1日施行。若目标行业在清单上,收购须满足其条件(股权上限、中方控股要求等);若不在清单上,则与境内并购平等对待。跨境换股允许但有条件——一般作为对价的外国股权应为境外上市公司股权,不过2024年战投规则对特定定向发行与要约收购结构有所放宽。交易后,外国投资者报送投资信息而非申请审批。

关口二——经营者集中(反垄断)申报

外国收购方须在实施达到门槛的集中前通知SAMR。依修订后的国务院规定(第773号令,2024年1月26日施行),上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,须申报。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。

2024年修订将原有标准(100亿/20亿/4亿)提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元,SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%、降低交易成本。交易不得在未获核准前实施;”抢跑”受罚。SAMR对简易案件设”双20天”目标(受理与审查各20天),并将试点委托地方审查转为正式委托(2025年8月试点转正式,2026年3月公告完善)。

成效实在:2025年SAMR依法审结经营者集中706件,同比增长9.8%,83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。在汽车、光伏、锂电池等重点领域,该局”快审不降质”以支持重组。

关口三——国家安全审查

当收购位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时,须在实施前通过安全审查。《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委、商务部,2020年12月19日发布,2021年1月18日施行)界定范围:国防及周围地区;以及重要农产品、能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域——且投资者取得实际控制权。

“实际控制”标准宽于经营者集中:包括持股50%以上;持股不足50%但表决权对董事会/股东会决议产生重大影响;或其他对经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。程序为初步(15个工作日决定是否审查)→一般审查(30个工作日)→特别审查(60个工作日,可延长);决定具终局性,可禁止、附条件批准或准予。因其可推翻已通过的经营者集中,安全审查是收购方须首先筛查的关口——且如2026年Meta–Manus禁止案所示,它正被积极执行(详见本系列专文)。

上市公司战略投资(2024更新)

若目标为上市公司,外国投资者还须遵守修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(六部门,第3号令,2024;2024年11月1日公布,2024年12月2日施行)。修订大幅降低门槛:允许外国自然人;资产门槛放宽(非控股者实有5000万美元或管理3亿美元;控股者1亿美元或管理5亿美元);跨境换股对定向发行与要约收购放宽;战略投资方式新增要约收购;协议转让/要约收购持股比由10%降至5%(定向发行取消比例要求);锁定期由3年降至12个月(其他规则有更长要求从其规定)。重要的是,战略投资不再需商务审批——经信息报告与证券市场规则办理,安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。

现实时间线

一项简单、无限制、未达门槛的收购约2–4个月可完成:尽调与SPA、外商投资信息报告与公司法律文件、以及行业许可。若达门槛则叠加经营者集中——简易案件审查约20天加申报时间;标准案件更久。若涉范围且取得控制权则叠加安全审查——15+30+60工作日路径(含延期)对敏感案件可远超一年。三项工作流应并行,但交割受最慢的强制核准制约。

切勿串行处理核准。应在条款书阶段即启动经营者集中与安全审查分析,因其文件与实质分析与尽调重叠;在审查范围确定前锁定结构,可能导致后期重构。长停日应围绕特别审查上限设定,而非初步审查下限。

下一步

  • 将目标行业对照2024年负面清单筛查;若受限,签约前确认股权/控制条件可满足。
  • 尽早做经营者集中门槛测试(全球超120亿且两方中国各超8亿;或中国合计超40亿且两方中国各超8亿)。
  • 测试安全审查范围与”实际控制”(50%以上股权、重大表决影响、或对决策/人事/财务/技术重大影响)。
  • 对上市公司目标,适用2024年战投规则,经信息报告而非商务审批路径。
  • 经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行;未获所有强制核准前不得交割。
  • 长停日围绕特别审查上限设定,并在条款书阶段即启动两项审查。

常见误读

三类错误反复出现。其一,将核准串行处理(先经营者集中、再安全审查、再许可),而它们本应并行——串行是错过长停日的常见原因。其二,以为交易未达经营者集中门槛便无需任何事前审查;安全审查可因受涵盖领域与控制独立触发,与规模无关。其三,低估安全审查的”实际控制”——具否决权的少数股权亦可能计入——导致团队跳过筛查、后期才发现缺口。在条款书阶段即并行界定两项审查,是最佳防御。

Sources

Foreign M&A in China: process & approvals

  • Since 2020, domestic-enterprise M&A is no longer a commerce-department approval event — it runs through the negative list, information reporting, plus merger control and security review where triggered.
    2020 年后,并购境内企业不再是商务部门审批事件——经负面清单、信息报告办理,并在触发时通过经营者集中与安全审查。
  • Merger-control thresholds (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024): worldwide >RMB 12bn and two parties >RMB 800m China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn and two parties >RMB 800m China; below-threshold deals can still need security review where scope and control exist.
    经营者集中门槛(第 773 号令,2024 年 1 月 26 日施行):全球 >120 亿且两方中国 >8 亿,或中国合计 >40 亿且两方中国 >8 亿;未达门槛的交易在涉范围且取得控制权时仍可能需安全审查。
  • SAMR’s simplified track targets a “double 20-day” review; gun-jumping (closing before clearance) draws penalties.
    市场监管总局简易案件推行”双 20 天”审查目标;”抢跑”(获批前实施)受罚。
  • Security review is required where the target is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor acquires actual control; the control test is broader than merger control’s.
    当目标位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时须通过安全审查;控制标准宽于经营者集中标准。
  • The 2024 strategic-investment rules (Order No. 3, effective 2 December 2024) ease listed-company investment: foreign natural persons allowed, lower asset thresholds (USD 50m owned / USD 3bn managed for non-controlling), tender offers added, lock-up cut to 12 months, and no commerce approval needed.
    2024 年战投规则(第 3 号令,2024 年 12 月 2 日施行)放宽上市公司投资:允许外国自然人、降低资产门槛(非控股者实有 5,000 万美元或管理 3 亿美元)、新增要约收购、锁定期降至 12 个月,且无需商务审批。
  • A straightforward below-threshold acquisition can close in roughly 2–4 months; security review’s 15+30+60 working-day path (extendable) can exceed a year for sensitive cases.
    一项简单未达门槛的收购约 2–4 个月可完成;安全审查 15+30+60 工作日路径(可延长)对敏感案件可超一年。
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand, and begin the two reviews at term-sheet stage.
    将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进;未获所有强制 clearance 前不得交割,并在条款书阶段启动两项审查。

Foreign M&A in China: process & approvals | 外资并购中国企业的流程与审批

Overview

Acquiring a domestic Chinese company as a foreign investor runs through the same foreign-investment framework as greenfield entry, plus two deal-specific gates: merger control (antitrust) clearance with SAMR and national security review where a covered sensitive sector and control are involved. The foundational rule is the Provisions on Foreign Investors’ Mergers of and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises (MOFCOM Order No. 6, 2009), now operating inside the Foreign Investment Law’s negative-list and information-reporting regime. This article maps the process, the filing thresholds, the security review, and a realistic timeline.

A key behavioural change since 2020: M&A of a domestic enterprise is no longer a commerce-department approval event by itself. The investor incorporates/transfers under company law, clears any negative-list condition, reports foreign-investment information, and separately clears merger control and security review where triggered. Understanding which gates actually apply — and running them in parallel — is the core of a smooth closing.

The M&A rule and negative-list applicability

The 2009 M&A provisions govern how a foreign investor acquires equity or assets of a domestic enterprise, or obtains control through other means. They sit beneath the Foreign Investment Law: if the target’s sector is on the negative list, the acquisition must satisfy the list’s conditions (equity caps, Chinese-control, etc.); if off the list, the deal is treated on equal terms with domestic M&A.

Cross-border share swaps are permitted but conditioned: as a general rule the foreign equity used as consideration should be in a listed overseas company, though the 2024 strategic-investment rules relaxed this for certain directed-issue and tender-offer structures (allowing unlisted overseas company equity). Where the target is a listed company, the foreign investor must also comply with the Measures for the Administration of Foreign Investors’ Strategic Investment in Listed Companies, and the deal must respect the negative list — for example, a foreign investor may not acquire control of a sector that the list reserves to Chinese control.

Merger control (antitrust) filing

A foreign acquirer must notify SAMR before implementing a concentration that meets the thresholds. Under the revised State Council regulation (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures are calculated with sector-specific rules.

The 2024 thresholds raised the prior levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, cutting the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30%. A deal must not close before clearance; “gun-jumping” draws penalties. SAMR runs a simplified track with a “double 20-day” target for straightforward cases, and has piloted delegated review with selected provincial market-regulation bureaus to bring examination closer to the market.

National security review

Where the acquisition is in a covered sensitive sector (defence, important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT/finance/key tech) and the foreign investor acquires actual control, security review is required before implementation. The control test is broader than the merger-control test, so review can be triggered even when no antitrust filing is needed. The procedure runs preliminary (15 working days) → general (30) → special (60, extendable) review; the decision is final and can prohibit or condition the deal. Because it can override a cleared merger filing, security review is the gate an acquirer must screen first.

Strategic investment in listed companies (2024 update)

The revised Measures for Foreign Investors’ Strategic Investment in Listed Companies (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; effective 2 December 2024) lower the bar materially: foreign natural persons are allowed; asset thresholds are eased (non-controlling investors need only USD 500m owned or USD 3bn managed); tender offers are added as a method; cross-border share swaps are eased for directed issues and tender offers; and the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (longer if other rules require). Importly, post-Foreign-Investment-Law, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval — it is handled through information reporting and the securities-market rules, with security-review and merger-control interfaces preserved.

Typical timeline

A straightforward, unrestricted, below-threshold acquisition can complete in roughly 2–4 months: due diligence and SPA (variable), the foreign-investment information report and company-law filings (weeks), and any sector licence. Add merger control where thresholds are met (the simplified track targets ~20 days for review plus filing time; the standard track can run longer). Add security review where scope and control are present — the 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions) can extend well beyond a year for sensitive cases. The three workstreams should run in parallel, but closing is gated by the slowest mandatory clearance.

A practical tip: do not sequence the clearances serially. Begin merger-control and security-review analyses at term-sheet stage, because the documents and the substantive analysis overlap with diligence; locking the structure before the reviews are scoped risks a redesign late in the process. Build the long-stop date around the special-review maximum, not the preliminary-review minimum.

What to do next

Common misreads

Three mistakes recur in cross-border deals. The first is sequencing the clearances serially — merger control, then security review, then licence — when they should run in parallel; serial handling is the usual cause of a missed long-stop. The second is assuming that because a deal is below the merger-control turnover thresholds, no ex-ante review applies at all; security review can still be triggered by a covered sector and control, independent of size. The third is underestimating the breadth of “actual control” for security review — a minority stake with veto rights can count — which leads teams to skip the screen and discover the gap late. Scoping both reviews at term-sheet stage is the single best defence.

  • Screen the target sector against the 2024 negative list; if restricted, confirm the equity/control condition can be met before signing.
  • Run a merger-control threshold test early (worldwide >RMB 12bn & two parties >RMB 800m China; or China aggregate >RMB 4bn & two parties >RMB 800m China).
  • Test security-review scope and “actual control” (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
  • For listed-company targets, apply the 2024 strategic-investment rules and route through information reporting, not commerce approval.
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand.
  • Set the long-stop around the special-review maximum, and begin the two reviews at term-sheet stage rather than after signing.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: National security review of foreign investment
  • see also: FIE admission rules: approval vs. filing
  • see also: One-stop foreign investment service windows

外资并购中国企业的流程与审批

概述

外国投资者收购中国境内企业,遵循与绿地投资相同的外资框架,外加两道交易专属关卡:市场监管总局的经营者集中(反垄断)审查,以及涉及受涵盖敏感领域并取得控制权时的外商投资安全审查。基础规则是《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(商务部 2009 年第 6 号令),现运行于《外商投资法》的负面清单与信息报告制度之下。本文梳理流程、申报门槛、安全审查与合理时间表。

2020 年后的关键行为变化:并购境内企业本身不再是商务部门审批事件。投资者依公司法完成转让/设立,满足负面清单条件,报送外商投资信息,并在触发时另行通过经营者集中与安全审查。弄清哪些关卡真正适用——并并行推进——是顺利交割的核心。

并购规则与负面清单适用

2009 年并购规定规范外国投资者取得境内企业股权或资产,或通过其他方式取得控制权。其置于《外商投资法》之下:若目标行业在负面清单上,收购须满足清单条件(股比上限、中方控股等);若不在清单上,则按内资并购同等对待。

跨境换股被允许但有条件:一般规则下作为支付对价的外国股权应为境外上市公司股权,但 2024 年战投规则对特定定向发行与要约收购结构有所放宽(允许境外非上市公司股权)。目标为上市公司的,还须遵守《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》,且交易须尊重负面清单——例如,外国投资者不得取得清单保留由中方控股行业的控制权。

经营者集中(反垄断)申报

外国收购方须在实施达到门槛的集中前,向市场监管总局申报。依修订后的国务院规定(第 773 号令,2024 年 1 月 26 日施行),上一会计年度参与集中各方全球合计营业额超 120 亿元且至少两方中国境内营业额均超 8 亿元;或各方中国境内合计营业额超 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内营业额均超 8 亿元,即须申报。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别办法计算。

2024 年门槛将原标准(100 亿/20 亿/4 亿)提高至 120 亿/40 亿/8 亿,预计减少约 30% 应申报交易。交易须在获批前不得实施;”抢跑”受罚。市场监管总局简易案件推行受理与审查”双 20 天”目标,并试点委托部分省级市场监管局开展审查,使审查更贴近市场。

外商投资安全审查

当收购位于受涵盖敏感领域(军工、重要农业/能源/装备/基础设施/运输/文化/信息技术/金融/关键技术)且外国投资者取得实际控制权时,须在实施前通过安全审查。控制标准宽于经营者集中标准,故即便无需反垄断申报,仍可能触发审查。程序为初步审查(15 个工作日)→ 一般审查(30)→ 特别审查(60,可延长);决定为最终决定,可禁止或附条件。因其可凌驾于已通过的经营者集中申报,安全审查是收购方须最先筛查的关卡。

上市公司战略投资(2024 更新)

修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(六部门,2024 年第 3 号令,2024 年 12 月 2 日施行)大幅降低门槛:允许外国自然人;资产要求放宽(非控股股东仅需实有资产 5,000 万美元或管理资产 3 亿美元);新增要约收购方式;定向发行与要约收购的跨境换股放宽;锁定期由三年降至十二个月(其他规则有更长要求的从其规定)。重要的是,在外商投资法后,战略投资不再需商务部门审批——经信息报告与证券市场规则办理,安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。

典型时间表

一项简单、不受限、未达门槛的收购约 2–4 个月可完成:尽调与股权协议(可变)、外商投资信息报告与公司法项下登记(数周)、及相关行业许可。达到门槛的加经营者集中(简易案件审查目标约 20 天加申报时间;普通案件可能更久)。涉范围且取得控制权的加安全审查——15 + 30 + 60 工作日路径(可延长)对敏感案件可远超一年。三道工作流应并行,但交割受最慢的强制 clearance 约束。

实务提示:勿将各项 clearance 串行。在条款书阶段即启动经营者集中与安全审查分析,因其文件与实质分析与尽调重叠;在审查范围确定前锁定结构,可能导致流程后期重构。长止期应围绕特别审查上限而非初步审查下限设定。

下一步建议

常见误读

跨境交易中有三类反复出现的错误。其一,将各项 clearance 串行——先经营者集中,再安全审查,再许可——而它们应并行;串行处理是错过长止期的常见原因。其二,以为交易未达经营者集中营业额门槛即完全无需事前审查;受涵盖领域加控制权仍可触发安全审查,与规模无关。其三,低估安全审查”实际控制”的广度——具否决权的少数股权亦可计入——导致团队跳过筛查、后期才发现缺口。在条款书阶段即对两项审查做范围筛查,是最佳防御。

  • 将目标行业对照 2024 年版负面清单;若受限,签约前确认股比/控股条件可满足。
  • 尽早做经营者集中门槛测试(全球 >120 亿且两方中国 >8 亿;或中国合计 >40 亿且两方中国 >8 亿)。
  • 测试安全审查范围与”实际控制”(50% 以上股权、重大表决影响,或对决策/人事/财务/技术的重大影响)。
  • 目标为上市公司的,适用 2024 年战投规则,经信息报告而非商务审批办理。
  • 将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进;未获所有强制 clearance 前不得交割。
  • 长止期围绕特别审查上限设定,并在条款书阶段而非签约后启动两项审查。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:外商投资安全审查
  • 参见:外资企业准入:审批与备案
  • 参见:外商投资一站式服务窗口

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing

  • Foreign acquisitions, mergers, or acquisitions of control over a Chinese business may trigger a concentration filing to SAMR; the regime is mandatory and suspensory.
    外资收购、合并或取得中国企业控制权可能触发向国家市场监督管理总局的经营者集中申报;该制度具有强制性与暂停性。
  • The 2024 thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024) are global RMB 12bn / China RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties), cutting notifiable deals by an estimated 30%.
    2024年阈值(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行)为全球120亿/中国40亿/两方各8亿元,预计减少约30%的申报量。
  • A minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a notifiable concentration; pure intra-group reorganizations are exempt.
    赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属应申报集中;纯集团内部重组可豁免。
  • SAMR review runs an ordinary 30+90 day (extendable 60) procedure or a simplified “double 20 days” procedure, with outcomes of unconditional clearance, remedies, or prohibition.
    SAMR审查分普通程序30+90日(可延长60)或简易程序”双20天”,结果含无条件批准、附加条件批准或禁止。
  • “Gun-jumping” (acting before clearance) risks divestiture, fines up to RMB 5 million, and up to 10% of prior-year turnover for serious violations under the 2022 AML amendment.
    “抢跑”(获批前实施)风险包括责令恢复原状、最高500万元罚款,及依2022年修法情节严重最高处上一年度营业额10%罚款。
  • Foreign investors must keep closing, control, and integration waiting for SAMR clearance, and carve out China if a global deal closes elsewhere first.
    外国投资者须使交割、控制权与整合等待SAMR批准,若全球交易先在其他法域关闭则应拆分中国部分。

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing | 反垄断与经营者集中申报

Overview

When a foreign investor acquires a Chinese company, merges with a local competitor, or takes control of a domestic business, the transaction may trigger a concentration filing (经营者集中申报) under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The filing is made to the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), the national antitrust enforcement authority. The regime is mandatory and suspensory: if thresholds are met, the deal may not close (and control may not be exercised) until clearance is granted. Getting this wrong exposes the parties to “gun-jumping” penalties that, since the 2022 AML amendment, can reach a percentage of turnover.

This article sets out the 2024 turnover thresholds, how SAMR reviews a concentration, the simplified versus ordinary procedure, and the practical risk of closing before clearance.

Turnover thresholds for concentration filing

The current notification thresholds are set by the State Council’s “Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings” (Order No. 773), revised and effective 26 January 2024. A concentration must be notified to SAMR in advance, and may not be implemented until cleared, where either of the following is met (based on the parties’ turnover in the previous accounting year):

  • Global test: the worldwide aggregate turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million; or
  • China test: the aggregate China turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million.

These thresholds were raised from the prior RMB 10 billion / RMB 2 billion / RMB 400 million, reducing the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30% and lowering transaction costs. Turnover of the relevant group (not just the target) counts, and special rules apply to banking, insurance, securities, and futures. Even below the thresholds, SAMR may call in a transaction if it is likely to eliminate or restrict competition (the “fall below but suspect” power).

A concentration is defined as: (a) a merger; (b) acquisition of control through equity or assets; or (c) acquisition of control or decisive influence through contracts. Note that acquiring a minority stake that confers control or decisive influence can still be a notifiable concentration. Two exemptions apply: where one party already holds >50% of the other, or where a common parent holds >50% of each — i.e., pure intra-group reorganizations.

SAMR review procedure

Upon submission, SAMR decides whether to accept the filing. Once accepted, the ordinary (non-simplified) review has two phases: an initial 30-day phase, and, if it proceeds, a further 90-day phase (extendable by 60 days in specified circumstances). A simplified procedure applies to non-controversial deals — for example, where the parties are not competitors in the same market, or one party acquires a sole control stake in a joint venture — with a compressed timetable (the regulator targets “double 20 days” for acceptance and review of simplified cases). SAMR may clear unconditionally, clear with behavioural or structural remedies (附加条件批准), or prohibit the concentration.

Parties should expect to submit a notification form, market definitions, turnover calculations, competitive-effects analysis, and (for foreign-to-China deals) information on global filings. Early pre-filing consultation with SAMR is common and reduces the risk of a long Phase 2. Since 2023, SAMR has also piloted delegated review to five provincial market-regulation bureaus for certain simplified cases, improving speed for deals centered in those regions.

Gun-jumping and enforcement risk

“Gun-jumping” means implementing a concentration — or exercising control — before clearance. The 2022 AML amendment significantly strengthened enforcement. Implementing a notifiable concentration without filing, or implementing before clearance, can result in an order to restore the prior state (divestiture / undo the deal), a fine of up to RMB 5 million for the undertaking, and — importantly — for the 2022 amendment’s proportional penalty regime, fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s turnover in the prior year where the violation is serious. Responsible individuals may also be fined. Even signing and partially closing (e.g., taking board control, consolidating financials, or integrating the business) before clearance can be caught.

The lesson for foreign investors: structure the timetable so that closing, control, and integration wait for SAMR clearance. Use a long-stop date and conditions precedent, and keep the businesses separate (no joint management, no shared systems, no consolidated reporting) until the green light. Where a global deal must close elsewhere first, carve out the China leg or ring-fence the Chinese target to avoid premature exercise of control in China.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early using worldwide and China turnover of the whole group for the prior year; remember the RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties) 2024 thresholds.
  • Map the control question — a minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a concentration.
  • Plan for suspension — make SAMR clearance a condition precedent; do not close, integrate, or exercise control in China before approval.
  • Consider simplified procedure if markets don’t overlap, and use pre-filing consultation to compress the timeline.
  • Watch the gun-jumping traps — no board control, consolidation, or integration pre-clearance; carve out China if the global deal closes earlier.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Cybersecurity & MLPS (等保) for FIEs — M&A can reset system grading and trigger new filings.
  • see also: Foreign-related dispute resolution — litigation vs. arbitration — challenging or enforcing merger decisions.
  • see also: CIETAC & international arbitration — arbitrating competition and shareholder disputes.

反垄断与经营者集中申报

概述

当外国投资者收购中国企业、与本土竞争者合并,或取得境内企业的控制权时,该交易可能触发《反垄断法》项下的经营者集中申报。申报向国家市场监督管理总局(SAMR)——反垄断执法机构——提出。该制度具有强制性与暂停性:一旦达到阈值,在获得批准前不得实施集中(亦不得行使控制权)。若处理不当,当事人将面临”抢跑”(gun-jumping)处罚;自 2022 年《反垄断法》修订后,罚款可达营业额的一定比例。

本文列明 2024 年营业额阈值、SAMR 如何审查集中、简易与普通程序的区分,以及”获批前Closing”的实务风险。

经营者集中申报的营业额阈值

现行申报阈值由《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(第 773 号令)设定,于 2024 年 1 月 26 日修订施行。集中达到以下任一标准(按参与者上一会计年度营业额计算),须事先向 SAMR 申报,未申报不得实施:

  • 全球标准:参与集中的所有经营者全球合计营业额超过120 亿元人民币,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元;或
  • 中国标准:参与集中的所有经营者中国境内合计营业额超过40 亿元,且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元。

上述阈值较此前的 100 亿 / 20 亿 / 4 亿元上调,预计减少约 30% 的申报量,降低交易成本。计算以相关集团(而非仅标的)营业额为准,银行、保险、证券、期货等行业另有特别办法。即便未达阈值,若具有或可能具有排除、限制竞争效果,SAMR 仍可主动要求申报(”未达阈值但有嫌疑”权力)。

集中指:(一)经营者合并;(二)通过股权或资产取得控制权;(三)通过合同取得控制权或决定性影响。注意:取得赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍可能构成应申报集中。两类豁免适用:一方已持有另一方 50% 以上表决权股份,或同一未参与集中的经营者持有各方 50% 以上表决权股份——即纯集团内部重组。

SAMR 审查程序

受理申报后,SAMR 决定是否予以立案。立案后,普通程序分两阶段:初始30 日审查期;若进一步审查,再加90 日(特定情形下可延长 60 日)。简易程序适用于无争议的 Deal——例如当事方不在同一市场竞争,或一方取得合营企业单独控制权——时间表压缩(监管目标为简易程序”受理与审查双 20 天”)。SAMR 可无条件批准、附行为性或结构性条件批准(附加条件批准),或禁止集中。

当事人应准备申报书、相关市场界定、营业额计算、竞争效果分析,以及(外资赴华交易)全球申报信息。与 SAMR 的事前商谈十分常见,可降低进入第二阶段的风险。自 2023 年起,SAMR 还试点将部分简易案件委托五个省级市场监管部门审查,提升区域集中交易的效率。

抢跑与执法风险

“抢跑”指在未获批准前实施集中或行使控制权。2022 年《反垄断法》修订显著强化了执法。应申报而未申报,或在获批前实施集中,可能导致责令恢复原状(剥离/撤销交易)、对经营者最高500 万元罚款;更重要的是,依 2022 年修订的比例罚款机制,情节严重的可被处上一年度营业额 10% 以下的罚款。直接责任人员亦可能被罚。即便签约并部分 closing(如取得董事会控制、合并财务报表或整合业务),也可能被认定为抢跑。

对外国投资者的启示:时间表应安排为交割、控制权与整合均等待 SAMR 批准。使用最晚截止日与先决条件,在绿灯前保持标的独立(不共同管理、不共享系统、不合并报告)。若全球交易须在其他法域先 closing,应拆分中国部分或对中国标的”隔离”,以避免在中国境内过早行使控制权。

下一步建议

  • 尽早做阈值测试:使用整个集团上一年度的全球与中国营业额;牢记 2024 年 120 亿 / 40 亿 / 8 亿(两方)标准。
  • 厘清控制权问题——赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属集中。
  • 规划暂停性:将 SAMR 批准设为先决条件;获批前不在华交割、整合或行使控制权。
  • 考虑简易程序:若市场不重叠,并利用事前商谈压缩周期。
  • 警惕抢跑陷阱:获批前不得董事会控制、合并报表或整合;若全球先 closing,拆分中国部分。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:网络安全与等保(外资适用)— 并购可能重置系统定级并触发新备案。
  • 参见:涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁 — 对集中决定的异议与执行。
  • 参见:贸仲与涉外仲裁 — 仲裁竞争与股东纠纷。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

  • From 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s refined delegated-review system adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original provincial bureaus and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,市场监管总局完善后的经营者集中委托审查制度在原 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个受委托部门。
  • Delegated simple-case bureaus now total eight, and the delegated average acceptance and completion times have both stayed within roughly 20 days, materially faster than national review.
    简易案件受委托省级部门增至 8 个;受委托部门平均受理与审结时间均在约 20 天内,明显快于全国审查。
  • Zhejiang handles simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi from August 2026, giving regional companies near-by filing and review.
    2026 年 8 月起,浙江受委托承担浙江、福建、江西三省区域内经营者集中简易案件审查,区域企业可就近申报办理。
  • The SAMR also published six typical concentration cases on 21 August 2026, showing how review supports restructuring in platforms, PV, batteries, auto parts and coal logistics while curbing “involutionary” competition.
    市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、锂电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。
  • For foreign-invested groups, the changes affect where and how quickly qualifying deals are cleared, but the mandatory prior-filing threshold and substantive standards are unchanged.
    对外资集团而言,变化影响合格交易的审查地点与速度;强制事先申报门槛与实体标准不变。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026) | 经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)

Why this matters now

On 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s Announcement on Further Improving the Delegated Review System for Concentrations of Undertakings took effect. The system, which began as a pilot in August 2022 and was formalised in July 2025, now adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original delegated provincial bureaus — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi — and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases. A week later, on 21 August 2026, the SAMR published six typical cases of concentration review used to support restructuring in platform, solar-PV, battery, auto-parts and coal-logistics sectors while curbing “involutionary” competition. For foreign-invested enterprises and their advisers, the combination of wider delegation, faster regional clearance and clearer enforcement signals changes the practical geography of merger control in China.

What the expanded delegation changes

The delegated-review system is a division of work within China’s unitary concentration-review regime: the SAMR remains the reviewing authority, receives filings through the central business system, and delegates qualifying cases to provincial bureaus, which conduct the review and report back. The August 2026 changes operate on three axes. First, scope: in addition to simple cases, certain non-simple cases may now be delegated to the five original bureaus. The delegation criteria for non-simple cases include a combined market share of 15–25% in the same relevant market; or 25–35% shares in upstream and downstream markets respectively; or 25–35% shares in each relevant market for parties without horizontal or vertical relationships. Second, coverage: Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan join as delegated bureaus for simple cases, bringing the total to eight, each responsible for a defined regional territory. Zhejiang, for example, reviews simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi. Third, procedure: the SAMR has upgraded its concentration-review business system, revised the working handbook for provincial bureaus, and retained the rule that non-simple delegated cases must still have documents such as clearance decisions issued under the SAMR’s authority, while decisions with conditions or prohibitions are issued centrally by the SAMR.

Operationally, the delegated bureaus report average acceptance and completion times of about 16 and 18 days respectively — both within roughly 20 days — under the “double twenty” working standard, and simple cases account for about 90% of all concentration filings. For companies in the covered regions, the practical effect is faster, closer review: the Zhejiang bureau published a consultation phone line and a pre-filing consultation mechanism, and the entire process runs online.

The typical cases and enforcement signals

The six typical cases published on 21 August 2026 illustrate how the SAMR balances support for restructuring with restraint on harmful competition. Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five restrictive conditions (May 2026) to protect competition in online-audio and online-music markets; TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy was cleared unconditionally to consolidate solar-PV capacity; Hubei Jingjiang’s acquisition of East Group was cleared to support transformation into an “AI + new energy” services provider; and joint-venture cases in battery separators, automotive air-suspension components and coal logistics were cleared to integrate regional capacity and reduce low-level duplication. For foreign-invested companies, the enforcement posture is double-sided: genuine restructuring that improves efficiency and quality is supported, but transactions that entrench dominance or enable coordinated “involutionary” behaviour will attract conditions or prohibition — and the delegated bureaus apply the same substantive standards as the SAMR.

Practical steps

  1. Check whether delegation affects your filing. Determine whether your transaction meets the simple-case thresholds and whether the relevant market or parties sit in a delegated bureau’s territory; if so, expect local filing and faster clearance.
  2. Use pre-filing consultation. The business system and delegated bureaus (for example Zhejiang’s published hotline) allow pre-filing discussion of whether a filing is needed and how to frame the transaction.
  3. Plan the timeline around the “double twenty” standard. For qualifying cases, acceptance and completion are each targeted within 20 days; align signing, closing and financing steps accordingly.
  4. Treat simple-case status carefully. Simple-case filing is faster but still requires full and accurate notification; mischaracterisation invites correction and delay.
  5. Watch the substantive lines. The typical cases show that restrictive conditions and prohibitions are live tools for platform and network effects; conduct a realistic competition assessment before filing.
  6. Maintain group-wide notification discipline. The delegation does not lower the mandatory filing thresholds — turnover-based thresholds remain — and failure to file before closing (“gun-jumping”) remains a serious violation.

Compliance notes

The delegated-review system is administrative division of work, not decentralisation of substantive standards. The SAMR still issues conditional-approval and prohibition decisions; delegated bureaus act within their mandates and under the SAMR’s supervision. For foreign investors, the important practical change is speed and location of review, plus a clearer picture of how the SAMR treats sector restructuring. Nothing in the August 2026 changes alters the prior-filing obligation, the notification thresholds, or the penalties for closing before approval. Keep the transaction diary, engage the business system early, and treat the six typical cases as a practical guide to how restructuring proposals will be framed and assessed.


经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)/ Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 1 日,《市场监管总局关于进一步完善经营者集中委托审查制度的公告》正式施行。这一始于 2022 年 8 月试点、2025 年 7 月转正的制度,如今在原北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件的委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个简易案件受委托部门。一周后,市场监管总局于 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。对外资企业及其顾问而言,委托扩容、区域快速审结与更清晰的执法信号,共同改变了中国经营者集中的实务版图。

扩容改变了什么

委托审查制度是中国单一集中的审查体制内的分工:市场监管总局是审查机关,通过全国经营者集中业务系统统一接收申报,将符合条件的案件转受委托省级部门办理,后者审查并报告,总局作出决定。2026 年 8 月的调整沿三条轴展开。其一,范围:除简易案件外,部分非简易案件现在可委托原 5 个省级部门审查。非简易案件委托标准包括:同一相关市场合计份额 15%–25%;上下游市场份额均 25%–35%;无横向纵向关系者在每个相关市场份额均 25%–35%。其二,覆盖面:辽宁、浙江、四川加入简易案件受委托名单,受委托部门增至 8 个,各负责相应区域。例如,浙江受理浙江、福建、江西三省的简易案件。其三,程序:总局升级经营者集中反垄断业务系统、修订省级审查工作手册;非简易案件委托仍以总局名义出具批准文书,附条件批准或禁止的由总局统一发布决定。

运营层面,受委托部门在”双二十”工作标准下,平均受理约 16 天、审结约 18 天,均不超过约 20 天;简易案件约占全部申报的九成。对覆盖区域内的企业,实际效果是更快、更近的审查:浙江省局公布咨询电话并实行申报前商谈机制,全流程线上办理。

典型案例与执法信号

2026 年 8 月 21 日公布的六起典型案例展示总局如何在支持重组与遏制有害竞争之间平衡。腾讯收购喜马拉雅股权案于 2026 年 5 月附加五项限制性条件批准,以保护在线音频、网络音乐市场竞争;TCL 中环收购一道新能源案无条件批准,以整合光伏产能;湖北荆江收购易事特案批准,支持转型”AI+新能源”综合服务商;电池隔膜、汽车空气悬架部件与煤炭物流的新设合营案均无条件批准,以整合区域产能、减少低水平重复。对外资企业,执法姿态是双面的:改善效率与质量的真实重组受到支持,但固化支配地位或促成协同性”内卷”的交易将面临条件或禁止——受委托部门适用与总局一致的实体标准。

操作步骤

  1. 核验委托是否影响申报。 判断交易是否满足简易案件门槛,以及相关市场或当事方是否位于受委托部门辖区;若是,将属地申报并更快审结。
  2. 利用申报前商谈。 业务系统与受委托部门(如浙江公布的咨询电话)支持申报前讨论是否需要申报及如何构架交易。
  3. 按”双二十”标准排期。 合格案件受理与审结各目标 20 天内;据此安排签约、交割与融资节点。
  4. 审慎对待简易地位。 简易申报更快,但仍需完整准确申报;错误定性将招致更正与延误。
  5. 关注实体红线。 典型案例显示,对平台与网络效应,限制性条件与禁止是活跃工具;申报前应作现实竞争评估。
  6. 保持集团申报纪律。 委托不降低强制申报门槛——营业额门槛不变——交割前未申报(抢跑)仍是严重违规。

合规提示

委托审查是行政分工,不是实体标准的分散化。总局仍统一作出附条件批准与禁止决定;受委托部门在其职责内、在总局监督下行事。对外资投资者,实际变化主要是审查速度与地点,以及对总局如何处理行业重组的更清晰图景。2026 年 8 月的调整不改变事先申报义务、申报门槛或未批先交的处罚。保留交易台账、尽早接入业务系统,并将六起典型案例视为理解重组方案如何被构架与评估的实务指南。

Sources