Tag Archives: Sector Restrictions

RCEP beyond tariffs: services commitments, investment negative lists and natural-person mobility

  • RCEP services commitments run on two tracks: seven of the fifteen members scheduled on a negative list, while China and the other seven used a positive list and must convert within six years of entry into force.
    RCEP服务贸易承诺采用两种模式并行:15个成员中7个以负面清单方式承诺,中国等其余8个成员采用正面清单,并须在协定生效后6年内转化为负面清单。
  • China’s services schedule is the highest in any of its FTAs — 22 sectors added to the roughly 100 bound at WTO accession, with improved terms in 37 more.
    中方服务贸易开放承诺达到已有自贸协定的最高水平——在入世承诺约100个部门基础上新增22个部门,并提高37个部门的承诺水平。
  • All fifteen used a negative list for investment in five non-services areas — China’s first negative-list investment commitment under any FTA.
    15方均以负面清单方式对5个非服务业领域投资作出承诺,这是中国首次在自贸协定项下以负面清单形式对投资领域作出承诺。
  • The natural-person mobility chapter reaches beyond service suppliers to investors, intra-corporate transferees, contractual service suppliers and accompanying spouses and dependants.
    自然人移动章的适用范围扩展至服务提供者以外的投资者、公司内部流动人员、合同服务提供者及随行配偶和家属。
  • The revised Foreign Trade Law, in force 1 March 2026, establishes a cross-border services trade negative list in Article 31 — the statutory step towards that conversion.
    2026年3月1日施行的新版《对外贸易法》第三十一条确立跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,是履行转换承诺的立法步骤。
  • That list is not the free trade zone foreign-investment list: it targets cross-border services and binds domestic and foreign-invested operators alike, while Article 38 makes data security a mandatory duty.
    该清单不同于自贸试验区外商投资负面清单:它聚焦跨境服务贸易,对境内企业与外资企业一体适用;同法第三十八条将数据安全保护列为强制义务。

RCEP beyond tariffs: services commitments, investment negative lists and natural-person mobility | RCEP 的关税之外:服务贸易承诺、投资负面清单与自然人移动

Overview: Three Chapters Beyond the Tariff Schedule

Most RCEP briefings stop at duty rates and origin rules — important, and covered separately. But a manufacturer that has already secured preferential duty still needs to know whether it can own the logistics subsidiary, bill an affiliate for design work done in Shanghai, and station a project lead in Suzhou for eighteen months. Those answers sit in three other chapters — and in 2026 they moved.

Services: Two Tracks, One Six-Year Deadline

RCEP has fifteen members and accepted two scheduling techniques at once. Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia scheduled on a negative list. China and the remaining seven used a positive list and committed to convert to a negative list within six years of entry into force. All fifteen pitched commitments above the level of their respective “10+1” ASEAN agreements. For services firms, that conversion deadline is the most consequential date in the agreement.

What China Actually Opened

MOFCOM’s Department of International Trade describes China’s schedule as the highest level of any Chinese FTA to date. On top of roughly 100 sectors bound at WTO accession, it adds 22 sectors — R&D, management consulting, manufacturing-related services and air transport among them — and raises commitments in 37, including finance, legal services, construction and maritime transport. Other members committed at high levels in the sectors China pressed hardest: construction, medical services, real estate, finance and transport.

Investment: China’s First Negative List Bound in a Treaty

Here there was no split. All fifteen members used a negative list, covering five non-services areas: manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fisheries and mining. Restrictions must be written down to survive, which lifts policy transparency region-wide.

For China the step was structural: the first time China committed to investment on a negative-list basis under any free trade agreement, reinforcing the domestic “pre-establishment national treatment plus negative list” regime and locking in successive reductions of the foreign investment access list. The chapter also carries investment promotion, facilitation and dispute settlement provisions, and prohibits performance requirements such as forced technology transfer.

Natural-Person Mobility: Who Can Actually Travel

Members undertake that, where conditions are met, investors, intra-corporate transferees, contractual service suppliers, and accompanying spouses and dependants may obtain a defined period of stay and visa facilitation. Earlier agreements typically covered service suppliers only; RCEP extends coverage to every category of natural person who might move across borders under the agreement, at a level generally exceeding members’ existing FTA practice.

Rules the “10+1” Agreements Did Not Reach

RCEP brought in intellectual property, electronic commerce, competition and government procurement, plus cooperation provisions for SMEs. Three items matter to foreign investors:

  • Digital trade rules for the first time — data flows, electronic authentication and signatures, online consumer protection, network security.
  • A prohibition of zeroing, added on top of WTO rules for the first time, disciplining regional trade remedy disputes.
  • An IP chapter spanning copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, patents, designs, genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore.

Members must also operate a “single window” coordinating declaration, inspection and release digitally. The payoff is measurable: road transport from Lang Son to Nanning fell from eight hours to four, a Brunei-to-Qinzhou “fruit express” runs 72 hours door to door, and Vietnamese assemblers counting Chinese-origin inputs towards regional value report supply-chain cost reductions of roughly 15%.

2026: The Commitment Becomes Statute

The revised Foreign Trade Law, promulgated 27 December 2025 and in force 1 March 2026, is where the conversion enters domestic law. Article 27 restates the four modes of services trade — cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and movement of natural persons. Article 31 then establishes, for the first time in a Chinese statute, a cross-border services trade negative list management system covering the three modes other than commercial presence, which remains governed by the Foreign Investment Law.

Zhang Jianping, Director of the Centre for Regional Economic Studies at MOFCOM’s research academy, reads this as a significant step in China’s performance of its RCEP obligations. The instrument was piloted first — the Hainan Free Trade Port issued China’s first cross-border services trade negative list — and elevated to national law only once the experience proved manageable.

Why This Is Not the Free Trade Zone List

PointFTZ foreign-investment listCross-border services list (Art. 31)
Subject matterForeign investment, all industriesCross-border services trade
Who is boundForeign-invested enterprisesDomestic and foreign operators alike
Legal rankAdministrative measuresStatute

Three consequences follow: higher legal rank, wider scope, clearer rights and obligations. A Chinese engineering-services exporter and a foreign cross-border software supplier now sit under one framework.

New Duties in the Same Law

Article 38 makes data security protection a mandatory duty of foreign trade operators, read with the Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection Law and outbound transfer assessment requirements. Cross-border delivery businesses need a working chain of data classification and grading, transfer security assessment and incident response. Article 32(2) lets the competent department bar an infringer from importing relevant goods where imported goods infringe IP and harm foreign trade order; Article 34 targets rights-holder abuse such as compulsory package licensing and no-challenge clauses. The law also brings digital trade and green trade into legal scope for the first time.

The 2026 Policy Pipeline

MOFCOM’s 2026 deployment runs the same way: refine the cross-border services trade negative list system, open the services market in orderly fashion, build demonstration zones for services trade innovation, launch a national digital trade demonstration zone, and digitalise services outsourcing. On agreements, work proceeds with the GCC, Switzerland, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pacific island countries, Central Asian and African countries, with investment treaty negotiations accelerated along Belt and Road routes.

The *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising the Use of Foreign Investment* (Shangzifa [2026] No. 97, MOFCOM, NDRC and the Ministry of Finance, 16 June 2026) adds fifteen measures: deeper services opening, including a CEPA upgrade with the Hong Kong SAR and the Macao SAR; financial opening, with foreign institutions able to use risk tools including treasury bond futures; support for free trade pilot zones and services-opening pilot cities in exploring outbound data negative lists; and the tax incentive for reinvestment of distributed profits.

Wang Ya of MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Investment Administration frames the structure plainly: services already absorb around 70% of actual foreign investment used; manufacturing access restrictions are fully removed; and the emphasis now is on ensuring foreign investors can both enter and operate in already-opened fields.

What to do next

  1. Locate your business in the right chapter. Selling across the border is services trade under Article 31; setting up an entity is investment under the Foreign Investment Law.
  2. Track the conversion, not just today’s list. Sectors absent from the current schedule may open without any new treaty.
  3. Read the counterpart schedules. Others’ construction, medical, real estate, finance and transport commitments are where outbound service revenue sits.
  4. Use the mobility chapter deliberately. Investors, transferees, contractual suppliers and accompanying family are separate categories with separate conditions.
  5. Build the data chain before first delivery. Article 38 makes this a duty; and note the ratchet — removed restrictions lock in at the more open level.

Related Reading

Tariff reductions, origin rules, cumulative origin and authorised exporters are covered in our separate RCEP articles.


RCEP 的关税之外:服务贸易承诺、投资负面清单与自然人移动

概览:关税表之外的三章

多数RCEP解读止步于税率与原产地规则——两者都很重要,本站另有专文。但一家已拿到进项优惠关税的制造企业,仍要回答更难的问题:能否自己持有物流子公司?能否就在上海完成的设计工作向境外关联方开票?能否让一名项目负责人在苏州驻场十八个月?答案在另外三章之中,而这三章在2026年出现了实质进展。

服务贸易:两种模式与6年期限

RCEP共15个成员,服务贸易章同时接受两种承诺方式。日本、韩国、澳大利亚、新加坡、文莱、马来西亚、印度尼西亚7个成员采用负面清单方式承诺;中国等其余8个成员采用正面清单承诺,并将于协定生效后6年内转化为负面清单。15方均作出了高于各自”10+1″自贸协定水平的开放承诺。对服务业企业而言,这一转换期限是协定中最关键的时间点。

中方究竟开放了什么

按商务部国际司的解读口径,中方服务贸易开放承诺达到了已有自贸协定的最高水平:在中国入世承诺约100个部门的基础上,新增22个部门(研发、管理咨询、制造业相关服务、空运等),并提高37个部门的承诺水平(金融、法律、建筑、海运等)。其他成员则在中方重点关注的建筑、医疗、房地产、金融、运输等服务部门作出高水平开放承诺。

投资:中国首次以负面清单形式作出的协定承诺

投资章没有”双轨”。15方均采用负面清单方式,对制造业、农业、林业、渔业、采矿业5个非服务业领域投资作出较高水平开放承诺。限制措施必须写明才能保留,各方政策透明度由此大大提高。

对中国而言这一步具有制度性意义:这是中国首次在自贸协定项下以负面清单形式对投资领域作出承诺,对完善国内”准入前国民待遇加负面清单”管理制度、锁定压缩外资准入负面清单的改革成果、扩大市场准入具有重要意义。该章同时强化投资保护,明确投资促进、投资便利化及争端解决条款,并禁止强制技术转让等业绩要求。

自然人移动:谁真的可以流动

各方承诺:对区域内各国的投资者、公司内部流动人员、合同服务提供者、随行配偶及家属等各类商业人员,在符合条件情况下可获得一定居留期限、享受签证便利。以往协定通常只覆盖服务提供者;RCEP将适用范围扩展至协定下所有可能跨境流动的自然人类别,总体水平基本超过各成员在现有自贸协定缔约实践中的承诺水平。

“10+1″协定未覆盖的规则

RCEP拓展了原”10+1″自贸协定的规则涵盖领域,纳入知识产权、电子商务、竞争、政府采购等议题。其中三项对外资企业尤为重要:

  • 首次纳入数字贸易规则——数据流动、电子认证与签名、在线消费者保护、网络安全。
  • 在WTO规则基础上首次纳入”禁止归零”条款,为区域内贸易摩擦提供更规范的解决路径。
  • 知识产权章涵盖著作权、商标、地理标志、专利、外观设计、遗传资源、传统知识和民间文艺等内容。

协定还要求成员国建立”单一窗口“制度,实现货物申报、查验、放行全流程数字化协同。效果可量化:越南谅山至南宁跨境公路运输时间从8小时压缩至4小时,文莱至钦州港”水果快线”实现72小时直达;越南组装方将中国进口零部件价值纳入区域价值累积后,整体供应链成本可降低约15%。

2026年:承诺落为法律

2025年12月27日公布、2026年3月1日起施行的新版《对外贸易法》,是这项转换进入国内法的节点。第二十七条重申服务贸易四种模式——跨境交付、境外消费、商业存在、自然人移动;第三十一条首次以法律形式确立跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,覆盖商业存在以外的三种模式,商业存在仍适用《外商投资法》等规定。

商务部研究院区域经济研究中心主任张建平指出,此举是中国履行RCEP承诺的重要进展——修订后的《对外贸易法》表明中国正积极落实6年转换规定。该制度先行试点——海南自贸港推出全国首张跨境服务贸易负面清单,在风险可控、管理可行基础上总结经验后上升为国家法律。

它不是自贸试验区那张清单

比较项自贸试验区外商投资负面清单跨境服务贸易负面清单(第31条)
适用事项外商投资,涵盖所有产业跨境服务贸易
约束对象外商投资企业境内企业与外资企业一体适用
效力层级管理措施法律

由此产生三大核心价值:效力层级提升、适用范围扩容、权利义务明确。中国工程服务出口商与跨境交付软件的境外供应商,如今同处一套制度框架。

同一部法律中的新增义务

开放同时带来义务。第三十八条将”遵守数据安全保护规定”列为对外贸易经营者的强制义务,需与《数据安全法》《个人信息保护法》衔接并履行数据出境安全评估义务;跨境交付型企业须建立”数据分类分级+跨境传输安全评估+安全事件应急处置“全流程机制。第三十二条第二款规定进口货物侵犯知识产权并危害对外贸易秩序的,国务院对外贸易主管部门可采取在一定期限内禁止侵权人生产、销售的有关货物进口等措施;第三十四条禁止权利人实施”强制性一揽子许可””阻止被许可人质疑知识产权有效性”等滥用行为。新法还首次将数字贸易和绿色贸易纳入法律规范。

2026年的政策链条

商务部2026年工作部署方向一致:完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,有序推进服务市场开放,建设服务贸易创新发展示范区,启动建设国家数字贸易示范区,推动服务外包数字化转型。协定层面,持续推进与海合会、瑞士、韩国、新西兰、太平洋岛国、中亚及非洲国家的自贸合作,并以共建”一带一路”国家为重点加快推进投资协定谈判。

商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部于2026年6月16日印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)以15条举措予以支撑:深化服务业领域开放,推动全面升级内地与中国香港、中国澳门的CEPA;稳步提升金融业开放水平,支持外资机构利用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具;支持自贸试验区、国家服务业扩大开放试点城市探索在更多领域制定数据出境负面清单;落实境外投资者以分配利润直接投资税收优惠政策。

商务部外国投资管理司负责人王亚点明了结构性事实:服务业在实际使用外资中的比重已达七成;制造业领域外资准入限制已全面取消;当前重点是在已开放领域保障外商投资”既准入又准营“。

下一步建议

  1. 先判断业务落在哪一章。 跨境销售属第三十一条项下的服务贸易;设立主体属《外商投资法》项下的投资,测试标准与清单各不相同。
  2. 盯住转换进程,而非仅看当下清单。 现行承诺表未列的部门,可能无需新协定即被开放。
  3. 同时研读对方承诺表。 其他成员在建筑、医疗、房地产、金融、运输的承诺,正是对外服务收入所在。
  4. 有针对性地使用自然人移动章。 投资者、公司内部流动人员、合同服务提供者与随行家属属不同类别,条件各异。
  5. 在首次交付前搭好数据链条。 第三十八条使其成为法定义务;并注意”棘轮”效应——已取消的限制将锁定在更开放水平。

延伸阅读

关税减让、原产地规则、原产地累积与经核准出口商,见本站关于RCEP关税红利与原产地规则的单独文章。

Sources

Vehicle Catalogues and Emission Rules: What August 2026 Brings for Automakers and Suppliers in China

  • On 12 August 2026, the MIIT published Announcement No. 21 of 2026, releasing Batch 409 of the catalogue of road motor-vehicle manufacturers and products together with the NEV catalogues for vehicle/vessel tax relief and purchase-tax exemption.
    2026 年 8 月 12 日,工信部发布 2026 年第 21 号公告,公布《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品》(第 409 批)以及车船税减免、车辆购置税减免的新能源汽车车型目录。
  • Batch 409 includes 478 NEV product models across 217 manufacturers and 210 brands, with battery-electric models dominating at 415 units.
    第 409 批共 217 家企业、210 个品牌、478 个新能源产品型号列入,其中纯电动产品 415 个。
  • From 1 August 2026, the Emission Full-Chain Supervision and Administration Implementing Rules took effect, requiring third-generation connected OBD on new fuel vehicles and an 8-year/160,000-km quality guarantee for emission-critical components.
    2026 年 8 月 1 日起《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》施行,要求燃油新车标配第三代远程 OBD,排放核心部件质保 8 年或 16 万公里。
  • The rules follow a “new cars, new standards; old cars, old standards” principle, so existing fuel vehicles are not retrofitted or forced into scrappage.
    新规坚持”新车新标准、老车老标准”,存量燃油车不追溯改造、不强制淘汰。
  • For foreign-invested automakers and parts suppliers, the August 2026 combination of catalogue approvals, purchase-tax relief lists and stricter emissions governance defines the compliance and market-access picture for the second half of the year.
    对外资车企与零部件供应商,2026 年 8 月的目录许可、购置税减免名单与更严排放监管共同界定了下半年的合规与市场准入图景。

Vehicle Catalogues and Emission Rules: What August 2026 Brings for Automakers and Suppliers in China | 车辆公告目录与排放新规:2026 年 8 月对在华车企与供应商意味着什么

Why this matters now

Two August 2026 developments together define the near-term regulatory picture for China’s automotive sector. On 12 August 2026, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published Announcement No. 21 of 2026, releasing Batch 409 of the Road Motor-Vehicle Manufacturers and Products catalogue, along with the 88th catalogue of energy-saving and new-energy vehicle models enjoying vehicle/vessel tax relief and the 33rd catalogue of new-energy vehicle models exempt from vehicle purchase tax. Separately, the Emission Full-Chain Supervision and Administration Implementing Rules (《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》), jointly issued by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the MIIT and the SAMR, took effect nationwide on 1 August 2026. For foreign-invested original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and parts suppliers, these two instruments determine which products can be sold, which models qualify for tax relief, and what engineering and warranty obligations attach to new fuel vehicles.

Batch 409 and the tax-relief catalogues

The MIIT catalogue announcement performs a dual licensing function: it approves road-vehicle manufacturers and products, and it confirms which models qualify for vehicle/vessel tax relief and NEV purchase-tax exemption. Batch 409 was coordinated with the State Taxation Administration. According to industry analysis of the batch, 478 NEV product models from 217 enterprises and 210 brands passed technical review, including 415 battery-electric products, 56 plug-in hybrids, 6 fuel-cell products and 1 methanol product; commercial and special-purpose vehicles dominate, reflecting the industrial mix. For a foreign brand or a joint-venture OEM, inclusion of a model in the catalogue is a precondition for sale, and inclusion in the purchase-tax exemption catalogue is a direct factor in retail pricing. The catalogue system is therefore both a market-access gate and a pricing lever.

The emission full-chain rules

The emission rules, effective 1 August 2026, adopt a “new cars, new standards; old cars, old standards” principle. Vehicles already registered before 1 August 2026 — regardless of China-4, China-5 or China-6 emission standard — keep their existing inspection cycles, local transfer rights and driving rules; there is no mandatory retrofitting, scrappage or blanket travel restriction. The new requirements apply to fuel vehicles produced after 1 August 2026 and to cross-provincial transfers of used fuel vehicles from that date. The key obligations for new fuel vehicles are: mandatory third-generation connected OBD systems that upload emissions, engine and fuel-evaporation data in real time to the national supervision platform; an extended quality guarantee of 8 years or 160,000 km for emission-critical components such as three-way catalytic converters, particulate filters (GPF) and oxygen sensors; and stricter factory emission-consistency supervision, with whole-route testing of each production batch. Used-vehicle transfers across provinces now face emission traceability checks, including maintenance records, recent passing emission reports and the absence of long-unresolved OBD fault codes.

What this means for foreign-invested companies

For foreign-invested OEMs, the practical agenda has several parts. First, product planning: every new model must clear the MIIT catalogue, and the NEV tax-relief lists must be monitored because they change every batch and directly affect price competitiveness in the world’s largest EV market. Second, engineering: new fuel vehicles produced from August 2026 must embed connected OBD and meet the 8-year/160,000-km component warranty, which shifts warranty-cost modelling and supplier contracts for exhaust systems. Third, commercial-vehicle and special-purpose vehicle operators with Chinese joint ventures must track catalogue batches closely, since most batch content is commercial and special-purpose products. Fourth, used-vehicle and fleet businesses face new traceability duties on cross-provincial transfers, affecting remarketing and fleet rotation. Fifth, joint-venture governance: with the catalogue and emissions regimes both administered at the central level but implemented through local authorities, joint ventures should keep compliance ownership clear and data pipelines (catalogue submissions, OBD telematics, recall reporting) properly governed.

Practical steps

  1. Track catalogue batches. Assign an owner to monitor each MIIT batch and the associated tax-relief catalogues for your models, and reconcile with the State Taxation Administration lists.
  2. Plan engineering changes for post-August 2026 vehicles. Embed connected OBD, update exhaust-component warranty terms and supply agreements, and provision for batch whole-route emission testing.
  3. Review used-vehicle and fleet processes. Where you operate used-vehicle or fleet business, update cross-provincial transfer procedures to meet maintenance-record, emission-report and OBD-fault-code requirements.
  4. Align pricing with tax relief. Confirm each model’s purchase-tax and vehicle/vessel tax treatment before setting retail pricing and incentives.
  5. Keep emissions compliance documentation. Records of catalogue filings, OBD data governance and recall reporting protect the group against disputes and inspections.
  6. Coordinate with the broader NEV policy environment. Combine catalogue status with the purchase-tax continuation framework and the 2026–2027 technical requirements to maintain full market access.

Compliance notes

The catalogue is a precondition, not a guarantee: models must be on the current batch to be sold, and removal or non-inclusion suspends sales. The emission rules are obligations on the vehicle and its manufacturer, not just the consumer, and the data uploaded by connected OBD is live evidence for enforcement. Companies should not assume that “old cars, old standards” eliminates all duties for legacy fleets: cross-provincial transfer traceability now reaches pre-August vehicles. Finally, catalogue and tax-relief rules change by batch, and the emission implementation details may be refined locally; verify the current lists and local implementation before committing to a model year or a used-vehicle campaign.


车辆公告目录与排放新规:2026 年 8 月对在华车企与供应商意味着什么

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月的两项进展共同界定中国汽车行业的近期监管图景。8 月 12 日,工信部发布 2026 年第 21 号公告,公布《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品》(第 409 批)以及享受车船税减免的节能、使用新能源汽车车型目录(第八十八批)和减免车辆购置税的新能源汽车车型目录(第三十三批)。另一项是生态环境部、工信部、市场监管总局联合制定的《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》于 2026 年 8 月 1 日在全国施行。对外资整车厂与零部件供应商,这两项工具决定哪些产品可以销售、哪些车型享受税收减免,以及新燃油车承担何种工程与质保义务。

第 409 批与税收减免目录

工信部公告承担双重许可功能:既批准道路机动车生产企业及产品,又确认哪些车型享受车船税减免与新能源购置税免征。第 409 批经商税务总局同意。据行业对该批的分析,共有 217 家企业、210 个品牌、478 个新能源产品型号通过技术审查,其中纯电动 415 个、插电式混合动力 56 个、燃料电池 6 个、甲醇产品 1 个;商用车与专用车占多数,反映产业结构。对外国品牌或合资整车厂,车型进入目录是销售前提,进入购置税免征目录则直接关系零售定价。目录体系因此既是市场准入闸门,也是定价杠杆。

排放全链条细则

2026 年 8 月 1 日施行的排放细则坚持”新车新标准、老车老标准”。2026 年 8 月 1 日前已注册登记的车辆,无论国四、国五还是国六,原有年检周期、本地过户权限与通行规则不变,不追溯改造、不强制淘汰、不设一刀切限行。新要求针对 2026 年 8 月 1 日后出厂的新燃油车及该日起跨省流通的二手燃油车。新燃油车的关键义务包括:强制标配第三代远程 OBD,实时向国家监管平台上传排放、发动机工况与燃油蒸发数据;三元催化器、颗粒捕捉器(GPF)、氧传感器等排放核心部件质保 8 年或 16 万公里;出厂排放一致性监管升级,每批次全路况实测。跨省二手燃油车过户面临排放溯源核查,包括维保记录、近期合格排放报告以及无长期未修复 OBD 故障码。

对外资企业的意义

对外资整车厂,实务议程有若干部分。其一,产品规划:每个新车型必须通过工信部目录,且须跟踪新能源税收减免名单——每批变化,直接影响全球最大电动车市场的价格竞争力。其二,工程:2026 年 8 月起生产的燃油新车须嵌入联网 OBD 并满足 8 年/16 万公里部件质保,这改变排气系统的质保成本建模与供应商合同。其三,合资商用车与专用车运营者须紧密跟踪目录批次,因为批次内容以商用车与专用车为主。其四,二手车与车队业务面临跨省过户新溯源义务,影响再营销与车队周转。其五,合资治理:目录与排放制度均由中央层面管理、地方实施,合资企业应明确合规归属,妥善治理目录申报、OBD 车联网数据与召回报告等数据管线。

操作步骤

  1. 跟踪目录批次。 指定专人监控每批工信部公告及相应的税收减免目录,并与税务总局名单核对。
  2. 规划 2026 年 8 月后车辆的工程变更。 嵌入联网 OBD、更新排气部件质保条款与供应协议,并为每批次全路况排放测试预留预算。
  3. 审查二手车与车队流程。 若经营二手车或车队业务,更新跨省过户程序以满足维保记录、排放报告与 OBD 故障码要求。
  4. 按税收减免对齐定价。 定价与促销前确认各车型购置税与车船税待遇。
  5. 留存排放合规文档。 目录申报、OBD 数据治理与召回报告记录保护集团免于争议与检查。
  6. 与更广的 NEV 政策环境协同。 将目录状态与购置税延续框架及 2026–2027 技术要求结合,保持完整市场准入。

合规提示

目录是前提而非保证:车型必须在当期批次中方可销售,移出或未列入将暂停销售。排放规则是对车辆及其制造商的义务,而非仅对消费者;联网 OBD 上传的数据是执法的实时证据。企业不应假设”老车老标准”消除了存量车队的全部义务:跨省过户溯源现在覆盖 8 月前的车辆。最后,目录与税收减免规则按批次变化,排放实施细节可能在地方细化;确定车型年度或二手车营销活动前,应核实现行清单与地方实施情况。

Sources

Education Opening in China: Foreign Institutions, Hainan Pilots and the 2026 Expansion Wave

  • China’s education opening is scaling up fast: in May 2026 the Ministry of Education approved 219 new Sino-foreign cooperative education units (86 new institutions and 133 new programmes), the largest single-batch expansion in two decades.
    中国教育开放加速扩容:2026 年 5 月教育部一次性批复 219 个中外合作办学单元——86 家新机构、133 个新项目,为近二十年来单次最大扩容。
  • The Education Development 15th Five-Year Plan, issued by the State Council in June 2026, calls for expanding high-level education opening, encouraging foreign high-level science and engineering universities to run programmes in China, and building international education cooperation demonstration zones.
    国务院 2026 年 6 月印发的《教育发展”十五五”规划》要求扩大高水平教育对外开放,鼓励国外高水平理工类大学来华合作办学,布局建设教育国际合作示范区。
  • Hainan’s International Education Innovation Island is the flagship: the Lingshui Li’an pilot zone has brought in 30 universities, 24 MOE-approved Sino-foreign cooperation institutions and programmes, with student numbers expected to exceed 15,000 in 2026.
    海南国际教育创新岛是旗舰项目:陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区已引进国内外知名高校 30 所、经教育部审批的中外合作办学机构及项目 24 个,2026 年师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人。
  • Overseas universities can now operate independently in Hainan under the FTZ rules: Hainan Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences and Hainan Lausanne Hospitality Management University are the first two foreign-owned institutions.
    依自贸港规则,境外高校可在海南独立办学:海南比勒费尔德应用科学大学、海南洛桑旅游大学为全国首批境外高校独立举办的本科院校。
  • The utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports steady expansion of pilots for foreign vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science, engineering, agriculture and medicine universities.
    《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》支持稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学的对外开放试点。
  • For foreign universities and education investors, the practical route combines MOE approval for cooperative education, FTZ pilot channels in Hainan, RCEP-region cooperation zones (e.g. Yunnan), and strict screening against the low-quality programme phase-outs.
    对外国高校与教育投资者,实操路径包括教育部中外合作办学审批、海南自贸港独立办学通道、RCEP 区域教育合作区(如云南),并须对照低质项目清退名单严格筛选。

Education Opening in China: Foreign Institutions, Hainan Pilots and the 2026 Expansion Wave | 中国教育开放:境外机构、海南试点与 2026 扩容浪潮

Why this matters now

Education is now one of the most active fronts of China’s services opening. In May 2026, the Ministry of Education (MOE) approved 219 new Sino-foreign cooperative education units — 86 new institutions and 133 new programmes — the largest single-batch approval in two decades, roughly double the volume of the same period in 2025. In June 2026, the State Council issued the Education Development 15th Five-Year Plan, which elevates “expanding high-level education opening” to a national priority and explicitly encourages foreign high-level science and engineering universities to run programmes in China. The utilisation of foreign capital action plan separately supports pilots for foreign vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level universities in science, engineering, agriculture and medicine. For foreign universities, vocational training groups and education investors, 2026 presents both the widest entry channels in years and a clearer regulatory floor.

The scale of the 2026 wave

The 219 new units include high-profile partnerships: Harbin Institute of Technology and emlyon Business School (data science college), Beijing Institute of Technology and Politecnico di Torino (Beili Torino Polytechnic), Sichuan University and the University of Auckland (Auckland College), and Tianjin University with Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Shenzhen Future Technology College). Roughly two-thirds of the new programmes are science and engineering oriented, including artificial intelligence, data science, intelligent manufacturing and biomedical engineering. The participant base is widening beyond the traditional US-UK-Australia group to France, Singapore, Russia, Spain, Hungary, Cuba and Central Asia. To date, MOE-approved undergraduate-level Sino-foreign cooperative institutions and programmes exceed 1,700, involving more than 1,100 overseas universities across 45 countries and regions. At the same time, the MOE is culling low-quality programmes: 315 institutions and programmes were terminated in 2025-2026.

Hainan: the independent-campus channel

Hainan is the pilot for the most advanced form of opening: foreign universities operating independently. Under the Hainan Free Trade Port Law (2021) and the Provisional Rules on Overseas Higher Education Institutions Running Schools in Hainan FTZ (2023), a foreign university can establish a campus without a Chinese partner, limited to undergraduate and above programmes in science, engineering, agriculture and medicine. Two schools have been approved: Hainan Bielefeld University of Applied Sciences (a German public university, in Danzhou Yangpu) and Hainan Lausanne Hospitality Management University (operated by EHL, in Sanya). Benefits include zero-tariff import of self-use teaching and research equipment, an individual income tax cap of 15% for high-end talent, and visa-free entry facilitation for foreign teachers. The Lingshui Li’an International Education Innovation Pilot Zone has brought in 30 universities and 24 MOE-approved cooperative institutions and programmes, with 2026 student numbers expected to exceed 15,000.

Regional cooperation zones

Beyond Hainan, regional zones are emerging. In 2026 the MOE and Yunnan Province jointly issued an action plan to build an “RCEP International Education Cooperation Zone” in Yunnan, targeting the South and Southeast Asia neighbourhood. Yunnan’s 12 universities run 26 overseas institutions and programmes, over 90% of them in South and Southeast Asian countries, having trained more than 5,000 people; the province has also hosted 48 Sino-foreign cooperative institutions and programmes. For foreign universities, these zones offer cooperative channels that combine vocational training, skill certification and industrial linkage, often with government funding support.

Regulatory floor and screening

The expansion comes with a strict floor. New projects are screened against industrial relevance and quality; since 2025, commercial and management programmes have been approved only sparingly, while science, engineering, agriculture and medicine projects now exceed 85% of new approvals. Institutions with insufficient foreign input, disconnected curricula or enrolment shortfalls are terminated (315 terminated in 2025-2026). Foreign institutions should verify a Chinese partner’s credentials, confirm the programme’s inclusion in the MOE supervision platform, and assess whether the proposed programme sits in a priority field before committing resources.

Practical steps for foreign institutions

First, choose the entry channel: MOE-approved cooperative education (with a Chinese university partner), Hainan independent campus (science, engineering, agriculture and medicine, undergraduate and above), or vocational training via the services-opening pilots. Second, for cooperative models, select a partner university with compatible research strength and apply through the provincial education department to the MOE; monitor the approval calendar, as batches are processed periodically. Third, for Hainan, engage the provincial education department and the Lingshui pilot zone administration early, and budget for the FTZ benefits (zero-tariff equipment, talent tax, visa facilitation). Fourth, plan for quality compliance from day one: MOE supervision reporting, enrolment thresholds and periodic evaluation are mandatory. Fifth, for the vocational segment, align with industry partners and local government demand signals.

Compliance notes

All cooperative institutions and programmes require MOE approval; operating without it exposes the programme to termination. The distinction between on-quota programmes (included in the gaokao plan) and off-quota ones matters for student recruitment and diploma recognition — off-quota students need CSCSE certification, with higher compliance risk. Foreign degree programmes for Chinese students should be checked against the MOE’s list of approved units. Finally, the policy momentum is strong but the floor is rising: quality and industrial relevance determine approval odds in the 2026-2030 cycle.


中国教育开放:境外机构、海南试点与 2026 扩容浪潮

为什么当下重要

教育已成为中国服务业开放最活跃的领域之一。2026 年 5 月,教育部批复 219 个中外合作办学单元——86 家新机构、133 个新项目,为近二十年来单次最大扩容,数量约为上年同期的两倍。2026 年 6 月,国务院印发《教育发展”十五五”规划》,把”扩大高水平教育对外开放”提升为国家重点任务,明确提出鼓励国外高水平理工类大学来华合作办学。稳外资行动方案另就职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点作出安排。对外国高校、职业培训集团与教育投资者,2026 年既是多年最宽的进入通道,也伴随更清晰的监管底线。

2026 扩容规模

219 个新单元含多个高关注合作:哈尔滨工业大学与法国里昂商学院共建数据科学学院、北京理工大学与意大利都灵理工大学设立北理都灵理工学院、四川大学与新西兰奥克兰大学成立奥克兰学院、天津大学与香港理工大学在深圳共建未来技术学院。新增项目中理工类约占三分之二,集中于人工智能、数据科学、智能制造、生物医学工程等方向。参与高校从传统英美澳扩展到法国、新加坡、俄罗斯、西班牙、匈牙利、古巴与中亚。截至目前,经教育部批准的本科以上中外合作办学机构和项目超过 1700 个,合作方覆盖全球 45 个国家和地区、涉及海外高校逾 1100 所。与此同时,教育部在清退低质项目:2025—2026 年累计终止 315 个中外合作办学机构与项目。

海南:独立办学通道

海南承担着最前沿的开放形态试点:境外高校独立办学。依《海南自由贸易港法》(2021 年)与《境外高等教育机构在海南自由贸易港办学暂行规定》(2023 年),境外高校无需中方合作即可设立校区,办学层次限于理工农医类学科本科及以上。已批准两所:海南比勒费尔德应用科学大学(德国公立大学,儋州洋浦)与海南洛桑旅游大学(瑞士 EHL 举办,三亚)。配套红利包括自用教学科研设备”零关税”进口、高端人才个人所得税上限 15%、外籍教师免签入境便利。陵水黎安国际教育创新试验区已引进 30 所高校、24 个教育部审批的中外合作办学机构及项目,2026 年师生规模预计突破 1.5 万人。

区域合作区

除海南外,区域合作区正在形成。2026 年,教育部与云南省联合印发行动方案,在云南建设”RCEP 国际教育合作区”,面向南亚东南亚邻国。云南 12 所高校举办 26 个境外办学机构及项目,90% 以上在南亚东南亚国家,累计培养人才逾 5000 人;全省累计举办 48 个中外合作办学机构和项目。对外国高校,这些区域提供职业教育、技能认证与产业联动相结合的合作通道,往往带有政府资金支持。

监管底线与筛选

扩容伴随严格底线。新项目按产业相关性筛选:2025 年以来商科、管理类新项目审批大幅收紧,理工农医类新获批项目占比突破 85%。外方投入不足、专业脱节、招生不达标的机构被终止(2025—2026 年终止 315 个)。外国机构应在投入资源前核实中方伙伴资质、确认项目纳入教育部监管平台,并评估拟办专业是否属于优先领域。

外国机构的实操步骤

其一,选择进入通道:教育部审批的中外合作办学(与中方大学合作)、海南独立校区(理工农医、本科以上)、或经服务业开放试点进入职业培训。其二,对合作办学,选择科研实力匹配的中方伙伴,经省级教育部门向教育部申报;留意审批节奏,批次定期处理。其三,对海南模式,尽早对接省教育厅与黎安试验区管理局,并按自贸港红利(设备零关税、人才税、签证便利)编制预算。其四,从第一天起规划质量合规:教育部监管报告、招生门槛与定期评估是强制项。其五,职业教育板块,与行业伙伴和地方政府的需求信号对齐。

合规提示

所有合作办学机构与项目都须经教育部审批;无审批运行将面临终止。统招计划内项目与计划外项目的区分影响招生与文凭认证——计划外学生需做中留服认证,合规风险更高。面向中国学生的境外学位项目应核对教育部批准名单。最后,政策动能强劲但底线持续抬升:质量与产业相关性决定 2026—2030 周期内的审批概率。

Sources

Decoding China’s 2026 Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment

  • On 16 June 2026, MOFCOM, NDRC and MOF issued the *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (Document No. 97 of 2026), a 15-measure package across five dimensions approved by the State Council.
    2026年6月16日,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号),经国务院同意,围绕五大维度推出15条举措。
  • The Plan shifts the policy centre of gravity from “allowing entry” to “ease of operating” — deepening services-sector opening while streamlining foreign M&A, data flows, onshore reinvestment and R&D centres.
    方案将政策重心从”能进入”转向”准营便利”——在深化服务业开放的同时,简化外资并购、数据流动、境内再投资与研发中心建设。
  • Manufacturing foreign-access restrictions have been fully removed; services — now about 70% of actually-utilised foreign capital — is the new opening frontier, with cloud computing, wholly-foreign-owned hospitals and biotech pilots set to expand.
    制造业外资准入限制已全面取消;服务业(实际使用外资比重约七成)成为开放新前沿,云计算、外商独资医院、生物技术等领域试点将扩大。
  • Investment facilitation measures include revising foreign M&A rules, scenario- and field-level negative lists for data export in FTZs, and easier onshore reinvestment with improved service for major projects.
    投资便利举措涵盖修订外资并购规定、自贸区场景化与字段级数据出境负面清单、境内再投资便利化及重大外资项目服务保障。
  • Investment promotion strengthens the “Invest in China” brand, explores a digital comprehensive service platform, and introduces an “encourage / prohibit” list for local-government investment attraction.
    投资促进方面强化”投资中国”品牌、探索外商投资数字综合服务平台,并建立地方政府招商引资的鼓励与禁止事项清单。
  • In the first half of 2026, nearly 4,800 foreign-invested enterprises increased investment in China, with the high-tech share of inbound investment rising.
    2026年上半年,近4800家外资企业追加对华投资,高技术领域引资占比提升。

Decoding China’s 2026 Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment | 解读《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026):外资来华五大维度十五项举措

Why this matters now

China’s foreign-investment policy has entered a “stabilise, retain and upgrade” phase. After a cycle of negative-list cuts and the full removal of manufacturing access restrictions, the policy question is no longer chiefly about *what is open* but about *how easy it is to operate, grow and reinvest*. The *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (MOFCOM, NDRC and MOF, Document No. 97 of 2026, issued 16 June 2026 with State Council approval) is the most consolidated statement of that shift. Together with the 15th Five-Year Plan framing, it sets the tone for inbound investment through the late 2020s.

This article decodes the Plan’s five dimensions, highlights the measures most relevant to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), and translates them into a practical checklist. It pairs with our coverage of the negative list, market-access approvals and the FTZ playbook.

The five dimensions at a glance

The Plan organises its 15 measures under five headings:

  1. Expanding market access — deepening services-sector opening, raising the level of financial opening, and supporting foreign participation in industries such as pharmaceuticals.
  2. Enhancing investment facilitation — improving the foreign M&A regime, optimising cross-border data flows, and facilitating onshore reinvestment.
  3. Raising the level of investment promotion — strengthening the “Invest in China” brand and standardising investment-attraction conduct.
  4. Improving the service and safeguard system — delivering national treatment, fair-competition review, and protecting FIEs’ online rights.
  5. Optimising foreign-investment management — upgrading the foreign-investment information-reporting system.

Market access: services is the new frontier

Manufacturing foreign-access restrictions have been fully cancelled. The Plan therefore foregrounds services, which now account for roughly 70% of actually-utilised foreign capital. Concrete openings include:

  • expanding pilot openings for cloud computing, wholly-foreign-owned hospitals and biotech;
  • widening the opening of vocational training, schools and high-level science/engineering/agriculture/medical universities;
  • supporting Beijing’s comprehensive services-opening demonstration zone and piloting digital-economy and healthcare-modernisation measures;
  • upgrading the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macao to open services to them first;
  • in finance, letting more foreign institutions use risk-management tools including government-bond futures, conduct fund-investment advisory business, and listing key foreign firms domestically.

The signal is clear: the marginal liberalisation now lives in services, and FIEs should revisit sectors — healthcare, education, cloud, finance — that were historically constrained.

Investment facilitation: from entry to operation

Three measures matter most for day-to-day FIE operations:

  • Foreign M&A: the rules on foreign investors acquiring domestic enterprises will be revised to streamline process and consideration payment, with strengthened inter-departmental coordination; qualifying foreign equity-investment institutions may participate as strategic investors in non-related listed-company securities issuance.
  • Cross-border data: FTZs and services-opening pilot cities are encouraged to formulate scenario-based, field-level negative lists for data export, and national standards for important-data identification are to be developed in sectors such as industry, telecoms, geoinformation, automotive, pharmaceuticals, seeds, aerospace and civil aviation.
  • Onshore reinvestment: the Plan facilitates foreign investors’ reinvestment in China and strengthens services for reinvestment projects — directly relevant to the profit-reinvestment tax incentives covered elsewhere on this site.

Promotion and safeguards

On promotion, the Plan strengthens the “Invest in China” brand, explores a digital comprehensive service platform for foreign investment, and — notably — moves to standardise local-government investment attraction by publishing an “encourage / prohibit” list of matters. This responds to concerns about uneven, subsidy-driven competition among localities.

On safeguards, it affirms national treatment, strengthens fair-competition review in government procurement and bidding, supports FIE participation in consumption-stimulation campaigns, and establishes a coordinated mechanism for handling online-infringement complaints — protecting FIEs’ legitimate online rights.

Optimising management

The Plan pledges a comprehensive upgrade of the foreign-investment information-reporting system, with direct reporting channels and information sharing that support foreign-exchange registration, administrative licensing and fixed-asset-investment management. For FIEs, this points to a lighter, more digital compliance footprint over time.

Practical takeaways for FIEs

  1. Re-screen services sectors (healthcare, education, cloud, finance) for openings that were previously closed.
  2. Plan M&A and reinvestment against the forthcoming revised foreign-M&A rules and the reinvestment-facilitation measures.
  3. Map your data flows to the emerging scenario-based, field-level export negative lists in FTZs.
  4. Use the major-project work-stream (national and provincial task forces) for large greenfield or expansion investments.
  5. Engage the “Invest in China” platforms and the forthcoming digital service portal for matching and approval support.

Related reading

  • The 2026 negative list and sector-specific restriction map.
  • Market-access approval and the FTZ fast-track.
  • Onshore reinvestment and the profit-reinvestment tax incentive.

解读《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(2026):外资来华五大维度十五项举措

为何重要

中国的外资政策已进入”固稳促优”阶段。在经历负面清单持续缩减、制造业准入限制全面取消的循环之后,政策议题的核心不再主要是”开放什么”,而是”运营、成长与再投资有多便利”。《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97号,2026年6月16日印发,经国务院同意)是这一转向最集中的表述。结合”十五五”规划框架,它为2020年代末的引资定下基调。

本文拆解方案的五大维度,突出与外商投资企业(FIE)最相关的举措,并转化为实用清单。它与本站点关于负面清单、准入审批与自贸区落地的报道相互呼应。

五大维度一览

方案将15条举措归为五个部分:

  1. 扩大市场准入——深化服务业领域开放、提升金融业开放水平、支持外资参与医药等产业高质量发展。
  2. 提升投资便利度——完善外资并购管理制度、优化数据跨境流动管理、促进外资境内再投资。
  3. 提高投资促进水平——强化”投资中国”品牌、规范招商引资行为。
  4. 健全服务保障体系——落实国民待遇、公平竞争审查、维护外资企业网络合法权益。
  5. 优化外资管理——升级外商投资信息报告制度。

市场准入:服务业成为新前沿

制造业外资准入限制已全面取消。方案因而将服务业置于前台——其占实际使用外资比重约七成。具体开放包括:

  • 扩大云计算、外商独资医院、生物技术等领域试点开放;
  • 拓宽职业技能培训、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学的对外开放试点;
  • 支持北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区,在数字经济、医药健康等现代服务业重点领域先行先试;
  • 升级内地与港澳CEPA,在服务业领域对港澳投资者率先开放;
  • 金融领域,允许更多外资机构运用国债期货等风险管理工具、依法开展基金投资顾问业务,并支持重点外资企业境内上市。

信号明确:边际自由化如今落在服务业,外商投资企业应当重新审视医疗、教育、云计算、金融等历史上受限的行业。

投资便利:从准入到准营

三项举措对外商投资企业的日常运营最为关键:

  • 外资并购: 将修订完善外国投资者并购境内企业规定,优化流程与对价支付,强化部门协同;符合条件的外资股权投资机构可以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行。
  • 数据跨境: 鼓励自贸区与服务业扩大开放试点城市制定场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单,并推动工业、电信、地理信息、汽车、医药、种业、航天、民航等行业重要数据识别目录国家标准。
  • 境内再投资: 方案促进外资境内再投资并强化再投资项目服务保障——与本站点另文所述的利润再投资税收优惠直接相关。

促进与保障

在促进方面,方案强化”投资中国”品牌,探索外商投资数字综合服务平台,并——值得注意——通过发布招商引资鼓励与禁止事项清单来规范地方招商行为,回应了对地方间补贴驱动、参差不齐竞争的关切。

在保障方面,方案落实国民待遇,加强政府采购与招标投标领域的公平竞争审查,支持外资企业参与提振消费行动,并建立涉企网络侵权举报联动机制,维护外资企业网络合法权益。

优化管理

方案承诺全面优化外商投资信息报告制度,健全直报渠道与信息共享机制,为外汇登记、行政许可、固定资产投资等外资管理提供支撑。对FIE而言,这意味着长期合规负担将更轻、更数字化。

外商投资企业的实务要点

  1. 重新筛查服务业(医疗、教育、云计算、金融)中此前关闭、如今开放的领域。
  2. 围绕并购与再投资对接即将修订的外资并购规定与再投资便利化举措。
  3. 梳理数据流向,对应自贸区新兴的场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单。
  4. 善用重大外资项目专班(国家与省级)推进大型绿地或扩产投资。
  5. 对接”投资中国”平台与即将上线的数字服务门户,获取撮合与审批支持。

延伸阅读

  • 2026年负面清单与分行业限制地图。
  • 准入审批与自贸区快速通道。
  • 境内再投资与利润再投资税收优惠。

Sources

  • 商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部:《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)— https://fdi.mofcom.gov.cn/questionDetial.html?id=48925
  • 商务部国新办新闻发布会解读《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》— https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcjd/tzhz/art/2026/art_d0190837f61147258546c1bcc8f9be05.html
  • 中国贸易救济信息网:稳外资政策解读— https://cacs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gnwjmdt/gn/202608/188808.html

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots

  • The State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly calls for expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steadily advancing international medical services pilots.
    国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出”推动医疗领域有序扩大开放,进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点,稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点”。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots now cover nine locations — Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and all of Hainan — with foreign hospitals landing in 2026 (e.g. Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital).
    外商独资医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛 9 个地方,2026 年外资医院加速落地(如鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院)。
  • Value-added telecoms opening continues at scale: 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals since February 2025, covering all ten value-added telecom business categories, and foreign-invested telecom enterprises nationwide exceed 3,100.
    增值电信开放持续推进:2025 年 2 月以来已有 166 家外资企业获经营试点批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务;全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家。
  • Education, finance and services opening are broadening in parallel: nine new services-opening comprehensive pilot cities since 2025, foreign vocational training pilots, and more foreign institutions using fund-investment and risk-management tools.
    教育、金融等服务业开放同步拓宽:2025 年以来服务业扩大开放综合试点新增 9 个城市,推进职业技能培训开放试点,支持外资机构运用基金投顾与风险管理工具。
  • The National Health Plan also advances innovation-drug and medical-device channels, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs, and AI-enabled pharma value chains — relevant to foreign pharma and device companies entering China.
    《国民健康”十五五”规划》还推进创新药械审评审批、商业保险覆盖创新药、人工智能赋能医药全产业链,对进入中国的外资药械企业直接相关。
  • For foreign investors, the practical takeaway is that sector restrictions are being dismantled industry by industry through pilots: confirm whether the target sector is in an expanded pilot, prepare the sectoral licence application early, and use the provincial commerce one-stop channels.
    对外国投资者,实操要点是分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除:确认目标行业是否在扩容试点内、尽早准备行业牌照申请、善用省级商务一站式通道。

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots | 2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

Why this matters now

China’s sector restrictions on foreign investment are being dismantled industry by industry through pilot programmes rather than through a single omnibus measure. Three tracks are moving in parallel in 2026. First, healthcare: the State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly supports expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and advancing international medical services pilots, and wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots already cover nine locations. Second, telecoms: the value-added telecoms pilot has issued approvals to 166 foreign enterprises since February 2025, covering all ten value-added categories. Third, education and finance: the services-opening comprehensive pilots added nine new cities in 2025, and the utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports foreign vocational training institutions, fund-investment advisory and risk-management tools for foreign institutions. For foreign companies whose target sector still carries restrictions, the operative question is which pilot applies and how the licence process runs. This article maps the 2026 sector-opening landscape.

Healthcare: hospital and pharma channels

The National Health 15th Five-Year Plan, issued under Guo Fa [2026] No. 23, directs orderly expansion of medical-sector opening, further expansion of the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steady advancement of international medical services pilots. The hospital pilot already covers Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and the whole of Hainan. Foreign hospital groups have been landing: Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital and Nanjing Hanmei Viti Cosmetic Hospital are cited as examples of foreign-invested hospitals entering the market. The plan also supports optimised review and approval for innovative and clinically urgent drugs, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs and medical devices, and AI-enabled pharma value chains. For foreign pharma and device companies, the plan signals sustained demand-side support for innovative products alongside the supply-side opening of hospital ownership.

Telecoms: the value-added pilot at scale

The value-added telecoms pilot, launched in October 2024 in Beijing (services opening-up comprehensive demonstration zone), the Shanghai FTZ Lin-gang New Area and Shanghai’s socialist modernisation leading zone, Hainan Free Trade Port and Shenzhen’s socialist demonstration zone, removed foreign shareholding caps on specified value-added services including internet data centres (IDC), content delivery networks (CDN), internet access services (ISP), online data processing and transaction processing, and information publication platform services. Since the first batch of approvals in February 2025, 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals, and some wholly foreign-owned enterprises have obtained IDC qualifications — relevant for AI data-centre investment. Nationwide, foreign-invested telecom enterprises exceed 3,100, covering all ten value-added categories under the Telecommunications Business Classification Catalogue. The utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports continuing and expanding the pilot.

Education and finance

Education opening is advancing through the services-opening comprehensive pilots, which added nine new cities in 2025, and through the action plan’s commitment to steadily expand pilots for foreign vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science, engineering, agriculture and medicine universities. In finance, the action plan supports more foreign institutions using risk-management tools including government bond futures, foreign institutions carrying out fund-investment advisory business, and facilitation of cross-border business for key foreign-invested enterprises. These items matter for foreign financial institutions and education groups assessing entry.

How sector pilots actually run

Each pilot follows the same shape: a national policy statement names the sector and the pilot regions; the competent ministry (NHSA/MOFCOM for hospitals, MIIT for telecoms, MOE for education) issues implementation rules; provincial authorities process applications; and foreign enterprises apply for the sectoral licence or approval. For hospitals, the provincial health commission and commerce department jointly review the establishment; for value-added telecoms, MIIT issues the pilot approval and the enterprise obtains the value-added telecom business licence (ICP/EDI) locally; for education, the MOE approves cooperative or independent institutions. Timing differs: hospital establishment can take months of review; telecoms approvals have been issued in batches; education approvals follow the MOE’s periodic batches.

Practical steps

First, verify the target sector’s current restriction level: full opening, pilot opening, conditional or prohibited. Second, where a pilot applies, confirm the pilot region covers the planned location and that the business line is within the pilot’s service scope. Third, prepare the sectoral application package: for hospitals, the feasibility study, qualifications of the foreign hospital group, and the cooperation or independent-establishment plan; for telecoms, the corporate structure demonstrating shareholding compliance and the security assessment materials; for education, the partner credentials and curriculum plan. Fourth, engage the provincial commerce department’s one-stop window and the competent ministry’s pre-communication channel early. Fifth, monitor pilot expansion announcements — hospital, biotech and telecom expansions are explicitly in the pipeline.

Compliance notes

Sector pilots do not remove all restrictions: negative-list limits still apply to fields outside the pilots, and each licence carries conditions (e.g. service scope, foreign shareholding, security review for telecoms). The National Health Plan is a planning document; implementing rules for hospital and international medical pilots will follow from the competent authorities. Foreign investors should not assume that a pilot in one region extends to others, and should confirm current regional scope before committing.


2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

为什么当下重要

中国对外资的分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除,而非依赖一部一揽子法规。2026 年有三条线并行推进。其一,医疗:国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点,外商独资医院试点已覆盖 9 个地方。其二,电信:增值电信开放试点自 2025 年 2 月以来已向 166 家外资企业发放经营批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务。其三,教育与金融:服务业扩大开放综合试点 2025 年新增 9 个城市,稳外资行动方案支持外资职业技能培训机构、基金投顾业务与风险管理工具。对目标行业仍带限制的外国公司,操作性问题在于适用哪个试点、牌照流程如何运转。本文梳理 2026 年分行业开放版图。

医疗:医院与药械通道

《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)部署推动医疗领域有序扩大开放、进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点。医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛。外资医院集团加速落地:鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院、南京韩美维媞整形医院被作为外资医院进入市场的案例提及。规划还支持优化创新药和临床急需药品审评审批、商业健康保险覆盖创新药械、人工智能赋能医药全产业链。对外资药械企业,规划在供给侧开放医院股权的同时,提供需求侧对创新产品的持续支持信号。

电信:增值电信试点规模化

增值电信开放试点于 2024 年 10 月在北京(服务业扩大开放综合示范区)、上海自贸试验区临港新片区及社会主义现代化建设引领区、海南自由贸易港、深圳中国特色社会主义先行示范区启动,取消互联网数据中心(IDC)、内容分发网络(CDN)、互联网接入服务(ISP)、在线数据处理与交易处理、信息发布平台服务等指定增值业务的外资股比限制。自 2025 年 2 月首批批复以来,已有 166 家外资企业获试点批复,部分全外资企业取得 IDC 资质——这对 AI 数据中心投资具有参照价值。全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家,经营范围覆盖《电信业务分类目录》全部 10 项增值电信业务。稳外资行动方案支持继续推进并扩大试点。

教育与金融

教育开放依托服务业扩大开放综合试点(2025 年新增 9 个城市)与行动方案关于稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学开放试点的承诺推进。金融端,行动方案支持更多外资机构运用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、优化重点外资企业跨境业务管理。这些对外资金融机构与教育集团评估进入都直接相关。

试点如何实际运转

各试点遵循同一形态:国家政策文件点名行业与试点区域;主管部委(医院为卫生健康部门与商务部、电信为工信部、教育为教育部)发布实施细则;省级部门处理申请;外资企业申办行业牌照或批复。医院由省卫健委与商务部门联合审查设立;增值电信由工信部核发试点批复、企业再就地申领增值电信业务许可证(ICP/EDI);教育由教育部审批合作或独立机构。时序不同:医院设立审查可能长达数月;电信批复分批发放;教育审批跟随教育部周期性批次。

实操步骤

其一,核验目标行业当前限制级别:全面开放、试点开放、有条件开放还是禁止。其二,适用试点的,确认试点区域覆盖计划地点且业务线在试点业务范围内。其三,准备行业申请材料:医院为可行性研究、外资医院集团资质、合作或独立设立方案;电信为企业架构证明股比合规与安全评估材料;教育为伙伴资质与课程方案。其四,尽早对接省商务部门一站式窗口与主管部委的预沟通渠道。其五,紧盯试点扩容公告——医院、生物技术、电信扩容明确在推进之列。

合规提示

行业试点并未消除全部限制:试点之外领域仍适用负面清单限制,每张牌照都附带条件(如业务范围、外资股比、电信安全审查)。《国民健康”十五五”规划》是规划性文件,医院与国际医疗试点的实施细则将由主管机关后续出台。外资投资者不应假设一地的试点扩展至其他地区,投入前应确认现行区域范围。

Sources

Sector Restrictions After Manufacturing Zeroing: Where Foreign Capital Can (and Cannot) Go in 2026

  • China’s unified Market Access Negative List (2025 edition) was cut to 106 items, down from 117 in 2022, while the foreign-investment access list stands at 29 national items with manufacturing fully zeroed.
    中国统一市场准入负面清单(2025版)由2022版117项减至106项,外资准入负面清单全国版保留29项、制造业全面清零。
  • The 2026 policy emphasis has shifted from manufacturing to services: telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare are the next opening fronts.
    2026年政策重点由制造业转向服务业:电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗成为下一开放重点。
  • The “Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment” action plan (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) anchors services opening — vocational training, finance, pharmaceuticals — and the move from “access” to “operation.”
    《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)锚定服务业开放——职业培训、金融、医药——并从”准入”转向”准营”。
  • A cross-border services negative list and pilot zones (telecom, biotech, wholly-foreign-owned hospitals) are the operational channels for new openings.
    跨境服务贸易负面清单与试点区域(电信、生物技术、外商独资医院)是新开放的操作通道。
  • Sector restrictions live in two lists: the market-access list (binds all entities) and the foreign-investment list (adds foreign-capital limits) — screen both.
    行业限制存在于两张清单:市场准入清单(约束所有主体)与外资准入清单(叠加外资限制)——须双查。
  • Practical step: map the target sector against both lists, use pilot zones for services openings, and track the 2026 action plan’s rollout.
    实操建议:将目标行业对照两张清单,服务业开放走试点区,并跟踪2026年行动方案落地。

Sector Restrictions After Manufacturing Zeroing: Where Foreign Capital Can (and Cannot) Go in 2026 | 制造业清零后的行业限制:2026年外资可进与禁区

China’s foreign-investment access regime now rests on a clear pivot: manufacturing restrictions are fully zeroed, and the policy centre of gravity has moved to services. For a foreign investor, the practical question is no longer “is manufacturing open?” but “which services sectors, through which channels, and under what pilots?” This article maps the current sector-restriction landscape.

The two-list architecture

Two parallel negative lists govern access:

  1. Market Access Negative List (市场准入负面清单) — binds every business form equally inside China. The 2025 edition (NDRC, MOFCOM, SAMR; Fa Gai Ti Gai Gui [2025] No. 466, issued 24 April 2025) cut items from 117 (2022) to 106, with national sub-measures falling from 486 to 469 and local measures from 36 to 20.
  2. Foreign Investment Access Negative List (外商投资准入负面清单) — adds foreign-capital-specific sector limits on top. As of 2026 it stands at 29 national items (27 in pilot free-trade zones). Critically, all manufacturing-sector restrictions are zeroed — the first industry fully liberalised.

The message of the 2025 market-access list is that items outside the list must be genuinely open; a barrier clean-up campaign publicly notifies typical cases and builds a rectification loop to remove “glass doors” beyond the list.

Manufacturing zeroed, services next

At a March 2026 State Council briefing, NDRC confirmed the foreign-investment list at 29 national / 27 FTZ items and signalled that the next phase focuses on services — telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare to be opened “orderly.” The *15th Five-Year Plan* outline reinforces this: with the manufacturing access cleared, the focus is “expanding market access and opening in services.”

The 2026 action plan: services in detail

The *Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment* (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) turns the services priority into concrete measures:

  • Deepening services opening: steadily expand pilot opening of vocational-skill training institutions, vocational schools and high-level polytechnic/agricultural/medical universities; upgrade Beijing’s services-opening demonstration zone; broaden CEPA for Hong Kong and Macao.
  • Financial services: more foreign institutions using risk-management tools (including government-bond futures), foreign-institution fund-investment advisory, cross-border financing facilitation, and pre-communication for onshore listings.
  • Pharmaceuticals: drug segment-manufacturing rules, broader biotechnology and wholly-foreign-owned-hospital pilot zones, innovative-device insurance coverage.

A 22 June 2026 State Council Information Office briefing framed the plan as moving from “access” to “operation” — fixing the “big door open, small door closed” problem through services opening and national treatment.

Operational channels for new openings

New services openings proceed through defined channels:

  • Cross-border services negative list. MOFCOM is improving the cross-border services-trade negative-list management system and orderly expanding autonomous opening in telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare; value-added telecom, biotech and wholly-foreign-owned-hospital pilots continue and broaden.
  • Pilot zones. Designated pilot free-trade zones and services-opening demonstration cities trial field-level data-export negative lists and sector openings; apply there rather than assuming nationwide access.
  • National treatment. The plan commits to equal application of pro-enterprise support policies to foreign firms (except where laws clearly provide otherwise or national security is involved), and fair-competition review in government procurement and bidding.

Practical steps

  1. Screen both lists. Confirm the sector is outside — or acceptably inside — both the market-access and foreign-investment negative lists.
  2. Use the pilot pathway. Telecom, medical, education and biotech openings run via pilot zones; pursue them there.
  3. Watch CEPA and Beijing. Hong Kong/Macao investors and Beijing demonstration-zone players get earlier access.
  4. Plan for operation, not just access. Post-entry, align with data-security, Anti-Monopoly and tax obligations early.
  5. Track the action plan rollout. The 2026 plan’s measures phase in; monitor which zones are designated and when approvals open.

制造业清零后的行业限制:2026年外资可进与禁区

中国外资准入制度现已明确转折:制造业限制全面清零,政策重心转向服务业。对外国投资者而言,实际问题不再是”制造业是否开放?”,而是”哪些服务业、经哪些通道、在何种试点下开放?”。本文勾勒当前行业限制格局。

双清单架构

两张并行负面清单治理准入:

  1. 市场准入负面清单——对中国境内各类经营主体一体适用。2025版(国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局;发改体改规〔2025〕466号,2025年4月24日印发)由2022版117项减至106项,全国性措施由486条减至469条,地方性措施由36条减至20条。
  2. 外商投资准入负面清单——在其上叠加外资专项行业限制。截至2026年全国版保留29项(自贸试验区版27项)。关键突破:制造业领域限制全面清零——首个全面开放的产业。

2025版市场准入清单的信号是:清单之外必须真放开;准入壁垒清理行动公开通报典型案例,并建立整改闭环以清除清单之外的”玻璃门”。

制造业清零、服务业接棒

在2026年3月国务院政策吹风会上,国家发展改革委确认外资准入清单全国版29项、自贸试验区版27项,并预示下一阶段以服务业为重点,推动电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗”有序”扩大开放。”十五五”规划纲要强化此点:制造业准入清除后,重点转向”扩大服务业市场准入和开放领域”。

2026年行动方案:服务业的细节

《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)将服务业优先转为具体措施:

  • 深化服务业开放: 稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点;提升北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区;拓宽对港澳CEPA。
  • 金融业: 更多外资机构利用含国债期货的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、跨境融资便利化、上市申报前预沟通。
  • 医药: 药品分段生产细则、扩大生物技术与外商独资医院试点区域、创新药械纳入保险。

2026年6月22日国新办发布会将该方案定位于从”准入”转向”准营”——以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”。

新开放的操作通道

新服务业开放经明确通道推进:

  • 跨境服务贸易负面清单。 商务部完善跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,有序扩大电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗自主开放;增值电信、生物技术、外商独资医院试点持续扩围。
  • 试点区域。 指定自贸试验区与服务业开放示范城市试点字段级数据出境负面清单与行业开放;应在试点区申请,而非假设全国放开。
  • 国民待遇。 方案承诺涉企支持政策对外资企业平等适用(法律明确规定或涉国家安全者除外),并在政府采购与招投标中落实公平竞争审查。

实操步骤

  1. 双清单筛查。 确认行业处于两张清单的”之外”或”可承受之内”。
  2. 走试点路径。 电信、医疗、教育、生物技术开放经试点区推进;应在试点区申请。
  3. 关注CEPA与北京。 港澳投资者与北京示范区主体获更早准入。
  4. 谋准营非仅准入。 进入后尽早对齐数据安全、反垄断与税务义务。
  5. 跟踪方案落地。 2026年方案措施分批推出;关注哪些区域被指定、何时开放审批。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • 106 vs 29: market-access list 106 items (2025); foreign-investment list 29 national, manufacturing zeroed.
    106对比29:市场准入清单106项(2025);外资清单全国29项,制造业清零。
  • Services are the front: telecom, internet, education, culture, healthcare open “orderly” post-manufacturing zeroing.
    服务业是前沿:制造业清零后电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗”有序”开放。
  • Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97: the plan that operationalises services opening and “access to operation.”
    商资发〔2026〕97号:落地服务业开放、从准入到准营的方案。
  • Two channels: cross-border services negative list + pilot zones (telecom, biotech, WFOE hospitals).
    两条通道:跨境服务贸易负面清单加试点区(电信、生物技术、外商独资医院)。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming nationwide services access: pilot-zone openings are not automatic national licences.
    以为服务业全国放开:试点区开放非自动全国牌照。
  • Screening only one list: missing the foreign-investment-specific limit risks a blocked entry.
    只查一张清单:漏掉外资专项限制可能致准入受阻。
  • Stopping at access: “big door open, small door closed” is solved by operation readiness, not approval alone.
    止于准入:”大门开、小门不开”靠准营准备解决,非仅靠批文。

Sources

Manufacturing Fully Open to Foreign Investment

  • As of the 2024 negative list, manufacturing is fully open to foreign investment with no remaining restricted entries.
    自 2024 年版负面清单起,制造业全面向外资产开放,已无残留受限条目。
  • Foreign investors may wholly own manufacturing WFOEs in China without an equity cap or prior approval for access.
    外资可全资持有在华制造外商独资企业,无需股比上限或准入事前审批。
  • The opening was delivered by deleting the entire “manufacturing” category from the negative list, not by partial relaxation.
    开放是通过从负面清单中删除整个”制造业”类别实现的,而非部分放松。
  • What remains for a manufacturer is ordinary licensing — environmental, safety, product and operating permits — not foreign-access limits.
    制造企业仍需面对的是常规许可——环保、安全、产品与经营许可——而非外资准入限制。
  • Sensitive sub-items touching defense, rare earths or critical tech may still draw security review or export-control scrutiny.
    触及国防、稀土或关键技术的敏感子项仍可能招致安全审查或出口管制审视。
  • Free-trade zones add incentives (tax, bonded logistics) on top of the national full-access baseline for manufacturers.
    自贸区在全国全面开放基线之上,为制造企业提供激励(税收、保税物流等)。
  • 2026 is about executing manufacturing entry efficiently — site selection, licensing and supply-chain setup — not clearing an access cap.
    2026 年的重点在于高效执行制造进入——选址、许可与供应链搭建——而非清掉准入上限。

Manufacturing Fully Open to Foreign Investment | 制造业全面向外资开放

The headline: manufacturing is off the list

The single clearest fact for an industrial investor in 2026 is that manufacturing in China is fully open to foreign investment. The 2024 negative list (《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》, effective 1 November 2024) deleted the entire “manufacturing” (制造业) category. For the first time, there is no manufacturing entry on the foreign-investment negative list. A foreign investor may establish or acquire a manufacturing business and hold 100% ownership without a foreign-equity cap and without a foreign-access prior approval.

This is the endpoint of a multi-year sequence. Earlier lists had already removed caps in automobiles, shipbuilding, aircraft, and power equipment; the 2024 list finished the job by clearing the category altogether. The practical meaning: if you make physical goods, the access question is, for almost all products, already answered in your favor.

What “fully open” does and does not mean

“Fully open” means no foreign-equity restriction and no negative-list access approval. It does not mean “no regulation.” A manufacturing foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) is still incorporated through the normal company-registration channel, still submits the foreign-investment information report, and still needs the ordinary licences any Chinese manufacturer needs. The access gate is gone; the operating gates are not.

Those operating gates include: business-licence scope, environmental impact approval or filing, work-safety permits, product-quality and compulsory-certification (CCC) where applicable, and sector-specific permits (e.g., for food, drugs, medical devices, chemicals). These apply to domestic and foreign firms alike. The disciplined manufacturer maps them early; they, not the negative list, are where timelines are won or lost.

The path from approval to filing

For a typical unrestricted manufacturing WFOE, the sequence in 2026 is straightforward: screen the sector (off the list), reserve the name, incorporate via SAMR / the local market-regulation bureau using the one-network channel, submit the initial foreign-investment information report, open bank and foreign-exchange accounts, and obtain the relevant operating permits. No commerce-department approval sits in the path. The only ex-ante state reviews that could apply are national security review (for control-acquiring deals in covered defense/important sectors) and SAMR merger control (for transactions above turnover thresholds) — ordinary greenfield manufacturing is generally outside both.

Sensitive manufacturing sub-items

Full access is the default, but a few manufacturing-adjacent situations still draw scrutiny:

  • Defense and dual-use: manufacturing tied to national defense or dual-use items may trigger security review or export-control and technology-transfer rules.
  • Rare earths and key resources: processing and separation tied to rare earths and certain critical materials retain conditions and strategic control.
  • Critical technology: transactions involving important data, core technology, or critical information infrastructure may draw cybersecurity and security review.

These are edges, not the main field. A standard consumer-goods, components, machinery or electronics manufacturer is unaffected. The investor should confirm only that its specific product does not fall into a sensitive corner before assuming full access.

Why this matters for supply-chain strategy

Full manufacturing access reshapes how foreign groups use China. A wholly owned plant can serve the domestic market, export, and integrate into a regional supply chain without a local joint-venture partner imposed by law. This supports several 2026 strategies:

  • Local-for-local: own the plant that serves Chinese customers, protecting process and brand control.
  • Export platform: use China as a cost-competitive, fully foreign-owned export base.
  • R&D plus manufacturing: co-locate a WFOE factory with an R&D entity, with no ownership cap on either.
  • FTZ upside: layer FTZ incentives (tax, bonded logistics, streamlined customs) on top of the national full-access baseline.

The removal of the cap is therefore not merely symbolic; it changes the feasible ownership and operating models.

Free-trade zones add a layer

Although manufacturing is open nationwide, FTZs still add value for manufacturers through incentives rather than access. Bonded logistics, streamlined customs (e.g., the two-step declaration and AEO facilitation), tax treatments, and integrated service counters can lower the cost and time of a manufacturing operation. For a foreign manufacturer, the access decision is settled; the location decision then weighs incentives, logistics and talent. Hainan Free Trade Port and leading FTZs are natural candidates where the product and supply chain fit.

A 2026 manufacturing-entry checklist

  1. Confirm the product is off the negative list — for manufacturing, this is the baseline assumption, but verify no sensitive sub-item applies.
  2. Choose ownership — a 100% WFOE is permissible; a joint venture is optional, not required.
  3. Incorporate via the one-network channel and submit the initial foreign-investment information report.
  4. Map operating permits — environmental, safety, CCC, and sector licences — and start them early.
  5. Screen security review and merger control only if acquiring control of a covered or large business.
  6. Evaluate FTZ/Hainan incentives for logistics, tax and customs benefits.
  7. Set up the supply chain — import/export, bonded options, and local sourcing — within the opened framework.

Manufacturing is the part of China market entry where the hardest question — “may I own it?” — already has a clear answer. The 2026 work is the softer but decisive work of execution: licensing, siting, and supply chain.


制造业全面向外资开放

核心结论:制造业已移出清单

2026 年工业投资者最清晰的事实是:中国制造业已全面向外资产开放。2024 年版负面清单(《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》,2024 年 11 月 1 日施行)删除了整个”制造业”类别。这是首次,外资负面清单上已无制造业条目。外资可设立或收购制造企业并持有 100% 股权,既无外资股比上限,亦无外资准入事前审批。

这是多年序列的终点。更早的清单已取消汽车、船舶、飞机及电力设备的股比上限;2024 版通过清空整个类别完成收尾。其实际含义是:若你生产实物商品,对几乎所有产品,准入问题已朝有利于你的方向解决。

“全面开放”的含义与边界

“全面开放”意味着无外资股比限制、无负面清单准入审批。它不意味着”无监管”。制造类外商投资企业仍须经普通公司登记渠道设立,仍须报送外商投资信息报告,仍须取得任何中资制造商都需要的常规许可。准入关卡已去,经营关卡未去。

这些经营关卡包括:经营范围、环评审批或备案、安全生产许可、适用时的产品质量与强制性产品认证(CCC),以及行业特定许可(如食品、药品、医疗器械、化学品)。这些对内资外资企业一体适用。纪律严明的制造商尽早梳理它们;成败所在正是这些,而非负面清单。

从审批到备案的路径

对典型的不受限制造业外商独资企业,2026 年的序列直截了当:筛查行业(清单外)、名称预留、经市场监管局一网通办渠道设立、报送外商投资初始信息报告、开立银行与外汇账户、取得相关经营许可。路径中无商务部门审批。可能适用的唯一事前国家审查是国家安全审查(受覆盖国防/重要领域取得控制权的交易)与 SAMR 经营者集中(达营业额阈值的交易)——普通绿地制造一般均不在此列。

敏感的制造子项

全面开放是默认,但少数制造相邻情形仍受审视:

  • 国防与两用:关联国防或两用品的制造可能触发安全审查或出口管制与技术转让规则。
  • 稀土与关键资源:关联稀土及若干关键材料的加工与分离保留条件与战略管控。
  • 关键技术:涉及重要数据、核心技术或关键信息基础设施的交易可能招致网络安全与安全审查。

这些是边角,而非主战场。标准的消费品、零部件、机械或电子制造商不受影响。投资者仅需确认其具体产品不落入敏感角落,即可假定全面开放。

这对供应链战略的意义

制造全面开放重塑了外资集团运用中国的方式。全资工厂可服务国内市场、出口,并融入区域供应链,而无需法律强加的本地合资伙伴。这支撑若干 2026 战略:

  • 本地供本地:持有服务中国客户的工厂,保护工艺与品牌控制。
  • 出口平台:将中国作为成本竞争力强、全资持有的出口基地。
  • 研发加制造:将外商独资企业工厂与研发实体同址,二者均无持股上限。
  • 自贸区加成:在全国全面开放基线之上叠加自贸区激励(税收、保税物流、简化海关)。

取消上限因此不唯象征;它改变了可行的所有体与运营模型。

自贸区叠加一层

尽管制造业全国开放,自贸区仍通过激励而非准入为制造商增值。保税物流、简化海关(如两步申报与 AEO 便利)、税收处理及综合服务窗口,可降低制造运营的成本与时间。对外资制造商,准入决定已定;选址决定继而权衡激励、物流与人才。在产品与供应链契合时,海南自贸港与领先自贸区是自然候选。

2026 年制造进入清单

  1. 确认产品不在负面清单上:对制造业,这是基线假定,但仍须核实无敏感子项适用。
  2. 选择所有体:100% 外商独资被允许;合资可选,非必须。
  3. 经一网通办设立并报送外商投资初始信息报告。
  4. 梳理经营许可:环保、安全、CCC 及行业许可,尽早启动。
  5. 仅当取得受覆盖或大型企业控制权时,筛查安全审查与经营者集中。
  6. 评估自贸区/海南激励:物流、税收与海关收益。
  7. 在开放框架下搭建供应链:进出口、保税选项与本地采购。

制造业是中国市场进入中”我能否持有?”这一最难问题已有明答的部分。2026 年的工作,是许可、选址与供应链这些更软却更决定性的执行工作。

Sources

Telecom and Finance Opening to Foreign Investment

  • Most financial sub-sectors are now fully open to foreign ownership after caps were removed in 2020–2021.
    随着 2020—2021 年股比上限取消,多数金融子行业已全面向外资产开放。
  • Value-added telecom services have been further opened in designated pilot areas rather than nationwide at once.
    增值电信业务在指定的试点地区进一步开放,而非一次性全国放开。
  • Foreign banks, securities, fund-management and insurance firms enter via licensing with the financial regulators, not the negative list alone.
    外资银行、证券、基金管理与保险机构经金融监管部门许可进入,而非仅靠负面清单。
  • Pilot zones — Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan, Shenzhen and others — host the deepest telecom opening experiments.
    北京、上海、海南、深圳等地作为试点片区,承载最深的电信开放试验。
  • Data, cybersecurity and content rules still shape how far and how foreign telecom services may operate.
    数据、网络安全与内容规则仍决定外资电信业务可运营的范围与方式。
  • A foreign financial institution still clears prudential licensing and, for control deals, SAMR merger control.
    外资金融机构仍须通过审慎许可,且取得控制权的交易须过 SAMR 经营者集中审查。
  • 2026 is about implementing and deepening the openings already made, especially in cross-border services and pilots.
    2026 年的重点在于落实并深化既有开放,尤其是跨境服务与试点领域。

Telecom and Finance Opening to Foreign Investment | 电信与金融业扩大对外资开放

Two fronts of service-sector opening

If manufacturing is fully open and the negative list’s residue sits in services, then telecom and finance are the two highest-profile service fronts. They differ in mechanism. Financial opening was delivered mainly through removing foreign-ownership caps in successive negative-list revisions and corresponding regulatory changes, now largely complete. Telecom opening is being delivered more cautiously through pilot zones and incremental licence liberalization, because it touches networks, data and content. For a 2026 entrant, the two require different playbooks.

Financial opening: caps removed, licensing remains

The decisive step came in 2020–2021, when China removed foreign-equity caps in banking, securities, fund management, futures and life insurance. Today a foreign investor may, in principle, wholly own a bank, securities firm, fund manager, futures company or life insurer in China. The removal is reflected in the negative list, which no longer carries those caps for most financial sub-sectors.

But “no cap” is not “no gate.” A foreign financial institution still requires a prudential licence from the relevant regulator — the financial regulatory administration for banks and insurance, and the securities regulator for securities, funds and futures. Licensing tests capital, fitness of shareholders, risk systems and business plans; it is a substantive review, not a formality. For a controlling acquisition, SAMR merger control also applies if thresholds are met. The 2026 task for a foreign financial group is therefore execution: choose the vehicle (wholly foreign-owned, joint venture, or stake in an existing licensee), meet the prudential bar, and clear merger control where relevant.

Telecom: pilot-led, incremental

Telecom is opened differently. The negative list still caps or conditions certain value-added telecom (增值电信) services, and the operating licence (增值电信业务经营许可证) is issued by MIIT and its provincial offices. Rather than lifting all caps at once, the state has used pilot areas to widen access: designated localities — including Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan and Shenzhen, among others — have been authorized to relax foreign-equity conditions for selected value-added telecom services. The pattern is the familiar pilot-then-nationalize logic applied to networks.

For an investor, this means location is decisive. A value-added telecom service that is capped nationally may be open to foreign majority or full ownership inside a pilot locality. The investor should confirm, for the specific service and locality, whether the pilot authorization applies, and should expect to operate under the pilot’s terms (often including data-localization and cybersecurity obligations).

Why telecom stays cautious

The caution is structural. Telecom networks and the data they carry intersect with critical information infrastructure, cybersecurity review, and content regulation. Even where foreign equity is permitted, the licence and the operating environment impose obligations: data handling consistent with the data-security and personal-information-protection framework, cybersecurity review for covered transactions, and content compliance for any user-facing service. A foreign telecom investor should budget for these non-equity constraints as carefully as for the ownership question.

The overlap with the negative list and the market-access list

Both sectors also sit under the market-access negative list. A foreign-invested bank or telecom operator is “open” on the foreign list but still needs the ordinary licence that applies to all players. The two-screen discipline from earlier articles applies: clear the foreign-access condition (often now “none” in finance, or “pilot-dependent” in telecom), then clear the operating licence that everyone faces. Missing the second screen is the most common cause of a stalled launch.

Pilot zones as the 2026 frontier

The 2026 action is concentrated in pilots. Designated service-opening pilot cities and the FTZs continue to trial wider foreign participation in value-added telecom and selected financial services, including cross-border services from pilots. Hainan Free Trade Port and the Lingang New Area carry bespoke measures. The investor’s edge is to track these pilots annually: a service open only in a pilot this year may be open nationally within a revision or two, and entering the pilot now can secure a first-mover position.

A 2026 entry checklist

  1. Finance: confirm the sub-sector cap is removed; choose vehicle; prepare the prudential licence application; screen merger control for control deals.
  2. Telecom: identify the exact value-added service; check the national cap; test Beijing/Shanghai/Hainan/Shenzhen pilot availability; prepare the MIIT licence and data/cybersecurity plan.
  3. Both: clear the market-access negative list licence that applies to all investors.
  4. Both: plan for ongoing prudential supervision, reporting and inspection.
  5. Both: watch pilot expansions annually and position for nationalization.

Telecom and finance show China’s two speeds of opening: finance flipped the switch on ownership and now runs on licensing; telecom eases in through pilots while guarding networks and data. The 2026 investor succeeds by matching the playbook to the sector.


电信与金融业扩大对外资开放

服务业开放的两大前沿

若制造业已全面开放,而负面清单的残留集中于服务业,则电信与金融便是服务业主最瞩目的两大前沿。二者机制不同。金融开放主要通过连续负面清单修订及相应监管变更取消外资股比上限来实现,如今大体完成。电信开放则通过试点片区与渐进式许可放开更为审慎地推进,因其触及网络、数据与内容。对 2026 年进入者,二者需要不同打法。

金融开放:上限已撤,许可仍在

决定性一步发生于 2020—2021 年,中国取消了银行、证券、基金管理、期货及寿险的外资股比上限。如今外资原则上可全资持有中国的银行、证券公司、基金管理人、期货公司或寿险公司。这一取消体现于负面清单——多数金融子行业已不再载有该等上限。

但”无上限”不等于”无门槛”。外资金融机构仍须取得相关监管者的审慎许可——银行与保险归金融监管总局,证券、基金与期货归证券监管机构。许可审查资本、股东适格性、风险体系与业务计划,属实质审查而非形式。对取得控制权的收购,若达阈值还须通过 SAMR 经营者集中审查。因此 2026 年外资金融集团的任务是执行:选择载体(外商独资、合资,或入股既有持牌机构),满足审慎标准,并在相关时通过经营者集中审查。

电信:以试点引领,渐进放开

电信的放开方式不同。负面清单仍对若干增值电信业务设限或附加条件,经营许可证(增值电信业务经营许可证)由工信部及省级机构核发。国家未一次性取消所有上限,而是以试点地区拓宽准入:包括北京、上海、海南、深圳等在内的指定地方,被授权对选定增值电信业务放宽外资股权条件。这正是熟悉的”先试点、后全国”逻辑应用于网络。

对投资者而言,这意味着选址具决定性。全国受限的增值电信业务,在试点地方可能向外方多数或全资开放。投资者应就具体业务与地点,确认试点授权是否适用,并预期在试点条款下运营(通常含数据本地化与网络安全义务)。

电信为何保持审慎

审慎是结构性的。电信网络及其承载的数据,与关键信息基础设施、网络安全审查及内容监管相交。即便允许外资股权,许可与运营环境仍设义务:符合数据安全与个人信息保护框架的数据处理、受覆盖交易的网络安全审查、以及任何面向用户服务的内容合规。外资电信投资者应如同对待持股问题一样,审慎为这些非股权约束预留预算。

与负面清单及市场准入清单的交叠

两行业亦处于市场准入负面清单之下。外商投资银行或电信运营商在”外资清单”上”开放”,仍须取得面向所有参与者的常规许可。前文的两屏纪律在此适用:清掉外资准入条件(金融如今常为”无”,电信则为”视试点而定”),再清掉人人面对的经营许可。漏掉第二屏,是启动受阻最常见的原因。

作为 2026 前沿的试点片区

2026 年的动作集中在试点。指定的服务业开放试点城市与自贸区持续试验增值电信与若干金融服务的更宽外资参与,含自试点的跨境服务。海南自贸港与临港新片区承载定制措施。投资者优势在于每年跟踪这些试点:今年仅于试点开放的某服务,可能在一两次修订内全国开放,而此刻进入试点可抢占先发位。

2026 年进入清单

  1. 金融:确认子行业上限已撤;选载体;备审慎许可申请;对控制权交易筛查经营者集中。
  2. 电信:识别确切增值业务;查全国上限;测试北京/上海/海南/深圳试点可用性;备工信部许可与数据/网络安全方案。
  3. 二者:清掉面向所有投资者的市场准入负面清单许可。
  4. 二者:规划持续的审慎监管、报告与检查。
  5. 二者:每年关注试点扩围,并为全国化布局。

电信与金融展现了中国开放的两种速度:金融在持股上拨动开关,如今运行于许可之上;电信经试点渐进放松,同时守护网络与数据。2026 年投资者成功之道,在于让打法匹配行业。

Sources

How China’s Negative List Has Cut Sector Restrictions

  • China’s foreign-investment negative list has been shortened in every major revision since 2013, with entries falling from over 100 to about 30.
    中国外资负面清单自 2013 年起历次重大修订持续缩减,条目由百余项降至约 30 项。
  • The 2024 version deleted the entire manufacturing category, making manufacturing fully open to foreign investment.
    2024 年版删除了整个制造业类别,使制造业全面向外资产开放。
  • Each cut follows a pattern: pilot an opening in free-trade zones, then write it into the national list.
    每次缩减都遵循同一路径:先在自贸区试点开放,再写入全国清单。
  • Remaining restrictions are concentrated in services, content, data, and national-security-sensitive fields.
    保留的限制集中于服务业、内容、数据及国家安全敏感领域。
  • The market-access negative list (all investors) has also been streamlined, easing permissions beyond foreign capital.
    面向所有投资者的市场准入负面清单同样被精简,放宽了外资之外的许可。
  • 2026 is a year of consolidation and implementation rather than a dramatic new list, with services the next frontier.
    2026 年是整合与落地之年,而非推出惊新清单之年,服务业是下一前沿。
  • Investors should track annual revisions, because a zone pilot today can become a national right within a year or two.
    投资者应跟踪每年修订,因为今日的片区试点可能在一两年内成为全国权利。

How China’s Negative List Has Cut Sector Restrictions | 负面清单如何持续缩减行业限制

The negative list as a reform instrument

China’s negative list for foreign investment is more than a compliance document; it is the central instrument of a decade-long opening strategy. Before the list era, foreign access was governed by a “guiding catalogue” that steered investment by encouragement, restriction and prohibition, administered through case-by-case approval. The shift to a negative list — piloted in the Shanghai FTZ in 2013 and made national in 2017 — inverted the logic: everything is permitted except what the list names. Each annual or biennial revision has, with rare exceptions, removed entries rather than added them.

The list’s power is its visibility. A shrinking list is a measurable, government-committed signal of opening, and it gives investors a single place to verify access. For 2026 planning, understanding the trajectory matters as much as reading the current text.

The decade of cuts

The national foreign-investment negative list has been shortened repeatedly. Early versions (2017–2018) carried well over 60 restricted entries; subsequent revisions cut financial and manufacturing limits; the 2020 and 2021 versions removed foreign-ownership caps in banking, securities, fund management, futures and life insurance; and the 2024 version went furthest by deleting the entire manufacturing category. Across this arc, the entry count fell from more than 100 to roughly 30, with the reductions concentrated in manufacturing and finance and the residue in services and sensitivity.

The manufacturing story is the cleanest illustration. Items that once capped foreign ownership in automobiles, power, and various industrial sub-sectors were removed step by step; by the 2024 list, no manufacturing entry remained. The message to investors is unambiguous: if you make goods, you may own the Chinese operation outright.

The pilot-then-nationalize mechanism

Almost every national cut began as a free-trade-zone experiment. The FTZ negative list has always been shorter than the national one, and items proven manageable inside a zone — a relaxed equity cap, a newly opened sub-sector — are written into the next national revision. This mechanism de-risks liberalization for the regulator and creates a predictable pipeline for investors: watch the FTZ list and Hainan/Lingang carve-outs, because they preview the national list of the near future.

The cadence is regular enough to plan around. A sector opened in a leading zone in one year is a credible candidate for the national list within one to two revisions. Investors who enter via the zone pilot thus often get a head start and, later, the option to operate nationwide under the same opening.

What remains, and why

The residue after a decade of cuts is not random. It clusters in areas where the state weighs non-economic concerns:

  • Content and ideology: news, publishing, broadcast production/distribution, and certain internet culture remain closed or tightly capped.
  • Data and security: items touching critical information infrastructure, important data, and cybersecurity review retain conditions.
  • Strategic resources and defense: rare earths, certain resource processing, and defense-related investment stay restricted, with national-security review as a backstop.
  • Selected services: a few transport, telecom and professional-service sub-sectors keep equity or control conditions.

These are the “hard edges” of the list. They are unlikely to vanish in a single revision; movement there is incremental and tied to broader policy judgments.

The market-access negative list, in parallel

While the foreign-investment list governs capital origin, the market-access negative list governs permissions for all investors. It, too, has been streamlined in successive versions (including the 2025 edition), removing or simplifying licences and approvals that apply to domestic firms and foreigners alike. The two lists together define the true barrier to operation: the foreign list says who may own, the market-access list says what anyone must permit. An investor tracking only the foreign list will miss the second half of the picture.

The 2026 posture

For 2026, the realistic posture is consolidation and implementation, not a dramatic new list. The 2024 manufacturing opening and the earlier financial liberalization are still bedding in; regulators are focused on making the existing openings work — clearer licence conditions, faster filings, wider inform-and-commit, and better data sharing. Services liberalization continues at the margin (telecom and a few professional services), often first in pilots. The investor takeaway: the big, list-level openings have largely been made; the 2026 gains come from executing within them efficiently and watching zone pilots for the next wave.

Tracking the list: a habit, not an event

  1. Read the current national list (2024) as baseline and confirm no 2025/2026 supplement alters your sector.
  2. Read the FTZ list and Hainan/Lingang carve-outs for previews of future national openings.
  3. Map the market-access negative list to capture all-investor permissions.
  4. Note the restriction form (cap, control, licence) so you can structure the deal.
  5. Set an annual review — negative lists are revised; a closed sector this year may open next.
  6. Pair with security review and merger control screening for control-acquiring transactions.

The negative list is a living document. The investors who benefit most are those who treat its annual shrinkage as a planning input, not a one-time check.


负面清单如何持续缩减行业限制

作为改革工具的负面清单

中国外资负面清单不只是一份合规文件,更是十年开放战略的核心工具。在清单时代之前,外资准入由”指导目录”以鼓励、限制、禁止来引导,并通过逐案审批管理。转向负面清单——2013 年于上海自贸区试点、2017 年推向全国——颠覆了逻辑:除清单列名者外,一切皆许。此后每年或每两年一次的修订,除极少数例外,均在移除条目而非增列。

清单的力量在于其可见性。一份缩短的清单是可度量、由政府承诺的开放信号,并为投资者提供单一核验入口。对 2026 年规划而言,理解其轨迹与阅读现行文本同等重要。

十年的缩减

全国外资负面清单历经反复缩短。早期版本(2017—2018)含 60 余项受限条目;后续修订削减金融与制造限制;2020 与 2021 版取消了银行、证券、基金管理、期货及寿险的外资股比上限;2024 版走得更远,删除了整个制造业类别。在此弧线上,条目数由百余项降至约 30 项,削减集中于制造业与金融,残留于服务业与敏感性领域。

制造业故事最为清晰。曾对外资在汽车、电力及若干工业子行业设限的条目被逐步移除;至 2024 版,已无制造业条目残留。向投资者传递的信息明确无误:若你从事货物制造,可全资持有中国运营实体。

先试点、后全国的机制

几乎每一次全国缩减都始于自贸区试验。自贸区负面清单始终比全国版更短,区内验证可控的条目——放宽的股比上限、新开放的子行业——被写入下一版全国修订。该机制为监管者降低了放开风险,也为投资者提供了可预测管道:关注自贸区清单与海南/临港特别安排,因为它们预示不远的未来全国清单。

其节奏规律到足以据此规划。某行业在领先片区一年开放,便是一至两次修订内进入全国清单的可信候选。经片区试点进入的投资者因此常获先发优势,日后更可在同一开放下于全国经营。

保留之物及其缘由

十年削减后的残留并非随机,而聚集于国家权衡非经济关切之处:

  • 内容与意识形态:新闻、出版、广播制作/发行及部分网络文化仍封闭或严限。
  • 数据与安全:触及关键信息基础设施、重要数据与网络安全审查的事项保留条件。
  • 战略资源与国防:稀土、部分资源加工及涉国防投资仍受限,并以安全审查为兜底。
  • 部分服务业:少数运输、电信与专业服务子行业保留股权或控制条件。

这些即清单的”硬边”。它们不太可能于单次修订中消失;那里的动作是渐进的,并系于更广泛的政策判断。

并行的市场准入负面清单

当外资清单规范资本来源时,市场准入负面清单规范面向所有投资者的许可。它亦在连续版本(含 2025 年版)中被精简,移除或简化面向内外资一体的许可与审批。两份清单共同定义真正的经营壁垒:外资清单说”谁可持有”,市场准入清单说”任何人都须许可什么”。仅盯外资清单的投资者会错过图景的另一半。

2026 年姿态

对 2026 年,务实姿态是整合与落地,而非推出惊新清单。2024 年制造业开放与早前金融放开仍在消化;监管者聚焦于让既有开放生效——更清晰的许可条件、更快的备案、更广的告知承诺、更佳的数据共享。服务业开放在边际推进(电信与若干专业服务),且常先于试点。投资者要点:清单层面的大开放大多已完成;2026 年的收益来自在其中高效执行,并关注片区试点以迎接下一波。

跟踪清单:一种习惯,而非一次事件

  1. 以现行全国清单(2024)为基线,并确认无 2025/2026 补充改动你的行业。
  2. 阅读自贸区清单与海南/临港特别安排,以预览未来全国开放。
  3. 梳理市场准入负面清单,捕捉面向所有投资者的许可。
  4. 记录限制形式(上限、控股、许可),以便设计交易。
  5. 设定年度复核:负面清单会修订;今年封闭的行业明年可能开放。
  6. 结合安全审查与经营者集中筛查取得控制权的交易。

负面清单是一份”活文件”。受益最多的投资者,是将其逐年缩减视为规划输入,而非一次性检查的人。

Sources

Sector Restrictions on Foreign Investment in China

  • Sector restrictions on foreign investment in China are organized through the foreign-investment negative list, not a scattered set of laws.
    中国对外资的分行业限制通过外资负面清单组织,而非分散于各法律。
  • The 2024 negative list removed the entire manufacturing category, leaving restrictions concentrated in services and a few sensitive fields.
    2024 年版负面清单删除了整个制造业类别,限制集中于服务业及少数敏感领域。
  • Restrictions take the form of prohibitions, equity caps, Chinese-control requirements, and licence conditions.
    限制表现为禁止、股比上限、中方控股要求及许可条件等形式。
  • The market-access negative list adds permissions that apply to all investors, on top of the foreign-specific list.
    市场准入负面清单在”外资专属清单”之外,叠加了面向所有投资者的许可事项。
  • Sensitive fields — including news, culture, education, religion, and certain data and security areas — remain materially closed or capped.
    新闻、文化、教育、宗教及部分数据与安全等敏感领域仍实质封闭或受限。
  • The same sector can be open nationally but more open inside a free-trade zone, so location changes the restriction map.
    同一行业可全国开放,却在自贸区内更开放,故选址会改变限制地图。
  • 2026 planning should start from the negative list and then layer on ordinary sector licences to get the true准入 picture.
    2026 年规划应从负面清单入手,再叠加常规行业许可,以得真实准入全貌。

Sector Restrictions on Foreign Investment in China | 中国外资准入的分行业限制

How restrictions are organized

Unlike some jurisdictions where foreign-ownership limits hide inside sector statutes, China consolidates its foreign-investment restrictions into one document: the foreign-investment access negative list (外商投资准入负面清单), jointly issued by NDRC and MOFCOM. If a sector is absent from the list, foreign investment is admitted on national-treatment terms — no equity cap, no special approval beyond ordinary licensing. If a sector is present, the listed condition is the entire restriction: read it carefully, because that single line is the law.

This consolidation is the single most useful fact for an investor. Rather than reading dozens of laws, one screens the current list. The 2024 version (《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》) is the operative national list, effective 1 November 2024, and it is the baseline for 2026 planning.

What the 2024 list looks like

The 2024 negative list is historically short. Its headline change was the removal of the entire manufacturing category — for the first time, manufacturing is fully open to foreign investment with no residual entries. Restrictions that remain are concentrated in:

  • Services with caps: certain value-added telecom services, some financial and insurance sub-sectors’ specific products, maritime and air transport services, and selected professional services.
  • Sensitive fields: news, editing and publishing, broadcast and television program production/distribution, culture and performance, religious venues, and political/ideological content.
  • Strategic and security areas: investment related to national defense, certain rare-earth and resource items, and specific items touching data security and critical information infrastructure.

The exact count of entries shifts with each revision; the durable point is the direction — fewer entries, concentrated in services and sensitivity, not in goods production.

Forms the restrictions take

A restriction on the list is never vague. It takes one of a handful of precise forms:

  1. Prohibition — the field is closed to foreign investment entirely (e.g., news organizations, certain cultural and religious activities).
  2. Equity cap — foreign ownership is capped at a stated percentage (e.g., a 50% or lower ceiling in specific transport or telecom services).
  3. Chinese control / Chinese majority — the invested entity must be controlled by, or have a legal representative who is, a Chinese national or Chinese-controlled party.
  4. Licence condition — the field is open in principle but the operating licence embodies a foreign-specific condition.

Knowing the form tells the investor what to negotiate: an equity cap dictates the joint-venture structure; a Chinese-control requirement dictates board and legal-representative arrangements; a licence condition dictates the application strategy.

The market-access negative list overlay

The foreign-investment list is not the only screen. The market-access negative list (市场准入负面清单), also from NDRC and MOFCOM, lists permissions and licences that apply to every investor. A sector can be fully open to foreign equity yet still require an ordinary operating licence that applies to domestic firms too. For example, a foreign-invested food or medical business is “open” on the foreign list but still needs the same food-operating or medical licence a Chinese firm needs. The true准入 picture is the union of the two lists plus the ordinary sector licence.

Services vs. goods: where the line sits

The clearest structural fact of 2026 is that goods production is open and services are the live frontier. Manufacturing — including automobiles, electronics, machinery, chemicals and most consumer goods — carries no foreign-equity restriction. The restrictions that remain cluster in services: telecom, finance, transport, culture, education, and healthcare, plus the enduring sensitivity around content, data and security. An investor in goods production mostly worries about ordinary licences; an investor in services must study the negative list line by line.

Free-trade zones redraw the map

Because FTZs operate a shorter negative list, the same sector can be restricted nationally but open in a zone. A foreign investor should therefore ask two location questions: (1) Is the sector on the national list at all? (2) If so, is it carved out or relaxed in the FTZ list, Hainan, or Lingang? The answer can turn a “no” into a “yes” by changing where the entity is established. This is why sector-restriction analysis is inseparable from location strategy in 2026.

2026 planning approach

  1. Start with the 2024 national negative list as the baseline; check for any 2025/2026 revision or supplement.
  2. Identify the precise restriction form (prohibition, cap, control, licence) for your sector.
  3. Layer the market-access negative list to capture permissions applying to all investors.
  4. Add the ordinary sector licence required to actually operate.
  5. Test the FTZ/Hainan/Lingang carve-outs for any restricted item.
  6. Screen security review and merger control for control-acquiring deals.

Sector restrictions in China are narrower than their reputation, but they are real where they exist. The disciplined investor reads the one list, maps the one licence, and chooses the one location — rather than guessing.


中国外资准入的分行业限制

限制如何组织

与某些将外资持股限制散落于行业法律中的法域不同,中国将其外资限制 consolidated 于一份文件:外商投资准入负面清单,由发改委与商务部联合发布。若某行业不在清单上,外资按国民待遇准入——无股比上限,除常规许可外无特别审批。若在清单上,所列条件即为全部限制:须细读,因那一行即是法律。

这一整合是投资者最有用的事实。不必通读数十部法律,只需筛查现行清单。2024 年版(《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》)是现行全国清单,自 2024 年 11 月 1 日施行,也是 2026 年规划的基线。

2024 版清单的面貌

2024 年版负面清单史上最短。其最醒目变化是删除了整个制造业类别——制造业首次全面向外资产开放,无残留条目。保留的限制集中于:

  • 带上限的服务业:若干增值电信业务、部分金融与保险子行业特定产品、海运与空运服务、以及部分专业服务。
  • 敏感领域:新闻、编辑出版、广播电视节目制作/发行、文化与演出、宗教场所、及政治/意识形态内容。
  • 战略与安全领域:涉及国防、部分稀土与资源品、以及触碰数据安全与关键信息基础设施的特定事项。

条目确切数量随每次修订浮动;持久指向是:条目更少,集中于服务业与敏感性,而非货物生产。

限制的表现形式

清单上的限制从不模糊,表现为寥寥几种精确形式:

  1. 禁止:该领域对外资完全关闭(如新闻机构、特定文化与宗教活动)。
  2. 股比上限:外资持股被限定于明示比例(如特定运输或电信服务中的 50% 或更低上限)。
  3. 中方控股/中方多数:被投资企业须由中方或中国籍人士控制,或法定代表人须为中国籍/中方控制方。
  4. 许可条件:原则开放,但经营许可体现外资专属条件。

知悉形式即知应谈判什么:股比上限决定合资结构;中方控股要求决定董事会与法定代表人安排;许可条件决定申请策略。

市场准入负面清单的叠加

外资清单并非唯一筛查。由发改委与商务部发布的市场准入负面清单,列明面向所有投资者的许可事项。某行业可对外资股权完全开放,却仍须取得内资企业同样的常规经营许可。例如,外商投资食品或医疗业务在”外资清单”上”开放”,但仍需与中资相同的食品经营或医疗许可。真实准入全貌是两份清单加上常规行业许可的并集。

服务业与货物:界线所在

2026 年最清晰的结构性事实是:货物生产开放,服务业才是活前沿。制造业——含汽车、电子、机械、化工及多数消费品——无外资股比限制。保留的限制聚集于服务业:电信、金融、运输、文化、教育、医疗,加上围绕内容、数据与安全 persistent 的敏感性。货物生产投资者主要忧心常规许可;服务业投资者须逐行研读负面清单。

自贸区重绘地图

由于自贸区施行更短负面清单,同一行业可全国受限却在区内开放。因此外资投资者须问两个选址问题:(1)该行业是否在全国版清单上?(2)若在,是否在自贸区清单、海南或临港被剔除或放宽?答案可通过改变实体设立地,将”不行”变为”可行”。这正是为何 2026 年行业限制分析离不开选址策略。

2026 年规划方法

  1. 以 2024 全国负面清单为基线;核查有无 2025/2026 修订或补充。
  2. 识别精确限制形式(禁止、上限、控股、许可)对应你的行业。
  3. 叠加市场准入负面清单以捕捉面向所有投资者的许可。
  4. 加上实际经营所需的常规行业许可。
  5. 测试自贸区/海南/临港的特别安排对应任何受限项目。
  6. 筛查安全审查与经营者集中对应取得控制权的交易。

中国的分行业限制比其名声更窄,但在存在之处是真实的。纪律严明的投资者读透一份清单、厘清一张许可、选对一处选址——而非凭猜。

Sources