Tag Archives: Automotive & EV

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for Intelligent Connected NEVs: Targets, Guardrails and What It Means for Foreign Investors

  • Nine departments led by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology have jointly issued the 15th Five-Year Plan for the Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicle Industry; the co-issuing bodies are the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the Cyberspace Administration of China.
    工业和信息化部会同国家发展改革委、公安部、交通运输部、商务部、自然资源部、住房和城乡建设部、市场监管总局、国家网信办(共九部门)联合印发《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》。
  • The 2030 targets are that China’s whole-industry-chain advantage in intelligent connected new energy vehicles is further consolidated and the country joins the ranks of the world’s automotive powers; new energy passenger vehicles are to reach 70% of new-vehicle sales in their respective segments and commercial vehicles 40%; and vehicles with autonomous-driving functions are to achieve large-scale application.
    到 2030 年,我国智能网联新能源汽车全产业链优势进一步巩固,进入世界汽车强国行列;国内新能源乘用车在各自领域新车总销量占比达 70%、商用车达 40%;具备自动驾驶功能的汽车实现规模应用。
  • The plan deploys five areas and 17 key tasks — raising technological innovation capability, upgrading the industrial system, promoting cross-sector integration, building a scientific and efficient industry-governance system, and opening a new chapter in global industrial cooperation — supported by four major projects and three priority actions.
    《规划》部署 5 方面 17 项重点任务:提高技术创新能力、推动产业体系优化升级、促进跨界融合发展、构建科学高效的行业治理体系、开创全球产业合作新局面;并配套 4 项重大工程与 3 项重点行动。
  • Capacity early-warning and control is written into an industry five-year plan for the first time: the plan tightens the conditions for establishing independent new energy vehicle makers, speeds up merger-and-reorganisation and the reform of grouped qualification management, and extends capacity control to power batteries by requiring stronger early-warning and control management of power-battery capacity.
    “产能预警调控”首次写入行业五年规划:严格新建独立新能源车企条件,兼并重组、资质集团化管理改革提速,并将产能调控触角延伸至动力电池环节,提出加强动力电池产能预警和调控管理。
  • On 29 September 2026 the Department of Science and Technology of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published for comment 29 recommended national standard plan projects, including the Technical Requirements and Test Methods for Supply-Chain Cybersecurity of Intelligent Connected Vehicles; the comment period runs from 30 September to 29 October 2026.
    2026 年 9 月 29 日,工业和信息化部科技司公示《智能网联汽车 供应链网络安全技术要求及试验方法》等 29 项推荐性国家标准计划项目,公示时间为 2026 年 9 月 30 日至 2026 年 10 月 29 日。

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for Intelligent Connected NEVs: Targets, Guardrails and What It Means for Foreign Investors | 中国智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划:目标、护栏与外资含义

Overview

The Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicle Industry “15th Five-Year Plan” was jointly issued by nine departments, led by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The co-issuing bodies are the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the Cyberspace Administration of China.

The plan sets the sector’s direction to 2030 across three layers: quantified market-share targets, an organising structure of tasks, projects and actions, and a governance layer that for the first time puts capacity early-warning and control into an industry five-year plan. Running alongside it is a standards programme, of which the most immediately relevant piece is a set of 29 recommended national standard plan projects opened for public comment in late September 2026.

The 2030 targets

By 2030, the plan aims for China’s whole-industry-chain advantage in intelligent connected new energy vehicles to be further consolidated, and for the country to join the ranks of the world’s automotive powers. Two quantified targets anchor the market dimension: new energy passenger vehicles are to account for 70% of new-vehicle sales in their respective segments, and commercial vehicles for 40%. On the technology dimension, the plan states that vehicles with autonomous-driving functions are to achieve large-scale application.

Five areas, 17 tasks, four projects, three actions

The plan deploys five areas and 17 key tasks: raising technological innovation capability; promoting the optimisation and upgrading of the industrial system; advancing cross-sector integrated development; building a scientific and efficient industry-governance system; and opening a new chapter in global industrial cooperation.

Four major projects support those tasks: the intelligent connected new energy vehicle key-technology breakthrough project; the standards and testing-evaluation capability improvement project; the intelligent connected new energy vehicle safety foundation project; and the internationalisation capability upgrade project.

Three priority actions translate the projects into workstreams: the “artificial intelligence plus automobile” development action; the key-component ecosystem development and leading-enterprise cultivation action; and the intelligent connected new energy vehicle application-promotion action.

Capacity early-warning and control enter a five-year plan

The governance layer is where the plan breaks new ground. Capacity early-warning and control is written into an industry five-year plan for the first time. In practice this shows up in three ways: the conditions for establishing independent new energy vehicle makers are tightened; merger and reorganisation and the reform of grouped qualification management are accelerated; and the reach of capacity control is extended to power batteries, with the plan calling for stronger early-warning and control management of power-battery capacity.

For a foreign investor weighing a new greenfield vehicle or battery plant, this is the provision that most directly changes the arithmetic: entry conditions, qualification structure and the capacity conversation are all being moved into a more managed framework.

The standards system: six specialised domains

The plan requires the continued development and improvement of specialised standards systems in six domains: automotive chips, automotive software, data governance and applications, automotive artificial intelligence, automotive solid-state batteries and low-carbon automotive development.

It also addresses market conduct: regulating the release of industry data and information and the payment of enterprise accounts; strengthening market-supervision enforcement; reinforcing anti-monopoly, anti-unfair-competition and price enforcement and justice; and intensifying quality supervision and inspection, defect investigation and product-consistency supervision and inspection.

The 29 draft national standards on supply-chain cybersecurity

On 29 September 2026 the Department of Science and Technology of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published for public comment 29 recommended national standard plan projects, among them the Technical Requirements and Test Methods for Supply-Chain Cybersecurity of Intelligent Connected Vehicles. The comment period runs from 30 September to 29 October 2026, and comments are submitted online through the “standards project initiation — project initiation publicity” section of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Standards Information Service Platform (https://std.miit.gov.cn).

The drafting of a supply-chain cybersecurity standard for intelligent connected vehicles sits directly under the plan’s automotive-software and automotive-artificial-intelligence standard domains. For suppliers, it is the earliest visible signal of the technical requirements that intelligent connected vehicle supply chains will be expected to meet.

Separately, the State Administration for Market Regulation (Standardization Administration of China) approved and released the national standard on automotive software quality and defect management around 14 September 2026, adding a quality-management counterpart to the technical standards workstream.

Global supply chain and foreign investment cooperation

The plan sets out to build a global industrial chain and supply chain, to improve overseas development service capability, and to support foreign-invested enterprises in investing and cooperating in China.

On 28 September 2026, at the press conference for the 2026 World Intelligent Connected Vehicle Conference, Hao Lishun, deputy director of the First Department of Equipment Industry of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, answered questions and set out three areas of work. First, making industrial chain and supply chain cooperation closer — including supporting foreign-invested enterprises in deepening their presence in the Chinese market. Second, deepening international coordination of standards and regulations — actively participating in international standards and regulations activities under mechanisms including the United Nations World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, and promoting coordination in the development of standards and regulations for autonomous driving and electric vehicles. Third, making enterprises’ international development more stable — improving supporting arrangements such as cross-border logistics and investment and financing, strengthening overseas risk prevention and corporate compliance, and guiding enterprises to carry out overseas deployment in a prudent and orderly manner.

Judicial rules on AI-related disputes

On 7 September 2026 the Supreme People’s Court of China issued its Opinions on Trying Cases Involving Artificial-Intelligence-Related Disputes, which address liability where a vehicle defect and driver fault cause the same damage, and liability for misleading promotion of a vehicle’s automation level, intelligence, performance or use.

Practical notes for foreign investors

  • Read the capacity layer first. The tightening of conditions for new independent NEV makers and the extension of capacity control to batteries are the provisions that shape whether a new plant is approvable.
  • Track the six standard domains. Automotive chips, software, data governance, automotive AI, solid-state batteries and low-carbon development are the areas where technical requirements will be formalised.
  • Follow the 29 draft standards. Supply-chain cybersecurity is the first of the batch to watch, with comments open until 29 October 2026.
  • Use the cooperation channels. The plan and the 28 September briefing both explicitly support foreign-invested enterprises deepening their China presence and participating in international standards work under WP.29, ISO and IEC.

Sources

  • 工业和信息化部(《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》通知): https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2026/art_47e6f99ffbe945279ef3ffd23c5b3631.html
  • 工业和信息化部科技司(29 项推荐性国家标准计划项目立项公示): https://www.miit.gov.cn/jgsj/kjs/jscx/bzgf/art/2026/art_88f891ce12ee49eabf2a3585eca08ee1.html
  • 工业和信息化标准信息服务平台(标准立项—立项公示): https://std.miit.gov.cn
  • 中国工业新闻网(规划与标准相关报道): https://www.cinn.cn/yc/2026/09-29/LkvqQ7aD.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室(政策转载): https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260923/3a34c2e581c04aa4a3eb7dafedd9e404.html
  • 国家发展改革委(新闻发布会): https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/wszb/9yfbh

Related reading

  • see also: 智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划解读(341-nev-15th-fyp-plan)
  • see also: 机动车生产一致性监督检查专项行动(378-vehicle-production-consistency-campaign)

中国智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划:目标、护栏与外资含义

概述

《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》由工业和信息化部会同国家发展改革委、公安部、交通运输部、商务部、自然资源部、住房和城乡建设部、市场监管总局、国家网信办(共九部门)联合印发。

规划以三个层次界定 2030 年前的方向:量化的市场份额目标;由重点任务、重大工程、重点行动构成的推进结构;以及首次把产能预警调控写入行业五年规划的治理层。与之并行的是标准工作,其中与产业主体最直接相关的一项,是 2026 年 9 月下旬公开征求意见的 29 项推荐性国家标准计划项目。

2030 年目标

规划提出,到 2030 年,我国智能网联新能源汽车全产业链优势进一步巩固,进入世界汽车强国行列。市场维度有两个量化目标锚定:国内新能源乘用车在各自领域新车总销量占比达 70%,商用车达 40%。技术维度上,规划提出具备自动驾驶功能的汽车实现规模应用。

5 方面 17 项任务、4 项工程、3 项行动

规划部署 5 方面 17 项重点任务:提高技术创新能力;推动产业体系优化升级;促进跨界融合发展;构建科学高效的行业治理体系;开创全球产业合作新局面。

4 项重大工程为上述任务提供支撑:智能网联新能源汽车关键技术攻关工程;标准及测试评价能力提升工程;智能网联新能源汽车安全筑基工程;国际化能力跃升工程。

3 项重点行动把工程转化为具体工作流:”人工智能+汽车”发展行动;关键零部件生态建设和领军企业培育行动;智能网联新能源汽车应用推广行动。

产能预警调控首次写入五年规划

治理层是规划的突破之处。”产能预警调控”首次写入行业五年规划。具体体现为三条:严格新建独立新能源车企条件;兼并重组、资质集团化管理改革提速;将产能调控触角延伸至动力电池环节,提出加强动力电池产能预警和调控管理。

对正在评估新建整车或电池工厂的外国投资者而言,这一条最直接地改变测算:准入条件、资质结构与产能议题,都被移入一个更强调管理的框架之中。

标准体系:六个专项领域

规划要求持续建立完善六个专项标准体系:汽车芯片、汽车软件、数据治理及应用、汽车人工智能、车用固态电池、汽车低碳发展。

规划同时规范市场行为:规范行业数据信息发布和企业账款支付;加强市场监管执法;强化反垄断、反不正当竞争和价格执法司法;加强质量监督检查、缺陷调查和产品一致性监督检查力度。

供应链网络安全:29 项国家标准立项公示

2026 年 9 月 29 日,工业和信息化部科技司公示《智能网联汽车 供应链网络安全技术要求及试验方法》等 29 项推荐性国家标准计划项目。公示时间为 2026 年 9 月 30 日至 2026 年 10 月 29 日,意见通过”工业和信息化标准信息服务平台”(https://std.miit.gov.cn)”标准立项—立项公示”栏目在线反馈。

智能网联汽车供应链网络安全标准的立项,正落在规划的汽车软件与汽车人工智能两个标准领域之下。对供应商而言,这是智能网联汽车供应链将要满足的技术要求最早可见的信号。

此外,市场监管总局(国家标准委)于 2026 年 9 月 14 日前后批准发布《汽车软件质量与缺陷管理规范》国家标准,为技术标准工作补充了质量管理维度的对应文件。

全球产业链供应链与外资合作

规划提出构建全球产业链供应链、提升海外发展服务能力、支持外资企业在华投资合作等目标任务。

2026 年 9 月 28 日,在 2026 世界智能网联汽车大会新闻发布会上,工业和信息化部装备工业一司副司长郝立顺答记者问,明确工信部将重点做好三方面工作。其一,推动产业链供应链合作更加紧密,包括支持外资企业深耕中国市场。其二,推动标准法规国际协同更加深入,积极参与联合国世界车辆法规协调组织(WP.29)、国际标准化组织、国际电工委员会等机制下的国际标准法规活动,推动自动驾驶、电动汽车等标准法规制定协调。其三,推动企业国际化发展更加稳健,完善跨境物流、投融资等配套支撑,加强海外风险防范和企业合规建设,引导企业稳妥有序开展海外布局。

涉人工智能纠纷案件的司法规则

2026 年 9 月 7 日,中国最高人民法院发布《关于依法审理涉人工智能纠纷案件的意见》,对车辆缺陷与驾驶人过错行为结合致损的责任,以及对车辆自动化等级、智能程度、性能、用途等作虚假或者引人误解宣传的责任作出规定。

外资企业实务提示

  • 先读产能层。 严格新建独立新能源车企条件,以及产能调控向电池环节延伸,是决定新建工厂能否获批的条款。
  • 跟踪六个标准领域。 汽车芯片、汽车软件、数据治理、汽车人工智能、车用固态电池与汽车低碳发展,是技术要求将被正式化的方向。
  • 关注 29 项立项公示。 供应链网络安全是本批中最值得跟踪的一项,意见反馈开放至 2026 年 10 月 29 日。
  • 用好合作通道。 规划与 9 月 28 日发布会均明确支持外资企业深耕中国市场,并参与 WP.29、ISO、IEC 机制下的国际标准工作。

来源

  • 工业和信息化部(《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》通知): https://www.miit.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/wjfb/tz/art/2026/art_47e6f99ffbe945279ef3ffd23c5b3631.html
  • 工业和信息化部科技司(29 项推荐性国家标准计划项目立项公示): https://www.miit.gov.cn/jgsj/kjs/jscx/bzgf/art/2026/art_88f891ce12ee49eabf2a3585eca08ee1.html
  • 工业和信息化标准信息服务平台(标准立项—立项公示): https://std.miit.gov.cn
  • 中国工业新闻网(规划与标准相关报道): https://www.cinn.cn/yc/2026/09-29/LkvqQ7aD.html
  • 上海市人民政府外事办公室(政策转载): https://wsb.sh.gov.cn/ztzl/shzxzb/20260923/3a34c2e581c04aa4a3eb7dafedd9e404.html
  • 国家发展改革委(新闻发布会): https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/wszb/9yfbh

相关阅读

  • 见:智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划解读(341-nev-15th-fyp-plan)
  • 见:机动车生产一致性监督检查专项行动(378-vehicle-production-consistency-campaign)

China’s one-year vehicle production-consistency and quality campaign: what it means for automakers and suppliers

  • On 27 August 2026, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and SAMR jointly launched a one-year special campaign on production consistency and quality improvement for road motor vehicles (document MIIT Office letter 联通装函〔2026〕407号, dated 21 August 2026).
    2026年8月27日,工业和信息化部、公安部、生态环境部、市场监管总局四部门联合发布通知,自即日起在全国开展为期一年的道路机动车辆产品生产一致性和质量提升专项行动(文号:工信厅联通装函〔2026〕407号,落款日期2026年8月21日)。
  • The campaign targets four problem areas: production consistency (量产车参数与《公告》一致性), reliability, durability and test verification of new technologies, in an effort to steer the intensely price-competitive NEV market back towards quality and technology.
    专项行动集中整治四方面问题:生产一致性、可靠性、耐久性与新技术测试验证,意在把竞争激烈的新能源汽车市场引导回”质量与技术”赛道。
  • Production consistency checks cover three layers: whether mass-produced vehicles match the parameters and mandatory national standards in the vehicle Public Announcement; how OEMs manage component suppliers (procurement standards, incoming inspection, parts quality); and the OEM’s consistency-assurance capability (personnel, equipment, processes, management systems).
    生产一致性检查覆盖三个层面:量产车技术指标与《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品公告》参数及国家标准的一致性;整车企业对零部件供应商的管理(采购标准、进货检验、零部件质量);整车企业生产一致性保证能力(人员、设备、工艺、管理体系)。
  • Verification of new technologies now extends to intelligent-connected vehicles and AI: driving-assistance and autonomous-driving functions must be sufficiently tested and validated, product and cloud-platform data and network security protections must be adequate, and logs for incident investigation must be complete.
    新技术测试验证延伸到智能网联与人工智能:组合驾驶辅助及自动驾驶功能须充分测试验证,产品与云端平台的数据安全、网络安全防护须充分,用于案事件调查的日志留存须完整。
  • For foreign brands manufacturing in China and global suppliers to Chinese OEMs, the campaign signals stricter enforcement of the “公告准入—一致性保持—质量责任” chain and deeper scrutiny of the supply chain; quality consistency work that used to be paperwork-heavy now faces real verification against samples and test data.
    对在华生产的外资品牌与供应中国主机厂的全球零部件企业而言,专项行动意味着”公告准入—一致性保持—质量责任”链条执法收紧、供应链穿透式检查加深;过去偏重纸面材料的一致性工作将面临样车抽检与试验数据的实地核验。

China’s one-year vehicle production-consistency and quality campaign: what it means for automakers and suppliers | 四部门启动为期一年的机动车生产一致性与质量提升专项行动

Overview

On 27 August 2026, four Chinese authorities — the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) — jointly published the Notice on Launching a Special Campaign on Production Consistency and Quality Improvement for Road Motor Vehicles (关于开展道路机动车辆产品生产一致性和质量提升专项行动的通知, 工信厅联通装函〔2026〕407号). The campaign runs nationwide for one year from the date of issue and follows a 17 July 2026 meeting at which MIIT’s Equipment Industry Department I asked major automakers to strengthen self-inspection, and unannounced consistency inspections at OEMs including GAC Aion, Xpeng, Chery, NIO and JAC during July.

The campaign’s stated purpose is to regulate the competitive order of the new-energy-vehicle (NEV) industry and hold the line on production consistency and quality safety. Coming after a period of aggressive price competition in China’s NEV market, the initiative is widely read by analysts as a signal that competition must return to quality and technology rather than price and speed.

The four problem areas under scrutiny

1. Production consistency (生产一致性). This is the first and deepest target. Inspections verify:

  • whether mass-produced vehicles’ technical parameters match the vehicle Public Announcement (《公告》) and comply with relevant mandatory national standards;
  • how the OEM manages component suppliers — procurement standards, incoming inspection and parts-quality management;
  • whether the OEM has a genuine consistency-assurance capability: personnel competence, production and inspection equipment, purchased raw materials and parts assemblies and their suppliers, production processes, working environment and management systems.

MIIT’s Equipment Industry Development Centre describes production consistency as the baseline institutional requirement of vehicle admission management: the parameters, configurations and performance of batch-produced vehicles must remain consistent with the type-approved product, the type-test sample and the certificate information, and continue to meet mandatory national standards. On 28 August 2026, MIIT published typical cases from the 2025 NEV production-consistency supervision and inspection, including sample vehicles delivered without user manuals, individual parameters inconsistent with the Announcement, and emergency-window net areas and side/rear underrun-protection performance failing national-standard requirements.

2. Reliability (可靠性). Checks cover the reliability testing and validation of complete vehicles, key systems and components, and whether manufacturing processes and standards at OEMs and parts makers can guarantee reliability.

3. Durability (耐久性). Inspectors look at new-vehicle design service life and R&D cycles, body-material selection, anti-corrosion processes and structural protection, and recorded problems such as defects, corrosion and suspension fractures.

4. Test verification of new technologies (新技术测试验证). This category is squarely aimed at the intelligent-connected era:

  • whether innovative designs adequately assess risks to user habits, misuse and extreme-use scenarios, and whether marketing claims match reality;
  • whether new materials and structures carry hidden defect or fatigue-failure risks;
  • whether combined driving-assistance and autonomous-driving functions have been sufficiently tested and validated; whether product and cloud-platform data-security and network-security protections are adequate; whether AI-safety protections are adequate; whether security measures were planned, built and put into use simultaneously (“三同步”); and whether logs needed for incident investigation are complete.

The campaign also calls for establishing industry-wide third-party testing and evaluation activity guidelines that are standardised, open, fair and traceable, continued crackdowns on exaggerated and false advertising, and public disclosure of problem enterprises and inspection bodies to draw clear “red lines”.

How the campaign is enforced

The Notice asks provincial industry-and-information-technology, public-security, ecology-and-environment and market-regulation departments to implement it in their localities under territorial responsibility, strictly regulate administrative inspections of enterprises, and report results to the four ministries after the year ends. An annex sets out a work plan for inspecting manufacturers’ product-safety-assurance capability and production consistency.

Key expectations are placed on:

  • Vehicle manufacturers: strengthen their primary responsibility for production consistency and quality safety, conduct deep self-inspection and correction, resist irrational competition, tighten supply-chain management, strengthen consistency-assurance capability, improve testing and validation of new products, standardise marketing claims, and hold the product-safety line.
  • Inspection and testing institutions: operate lawfully, impartially and objectively, and genuinely improve work quality.
  • Industry associations: guide self-discipline and corporate social responsibility.
  • Standardisation bodies: accelerate the drafting and revision of relevant standards.
  • Technical-service institutions: strictly conduct technical review, including assessment of innovative designs.

What this means for foreign-invested players

  • Localised manufacturers under sharper scrutiny. Foreign brands producing NEVs in China — whether through wholly owned plants or joint ventures — must verify that mass-production data, supplier records and certification documents align with the Announcement for every model sold. Discrepancies that previously triggered warnings may now produce public naming and penalties.
  • Suppliers drawn into the inspection web. Because consistency checks reach into procurement standards and incoming inspection, component suppliers (batteries, motors, electronics, chassis) will face more demanding customer audits and possibly direct regulatory contact. Global suppliers should expect OEM requests for higher documentation standards and tighter quality agreements.
  • The intelligent-driving agenda is now a compliance topic. With AI and autonomous-driving functions inside the test-verification scope, software-defined vehicle makers and their algorithm/data partners must demonstrate adequate testing, cybersecurity and data-protection measures, and complete log retention. This aligns with the mandatory national standards for intelligent-connected vehicles (e.g. GB 44721—2026 and GB 47955—2026, published 2026) that set a framework for safe operation of the technology.
  • Marketing claims need a legal scrub. The campaign’s emphasis on curbing exaggerated and false advertising means sales and PR materials making performance, range or safety claims should be reviewed against verified test data.

Practical steps

  • Run an internal consistency audit: compare current production configuration, software versions and component part numbers against the Announcement and certification files for each model.
  • Tighten supplier quality management: verify incoming-inspection records, and ask key suppliers to confirm their own consistency controls.
  • Strengthen test-verification documentation for ADAS/AD features, including cybersecurity reviews of vehicle and cloud platforms and log-retention arrangements.
  • Prepare for potential on-site inspection and sample testing; designate a responsible officer for campaign-related queries from local authorities.
  • Review advertising and marketing materials for consistency with verified technical data before publication.

Sources

  • 工信部装备工业发展中心 — 工业和信息化部等四部门办公厅关于开展道路机动车辆产品生产一致性和质量提升专项行动的通知(全文): https://www.miit-eidc.org.cn/art/2026/8/27/art_1657_12693.html
  • 工信微报(网易转载)— 四部门联合整治汽车质量 推动行业竞争回归质量与技术: https://www.163.com/dy/article/L5IO290I0514K35E.html
  • 央视新闻(今日头条转载)— 四部门开展专项行动集中整治车辆可靠性耐久性等问题: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7678641260592103986

Related reading

  • see also: NEV 15th Five-Year Plan signals — where the sector is heading (341-nev-fifteenth-fyp)
  • see also: China’s mandatory national standards for intelligent-connected vehicles (intelligent-connected-vehicle-gb-standards)

四部门启动为期一年的机动车生产一致性与质量提升专项行动

概述

2026年8月27日,工业和信息化部、公安部、生态环境部、市场监管总局联合发布《关于开展道路机动车辆产品生产一致性和质量提升专项行动的通知》(工信厅联通装函〔2026〕407号,落款日期2026年8月21日),宣布自即日起在全国范围内开展为期一年的专项行动。此前的7月17日,工信部装备工业一司已召开重点汽车生产企业座谈会部署自查;7月下旬又对广汽埃安、小鹏、奇瑞、蔚来、江淮等企业开展产品安全保障能力和生产一致性监督检查。

专项行动旨在规范新能源汽车产业竞争秩序、守牢产品生产一致性和质量安全底线。在经历一轮激烈价格战之后,业内普遍将其解读为:竞争必须回到质量与技术,而不是价格与速度。

重点整治的四个方面

一、生产一致性。 这是排在第一位的深度整治对象,检查涵盖三方面:

  • 整车企业量产车技术指标与《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品公告》参数的一致性、相关国家标准的符合性;
  • 整车企业对零部件供应商的管理情况——采购标准、进货检验、零部件产品质量管理;
  • 整车企业的生产一致性保证能力——人员能力、生产与检验设备、采购的原材料和零部件总成及其供应商、生产工艺、工作环境、管理体系。

工信部装备工业发展中心将生产一致性概括为机动车准入管理的基础制度要求:企业批量生产销售车辆的技术参数、配置、性能,要与《公告》型式批准的产品、型式试验样品、合格证信息保持一致,持续符合国家强制性标准。8月28日,工信部公开曝光2025年度新能源汽车产品生产一致性监督检查典型案例,包括样车未配说明书、个别参数与《公告》不一致、应急窗净面积与侧后防护装置性能不符合国标要求等。

二、可靠性。 检查整车产品、关键系统和零部件的可靠性测试验证情况,以及整车与零部件企业生产制造工艺标准能否保证产品可靠性。

三、耐久性。 检查整车企业新车设计使用寿命和研发周期、车身材料选用、防腐工艺、结构防护要求,以及产品缺陷、锈蚀、悬架断裂等问题。

四、新技术测试验证。 这一项直接指向智能网联时代:

  • 新产品创新设计对用户习惯、误操作风险、极端使用场景的风险评估是否充分,营销宣传是否符合实际;
  • 新材料、新结构是否存在产品缺陷、疲劳失效等风险隐患;
  • 组合驾驶辅助及自动驾驶功能测试验证是否充分;产品及云端平台数据安全、网络安全防护是否充分;人工智能安全防护是否充分;是否同步规划、同步建设、同步使用;用于案事件调查的日志留存是否完整。

专项行动还要求研究建立规范、公开、公正、可追溯的汽车行业第三方测评活动指南,持续整治汽车行业网络乱象、严厉打击夸大和虚假宣传,公开通报问题企业与检验机构,为行业划清”红线”、守牢”底线”。

如何执行

通知要求各地工信、公安、生态环境、市场监管部门落实属地责任,开展本地区专项行动,严格规范涉企行政检查,一年期满后向四部门报送工作情况。附件为《道路机动车辆生产企业产品安全保障能力和生产一致性监督检查工作方案》。

各环节责任被明确压实:整车企业要深入开展自查自纠、自觉抵制非理性竞争、加强供应链管理、强化生产一致性保证能力、加强新产品测试验证、规范营销宣传;检验检测机构要依法依规公正客观执业;行业协会引导自律;标准化组织加快标准制修订;技术服务机构严格技术审查并加强对创新设计的审查评估。

对外资车企与供应商的意义

  • 本土化生产的外资品牌面临更严核验。 无论独资还是合资,外资新能源品牌必须确保每个在售车型的量产数据、供应商记录与认证文件同《公告》一致。以往可能只是警示的偏差,如今可能被公开点名并处罚。
  • 供应商被纳入穿透式检查网。 一致性检查深入采购标准与进货检验,电池、电机、电控、底盘等零部件供应商将面对更严苛的客户审核,甚至监管部门的直接接触。全球供应商应预期主机厂提出更高的文件化标准和更严的质量协议。
  • 智能驾驶议题成为合规议题。 自动驾驶与人工智能功能进入测试验证范围,软件定义汽车厂商及其算法、数据合作伙伴必须证明测试充分、网安与数据保护到位、日志留存完整。这与2026年发布的多项智能网联汽车强制性国家标准(如GB 44721—2026、GB 47955—2026)相衔接,共同为技术安全运行划定框架。
  • 营销话术需要法务审查。 专项行动强调遏制夸大与虚假宣传,销售与公关材料中的性能、续航、安全类表述应与经核验的试验数据一致。

实务建议

  • 开展内部一致性审计:逐车型核对量产配置、软件版本与零部件号是否与《公告》和认证文件一致。
  • 收紧供应商质量管理:核查进货检验记录,要求关键供应商确认其自身一致性管控。
  • 完善ADAS/AD功能测试验证文档,包括车端与云端平台的网络安全审查与日志留存安排。
  • 为可能的现场检查与样车抽检做准备,指定专人对接地方主管部门在行动期间的问询。
  • 发布前审查广告与营销材料的各项表述是否与已核验技术数据一致。

来源

  • 工信部装备工业发展中心 — 四部门办公厅关于开展道路机动车辆产品生产一致性和质量提升专项行动的通知(全文): https://www.miit-eidc.org.cn/art/2026/8/27/art_1657_12693.html
  • 工信微报(网易转载)— 四部门联合整治汽车质量 推动行业竞争回归质量与技术: https://www.163.com/dy/article/L5IO290I0514K35E.html
  • 央视新闻(今日头条转载)— 四部门开展专项行动集中整治车辆可靠性耐久性等问题: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7678641260592103986

相关阅读

  • 见:新能源汽车”十五五”政策信号——产业走向何方(341-nev-fifteenth-fyp)
  • 见:中国智能网联汽车强制性国家标准(intelligent-connected-vehicle-gb-standards)

China’s “15th Five-Year Plan” for Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicles: Quality First, Full-Country Charging

  • On 26 August 2026 the MIIT deputy minister outlined the Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicle Industry “15th Five-Year Plan” at a State Council Information Office briefing: quality is the priority, and products that have not been fully tested and validated are banned from entering the market.
    2026 年 8 月 26 日,工业和信息化部副部长在国新办发布会上介绍《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》:以质量为先,严禁未经充分测试验证的产品进入市场。
  • “14th Five-Year” achievements set the baseline: NEV annual sales rose from 1.367 million to 16.49 million units, the share of new-car sales climbed from 5.4% to 47.9%, and China produces over 70% of the world’s NEVs, power batteries and key materials.
    “十四五”成绩奠定基线:新能源汽车年销量从 136.7 万辆增至 1649 万辆,新车销售占比从 5.4% 提高到 47.9%,新能源汽车、动力电池及关键材料产量占全球 70% 以上。
  • The plan’s four pillars are: higher product quality (battery low-temperature performance, autonomous-driving safety and reliability); better supporting infrastructure (charging stations in every county and piles in every township, used-car and trade-in programmes); improved industry governance (grouped production-qualification reform, strict design-admission review); and deeper international cooperation.
    规划四大方向:提升产品供给质量(动力电池低温适应性、自动驾驶安全性与可靠性);优化配套使用环境(充电站”县县全覆盖”、充电桩”乡乡全覆盖”、以旧换新);完善行业治理(生产资质集团化管理改革、严格创新设计准入审查);深化国际合作。
  • Battery recycling gets a regulatory push: a dedicated administrative regulation is being drafted, joint enforcement campaigns are planned, and a digital identity system for power batteries will make them traceable from source to destination, aiming for over one million tonnes of comprehensive recycling utilisation by 2030.
    电池回收获监管加码:研究起草相关行政法规、开展部门联合执法专项行动、实施动力电池数字身份证管理制度,实现”来源可溯、去向可查”;到 2030 年废旧动力电池综合利用量力争达到百万吨级以上。
  • For foreign auto companies, the signals are a quality-first admission regime (new-design review and testing will tighten), stable NEV incentives through better charging and insurance support, and continued opening to international standards and investment cooperation.
    对外资车企,信号是:质量优先的准入体系(创新设计审查与测试将收紧)、通过补充电设施与优化车险维持的新能源激励,以及继续对接国际标准与投资合作。

China’s “15th Five-Year Plan” for Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicles: Quality First, Full-Country Charging | 中国智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划:质量为先,全域补能

The briefing and the plan

On 26 August 2026, at a State Council Information Office briefing on the “15th Five-Year Plan”, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology outlined the Intelligent Connected New Energy Vehicle Industry “15th Five-Year Plan”. The plan is the sector’s roadmap for 2026–2030, and its headline message is quality over speed: “products that have not been fully tested and validated are strictly prohibited from entering the market”. The briefing acknowledged the “14th Five-Year” record — NEV annual sales rising from 1.367 million to 16.49 million units, penetration climbing from 5.4% to 47.9% of new-car sales, output of NEVs, batteries and key materials above 70% of the world total, and exports to more than 100 countries — but also flagged the problems the next five years must fix: irrational competition, “aggressive” designs put into vehicles without sufficient experimental validation, and safety events that drew public attention.

The four pillars

The plan rests on four pillars. First, product quality: support leading companies in raising power-battery low-temperature adaptability and durability and in improving autonomous-driving safety and reliability; advance the intelligent-connected-vehicle admission and road-test pilots and the “vehicle-road-cloud integration” pilots; and hold the line on quality. Second, supporting infrastructure: run trade-in and NEV-to-the-countryside programmes and the pilot to close charging gaps in counties, aiming for charging stations in every county and charging piles in every township; build out the vehicle-modification management regime; and optimise NEV insurance policy and lower repair costs so consumers are willing to buy and confident to use. Third, industry governance: reform the grouped management of vehicle-production qualifications, optimise industry layout, strengthen admission review of innovative designs and testing/validation management, and step up consistency inspections. Fourth, international cooperation: intensify coordination on international standards and regulations, improve cross-border logistics and financing support, and steadily advance trade and investment cooperation.

Battery recycling gets teeth

A notable new element is the battery end-of-life agenda. With a wave of battery retirements arriving, the authorities plan to draft dedicated administrative regulations, run joint departmental enforcement campaigns to standardise the recycling and reuse order, and implement a digital identity system for power batteries so that every battery is traceable “from source to destination”. The target is comprehensive utilisation of waste power batteries at or above one million tonnes per year by 2030. For companies in the recycling, second-life and materials businesses — including foreign investors — this signals a formalised, traceable regulatory regime rather than the current patchwork.

What it means for foreign auto players

For foreign carmakers and suppliers in China, the plan carries four practical signals. First, admission: the design-admission review and testing requirements will tighten, so product-development pipelines must budget more validation time and evidence before launch. Second, market support: the charging build-out and insurance/cost optimisation are designed to keep demand growth alive, protecting the commercial case for NEV investment. Third, governance: grouped production-qualification reform may create new structures for brands that license or assemble in China, worth modelling for restructuring decisions. Fourth, openness: the plan’s international-cooperation pillar — standards coordination, cross-border logistics and financing support — is consistent with China’s broader invitation to global players, and foreign brands participating in the pilots (intelligent connected admission, vehicle-road-cloud integration) will help shape the standards that later go national. Companies should also prepare for the battery traceability regime, which will affect warranty, recall and recycling obligations across the value chain.

The numbers behind the plan

The plan’s targets sit on a rapidly expanding base. In 2026, NEVs already account for the majority of monthly new-car sales — July 2026 data show NEVs above 60 per cent of new-vehicle sales for the month — and the first half of the year saw NEV penetration near 50 per cent of the market. Chinese-brand NEVs held a 24 per cent share of overseas markets in H1 2026, up 10 percentage points year on year, with the EU a leading contributor. On infrastructure, the charging build-out is accelerating: the plan’s “charging stations in every county, piles in every township” target follows the 2030 charging-infrastructure goals already set for the sector, and provincial players such as Fujian have begun publishing virtual-power-plant management rules that open new market participation for private and small-mid enterprises. On the standards side, the MIIT has been active: in August 2026 it opened public comment on a mandatory national standard for automotive cryptographic application technologies and on 50 communications-industry standards for vehicle-road-cloud systems — both signals that the technical rulebook for intelligent connected vehicles is being written now, and that foreign suppliers engaging in the standards process early will help shape it.

Sources


中国智能网联新能源汽车”十五五”规划:质量为先,全域补能

发布会与规划

2026 年 8 月 26 日,在国新办”开局起步’十五五'”系列主题新闻发布会上,工业和信息化部副部长介绍了《智能网联新能源汽车产业发展”十五五”规划》。规划是行业 2026—2030 路线图,核心基调是质量优先于速度:”严禁未经充分测试验证的产品进入市场”。发布会认可了”十四五”成绩——新能源汽车年销量从 136.7 万辆增至 1649 万辆、新车销售占比从 5.4% 提高到 47.9%、整车与动力电池及关键材料产量占全球 70% 以上、产品远销 100 多个国家和地区——但也点出未来五年必须解决的问题:非理性竞争、未经充分实验验证就装车应用的”激进式”创新设计、以及引发社会关注的汽车质量与自动驾驶安全事件。

四大支柱

规划依托四大支柱。其一,产品供给质量:支持重点企业提升动力电池低温适应性与耐久性、提高自动驾驶安全性与可靠性;积极稳妥推进智能网联汽车准入和上路通行试点与”车路云一体化”试点;坚守产品质量底线。其二,配套使用环境:开展汽车以旧换新、新能源汽车下乡与县域充换电设施补短板试点,推动充电站”县县全覆盖”、充电桩”乡乡全覆盖”;建立健全汽车改装管理制度;优化新能源汽车车险政策、降低维修成本,让消费者愿意买、放心用。其三,行业治理:推进汽车企业生产资质集团化管理改革、优化产业布局,加强产品创新设计准入审查与测试验证管理,加大生产一致性监督检查力度。其四,国际合作:加大国际标准法规制定协调力度,完善跨境物流、投融资等配套支撑,稳步推进国际贸易和投资合作。

电池回收获监管加码

一个值得注意的新元素是电池退役议程。面对退役潮来临,主管部门计划研究起草相关行政法规、开展部门联合执法专项行动规范回收利用秩序,并实施动力电池数字身份证管理制度,实现”来源可溯、去向可查”。目标是到 2030 年废旧动力电池综合利用量达到百万吨级以上。对回收、梯次利用与材料企业——包括外国投资者——这预示一个正式化、可追溯的监管体系,而非当前的零散拼凑。

对外资车企的意义

对外国车企与供应商,规划传递四重实务信号。第一,准入:创新设计审查与测试要求将收紧,产品开发管线须在上市前预算更多验证时间与证据。第二,市场支撑:充电设施建设与车险/成本优化旨在维持需求增长,保护新能源投资商业逻辑。第三,治理:生产资质集团化管理改革可能为在华授权生产或组装品牌创造新结构,重组决策值得建模评估。第四,开放:规划的国际合作支柱——标准协调、跨境物流与融资支持——与中国欢迎全球参与者的整体姿态一致,参与试点(智能网联准入、车路云一体化)的外资品牌将共同塑造日后全国推广的标准。企业还应提前应对电池可追溯制度,其将影响价值链各环节的质保、召回与回收义务。

规划背后的数据

规划目标立在快速扩张的基数之上。2026 年,新能源汽车已占月度新车销售的大头——2026 年 7 月数据显示当月新能源车占新车销量超 60%——上半年渗透率接近五成。自主品牌新能源乘用车 2026 年上半年海外市场份额 24%、同比提升 10 个百分点,欧盟市场是主要贡献者。基础设施方面,充换电建设提速:规划”充电站县县全覆盖、充电桩乡乡全覆盖”目标承接行业已设定的 2030 年充电基础设施目标,福建等省份已出台虚拟电厂管理办法,为民营企业与中小微企业开放新的市场参与。标准端,工信部动作密集:2026 年 8 月就《汽车密码应用技术要求》强制性国标与 50 项车路云系统通信行业标准公开征求意见——两项信号表明智能网联汽车技术规则手册正在当下书写,尽早参与标准进程的外资供应商将共同塑造它。

Sources

Automotive & EV market entry

  • All equity caps on passenger-car manufacturing were lifted on 1 January 2022, fully opening the vehicle and parts chain to foreign investment.
    2022年1月1日全面取消乘用车制造外资股比上限,整车与零部件全链条对外资开放。
  • The opening covers manufacturing equity, but vehicle data, mapping, and some ICT/services may still face ownership or licensing limits under the negative list.
    股比放开适用于制造股权,但车辆数据、地图测绘及部分电信/ICT要素在负面清单下仍可能受股比或许可限制。
  • The direct NEV purchase subsidy fully exited at end-2022; today the levers are the purchase-tax exemption/reduction and city-level plate/traffic privileges that change yearly.
    新能源汽车直接购置补贴已于2022年底全面退出;如今杠杆是购置税免征/减免与逐年变化的城市级牌照/通行优待。
  • China’s CCC and MIIT vehicle type-approval against GB standards are mandatory — a UN/ECE or US type-approval does not substitute.
    中国CCC强制认证与工信部依GB标准的车辆型式准入为强制要求,UN/ECE或美国型式批准不能替代。
  • Battery packs need MIIT catalogue type approval and a traceable recycling channel; a non-compliant pack can stall the entire vehicle’s approval.
    电池包须通过工信部目录型式准入并具备可追溯回收渠道;不合规电池可拖垮整车型式准入。
  • The dual-credit regime (average fuel-consumption and NEV credits) binds both foreign and domestic OEMs and must be folded into the market-entry plan.
    双积分(平均燃料消耗量与新能源汽车积分)政策约束外资与本土整车企业,须纳入市场准入计划。

Automotive & EV market entry | 汽车与新能源汽车入华

Overview

China is the world’s largest car market and the global leader in new-energy vehicles (NEVs — battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel-cell vehicles). For foreign carmakers the single most important structural change of the last decade was the removal of the joint-venture (JV) foreign-ownership cap: a five-year transition that ended on 1 January 2022 lifted all equity limits on passenger-car manufacturing.

This article reviews the JV-rule history, NEV incentives and purchase-treatment rules, and the local-sourcing and battery considerations a foreign entrant should plan for. It is informational; confirm current subsidy and policy detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The JV-rule history and its removal

China’s automotive opening was staged over years. The 2018 negative-list revision began a transition: foreign caps were removed on special-purpose and new-energy vehicle manufacturing in 2018, on commercial vehicles in 2020, and finally on passenger vehicles and the “at most two JVs per vehicle category” rule on 1 January 2022. Since then, the entire vehicle and parts chain is open to foreign investment without equity caps. The NDRC and MIIT co-led the opening; the negative list is jointly issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM.

Two clarifications prevent misreading the opening. First, the lift applies to vehicle and parts manufacturing equity, not to every adjacent activity: the negative list and sector rules still govern related services such as automotive data, mapping, and certain telecom/ICT elements, and a foreign entrant in those areas may still face ownership or licensing limits. Second, “no JV required” is not “no local footprint advised.” Even a wholly foreign-owned plant must satisfy local content indirectly through the supply chain to be price-competitive, and provincial investment-promotion terms, land, and talent still favour entities with a real in-China operation. The strategic question is therefore not “must I take a partner?” but “where does a local presence reduce my cost and regulatory friction?”

NEV incentives and purchase treatment

China’s NEV sector grew behind a stack of demand and supply incentives: purchase subsidies (the “NEV subsidy”), purchase-tax exemptions, and licence-plate and traffic privileges in restrictied cities. The direct purchase subsidy was wound down and fully exited at the end of 2022, but the vehicle purchase tax exemption/reduction for NEVs has been repeatedly extended by the Ministry of Finance, the SAT, and the MIIT, and many cities retain plate and access preferences for NEVs. Because these levers shift year to year, treat any specific rate as time-bound and verify before relying on it.

A supplementary point: the licence-plate and traffic privileges in licence-restricted cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and others) carry real value, but the rules differ sharply — some cities allocate separate NEV quotas, others tighten plug-in hybrids, and fuel-cell vehicles remain in demonstration phase. A foreign entrant sizing NEV competitiveness should model city-level policy, not just the national purchase-tax treatment. The dual-credit regime (average fuel-consumption and NEV credits) also imposes compliance pressure on vehicle makers, indirectly shaping JV and product-mix decisions for both foreign and domestic OEMs.

Local sourcing, supply chain, and battery rules

With the ownership cap gone, a foreign OEM is no longer required to form a JV or to source a fixed local share. In practice, though, China’s EV supply chain — batteries, cells, power electronics, and materials — is the densest in the world, so most entrants localise sourcing for cost and lead-time reasons. Battery makers face a separate regime: the MIIT “roadmap”/catalogue system (the recommended EV battery catalogue) and battery-recycling traceability rules mean a battery pack needs type approval and a traceable recycling channel. Foreign battery firms may manufacture in China but must meet the same technical and recycling obligations.

Battery compliance is the part most often underestimated. Beyond type approval, China operates a battery traceability regime: every power battery receives a unique identification code and is tracked through a national platform from production to retirement, and producers (including foreign battery makers) must register and meet recycling-responsibility obligations under the “producer extends responsibility” framework. The MIIT recommended catalogue (推荐目录/公告) historically influenced which batteries were eligible for subsidies and procurement, so although the purchase subsidy is gone, inclusion in the relevant catalogues still affects bankability and OEM acceptance. Importers of complete vehicles with batteries should confirm the pack’s approval status and coding before shipment, because a non-compliant battery can block the whole vehicle’s type approval.

Market-access paths for a foreign entrant

A foreign carmaker can (1) import vehicles as general trade (subject to import tariffs, the carbon-emissions and fuel-consumption rules, and the China-unique type-approval / CCC certification); (2) manufacture locally via a WFOE or JV; or (3) focus on NEVs where the regulatory and incentive tilt is strongest. Component and battery suppliers typically set up manufacturing or R&D entities and pursue CCC and MIIT catalogue inclusion. Each path has distinct certification, tax, and distribution implications.

Note too that importing complete vehicles via general trade means, beyond tariffs, satisfying China’s fuel-consumption and carbon (CAFC/NEV credit) compliance and clearing the CCC gate; imported NEVs must still enter the MIIT “Road Motor Vehicle Manufacturers and Products” announcement and the NEV recommended catalogue to be sold and licensed in China. A local WFOE plant avoids the complete-vehicle import tariff but requires NDRC/MIIT investment and capacity filing/approval and a production line meeting GMP-style quality systems. The path choice should be judged at project launch against tariffs, certification lead time, and credit compliance together.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming the JV cap removal opens every auto-adjacent business. Manufacturing equity is free, but data, mapping, and some ICT/services tied to vehicles can still carry ownership or licensing limits under the negative list.
  • Believing the NEV purchase subsidy still exists. The direct purchase subsidy fully exited at end-2022; today the lever is the purchase-tax exemption/reduction and city privileges, which change yearly.
  • Treating overseas homologation as Chinese certification. A UN/ECE or US type-approval does not substitute for China’s CCC and MIIT vehicle-type approval against GB standards; a separate certification is mandatory.
  • Overlooking battery type approval and traceability. A battery pack needs MIIT catalogue type approval and a traceable recycling channel; a non-compliant pack can stall the entire vehicle’s approval.
  • Assuming wholly foreign ownership removes the need for a local footprint. Without local sourcing and a real in-China operation, cost and lead-time disadvantages usually outweigh the equity freedom.
  • Treating the dual-credit regime as somebody else’s problem. The average-fuel-consumption and NEV-credit rules bind vehicle makers; a foreign entrant, importing or building locally, must fold credit compliance and product mix into its plan.

What to do next

  • Confirm whether you will import, build locally, or focus on NEVs — the choice drives certification and tax exposure.
  • plan for CCC (China Compulsory Certification) and the MIIT vehicle-type approval / EV catalogue before any sale.
  • Assume the NEV purchase subsidy is gone; size the business case on purchase-tax treatment and city privileges, verified annually.
  • For batteries, budget type approval plus a compliant recycling/traceability channel under MIIT rules.
  • Localise the supply chain pragmatically — not because a JV is mandated, but for cost and lead-time.
  • Engage MIIT, NDRC, and customs advisers early on tariff, CCC, and catalogue timing.

Sources

  • NDRC — negative-list revision removing the passenger-car ownership cap (effective 1 Jan 2022): https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/news/mediarusources/202112/t20211228_1310393.html
  • NDRC — Q&A on the manufacturing opening and the five-year auto transition: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/201804/t20180417_954245.html
  • Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) — official portal: https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • Certification and Accreditation Administration of China (CNCA) — China Compulsory Certification (CCC): https://www.cnca.gov.cn/ (official portal)
  • State Council — official portal (NEV and auto industry policy): https://www.gov.cn
  • Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) — policy release portal: https://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/index.html

Related reading

  • see also: Renewable energy & green investment incentives (49-renewable-energy-green-investment)
  • see also: Import-export licensing & customs clearance (50-import-export-customs-clearance)
  • see also: E-commerce market entry for foreign brands (43-ecommerce-market-entry)

汽车与新能源汽车入华

概述

中国是全球最大的汽车市场,也是新能源汽车(NEV,含纯电动、插电式混动与燃料电池)的全球领跑者。对外国车企而言,过去十年最重要的结构性变化是合资股比限制的取消:自 2018 年起分五年过渡,至 2022 年 1 月 1 日全面取消乘用车制造的外资股比上限。

本文回顾合资规则的演变历史、新能源汽车的激励与购置税待遇,以及外资进入者应规划的本地采购与电池考量。本文仅为信息参考,具体补贴与政策细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

合资规则演变及其取消

中国汽车业的开放是分阶段推进的。2018 年负面清单修订启动过渡:2018 年取消专用车与新能源汽车外资股比限制,2020 年取消商用车限制,最终于 2022 年 1 月 1 日取消乘用车股比及”同一类整车产品合资企业不超过两家”的限制。自此,整车与零部件全链条对外资开放,不再设股比上限。开放由发改委与工信部共同牵头,负面清单由发改委与商务部联合发布。

两点澄清可避免误读开放。其一,股比放开适用于整车与零部件制造股权,而非所有相邻活动:负面清单与行业规则仍监管汽车数据、地图测绘及部分电信/ICT 要素,外资在这些领域仍可能面临股比或许可限制。其二,”无需合资”不等于”无需本地布局”。即便全资工厂,为保持价格竞争力仍须通过供应链间接满足本地配套,且地方招商引资条件、土地与人才仍向真正在华运营的实体倾斜。因此战略问题不是”我是否必须找伙伴?”,而是”本地布局在何处能降低我的成本与监管摩擦?”

新能源汽车激励与购置待遇

中国新能源汽车产业在一系列需求与供给激励下成长:购置补贴(”新能源车补”)、购置税免征,以及限牌城市的牌照与通行优待。直接购置补贴已逐步退坡,并于 2022 年底全面退出;但新能源汽车车辆购置税免征/减免由财政部、税务总局与工信部多次延续,多座城市仍保留对 NEV 的牌照与通行优待。由于这些杠杆逐年变化,任何具体税率均应视为时效性数字,引用前须核实。

补充一点:新能源车的通行与牌照优待在限牌城市(如北京、上海、广州、深圳)具有实质价值,但其规则差异极大——有的城市对 NEV 单独配置指标,有的对插电混动逐步收紧,燃料电池车则处于示范推广阶段。外资在测算 NEV 竞争力时,应把城市级政策纳入模型,而非仅看全国性购置税。另有双积分(乘用车企业平均燃料消耗量与新能源汽车积分)政策,对整车企业形成新能源产销的合规约束,间接影响外资与本土 OEM 的合作与产品组合决策。

本地采购、供应链与电池规则

股比上限取消后,外资 OEM 不再被强制组建合资企业或采购固定比例的本地部件。但实践中,中国的新能源供应链——电池、电芯、功率电子与材料——是全球最密集的,因此多数进入者为成本与交期而本地化采购。电池企业另有一套制度:工信部的”推荐目录/公告”体系,以及电池回收溯源规则,意味着电池包须通过型式准入并具备可追溯的回收渠道。外资电池企业可在中国制造,但须满足同等技术与回收义务。

电池合规是最常被低估的一环。除型式准入外,中国实行电池溯源制度:每块动力电池须具唯一识别编码,并通过国家平台从生产追踪至退役;生产者(含外资电池企业)须登记并依”生产者责任延伸”框架履行回收义务。工信部推荐目录虽在补贴退出后影响减弱,但目录列入仍关系到产品的可融资性与 OEM 接受度。进口含电池整车者应在发运前确认电池包的准入状态与编码,因为不合规电池可拖垮整车型式准入。此外,关键矿产与材料的可追溯要求也在趋严。

外资进入者的市场准入路径

外国车企可(1)以一般贸易进口车辆(须缴纳进口关税,满足油耗与碳排放规则,以及中国特有的型式准入/CCC 强制认证);(2)通过 WFOE 或合资本地制造;(3)聚焦政策与激励倾斜最明显的新能源汽车。零部件与电池供应商通常设立制造或研发实体,并争取 CCC 与工信部公告目录列入。每条路径的认证、税务与分销含义各不相同。

还需提示:以一般贸易进口整车,除关税外还须满足中国的燃料消耗量与碳排放(CAFC/NEV 积分)合规,以及 CCC 强制认证这一准入闸门;进口新能源车同样须进入工信部《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品公告》与新能源推荐目录方可在华销售上牌。本地制造的 WFOE 路径虽免去整车进口关税,但须完成发改与工信的投资与产能备案/核准,并建设满足 GMP 式质量体系的产线。路径选择应在立项期即结合关税、认证周期与积分合规综合判断。

常见误读

  • 以为取消合资限制即放开所有汽车相关业务。 制造股权已自由,但车辆相关的数据、地图测绘及部分 ICT/服务,在负面清单下仍可能受股比或许可限制。
  • 以为新能源车购置补贴仍在。 直接购置补贴已于 2022 年底全面退出;如今杠杆是购置税免征/减免与城市优待,且逐年变化。
  • 把境外认证当作中国认证。 UN/ECE 或美国型式批准不能替代中国 CCC 与工信部车辆型式准入(依 GB 标准);须另行认证。
  • 忽视电池型式准入与溯源。 电池包须通过工信部目录型式准入并具备可追溯回收渠道;不合规电池可拖垮整车准入。
  • 以为全资即可不要本地布局。 缺乏本地采购与真实在华运营,成本与交期劣势通常盖过股权自由的好处。
  • 把双积分当作与己无关。 双积分政策约束整车企业的新能源产销,外资以进口或本地制造整车,均须纳入积分合规与产品结构考量。

下一步建议

  • 先确认是进口、本地建厂,还是聚焦 NEV——该选择决定认证与税务敞口。
  • 在任何销售前规划 CCC(中国强制性产品认证)与工信部车辆型式准入/新能源目录。
  • 假定新能源车购补贴已取消;以购置税待遇与城市优待为基础做商业测算,并逐年核实。
  • 电池须预算型式准入,以及工信部规则下的合规回收/溯源渠道。
  • 务实本地化供应链——不是因为强制合资,而是出于成本与交期。
  • 就关税、CCC 与目录时点,尽早对接工信部、发改委与海关顾问。

来源

  • 国家发改委——取消乘用车股比限制的负面清单修订(2022 年 1 月 1 日生效):https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/news/mediarusources/202112/t20211228_1310393.html
  • 国家发改委——制造业开放与五年汽车过渡问答:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/201804/t20180417_954245.html
  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)——官方门户:https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • 国家认证认可监督管理委员会(CNCA)——中国强制性产品认证(CCC):https://www.cnca.gov.cn/(官方门户)
  • 国务院——官方门户(新能源汽车与汽车产业政策):https://www.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)——政策发布门户:https://wms.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/index.html

相关阅读

  • 参见:可再生能源与绿色投资激励(49-renewable-energy-green-investment)
  • 参见:进出口许可与海关清关(50-import-export-customs-clearance)
  • 参见:外国品牌的电商入华(43-ecommerce-market-entry)

Vehicle Catalogues and Emission Rules: What August 2026 Brings for Automakers and Suppliers in China

  • On 12 August 2026, the MIIT published Announcement No. 21 of 2026, releasing Batch 409 of the catalogue of road motor-vehicle manufacturers and products together with the NEV catalogues for vehicle/vessel tax relief and purchase-tax exemption.
    2026 年 8 月 12 日,工信部发布 2026 年第 21 号公告,公布《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品》(第 409 批)以及车船税减免、车辆购置税减免的新能源汽车车型目录。
  • Batch 409 includes 478 NEV product models across 217 manufacturers and 210 brands, with battery-electric models dominating at 415 units.
    第 409 批共 217 家企业、210 个品牌、478 个新能源产品型号列入,其中纯电动产品 415 个。
  • From 1 August 2026, the Emission Full-Chain Supervision and Administration Implementing Rules took effect, requiring third-generation connected OBD on new fuel vehicles and an 8-year/160,000-km quality guarantee for emission-critical components.
    2026 年 8 月 1 日起《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》施行,要求燃油新车标配第三代远程 OBD,排放核心部件质保 8 年或 16 万公里。
  • The rules follow a “new cars, new standards; old cars, old standards” principle, so existing fuel vehicles are not retrofitted or forced into scrappage.
    新规坚持”新车新标准、老车老标准”,存量燃油车不追溯改造、不强制淘汰。
  • For foreign-invested automakers and parts suppliers, the August 2026 combination of catalogue approvals, purchase-tax relief lists and stricter emissions governance defines the compliance and market-access picture for the second half of the year.
    对外资车企与零部件供应商,2026 年 8 月的目录许可、购置税减免名单与更严排放监管共同界定了下半年的合规与市场准入图景。

Vehicle Catalogues and Emission Rules: What August 2026 Brings for Automakers and Suppliers in China | 车辆公告目录与排放新规:2026 年 8 月对在华车企与供应商意味着什么

Why this matters now

Two August 2026 developments together define the near-term regulatory picture for China’s automotive sector. On 12 August 2026, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology published Announcement No. 21 of 2026, releasing Batch 409 of the Road Motor-Vehicle Manufacturers and Products catalogue, along with the 88th catalogue of energy-saving and new-energy vehicle models enjoying vehicle/vessel tax relief and the 33rd catalogue of new-energy vehicle models exempt from vehicle purchase tax. Separately, the Emission Full-Chain Supervision and Administration Implementing Rules (《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》), jointly issued by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the MIIT and the SAMR, took effect nationwide on 1 August 2026. For foreign-invested original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and parts suppliers, these two instruments determine which products can be sold, which models qualify for tax relief, and what engineering and warranty obligations attach to new fuel vehicles.

Batch 409 and the tax-relief catalogues

The MIIT catalogue announcement performs a dual licensing function: it approves road-vehicle manufacturers and products, and it confirms which models qualify for vehicle/vessel tax relief and NEV purchase-tax exemption. Batch 409 was coordinated with the State Taxation Administration. According to industry analysis of the batch, 478 NEV product models from 217 enterprises and 210 brands passed technical review, including 415 battery-electric products, 56 plug-in hybrids, 6 fuel-cell products and 1 methanol product; commercial and special-purpose vehicles dominate, reflecting the industrial mix. For a foreign brand or a joint-venture OEM, inclusion of a model in the catalogue is a precondition for sale, and inclusion in the purchase-tax exemption catalogue is a direct factor in retail pricing. The catalogue system is therefore both a market-access gate and a pricing lever.

The emission full-chain rules

The emission rules, effective 1 August 2026, adopt a “new cars, new standards; old cars, old standards” principle. Vehicles already registered before 1 August 2026 — regardless of China-4, China-5 or China-6 emission standard — keep their existing inspection cycles, local transfer rights and driving rules; there is no mandatory retrofitting, scrappage or blanket travel restriction. The new requirements apply to fuel vehicles produced after 1 August 2026 and to cross-provincial transfers of used fuel vehicles from that date. The key obligations for new fuel vehicles are: mandatory third-generation connected OBD systems that upload emissions, engine and fuel-evaporation data in real time to the national supervision platform; an extended quality guarantee of 8 years or 160,000 km for emission-critical components such as three-way catalytic converters, particulate filters (GPF) and oxygen sensors; and stricter factory emission-consistency supervision, with whole-route testing of each production batch. Used-vehicle transfers across provinces now face emission traceability checks, including maintenance records, recent passing emission reports and the absence of long-unresolved OBD fault codes.

What this means for foreign-invested companies

For foreign-invested OEMs, the practical agenda has several parts. First, product planning: every new model must clear the MIIT catalogue, and the NEV tax-relief lists must be monitored because they change every batch and directly affect price competitiveness in the world’s largest EV market. Second, engineering: new fuel vehicles produced from August 2026 must embed connected OBD and meet the 8-year/160,000-km component warranty, which shifts warranty-cost modelling and supplier contracts for exhaust systems. Third, commercial-vehicle and special-purpose vehicle operators with Chinese joint ventures must track catalogue batches closely, since most batch content is commercial and special-purpose products. Fourth, used-vehicle and fleet businesses face new traceability duties on cross-provincial transfers, affecting remarketing and fleet rotation. Fifth, joint-venture governance: with the catalogue and emissions regimes both administered at the central level but implemented through local authorities, joint ventures should keep compliance ownership clear and data pipelines (catalogue submissions, OBD telematics, recall reporting) properly governed.

Practical steps

  1. Track catalogue batches. Assign an owner to monitor each MIIT batch and the associated tax-relief catalogues for your models, and reconcile with the State Taxation Administration lists.
  2. Plan engineering changes for post-August 2026 vehicles. Embed connected OBD, update exhaust-component warranty terms and supply agreements, and provision for batch whole-route emission testing.
  3. Review used-vehicle and fleet processes. Where you operate used-vehicle or fleet business, update cross-provincial transfer procedures to meet maintenance-record, emission-report and OBD-fault-code requirements.
  4. Align pricing with tax relief. Confirm each model’s purchase-tax and vehicle/vessel tax treatment before setting retail pricing and incentives.
  5. Keep emissions compliance documentation. Records of catalogue filings, OBD data governance and recall reporting protect the group against disputes and inspections.
  6. Coordinate with the broader NEV policy environment. Combine catalogue status with the purchase-tax continuation framework and the 2026–2027 technical requirements to maintain full market access.

Compliance notes

The catalogue is a precondition, not a guarantee: models must be on the current batch to be sold, and removal or non-inclusion suspends sales. The emission rules are obligations on the vehicle and its manufacturer, not just the consumer, and the data uploaded by connected OBD is live evidence for enforcement. Companies should not assume that “old cars, old standards” eliminates all duties for legacy fleets: cross-provincial transfer traceability now reaches pre-August vehicles. Finally, catalogue and tax-relief rules change by batch, and the emission implementation details may be refined locally; verify the current lists and local implementation before committing to a model year or a used-vehicle campaign.


车辆公告目录与排放新规:2026 年 8 月对在华车企与供应商意味着什么

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月的两项进展共同界定中国汽车行业的近期监管图景。8 月 12 日,工信部发布 2026 年第 21 号公告,公布《道路机动车辆生产企业及产品》(第 409 批)以及享受车船税减免的节能、使用新能源汽车车型目录(第八十八批)和减免车辆购置税的新能源汽车车型目录(第三十三批)。另一项是生态环境部、工信部、市场监管总局联合制定的《机动车排放全链条监督管理实施细则》于 2026 年 8 月 1 日在全国施行。对外资整车厂与零部件供应商,这两项工具决定哪些产品可以销售、哪些车型享受税收减免,以及新燃油车承担何种工程与质保义务。

第 409 批与税收减免目录

工信部公告承担双重许可功能:既批准道路机动车生产企业及产品,又确认哪些车型享受车船税减免与新能源购置税免征。第 409 批经商税务总局同意。据行业对该批的分析,共有 217 家企业、210 个品牌、478 个新能源产品型号通过技术审查,其中纯电动 415 个、插电式混合动力 56 个、燃料电池 6 个、甲醇产品 1 个;商用车与专用车占多数,反映产业结构。对外国品牌或合资整车厂,车型进入目录是销售前提,进入购置税免征目录则直接关系零售定价。目录体系因此既是市场准入闸门,也是定价杠杆。

排放全链条细则

2026 年 8 月 1 日施行的排放细则坚持”新车新标准、老车老标准”。2026 年 8 月 1 日前已注册登记的车辆,无论国四、国五还是国六,原有年检周期、本地过户权限与通行规则不变,不追溯改造、不强制淘汰、不设一刀切限行。新要求针对 2026 年 8 月 1 日后出厂的新燃油车及该日起跨省流通的二手燃油车。新燃油车的关键义务包括:强制标配第三代远程 OBD,实时向国家监管平台上传排放、发动机工况与燃油蒸发数据;三元催化器、颗粒捕捉器(GPF)、氧传感器等排放核心部件质保 8 年或 16 万公里;出厂排放一致性监管升级,每批次全路况实测。跨省二手燃油车过户面临排放溯源核查,包括维保记录、近期合格排放报告以及无长期未修复 OBD 故障码。

对外资企业的意义

对外资整车厂,实务议程有若干部分。其一,产品规划:每个新车型必须通过工信部目录,且须跟踪新能源税收减免名单——每批变化,直接影响全球最大电动车市场的价格竞争力。其二,工程:2026 年 8 月起生产的燃油新车须嵌入联网 OBD 并满足 8 年/16 万公里部件质保,这改变排气系统的质保成本建模与供应商合同。其三,合资商用车与专用车运营者须紧密跟踪目录批次,因为批次内容以商用车与专用车为主。其四,二手车与车队业务面临跨省过户新溯源义务,影响再营销与车队周转。其五,合资治理:目录与排放制度均由中央层面管理、地方实施,合资企业应明确合规归属,妥善治理目录申报、OBD 车联网数据与召回报告等数据管线。

操作步骤

  1. 跟踪目录批次。 指定专人监控每批工信部公告及相应的税收减免目录,并与税务总局名单核对。
  2. 规划 2026 年 8 月后车辆的工程变更。 嵌入联网 OBD、更新排气部件质保条款与供应协议,并为每批次全路况排放测试预留预算。
  3. 审查二手车与车队流程。 若经营二手车或车队业务,更新跨省过户程序以满足维保记录、排放报告与 OBD 故障码要求。
  4. 按税收减免对齐定价。 定价与促销前确认各车型购置税与车船税待遇。
  5. 留存排放合规文档。 目录申报、OBD 数据治理与召回报告记录保护集团免于争议与检查。
  6. 与更广的 NEV 政策环境协同。 将目录状态与购置税延续框架及 2026–2027 技术要求结合,保持完整市场准入。

合规提示

目录是前提而非保证:车型必须在当期批次中方可销售,移出或未列入将暂停销售。排放规则是对车辆及其制造商的义务,而非仅对消费者;联网 OBD 上传的数据是执法的实时证据。企业不应假设”老车老标准”消除了存量车队的全部义务:跨省过户溯源现在覆盖 8 月前的车辆。最后,目录与税收减免规则按批次变化,排放实施细节可能在地方细化;确定车型年度或二手车营销活动前,应核实现行清单与地方实施情况。

Sources

Automotive and NEV Market Access for Foreign Investors: The Post-Restriction Landscape (2026)

  • All manufacturing foreign-investment access restrictions are now abolished; the 2024 negative list cleared the last manufacturing items, including passenger-vehicle equity caps.
    制造业外资准入限制已全部取消;2024 年负面清单清除了最后制造业条目,包括乘用车股比限制。
  • The 2025 Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment (in force 1 Feb 2026) lists new-energy and smart-vehicle supply-chain items as encouraged.
    2025 年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)将新能源与智能网联汽车供应链条目列为鼓励类。
  • The 2026 stabilise-and-optimise-FDI action plan reaffirms solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem — i.e., access plus operating permission.
    2026 年稳外资行动方案重申解决「大门开、小门不开」,即准入加准营。
  • Foreign auto and NEV investors can now fully own WFOEs, JVs are no longer equity-capped, and encouraged items enjoy preferential treatment.
    外国汽车与新能源投资者可全资设 WFOE,合资不再受股比限制,鼓励类条目享优惠。
  • Practical focus shifts from “can I enter?” to “can I operate?” — licences, standards, data and localisation now dominate the agenda.
    实务焦点从「能否进入」转向「能否运营」——牌照、标准、数据与本地化成为议程主线。
  • Watch the negative list’s service-sector items (29 national / 27 FTZ) and the encouraged catalogue’s annual updates for the next opening wave.
    关注负面清单服务业条目(全国 29 / 自贸区 27)与鼓励目录的年度更新,捕捉下一波开放。

Automotive and NEV Market Access for Foreign Investors: The Post-Restriction Landscape (2026) | 汽车与新能源汽车外资准入:限制清零后的格局(2026)

China’s manufacturing sector is now fully open to foreign investment. The *Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative List) (2024)* removed the final manufacturing restrictions, including the passenger-vehicle foreign-equity cap and the limit of two same-segment JVs per foreign maker. Combined with the 2021 removal of satellite-TV equipment restrictions, the FTZ negative list achieved “manufacturing items cleared to zero.” For automotive and new-energy-vehicle (NEV) investors, this means full freedom to choose structure: a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, a majority-owned JV, or a 50/50 JV — the cap is gone.

The encouraging side is equally explicit. The *Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment (2025 Edition)*, promulgated 15 December 2025 and effective 1 February 2026, carries a deep set of automotive and NEV supply-chain items — from power batteries and key materials to smart-vehicle components, hydrogen preparation and CCUS. Encouraged items, consistent with access policy, enjoy preferential treatment (e.g., tax incentives) where they are not excluded by other industrial catalogues. This steers foreign capital toward the high-value, green and smart segments rather than mere assembly.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* frames the next problem precisely: with manufacturing access “zeroed,” the bottleneck is “access after admission” — making sure a cleared investment can actually operate. Officials describe the “big door open, small door closed” issue and commit to solving licensing, standards and local operating frictions. For auto/NIV investors this is the real work: vehicle-type approval, battery and recycling rules, data-security for connected vehicles, and local supply-chain integration.

Structurally, the path is: (1) confirm the specific product sits in the encouraged catalogue (for incentives) and is outside any residual restriction; (2) choose WFOE vs JV on commercial grounds, not because of a cap; (3) map the operating licences — production, product certification, battery/NEV-specific approvals; (4) build a data-compliance plan for connected and intelligent vehicles; and (5) use the “investment China” service window and any applicable FTZ pilot to compress licensing. The era of negotiation over equity caps is over; the era of operating-permission mastery has begun.


汽车与新能源汽车外资准入:限制清零后的格局(2026)

中国制造业已对外资全面开放。《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024 年版)》取消了最后制造业限制,包括乘用车外资股比限制与同一外商两家同类整车合资限制。叠加 2021 年取消卫星电视设备限制,自贸区负面清单实现「制造业条目清零」。对汽车与新能源汽车(NEV)投资者,这意味着可自由选择结构:外商独资、控股合资或 50/50 合资——上限已无。

鼓励侧同样明确。2025 年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(2025 年 12 月 15 日公布,2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)包含大量汽车与 NEV 供应链条目——从动力电池、关键材料到智能网联零部件、制氢与 CCUS。鼓励类条目在符合准入政策前提下享优惠(如税收激励),引导外资流向高价值、绿色与智能环节,而非单纯组装。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》精准框定下一问题:制造业准入「清零」后,瓶颈在「准入之后准营」——确保获批投资真能运营。官方直指「大门开、小门不开」,承诺破解牌照、标准与本地运营摩擦。对汽车/NIV 投资者,真正功课是:车辆型式准入、电池与回收规则、智能网联汽车数据安全、本地供应链整合。

结构上,路径是:(1)确认具体产品落入鼓励目录(享优惠)且不在任何残留限制内;(2)基于商业而非上限选择 WFOE 或合资;(3)梳理运营牌照——生产、产品认证、电池/NV 专项审批;(4)为智能网联汽车建数据合规方案;(5)用「投资中国」服务窗口与适用自贸区试点压缩拿照周期。谈判股比上限的时代结束,掌握准营的时代开始。

From “Can I Enter?” to “Can I Operate?”

With the equity cap gone, the real constraints are operational. A foreign NEV maker should focus on vehicle-type approval, battery production and recycling approvals, and the data-security rules for connected and intelligent vehicles — these, not ownership, now shape time-to-market. Build a local compliance and data-governance function early; for smart vehicles, cross-border data and mapping rules are as strategic as the factory permit.

Use the encouraged catalogue for economics. If your product sits in the 2025 encouraged list (power batteries, key materials, smart components, hydrogen, CCUS), confirm eligibility for preferential treatment and pair it with any applicable FTZ pilot. The action plan’s “access after admission” commitment means licensing and standards should become more predictable — but only if you engage the “investment China” service window and pre-align with regulators rather than wait for a surprise at operating stage.

Plan the structure on commercial grounds. WFOE versus JV is now a strategy choice, not a legal ceiling. A JV may still help with local ecosystem, distribution and policy access; a WFOE maximises control and IP protection. Either way, the 2026 agenda is operating-permission mastery: whoever clears licences, standards and data fastest will capture the China NEV and smart-vehicle opportunity — the cap era is definitively over.

从「能否进入」到「能否运营」

股比上限取消后,真正约束在运营。外资新能源车企应聚焦车辆型式准入、电池生产与回收审批、智能网联汽车数据安全规则——这些而非所有权,如今决定上市速度。早建本地合规与数据治理职能;对智能车,跨境数据与地图规则与工厂许可同样战略。

用鼓励目录换经济账。若产品落入 2025 鼓励目录(动力电池、关键材料、智能零部件、制氢、CCUS),确认优惠资格并与适用自贸区试点配对。方案「准入之后准营」承诺意味着牌照与标准更可预期——但前提是善用「投资中国」服务窗口、预先与监管对齐,而非运营阶段才遇 surprises。

基于商业选结构。WFOE 还是合资,如今是战略选择而非法律天花板。合资仍有助于本地生态、渠道与政策触达;WFOE 最大化控制与 IP 保护。无论如何,2026 议程是准营 mastery:谁能最快清牌照、标准与数据,谁就拿下中国新能源与智能车机会——上限时代已彻底结束。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Manufacturing open: the 2024 negative list cleared the last manufacturing items, including passenger-vehicle caps.
  • Encouraged: the 2025 catalogue (effective 1 Feb 2026) lists NEV/smart-vehicle supply-chain items.
  • Structure free: WFOE, majority JV or 50/50 JV all permitted; cap abolished.
  • Bottleneck: “access after admission” — licences, standards, data now dominate.
  • Data duty: connected/intelligent vehicles face cross-border data and mapping rules.
  • Economics: confirmed encouraged items may enjoy preferential treatment.
  • Action: use the “investment China” window; pre-align with regulators before operating stage.

实务速查

  • 制造业放开: 2024 负面清单清除最后制造业条目,含乘用车股比限制。
  • 鼓励: 2025 目录(2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)列新能源/智能车供应链条目。
  • 结构自由: 外商独资、控股合资或 50/50 合资均允许;上限取消。
  • 瓶颈: 「准入之后准营」——牌照、标准、数据成为主线。
  • 数据义务: 智能网联汽车面临跨境数据与地图规则。
  • 经济账: 确认鼓励类条目或可享优惠。
  • 行动: 用「投资中国」窗口;运营前预先与监管对齐。

Bottom Line

With the equity cap abolished, the NEV and smart-vehicle race in China is won on operating permission — licences, standards and data — not on ownership. Use the encouraged catalogue for economics, choose WFOE or JV on commercial grounds, and engage the “investment China” service window early to pre-align with regulators. The cap era is over; the capability era has begun, and speed-to-licence is the new competitive edge.

底线

股比上限取消后,中国新能源与智能车的竞赛赢在准营——牌照、标准、数据——而非所有权。用鼓励目录换经济账,基于商业选 WFOE 或合资,并早接「投资中国」服务窗与监管预先对齐。上限时代结束,能力时代开始,拿照速度成为新的竞争优势。

Sources

Auto parts — import substitution and foreign suppliers’ China strategy

  • China’s auto-parts market is fully open to foreign investment, but the competitive battleground in 2026 has flipped: domestic suppliers are displacing foreign Tier-1s on cost, speed and local R&D, even at foreign-brand OEMs.
    中国汽车零部件市场对外资完全开放,但2026年的竞争主战场已翻转:本土供应商正凭成本、速度与本地研发,甚至在外资品牌OEM处替代国外Tier-1。
  • The binding constraint for foreign parts firms is no longer market access but “response speed” — OEM development clocks have compressed to 12–18 months, and slow headquarters cycles lose bids regardless of price.
    外资零部件企业的约束不再是市场准入,而是”响应速度”——OEM开发周期已压缩至12–18个月,总部慢节奏无论价格如何都会丢单。
  • High-end cores (automotive-grade chips, high-end sensors, foundational software) remain import-dependent, while electrification and intelligent-cabin parts are where local substitution is accelerating.
    高端核心件(车规芯片、高端传感器、基础软件)仍依赖进口,而电气化与智能座舱部件正是本土替代加速之处。
  • Import substitution is policy-backed: MIIT and local governments push domestic chips/OS/chassis electronics via innovation consortia, with R&D super-deductions and first-set insurance subsidies.
    进口替代有政策支撑:工信部与地方政府通过创新联合体推动国产芯片/OS/底盘电子,配套研发费用加计扣除与首台套保险补偿。
  • Foreign Tier-1 winners are those that localise decision autonomy, shift to “value not price,” and follow Chinese OEMs overseas (Southeast Asia, Middle East) as a “trade + investment + local operation” export model.
    胜出的外资Tier-1是那些本地化决策自主权、从”价格”转向”价值”,并以”贸易+投资+本地化运营”模式跟随中国OEM出海(东南亚、中东)者。
  • Aptiv’s 2026 “bet on China” illustrates the pivot: stripping legacy combustion lines, going all-in on electrification/software-defined architecture, and achieving full chip localisation on key modules.
    安波福2026年”押注中国”说明了这一转向:剥离燃油产品线,全力押注电气化/软件定义架构,并在关键模块实现芯片全国产化。
  • Practical moves: grant the China entity real autonomy, co-locate R&D in China, pursue JV-to-local or local-acquisition routes, and meet OEM ESG/sourcing credentials.
    务实动作:赋予中国实体真实自主权、研发本地共址、走合资转本地或本地并购路径,并满足OEM的ESG/采购资质。

Auto parts — import substitution and foreign suppliers’ China strategy | 汽车零部件:进口替代与外资零部件企业在华策略

Overview

China’s auto-parts sector is open to foreign investment, and the removal of manufacturing equity caps applies here as everywhere. But the 2026 story is not about access — it is about a market inverting. Domestic suppliers, strengthened by the NEV and intelligent-driving wave, are winning share from foreign Tier-1s on cost, iteration speed and local R&D, and they are doing so even inside foreign-brand supply chains. For foreign parts firms the question has become: how to stay relevant when the local ecosystem out-develops the headquarters cycle.

This article reviews the substitution dynamics, the policy tailwind behind localisation, and the strategies foreign suppliers are actually adopting in 2026. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The battleground has flipped

For decades foreign Tier-1s (Bosch, ZF, Continental, Aptiv and others) were default, often irreplaceable, suppliers — especially in fuel injection, chassis control and electronics. That position is eroding. Industry observers note that at foreign-brand supplier conferences, the share of foreign Tier-1s is falling as local suppliers win orders at BMW, Mercedes, Audi and Toyota-JV programmes. Examples in 2025–2026 include local firms taking volume production nominations for current/voltage sensors, LiDAR and intelligent-cabin modules.

The root cause cited inside foreign suppliers is not price. “Many overseas people think it is price,” one insider notes, “but the core issue is response speed.” Chinese OEMs have compressed development clocks to 12–18 months; a foreign parts maker still running on a slow US/European headquarters cycle is dropped for a local supplier even when its price is acceptable. So the 2026 competitive edge is local autonomy plus speed, not cost alone.

Where substitution is real — and where it is not

Substitution is accelerating in electrification and intelligent-cabin parts (power electronics, thermal management, domain controllers, LiDAR, intelligent driving stacks) and in the software/base layer (vehicle OS, chips). State-backed consortia are closing gaps fast: Guangzhou Automobile led 105 firms to jointly define and validate nearly 400 chip types, putting 51 fully localised chips into a production car; Dongfeng built a local MCU; BYD and Huawei shipped domestic IGBT/SiC and full-stack OS. Even Bosch’s chassis domain is being challenged by local integrated vehicle-motion control and domestic braking/suspension suppliers.

But high-end cores remain import-dependent: automotive-grade chips (especially ADAS and high-end MCU), high-end sensors, and foundational industrial software still lag German/US leaders. Brand premium and standard-setting power also favour incumbents like Bosch and ZF. The practical read: foreign suppliers are most exposed in commoditising electrification hardware and most protected in high-end, IP-heavy components and in systems where safety certification and global footprint still matter.

The policy tailwind behind localisation

Import substitution is not purely market-driven; it is policy-backed. MIIT and local governments issue support policies pushing parts localisation and standardisation, encouraging core-technology R&D, and using R&D super-deductions to lower development cost. “Little-giant” (专精特新) firms get tangible support in first-set (首台套) insurance compensation and priority procurement in补短板 projects. Cross-industry fusión (automotive + robotics + low-altitude economy) is being nurtured via demonstration zones. The direction of travel is clear: domestic share in high-value parts rises, and foreign suppliers must either localise deeply or retreat to niches.

Strategies foreign suppliers are adopting in 2026

Foreign Tier-1s are not uniformly retreating; the winners are adapting:

  • Localise decision autonomy. Grant the China entity real authority over engineering, pricing and sourcing so it can match the 12–18 month clock. Aptiv’s China president framed the choice plainly: it is not “whether to invest in China” but “where else could we invest.”
  • Pivot to electrification/software-defined architecture. Aptiv stripped pure-combustion product lines and went all-in on electrification and software-defined vehicles; its emergency-power-module chip set was fully localised and then exported. This turns “localisation” from a cost centre into an export advantage.
  • From price to value. Leading suppliers reframe competition around system value (safety, integration, lifecycle cost) rather than unit price, resisting the “profit compression — quality concession” trap of pure price wars.
  • Follow OEMs overseas. As Chinese brands export to Southeast Asia and the Middle East, foreign and local suppliers alike adopt a “trade + investment + local operation” model to serve those markets and hedge EU/US carbon and tariff barriers.
  • Selective JV-to-local and acquisition. Some foreign suppliers convert JVs toward local control or acquire local capability to close speed and IP gaps quickly.

Market-access notes

Parts manufacturing is open; there is no foreign-ownership cap, and the 2024 negative list cleared manufacturing restrictions. Import of finished parts is governed by MFN tariffs and, for certain items, trade-remedy measures (anti-dumping/countervailing) — low-speed EVs and tyres have seen such actions. RCEP gradually lowers tariffs on qualifying regional value chains, relevant for suppliers sourcing across member economies. The practical entry is usually a WFOE or JV manufacturing/R&D entity, with CCC where applicable, plus alignment to OEM local-sourcing and ESG credentials.

Common pitfalls

  • Blaming lost bids on price. The core issue is response speed versus the compressed OEM clock.
  • Running China on headquarters time. Slow cycles lose share regardless of cost.
  • Assuming foreign-brand OEMs will keep foreign Tier-1s by default. Local suppliers now win foreign-brand orders.
  • Ignoring the policy tailwind for localisation. R&D deductions, first-set insurance and procurement bias are real.
  • Treating China as a sales outlet only. The winners use China as an R&D and export base.

What to do next

  • Grant the China entity real engineering, pricing and sourcing autonomy to match the 12–18 month OEM clock.
  • Decide a clear pivot: which combustion lines to retire and where to go all-in on electrification/software-defined architecture.
  • Localise critical chip/module supply; turn localisation into an export capability, not just a cost.
  • Reframe from price to system value; resist pure price wars.
  • Build a “trade + investment + local operation” model to follow Chinese OEMs into Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
  • Track MIIT/local innovation-consortium programmes and the 2025 Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries for incentives.

Sources

  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 汽车零部件国产化、标准化与核心技术攻关:https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 外资零部件企业在华政策与稳外资:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 制造业与供应链政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 经济日报/中国青年报 — 汽车零部件技术攻关与本土替代报道(2026-03):https://auto.cyol.com/gb/articles/2026-03/25/content_nyl0nZUwGO.html

Related reading

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)

汽车零部件:进口替代与外资零部件企业在华策略

概述

中国汽车零部件行业对外资开放,且制造业股比上限的取消在此与其他领域一致适用。但2026年的主题不是准入,而是市场反转。在新能源与智能驾驶浪潮中壮大的本土供应商,正凭成本、迭代速度与本地研发从国外Tier-1手中夺份额,甚至在外资品牌供应链内部也是如此。对外资零部件企业,问题变成:当本地生态的开发速度快过总部周期,如何保持相关性。

本文审视替代动态、本地化背后的政策顺风,以及外资供应商2026年实际采取的战略。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

竞争主战场已翻转

数十年来,国外Tier-1(博世、采埃孚、大陆、安波福等)是默认、往往不可替代的供应商——尤其在燃油喷射、底盘控制与电子领域。这一地位正在侵蚀。行业观察指出,在外资品牌供应商大会上,随着本土供应商在宝马、奔驰、奥迪与丰田合资项目中斩获订单,国外Tier-1占比下降。2025–2026年的例子包括本土企业在电流传感器、激光雷达与智能座舱模块拿下量产定点。

外资内部人士指出的根源不是价格。”很多海外人士以为是价格,”一位内部人士称,”但核心问题是响应速度。”中国OEM已将开发周期压缩至12–18个月;仍按美/欧总部慢周期运行的外资零部件商,即便价格可接受,也会被本土供应商替换。故2026年的竞争优势是本地自主权加速度,而非仅成本。

替代真实发生之处——与尚未发生之处

替代在电气化与智能座舱部件(功率电子、热管理、域控制器、激光雷达、智驾栈)以及软件/基础层(车载OS、芯片)加速。国家级联合体正快速缩小差距:广汽牵头105家企业联合定义与验证近400款芯片,把51款全国产化芯片装车;东风建成国产MCU;比亚迪与华为交付国产IGBT/SiC与全栈OS。连博世的底盘域也正受本土整车运动融合控制与国产制动/悬架供应商挑战。

但高端核心件仍依赖进口:车规芯片(尤其ADAS与高端MCU)、高端传感器与基础工业软件与德国、美国领先企业仍有技术差距。品牌溢价与标准话语权也利于博世、采埃孚等在位者。务实判断:外资在商品化电气硬件上最易被替代,而在高价值、IP密集部件及安全认证与全球足迹仍重要的系统中最被保护。

本地化背后的政策顺风

进口替代不只是市场驱动,也有政策支撑。工信部与地方政府出台多项扶持政策,推动零部件国产化与标准化,鼓励核心技术研发,并通过研发费用加计扣除降低成本。”专精特新”企业在首台套保险补偿与补短板项目优先采购中获实质支持。跨行业融合(汽车+机器人+低空经济)通过示范区培育。方向明确:高价值部件本土占比上升,外资供应商须深度本地化或退守利基。

外资供应商2026年采取的战略

国外Tier-1并非一致收缩;胜出者在适应:

  • 本地化决策自主权。 赋予中国实体在工程、定价与采购上的真实权限,以匹配12–18个月节奏。安波福中国总裁直言:问题不是”要不要投中国”,而是”还能往哪投”。
  • 转向电气化/软件定义架构。 安波福剥离纯燃油产品线,全力押注电气化与软件定义汽车;其应急电源模块芯片组实现全国产化并出口。这把”本地化”从成本中心变为出口优势。
  • 从价格到价值。 领先供应商把竞争重构为系统价值(安全、集成、全生命周期成本)而非单价,抵制纯价格战的”利润压缩—品质让步”陷阱。
  • 跟随OEM出海。 随着中国品牌出口东南亚与中东,外资与本土供应商 alike 采用”贸易+投资+本地化运营”模式服务这些市场,对冲美欧碳与关税壁垒。
  • 选择性合资转本地与并购。 部分外资将合资转向本地控制,或并购本地能力以快速补齐速度与IP短板。

准入提示

零部件制造开放,无外资股比上限,2024年版负面清单清除制造业限制。成品零件进口受最惠国关税及部分商品的贸易救济(反倾销/反补贴)约束——低速电动车与轮胎曾遭遇此类措施。RCEP逐步降低合格区域价值链的关税,对跨成员经济体采购的供应商相关。务实进入通常是WFOE或合资制造/研发实体,适用处须过CCC,并与OEM本地采购和ESG资质对齐。

常见误读

  • 把丢单归咎于价格。 核心问题是相对压缩后OEM节奏的响应速度。
  • 以总部时间运营中国。 慢周期无论成本都会丢份额。
  • 以为外资品牌OEM会默认保留国外Tier-1。 本土供应商如今斩获外资品牌订单。
  • 忽视本地化的政策顺风。 研发加计扣除、首台套保险与采购倾斜是真实的。
  • 只把中国当销售 outlet。 胜出者把中国用作研发与出口基地。

下一步建议

  • 赋予中国实体真实的工程、定价与采购自主权,以匹配12–18个月OEM节奏。
  • 做出清晰转向:退役哪些燃油产品线,在何处全力押注电气化/软件定义架构。
  • 本地化关键芯片/模块供应;把本地化变成出口能力,而非仅成本。
  • 从价格重构为系统价值;抵制纯价格战。
  • 建立”贸易+投资+本地化运营”模式,跟随中国OEM进入东南亚与中东。
  • 关注工信部/地方创新联合体项目与2025年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》的激励。

来源

  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 汽车零部件国产化、标准化与核心技术攻关:https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 外资零部件企业在华政策与稳外资:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 制造业与供应链政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 经济日报/中国青年报 — 汽车零部件技术攻关与本土替代报道(2026-03):https://auto.cyol.com/gb/articles/2026-03/25/content_nyl0nZUwGO.html

相关阅读

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)

Intelligent and connected vehicles — foreign test licences and data compliance

  • China issued its first production-intent L3 conditional-automation access licences in late 2025 (Changan in Chongqing, BAIC Arcfox in Beijing), with 2026 described by analysts as the “mass-production start year” for L3; L4 robotaxi/mobility is approaching a 0-to-1 inflection in defined scenarios.
    中国于2025年底发放首批面向量产的L3级有条件自动驾驶准入许可(重庆长安、北京北汽极狐),分析机构称2026年为L3″量产启动元年”;限定场景下的L4 Robotaxi/无人配送正接近从0到1的拐点。
  • Two distinct licences exist: an MIIT-issued access licence (allows commercial pilot of a mass-produced model) versus a local-government road-test licence (R&D testing only, “test-to-develop”). Foreign entrants must know which they hold.
    存在两类牌照:工信部发放的准入许可(允许量产车型商业化试点)与地方政府的道路测试牌照(仅研发测试、”以测促研”)。外资进入者须分清所持是哪一种。
  • Eight authorities issued the 《Automotive Data Export Security Guideline (2026 Edition)》, requiring data handlers to file a security assessment through an in-China legal entity; no in-China entity means the local branch files.
    八部门印发《汽车数据出境安全指引(2026版)》,要求数据处理者通过境内法人主体申报数据出境安全评估;无境内法人主体的由境内分支机构申报。
  • HD-map surveying remains a restricted, essentially Chinese-controlled activity; foreign ownership and cross-border map-data flows are constrained, so L3+ features depending on HD maps touch an un-opened sector.
    高精地图测绘仍属受限、实质由中方控制的 activity;外资持股与跨境地图数据流动受限,故依赖高精地图的L3+功能触及未放开领域。
  • Testing access for foreign brands runs through the same MIIT access-pilot and local road-test regimes; a local JV or WFOE is the realistic applicant because the access-pilot applicant is limited to vehicle manufacturers.
    外资品牌的测试准入走同样的工信部准入试点与地方道路测试制度;由于准入试点申请主体限定为汽车生产企业,本地合资或独资企业是现实的申报主体。
  • Default data localisation plus a mandatory outbound security assessment applies; “black-box” event data must be recorded and uploaded to government monitoring platforms for liability tracing.
    默认数据本地化加上强制出境安全评估;”黑匣子”事件数据须记录并上传政府监测平台以定责溯源。
  • Practical entry is via (a) a local manufacturing/R&D entity applying for road-test/access licences, (b) an in-China data-localisation and assessment posture, and (c) HD-map partnership with a licensed Chinese surveyor.
    务实进入路径为:(a)本地制造/研发实体申请路测/准入牌照;(b)数据境内本地化与评估 posture;(c)与持照中国测绘单位合作高精地图。

Intelligent and connected vehicles — foreign test licences and data compliance | 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规

Overview

China is moving autonomous driving from test tracks to public roads under a tightly governed, “small-cut” pilot model. In late 2025 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the country’s first access licences for L3 conditional-automation production-intent models — Changan’s Deepal in Chongqing and BAIC’s Arcfox in Beijing — and in 2026 analysts expect L3 mass-production starts alongside an L4 robotaxi inflection in defined scenarios. For foreign carmakers and tech suppliers, the opening is real but bounded by licensing tiers and a strict data/security regime.

This article explains the licence landscape, the 2026 data-export rule, the mapping constraint, and a practical market-access path. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The licence landscape: access vs road test

Two distinct instruments matter, and confusing them is the most common foreign mistake.

  • MIIT access licence (准入许可). Granted to a vehicle manufacturer after large-scale road testing and demonstration, this is the “uniform national exam” that lets a model move from technology validation toward mass-production commercial pilot. The approved L3 functions run only in defined road sections, at defined speeds (often ≤50 km/h in congestion), and in defined scenarios. The applicant is limited to vehicle manufacturers.
  • Local road-test licence (道路测试牌照). Issued by city transport/industry authorities, this is “test-to-develop” — accumulating real-road data to refine technology; it does not permit commercial operation, and liability rules are not yet settled.

Reporters note that some city-granted “L3” plates are in fact R&D test licences, not the MIIT production access licence. A foreign brand must know which it holds: only the MIIT access licence supports a commercial pilot of a mass-produced model.

2026 developments on the road

By 2026 the pilot is expanding city by city. Beijing opened high-auxiliary-map (高辅地图) review across the whole municipality to support L3-and-below mapping needs, and cities such as Hangzhou have granted L3 road-test licences to models from Geely and others, wiring them into city traffic-data sets to build large autonomous-driving corpora. MIIT’s equipment-industry body has said road testing and demonstration involved diverse applicants (OEMs, research institutes, tech firms, parts companies) under test licences, whereas the access pilot is limited to manufacturers — a distinction that shapes who can be the foreign applicant.

For a foreign entrant, the realistic applicant for an MIIT access pilot is its China JV or WFOE, not the overseas parent. The overseas parent can supply technology, but the in-China legal entity carries the licence, the compliance and the liability.

Automotive data export: the 2026 guideline

In early 2026 eight authorities — including MIIT — issued the *Automotive Data Export Security Guideline (2026 Edition)*. Its core rule: automotive data handlers shall file a data-export security assessment through an in-China legal entity; where no in-China legal entity exists, the in-China branch files. Handlers conduct a self-assessment of export risk, remediate gaps, and submit to the cyberspace authority; only after passing assessment may export occur, and material changes trigger re-assessment.

This sits on top of China’s broader data-export framework (the Data Export Security Assessment Measures, and the Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows). For connected vehicles the practical posture is default localisation:感知, mapping, and driving-decision data are best stored and processed in China, with only non-sensitive, assessed flows leaving the border. The “black-box” event-data recorder mandated on L3 vehicles records vehicle state, system decisions and driver takeovers, and data is uploaded to government monitoring platforms for liability tracing — another reason an in-China entity and in-China infrastructure are unavoidable.

The mapping constraint

High-definition map surveying is a restricted activity under Chinese law, essentially reserved to licensed Chinese surveying entities. Foreign ownership of map-content businesses and cross-border flow of surveying/map data are constrained. Because L3+ autonomy that relies on HD maps touches this sector, a foreign OEM cannot simply import its global HD-map stack; it must partner with a licensed Chinese surveyor and keep the map pipeline inside the compliance perimeter.

Beijing’s pilot framework and the natural-resources authority’s HD-map application pilots (in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Chongqing) show the policy intent: enable autonomous driving while safeguarding geographic information security. The commercial lesson is to plan HD-map dependency as a local partnership, not a global import.

Practical market-access path

  • Establish the in-China applicant. Form or use a China JV/WFOE as the access-pilot or road-test applicant; the overseas parent supplies technology under contract.
  • Choose the licence tier deliberately. Use local road-test licences to build corpora and refine functions; pursue the MIIT access licence when a mass-produced model is ready for defined-scenario commercial pilot.
  • Build data localisation and assessment capability. Stand up in-China storage/processing and a data-export assessment workflow before any cross-border flow; designate the in-China legal entity as the filer.
  • Partner for HD maps. Contract a licensed Chinese surveying entity for map content; keep the mapping pipeline compliant.
  • Plan for liability tracing. Implement the mandated event-data recording and government-platform upload; align insurance and liability playbooks with regulators.

Common pitfalls

  • Confusing a city test licence with an MIIT access licence. Only the latter supports commercial pilot of a mass-produced model.
  • Assuming the overseas parent can be the licence holder. The access-pilot applicant is limited to in-China vehicle manufacturers.
  • Treating data export as a formality. The 2026 guideline requires a filed, passed security assessment through an in-China entity.
  • Importing a global HD-map stack. Map surveying is restricted; partner locally instead.
  • Under-building in-China infrastructure. Event-data upload and localisation make a local entity unavoidable.

What to do next

  • Map your autonomy features to the L3/L4 tier and the defined-scenario limits before promising capabilities.
  • Decide the in-China entity that will hold the licence; align the overseas-parent technology-supply contract.
  • Stand up data localisation and a data-export assessment workflow now; designate the filer entity.
  • Engage a licensed Chinese surveying partner for HD-map content early.
  • Track the 2026 expansion of L3 access pilots and city road-test scopes; plan corpora-building via local test licences.
  • Coordinate cybersecurity, mapping and insurance advisers before any public-road deployment.

Sources

  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — L3准入许可、智能网联汽车管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • 国家网信办(CAC)— 《汽车数据出境安全指引(2026版)》及数据出境安全评估:https://www.cac.gov.cn
  • 自然资源部(MNR)门户网站 — 智能网联汽车高精地图试点:https://www.mnr.gov.cn
  • 新华社 — L3上路试点报道(2026-01):https://app.xinhuanet.com/news/article.html?articleId=071cd962ca6812d55a0910c1776ceb9f

Related reading

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 汽车零部件进口替代与外资零部件企业在华策略(145-auto-parts-2026)

智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规

概述

中国正以严格治理、”小切口”试点的模式,把自动驾驶从测试场推向公共道路。2025年底,工业和信息化部(MIIT)发放了国内首批面向量产的L3级有条件自动驾驶准入许可——重庆长安深蓝与北京北汽极狐;分析机构预计2026年为L3″量产启动元年”,限定场景下的L4 Robotaxi正接近从0到1的拐点。对外国车企与技术方案商而言,开放是真实的,但受牌照层级与严格的数据/安全制度约束。

本文解释牌照格局、2026年数据出境规则、地图约束与务实准入路径。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

牌照格局:准入与路测之分

两类文书至关重要,混淆二者是外资最常见的错误。

  • 工信部准入许可。 在大规模道路测试与示范后授予汽车生产企业,相当于”全国统一命题”,让车型从技术验证走向量产商业化试点。获批的L3功能仅在限定路段、限定速度(拥堵场景下常≤50km/h)与限定场景中运行。申请主体限定为汽车生产企业。
  • 地方道路测试牌照。 由城市交通/工信部门发放,属”以测促研”——积累真实路况数据以优化技术;不允许商业化运营,责任划分尚未明确。

报道指出,部分城市发放的”L3″牌照实为研发测试牌照,并非工信部量产准入许可。外资品牌须分清所持是哪一种:只有工信部准入许可支持量产车型的商业化试点。

2026年路上进展

到2026年,试点正逐城扩展。北京全域开放高辅地图审图以支撑L3及以下地图需求;杭州等城市向吉利等车型发放L3道路测试牌照,并将其接入城市交通数据集以构建自动驾驶语料库。工信部装备工业中心曾表示,道路测试与示范的申请主体多元(车企、科研院所、科技企业、零部件公司等),而准入试点限定为生产企业——这一区别决定了外资可由谁作为申请主体。

对外资进入者而言,工信部准入试点的现实申请主体是其中国合资或独资企业,而非境外母公司。境外母公司可提供技术,但境内法律实体持有牌照、承担合规与责任。

汽车数据出境:2026版指引

2026年初,工信部等八部门印发《汽车数据出境安全指引(2026版)》。其核心规则:汽车数据处理者应当通过境内法人主体申报数据出境安全评估;无境内法人主体的,由境内分支机构申报。处理者开展出境风险自评估、整改问题,并向网信部门提交材料;通过评估后方可开展出境,情形变化须重新申报。

这叠加在中国更宽泛的数据出境框架之上(《数据出境安全评估办法》《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》)。对智能网联汽车,务实 posture 是默认本地化:感知、地图与驾驶决策数据最好在中国境内存储处理,仅非敏感且经评估的流量出境。L3车辆强制配备的”黑匣子”事件记录器记载车辆状态、系统决策与驾驶员接管行为,数据上传政府监测平台以定责溯源——这进一步说明境内实体与境内基础设施不可避免。

地图约束

高精地图测绘在中国法下属受限活动,实质保留给持照中国测绘单位。地图内容业务的外资持股与测绘/地图数据跨境流动受限。由于依赖高精地图的L3+自动驾驶触及该领域,外资OEM不能简单进口其全球高精地图栈,而必须与持照中国测绘单位合作,将地图管线留在合规边界内。

北京的试点框架与自然资源部门的高精地图应用试点(北京、上海、广州、深圳、杭州、重庆)体现了政策意图:在保障地理信息安全的前提下发展自动驾驶。商业启示是把高精地图依赖规划为本地合作,而非全球进口。

务实准入路径

  • 确立境内申请主体。 设立或使用中国合资/独资企业作为准入试点或路测申请主体;境外母公司依合同提供技术。
  • 刻意选择牌照层级。 用地方道路测试牌照构建语料、打磨功能;待量产车型就绪、进入限定场景商业化试点时再争取工信部准入许可。
  • 建设数据本地化与评估能力。 在任何跨境流动前,建立境内存储/处理与数据出境评估流程;指定境内法律实体为申报人。
  • 地图本地合作。 就地图内容与持照中国测绘单位签约,保持管线合规。
  • 规划定责溯源。 落实强制事件数据记录与政府平台上传;与监管对齐保险与责任剧本。

常见误读

  • 把城市测试牌照当作工信部准入许可。 只有后者支持量产车型商业化试点。
  • 以为境外母公司可持牌。 准入试点申请主体限定为境内汽车生产企业。
  • 把数据出境当形式。 2026版指引要求通过境内实体申报并pass安全评估。
  • 进口全球高精地图栈。 地图测绘受限;应本地合作。
  • 轻视境内基础设施。 事件数据上传与本地化使本地实体不可避免。

下一步建议

  • 在承诺能力前,将自动驾驶功能映射到L3/L4层级与限定场景限制。
  • 决定持有牌照的境内实体;对齐境外母公司的技术供方合同。
  • 立即建立数据本地化与数据出境评估流程;指定申报实体。
  • 尽早就高精地图内容与持照中国测绘单位合作。
  • 跟踪2026年L3准入试点与城市路测范围的扩展;通过地方测试牌照规划语料构建。
  • 在任何公共道路部署前,协调网络安全、测绘与保险顾问。

来源

  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — L3准入许可、智能网联汽车管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn
  • 国家网信办(CAC)— 《汽车数据出境安全指引(2026版)》及数据出境安全评估:https://www.cac.gov.cn
  • 自然资源部(MNR)门户网站 — 智能网联汽车高精地图试点:https://www.mnr.gov.cn
  • 新华社 — L3上路试点报道(2026-01):https://app.xinhuanet.com/news/article.html?articleId=071cd962ca6812d55a0910c1776ceb9f

相关阅读

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 汽车零部件进口替代与外资零部件企业在华策略(145-auto-parts-2026)

Power battery supply chain — foreign opportunities and localisation

  • China’s power-battery manufacturing is fully open to foreign investment, but the 2024 MIIT “Comprehensive Utilisation of End-of-Life NEV Power Batteries (2024 Edition)” norm tightens recycling, traceability and technical thresholds.
    中国动力电池制造对外资完全开放,但工信部2024年《新能源汽车废旧动力电池综合利用行业规范条件(2024年本)》提高了回收、溯源与技术门槛。
  • Every power battery must carry a unique identification code tracked through the national traceability platform from production to retirement; producers bear extended-producer-responsibility obligations.
    每块动力电池须具唯一识别编码,经国家溯源平台从生产追踪至退役;生产者承担生产者责任延伸义务。
  • Export markets impose their own local-content and carbon rules: the US 301 tariffs raise Chinese EV/battery duties (EVs to 100% from 2024), and the EU Battery Regulation mandates carbon-footprint declarations and a battery passport.
    出口市场设有本地含量与碳规则:美国301关税上调中国电动车/电池税率(2024年起电动车达100%),欧盟新电池法要求碳足迹声明与电池护照。
  • Recycling scale is being built: by early 2026 China had 148 announced compliant enterprises and provincial clusters (Ganzhou, Changsha); the 2025 State Council action plan targets a standardised, efficient recovery system.
    回收规模正在形成:截至2026年初中国已公告148家合规企业并形成赣州、长沙等集群;2025年国务院行动方案目标是规范化、高效回收体系。
  • Foreign battery firms can manufacture in China but must meet the same GB/catalogue and recycling obligations as domestic players; a non-compliant pack can block the whole vehicle’s type approval.
    外资电池企业可在中国制造,但须满足与本土企业同等的GB/目录与回收义务;不合规电池包可拖垮整车准入。
  • Localisation of cells, materials and recycling is now driven less by a mandated JV ratio and more by cost, lead-time, and customer (OEM) ESG/sourcing requirements.
    电芯、材料与回收的本地化,如今更少由强制合资比例驱动,更多由成本、交期与整车厂ESG/采购要求驱动。
  • Opportunities sit in high-value segments: LFP/high-nickel cells, separator/electrolyte materials, recycling and refurbishment, and battery-swap/energy-storage co-location.
    机会在于高价值环节:磷酸铁锂/高镍电芯、隔膜电解液材料、回收再利用,以及换电/储能协同。

Power battery supply chain — foreign opportunities and localisation | 动力电池产业链:外资机会与本地化配套

Overview

China hosts the world’s densest and lowest-cost power-battery supply chain — from cathode and anode materials to cells, packs, BMS and recycling. For foreign battery makers and the OEMs that buy from them, the sector is legally open: there is no foreign-ownership cap on battery manufacturing, and the 2024 negative list cleared manufacturing-sector restrictions generally.

The practical question in 2026 is not “may I invest” but “how do I meet China’s tightening recycling, traceability and technical rules while competing on a supply chain that is rapidly localising and, at the same time, navigating US and EU trade and carbon barriers abroad.” This article outlines the regulatory floor, the localisation logic, and where foreign capital can still win.

The regulatory floor: type approval, catalogue and traceability

Beyond general manufacturing access, batteries sit under a specific regime. The MIIT “Roadmap”/catalogue system and battery-recycling traceability rules mean a battery pack needs type approval and a traceable recycling channel. The 2024 revision of the *Measures for Comprehensive Utilisation of End-of-Life NEV Power Batteries* (effective 1 January 2025) raises the bar further: registered capital of no less than RMB 10 million, paid-in capital of no less than RMB 5 million,梯次利用 capacity of at least 1,000 t/year and再生利用 of at least 5,000 t/year. It lifts the lithium recovery rate from ≥85% to ≥90%, adds an electrode-powder recovery rate of ≥98% and impurity caps (aluminium <1.5%), and requires R&D spend as a share of utilisation revenue.

Traceability is the part most often underestimated. Every power battery receives a unique identification code and is tracked through a national platform from production to retirement; producers (including foreign battery makers) must register and meet recycling-responsibility obligations under the extended-producer-responsibility framework. Importers of complete vehicles with batteries should confirm the pack’s approval status and coding before shipment, because a non-compliant battery can block the whole vehicle’s type approval.

Localisation logic: from mandated ratio to market pull

With the ownership cap gone, a foreign battery firm is no longer required to form a JV or to source a fixed local share. In practice, however, China’s cell, material and equipment ecosystem is the densest in the world, so most entrants localise for cost and lead-time reasons. The driver has shifted: it is no longer a legal JV ratio but customer pull — Chinese OEMs (including foreign-brand JVs) now demand fast response, local R&D presence and ESG/sourcing credentials, and they increasingly award contracts to suppliers who can iterate on China’s 12–18 month development clock.

This matters for foreign Tier-1 battery and materials suppliers. A foreign cell maker that runs its China business on a slow headquarters cycle will lose bids not because it is expensive but because it is late. The 2026 competitive edge is local decision autonomy plus speed, not price alone.

Export barriers reshape the China play

Foreign battery firms in China must also plan for destination markets. The US 301 tariff review raised duties on Chinese EVs to 100% and on lithium batteries to 25% from 2024, and the US has layered software/hardware restrictions on connected and autonomous vehicles. The EU’s Battery Regulation (in force and tightening through 2026–2027) mandates carbon-footprint declarations, a digital battery passport, and minimum recycled-content thresholds; its CBAM indirectly raises the carbon cost of steel and aluminium enclosures. China’s own export-tax-rebate step-down on batteries (a rebate cut from 9% to 6% in 2026, with a planned further move) signals a push up the value chain.

The practical response for a foreign battery investor is to separate “China-for-China” from “China-for-export.” The former leans into the local supply chain and catalogue inclusion; the latter requires carbon-accounting, passport readiness and, for the US/EU, likely local production in those regions or routing through third countries with genuine transformation.

Where foreign capital can still win

Opportunities are not in commoditised cells but in high-value, capability-intensive segments:

  • Advanced materials and components — high-nickel cathodes, silicon-anode and separator/electrolyte formulations where foreign IP still leads.
  • Recycling and refurbishment — the 2024 norm and 2025 State Council action plan explicitly encourage producers to build recovery systems and use recycled metal; by early 2026 China had announced 148 compliant enterprises and clusters in Ganzhou and Changsha. Foreign players with hydrometallurgy or direct-recycling IP can partner locally.
  • Battery-swap and storage co-location — the 2026 halved NEV purchase tax and the separate energy-storage capacity-price mechanism (see the storage article) make pack-level services attractive.
  • Testing, certification and safety — SAMR-led national standards for recycling (22 published by late 2025) create demand for conformance and quality-infrastructure services.

Common pitfalls

  • Treating battery entry as pure manufacturing. Type approval, catalogue inclusion and traceability are separate gates; miss one and the pack cannot ship.
  • Assuming the JV cap removal removes local-content pressure. The pressure now comes from OEMs and ESG rules, not a legal ratio.
  • Underestimating recycling obligations. Extended-producer responsibility and the 90% lithium-recovery bar apply to foreign makers too.
  • Ignoring export carbon rules. EU passport/CBAM and US tariffs can erase China-cost advantages on outbound packs.
  • Running China on headquarters time. Slow decision cycles lose bids regardless of price.

What to do next

  • Confirm the MIIT catalogue and CCC path before committing a cell or pack line; budget for GB-standard testing and coding.
  • Build or partner for a compliant recycling/traceability channel — register on the national platform and meet the 2024 norm’s scale and recovery thresholds.
  • Localise materials and R&D decision-making in China to match the 12–18 month OEM clock; grant the China entity real autonomy.
  • Separate China-for-China from China-for-export; for the latter, stand up carbon accounting and passport readiness now.
  • Scout high-value niches (materials, recycling, swap/storage, testing) rather than competing on commoditised cells.
  • Track the 2025 Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries and local green-manufacturing incentives.

Sources

  • 工业和信息化部《新能源汽车废旧动力电池综合利用行业规范条件(2024年本)》解读(2025-01-01实施):https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/policyInfo.shtml?id=6971
  • 国家市场监督管理总局(SAMR)门户网站 — 动力电池回收利用国家标准:https://www.samr.gov.cn
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 循环经济与绿色制造:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 美国对华汽车产业关税措施相关报道(2026):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gjxw/2026-05/06/content_512332.html

Related reading

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)

动力电池产业链:外资机会与本地化配套

概述

中国拥有全球最密集、成本最低的动力电池供应链——从正负极材料到电芯、电池包、BMS与回收。对国外电池企业与采购它们的OEM而言,该领域在法律上开放:电池制造无外资股比上限,2024年版负面清单整体清除了制造业限制。

2026年的实操问题不是”能否投资”,而是”在满足中国日益收紧的回收、溯源与技术规则的同时,如何在一个快速本地化的供应链上竞争,并在海外应对美欧贸易与碳壁垒”。本文勾勒监管底线、本地化逻辑,以及外资仍可胜出的位置。

监管底线:型式准入、目录与溯源

除一般制造准入外,电池另有一套制度。工信部”公告/目录”体系与电池回收溯源规则意味着,电池包须通过型式准入并具备可追溯回收渠道。2024年修订的《新能源汽车废旧动力电池综合利用行业规范条件(2024年本)》(2025年1月1日施行)进一步抬高门槛:注册资本不少于1000万元、实缴不少于500万元,梯次利用产能不低于1000吨/年、再生利用不低于5000吨/年;锂回收率由≥85%提至≥90%,新增电极粉料回收率≥98%与杂质上限(铝<1.5%),并要求研发费用占综合利用业务收入的比例。

溯源是最常被低估的一环。每块动力电池具唯一识别编码,经国家平台从生产追踪至退役;生产者(含外资电池企业)须登记并依生产者责任延伸框架履行回收义务。进口含电池整车者应在发运前确认电池包准入状态与编码,因为不合规电池可拖垮整车准入。

本地化逻辑:从强制比例到市场牵引

股比上限取消后,外资电池企业不再被强制组建合资或采购固定本地比例。但实践中,中国的电芯、材料与设备生态全球最密集,多数进入者为成本与交期而本地化。驱动力已转变:不再是法律上的合资比例,而是客户牵引——中国OEM(含外资品牌合资企业)如今要求快速响应、本地研发存在感与ESG/采购资质,并日益把合同授予能在中国12–18个月开发节奏上迭代的供应商。

这对国外电池与材料Tier-1至关重要。若以总部慢周期运营中国业务,丢单并非因为贵,而是因为慢。2026年的竞争优势是本地决策自主权加速度,而非仅靠价格。

出口壁垒重塑中国打法

在中国的外资电池企业还须规划目的地市场。美国301复审自2024年起将中国电动车关税提至100%、锂电池提至25%,并对智能网联与自动驾驶汽车叠加软件/硬件限制。欧盟新电池法(已生效并在2026–2027年趋严)要求碳足迹声明、数字电池护照与最低回收料比例;其CBAM通过钢铝外壳间接抬高碳成本。中国自身对电池出口退税的阶梯式下调(2026年由9%降至6%,并计划进一步退出)释放了向价值链上游迈进的信号。

对外资电池投资者的务实应对,是将”中国供中国”与”中国供出口”分开。前者依托本地供应链与目录列入;后者须具备碳核算、护照准备,且对美欧市场大概率需要在当地生产或经具备实质性转化的第三国绕道。

外资仍可胜出的位置

机会不在商品化电芯,而在高价值、能力密集的环节:

  • 先进材料与部件 —— 高镍正极、硅负极及隔膜/电解液配方,外资IP仍领先。
  • 回收与再利用 —— 2024年规范与2025年国务院行动方案明确鼓励生产者建立回收体系并使用再生金属;截至2026年初中国已公告148家合规企业,形成赣州、长沙集群。具备湿法冶金或直接回收IP的外资可本地合作。
  • 换电与储能协同 —— 2026年购置税减半与独立的储能容量电价机制(见储能篇)使包级服务具吸引力。
  • 测试、认证与安全 —— 市场监管总局主导的回收国标(2025年底已发布22项)催生对合规与质量基础设施服务的需求。

常见误读

  • 把电池进入当作纯制造。 型式准入、目录列入与溯源是分立闸门;漏掉一项电池包便无法出货。
  • 以为取消股比即消除本地含量压力。 压力如今来自OEM与ESG规则,而非法律比例。
  • 低估回收义务。 生产者责任延伸与90%锂回收门槛同样适用于外资企业。
  • 忽视出口碳规则。 欧盟护照/CBAM与美国关税可抹平中国成本优势。
  • 以总部节奏运营中国。 慢决策周期无论价格如何都会丢单。

下一步建议

  • 在落子电芯或电池包产线前,确认工信部目录与CCC路径;为GB标准测试与编码预留预算。
  • 建设或合作合规的回收/溯源渠道——在国家平台登记,并满足2024年规范的规模与回收门槛。
  • 在中国本地化材料与研发决策,以匹配12–18个月OEM节奏;赋予中国实体真实自主权。
  • 区分中国供中国与中国供出口;对后者,立即建立碳核算与护照准备。
  • 瞄准高价值利基(材料、回收、换电/储能、测试),而非在商品化电芯上竞争。
  • 关注2025年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》与地方绿色制造激励。

来源

  • 工业和信息化部《新能源汽车废旧动力电池综合利用行业规范条件(2024年本)》解读(2025-01-01实施):https://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/claw/policyInfo.shtml?id=6971
  • 国家市场监督管理总局(SAMR)门户网站 — 动力电池回收利用国家标准:https://www.samr.gov.cn
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 循环经济与绿色制造:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 美国对华汽车产业关税措施相关报道(2026):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gjxw/2026-05/06/content_512332.html

相关阅读

  • 新能源汽车整车制造准入(142-nev-manufacturing-2026)
  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)

NEV manufacturing access after foreign-ownership liberalisation

  • China’s entire vehicle and parts manufacturing chain has been open to foreign investment without equity caps since 1 January 2022, and the 2024 negative list went further by clearing all manufacturing restrictions (“manufacturing zeroed-out”).
    自2022年1月1日起,整车与零部件全链条已对外资开放、不设股比上限;2024年版负面清单进一步清除制造业全部限制(”制造业清零”)。
  • 2026 is the first full year in which the policy focus has shifted from opening manufacturing to “access-plus-operation” in services; for vehicle manufacturing itself, the question is no longer “can a foreigner own it” but “how to operate competitively.”
    2026年是政策重心由制造业开放转向服务业”既准入又准营”的首个完整年度;对整车制造本身,问题已不是”外资能否控股”,而是”如何具竞争力地运营”。
  • Tesla’s wholly foreign-owned Shanghai plant (operational since 2020) and BMW’s 75% control of its Chinese JV (effective 2022) are the templates; new entrants can now choose a WFOE from day one.
    特斯拉上海全资工厂(2020年投产)与宝马对中国合资企业75%控股(2022年生效)已成为范本;新进入者可一开局即选择外商独资企业。
  • The NEV purchase-tax relief is extended to end-2027: 2024–2025 fully exempt (cap RMB 30,000/vehicle), 2026–2027 halved (cap RMB 15,000/vehicle).
    新能源汽车购置税减免延续至2027年底:2024–2025年全免(每辆乘用车上限3万元),2026–2027年减半(上限1.5万元)。
  • Vehicle and battery type-approval against Chinese GB standards (CCC + MIIT announcement/catalogue) remains mandatory and is not substituted by UN/ECE or US approval.
    依中国GB标准的车辆与电池型式准入(CCC+工信部公告/目录)仍为强制,UN/ECE或美国批准不能替代。
  • Adjacent auto activities — mapping, connected-vehicle data, and certain telecom/ICT services — still face ownership or licensing limits under the negative list and sector rules.
    汽车相邻业务——地图测绘、智能网联汽车数据及部分电信/ICT服务——在负面清单与行业规则下仍受股比或许可限制。
  • China is increasingly used as an export base; a WFOE plant can serve both the domestic market and third-country exports, but US and EU trade barriers reshape the destination mix.
    中国日益被用作出口基地;外商独资工厂可同时服务国内与第三国市场,但美欧贸易壁垒重塑了目的地组合。

NEV manufacturing access after foreign-ownership liberalisation | 外资股比放开后的新能源汽车整车制造准入

Overview

China is the world’s largest car market and the global leader in new-energy vehicles (NEVs — battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel-cell vehicles). For foreign carmakers, the single most important structural change of the last decade was the staged removal of the joint-venture (JV) foreign-ownership cap, completed on 1 January 2022. Since then the entire vehicle and parts chain has been open to foreign investment without equity limits. The 2024 negative list then deleted the last manufacturing restrictions, achieving a de facto “manufacturing zeroed-out” position.

This article reviews the opening trajectory, the post-liberalisation market structure in 2026, the incentive backdrop (notably the 2026–2027 halved NEV purchase tax), and the boundaries that ownership liberalisation did not remove — data, mapping and telecom. It is informational; confirm current policy detail with qualified PRC advisers.

From JV caps to a manufacturing-cleared market (2018–2024)

China’s automotive opening was staged over years. The 2018 negative-list revision began a five-year transition: foreign caps were removed on special-purpose and new-energy vehicle manufacturing in 2018, on commercial vehicles in 2020, and finally on passenger vehicles and the “at most two JVs per vehicle category” rule on 1 January 2022. Since then, the entire vehicle and parts chain is open to foreign investment without equity caps, co-led by the NDRC and MIIT; the negative list is jointly issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM.

The 2024 negative list (effective 1 November 2024) went further. It deleted the two remaining manufacturing restrictions — “publication printing must be Chinese-controlled” and the bar on certain traditional Chinese medicine preparation techniques — completing the clearance of manufacturing-sector foreign-access limits. In the words used by Chinese officials, manufacturing restrictions were “zeroed out.” For a foreign carmaker this means a WFOE plant is legally permitted from day one, with no mandatory partner and no fixed local-share requirement in the entry rule itself.

Two clarifications prevent misreading the opening. First, the lift applies to vehicle and parts manufacturing equity, not to every adjacent activity. The negative list and sector rules still govern related services such as automotive data, mapping, and certain telecom/ICT elements; a foreign entrant in those areas may still face ownership or licensing limits. Second, “no JV required” is not “no local footprint advised.” Even a wholly foreign-owned plant must satisfy local content indirectly through the supply chain to be price-competitive, and provincial investment-promotion terms, land and talent still favour entities with a real in-China operation.

2026 market structure: who owns what

The post-2022 market shows two clear templates. Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory, a wholly foreign-owned plant operational since 2020, demonstrated that a foreign OEM can build, certify and export from China without a local JV. BMW raised its stake in its Chinese JV to 75% (effective 2022), exercising the freed cap. Volkswagen had earlier taken full control of its JAC Volkswagen (SOL) venture in 2020. These moves were not merely financial restructurings; they re-centred product, software and export decisions inside China.

By 2026 the practical question is strategy, not permission. A foreign entrant choosing a WFOE accepts full control and full compliance responsibility; a JV with a Chinese partner still offers faster local sourcing, licensing and government-relations leverage. Many foreign brands that entered via JV decades ago are now renegotiating the balance — some buying up stakes, others deepening local R&D so that China becomes the global product-definition hub. MOFCOM has explicitly said that, with manufacturing limits cleared, the 2026 emphasis is on attracting R&D and high-end manufacturing links to China and on ensuring foreign-invested enterprises can both “access and operate” (既准入又准营) in the opened sectors.

The 2026 incentive backdrop: purchase tax and beyond

The direct NEV purchase subsidy fully exited at end-2022. Today the main national demand lever is the vehicle purchase-tax relief, extended by the Ministry of Finance, SAT and MIIT to end-2027: NEVs purchased in 2024–2025 are exempt (per-passenger-vehicle cap RMB 30,000); those purchased in 2026–2027 are taxed at half rate (cap RMB 15,000). For a 2026 buyer of a RMB 300,000 NEV, the taxable base is RMB 30,000 at 10%, the half-rate relief is RMB 1,500, so RMB 1,500 of tax is due — a material but shrinking advantage versus the 2024–2025 full exemption.

City-level licence and traffic privileges in restricted cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and others) still carry real value, but rules differ sharply — some cities allocate separate NEV quotas, others tighten plug-in hybrids, and fuel-cell vehicles remain in demonstration phase. The dual-credit regime (average fuel-consumption and NEV credits) also binds both foreign and domestic OEMs and must be folded into any market-entry plan. Because these levers shift year to year, treat any specific rate as time-bound and verify before relying on it.

Where ownership is still not free

Liberalisation of manufacturing equity must be distinguished from liberalisation of the data and connectivity stack that rides on the vehicle. Three boundaries remain:

  • Mapping and surveying. High-definition map surveying is a restricted activity; foreign ownership and cross-border map-data flows are constrained. L3+ autonomy that depends on HD maps therefore touches a sector that is not opened by the manufacturing rule.
  • Connected-vehicle data. Automotive data collection, storage and cross-border transfer are governed by the data-security and personal-information regimes; a foreign OEM must plan for in-China data localisation and, where relevant, a security assessment for outbound transfer.
  • Telecom/ICT elements. Certain onboard connectivity, V2X and cloud services sit in sectors with ownership or licensing limits under the negative list and the cross-border services negative list.

These are addressed in a separate article on intelligent and connected vehicles; the point here is that “I can own the factory” does not automatically mean “I can own the map, the data platform and the connectivity layer.”

Market-access paths and the export-hub angle

A foreign carmaker can (1) import vehicles as general trade (subject to tariffs, CAFC/NEV credit rules and China-unique type-approval / CCC); (2) manufacture locally via a WFOE or JV; or (3) focus on NEVs where the policy and incentive tilt is strongest. Component and battery suppliers typically set up manufacturing or R&D entities and pursue CCC and MIIT catalogue inclusion.

A newer path is the export hub: a China WFOE that serves the domestic market and also ships to third countries (Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America). This works best where the destination does not impose the high US/EU barriers. The 2024–2026 US 301 tariff increases — EVs from China at 100% and lithium batteries at 25% — and the EU’s rising local-content and carbon requirements mean that, for the US and increasingly the EU, direct export from China is constrained, pushing foreign OEMs toward localising production in those regions or routing via third countries. China remains the lowest-cost, densest NEV supply base in the world, which is precisely why it is attractive as both a market and an export platform.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming the JV-cap removal opens every auto-adjacent business. Manufacturing equity is free, but data, mapping and some ICT/services tied to vehicles can still carry ownership or licensing limits.
  • Believing the NEV purchase subsidy still exists. The direct subsidy exited at end-2022; today the lever is the 2026–2027 halved purchase-tax relief and city privileges, which change yearly.
  • Treating overseas homologation as Chinese certification. A UN/ECE or US type-approval does not substitute for China’s CCC and MIIT vehicle-type approval against GB standards.
  • Overlooking the dual-credit regime. Average-fuel-consumption and NEV-credit rules bind vehicle makers; a foreign entrant, importing or building locally, must fold credit compliance into its plan.
  • Assuming wholly foreign ownership removes the need for a local footprint. Without local sourcing and a real in-China operation, cost and lead-time disadvantages usually outweigh the equity freedom.

What to do next

  • Decide WFOE vs JV early — the choice drives control, compliance and government-relations exposure, not just ownership.
  • Plan CCC and MIIT vehicle-type approval / NEV catalogue before any sale; budget for GB-standard testing.
  • Size the business case on the 2026–2027 halved purchase-tax relief and city privileges, verified annually; assume the direct subsidy is gone.
  • Separate the manufacturing question from the data/mapping/connectivity question; engage cybersecurity and surveying advisers before promising L3+ features.
  • Evaluate China as an export hub but model US/EU tariff and carbon barriers into destination mix.
  • Track the 2025 edition of the Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries (205 net new items, emphasising advanced manufacturing) for potential incentives.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 外资准入与制造业开放政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 2025年版鼓励外商投资产业目录、稳外资政策:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国务院 — 《延续和优化新能源汽车车辆购置税减免政策的公告》(2024–2027,2026–2027减半):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202306/content_6887717.htm
  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 车辆与电池准入、双积分管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 可再生能源与绿色投资激励(49-renewable-energy-green-investment)

外资股比放开后的新能源汽车整车制造准入

概述

中国是全球最大的汽车市场,也是新能源汽车(NEV,含纯电动、插电式混动与燃料电池)的全球领跑者。对外国车企而言,过去十年最重要的结构性变化,是分阶段取消合资(JV)外资股比限制、并于2022年1月1日完成。自此,整车与零部件全链条对外资开放、不再设股比上限。2024年版负面清单进一步删除制造业剩余限制,实现事实上的”制造业清零”。

本文回顾开放路径、2026年股比放开后的市场格局、激励背景(尤其是2026–2027年购置税减半),以及股权放开并未消除的边界——数据、地图与电信。本文仅为信息参考,具体政策细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

从股比限制到制造业清零(2018–2024)

中国汽车业的开放分阶段推进。2018年负面清单修订启动五年过渡:2018年取消专用车与新能源汽车外资股比限制,2020年取消商用车限制,最终于2022年1月1日取消乘用车股比及”同一类整车产品合资企业不超过两家”的限制。此后整车与零部件全链条对外资开放、不设股比上限,由发改委与工信部共同牵头,负面清单由发改委与商务部联合发布。

2024年版负面清单(2024年11月1日施行)更进一步,删除制造业仅剩的两条限制——”出版物印刷须由中方控股”与部分中药饮片炮制技术限制——完成制造业外资准入限制的清除。用官方表述,即制造业限制”清零”。对国外车企而言,这意味着外商独资企业自第一天起即合法可行,无强制伙伴、准入规则本身也无固定本地股比要求。

两点澄清可避免误读开放。其一,股比放开适用于整车与零部件制造股权,而非所有相邻活动:负面清单与行业规则仍监管汽车数据、地图测绘及部分电信/ICT要素,外资在这些领域仍可能面临股比或许可限制。其二,”无需合资”不等于”无需本地布局”:即便全资工厂,为保持价格竞争力仍须通过供应链间接满足本地配套,且地方招商引资条件、土地与人才仍向真正在华运营的实体倾斜。

2026市场格局:谁持有什么

2022年后的市场呈现两种清晰范本。特斯拉上海超级工厂作为2020年投产的外商独资企业,证明了外资OEM无需本地合资即可在中国建厂、认证与出口。宝马于2022年将其中国合资企业股比提升至75%,行使了被放开的限制。大众则早在2020年取得江淮大众(SOL)全资控制权。这些动作不只是财务重组,更把产品、软件与出口决策重新收归中国。

到2026年,实操问题已转向战略而非许可。选择WFOE的外资接受完全控制与完全合规责任;与中国伙伴合资则仍能获得更快的本地采购、牌照与政府关系杠杆。许多数十年前以合资进入的外国品牌正在重新平衡——有的增持股份,有的深化本地研发,使中国成为全球产品定义中心。商务部明确表示,制造业限制清零后,2026年的重点是吸引跨国公司将研发与高端制造环节放在中国,并保障外资企业在已开放领域”既准入又准营”。

2026激励背景:购置税及更多

新能源汽车直接购置补贴已于2022年底全面退出。当前主要全国性需求杠杆是车辆购置税减免,由财政部、税务总局与工信部延续至2027年底:2024–2025年购置的新能源汽车免征(每辆乘用车上限3万元);2026–2027年减半征收(上限1.5万元)。以2026年购买一辆30万元NEV为例,计税价3万元、税率10%,减半 relief 为1.5万元,须缴税1.5万元——相比2024–2025年全免,优势仍在但逐步收窄。

限牌城市(北京、上海、广州、深圳等)的牌照与通行优待仍具实质价值,但规则差异极大:有的城市对NEV单独配置指标,有的收紧插电混动,燃料电池车仍处示范阶段。双积分(平均燃料消耗量与新能源汽车积分)政策约束外资与本土OEM,须纳入任何市场准入计划。因这些杠杆逐年变化,任何具体税率均应视为时效性数字,引用前须核实。

股权仍未自由之处

制造股权的放开,须与搭载于车辆之上的数据与连接栈的放开区分开来。三道边界仍在:

  • 地图测绘。 高精地图测绘属受限活动;外资持股与跨境地图数据流动受限。依赖高精地图的L3+自动驾驶因此触及制造业规则并未放开的领域。
  • 智能网联汽车数据。 汽车数据收集、存储与跨境传输受数据安全与个人信息制度监管;外资OEM须规划数据境内本地化,并在需要时履行出境安全评估。
  • 电信/ICT要素。 部分车载连接、V2X与云服务处于负面清单及跨境服务贸易负面清单下有股比或许可限制的 sector。

这些在另一篇智能网联汽车文章中详述;此处要点是”我能拥有工厂”并不自动等于”我能拥有地图、数据平台与连接层”。

准入路径与出口基地角度

外国车企可(1)以一般贸易进口车辆(须缴关税,满足CAFC/NEV积分规则,以及中国特有的型式准入/CCC);(2)通过WFOE或合资本地制造;或(3)聚焦政策与激励倾斜最明显的NEV。零部件与电池供应商通常设立制造或研发实体,并争取CCC与工信部目录列入。

一条较新的路径是出口基地:中国WFOE既服务国内市场,也向第三国(东南亚、中东、拉美)发货。这在不施加美欧高壁垒的目的地效果最佳。2024–2026年美国301关税上调——中国电动车100%、锂电池25%——以及欧盟日益提高的本地含量与碳要求,意味着对美乃至对欧的直接出口受约束,推动外资OEM在那些区域本地化生产或经第三国绕道。中国仍是全球成本最低、最密集的NEV供应链基地,正因如此,它既是市场也是出口平台。

常见误读

  • 以为取消合资限制即放开所有汽车相关业务。 制造股权已自由,但车辆相关的数据、地图测绘及部分ICT/服务仍可能受股比或许可限制。
  • 以为新能源车购置补贴仍在。 直接补贴已于2022年底退出;如今杠杆是2026–2027年减半的购置税减免与城市优待,且逐年变化。
  • 把境外认证当作中国认证。 UN/ECE或美国型式批准不能替代中国CCC与工信部依GB标准的车辆型式准入。
  • 忽视双积分。 双积分政策约束整车企业;外资以进口或本地制造整车,均须纳入积分合规。
  • 以为全资即可不要本地布局。 缺乏本地采购与真实在华运营,成本与交期劣势通常盖过股权自由的好处。

下一步建议

  • 尽早决定WFOE还是合资——该选择决定控制权、合规与政府关系敞口,而非仅仅是所有权。
  • 在任何销售前规划CCC与工信部车辆型式准入/新能源目录;为GB标准测试预留预算。
  • 以2026–2027年减半的购置税减免与城市优待为基础做商业测算,逐年核实;假定直接补贴已取消。
  • 把制造问题与数据/地图/连接问题分开;在承诺L3+功能前,先对接网络安全与测绘顾问。
  • 将中国视为出口基地评估,但把美欧关税与碳壁垒纳入目的地组合模型。
  • 关注2025年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(净增205条,侧重先进制造)可能带来的激励。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 外资准入与制造业开放政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 2025年版鼓励外商投资产业目录、稳外资政策:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国务院 — 《延续和优化新能源汽车车辆购置税减免政策的公告》(2024–2027,2026–2027减半):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202306/content_6887717.htm
  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 车辆与电池准入、双积分管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn

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