Category Archives: Market Entry / 市场准入

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026)

  • A concentration must be notified to SAMR before closing if it meets the turnover thresholds; failing to file or closing early triggers investigation and penalties.
    达到营业额标准的经营者集中,须在实施前事先向市场监管总局申报;未申报或获批前实施将面临调查与处罚。
  • Current thresholds (raised in the 2024 revision): global aggregate turnover > RMB 12bn, or China aggregate > RMB 4bn with at least two parties each > RMB 0.8bn in China.
    现行标准(2024 年修订提高):全球合计营业额 > 120 亿元,或中国境内合计 > 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内各 > 8 亿元。
  • The industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (effective 1 Oct 2025) consolidates prior guidance into one filing playbook — conditions, materials, workflow.
    市场监管行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)将既往零散指引整合为统一申报手册——申报条件、材料、流程。
  • From 1 August 2026, SAMR delegates part of non-simplified-case review to five provincial bureaus (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, Shaanxi), shortening timelines for non-problematic deals.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,总局将部分非简易案件委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查,加速无竞争问题交易的落地。
  • Foreign-to-foreign deals can also be caught when they acquire control of, or decisive influence over, a China-business; the same thresholds and suspensory rule apply.
    外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,同样触发;适用相同标准与「停表」规则。
  • Practical tip: run a control-and-turnover test at term sheet; use SAMR’s pre-filing consultation and the online system to compress the clock.
    实操提示:在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额测试;善用总局商谈与在线系统压缩周期。

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026) | 中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

China’s merger-control regime is built on the *Anti-Monopoly Law* and the *State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings*. The core rule is suspensory: where a concentration reaches the notification thresholds, the parties must file with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and may not implement it before clearance. Implementing early — or not filing at all — exposes the parties to investigation and fines.

The thresholds were raised in the 2024 revision. A concentration must be notified if: (a) the aggregate global turnover of all parties in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion; or (b) the aggregate China turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion. SAMR is required to assess the thresholds against economic development and may adjust them.

To make filing predictable, SAMR issued the industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (released 26 September 2025, effective 1 October 2025). It is the first SAMR industry standard to set out concentration notification in a single, structured document, integrating four prior guidance papers (now repealed). It clarifies what constitutes a concentration (merger; acquisition of control via equity/assets; control or decisive influence via contract), the materials required (notification form, simplified-case requirements, appendices on control and turnover calculation), and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For foreign investors, this means a clearer, more standardised path to clearance.

A notable efficiency change took effect on 1 August 2026. SAMR expanded its delegated-review system: certain non-simplified cases may be entrusted to the provincial bureaus of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi, within defined market-share bands (e.g., combined share 15–25% in the same relevant market). Simple cases remain delegated to an expanded set of provincial bureaus. The policy aim is “complexity分流” — fast-track deals with no competition concerns so investment closes sooner, while SAMR retains the sensitive matters.

Cross-border relevance is direct. A foreign-to-foreign transaction that acquires control of, or decisive influence over, a Chinese business is not exempt. The same thresholds and the same standstill obligation apply, and SAMR coordinates with foreign enforcers where relevant. Parties should therefore (1) screen control and turnover at the term-sheet stage, (2) consider a pre-filing consultation for novel structures, and (3) use the online system to reduce avoidable back-and-forth. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest way to keep a deal on schedule.


中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

中国的经营者集中制度以《反垄断法》与《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》为框架。核心规则是「事前审查、停表」:达到申报标准的集中,须事先向市场监管总局(SAMR)申报,未获批准不得实施;抢跑或未申报将触发调查与罚款。

申报标准已在 2024 年修订提高。满足以下之一即须申报:(a)参与集中的所有经营者上一会计年度全球合计营业额超过 120 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元;或(b)中国境内合计营业额超过 40 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元。总局应根据经济发展情况评估标准实施。

为提升可预期性,总局发布行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 9 月 26 日发布,2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)。这是首部以行业标准形式系统规定经营者集中申报的文件,整合了此前的 4 部申报指导性文件(同步废止),统一明确申报条件(构成集中的情形、控制权判断、营业额计算)、申报材料(申报表、简易案件要求、控制权与营业额计算附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对外资而言,这意味着更清晰、标准化的获批路径。

一项提效变化于 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效。总局完善委托审查制度:符合份额区间(如同一相关市场份额合计 15%–25%)的部分非简易案件,可委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查;简易案件受托省级局相应扩容。政策意图是「繁简分流」——让无竞争问题的交易加速落地,敏感事项仍由总局把关。

跨境适用性直接。外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,并不豁免;同样适用该标准与停表义务,总局在必要时与境外执法机构协调。交易方应:(1)在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额筛查;(2)对新颖结构善用商谈;(3)用在线系统减少无效往返。早而规范的申报,是让交易按期完成的最低成本方式。

Filing Playbook for Foreign Investors

Start with the control test. Acquisition of a China business — even as part of a global transaction — can constitute a concentration if it confers control or decisive influence. Map the target’s China revenue and the parties’ global and China turnover against the thresholds before signing. If the deal is close to a threshold, model both the global and the Chinaaggregate tests; the lower of the two can still trigger.

Use the 2025 *Specification* as your template. It consolidates what to submit (notification form, simplified-case annexes, control and turnover appendices) and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For straightforward, non-problematic deals, consider the simplified procedure and the expanded provincial delegation effective 1 August 2026, which can shift routine non-simplified review to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing or Shaanxi within defined share bands.

Mind the standstill. Do not close, integrate or exercise control before clearance — interim integration (sharing confidential info, appointing managers, consolidating accounts) can be read as early implementation. Build a conditionality and long-stop that reflects the review period, keep the CSRC/security-review workstreams in view if the deal is also an inbound acquisition, and document a clean competition narrative. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest insurance for deal certainty.

外资申报实操手册

从控制权测试入手。取得中国业务控制权或决定性影响的交易——即便作为全球交易一部分——可能构成集中。签约前将标的中国营收与各党全球/中国营业额对照标准;若接近阈值,同时建模全球与境内合计两种测试,较低者亦可能触发。

以 2025 年《申报规范》为模板。它整合了提交内容(申报表、简易案件附件、控制权与营业额附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对清晰无问题的交易,可考虑简易程序及 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效的省级委托扩容——在既定份额区间内将常规非简易案件移至北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西。

遵守停表。获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制;过渡期整合(共享机密信息、委派管理人、合并账务)可能被认定为提前实施。设定反映审查周期的条件与长停,若同时属 inbound 并购则留意证监会/安审工作流,并备好清晰竞争叙事。早而规范的申报,是交易确定性的最低成本保险。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Suspensory rule: file with SAMR before closing once thresholds are met; early closing triggers investigation and fines.
  • Thresholds: global aggregate > RMB 12bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China); or China aggregate > RMB 4bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China).
  • Concentration: merger; equity/asset acquisition of control; control/decisive influence by contract.
  • 2025 standard: *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* effective 1 Oct 2025 consolidates prior guidance.
  • Delegation: from 1 Aug 2026, part of non-simplified cases delegated to Beijing/Shanghai/Guangdong/Chongqing/Shaanxi.
  • Standstill: no closing, integration or control exercise before clearance.
  • Cross-border: foreign-to-foreign deals acquiring control of a China business are equally caught.

实务速查

  • 停表规则: 达阈值须向 SAMR 申报后方可交割;抢跑触发调查与罚款。
  • 标准: 全球合计 > 120 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国);或中国合计 > 40 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国)。
  • 集中: 合并;取得控制权的股权/资产收购;依合同取得控制或决定性影响。
  • 2025 标准: 《经营者集中申报规范》2025 年 10 月 1 日施行,整合既往指引。
  • 委托: 2026 年 8 月 1 日起部分非简易案件委托北京/上海/广东/重庆/陕西。
  • 停表: 获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制。
  • 跨境: 取得中国业务控制权的外资间交易同样被纳入。

Sources

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review

  • China’s 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 empowers SAMR to review concentrations that fall below the notification thresholds where they may eliminate or restrict competition.
    中国2022年修订的《反垄断法》授权市场监管总局对未达申报标准、但可能排除限制竞争的集中进行审查。
  • “Killer” or “sniping” (掐尖式) acquisitions—buying a nascent rival to discontinue or absorb it—are a stated SAMR enforcement priority, especially in the platform economy.
    “扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购——收购新生竞争对手以停用或吸收之——是市场监管总局明确的执法重点,尤其在平台经济领域。
  • Below-threshold deals are not a safe harbour; the authority can call them in, impose remedies, or unwind completed transactions.
    未达门槛的交易并非安全港;监管可主动立案,附加救济,或撤销已完成的交易。
  • The theory targets potential competition: a small or pre-revenue target’s future trajectory is what makes the deal reviewable.
    该理论针对潜在竞争:标的虽小或尚无营收,其未来轨迹正使交易具有可审查性。
  • As of 2026, the focus has extended from platforms to biotech, semiconductors, and AI, where a startup’s talent or IP is the real asset.
    截至2026年,重点已从平台延伸至生物医药、半导体及人工智能,其中初创企业的人才或知识产权才是真正资产。
  • Entrants should document a genuine, pro-competitive rationale and preserve standalone-viability evidence for any acquisition of an early-stage rival.
    准入者应就收购早期竞争对手记录真实、促进竞争的理据,并保存其独立存续可行性的证据。

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review | 中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

The Legal Hook: Below-Threshold Review

A defining innovation of the 2022 《反垄断法》 amendment is explicit authority for the enforcer to examine concentrations that do not meet the turnover notification thresholds yet “have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” This closes the gap that previously let small, strategic acquisitions escape scrutiny simply because the target’s revenue was negligible. SAMR may, on its own initiative or following a complaint, open a below-threshold review—even after closing.

What Is a “Killer” or “Sniping” Acquisition?

The term “killer acquisition” (and its Chinese framing 掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购) describes a dominant firm buying an emerging competitor chiefly to shut it down, shelf the product, or absorb its talent and IP rather than to compete with it. The competitive harm is forward-looking: the market loses a future rival, and innovation is chilled. In platform and deep-tech contexts, the acquired asset is often pre-revenue, so classic turnover-based thresholds would never catch it—hence the below-threshold power is the relevant tool.

Why 2026 Makes This Salient

Entering 2026, several forces elevate below-threshold scrutiny:

  • Platform precedent. SAMR’s platform-economy guidance names eliminating potential competition as a core concern, and 掐尖式并购 is repeatedly cited in enforcement rhetoric.
  • Deep-tech race. In semiconductors, AI, and biotech, acquisitions of tiny startups for their talent or patents are strategically loaded; the real value is not current sales but future capability.
  • Talent and data. Buying a team or dataset to neutralize a rival’s trajectory is exactly the harm the below-threshold rule targets.

How SAMR Assesses These Deals

The authority looks beyond current overlap to potential competition:

  • Would the target, absent the deal, likely have become a significant rival?
  • Is the acquirer a dominant or strategically placed firm?
  • Does the transaction remove a nascent competitive constraint?
  • Is there a genuine efficiency or pro-competitive rationale, or merely elimination?

Evidence of “shelving” intent—internal plans to discontinue the product, retain talent only, or refuse to invest—sharpens the case against the deal.

Remedies and Consequences

For below-threshold deals found anticompetitive, SAMR may:

  • Prohibit the transaction;
  • Order divestiture or restructuring of the acquired asset;
  • Impose behavioural remedies (e.g., keep the product alive, license the technology, maintain investment);
  • Unwind a completed concentration and impose turnover-based fines.

Because the acquirer may already have integrated the target, unwinding is disruptive and value-destroying—so the ex ante risk calculus matters more than the (often low) notification threshold.

2026 Practice Notes

  • The below-threshold power is used selectively, not as a dragnet; cases cluster in platform, tech, and innovation-heavy sectors.
  • SAMR signals intent through guidelines and public statements more than through a fixed numerical trigger, so sector context governs.
  • Acquirers of early-stage rivals should expect that a deal’s *strategic logic*, not its size, determines scrutiny.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Do not assume “small = safe.” A below-threshold acquisition of a rival still invites review if its trajectory matters.
  2. Document pro-competitive rationale. Business plans, investment commitments, and roadmaps showing the target will thrive post-deal are protective.
  3. Preserve standalone-viability evidence. Demonstrate the target was not on a clear path to become a rival, or that the deal genuinely accelerates its offering.
  4. Consider voluntary engagement. Where a deal is sensitive, a proactive explanation to SAMR can pre-empt a contested proceeding.
  5. Contract for remediation. Allocate unwinding and remedy risk in the SPA, with appropriate long-stop dates.

Bottom Line

The below-threshold review power reframes China’s merger control: size is no longer the sole gate. For 2026, any acquisition by a dominant or strategically placed firm of an early-stage innovator—especially in platforms, AI, semiconductors, or biotech—should be planned as if scrutinised for its effect on future competition, with the evidentiary file built accordingly.


中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

法律抓手:未达门槛的审查

2022年《反垄断法》修订的一项标志性创新,是明确授权执法机关审查未达营业额申报标准、但”具有或者可能具有排除、限制竞争效果”的经营者集中。这填补了此前的漏洞——即小型战略性收购仅因标的营收微薄便可逃避审查。市场监管总局可主动或依举报,开展未达门槛审查,甚至在交割后启动。

何为”扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购?

“扼杀式收购”(中文亦称掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购)指支配企业收购新兴竞争对手,主要目的为关停、搁置产品,或吸收其人才与知识产权,而非与之竞争。其竞争损害是前瞻性的:市场失去一个未来竞争对手,创新受抑。在平台与深科技场景中,被收购资产常处于尚无营收阶段,经典营业额门槛本无从捕获——因此未达门槛的审查权才是适用工具。

2026年为何凸显

进入2026年,多重力量抬升了未达门槛审查:

  • 平台先例。 市场监管总局平台经济指引将消除潜在竞争列为核心关切,”掐尖式并购”在执法论述中屡被援引。
  • 深科技竞赛。 在半导体、人工智能与生物医药领域,为人才或专利而收购微型初创企业具有战略载荷;真正价值不在当前销售,而在未来能力。
  • 人才与数据。 收购团队或数据集以中性化对手轨迹,正是未达门槛规则所欲针对的损害。

市场监管总局如何评估此类交易

监管超越当前重叠,审视潜在竞争:

  • 若交易不发生,标的是否可能成为重要竞争对手?
  • 收购方是否为支配或具战略地位的企业?
  • 交易是否消除了新生的竞争约束?
  • 是否存在真实的效率或促进竞争理据,抑或仅为消除?

“搁置”意图的证据——内部关停产品、仅留人才、拒绝投入的计划——会使案件对交易更为不利。

救济与后果

对认定具反竞争效果的未达门槛交易,市场监管总局可:

  • 禁止交易;
  • 责令剥离或重组被收购资产;
  • 附加行为性救济(如保持产品存续、许可技术、维持投入);
  • 撤销已完成的集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。

由于收购方可能已整合标的,撤销具有破坏性且摧毁价值——因此事前的风险权衡,比(往往很低的)申报门槛更关键。

2026年实践要点

  • 未达门槛审查权被选择性使用,而非撒网;案件集中于平台、科技及创新密集型行业。
  • 市场监管总局更多通过指引与公开表态释放意图,而非固定数值触发,故行业语境决定一切。
  • 收购早期竞争对手者须预期:决定审查的是交易的*战略逻辑*,而非其规模。

准入者实务指引

  1. 勿假定”小即安全”。 未达门槛但轨迹重要的竞品收购,仍会招致审查。
  2. 记录促进竞争的理据。 商业计划、投入承诺及标的交易后仍将壮大的路线图,具有保护作用。
  3. 保存独立存续可行性证据。 证明标的并非清晰走向成为竞争对手,或交易确实加速了其产品供给。
  4. 考虑主动沟通。 交易敏感时,主动向市场监管总局说明可避免陷入争议的程序。
  5. 在合同中约定补救。 于协议中分配撤销与救济风险,并设置适当的最晚截止日。

要点总结

未达门槛审查权重塑了中国经营者集中制度:规模不再是唯一关口。就2026年而言,任何支配或具战略地位企业对早期创新者的收购——尤其在平台、人工智能、半导体或生物医药领域——都应按”审查其对未来竞争的影响”来规划,并据此构建证据案卷。

Sources

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market

  • Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
    数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范,该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。
  • Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
    巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查,即便标的规模小或尚无营收。
  • VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
    采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖;”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。
  • Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
    在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济,正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
    截至2026年,审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态,以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。
  • Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
    准入者应预判:任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购,都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

The Platform Antitrust Framework

China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.

Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review

Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:

  • Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
  • Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
  • Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
  • Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).

These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.

VIE Structures Are In Scope

A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.

Substantive Theories SAMR Applies

In platform cases SAMR weighs:

  • Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
  • Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
  • Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
  • Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.

Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.

2026 Trajectory

Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:

  • Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
  • AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
  • Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.

The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
  2. Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
  3. Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
  4. Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
  5. Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.

Stakes

Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.


中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

平台反垄断框架

中国转向平台经济反垄断,以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场,阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时,如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言,定义的不是 bare AML 文本,而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。

平台并购为何受到更高审查

平台收购引发独特关切:

  • 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者,可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
  • 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河,并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
  • 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
  • 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品(见下篇)。

这些理论意味着,市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠,更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。

VIE 结构在管辖之内

一种长期误解认为可变利益实体(VIE)结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确:采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查,达标须申报,且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞,并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。

市场监管总局适用的实质理论

在平台案件中,市场监管总局考量:

  • 跨边市场界定(如匹配、支付、配送),承认多边性;
  • 支配地位,由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断;
  • 消除潜在竞争,包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购;
  • 纵向封阻,即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。

结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济,如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。

2026年走向

至2026年,平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至:

  • 算法驱动的整合,合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切;
  • 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购,就加深护城河进行评估;
  • 超级应用生态,就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。

其内在逻辑是:平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判,而不只看今日的份额。

准入者实务指引

  1. 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
  2. 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
  3. 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
  4. 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免;达标即申报。
  5. 标的涉大规模或重要数据时,统筹数据安全审查。

利害关系

误判审查的平台交易,面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济,或被禁止。无论外资还是内资,陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作,是审慎之道。

Sources

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice

  • A concentration is notifiable to SAMR when the parties’ turnover meets the State Council thresholds; the deal is suspensory and cannot close before clearance.
    当各方营业额达到国务院标准时,集中须向市场监管总局申报;交易具有暂停效力,获批前不得交割。
  • The State Council raised the notification thresholds in its 2024 revision, recalibrating the global and China turnover benchmarks to current economic scale.
    国务院在2024年修订中上调了申报标准,使全球及中国营业额基准与当前经济规模重新校准。
  • SAMR operates a simplified (简易) procedure for non-issue, non-rivalrous transactions, materially shortening review time versus the standard track.
    市场监管总局对无非竞争关切的集中适用简易程序,相较标准程序显著缩短审查时间。
  • The 2022 AML introduced a stop-the-clock (停钟) mechanism; incomplete filings or further-review needs pause the statutory clock.
    2022年《反垄断法》引入”停钟”机制;申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限暂停计算。
  • Gun-jumping—closing or integrating before clearance—draws substantially higher fines under the 2022 amendments, making procedural discipline essential.
    抢跑——在获批前交割或整合——依2022年修订面临显著提高的罚款,程序纪律因而至关重要。
  • As of 2026, expect tighter scrutiny of minority acquisitions that confer decisive influence and of filings’ substantive accuracy.
    截至2026年,须预期对赋予决定性影响的少数股权收购,以及申报实质准确性,将受到更严审视。

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice | 中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

When a Filing Is Required

Under the 《反垄断法》 and SAMR’s implementing rules, a “concentration” ( merger; acquisition of control; or acquisition of decisive influence over another undertaking) must be notified where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s thresholds. The original thresholds, set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, turned on combined global turnover and China turnover. In its 2024 revision, the State Council raised these thresholds to reflect China’s enlarged economic scale—reducing filings for routine small deals while keeping strategically significant transactions within scope. Because the precise figures are set by State Council regulation and periodically adjusted, deal teams should confirm the current thresholds against the latest SAMR guidance at the time of signing.

The Suspensory Principle

The cardinal rule: a notifiable concentration is suspensory. The parties may sign, but they may not implement the concentration—no control change, no asset integration, no voting-rights exercise—until SAMR clears it. Premature implementation (“gun-jumping”) is an independent violation under the 2022 AML, carrying far higher fines than under the prior regime. This makes the filing not a formality but a gating condition in the SPA.

Two Procedures: Standard and Simplified

SAMR administers two tracks:

TrackApplicabilityTypical duration
Standard (普通)Likely competitive concerns or complex factsUp to 30 days initial + extended phase
Simplified (简易)No substantive concern; e.g., low combined share, non-competitors, passive minorityMaterially shorter, often cleared within the initial phase

The simplified procedure applies where the combined market share is low, the parties are not actual or potential competitors in the same market, or the acquisition is a passive minority stake. Choosing the correct track—and presenting a clean, complete file—directly affects clearance speed.

The Stop-the-Clock Mechanism

A defining feature of the 2022 AML is the stop-the-clock (停钟) rule, operationalised in SAMR’s 经营者集中审查规定. The statutory review clock pauses when:

  • The notifying party fails to provide required materials and SAMR requests supplementation; or
  • A circumstance arises requiring further review (e.g., third-party opposition, new evidence).

Practically, a careless or incomplete filing can double the effective timeline. Diligent, complete first submission is the cheapest insurance against clock-stoppage.

Substantive Assessment

SAMR assesses whether the concentration would eliminate or restrict competition, considering market share, concentration ratios, entry barriers, efficiencies, and failing-firm defences. Remedies—structural (divestiture) or behavioural (access, non-discrimination)—may be imposed. For market entrants, the key is to demonstrate that the combination does not foreclose rivals or raise barriers in the relevant China market.

2026 Filing Practice

Entering 2026, SAMR’s practice shows:

  • Tighter look at “decisive influence” acquisitions—minority stakes that nonetheless confer control-like influence are caught.
  • Greater demands for data accuracy in notifications, with scrutiny of market definition.
  • Continued use of simplified procedure for clean, non-rivalrous deals, keeping routine inbound acquisitions efficient.
  • Coordination with security and data reviews where the target sits in a sensitive sector.

Practical Steps for Filers

  1. Screen early. Test the transaction against current thresholds at term-sheet stage.
  2. Choose the track correctly. Mislabeling a standard case as simplified invites rejection and delay.
  3. Prepare a complete file. Accurate turnover, market definition, and supporting evidence prevent clock-stoppage.
  4. Sequence with other regimes. Where security or data review applies, align filing timelines.
  5. Contractual protection. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and allocate gun-jumping risk in the SPA.

Exposure and Remedies

Beyond clearance denial, SAMR may unwind completed unlawful concentrations and impose turnover-based fines. The 2022 amendments raised these ceilings, and responsible individuals can be penalised. For foreign acquirers, disciplined filing practice—correct track, complete file, no pre-clearance integration—is the difference between a routine clearance and a value-destroying remediation.


中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

何时需要申报

依据《反垄断法》及市场监管总局实施规则,”经营者集中”(合并;取得控制权;或取得对其他经营者的决定性影响)于各方营业额达到国务院标准时须申报。原始门槛由国务院2008年规定设定,以合计全球营业额与中国营业额为准。在2024年修订中,国务院上调了这些门槛,以反映中国扩大的经济规模——在减少常规小规模交易申报的同时,将具有战略意义的交易保留在范围内。由于具体数字由国务院规定设定并定期调整,交易团队应在签约时对照市场监管总局最新指引确认现行门槛。

暂停原则

首要规则是:须申报的集中具有暂停效力。各方可以签约,但在市场监管总局批准前,不得实施集中——不得变更控制、不得整合资产、不得行使表决权。提前实施(”抢跑”)依2022年《反垄断法》构成独立违法,罚款远高于此前制度。这使得申报不再是形式,而是协议中的一项先决条件。

两种程序:标准与简易

市场监管总局设有两条路径:

路径适用情形通常时长
标准(普通)可能存在竞争关切或事实复杂初始30日+延长阶段
简易无非实质关切,如合计份额低、非竞争者、被动少数股权显著更短,常在初始阶段内审结

简易程序适用于合计市场份额低、各方非同一市场现实或潜在竞争者,或收购为被动少数股权等情形。选择正确的路径并提交干净、完整的案卷,直接影响获批速度。

停钟机制

2022年《反垄断法》的标志性特征是“停钟”规则,由市场监管总局《经营者集中审查规定》落实。在以下情形,法定审查时限暂停:

  • 申报方未提供所需材料,市场监管总局要求补充;或
  • 出现需进一步审查的情形(如第三方异议、新证据)。

实践中,草率或不完整的申报可能使实际时间表翻倍。勤勉、完整地首次提交,是防止停钟最廉价的保障。

实质审查

市场监管总局评估集中是否排除、限制竞争,考量市场份额、集中度、进入壁垒、效率及困境企业抗辩等。可能附加救济——结构性(剥离)或行为性(开放接入、非歧视)。对准入者而言,关键在于证明该结合不会在中国相关市场封阻竞争对手或抬高壁垒。

2026年申报实践

进入2026年,市场监管总局的实践显示:

  • 对”决定性影响”收购审查更严——虽为少数股权但赋予类控制性影响的交易亦被纳入。
  • 对申报数据准确性要求更高,并审视市场界定。
  • 继续对干净、非竞争类交易适用简易程序,使常规 inbound 收购保持高效。
  • 与安全和数据审查统筹,当标的位于敏感行业时。

申报者实务步骤

  1. 尽早筛查。 在条款书阶段即对照现行门槛测试交易。
  2. 正确选择路径。 将标准案件误标为简易将招致退回与延误。
  3. 备妥完整案卷。 准确的营业额、市场界定及佐证可防止停钟。
  4. 与其他制度统筹。 如涉及安全或数据审查,须对齐申报时间表。
  5. 合同保护。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,并在协议中分配抢跑风险。

风险与救济

除不予批准外,市场监管总局可撤销已完成的违法集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。2022年修订提高了这些上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外国收购方而言,纪律化的申报实践——正确路径、完整案卷、获批前不整合——决定着是顺利获批还是陷入摧毁价值的补救。

Sources

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework

  • China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
    中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石,主要由市场监管总局执行,其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。
  • Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
    经营者集中具有暂停效力:达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割,而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。
  • The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
    2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制,提高了处罚幅度,并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。
  • The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
    2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断,与市场准入壁垒直接相关。
  • As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
    截至2026年,执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议,以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。
  • Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
    外资投资者进入中国市场时,应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

The Statutory Foundation

China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.

Three Pillars of Enforcement

  1. Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
  2. Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
  3. Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.

For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.

Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover

A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.

The 2022 Amendments: What Changed

The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:

  • Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
  • Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
  • Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
  • “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.

These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.

Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus

SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.

Fair Competition Review and Market Entry

The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.

Practical Compliance for Entrants

  1. Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
  2. Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
  3. Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
  4. Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
  5. Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.

Penalties and Exposure

Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.


中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

法律基础

中国竞争法是《反垄断法》,于2007年通过,2022年作重大修订,修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中,并授权国家市场监督管理总局(市场监管总局)作为国家级主要执法机构,会同省级市场监管部门执法。

执法的三大支柱

  1. 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
  2. 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位(如不公平定价、排他、搭售)。
  3. 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。

对市场准入者而言,三者均具意义:第一项管控交易,第二项约束市场行为,第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。

经营者集中:暂停效力且以营业额为触发

“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权,以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时,交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛(由国务院2008年规定设定,并于2024年修订中上调)以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大,在减少小规模交易申报的同时,仍将战略性交易纳入范围。

2022年修订:变化何在

2022年修订显著加强了制度:

  • 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限可暂停,从而延长实际审查时间。
  • 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制,将面临显著提高的罚款。
  • 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素,并提高处罚。
  • 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口,由市场监管总局指引落实。

这些变化意味着,时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。

平台经济与行为监管重点

市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架:”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年,市场监管总局持续关注平台行为,以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。

公平竞争审查与市场准入

《公平竞争审查条例》(2024年8月1日施行)要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言,这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时,公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致,却是一条被认可的救济路径。

准入者实务合规

  1. 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
  2. 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表;在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
  3. 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款,避免触犯行为规则。
  4. 监测支配力指标;若份额超过约50%,须以更高谨慎对待行为。
  5. 遇地方规则阻碍准入时,运用公平竞争审查。

处罚与风险敞口

违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言,暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织,使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题,而非后台形式。

Sources

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots

  • The State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly calls for expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steadily advancing international medical services pilots.
    国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出”推动医疗领域有序扩大开放,进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点,稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点”。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots now cover nine locations — Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and all of Hainan — with foreign hospitals landing in 2026 (e.g. Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital).
    外商独资医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛 9 个地方,2026 年外资医院加速落地(如鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院)。
  • Value-added telecoms opening continues at scale: 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals since February 2025, covering all ten value-added telecom business categories, and foreign-invested telecom enterprises nationwide exceed 3,100.
    增值电信开放持续推进:2025 年 2 月以来已有 166 家外资企业获经营试点批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务;全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家。
  • Education, finance and services opening are broadening in parallel: nine new services-opening comprehensive pilot cities since 2025, foreign vocational training pilots, and more foreign institutions using fund-investment and risk-management tools.
    教育、金融等服务业开放同步拓宽:2025 年以来服务业扩大开放综合试点新增 9 个城市,推进职业技能培训开放试点,支持外资机构运用基金投顾与风险管理工具。
  • The National Health Plan also advances innovation-drug and medical-device channels, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs, and AI-enabled pharma value chains — relevant to foreign pharma and device companies entering China.
    《国民健康”十五五”规划》还推进创新药械审评审批、商业保险覆盖创新药、人工智能赋能医药全产业链,对进入中国的外资药械企业直接相关。
  • For foreign investors, the practical takeaway is that sector restrictions are being dismantled industry by industry through pilots: confirm whether the target sector is in an expanded pilot, prepare the sectoral licence application early, and use the provincial commerce one-stop channels.
    对外国投资者,实操要点是分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除:确认目标行业是否在扩容试点内、尽早准备行业牌照申请、善用省级商务一站式通道。

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots | 2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

Why this matters now

China’s sector restrictions on foreign investment are being dismantled industry by industry through pilot programmes rather than through a single omnibus measure. Three tracks are moving in parallel in 2026. First, healthcare: the State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly supports expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and advancing international medical services pilots, and wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots already cover nine locations. Second, telecoms: the value-added telecoms pilot has issued approvals to 166 foreign enterprises since February 2025, covering all ten value-added categories. Third, education and finance: the services-opening comprehensive pilots added nine new cities in 2025, and the utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports foreign vocational training institutions, fund-investment advisory and risk-management tools for foreign institutions. For foreign companies whose target sector still carries restrictions, the operative question is which pilot applies and how the licence process runs. This article maps the 2026 sector-opening landscape.

Healthcare: hospital and pharma channels

The National Health 15th Five-Year Plan, issued under Guo Fa [2026] No. 23, directs orderly expansion of medical-sector opening, further expansion of the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steady advancement of international medical services pilots. The hospital pilot already covers Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and the whole of Hainan. Foreign hospital groups have been landing: Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital and Nanjing Hanmei Viti Cosmetic Hospital are cited as examples of foreign-invested hospitals entering the market. The plan also supports optimised review and approval for innovative and clinically urgent drugs, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs and medical devices, and AI-enabled pharma value chains. For foreign pharma and device companies, the plan signals sustained demand-side support for innovative products alongside the supply-side opening of hospital ownership.

Telecoms: the value-added pilot at scale

The value-added telecoms pilot, launched in October 2024 in Beijing (services opening-up comprehensive demonstration zone), the Shanghai FTZ Lin-gang New Area and Shanghai’s socialist modernisation leading zone, Hainan Free Trade Port and Shenzhen’s socialist demonstration zone, removed foreign shareholding caps on specified value-added services including internet data centres (IDC), content delivery networks (CDN), internet access services (ISP), online data processing and transaction processing, and information publication platform services. Since the first batch of approvals in February 2025, 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals, and some wholly foreign-owned enterprises have obtained IDC qualifications — relevant for AI data-centre investment. Nationwide, foreign-invested telecom enterprises exceed 3,100, covering all ten value-added categories under the Telecommunications Business Classification Catalogue. The utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports continuing and expanding the pilot.

Education and finance

Education opening is advancing through the services-opening comprehensive pilots, which added nine new cities in 2025, and through the action plan’s commitment to steadily expand pilots for foreign vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science, engineering, agriculture and medicine universities. In finance, the action plan supports more foreign institutions using risk-management tools including government bond futures, foreign institutions carrying out fund-investment advisory business, and facilitation of cross-border business for key foreign-invested enterprises. These items matter for foreign financial institutions and education groups assessing entry.

How sector pilots actually run

Each pilot follows the same shape: a national policy statement names the sector and the pilot regions; the competent ministry (NHSA/MOFCOM for hospitals, MIIT for telecoms, MOE for education) issues implementation rules; provincial authorities process applications; and foreign enterprises apply for the sectoral licence or approval. For hospitals, the provincial health commission and commerce department jointly review the establishment; for value-added telecoms, MIIT issues the pilot approval and the enterprise obtains the value-added telecom business licence (ICP/EDI) locally; for education, the MOE approves cooperative or independent institutions. Timing differs: hospital establishment can take months of review; telecoms approvals have been issued in batches; education approvals follow the MOE’s periodic batches.

Practical steps

First, verify the target sector’s current restriction level: full opening, pilot opening, conditional or prohibited. Second, where a pilot applies, confirm the pilot region covers the planned location and that the business line is within the pilot’s service scope. Third, prepare the sectoral application package: for hospitals, the feasibility study, qualifications of the foreign hospital group, and the cooperation or independent-establishment plan; for telecoms, the corporate structure demonstrating shareholding compliance and the security assessment materials; for education, the partner credentials and curriculum plan. Fourth, engage the provincial commerce department’s one-stop window and the competent ministry’s pre-communication channel early. Fifth, monitor pilot expansion announcements — hospital, biotech and telecom expansions are explicitly in the pipeline.

Compliance notes

Sector pilots do not remove all restrictions: negative-list limits still apply to fields outside the pilots, and each licence carries conditions (e.g. service scope, foreign shareholding, security review for telecoms). The National Health Plan is a planning document; implementing rules for hospital and international medical pilots will follow from the competent authorities. Foreign investors should not assume that a pilot in one region extends to others, and should confirm current regional scope before committing.


2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

为什么当下重要

中国对外资的分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除,而非依赖一部一揽子法规。2026 年有三条线并行推进。其一,医疗:国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点,外商独资医院试点已覆盖 9 个地方。其二,电信:增值电信开放试点自 2025 年 2 月以来已向 166 家外资企业发放经营批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务。其三,教育与金融:服务业扩大开放综合试点 2025 年新增 9 个城市,稳外资行动方案支持外资职业技能培训机构、基金投顾业务与风险管理工具。对目标行业仍带限制的外国公司,操作性问题在于适用哪个试点、牌照流程如何运转。本文梳理 2026 年分行业开放版图。

医疗:医院与药械通道

《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)部署推动医疗领域有序扩大开放、进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点。医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛。外资医院集团加速落地:鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院、南京韩美维媞整形医院被作为外资医院进入市场的案例提及。规划还支持优化创新药和临床急需药品审评审批、商业健康保险覆盖创新药械、人工智能赋能医药全产业链。对外资药械企业,规划在供给侧开放医院股权的同时,提供需求侧对创新产品的持续支持信号。

电信:增值电信试点规模化

增值电信开放试点于 2024 年 10 月在北京(服务业扩大开放综合示范区)、上海自贸试验区临港新片区及社会主义现代化建设引领区、海南自由贸易港、深圳中国特色社会主义先行示范区启动,取消互联网数据中心(IDC)、内容分发网络(CDN)、互联网接入服务(ISP)、在线数据处理与交易处理、信息发布平台服务等指定增值业务的外资股比限制。自 2025 年 2 月首批批复以来,已有 166 家外资企业获试点批复,部分全外资企业取得 IDC 资质——这对 AI 数据中心投资具有参照价值。全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家,经营范围覆盖《电信业务分类目录》全部 10 项增值电信业务。稳外资行动方案支持继续推进并扩大试点。

教育与金融

教育开放依托服务业扩大开放综合试点(2025 年新增 9 个城市)与行动方案关于稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学开放试点的承诺推进。金融端,行动方案支持更多外资机构运用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、优化重点外资企业跨境业务管理。这些对外资金融机构与教育集团评估进入都直接相关。

试点如何实际运转

各试点遵循同一形态:国家政策文件点名行业与试点区域;主管部委(医院为卫生健康部门与商务部、电信为工信部、教育为教育部)发布实施细则;省级部门处理申请;外资企业申办行业牌照或批复。医院由省卫健委与商务部门联合审查设立;增值电信由工信部核发试点批复、企业再就地申领增值电信业务许可证(ICP/EDI);教育由教育部审批合作或独立机构。时序不同:医院设立审查可能长达数月;电信批复分批发放;教育审批跟随教育部周期性批次。

实操步骤

其一,核验目标行业当前限制级别:全面开放、试点开放、有条件开放还是禁止。其二,适用试点的,确认试点区域覆盖计划地点且业务线在试点业务范围内。其三,准备行业申请材料:医院为可行性研究、外资医院集团资质、合作或独立设立方案;电信为企业架构证明股比合规与安全评估材料;教育为伙伴资质与课程方案。其四,尽早对接省商务部门一站式窗口与主管部委的预沟通渠道。其五,紧盯试点扩容公告——医院、生物技术、电信扩容明确在推进之列。

合规提示

行业试点并未消除全部限制:试点之外领域仍适用负面清单限制,每张牌照都附带条件(如业务范围、外资股比、电信安全审查)。《国民健康”十五五”规划》是规划性文件,医院与国际医疗试点的实施细则将由主管机关后续出台。外资投资者不应假设一地的试点扩展至其他地区,投入前应确认现行区域范围。

Sources

Sector Restrictions After Manufacturing Zeroing: Where Foreign Capital Can (and Cannot) Go in 2026

  • China’s unified Market Access Negative List (2025 edition) was cut to 106 items, down from 117 in 2022, while the foreign-investment access list stands at 29 national items with manufacturing fully zeroed.
    中国统一市场准入负面清单(2025版)由2022版117项减至106项,外资准入负面清单全国版保留29项、制造业全面清零。
  • The 2026 policy emphasis has shifted from manufacturing to services: telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare are the next opening fronts.
    2026年政策重点由制造业转向服务业:电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗成为下一开放重点。
  • The “Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment” action plan (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) anchors services opening — vocational training, finance, pharmaceuticals — and the move from “access” to “operation.”
    《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)锚定服务业开放——职业培训、金融、医药——并从”准入”转向”准营”。
  • A cross-border services negative list and pilot zones (telecom, biotech, wholly-foreign-owned hospitals) are the operational channels for new openings.
    跨境服务贸易负面清单与试点区域(电信、生物技术、外商独资医院)是新开放的操作通道。
  • Sector restrictions live in two lists: the market-access list (binds all entities) and the foreign-investment list (adds foreign-capital limits) — screen both.
    行业限制存在于两张清单:市场准入清单(约束所有主体)与外资准入清单(叠加外资限制)——须双查。
  • Practical step: map the target sector against both lists, use pilot zones for services openings, and track the 2026 action plan’s rollout.
    实操建议:将目标行业对照两张清单,服务业开放走试点区,并跟踪2026年行动方案落地。

Sector Restrictions After Manufacturing Zeroing: Where Foreign Capital Can (and Cannot) Go in 2026 | 制造业清零后的行业限制:2026年外资可进与禁区

China’s foreign-investment access regime now rests on a clear pivot: manufacturing restrictions are fully zeroed, and the policy centre of gravity has moved to services. For a foreign investor, the practical question is no longer “is manufacturing open?” but “which services sectors, through which channels, and under what pilots?” This article maps the current sector-restriction landscape.

The two-list architecture

Two parallel negative lists govern access:

  1. Market Access Negative List (市场准入负面清单) — binds every business form equally inside China. The 2025 edition (NDRC, MOFCOM, SAMR; Fa Gai Ti Gai Gui [2025] No. 466, issued 24 April 2025) cut items from 117 (2022) to 106, with national sub-measures falling from 486 to 469 and local measures from 36 to 20.
  2. Foreign Investment Access Negative List (外商投资准入负面清单) — adds foreign-capital-specific sector limits on top. As of 2026 it stands at 29 national items (27 in pilot free-trade zones). Critically, all manufacturing-sector restrictions are zeroed — the first industry fully liberalised.

The message of the 2025 market-access list is that items outside the list must be genuinely open; a barrier clean-up campaign publicly notifies typical cases and builds a rectification loop to remove “glass doors” beyond the list.

Manufacturing zeroed, services next

At a March 2026 State Council briefing, NDRC confirmed the foreign-investment list at 29 national / 27 FTZ items and signalled that the next phase focuses on services — telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare to be opened “orderly.” The *15th Five-Year Plan* outline reinforces this: with the manufacturing access cleared, the focus is “expanding market access and opening in services.”

The 2026 action plan: services in detail

The *Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment* (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) turns the services priority into concrete measures:

  • Deepening services opening: steadily expand pilot opening of vocational-skill training institutions, vocational schools and high-level polytechnic/agricultural/medical universities; upgrade Beijing’s services-opening demonstration zone; broaden CEPA for Hong Kong and Macao.
  • Financial services: more foreign institutions using risk-management tools (including government-bond futures), foreign-institution fund-investment advisory, cross-border financing facilitation, and pre-communication for onshore listings.
  • Pharmaceuticals: drug segment-manufacturing rules, broader biotechnology and wholly-foreign-owned-hospital pilot zones, innovative-device insurance coverage.

A 22 June 2026 State Council Information Office briefing framed the plan as moving from “access” to “operation” — fixing the “big door open, small door closed” problem through services opening and national treatment.

Operational channels for new openings

New services openings proceed through defined channels:

  • Cross-border services negative list. MOFCOM is improving the cross-border services-trade negative-list management system and orderly expanding autonomous opening in telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare; value-added telecom, biotech and wholly-foreign-owned-hospital pilots continue and broaden.
  • Pilot zones. Designated pilot free-trade zones and services-opening demonstration cities trial field-level data-export negative lists and sector openings; apply there rather than assuming nationwide access.
  • National treatment. The plan commits to equal application of pro-enterprise support policies to foreign firms (except where laws clearly provide otherwise or national security is involved), and fair-competition review in government procurement and bidding.

Practical steps

  1. Screen both lists. Confirm the sector is outside — or acceptably inside — both the market-access and foreign-investment negative lists.
  2. Use the pilot pathway. Telecom, medical, education and biotech openings run via pilot zones; pursue them there.
  3. Watch CEPA and Beijing. Hong Kong/Macao investors and Beijing demonstration-zone players get earlier access.
  4. Plan for operation, not just access. Post-entry, align with data-security, Anti-Monopoly and tax obligations early.
  5. Track the action plan rollout. The 2026 plan’s measures phase in; monitor which zones are designated and when approvals open.

制造业清零后的行业限制:2026年外资可进与禁区

中国外资准入制度现已明确转折:制造业限制全面清零,政策重心转向服务业。对外国投资者而言,实际问题不再是”制造业是否开放?”,而是”哪些服务业、经哪些通道、在何种试点下开放?”。本文勾勒当前行业限制格局。

双清单架构

两张并行负面清单治理准入:

  1. 市场准入负面清单——对中国境内各类经营主体一体适用。2025版(国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局;发改体改规〔2025〕466号,2025年4月24日印发)由2022版117项减至106项,全国性措施由486条减至469条,地方性措施由36条减至20条。
  2. 外商投资准入负面清单——在其上叠加外资专项行业限制。截至2026年全国版保留29项(自贸试验区版27项)。关键突破:制造业领域限制全面清零——首个全面开放的产业。

2025版市场准入清单的信号是:清单之外必须真放开;准入壁垒清理行动公开通报典型案例,并建立整改闭环以清除清单之外的”玻璃门”。

制造业清零、服务业接棒

在2026年3月国务院政策吹风会上,国家发展改革委确认外资准入清单全国版29项、自贸试验区版27项,并预示下一阶段以服务业为重点,推动电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗”有序”扩大开放。”十五五”规划纲要强化此点:制造业准入清除后,重点转向”扩大服务业市场准入和开放领域”。

2026年行动方案:服务业的细节

《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)将服务业优先转为具体措施:

  • 深化服务业开放: 稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点;提升北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区;拓宽对港澳CEPA。
  • 金融业: 更多外资机构利用含国债期货的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、跨境融资便利化、上市申报前预沟通。
  • 医药: 药品分段生产细则、扩大生物技术与外商独资医院试点区域、创新药械纳入保险。

2026年6月22日国新办发布会将该方案定位于从”准入”转向”准营”——以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”。

新开放的操作通道

新服务业开放经明确通道推进:

  • 跨境服务贸易负面清单。 商务部完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,有序扩大电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗自主开放;增值电信、生物技术、外商独资医院试点持续扩围。
  • 试点区域。 指定自贸试验区与服务业开放示范城市试点字段级数据出境负面清单与行业开放;应在试点区申请,而非假设全国放开。
  • 国民待遇。 方案承诺涉企支持政策对外资企业平等适用(法律明确规定或涉国家安全者除外),并在政府采购与招投标中落实公平竞争审查。

实操步骤

  1. 双清单筛查。 确认行业处于两张清单的”之外”或”可承受之内”。
  2. 走试点路径。 电信、医疗、教育、生物技术开放经试点区推进;应在试点区申请。
  3. 关注CEPA与北京。 港澳投资者与北京示范区主体获更早准入。
  4. 谋准营非仅准入。 进入后尽早对齐数据安全、反垄断与税务义务。
  5. 跟踪方案落地。 2026年方案措施分批推出;关注哪些区域被指定、何时开放审批。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • 106 vs 29: market-access list 106 items (2025); foreign-investment list 29 national, manufacturing zeroed.
    106对比29:市场准入清单106项(2025);外资清单全国29项,制造业清零。
  • Services are the front: telecom, internet, education, culture, healthcare open “orderly” post-manufacturing zeroing.
    服务业是前沿:制造业清零后电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗”有序”开放。
  • Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97: the plan that operationalises services opening and “access to operation.”
    商资发〔2026〕97号:落地服务业开放、从准入到准营的方案。
  • Two channels: cross-border services negative list + pilot zones (telecom, biotech, WFOE hospitals).
    两条通道:跨境服务贸易负面清单加试点区(电信、生物技术、外商独资医院)。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming nationwide services access: pilot-zone openings are not automatic national licences.
    以为服务业全国放开:试点区开放非自动全国牌照。
  • Screening only one list: missing the foreign-investment-specific limit risks a blocked entry.
    只查一张清单:漏掉外资专项限制可能致准入受阻。
  • Stopping at access: “big door open, small door closed” is solved by operation readiness, not approval alone.
    止于准入:”大门开、小门不开”靠准营准备解决,非仅靠批文。

Sources

Manufacturing Fully Open to Foreign Investment

  • As of the 2024 negative list, manufacturing is fully open to foreign investment with no remaining restricted entries.
    自 2024 年版负面清单起,制造业全面向外资产开放,已无残留受限条目。
  • Foreign investors may wholly own manufacturing WFOEs in China without an equity cap or prior approval for access.
    外资可全资持有在华制造外商独资企业,无需股比上限或准入事前审批。
  • The opening was delivered by deleting the entire “manufacturing” category from the negative list, not by partial relaxation.
    开放是通过从负面清单中删除整个”制造业”类别实现的,而非部分放松。
  • What remains for a manufacturer is ordinary licensing — environmental, safety, product and operating permits — not foreign-access limits.
    制造企业仍需面对的是常规许可——环保、安全、产品与经营许可——而非外资准入限制。
  • Sensitive sub-items touching defense, rare earths or critical tech may still draw security review or export-control scrutiny.
    触及国防、稀土或关键技术的敏感子项仍可能招致安全审查或出口管制审视。
  • Free-trade zones add incentives (tax, bonded logistics) on top of the national full-access baseline for manufacturers.
    自贸区在全国全面开放基线之上,为制造企业提供激励(税收、保税物流等)。
  • 2026 is about executing manufacturing entry efficiently — site selection, licensing and supply-chain setup — not clearing an access cap.
    2026 年的重点在于高效执行制造进入——选址、许可与供应链搭建——而非清掉准入上限。

Manufacturing Fully Open to Foreign Investment | 制造业全面向外资开放

The headline: manufacturing is off the list

The single clearest fact for an industrial investor in 2026 is that manufacturing in China is fully open to foreign investment. The 2024 negative list (《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》, effective 1 November 2024) deleted the entire “manufacturing” (制造业) category. For the first time, there is no manufacturing entry on the foreign-investment negative list. A foreign investor may establish or acquire a manufacturing business and hold 100% ownership without a foreign-equity cap and without a foreign-access prior approval.

This is the endpoint of a multi-year sequence. Earlier lists had already removed caps in automobiles, shipbuilding, aircraft, and power equipment; the 2024 list finished the job by clearing the category altogether. The practical meaning: if you make physical goods, the access question is, for almost all products, already answered in your favor.

What “fully open” does and does not mean

“Fully open” means no foreign-equity restriction and no negative-list access approval. It does not mean “no regulation.” A manufacturing foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) is still incorporated through the normal company-registration channel, still submits the foreign-investment information report, and still needs the ordinary licences any Chinese manufacturer needs. The access gate is gone; the operating gates are not.

Those operating gates include: business-licence scope, environmental impact approval or filing, work-safety permits, product-quality and compulsory-certification (CCC) where applicable, and sector-specific permits (e.g., for food, drugs, medical devices, chemicals). These apply to domestic and foreign firms alike. The disciplined manufacturer maps them early; they, not the negative list, are where timelines are won or lost.

The path from approval to filing

For a typical unrestricted manufacturing WFOE, the sequence in 2026 is straightforward: screen the sector (off the list), reserve the name, incorporate via SAMR / the local market-regulation bureau using the one-network channel, submit the initial foreign-investment information report, open bank and foreign-exchange accounts, and obtain the relevant operating permits. No commerce-department approval sits in the path. The only ex-ante state reviews that could apply are national security review (for control-acquiring deals in covered defense/important sectors) and SAMR merger control (for transactions above turnover thresholds) — ordinary greenfield manufacturing is generally outside both.

Sensitive manufacturing sub-items

Full access is the default, but a few manufacturing-adjacent situations still draw scrutiny:

  • Defense and dual-use: manufacturing tied to national defense or dual-use items may trigger security review or export-control and technology-transfer rules.
  • Rare earths and key resources: processing and separation tied to rare earths and certain critical materials retain conditions and strategic control.
  • Critical technology: transactions involving important data, core technology, or critical information infrastructure may draw cybersecurity and security review.

These are edges, not the main field. A standard consumer-goods, components, machinery or electronics manufacturer is unaffected. The investor should confirm only that its specific product does not fall into a sensitive corner before assuming full access.

Why this matters for supply-chain strategy

Full manufacturing access reshapes how foreign groups use China. A wholly owned plant can serve the domestic market, export, and integrate into a regional supply chain without a local joint-venture partner imposed by law. This supports several 2026 strategies:

  • Local-for-local: own the plant that serves Chinese customers, protecting process and brand control.
  • Export platform: use China as a cost-competitive, fully foreign-owned export base.
  • R&D plus manufacturing: co-locate a WFOE factory with an R&D entity, with no ownership cap on either.
  • FTZ upside: layer FTZ incentives (tax, bonded logistics, streamlined customs) on top of the national full-access baseline.

The removal of the cap is therefore not merely symbolic; it changes the feasible ownership and operating models.

Free-trade zones add a layer

Although manufacturing is open nationwide, FTZs still add value for manufacturers through incentives rather than access. Bonded logistics, streamlined customs (e.g., the two-step declaration and AEO facilitation), tax treatments, and integrated service counters can lower the cost and time of a manufacturing operation. For a foreign manufacturer, the access decision is settled; the location decision then weighs incentives, logistics and talent. Hainan Free Trade Port and leading FTZs are natural candidates where the product and supply chain fit.

A 2026 manufacturing-entry checklist

  1. Confirm the product is off the negative list — for manufacturing, this is the baseline assumption, but verify no sensitive sub-item applies.
  2. Choose ownership — a 100% WFOE is permissible; a joint venture is optional, not required.
  3. Incorporate via the one-network channel and submit the initial foreign-investment information report.
  4. Map operating permits — environmental, safety, CCC, and sector licences — and start them early.
  5. Screen security review and merger control only if acquiring control of a covered or large business.
  6. Evaluate FTZ/Hainan incentives for logistics, tax and customs benefits.
  7. Set up the supply chain — import/export, bonded options, and local sourcing — within the opened framework.

Manufacturing is the part of China market entry where the hardest question — “may I own it?” — already has a clear answer. The 2026 work is the softer but decisive work of execution: licensing, siting, and supply chain.


制造业全面向外资开放

核心结论:制造业已移出清单

2026 年工业投资者最清晰的事实是:中国制造业已全面向外资产开放。2024 年版负面清单(《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》,2024 年 11 月 1 日施行)删除了整个”制造业”类别。这是首次,外资负面清单上已无制造业条目。外资可设立或收购制造企业并持有 100% 股权,既无外资股比上限,亦无外资准入事前审批。

这是多年序列的终点。更早的清单已取消汽车、船舶、飞机及电力设备的股比上限;2024 版通过清空整个类别完成收尾。其实际含义是:若你生产实物商品,对几乎所有产品,准入问题已朝有利于你的方向解决。

“全面开放”的含义与边界

“全面开放”意味着无外资股比限制、无负面清单准入审批。它不意味着”无监管”。制造类外商投资企业仍须经普通公司登记渠道设立,仍须报送外商投资信息报告,仍须取得任何中资制造商都需要的常规许可。准入关卡已去,经营关卡未去。

这些经营关卡包括:经营范围、环评审批或备案、安全生产许可、适用时的产品质量与强制性产品认证(CCC),以及行业特定许可(如食品、药品、医疗器械、化学品)。这些对内资外资企业一体适用。纪律严明的制造商尽早梳理它们;成败所在正是这些,而非负面清单。

从审批到备案的路径

对典型的不受限制造业外商独资企业,2026 年的序列直截了当:筛查行业(清单外)、名称预留、经市场监管局一网通办渠道设立、报送外商投资初始信息报告、开立银行与外汇账户、取得相关经营许可。路径中无商务部门审批。可能适用的唯一事前国家审查是国家安全审查(受覆盖国防/重要领域取得控制权的交易)与 SAMR 经营者集中(达营业额阈值的交易)——普通绿地制造一般均不在此列。

敏感的制造子项

全面开放是默认,但少数制造相邻情形仍受审视:

  • 国防与两用:关联国防或两用品的制造可能触发安全审查或出口管制与技术转让规则。
  • 稀土与关键资源:关联稀土及若干关键材料的加工与分离保留条件与战略管控。
  • 关键技术:涉及重要数据、核心技术或关键信息基础设施的交易可能招致网络安全与安全审查。

这些是边角,而非主战场。标准的消费品、零部件、机械或电子制造商不受影响。投资者仅需确认其具体产品不落入敏感角落,即可假定全面开放。

这对供应链战略的意义

制造全面开放重塑了外资集团运用中国的方式。全资工厂可服务国内市场、出口,并融入区域供应链,而无需法律强加的本地合资伙伴。这支撑若干 2026 战略:

  • 本地供本地:持有服务中国客户的工厂,保护工艺与品牌控制。
  • 出口平台:将中国作为成本竞争力强、全资持有的出口基地。
  • 研发加制造:将外商独资企业工厂与研发实体同址,二者均无持股上限。
  • 自贸区加成:在全国全面开放基线之上叠加自贸区激励(税收、保税物流、简化海关)。

取消上限因此不唯象征;它改变了可行的所有体与运营模型。

自贸区叠加一层

尽管制造业全国开放,自贸区仍通过激励而非准入为制造商增值。保税物流、简化海关(如两步申报与 AEO 便利)、税收处理及综合服务窗口,可降低制造运营的成本与时间。对外资制造商,准入决定已定;选址决定继而权衡激励、物流与人才。在产品与供应链契合时,海南自贸港与领先自贸区是自然候选。

2026 年制造进入清单

  1. 确认产品不在负面清单上:对制造业,这是基线假定,但仍须核实无敏感子项适用。
  2. 选择所有体:100% 外商独资被允许;合资可选,非必须。
  3. 经一网通办设立并报送外商投资初始信息报告。
  4. 梳理经营许可:环保、安全、CCC 及行业许可,尽早启动。
  5. 仅当取得受覆盖或大型企业控制权时,筛查安全审查与经营者集中。
  6. 评估自贸区/海南激励:物流、税收与海关收益。
  7. 在开放框架下搭建供应链:进出口、保税选项与本地采购。

制造业是中国市场进入中”我能否持有?”这一最难问题已有明答的部分。2026 年的工作,是许可、选址与供应链这些更软却更决定性的执行工作。

Sources

Telecom and Finance Opening to Foreign Investment

  • Most financial sub-sectors are now fully open to foreign ownership after caps were removed in 2020–2021.
    随着 2020—2021 年股比上限取消,多数金融子行业已全面向外资产开放。
  • Value-added telecom services have been further opened in designated pilot areas rather than nationwide at once.
    增值电信业务在指定的试点地区进一步开放,而非一次性全国放开。
  • Foreign banks, securities, fund-management and insurance firms enter via licensing with the financial regulators, not the negative list alone.
    外资银行、证券、基金管理与保险机构经金融监管部门许可进入,而非仅靠负面清单。
  • Pilot zones — Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan, Shenzhen and others — host the deepest telecom opening experiments.
    北京、上海、海南、深圳等地作为试点片区,承载最深的电信开放试验。
  • Data, cybersecurity and content rules still shape how far and how foreign telecom services may operate.
    数据、网络安全与内容规则仍决定外资电信业务可运营的范围与方式。
  • A foreign financial institution still clears prudential licensing and, for control deals, SAMR merger control.
    外资金融机构仍须通过审慎许可,且取得控制权的交易须过 SAMR 经营者集中审查。
  • 2026 is about implementing and deepening the openings already made, especially in cross-border services and pilots.
    2026 年的重点在于落实并深化既有开放,尤其是跨境服务与试点领域。

Telecom and Finance Opening to Foreign Investment | 电信与金融业扩大对外资开放

Two fronts of service-sector opening

If manufacturing is fully open and the negative list’s residue sits in services, then telecom and finance are the two highest-profile service fronts. They differ in mechanism. Financial opening was delivered mainly through removing foreign-ownership caps in successive negative-list revisions and corresponding regulatory changes, now largely complete. Telecom opening is being delivered more cautiously through pilot zones and incremental licence liberalization, because it touches networks, data and content. For a 2026 entrant, the two require different playbooks.

Financial opening: caps removed, licensing remains

The decisive step came in 2020–2021, when China removed foreign-equity caps in banking, securities, fund management, futures and life insurance. Today a foreign investor may, in principle, wholly own a bank, securities firm, fund manager, futures company or life insurer in China. The removal is reflected in the negative list, which no longer carries those caps for most financial sub-sectors.

But “no cap” is not “no gate.” A foreign financial institution still requires a prudential licence from the relevant regulator — the financial regulatory administration for banks and insurance, and the securities regulator for securities, funds and futures. Licensing tests capital, fitness of shareholders, risk systems and business plans; it is a substantive review, not a formality. For a controlling acquisition, SAMR merger control also applies if thresholds are met. The 2026 task for a foreign financial group is therefore execution: choose the vehicle (wholly foreign-owned, joint venture, or stake in an existing licensee), meet the prudential bar, and clear merger control where relevant.

Telecom: pilot-led, incremental

Telecom is opened differently. The negative list still caps or conditions certain value-added telecom (增值电信) services, and the operating licence (增值电信业务经营许可证) is issued by MIIT and its provincial offices. Rather than lifting all caps at once, the state has used pilot areas to widen access: designated localities — including Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan and Shenzhen, among others — have been authorized to relax foreign-equity conditions for selected value-added telecom services. The pattern is the familiar pilot-then-nationalize logic applied to networks.

For an investor, this means location is decisive. A value-added telecom service that is capped nationally may be open to foreign majority or full ownership inside a pilot locality. The investor should confirm, for the specific service and locality, whether the pilot authorization applies, and should expect to operate under the pilot’s terms (often including data-localization and cybersecurity obligations).

Why telecom stays cautious

The caution is structural. Telecom networks and the data they carry intersect with critical information infrastructure, cybersecurity review, and content regulation. Even where foreign equity is permitted, the licence and the operating environment impose obligations: data handling consistent with the data-security and personal-information-protection framework, cybersecurity review for covered transactions, and content compliance for any user-facing service. A foreign telecom investor should budget for these non-equity constraints as carefully as for the ownership question.

The overlap with the negative list and the market-access list

Both sectors also sit under the market-access negative list. A foreign-invested bank or telecom operator is “open” on the foreign list but still needs the ordinary licence that applies to all players. The two-screen discipline from earlier articles applies: clear the foreign-access condition (often now “none” in finance, or “pilot-dependent” in telecom), then clear the operating licence that everyone faces. Missing the second screen is the most common cause of a stalled launch.

Pilot zones as the 2026 frontier

The 2026 action is concentrated in pilots. Designated service-opening pilot cities and the FTZs continue to trial wider foreign participation in value-added telecom and selected financial services, including cross-border services from pilots. Hainan Free Trade Port and the Lingang New Area carry bespoke measures. The investor’s edge is to track these pilots annually: a service open only in a pilot this year may be open nationally within a revision or two, and entering the pilot now can secure a first-mover position.

A 2026 entry checklist

  1. Finance: confirm the sub-sector cap is removed; choose vehicle; prepare the prudential licence application; screen merger control for control deals.
  2. Telecom: identify the exact value-added service; check the national cap; test Beijing/Shanghai/Hainan/Shenzhen pilot availability; prepare the MIIT licence and data/cybersecurity plan.
  3. Both: clear the market-access negative list licence that applies to all investors.
  4. Both: plan for ongoing prudential supervision, reporting and inspection.
  5. Both: watch pilot expansions annually and position for nationalization.

Telecom and finance show China’s two speeds of opening: finance flipped the switch on ownership and now runs on licensing; telecom eases in through pilots while guarding networks and data. The 2026 investor succeeds by matching the playbook to the sector.


电信与金融业扩大对外资开放

服务业开放的两大前沿

若制造业已全面开放,而负面清单的残留集中于服务业,则电信与金融便是服务业主最瞩目的两大前沿。二者机制不同。金融开放主要通过连续负面清单修订及相应监管变更取消外资股比上限来实现,如今大体完成。电信开放则通过试点片区与渐进式许可放开更为审慎地推进,因其触及网络、数据与内容。对 2026 年进入者,二者需要不同打法。

金融开放:上限已撤,许可仍在

决定性一步发生于 2020—2021 年,中国取消了银行、证券、基金管理、期货及寿险的外资股比上限。如今外资原则上可全资持有中国的银行、证券公司、基金管理人、期货公司或寿险公司。这一取消体现于负面清单——多数金融子行业已不再载有该等上限。

但”无上限”不等于”无门槛”。外资金融机构仍须取得相关监管者的审慎许可——银行与保险归金融监管总局,证券、基金与期货归证券监管机构。许可审查资本、股东适格性、风险体系与业务计划,属实质审查而非形式。对取得控制权的收购,若达阈值还须通过 SAMR 经营者集中审查。因此 2026 年外资金融集团的任务是执行:选择载体(外商独资、合资,或入股既有持牌机构),满足审慎标准,并在相关时通过经营者集中审查。

电信:以试点引领,渐进放开

电信的放开方式不同。负面清单仍对若干增值电信业务设限或附加条件,经营许可证(增值电信业务经营许可证)由工信部及省级机构核发。国家未一次性取消所有上限,而是以试点地区拓宽准入:包括北京、上海、海南、深圳等在内的指定地方,被授权对选定增值电信业务放宽外资股权条件。这正是熟悉的”先试点、后全国”逻辑应用于网络。

对投资者而言,这意味着选址具决定性。全国受限的增值电信业务,在试点地方可能向外方多数或全资开放。投资者应就具体业务与地点,确认试点授权是否适用,并预期在试点条款下运营(通常含数据本地化与网络安全义务)。

电信为何保持审慎

审慎是结构性的。电信网络及其承载的数据,与关键信息基础设施、网络安全审查及内容监管相交。即便允许外资股权,许可与运营环境仍设义务:符合数据安全与个人信息保护框架的数据处理、受覆盖交易的网络安全审查、以及任何面向用户服务的内容合规。外资电信投资者应如同对待持股问题一样,审慎为这些非股权约束预留预算。

与负面清单及市场准入清单的交叠

两行业亦处于市场准入负面清单之下。外商投资银行或电信运营商在”外资清单”上”开放”,仍须取得面向所有参与者的常规许可。前文的两屏纪律在此适用:清掉外资准入条件(金融如今常为”无”,电信则为”视试点而定”),再清掉人人面对的经营许可。漏掉第二屏,是启动受阻最常见的原因。

作为 2026 前沿的试点片区

2026 年的动作集中在试点。指定的服务业开放试点城市与自贸区持续试验增值电信与若干金融服务的更宽外资参与,含自试点的跨境服务。海南自贸港与临港新片区承载定制措施。投资者优势在于每年跟踪这些试点:今年仅于试点开放的某服务,可能在一两次修订内全国开放,而此刻进入试点可抢占先发位。

2026 年进入清单

  1. 金融:确认子行业上限已撤;选载体;备审慎许可申请;对控制权交易筛查经营者集中。
  2. 电信:识别确切增值业务;查全国上限;测试北京/上海/海南/深圳试点可用性;备工信部许可与数据/网络安全方案。
  3. 二者:清掉面向所有投资者的市场准入负面清单许可。
  4. 二者:规划持续的审慎监管、报告与检查。
  5. 二者:每年关注试点扩围,并为全国化布局。

电信与金融展现了中国开放的两种速度:金融在持股上拨动开关,如今运行于许可之上;电信经试点渐进放松,同时守护网络与数据。2026 年投资者成功之道,在于让打法匹配行业。

Sources

How China’s Negative List Has Cut Sector Restrictions

  • China’s foreign-investment negative list has been shortened in every major revision since 2013, with entries falling from over 100 to about 30.
    中国外资负面清单自 2013 年起历次重大修订持续缩减,条目由百余项降至约 30 项。
  • The 2024 version deleted the entire manufacturing category, making manufacturing fully open to foreign investment.
    2024 年版删除了整个制造业类别,使制造业全面向外资产开放。
  • Each cut follows a pattern: pilot an opening in free-trade zones, then write it into the national list.
    每次缩减都遵循同一路径:先在自贸区试点开放,再写入全国清单。
  • Remaining restrictions are concentrated in services, content, data, and national-security-sensitive fields.
    保留的限制集中于服务业、内容、数据及国家安全敏感领域。
  • The market-access negative list (all investors) has also been streamlined, easing permissions beyond foreign capital.
    面向所有投资者的市场准入负面清单同样被精简,放宽了外资之外的许可。
  • 2026 is a year of consolidation and implementation rather than a dramatic new list, with services the next frontier.
    2026 年是整合与落地之年,而非推出惊新清单之年,服务业是下一前沿。
  • Investors should track annual revisions, because a zone pilot today can become a national right within a year or two.
    投资者应跟踪每年修订,因为今日的片区试点可能在一两年内成为全国权利。

How China’s Negative List Has Cut Sector Restrictions | 负面清单如何持续缩减行业限制

The negative list as a reform instrument

China’s negative list for foreign investment is more than a compliance document; it is the central instrument of a decade-long opening strategy. Before the list era, foreign access was governed by a “guiding catalogue” that steered investment by encouragement, restriction and prohibition, administered through case-by-case approval. The shift to a negative list — piloted in the Shanghai FTZ in 2013 and made national in 2017 — inverted the logic: everything is permitted except what the list names. Each annual or biennial revision has, with rare exceptions, removed entries rather than added them.

The list’s power is its visibility. A shrinking list is a measurable, government-committed signal of opening, and it gives investors a single place to verify access. For 2026 planning, understanding the trajectory matters as much as reading the current text.

The decade of cuts

The national foreign-investment negative list has been shortened repeatedly. Early versions (2017–2018) carried well over 60 restricted entries; subsequent revisions cut financial and manufacturing limits; the 2020 and 2021 versions removed foreign-ownership caps in banking, securities, fund management, futures and life insurance; and the 2024 version went furthest by deleting the entire manufacturing category. Across this arc, the entry count fell from more than 100 to roughly 30, with the reductions concentrated in manufacturing and finance and the residue in services and sensitivity.

The manufacturing story is the cleanest illustration. Items that once capped foreign ownership in automobiles, power, and various industrial sub-sectors were removed step by step; by the 2024 list, no manufacturing entry remained. The message to investors is unambiguous: if you make goods, you may own the Chinese operation outright.

The pilot-then-nationalize mechanism

Almost every national cut began as a free-trade-zone experiment. The FTZ negative list has always been shorter than the national one, and items proven manageable inside a zone — a relaxed equity cap, a newly opened sub-sector — are written into the next national revision. This mechanism de-risks liberalization for the regulator and creates a predictable pipeline for investors: watch the FTZ list and Hainan/Lingang carve-outs, because they preview the national list of the near future.

The cadence is regular enough to plan around. A sector opened in a leading zone in one year is a credible candidate for the national list within one to two revisions. Investors who enter via the zone pilot thus often get a head start and, later, the option to operate nationwide under the same opening.

What remains, and why

The residue after a decade of cuts is not random. It clusters in areas where the state weighs non-economic concerns:

  • Content and ideology: news, publishing, broadcast production/distribution, and certain internet culture remain closed or tightly capped.
  • Data and security: items touching critical information infrastructure, important data, and cybersecurity review retain conditions.
  • Strategic resources and defense: rare earths, certain resource processing, and defense-related investment stay restricted, with national-security review as a backstop.
  • Selected services: a few transport, telecom and professional-service sub-sectors keep equity or control conditions.

These are the “hard edges” of the list. They are unlikely to vanish in a single revision; movement there is incremental and tied to broader policy judgments.

The market-access negative list, in parallel

While the foreign-investment list governs capital origin, the market-access negative list governs permissions for all investors. It, too, has been streamlined in successive versions (including the 2025 edition), removing or simplifying licences and approvals that apply to domestic firms and foreigners alike. The two lists together define the true barrier to operation: the foreign list says who may own, the market-access list says what anyone must permit. An investor tracking only the foreign list will miss the second half of the picture.

The 2026 posture

For 2026, the realistic posture is consolidation and implementation, not a dramatic new list. The 2024 manufacturing opening and the earlier financial liberalization are still bedding in; regulators are focused on making the existing openings work — clearer licence conditions, faster filings, wider inform-and-commit, and better data sharing. Services liberalization continues at the margin (telecom and a few professional services), often first in pilots. The investor takeaway: the big, list-level openings have largely been made; the 2026 gains come from executing within them efficiently and watching zone pilots for the next wave.

Tracking the list: a habit, not an event

  1. Read the current national list (2024) as baseline and confirm no 2025/2026 supplement alters your sector.
  2. Read the FTZ list and Hainan/Lingang carve-outs for previews of future national openings.
  3. Map the market-access negative list to capture all-investor permissions.
  4. Note the restriction form (cap, control, licence) so you can structure the deal.
  5. Set an annual review — negative lists are revised; a closed sector this year may open next.
  6. Pair with security review and merger control screening for control-acquiring transactions.

The negative list is a living document. The investors who benefit most are those who treat its annual shrinkage as a planning input, not a one-time check.


负面清单如何持续缩减行业限制

作为改革工具的负面清单

中国外资负面清单不只是一份合规文件,更是十年开放战略的核心工具。在清单时代之前,外资准入由”指导目录”以鼓励、限制、禁止来引导,并通过逐案审批管理。转向负面清单——2013 年于上海自贸区试点、2017 年推向全国——颠覆了逻辑:除清单列名者外,一切皆许。此后每年或每两年一次的修订,除极少数例外,均在移除条目而非增列。

清单的力量在于其可见性。一份缩短的清单是可度量、由政府承诺的开放信号,并为投资者提供单一核验入口。对 2026 年规划而言,理解其轨迹与阅读现行文本同等重要。

十年的缩减

全国外资负面清单历经反复缩短。早期版本(2017—2018)含 60 余项受限条目;后续修订削减金融与制造限制;2020 与 2021 版取消了银行、证券、基金管理、期货及寿险的外资股比上限;2024 版走得更远,删除了整个制造业类别。在此弧线上,条目数由百余项降至约 30 项,削减集中于制造业与金融,残留于服务业与敏感性领域。

制造业故事最为清晰。曾对外资在汽车、电力及若干工业子行业设限的条目被逐步移除;至 2024 版,已无制造业条目残留。向投资者传递的信息明确无误:若你从事货物制造,可全资持有中国运营实体。

先试点、后全国的机制

几乎每一次全国缩减都始于自贸区试验。自贸区负面清单始终比全国版更短,区内验证可控的条目——放宽的股比上限、新开放的子行业——被写入下一版全国修订。该机制为监管者降低了放开风险,也为投资者提供了可预测管道:关注自贸区清单与海南/临港特别安排,因为它们预示不远的未来全国清单。

其节奏规律到足以据此规划。某行业在领先片区一年开放,便是一至两次修订内进入全国清单的可信候选。经片区试点进入的投资者因此常获先发优势,日后更可在同一开放下于全国经营。

保留之物及其缘由

十年削减后的残留并非随机,而聚集于国家权衡非经济关切之处:

  • 内容与意识形态:新闻、出版、广播制作/发行及部分网络文化仍封闭或严限。
  • 数据与安全:触及关键信息基础设施、重要数据与网络安全审查的事项保留条件。
  • 战略资源与国防:稀土、部分资源加工及涉国防投资仍受限,并以安全审查为兜底。
  • 部分服务业:少数运输、电信与专业服务子行业保留股权或控制条件。

这些即清单的”硬边”。它们不太可能于单次修订中消失;那里的动作是渐进的,并系于更广泛的政策判断。

并行的市场准入负面清单

当外资清单规范资本来源时,市场准入负面清单规范面向所有投资者的许可。它亦在连续版本(含 2025 年版)中被精简,移除或简化面向内外资一体的许可与审批。两份清单共同定义真正的经营壁垒:外资清单说”谁可持有”,市场准入清单说”任何人都须许可什么”。仅盯外资清单的投资者会错过图景的另一半。

2026 年姿态

对 2026 年,务实姿态是整合与落地,而非推出惊新清单。2024 年制造业开放与早前金融放开仍在消化;监管者聚焦于让既有开放生效——更清晰的许可条件、更快的备案、更广的告知承诺、更佳的数据共享。服务业开放在边际推进(电信与若干专业服务),且常先于试点。投资者要点:清单层面的大开放大多已完成;2026 年的收益来自在其中高效执行,并关注片区试点以迎接下一波。

跟踪清单:一种习惯,而非一次事件

  1. 以现行全国清单(2024)为基线,并确认无 2025/2026 补充改动你的行业。
  2. 阅读自贸区清单与海南/临港特别安排,以预览未来全国开放。
  3. 梳理市场准入负面清单,捕捉面向所有投资者的许可。
  4. 记录限制形式(上限、控股、许可),以便设计交易。
  5. 设定年度复核:负面清单会修订;今年封闭的行业明年可能开放。
  6. 结合安全审查与经营者集中筛查取得控制权的交易。

负面清单是一份”活文件”。受益最多的投资者,是将其逐年缩减视为规划输入,而非一次性检查的人。

Sources