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Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in Mainland China: A Practical Guide under the New York Convention

  • The New York Convention has applied in mainland China since 22 April 1987, subject to China’s reciprocity reservation and commercial reservation.
    《纽约公约》自1987年4月22日起在中国内地施行,并受中国作出的互惠保留与商事保留两项声明的约束。
  • The seat of arbitration—not the institution’s nationality, the hearing place, or the rules’ governing law—is the sole test of an award’s nationality.
    仲裁地——而非仲裁机构国籍、开庭地或仲裁规则所适用法域——是判定裁决国籍的唯一标准。
  • Awards seated in mainland China are domestic; awards from the Hong Kong SAR or Macao SAR follow special mutual-enforcement arrangements, not the Convention.
    仲裁地位于中国内地的裁决为内国裁决;中国香港特别行政区、中国澳门特别行政区作出的裁决依专项相互执行安排处理,而非《纽约公约》。
  • File with the intermediate people’s court at the debtor’s domicile or where its property is located; the limitation period is two years under the Civil Procedure Law.
    应向被执行人住所地或财产所在地的中级人民法院提出申请;依《民事诉讼法》申请期间为两年。
  • Non-compliant documents are not accepted: submit the original award or certified copy, the arbitration agreement, and a certified Chinese translation.
    材料不合规将不予受理:须提交裁决正本或经证明副本、仲裁协议,以及经认证的中文译本。
  • Article V of the Convention exhaustively lists the only grounds for refusal, and they are narrowly construed in favour of enforcement.
    《纽约公约》第五条穷尽列举了拒绝承认与执行的唯一事由,且应作有利于执行的严格限缩解释。
  • Any proposed refusal must be escalated through the cascade reporting system to the Supreme People’s Court before a rejection can be issued.
    凡拟不予承认执行的,均须通过逐级报核制度层报最高人民法院,方可作出驳回裁定。

Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in Mainland China: A Practical Guide under the New York Convention | 外国仲裁裁决在中国内地的承认与执行实操:《纽约公约》项下实务指引

The New York Convention and China’s Two Reservations

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) entered into force for China on 22 April 1987, after China’s accession on 2 December 1986. It remains the cornerstone of cross-border award enforcement in mainland China, and China made two declarations every foreign investor should understand before drafting a dispute clause.

First, the reciprocity reservation: China applies the Convention only to awards made in the territory of another Contracting State, so an award from a non-Contracting State cannot be enforced through the Convention and would need a different, less certain basis.

Second, the commercial reservation: China applies the Convention only to disputes arising from legal relationships, contractual or not, considered commercial under Chinese law; non-commercial disputes fall outside it. In short, seat the arbitration in a Contracting State and ensure the dispute is commercial under Chinese law.

How the Nationality of an Award Is Determined: The Seat Rule

A recurring source of confusion is whether an award is “foreign” for New York Convention purposes. Chinese courts apply a single, exclusive test—the seat of arbitration (仲裁地); the institution’s nationality, the hearing place, and the governing law of the rules are all irrelevant.

If the seat is in mainland China, the award is a domestic award and the Convention does not apply; enforcement follows the ordinary route under the Arbitration Law and the Civil Procedure Law. If the seat is outside mainland China and in a Contracting State, the award is a “foreign award” enforceable under the Convention. Thus an award by a foreign institution (such as the ICC or SIAC) seated in mainland China is still domestic, while a Chinese institution’s award seated abroad is, for enforcement purposes, foreign. This seat-based test guards against forum-shopping and aligns with the “delocalised” nature of international arbitration, though a clause that fixes the seat ambiguously can still trigger a costly nationality dispute.

Awards Excluded from the New York Convention

Three categories fall outside the New York Convention in China:

  1. Awards seated in mainland China — enforced as domestic awards.
  2. Awards made in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China or the Macao Special Administrative Region of China — enforced under the special mutual-enforcement arrangements with the two Special Administrative Regions, not the Convention. The mainland-Hong Kong arrangement (2000, supplemented 2019) and the mainland-Macao arrangement (2007) apply.
  3. Awards made in the Taiwan region of China — handled through the cross-strait judicial mutual-assistance framework rather than the Convention.

The Convention and these arrangements are mutually exclusive; choosing the correct channel at the outset determines the court, procedure, and limitation period.

Where to File: Jurisdiction of the Intermediate People’s Court

Applications are heard by an intermediate people’s court (中级人民法院) at the domicile of the person subjected to enforcement (the debtor) or where its property is located; where property spans multiple jurisdictions, the applicant may choose among the courts with property jurisdiction.

Before filing, map the debtor’s registered address, place of business, and bank accounts, equity, and real estate in mainland China; a court lacking both domicile and assets in its territory has no jurisdiction, and the application will be transferred or rejected.

The Two-Year Time Limit

The application is subject to the two-year limitation under the Civil Procedure Law. The starting point follows the award: from the last day of a fixed performance period, from each installment’s last day if installments are specified, or from the award’s effective date if no period is fixed.

Crucially, the limitation is a defence the debtor may raise; the court does not examine it on its own motion. Parties should still file promptly: once the period lapses the right to apply is effectively lost, and early filing preserves the ability to seek property preservation in mainland China.

Documents You Must Prepare

Under the Supreme People’s Court’s 1987 notice and later practice, the applicant must submit:

  • a written application;
  • the original award or a duly certified copy;
  • the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy; and
  • a Chinese translation of the award and the arbitration agreement, certified by an entity qualified to provide translation.

The translation requirement is strict: foreign-language materials must carry a Chinese translation. If the documents are incomplete or non-compliant, the court will not accept the application; it will notify the applicant to cure the defects within a prescribed period, and if they are not cured the application is rejected. Getting the paperwork right the first time is decisive.

Grounds for Refusal under Article V

The New York Convention is pro-enforcement: Article V exhaustively lists the grounds on which a court may—but need not—refuse recognition and enforcement, and they are construed narrowly:

(a) incapacity of a party, or invalidity of the arbitration agreement under the law applicable to it; (b) the party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case; (c) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by, or beyond the scope of, the submission to arbitration (if the separable part can be enforced, only that part is refused); (d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or, failing such agreement, with the law of the seat; (e) the award has not yet become binding, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made.

In addition, recognition and enforcement may be refused if the subject matter is not arbitrable under Chinese law, or if it would be contrary to China’s public policy. Chinese courts apply the public-policy exception restrictively, confining it to the most fundamental principles and basic social interests of Chinese law, and not as a general escape hatch for dissatisfied debtors.

The Cascade Reporting and Approval System

The most distinctive feature of award enforcement in China is the cascade reporting and approval system (逐级报核制度). Because local courts once showed protectionist tendencies toward local debtors, the Supreme People’s Court requires any intermediate court proposing to refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign award to report first to the Higher People’s Court; if the High Court agrees, it must report further to the Supreme People’s Court, whose decision binds the lower courts. A refusal cannot be issued without that authorisation.

For domestic (non-foreign-related) arbitration judicial-review matters, the Supreme People’s Court later streamlined the reporting level: such cases are reported only to the Higher People’s Court, without Supreme People’s Court approval. The foreign-award track, by contrast, retains the full two-tier escalation to the Supreme People’s Court.

How the Supreme People’s Court Unifies Review Standards

To curb inconsistency across localities, the Supreme People’s Court has deployed several instruments:

  • The Minutes of the National Courts’ Forum on Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial Work (《全国法院涉外商事海事审判工作座谈会会议纪要》), consolidating judicial views on recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards.
  • Guiding Cases (指导性案例) on arbitration, binding lower courts and showing how Article V defences apply.
  • The bilingual Annual Report on Judicial Review of International Commercial Arbitration in China, publishing representative cases with English and Chinese reasoning.
  • The inclusion of 24 Chinese New York Convention cases in the UNCITRAL CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts) database.

Together these measures raise predictability and weaken the old local-protectionist route for a debtor’s Article V objection.

A Practical Checklist for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

For a foreign-invested enterprise that may enforce or resist a foreign award in mainland China, the following steps improve outcomes.

  • Draft the arbitration clause for the enforcement stage. Fix the seat in a New York Convention Contracting State, name a neutral institution, and avoid ambiguous seat language. The seat—not the institution or the rules—decides whether the Convention applies.
  • Pre-set a service address and keep records. Build a clear service address and a reliable notice channel into the contract and the proceeding, and preserve every dispatch. A clean record defeats the “no proper notice” defence before it is raised.
  • Map assets and time your preservation. Before and during arbitration, identify the debtor’s bank accounts, equity, and real property in mainland China. Chinese courts have, in practice, granted interim property preservation in support of foreign-seated arbitration; applying early can freeze assets before the award is final.
  • Use the settlement window. Between the award and enforcement—and even during recognition proceedings—a structured settlement is sometimes more valuable than contested enforcement against an asset-poor debtor.

Related Reading

See CIETAC international arbitration (No. 40), the Supreme People’s Court and CICC (No. 185), and the 2026 Arbitration Law revision (No. 166).


外国仲裁裁决在中国内地的承认与执行实操:《纽约公约》项下实务指引

《纽约公约》与中国两项保留

《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》(以下简称”《纽约公约》”)于1987年4月22日对中国正式施行(中国于1986年12月2日加入)。它至今仍是中国内地跨境仲裁裁决承认与执行的基石;中国加入时作出的两项声明,外资企业拟定争议条款前须充分理解。

第一项是互惠保留:中国仅对另一缔约国领土内作出的裁决适用《纽约公约》予以承认和执行,非缔约国境内作出的裁决无法经该公约在中国内地执行,而须依赖其他(且确定性更低的)基础。

第二项是商事保留:中国仅对按照中国法律认定为契约性或非契约性商事法律关系所引起的争议适用《纽约公约》,非商事事项被排除在外。简而言之,将仲裁地设于缔约国,并确保基础争议具有商事性质。

裁决国籍的判定标准:仲裁地规则

一个反复造成混淆的问题是:一项裁决在《纽约公约》意义上究竟是否”外国裁决”。中国法院采用唯一且排他性的判断标准——仲裁地(seat);仲裁机构的国籍、开庭地所在国、仲裁规则所适用法域,均与裁决国籍的判定无关。

如果仲裁地位于中国内地,该裁决被视为内国裁决,《纽约公约》不予适用,其执行遵循《仲裁法》与《民事诉讼法》的普通内国路径。如果仲裁地位于中国内地境外且属于某一缔约国,则该裁决为可据《纽约公约》执行的”外国裁决”。由此推之:一家外国机构(例如国际商会 ICC 或新加坡国际仲裁中心 SIAC)作出但仲裁地设在中国内地的裁决,仍属内国裁决;而一家中国机构但在境外设仲裁地作出的裁决,在执行意义上反而是外国裁决。这一以仲裁地为核心的判断标准,既防范当事人挑选法院,也契合国际仲裁”非本地化”的普遍理解;但对仲裁地约定模糊的条款,仍可能在执行阶段引发成本高昂的国籍争议。

被排除在《纽约公约》之外的裁决

有三类裁决不属于《纽约公约》的适用范围:

  1. 仲裁地位于中国内地的裁决——作为内国裁决执行。
  2. 在中国香港特别行政区或中国澳门特别行政区作出的裁决——依据内地与两个特别行政区之间的专项相互执行安排执行,而非《纽约公约》。内地与香港特区的安排(2000年订立,2019年补充)以及内地与澳门特区的安排(2007年)适用。
  3. 在中国台湾地区作出的裁决——通过两岸司法互助框架处理,而非《纽约公约》。

《纽约公约》与这些专项安排相互排斥;在起点选对渠道,决定了由哪一家法院、适用何种程序以及何种时效。

管辖法院:中级人民法院

承认与执行外国仲裁裁决的申请,由被执行人住所地或者被执行财产所在地的中级人民法院管辖。当财产分布于多个管辖区域时,申请人可在有财产管辖权的法院中择一提出申请。

实践中,提起申请前应摸清债务人的登记地址、主要营业地,以及位于中国内地的银行账户、股权与不动产。一家辖区内既无财产又无住所的法院将欠缺管辖权,申请会被移送或驳回。

两年的申请期间

承认与执行外国裁决的申请,受《民事诉讼法》两年期间约束。起算点取决于裁决内容:确定履行期限的,自履行期限届满之日起算;分期履行的,自每次履行期限届满之日起算;未确定履行期限的,自裁决生效之日起算。

关键在于,该期间是债务人可提出的抗辩,法院并不会在立案阶段依职权主动审查。尽管如此,当事人仍应及时提出申请:一旦期间届满,申请权实际上即告丧失;及早申请也保留了就债务人位于中国内地的财产申请保全的可能。

必须准备好的文件

根据最高人民法院1987年实施意见及后续实践,申请人应当提交:

  • 书面申请;
  • 裁决正本或者经证明无误的副本;
  • 仲裁协议正本或者经证明无误的副本;
  • 裁决书与仲裁协议的中文译本,且译本须由具备资质的翻译机构认证。

翻译要求十分严格:以外文提交的材料必须附具中文译本。若材料不齐全或不符合要求,法院将不予受理,并通知申请人在指定期限内补正;逾期未补正的,申请将被驳回。因此,第一次就把文书备齐备对,具有决定性意义。

《纽约公约》第五条的抗辩事由

《纽约公约》以支持执行为基调:第五条穷尽列举了法院”可以”(而非”必须”)拒绝承认与执行的事由,且应作严格限缩解释:

(a) 当事人无行为能力,或仲裁协议依其应适用的法律无效; (b) 被申请人未获关于指派仲裁员或仲裁程序的适当通知,或因其他缘故未能申辩; (c) 裁决处理的争议非提交仲裁的标的,或超出提交仲裁的范围(可分离部分仍可执行的,仅该部分被拒绝); (d) 仲裁庭的组成或仲裁程序与当事人约定不符,或在无约定时与仲裁地法不符; (e) 裁决尚未对当事人发生拘束力,或已被作出裁决的国家或依其法律作出裁决的国家的主管机关撤销或中止。

此外,若争议事项依中国法不可仲裁,或承认与执行将违背中国公共政策,亦可拒绝。中国法院对公共政策例外作限制解释,仅将其局限于中国法律最根本的原则与基本社会公益,绝非债务人可随意借用的逃逸通道。

逐级报核制度

中国裁决执行中最具特色的一项制度,或许是逐级报核制度。鉴于地方法院曾对本地债务人表现出保护主义倾向,最高人民法院要求:凡拟拒绝承认与执行外国裁决的中级法院,须先报所在高级人民法院;若高级人民法院同意,还须进一步层报最高人民法院,且其决定对下级法院具有约束力。未经最高人民法院核准,不得作出不予承认执行的裁定。

对于非涉外(即内国仲裁审查)的仲裁司法审查事项,最高人民法院后续精简了报核层级:此类案件通常仅层报高级人民法院,不再要求最高人民法院核准。相比之下,外国裁决的执行轨道保留了完整的”高院—最高院”两级上核。

最高人民法院统一审查标准的举措

为遏制各地尺度不一,最高人民法院采取了多项举措:

  • 《全国法院涉外商事海事审判工作座谈会会议纪要》,系统梳理了承认与执行外国仲裁裁决的司法观点。
  • 仲裁领域的指导性案例,对下级法院具有拘束力,并示范第五条抗辩应如何适用。
  • 中英双语的《中国国际商事仲裁司法审查年度报告》,以中英文发布典型案例并阐释法院推理。
  • 中国有24篇适用《纽约公约》的案例被联合国国际贸易法委员会 CLOUT(贸法会法规判例法)数据库收录。

上述举措共同提升了可预见性,并压缩了债务人借地方保护获取第五条异议支持的空间。

外资企业的实操清单

对于可能在中国内地执行或抗拒外国裁决的外商投资企业,以下步骤能改善结果:

  • 为执行阶段拟定仲裁条款。 将仲裁地固定为《纽约公约》缔约国,指定中立机构,并避免模糊的仲裁地措辞。切记:决定《纽约公约》是否适用的,是仲裁地,而非机构或规则。
  • 预设送达地址并留痕。 在合同与仲裁程序中嵌入清晰的送达地址与可靠通知渠道,并保留每一次送达记录。干净完整的记录,能在异议提出前就击破”未获适当通知”的抗辩。
  • 摸清资产并把握保全时点。 在仲裁前与仲裁中,梳理债务人位于中国内地的银行账户、股权与不动产。中国法院在实践中已就境外仲裁地仲裁准予临时财产保全;及早申请,可在裁决终局前冻结资产。
  • 善用和解窗口。 在裁决作出后至执行前,乃至承认与执行程序进行中,结构化和解有时价值高于对抗式执行一个资产匮乏的债务人。

相关阅读

可参阅本站 CIETAC 国际仲裁(编号40)、最高人民法院与国际商事法庭 CICC(编号185),以及2026年《仲裁法》修订(编号166)。

Sources

China’s Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC) and the 2026 Arbitration Law: a foreign-party guide

  • The Supreme People’s Court’s International Commercial Court (CICC, 国际商事法庭) provides first- and second-instance adjudication of foreign-related commercial disputes and centralized recognition of foreign judgments and awards.
    最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)集中审理涉外民商事一审、二审案件,并集中受理外国判决与裁决的承认案件。
  • The revised Arbitration Law (effective 1 March 2026) adds the “seat of arbitration,” ad-hoc “special arbitration” for defined foreign-related disputes, and online arbitration — aligning with the UNCITRAL Model Law.
    修订后的《仲裁法》(2026年3月1日施行)新增”仲裁地”、特定涉外纠纷的临时”特别仲裁”与在线仲裁,对接《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事仲裁示范法》。
  • Chinese courts apply a “validate-the-agreement” stance: a misnamed institution is valid if identifiable, and silence-plus-no-denial at first hearing can constitute an agreement.
    中国法院秉持”有利于仲裁协议有效”立场:机构名称不准确但可确定的即认定有效;首次开庭前不予否认的沉默可视为存在协议。
  • Courts strengthened support: pre-arbitration preservation, timely handling of all preservation applications, and authority for tribunals to request evidentiary assistance.
    法院支持强化:仲裁前保全、各类保全申请依法及时处理、仲裁庭有权请求有关方面协助收集证据。
  • CICC’s “one-stop” platform connects international commercial mediation and arbitration, letting parties seek recognition/enforcement and judicial review in one window.
    CICC”一站式”国际商事纠纷多元化解决平台联通国际商事调解与仲裁,当事人可于一窗申请承认执行与司法审查。
  • Foreign awards are recognized under the New York Convention; the revised law also details recognition of awards made inside and outside China.
    外国裁决依《纽约公约》承认;修订法并就中国域内、域外作出的生效裁决的承认与执行作了具体规定。
  • Foreign parties should draft clear arbitration clauses (institution, seat, rules) and use CICC’s one-stop route for recognition and review.
    外国当事人应拟定清晰仲裁条款(机构、仲裁地、规则),并借CICC一站式路径办理承认与审查。

China’s Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC) and the 2026 Arbitration Law: a foreign-party guide | 最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)与2026年《仲裁法》:外国当事人指南

Overview: a specialized forum for foreign-related disputes

Foreign investors in China increasingly resolve high-value cross-border disputes through arbitration and specialized adjudication. Two pillars matter in 2026: the Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC, 国际商事法庭), established to hear foreign-related commercial cases and centralize recognition of foreign judgments and awards; and the revised Arbitration Law of the PRC, effective 1 March 2026, the statute’s first full revision since 1995.

The CICC: mandate and “one-stop” platform

The CICC hears, as a matter of centralized jurisdiction, first- and second-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases and accepts applications for the recognition of foreign court judgments and arbitral awards. It operates a “one-stop” international commercial dispute resolution platform linking international commercial mediation and arbitration institutions, so parties can pursue mediation, arbitration, recognition/enforcement and judicial review through a single window. For foreign parties, this means a predictable, specialized channel rather than disparate local courts.

The revised Arbitration Law (effective 1 March 2026)

Adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 12 September 2025 and effective 1 March 2026, the revised law has 8 chapters / 96 articles. Its headline foreign-related reforms: (1) a new “seat of arbitration” (仲裁地) system aligning with the UNCITRAL Model Law — the seat determines the applicable procedural law and the court of judicial supervision unless parties agree otherwise; (2) special (ad-hoc) arbitration for defined foreign-related disputes — foreign-related maritime disputes, or foreign-related disputes between enterprises established and registered within pilot free-trade zones, the Hainan Free Trade Port or other state-designated areas — requiring a written agreement, a China-seated arbitration, qualified arbitrators, and filing with the arbitration association within three working days of constitution; (3) online arbitration by information network, absent objection; and (4) explicit support for Chinese institutions to “go global” and foreign institutions to operate in designated FTZs/Hainan.

The court’s pro-arbitration stance

Chinese courts apply a “favor validity” approach to arbitration agreements. Under the revised law, a clause naming an institution inaccurately is valid if a specific institution is identifiable; and where one party asserts an arbitration agreement at filing and the other does not deny it before the first hearing, after the tribunal prompts and records, an agreement is deemed to exist. The law also confirms arbitration-agreement independence: a contract’s non-formation, invalidity, termination, revocation or nullity does not affect an already-reached arbitration agreement. The SPC’s guiding cases (e.g., a Hong Kong-invested dispute where negotiation did not defeat a subsequently un-signed contract’s arbitration clause) illustrate this pro-enforcement philosophy.

Stronger court support and supervision

The revision reinforces judicial support: parties may seek pre-arbitration preservation (property, conduct, evidence) under the Civil Procedure Law; courts must timely handle both institution-submitted and directly-filed preservation applications; and tribunals may request relevant parties to assist in evidence collection. On supervision, the time to apply to set aside an award is shortened from six months to three months, promoting finality. The SPC has long held that it will, consistent with the New York Convention, recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards where fundamental principles, sovereignty, security, public interest and domestic creditors’ rights are not breached.

Recognition of foreign awards and judgments

For foreign arbitral awards, the New York Convention path remains central; our separate article details enforcement of foreign awards and judgments in China. The revised law additionally specifies recognition and enforcement of effective awards made within China’s territory and applications to Chinese courts for awards made outside China, and aligns with the Civil Procedure Law on judicial assistance. CICC’s centralized recognition function makes it the natural venue for foreign parties enforcing offshore awards or judgments against China-seated assets.

Drafting tips for foreign parties

  1. Name the institution precisely (e.g., CIETAC, CICC, HKIAC where permitted) to avoid validity fights.
  2. Specify the seat to fix procedural law and supervisory court.
  3. Choose rules and language expressly; for FTZ/Hainan foreign-related disputes, consider special arbitration with a written China-seat clause.
  4. Use CICC’s one-stop platform for recognition, enforcement and review.
  5. Preserve evidence and timeliness — the three-month set-aside clock and preservation windows are strict.
  6. Coordinate with institutional arbitration (CIETAC’s new 2026 arbitrator list and the 2026 China Arbitration Week) for appointments.

Related reading

The revised Arbitration Law’s foreign-party essentials, CIETAC and international arbitration, and enforcement of foreign awards and judgments are covered in separate articles; this piece is the CICC-and-2026-Law briefing plus the action list.


最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)与2026年《仲裁法》:外国当事人指南

概览:涉外纠纷的专门法庭

在华外国投资者日益通过仲裁与专门审判解决高价值跨境争议。2026年有两大支柱:为审理涉外民商事案件、集中受理外国判决与裁决承认而设的最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC);以及自2026年3月1日施行的修订后《中华人民共和国仲裁法》——该法自1995年以来首次全面修订。

CICC:职能与”一站式”平台

CICC以集中管辖方式审理涉外民商事一审、二审案件,并受理外国法院判决与仲裁裁决的承认申请。其运营”一站式”国际商事纠纷多元化解决平台,联通国际商事调解与仲裁机构,使当事人得以一窗办理调解、仲裁、承认执行与司法审查。对外国当事人而言,这意味着可预期、专门的渠道,而非分散的地方法院。

修订后《仲裁法》(2026年3月1日施行)

该法于2025年9月12日由全国人大常委会通过,2026年3月1日施行,共8章96条。其涉外改革要点:(1)新增对接《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事仲裁示范法》的”仲裁地”制度——除当事人另有约定外,仲裁地决定程序适用法与司法监督法院;(2)针对特定涉外纠纷的”特别仲裁”(临时仲裁)——涉外海事纠纷,或经国务院批准的自贸试验区、海南自贸港及国家规定的其他区域内设立登记企业之间的涉外纠纷——须书面约定、以中国为仲裁地、仲裁员符合资格,且组庭后三个工作日内向仲裁协会备案;(3)经信息网络在线仲裁(当事人无反对);并(4)明确支持中国机构”走出去”与外国机构在指定自贸区/海南设立业务机构。

法院支持仲裁的立场

中国法院对仲裁协议秉持”有利于有效”立场。依修订法,机构名称不准确但可确定的即认定有效;一方申请时主张有仲裁协议、另一方首次开庭前不予否认的,经仲裁庭提示并记录,视为存在协议。法律并确认仲裁协议独立性:合同不成立、无效、终止、被撤销或无效,不影响已达成的仲裁协议。最高法指导性案例(如一香港投资争议中磋商未阻却未签署合同的仲裁条款)体现这一支持执行理念。

更强有力的法院支持与监督

修订强化司法支持:当事人可依《民事诉讼法》申请仲裁前保全(财产、行为、证据);法院对机构提交与当事人直接申请的保全均须及时处理;仲裁庭有权请求有关方面协助收集证据。监督方面,申请撤销裁决期限由六个月缩短为三个月,促进一裁终局。最高法一贯立场是依《纽约公约》在恪守基本原则、国家主权安全、公共利益与境内债权人权益前提下承认执行外国仲裁裁决。

外国裁决与判决的承认

对外国仲裁裁决,《纽约公约》路径仍是核心;承认与执行外国裁决和判决本站另有专文。修订法另就中国域内作出的生效裁决的承认执行、向中国法院申请承认执行域外裁决作了规定,并与《民事诉讼法》司法协助相衔接。CICC的集中承认职能,使其成为外国当事人针对中国境内资产执行境外裁决或判决的自然管辖地。

外国当事人的起草要点

  1. 精确写明机构(如贸仲、CICC、获准的HKIAC),避免效力之争。
  2. 指定仲裁地,以固定程序法与监督法院。
  3. 明示规则与语言;自贸区/海南涉外纠纷可考虑附书面中国仲裁地条款的特别仲裁。
  4. 使用CICC一站式平台办理承认、执行与审查。
  5. 保全证据与时效——三个月撤销期与保全窗口严格。
  6. 与机构仲裁协同(贸仲2026年新仲裁员名册与2026中国仲裁周)安排组庭。

延伸阅读

修订《仲裁法》的外方要点、贸仲与涉外仲裁、外国裁决与判决的承认执行本站另有专文;本文为CICC与2026年《仲裁法》简报加行动清单。

Sources

China’s Revised Arbitration Law (2026): what foreign parties and FIEs need to know

  • China’s Arbitration Law has been comprehensively revised for the first time since 1994: the new law was passed on 12 September 2025, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, and takes effect on 1 March 2026 with eight chapters and 96 articles.
    中国《仲裁法》迎来 1994 年以来首次全面修订:新法于 2025 年 9 月 12 日通过,以第 54 号主席令公布,自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行,共八章 96 条。
  • The revision introduces the “seat of arbitration” (仲裁地) concept aligned with international practice — the seat determines the law governing the arbitral procedure and the courts with supervisory jurisdiction, so foreign parties should now state it expressly in their clauses.
    修订引入与国际接轨的”仲裁地”制度——仲裁地决定仲裁程序适用法及行使司法监督权的法院,外方当事人今后应在仲裁条款中明确约定。
  • A new “special (ad hoc) arbitration” regime lets parties in foreign-related maritime disputes, or between enterprises registered in a Free Trade Zone or the Hainan Free Trade Port, choose a tribunal outside any institution — a first for the mainland.
    新增”特别仲裁”(临时仲裁)制度:涉外海事纠纷,或自贸试验区、海南自贸港内登记企业之间的涉外纠纷,当事人可在仲裁机构之外自组仲裁庭——系内地首创。
  • Foreign arbitration institutions may now set up business offices in FTZs and Hainan to conduct foreign-related arbitration, and Chinese institutions may handle international investment (treaty) arbitration.
    境外仲裁机构今后可在自贸区、海南自贸港等区域设立业务机构办理涉外仲裁,中国仲裁机构亦可办理国际投资(条约)仲裁案件。
  • Online arbitration is expressly recognised — proceedings may be conducted over the internet unless a party objects — reflecting practice where 93 institutions handled online cases worth ¥300 billion in 2024.
    在线仲裁获明文确认——除当事人明确不同意外,仲裁可通过信息网络在线进行——呼应 2024 年 93 家机构在线办案、标的额 3000 亿元的实践。
  • Court support is strengthened: parties can seek pre-arbitration property, conduct and evidence preservation, courts must handle preservation promptly, and the period to apply to set aside an award is cut from six months to three.
    法院支持力度加大:当事人可申请仲裁前的财产、行为与证据保全,法院应及时处理保全,申请撤销裁决的期限由六个月缩短为三个月。
  • The law adds a good-faith principle and anti-sham-arbitration rules, an arbitrator disclosure system, and defines arbitration institutions as public-interest non-profit legal persons.
    新法增设诚信原则与防范虚假仲裁规定、仲裁员信息披露制度,并明确仲裁机构为公益性非营利法人。

China’s Revised Arbitration Law (2026): what foreign parties and FIEs need to know | 中国修订《仲裁法》(2026 年施行):外方当事人与外资企业须知

Overview

Arbitration is the default forum for cross-border commercial disputes: it is confidential, final in a single instance, and — thanks to the 1958 New York Convention — enforceable in over 170 jurisdictions. For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) or an overseas counterparty contracting with a Chinese business, the arbitration clause is often the single most important dispute-resolution decision in the contract.

On 12 September 2025 the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress passed a comprehensively revised Arbitration Law. It was promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54 and takes effect on 1 March 2026. This is the first full overhaul since the original 1994 statute (in force from 1995). The new law runs to eight chapters and 96 articles — 16 more than before — and is squarely aimed at raising the credibility and international competitiveness of Chinese arbitration. This article explains the changes that matter most to foreign parties. It is general information, not legal advice.

Why the revision, and how big it is

By August 2025 China had 285 arbitration commissions handling disputes involving parties from more than 100 countries and regions, across finance, e-commerce, construction, maritime and intellectual property. The 1994 law, however, predated modern practice: it did not recognise a “seat” of arbitration, permitted only institutional arbitration (no ad hoc tribunals), and said little about online hearings or interim relief. The revision closes those gaps and consciously converges with the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.

Change 1 — the “seat of arbitration”

The headline reform for international users is the introduction of the seat (仲裁地). Except where the parties have agreed otherwise on the law applicable to the procedure, the seat now determines both the procedural law and the court that exercises supervisory jurisdiction (for interim measures, set-aside and the like). Where parties do not agree the seat, it is fixed by the agreed arbitration rules; if the rules are silent, the tribunal designates it by reference to the principle of convenient dispute resolution. Practical effect: foreign parties should state the seat expressly — e.g. “the seat of arbitration shall be Shanghai” — separately from the hearing venue, because the two are now distinct legal concepts.

Change 2 — special (ad hoc) arbitration

The mainland has, until now, recognised only institutional arbitration. The new law adds a “special arbitration” regime with four defining features:

  • Eligible cases only. It is limited to foreign-related disputes — either foreign-related maritime disputes, or foreign-related disputes between enterprises registered in a State Council-approved Free Trade Zone, the Hainan Free Trade Port, or other areas designated by the State.
  • Written agreement, seat in China. The parties must agree in writing and designate a place in China as the seat, so Chinese arbitration law applies, the award is a Chinese award, and Chinese courts conduct judicial review.
  • Qualified arbitrators. The tribunal members must meet the statutory qualification requirements for arbitrators.
  • Filing. Within three working days of forming the tribunal, the parties must file details (names, seat, tribunal composition, rules) with the arbitration association.

For FTZ and Hainan-registered FIEs, this opens a genuinely new option for disputes with foreign counterparties — closer to the flexibility of ad hoc arbitration abroad, but with defined guardrails.

Change 3 — opening to foreign institutions and investment arbitration

The law codifies two opening measures already piloted: it supports Chinese institutions “going out” to establish offices abroad, and permits overseas arbitration institutions to establish business offices in FTZs and the Hainan FTP to conduct foreign-related arbitration. It also confirms that Chinese institutions and tribunals may administer international investment arbitration under the relevant investment treaties and the rules agreed by the disputing parties — a foundation for China to position itself as a seat for investor-state cases.

Change 4 — online arbitration and stronger court support

Two further reforms speak directly to efficiency:

  • Online arbitration. Article 11 provides that arbitration may be conducted online through information networks unless a party expressly disagrees. This reflects reality: in 2024, 93 institutions handled online cases worth ¥300 billion.
  • Interim measures and evidence. The law aligns with the Civil Procedure Law so that, in urgent cases, a party may apply to a court for property preservation, conduct preservation (an order requiring or prohibiting an act) and evidence preservation before commencing arbitration. Courts must handle such applications promptly, whether relayed by the institution or filed directly. The tribunal may also request relevant parties to assist in collecting evidence.

Change 5 — credibility, disclosure and a shorter set-aside window

Several provisions raise trust in the process and speed up finality:

  • Arbitration must follow the good-faith principle, with new rules against sham arbitration.
  • Arbitrators must disclose any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts about their independence or impartiality; the institution informs the parties.
  • The methods for recognising an arbitration agreement are broadened (e.g. where one party asserts an agreement and the other does not deny it before the first hearing).
  • The period to apply to set aside an award is shortened from six months to three months.
  • Arbitration institutions are defined as public-interest, non-profit legal persons, with the State Council authorised to issue registration rules.

What this means for foreign investors and FIEs

  • Review your arbitration clauses. State the institution (or, if eligible, ad hoc arbitration), the seat, the rules and the language. Distinguish seat from hearing venue.
  • Consider ad hoc arbitration only if eligible — maritime, or FTZ/Hainan-registered enterprises in foreign-related disputes.
  • Plan for interim relief. Pre-arbitration preservation is now clearer; identify assets and evidence early.
  • Diarise the three-month set-aside window — challenges must move faster than before.
  • Enforcement. Awards seated in China are Chinese awards; foreign awards continue to be recognised and enforced through the New York Convention and the Civil Procedure Law’s judicial-assistance provisions.

What to do next

  1. Audit existing China-related contracts and update dispute-resolution clauses ahead of the 1 March 2026 effective date.
  2. Decide seat and institution deliberately; do not leave the seat undefined.
  3. If you operate in an FTZ or Hainan, evaluate whether special arbitration suits your commercial relationships.
  4. Brief your legal and finance teams on the shorter set-aside period and the strengthened interim-measures toolkit.
  5. Confirm specifics with qualified PRC counsel before signing or amending clauses.

Sources

  • Ministry of Justice press conference on the revised Arbitration Law (official): https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/?CTPIC=ecc680
  • MOJ briefing transcript — key changes and special arbitration explained: https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/mtgz20250925/202509/t20250930_525844.html
  • Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court — Q&A on the revision (People’s Court Daily): https://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/149/156/12620.html
  • China Court Net — commentary on the revised Arbitration Law: https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2025/09/id/8991625.shtml
  • MOJ feature — “Advancing high-quality development of arbitration” (on the law’s entry into force): http://legalinfo.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbzhfx/zt/2025nzt0120/xcgvxxddzcf/202603/t20260302_532106.html

Related reading

  • CIETAC & international arbitration — 贸仲与涉外仲裁
  • Enforcing foreign arbitral awards and judgments in China — 在中国承认与执行外国仲裁裁决和判决
  • Foreign-related dispute resolution: litigation vs arbitration — 涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁

中国修订《仲裁法》(2026 年施行):外方当事人与外资企业须知

概述

仲裁是跨境商事纠纷的首选解决方式:保密、一裁终局,并且凭借 1958 年《纽约公约》可在 170 多个法域获得承认与执行。对与中国企业签约的外资企业或境外交易对手而言,仲裁条款往往是合同中最重要的一项争议解决安排。

2025 年 9 月 12 日,十四届全国人大常委会表决通过全面修订的《仲裁法》,以第 54 号主席令公布,自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行。这是 1994 年原法(1995 年施行)以来的首次全面修订。新法共八章 96 条,比修订前增加 16 条,核心目标是提升中国仲裁的公信力与国际竞争力。本文说明对外方当事人最重要的变化,仅为一般性信息,非法律意见。

为什么修、改动有多大

截至 2025 年 8 月,全国依法设立 285 家仲裁委员会,当事人涉及 100 多个国家和地区,纠纷涵盖金融、电子商务、建筑工程、海事海商、知识产权等领域。但 1994 年的仲裁法落后于现代实践:不承认”仲裁地”,只允许机构仲裁(无临时仲裁庭),对在线开庭与临时措施着墨极少。此次修订弥补了这些空白,并有意与《联合国国际商事仲裁示范法》相融通。

变化一——”仲裁地”制度

对国际用户而言,最重磅的改革是引入”仲裁地”。除当事人对仲裁程序适用法另有约定外,仲裁地现同时决定程序适用法与行使司法监督权的法院(保全、撤销等)。当事人未约定仲裁地的,按约定的仲裁规则确定;规则没有规定的,由仲裁庭按便利争议解决原则确定。实务影响: 外方应在条款中明确约定仲裁地——例如”仲裁地为上海”——并与开庭地相区分,因为二者现已是不同的法律概念。

变化二——特别仲裁(临时仲裁)

内地此前只承认机构仲裁。新法增设”特别仲裁”制度,有四个特征:

  • 仅限特定案件。 限于涉外纠纷——涉外海事纠纷,或在国务院批准设立的自贸试验区、海南自贸港及国家规定的其他区域内登记的企业之间发生的涉外纠纷。
  • 书面约定、仲裁地在中国。 当事人须书面约定并选择中国境内地点为仲裁地,从而适用中国仲裁法、裁决为中国裁决、由中国法院进行司法审查。
  • 仲裁员合格。 仲裁庭成员须符合仲裁法关于仲裁员资格的统一要求。
  • 备案。 组庭后三个工作日内,须将当事人名称、仲裁地、仲裁庭组成、仲裁规则向仲裁协会备案。

对自贸区和海南登记的外资企业,这为与外方对手的纠纷开辟了全新选项——更接近境外临时仲裁的灵活度,又设有明确边界。

变化三——向境外机构与投资仲裁开放

新法将两项试点措施法制化:支持中国仲裁机构”走出去”到境外设立业务机构,允许境外仲裁机构在自贸区、海南自贸港等区域设立业务机构办理涉外仲裁。同时明确,中国仲裁机构、仲裁庭可依据有关投资条约、协定并按争议双方约定的仲裁规则办理国际投资仲裁案件——为中国打造投资者—国家案件仲裁地奠定基础。

变化四——在线仲裁与更强的法院支持

另有两项改革直指效率:

  • 在线仲裁。 第十一条规定,除当事人明确表示不同意外,仲裁活动可通过信息网络在线进行。这呼应现实:2024 年 93 家机构办理在线案件,标的额 3000 亿元。
  • 临时措施与证据。 新法与《民事诉讼法》衔接:情况紧急时,当事人可在申请仲裁前向法院申请财产保全、行为保全(责令作出或禁止某行为)与证据保全。无论由机构转交还是当事人直接提交,法院都应及时处理。仲裁庭亦可请求有关方面协助收集证据。

变化五——公信力、披露与更短的撤销期限

多项条款提升过程可信度并加快终局:

  • 仲裁应遵循诚信原则,增设防范虚假仲裁规定。
  • 仲裁员须披露可能导致对其独立性、公正性产生合理怀疑的情形,由机构告知当事人。
  • 扩大仲裁协议的认定方式(如一方主张有协议、另一方在首次开庭前不予否认的)。
  • 申请撤销裁决的期限由六个月缩短为三个月。
  • 明确仲裁机构为公益性非营利法人,授权国务院制定登记管理办法。

对外资投资者与外资企业的意义

  • 审查你的仲裁条款。 明确机构(或在符合条件时选择临时仲裁)、仲裁地、规则和语言,并区分仲裁地与开庭地。
  • 仅在符合条件时考虑临时仲裁——涉外海事,或自贸区/海南登记企业的涉外纠纷。
  • 提前谋划临时救济。 仲裁前保全更清晰,尽早锁定资产与证据。
  • 牢记三个月撤销窗口——异议须比以往更快启动。
  • 执行。 仲裁地在中国的裁决为中国裁决;外国裁决继续通过《纽约公约》与《民事诉讼法》司法协助条款获得承认与执行。

下一步建议

  1. 在 2026 年 3 月 1 日生效前,梳理现有涉华合同并更新争议解决条款;
  2. 审慎确定仲裁地与机构,切勿让仲裁地处于未约定状态;
  3. 若在自贸区或海南经营,评估特别仲裁是否契合你的商业关系;
  4. 就更短的撤销期限与增强的保全工具,向法务与财务团队做说明;
  5. 签署或修订条款前,与执业中国律师确认具体事项。

Sources

  • 司法部关于新修订仲裁法的新闻发布会(官方):https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/?CTPIC=ecc680
  • 司法部发布会实录——主要修改与特别仲裁制度解读:https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/mtgz20250925/202509/t20250930_525844.html
  • 最高人民法院国际商事法庭——仲裁法修订答记者问(人民法院报):https://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/149/156/12620.html
  • 中国法院网——新修订仲裁法评论:https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2025/09/id/8991625.shtml
  • 司法部专题——《推进新时代仲裁事业高质量发展》(写在实施之际):http://legalinfo.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbzhfx/zt/2025nzt0120/xcgvxxddzcf/202603/t20260302_532106.html

相关阅读

  • 贸仲与涉外仲裁 / CIETAC & international arbitration
  • 在中国承认与执行外国仲裁裁决和判决 / Enforcing foreign arbitral awards and judgments
  • 涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁 / Foreign-related dispute resolution

The Foreign Investment Negative List in 2026: “Timely Reduction” Commitments and the Shift to Post-Access Regulation

  • In 2026 the national foreign investment negative list stays at 29 items, but regulators have committed to “timely reduction”, with services as the priority and telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare named as the next opening fronts.
    2026 年全国版外商投资准入负面清单保持 29 条,但主管部门明确承诺”适时缩减”,以服务业为重点,增值电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗被列为下一步开放前沿。
  • The National Health Commission confirmed in August 2026 that it is building a dynamic adjustment mechanism for a foreign investment negative list specific to medical projects, alongside a second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities.
    国家卫生健康委 2026 年 8 月确认,正在建立外商投资医疗项目负面清单动态调整机制,并同步遴选第二批外商独资医院试点城市。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospitals have now landed in four cities — Tianjin, Shanghai, Boao and Fuzhou — under the 2024 pilot scheme, and pilot-zone policy now allows foreign-invested firms to develop human stem-cell and gene-diagnosis technologies for product registration.
    2024 年试点方案落地后,外商独资医院已先后在天津、上海、博鳌、福州 4 地落地;自贸试验区与海南自由贸易港已允许外商投资企业从事人体干细胞、基因诊断与治疗技术开发应用,以用于产品注册上市和生产。
  • The June 2026 Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment adds education and finance opening and pilots the removal of equity caps for app stores and internet-access services in the telecom sector.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》新增教育与金融领域开放,并在电信领域试点取消应用商店、互联网接入等服务业务的外资股比限制。
  • The practical implication is that the binding constraint for foreign investors is shifting from “access” (准入) to “operation permission” (准营): the negative list is no longer the only gate, and sector-specific licensing, registration and standards now do most of the screening work.
    对境外投资者的实际含义是约束重心正从”准入”转向”准营”:负面清单不再是唯一门槛,行业许可、产品注册与标准合规承担了大部分筛选工作。
  • Investors should track four watchpoints: a possible 2026/2027 national list revision, the second batch of hospital pilots, the first items migrated from the medical negative-list adjustment mechanism, and the actual telecom equity-cap pilots in designated zones.
    投资者应跟踪四个看点:2026/2027 年全国清单可能的修订、第二批外商独资医院试点、医疗负面清单动态调整机制产出的首批条目,以及指定区域电信股比试点实际落地情况。

The Foreign Investment Negative List in 2026: “Timely Reduction” Commitments and the Shift to Post-Access Regulation | 2026 年外商投资准入负面清单:适时缩减承诺与”准入后监管”转向

The state of the list in 2026

The operative national foreign investment negative list remains the 2024 edition — NDRC and MOFCOM Order No. 23 — with 29 items, the shortest version in the instrument’s history. Manufacturing restrictions have been fully “zeroed out”, and the list now concentrates on services and a narrow set of security-sensitive sectors: news and publishing, culture, education, telecom, mining, agriculture breeding and a few others. Through 2026 no new national edition has been issued, and in August 2026 no formal revision has been gazetted. What has changed is the policy conversation around the list. At the June 2026 State Council Information Office press conference on foreign investment, the NDRC’s foreign investment department explicitly promised a “timely reduction” of the negative list and named telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare as the sectors where orderly opening will be pursued. The 2026 Government Work Report and the 15th Five-Year Plan repeat the same commitment.

The medical negative list: a new mechanism in the making

The most concrete new development in August 2026 comes from the health sector. In a reply to a CPPCC proposal published in August 2026, the National Health Commission confirmed several steps: (1) steadily expanding the hospital pilot from “point trials” to regional rollout and accelerating the selection of a second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities; (2) including high-end specialist medical, rehabilitation and nursing in the national encouraged-catalogue scope; (3) building a dynamic adjustment mechanism for the foreign investment negative list specific to medical projects, and revising departmental rules that are inconsistent with the opening policy; and (4) in the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong FTZs and the Hainan FTP, permitting foreign-invested enterprises to conduct R&D and application of human stem-cell and gene-diagnosis and therapy technologies for the purpose of product registration and marketing, with approved products usable nationwide. The first four wholly foreign-owned hospitals — in Tianjin, Shanghai, Boao and Fuzhou — are already operating under the 2024 scheme. The phrase “dynamic adjustment mechanism” for a medical negative list signals that healthcare opening will be managed by a sector-specific, frequently updated instrument rather than by waiting for the next full national revision.

Beyond the list: the “access to operation permission” shift

The strategic shift that frames all of 2026’s policy documents is the move from “access” (准入) to “operation permission” (准营). MOFCOM officials have repeatedly described the current phase as solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem: the negative list no longer blocks most foreign entry, but operating licences, product registration, data compliance and standards certification now do the screening that the list used to do. For a foreign investor, this means the compliance map is broader than the list: an auto manufacturer must handle catalogue and emission rules; a pharma firm must navigate drug registration and clinical trials; a telecom operator must secure the sectoral licence; a hospital must pass setting approval, medical institution licensing and insurance network access. The negative list is the first checkbox, not the last.

Education and finance: the new opening fronts

The June 2026 Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment (MOFCOM, NDRC and MOF published as Shangzi Fa [2026] No. 97, approved by the State Council) goes beyond the medical sector. It commits to expanding opening in education and finance, supports qualified foreign-invested equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-affiliated industries, and in the telecom field pilots the removal of foreign equity caps for app stores, internet access and similar service businesses. For the negative-list conversation, the significance is that the next revision is likely to delete or soften precisely these service items: value-added telecom caps, education cooperative restrictions and finance-related conditions are the most probable candidates for the next trimming round.

What has not changed: security carve-outs

It would be a mistake to read the 2026 signals as unconditional liberalisation. The negative list’s security carve-outs remain firmly in place: news and internet information services, online publishing and broadcast-television production stay prohibited; education institutions remain limited to Chinese-foreign cooperative forms with Chinese dominance; basic telecom remains Chinese-controlled; and the countermeasures framework in the revised Foreign Trade Law provides statutory authority to restrict trade with foreign persons or organisations that harm China’s sovereignty, security or development interests. Foreign investors in sensitive sectors should continue to plan on the basis of joint-venture or cooperative structures and should monitor the security review regime for mergers and acquisitions in critical areas.

Practical steps for investors in the 2026/2027 window

First, screen your business scope against the current 29-item national list and, if entering a pilot zone, the FTZ list. Second, for medical investments, watch the second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities and the medical negative-list dynamic adjustment mechanism; the first four pilots show that the practical route runs through setting approval and hospital licensing, not just the list. Third, for education and telecom, treat the June Action Plan as a strong directional signal and prepare structures that can convert to higher ownership if the caps are lifted. Fourth, keep the encouraged catalogue in view: high-end specialist medical, rehabilitation and nursing are now encouraged nationwide, with associated import-duty, land and tax benefits. Fifth, maintain documentation that demonstrates trade policy compliance — the “timely reduction” commitment cuts both ways, and regulators will scrutinise scope wording, sector licences and data flows more, not less.

Outlook

The negative list in 2026 is best understood as a stable floor with a sliding ceiling: no new national edition has been published, but every major policy document of the year commits to further service-sector trimming, and the health, education, telecom and finance fronts are each being prepared through pilots and mechanism-building. For foreign investors the strategy is to build around the current list, structure for upside optionality, and treat the post-access operating permit journey as the real competitive battlefield.

Sources


2026 年外商投资准入负面清单:适时缩减承诺与”准入后监管”转向

2026 年清单现状

现行有效的全国版外商投资准入负面清单仍是 2024 年版(国家发展改革委、商务部第 23 号令),共 29 条,为制度设立以来最短版本。制造业限制已全面”清零”,清单现集中于服务业与少数安全敏感领域:新闻出版、文化、教育、电信、采矿、农业育种等。2026 年全年尚未发布新版全国清单,截至 2026 年 8 月亦无正式修订公告。变化发生在围绕清单的政策语境。2026 年 6 月国新办利用外资发布会,国家发展改革委外资司负责人明确承诺”适时缩减外资准入负面清单”,并点名电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗为有序扩大开放的方向。2026 年《政府工作报告》与十五五规划《纲要》重申同一承诺。

医疗负面清单:一项新机制的形成

2026 年 8 月最具体的新进展来自医疗领域。国家卫生健康委 2026 年 8 月公开的政协提案答复函确认多项部署:(1)稳步推动医院试点从”点状试点”向”区域推广”拓展,加快遴选第二批外商独资医院试点城市;(2)将高端专业医疗、康复、护理纳入全国鼓励范围(落实《鼓励外商投资产业目录(2025年版)》);(3)建立外商投资医疗项目负面清单动态调整机制,并修订与开放政策不相适应的部门规章;(4)在北京、上海、广东自贸试验区和海南自由贸易港,允许外商投资企业从事人体干细胞、基因诊断与治疗技术开发应用,以用于产品注册上市和生产,经注册上市与批准生产的产品可在全国使用。2024 年试点方案下的首批 4 家外商独资医院——天津、上海、博鳌、福州——已先后落地。医疗领域负面清单”动态调整机制”的提法意味着医疗开放将交由一张行业专属、高频更新的清单管理,而不必等待下一轮全国清单全面修订。

清单之外:”准入”到”准营”的转向

贯穿 2026 年全部政策文件的战略转向,是从”准入”到”准营”。商务部官员多次将当前阶段描述为解决”大门开、小门不开”问题:负面清单不再阻挡多数外资进入,但经营许可、产品注册、数据合规与标准认证现在承担了清单原先的筛选职能。对外国投资者,合规地图比清单更宽:整车厂要应对目录与排放规则,药企要面对药品注册与临床试验,电信运营商要取得行业牌照,医院要通过设置审批、医疗机构执业登记与保险网络准入。负面清单是第一个勾选项,而不是最后一个。

教育与金融:新的开放前沿

2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部印发,商资发〔2026〕97 号,经国务院同意)超出医疗领域。它承诺扩大教育与金融开放,支持符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,并在电信领域试点取消应用商店、互联网接入等服务业务的外资股比限制。对负面清单讨论的意义在于:下一轮修订最可能删除或放松的正是这些服务条目——增值电信股比上限、教育中外合作限制与金融相关条件,是下一轮压缩的最大候选。

未变之处:安全保留

把 2026 年信号读作无条件开放将是误读。负面清单的安全保留依旧坚固:新闻与互联网信息服务、网络出版、广播电视节目制作保持禁止;教育机构仍限于中方主导的中外合作办学;基础电信仍须中方控股;修订后《对外贸易法》的反制框架为限制危害中国主权、安全与发展利益的境外个人、组织的贸易活动提供了法定依据。敏感行业的外国投资者应继续按合资或合作结构规划,并关注关键领域并购安全审查制度。

2026/2027 窗口期的投资者实操

其一,将经营范围对照现行 29 条全国清单,进入试点区域再对照自贸试验区版。其二,医疗投资关注第二批外商独资医院试点城市与医疗负面清单动态调整机制;首批 4 家试点表明实际路径走的是设置审批与医院执业登记,而非单纯清单。其三,教育与电信领域把 6 月《行动方案》作为强方向信号,若股比上限放开,准备可转换为更高持股的结构。其四,别忘鼓励目录:高端专业医疗、康复、护理现为全国鼓励类,附带进口设备关税、用地与税收优惠。其五,留存证明贸易政策合规的文件——”适时缩减”承诺是一把双刃剑,监管机构对经营范围表述、行业牌照与数据流的审查只多不少。

展望

2026 年的负面清单最适合理解为”稳定的地板 + 滑动天花板”:全年未发布新版全国清单,但年度每份重大政策文件都承诺进一步压减服务业条目,医疗、教育、电信与金融前沿各自以试点和机制建设推进。对外国投资者的策略是围绕现行清单搭建结构、为上行期权预留弹性,并把”准入后准营”许可旅程当作真正的竞争战场。

Sources

China’s Cross-Border Services Trade Negative List: The New Legal Foundation and What It Means for Foreign Suppliers

  • The revised Foreign Trade Law, which took effect on 1 March 2026, is the first law to codify a cross-border services trade negative list at the national level, placing cross-border delivery, consumption abroad and movement of natural persons under a “everything not listed is permitted” regime.
    2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行的新修订《对外贸易法》,首次在法律层面确立跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,将跨境交付、境外消费、自然人移动等模式下开展的跨境服务贸易置于”非禁即入”的清单管理之下。
  • The negative list for cross-border services trade is a different instrument from the foreign investment negative list: it governs services supplied across borders without a commercial presence, while the investment list governs services supplied through locally established entities.
    跨境服务贸易负面清单与外商投资准入负面清单是两项不同工具:前者管理不设商业存在而跨境提供的服务,后者管理以在华设立实体方式提供的服务。
  • A supplier delivering services into China from abroad must screen its activities against both lists: the cross-border services list for its offshore supply model, and the foreign investment list if it sets up a local presence.
    从境外向中国提供服务的外国服务提供者须对两张清单同时筛查:离岸供应模式对照跨境服务贸易清单,若在华设立商业存在则再对照外商投资准入清单。
  • The revised law empowers the State Council’s commerce department to formulate, adjust and publish the cross-border services negative list together with other departments, leaving room for pilot zones and the Hainan FTP to test broader opening first.
    修订后的法律授权商务部会同有关部门制定、调整并发布跨境服务贸易负面清单,为自贸试验区与海南自由贸易港先行先试更大开放留出空间。
  • Restrictions on cross-border services remain grounded in national security, public health and safety, domestic industry development and balance-of-payments grounds, mirroring GATS-style flexibilities.
    对跨境服务贸易的限制仍以国家安全、公共健康安全、国内特定服务产业培育和外汇收支平衡等事由为依据,与 GATS 式灵活性安排相衔接。
  • For foreign service firms, the 2026 legal upgrade converts policy pledges into statutory certainty: digital trade, green trade and new business models are explicitly encouraged, and a service-supplier’s compliance burden becomes a checklist exercise rather than an open-ended approval process.
    对境外服务企业而言,2026 年的法律升级把政策承诺转化为法律确定性:数字贸易、绿色贸易与新业态获明确鼓励,服务提供者的合规负担从开放式审批变为清单式核对。

China’s Cross-Border Services Trade Negative List: The New Legal Foundation and What It Means for Foreign Suppliers | 中国跨境服务贸易负面清单:新的法律基础与对外国服务提供者的意义

Why the new legal foundation matters

For decades, foreign suppliers of services to China faced an asymmetry: the goods trade was governed by tariffs and quota schedules, and investment was governed by the foreign investment negative list, but cross-border services — consulting, software, cloud services, engineering design, market research, payments and a wide range of business services supplied from abroad without a local entity — sat in a grey zone of sectoral licences and discretionary approvals. The revised Foreign Trade Law, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 27 December 2025 and in force since 1 March 2026, changes the architecture. Article 31 of the revised law establishes a “cross-border services trade negative list management system”: the State Council’s commerce department, together with other departments, formulates, adjusts and publishes the list, and any activity not on the list may be supplied cross-border without an item-by-item approval. The law itself does not enumerate the items — the list is a separate regulatory instrument — but it fixes the governing principle in legislation, giving foreign suppliers statutory predictability for the first time.

The list as distinct from the foreign investment negative list

It is important to keep the two negative lists separate. The foreign investment negative list (currently 29 national items, as the 2024 edition) applies to services supplied through a “commercial presence” in China — that is, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, joint venture or branch. The cross-border services trade negative list applies to the other three modes of service supply recognised in trade-policy terms: cross-border delivery (mode 1, services transmitted from abroad), consumption abroad (mode 2, a Chinese consumer travelling or staying abroad and consuming a service there) and movement of natural persons (mode 4, an individual entering China to deliver a service without establishing an entity). Article 31 makes this division explicit: services supplied through commercial presence are governed by the Foreign Investment Law, while services supplied under the other three modes are governed by the cross-border services negative list. A foreign software company that sells licences remotely from its home office, for example, is regulated under the cross-border list; if it sets up a Chinese subsidiary to sell the same licences, the subsidiary is regulated under the investment list.

What the revised Foreign Trade Law adds beyond the list

The 2025 revision, the law’s most substantial since 2004, contains several provisions that matter for foreign service suppliers. First, the law explicitly encourages digital trade and green trade, and commits China to promoting mutual recognition of digital certificates and electronic signatures, which eases cross-border contracting. Second, it strengthens the trade policy compliance mechanism: government measures affecting trade must undergo a compliance assessment aligned with international rules, which disciplines local regulators from imposing ad hoc barriers. Third, it codifies countermeasures: where a foreign country or region takes discriminatory measures against Chinese persons or organisations in trade, or harms China’s sovereignty, security or development interests, China may restrict trade with the responsible foreign individuals or organisations — including by prohibiting Chinese persons and organisations from providing them agency, freight, customs, warehousing or platform services. Fourth, it reaffirms the services-trade relief framework, allowing safeguard measures where a surge in imported services causes serious injury to domestic service industries.

The relationship between the national list and pilot-zone liberalisation

China already operates a cross-border services negative list for the Hainan Free Trade Port, issued in 2021 with 70 items, later compressed, and the FTZ cross-border services negative list, which has been progressively trimmed in successive editions. The 2026 legal codification does not itself shorten these lists, but it provides the statutory anchor that allows the national list to be built by extending pilot-zone experiments nationwide. In practice, the reform path mirrors the investment-list experience: pilot zones test a compressed list, the Hainan port tests a freer regime, and successful items migrate to the national list. Foreign suppliers should therefore watch three layers: the national list (once issued in its post-2026 form), the FTZ list for pilot-zone entry, and the Hainan list for port-based services.

What restricted categories look like

Although the operative national list is still being updated, the structure of the existing FTZ and Hainan lists gives a clear picture of where restrictions concentrate: (1) financial services — cross-border insurance, securities brokerage, fund distribution and certain payment services are either prohibited or subject to establishment requirements; (2) professional services — legal practice, certain accounting and certification activities, and some consulting services require local qualification or establishment; (3) telecommunications and internet — cross-border provision of basic and some value-added telecom services is restricted; (4) medical and health services — remote diagnosis and certain medical activities face qualification conditions; (5) cultural and information services — internet content, news and publishing activities remain restricted; and (6) transport and logistics — certain cabotage and cross-border logistics activities are conditioned on licensed local operators. The general test for a foreign supplier is straightforward: if the activity is not listed, it may be supplied cross-border; if it is listed, the supplier must look for a licensed route, typically by establishing a commercial presence.

Practical steps for foreign service suppliers

First, map your service model to the four modes and confirm whether your activity is cross-border (list applies) or commercial-presence based (investment list applies). Second, review the current FTZ and Hainan cross-border services lists as the best available proxy for the direction of the national list. Third, screen for sectoral regulators’ rules even where the list permits supply: data localisation, personal information cross-border transfer rules, payment licences and professional qualification requirements sit outside the list and continue to apply. Fourth, where the activity is restricted, consider structuring via a licensed joint venture or a pilot-zone entity. Fifth, document the trade policy compliance of your entry plan — the new statutory regime rewards clean, checklist-based compliance and penalises grey-zone operations.

Outlook for 2026 and beyond

The Government Work Report for 2026 and the 15th Five-Year Plan both direct that the cross-border services negative list be further compressed, with services as the priority for market-access opening. The Commerce Ministry has continued to expand the comprehensive pilot programme for services trade opening, and the “Services China” data for the first half of 2026 show knowledge-intensive services trade growing strongly. For foreign suppliers, the direction of travel is unambiguous: China is converting its services-opening policy into codified, list-based regulation, and the winners will be the firms that screen against the list, structure their mode of supply deliberately, and keep their offshore and onshore compliance aligned.

Sources


中国跨境服务贸易负面清单:新的法律基础与对外国服务提供者的意义

新的法律基础为何重要

数十年来,向中国提供服务的境外供应商面对一种不对称格局:货物贸易受关税与配额表约束,投资受外商投资负面清单约束,而跨境服务——咨询、软件、云服务、工程设计、市场调研、支付及各类不需在华设立实体的商业服务——长期处于部门许可与自由裁量审批的灰色地带。2025 年 12 月 27 日全国人大常委会表决通过、2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行的新修订《对外贸易法》改变了这一架构。修订后法律第三十一条确立”跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度”:国务院对外贸易主管部门会同有关部门制定、调整并发布跨境服务贸易负面清单,凡未列入清单的活动即可跨境提供,无需逐项审批。法律本身不列举条目——清单是独立的监管文件——但它在立法层面固定了管理原则,首次给予境外供应商以法律层面的可预期性。

与外商投资准入负面清单的区别

必须把两张清单区分开来。外商投资准入负面清单(当前为 2024 年版,全国版 29 条)适用于以”商业存在”方式在华提供的服务——即外商独资企业、合资企业或分支机构。跨境服务贸易负面清单适用于贸易政策意义上另外三种服务供应模式:跨境交付(模式一,从境外传输服务)、境外消费(模式二,中国消费者出境在境外消费服务)与自然人移动(模式四,个人进入中国提供服务而不设立实体)。第三十一条明确划界:以商业存在提供的服务适用《外商投资法》,以其他三种模式提供的服务适用跨境服务贸易负面清单。例如,一家外国软件公司从境外总部远程销售许可,按跨境清单监管;若它设立中国子公司销售同样的许可,子公司按投资清单监管。

修订后的《对外贸易法》在清单之外增加了什么

2025 年修订是 2004 年以来最实质的一次修法,对外国服务提供者有多项相关条款。其一,法律明确鼓励数字贸易与绿色贸易,并承诺推动数字证书、电子签名国际互认,便利跨境缔约。其二,强化贸易政策合规机制:影响贸易的政府措施须按与国际规则衔接的标准开展合规评估,约束地方监管者不得随意设置障碍。其三,成文规定反制措施:外国国家或地区对中国个人、组织实施歧视性措施,或危害中国主权、安全与发展利益的,中国可对该境外个人、组织限制相关贸易——包括禁止中国境内组织、个人为其提供代理、货运、报关、仓储、平台等服务。其四,重申服务贸易救济框架:进口服务激增对国内服务产业造成严重损害的,可采取保障措施。

国家清单与试点开放的关系

中国已有一张海南自由贸易港跨境服务贸易负面清单(2021 年发布时 70 条,后经压缩)与自贸试验区跨境服务贸易负面清单(历经多版压缩)。2026 年的法律成文本身并不缩短这些清单,但它提供了让国家清单得以”先试点、后推广”的立法锚点。实践中,改革路径与投资清单经验一致:试验区试验压缩版清单,海南试验更开放制度,成功条目向全国迁移。境外供应商应关注三层:国家清单(2026 年后新版一旦发布)、自贸试验区版(试点区域进入)、海南版(港口型服务)。

受限类别的样貌

尽管现行国家清单仍在更新中,既有自贸试验区与海南清单的结构已清楚显示限制集中的领域:(1)金融服务——跨境保险、证券经纪、基金销售及部分支付服务或被禁止或要求设立机构;(2)专业服务——法律执业、部分会计与认证活动、部分咨询服务要求本地资质或设立;(3)电信与互联网——基础电信及部分增值电信服务的跨境提供受限;(4)医疗卫生——远程诊疗及部分医疗活动有资质条件;(5)文化与信息服务——互联网内容、新闻与出版活动仍受限;(6)运输物流——部分国内运输与跨境物流活动须由持证本地经营者承接。对外国供应商的通用测试很简单:未列入清单即可跨境提供;列入清单则须寻找持牌路径,通常以设立商业存在实现。

外国服务提供者的实操步骤

其一,把服务模式映射到四种模式,确认属跨境(适用清单)还是商业存在(适用投资清单)。其二,研读现行自贸试验区与海南跨境服务贸易清单,作为国家清单方向的最近代理。其三,即便清单允许供应,仍须筛查行业主管部门规则:数据本地化、个人信息跨境传输规则、支付牌照与职业资质要求均在清单之外继续适用。其四,活动受限时,考虑以持牌合资或试验区主体结构进入。其五,让准入方案经得起贸易政策合规检验——新的成文制度奖励清晰、清单式的合规,惩戒灰色经营。

2026 年及之后展望

2026 年《政府工作报告》与十五五规划《纲要》均要求进一步压缩跨境服务贸易负面清单,并以服务业为扩大开放重点。商务部持续推进服务业扩大开放综合试点,2026 年上半年服务贸易数据显示知识密集型服务进出口强劲增长。对境外供应商,方向毋庸置疑:中国正把服务业开放政策转化为成文、清单式监管,胜者将是那些对照清单筛查、刻意设计供应模式、使离岸与在岸合规保持一致的机构。

Sources

China’s Unified Market Access Negative List System and Foreign Investment: The 2025 Edition, Barrier Clean-up, and the Shift from Manufacturing to Services

  • China’s unified market-access negative list was cut to 106 items in the 2025 edition, down from 117 in 2022, extending the “national single list” model and enforcing the “non-prohibited-is-open” principle.
    2025年版市场准入负面清单由2022年版117项缩减至106项,全国统一清单模式持续拓宽,”非禁即入”原则刚性落地。
  • The 2025 version deletes or relaxes measures across seal-engraving, TV-production setup, and online pharmaceutical/medical-device information services, while adding statutory emerging-sector items such as drone operations and e-cigarettes.
    2025版直接删除或放开公章刻制、电视剧制作单位设立、药品医疗器械互联网信息服务等一批措施,并依法纳入无人机运营、电子烟等新业态准入事项。
  • Foreign investors remain subject to the separate Foreign Investment Access Negative List; as of 2026 the manufacturing sector’s restrictions are fully zeroed at 29 national items, with services the next opening front.
    外资仍适用单独的外商投资准入负面清单;截至2026年制造业限制已全面清零、全国版保留29条,服务业成为下一阶段开放重点。
  • A market-access barrier clean-up campaign is running, publicising typical cases and using a closed-loop rectification mechanism to remove “glass doors” and “revolving doors” outside the list.
    市场准入壁垒清理整治行动已启动,通过公开通报典型案例与核实整改闭环机制,破除清单之外的”玻璃门””弹簧门””旋转门”。
  • The 2026 “Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment” action plan anchors the post-access phase: solving “access granted but operation blocked” through services opening and national treatment.
    2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》聚焦”准入后准营”,以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”。
  • Practical step: map the target sector against both the market-access and the foreign-investment negative lists, and use pilot zones plus the one-stop service window for licensing.
    实操建议:将目标行业同时对照市场准入负面清单与外资准入负面清单,并借助试点区域与一站式服务专窗办理许可。

China’s Unified Market Access Negative List System and Foreign Investment: The 2025 Edition, Barrier Clean-up, and the Shift from Manufacturing to Services | 全国统一市场准入负面清单制度与外资准入:2025版清单、准入壁垒清理与制造业清零后的服务业开放

China’s market-access governance rests on two parallel but distinct negative lists: the Market Access Negative List (市场准入负面清单), which binds every business form equally inside China, and the Foreign Investment Access Negative List (外商投资准入负面清单), which adds a layer of sector restrictions specific to foreign capital. For a foreign investor, understanding both is the first step to a compliant market entry. The 2025 edition of the market-access list and the 2026 foreign-investment posture together define the current opening trajectory.

The 2025 Market Access Negative List

In April 2025, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) jointly released the *Market Access Negative List (2025 Edition)*. The item count fell from 117 in the 2022 edition to 106, with national sub-measures reduced from 486 to 469 and local measures from 36 to 20. The revision follows four improvements: a strengthened “national single list” authority, clearer implementation rules for licensed items, better alignment with other access regimes, and more standardised, convenient access.

Concrete relaxations include moving seal-engraving from a licence to a filing, reforming the sale of computer-information-security products into standards-based certification, and removing licences for TV-production-unit setup, pharmaceutical and medical-device internet information services, and the trial operation of certain telecom services. At the same time, the list brings in new-economy items under statutory authority — drone-operation certificates (except micro drones) under the *Unmanned Aircraft Operation Administration Regulation*, and e-cigarette production, wholesale and retail approvals under the *Tobacco Monopoly Law*.

Foreign investment access after manufacturing zeroing

The foreign-investment negative list has been compressed to 29 national items. Critically, all manufacturing-sector access restrictions have been zeroed — the first industry to achieve full liberalisation. At a March 2026 State Council policy briefing, NDRC confirmed the list now stands at 29 items nationally and 27 in pilot free-trade zones, with the next phase focused on services: telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare will be opened “orderly”. The 2026 *Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment Action Plan* (MOFCOM, NDRC, Ministry of Finance; 商资发〔2026〕97号) frames the task as moving from “access” to “operation” — fixing the “big door open, small door closed” problem through services opening and national treatment.

Barrier clean-up campaign

A core message of the 2025 list is that items outside the list must be genuinely open. To that end, NDRC, MOFCOM and SAMR launched a market-access barrier clean-up, publicly notifying typical cases (seven batches, 115 cases to date) and building a clue-collection, verification, rectification and disclosure loop. The campaign targets local rules and practices that unlawfully add access conditions or erect “glass doors” and “revolving doors”. For foreign investors, this means a provincial measure that quietly blocks a listed-open sector can be reported and corrected.

Practical steps for foreign investors

  1. Screen both lists. Confirm the sector is outside — or acceptably inside — both the market-access and the foreign-investment negative lists before committing capital.
  2. Use the pilot pathway. Telecom, medical and education openings are proceeding via designated pilot zones; apply there rather than assuming nationwide access.
  3. Engage the one-stop window. Provincial investment-service desks and the “Invest in China” digital platform consolidate licensing, consultation and feedback.
  4. Watch the barrier clean-up. If a local rule impedes an otherwise-open sector, use the disclosure channel; the campaign is designed to remove it.
  5. Plan for operation, not just access. Post-entry, align with data-security, Anti-Monopoly and tax obligations early.

全国统一市场准入负面清单制度与外资准入:2025版清单、准入壁垒清理与制造业清零后的服务业开放

中国的市场准入治理建立在两张并行却又不同的负面清单之上:对境内各类经营主体一体适用的市场准入负面清单,以及针对外资额外叠加行业限制的外商投资准入负面清单。对外资而言,同时读懂两张清单是合规进入市场的第一步。2025年版市场准入清单与2026年外资准入姿态,共同定义了当前的开放路径。

2025年版市场准入负面清单

2025年4月,国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局联合发布《市场准入负面清单(2025年版)》。清单事项由2022年版的117项缩减至106项,全国性具体管理措施由486条减至469条,地方性措施由36条减至20条。本次修订围绕”四个完善”展开:强化”全国一张清单”权威、明确许可准入事项的实施要求、完善与其他准入规定的衔接、提升规范化便利化水平。

具体的放宽包括:公章刻制业由许可改为备案,计算机信息系统安全专用产品销售改为基于强制性国家标准的检测认证,取消电视剧制作单位设立、药品和医疗器械互联网信息服务、试办新型电信业务等管理措施。与此同时,清单依据法定授权纳入新业态事项——依《无人驾驶航空器运营管理条例》将民用无人驾驶航空器运营合格证核发纳入,依《烟草专卖法实施条例》将电子烟等新型烟草制品生产、批发、零售审批纳入。

制造业清零后的外资准入

外商投资准入负面清单已压缩至全国版29条。关键突破在于制造业领域准入限制全面”清零”——成为首个实现全面开放的产业。在2026年3月的国务院政策吹风会上,国家发展改革委确认全国版保留29项、自贸试验区版27项,下一阶段以服务业为重点,推动电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗等领域”有序扩大开放”。2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97号)将任务定位于从”准入”转向”准营”——以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”的具体问题。

准入壁垒清理整治

2025版清单的核心信号是:清单之外必须真放开。为此,国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局联合开展市场准入壁垒清理整治行动,已向社会公开通报7期115个违背清单的典型案例,并建立线索归集、核实整改、案例通报的闭环机制。行动剑指违规增设准入条件、设立”玻璃门””弹簧门””旋转门”的地方性规定与做法。对外资而言,这意味着某省份悄悄阻断本已开放行业的做法,可以被举报并纠正。

外资实操步骤

  1. 双清单筛查。 在投入资本前,确认目标行业同时处于市场准入负面清单与外资准入负面清单的”之外”或”可承受之内”。
  2. 走试点路径。 电信、医疗、教育等开放正通过指定试点区域推进,应在试点区内申请,而非假设全国放开。
  3. 对接一站式窗口。 省级投资服务专窗与”投资中国”数字综合服务平台整合了许可、咨询与反馈功能。
  4. 关注壁垒清理。 若地方规定阻碍本已开放的行业,可走披露渠道;行动的设计目的就是清除此类障碍。
  5. 既谋准入也谋准营。 进入后尽早对齐数据安全、反垄断与税务义务。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Two lists, not one: the market-access negative list binds every entity; the foreign-investment negative list adds foreign-capital sector limits on top.
    两张清单而非一张:市场准入负面清单约束所有主体;外资准入负面清单在其上额外叠加外资行业限制。
  • 2025 edition = 106 items: down from 117 in 2022; study the deleted and relaxed measures for fresh openings.
    2025版=106项:较2022版117项缩减;研究被删除与放开的措施以发现新开放。
  • Manufacturing zeroed, services next: 29 national items remain, concentrated in services (telecom, medical, education, culture).
    制造业清零、服务业接棒:全国版保留29项,集中在服务业(电信、医疗、教育、文化)。
  • Barrier clean-up is live: report local “glass doors” through the disclosure channel; typical cases are publicised.
    壁垒清理已启动:经披露渠道举报地方”玻璃门”;典型案例公开通报。
  • Use the window: provincial investment desks and the “Invest in China” portal consolidate licensing and consultation.
    善用窗口:省级投资专窗与”投资中国”门户整合许可与咨询。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming nationwide access: pilot-zone openings (telecom, medical, education) are not automatic national licences.
    误以为全国放开:试点区域开放(电信、医疗、教育)并非自动生效的全国牌照。
  • Ignoring the clean-up campaign: a local rule blocking an otherwise-open sector is challengeable, not final.
    忽视清理行动:地方规定阻碍本已开放的行业是可被纠正的,并非终局。
  • Confusing the two lists: screening only one of them risks missing a foreign-capital-specific restriction.
    混淆两张清单:只筛查其中一张,可能漏掉外资专项限制。

Sources

2026 Negative List for foreign investment: what changed

  • As of 2026, the operative negative list is still the 2024 edition (NDRC/MOFCOM Order No. 23, effective 1 November 2024), not a newer “2026 list” — screen your sector against it.
    截至 2026 年,现行有效的负面清单仍是 2024 年版(发改委、商务部第 23 号令,2024 年 11 月 1 日施行),而非更新的”2026 版清单”——请据此筛查目标行业。
  • The 2024 revision cut restrictive measures from 31 to 29 and eliminated all remaining manufacturing-sector foreign-access restrictions (“清零”).
    2024 年修订将限制措施由 31 条压减至 29 条,并取消制造业领域全部剩余外资准入限制(”清零”)。
  • Manufacturing is now fully open at the national level, with no equity cap, legal-form requirement, or management-nationality rule.
    制造业在全国层面现已完全放开,无股比上限、组织形式要求或管理人员国籍要求。
  • Services (telecom, healthcare, education, culture) open only gradually through FTZ / Hainan pilots, not the national list — check the pilot catalogue city by city.
    服务业(电信、医疗、教育、文化)仅通过自贸区/海南试点渐进开放,而非全国清单——须按城市核对试点目录。
  • The national list is the floor, not the ceiling: FTZ / Hainan pilot catalogues can apply a more liberal rule inside the zone.
    全国清单是开放的下限而非上限——自贸区/海南试点目录可在区内适用更宽松规则。
  • The encouraged-industries catalogue (2025 edition, effective 1 February 2026) expanded to 1,679 entries and offers preferences such as tilted corporate-income-tax for qualifying projects.
    鼓励外商投资产业目录(2025 年版,2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)扩至 1,679 条,并为符合条件的项目提供如企业所得税倾斜等优惠。
  • Being off the negative list does not mean no licence is needed — sectors may still require an ordinary industry licence.
    不在负面清单上不等于无需许可——相关行业仍可能需要普通行业许可。
  • Re-screen your target sector annually — the list is a living instrument that trends toward further narrowing.
    每年重新筛查目标行业——清单是动态工具,趋势为持续收窄。

2026 Negative List for foreign investment: what changed | 2026 年外资准入负面清单:主要变化解读

Overview

The negative list for foreign investment (外商投资准入负面清单) is the single instrument that defines which sectors are restricted or prohibited for foreign capital. Anything outside the list is, in principle, open to foreign investment on the same terms as domestic capital — the “non-prohibited, free to enter” (非禁即入) principle enacted by the Foreign Investment Law. As of 2026, the operative list is the 2024 edition, published on 8 September 2024 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) as Order No. 23 and in force since 1 November 2024. This article reviews what that revision changed, why it matters for an inbound investor, and where further liberalisation is headed.

The 2024 revision cut the number of restrictive measures from 31 to 29 and — most significantly — eliminated all remaining manufacturing-sector access restrictions (“清零”). This fulfilled the commitment announced at the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 to fully remove manufacturing foreign-access limits, and it is the headline change an investor should understand before scoping entry. Beyond the headline, the revision is best read as one step in a decade-long, deliberate narrowing of the list, set against a parallel Market Access Negative List that applies equally to domestic and foreign investors.

Legal basis and how the list works

The negative list is authorised by the Foreign Investment Law, which provides that the list is “published or approved for publication by the State Council” and that foreign investment outside the list receives national treatment. The list itself is a unified catalogue of special access measures — equity caps, requirements on legal form, and management-personnel rules — that apply only to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). For fields outside the list, domestic and foreign capital are treated alike (内外资一致).

The list does not operate in isolation. Two other instruments frame access. First, the Market Access Negative List (市场准入负面清单) applies to all investors, domestic and foreign, and covers items where any market player needs a licence or approval; the foreign-investment list layers on the extra conditions that only foreign capital faces. Second, where a free-trade zone (FTZ) or the Hainan Free Trade Port pilots a more liberal rule, that rule applies within the zone. A practical consequence: the national list is the floor, not the ceiling, of openness for foreign capital.

Crucially, the list is not the whole of market access. Sectors not on the list may still require an ordinary business licence or an industry licence (a general permit, not a foreign-access restriction). The practical question for an investor is therefore rarely “is it allowed?” but “what licence applies, and is there a foreign-equity condition?”.

Manufacturing clearance

The defining feature of the 2024 revision is the removal of the last two manufacturing restrictions. The 2021 edition still limited “publication printing must be Chinese-controlled” and prohibited “the application of steaming, frying, roasting and calcining techniques for Chinese medicinal decoction pieces, and the production of products from confidential Chinese medicine prescriptions”. Both were deleted. Manufacturing is now the only broad sector in which foreign access is, at the national level, essentially unrestricted by equity or legal-form conditions.

This follows a steady multi-year liberalisation. The nationwide and FTZ foreign-investment negative lists were cut from 93 and 122 items (2017) to 31 and 27 items (2021), and the FTZ manufacturing list had already reached “zero” in 2021. For an investor, the message is unambiguous: greenfield or acquisition in manufacturing — advanced manufacturing, high-tech, new-energy vehicles, equipment, chemicals — faces the same corporate and product-quality rules as a domestic firm, with no prior approval for foreign access as such. The only residual condition is that any new manufacturing entity still complies with product-safety, environmental and other general regulation, exactly as a domestic peer would.

Services: where opening is advancing

The 2024 revision is primarily a manufacturing story; services opening is, by design, proceeding more gradually and largely through pilot channels rather than the national list. The NDRC has signalled that work will continue on telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare, in line with the directives of the third plenum of the 20th Party Congress. Concrete moves already under way include pilot opening of value-added telecom services in designated areas and trial foreign-invested hospitals in selected cities.

Investors should treat services as a “watch the pilot catalogue” sector. A foreign hospital, for example, may be permitted in a pilot city under a filing path while remaining constrained elsewhere; education (pre-school, regular high school and higher-education institutions) remains limited to Chinese-led Sino-foreign cooperative schools; and a long list of cultural and internet-content services stays off-limits nationally. Because pilots are announced city-by-city and zone-by-zone, the national list and the relevant local pilot catalogue must be read together, and the more liberal local rule governs inside that zone.

Regional overlap and pilot openness

Free-trade zones and the Hainan Free Trade Port may pilot openings beyond the national list. Where they do, the more liberal rule governs inside the zone. This creates a two-layer map: the national 2024 list (29 items) sets the floor, and FTZ / Hainan pilot catalogues can lift specific restrictions further. An investor comparing Shanghai, Hainan, Guangdong’s cooperation zones and other pilot platforms should expect meaningful differences in, for example, telecom, medical, education and certain financial services — differences that can be decisive for a services business model.

The encouraged-industries catalogue (《鼓励外商投资产业目录》) is the complement to the negative list: it steers foreign capital toward sectors — advanced manufacturing, modern services, green tech, central and western regions — that enjoy preferential treatment such as tilted corporate-income-tax rates in qualifying circumstances. The 2025 edition (effective 1 February 2026) expanded the catalogue to 1,679 entries. Reading the negative list and the encouraged catalogue together gives the full picture: the list says what is closed or conditioned, the catalogue says where preferences apply.

Common misreads

Three misreads recur in practice. First, investors sometimes assume that because a sector is off the negative list, no licence is needed at all — but an ordinary industry licence may still apply, and the absence of a foreign-access restriction is not the absence of regulation. A factory still needs environmental and product-safety compliance exactly like a domestic peer. Second, some planners assume a newer “2026 list” has already superseded the 2024 edition; as of 2026 the 2024 list remains operative, and the correct move is to screen against it rather than await a revision that may or may not come. Third, teams compare only the national list and miss the FTZ / Hainan pilot catalogues, where a more liberal rule can be decisive for a services business model. Reading all three layers — national list, pilot catalogue, encouraged catalogue — avoids all three errors and prevents a structure from being designed around a restriction that has in fact been lifted locally.

What to do next

  • Confirm your target sector against the 2024 negative list (29 items) and separately against the FTZ / Hainan pilot catalogue — the more liberal rule applies within the zone.
  • For manufacturing, assume no foreign-access equity condition at the national level; plan around ordinary licences and product standards, not foreign-investment approval.
  • For services (telecom, healthcare, education, culture), check the current pilot open list city-by-city before committing a structure, and expect the map to keep moving.
  • Map the permitting pathway early — for restricted items, lead time on licences, not permission itself, is usually the binding constraint.
  • Review the encouraged-industries catalogue (2025 edition, effective 2026-02-01) to see whether your project qualifies for preference.
  • Re-screen your sector annually; the list is a living instrument that has trend-shrunk, and further narrowing is the stated policy direction.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Industry restrictions by sector: a quick map
  • see also: FIE admission rules: approval vs. filing
  • see also: Negative list revision enters effect

2026 年外资准入负面清单:主要变化解读

概述

外资准入负面清单是界定外资限制或禁止行业的核心工具。清单之外,原则上外资与内资同等待遇——即《外商投资法》确立的”非禁即入”原则。截至 2026 年,现行有效清单为 2024 年版:由国家发展改革委、商务部于 2024 年 9 月 8 日以第 23 号令发布,自 2024 年 11 月 1 日起施行。本文梳理该版修订的主要变化、对拟进入投资者的实务意义,以及下一步开放方向。

2024 年版将限制措施由 31 条压减至 29 条,最具标志性的变化是制造业领域外资准入限制措施实现”清零”,落实了 2023 年第三届”一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛关于全面取消制造业领域外资准入限制措施的承诺,也是投资者在进入前必须理解的首要变化。除头条外,本版修订最好理解为十年间有意为之的清单收窄的一步,其背景是与对内资外资统一适用的《市场准入负面清单》并行。

法律依据与清单运作

负面清单由《外商投资法》授权,该法规定清单”由国务院发布或者批准发布”,清单之外外资享受国民待遇。清单本身是统一列明仅适用于外商投资企业的特别管理措施——包括股比上限、组织形式要求、管理人员国籍要求等。清单之外,内外资一致管理。

清单并非孤立运作。另有两项工具框定准入。其一,《市场准入负面清单》对所有投资者(内外资)适用,列明任何市场主体均需许可或审批的事项;外资负面清单叠加仅对外资施加的额外条件。其二,自由贸易试验区、海南自贸港试点更开放规则的,在区内适用更优待遇。实务后果:全国清单是外资开放的下限,而非上限。

需要强调的是,清单并非市场进入的全部。未列入清单的行业仍可能需要普通营业执照或行业许可(属一般许可,而非外资准入限制)。对投资者而言,真正的问题通常不是”是否允许”,而是”需要什么许可,是否存在外资股比条件”。

制造业清零

2024 年版最显著的特征是删除了最后两项制造业限制:2021 年版中”出版物印刷须由中方控股”,以及”禁止投资中药饮片的蒸、炒、炙、煅等炮制技术的应用及中成药保密处方产品的生产”。两项均被删除。制造业由此成为全国层面唯一基本不再以外资股比或组织形式设限的大类行业。

这是多年持续开放的结果:全国与自贸试验区外资准入负面清单已由 2017 年的 93 条、122 条分别压减至 2021 年的 31 条、27 条,且自贸试验区制造业清单已于 2021 年率先”清零”。对投资者而言含义明确——在制造业(先进制造业、高新技术、新能源汽车、装备制造、化工)设立企业或并购,适用与内资相同的公司与产品质量规则,不再就外资准入本身事前审批。唯一残余条件是任何新设制造实体仍须遵守产品安全、环保等一般监管,正如内资同行一样。

服务业:开放在持续推进

2024 年版主要是制造业的故事;服务业开放按设计更为渐进,主要通过试点渠道而非全国清单推进。国家发改委已明确,将依二十届三中全会部署,在电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗等领域继续扩大开放。已有动作包括在特定区域启动增值电信业务开放试点,以及部分城市开展外资医院试点。

投资者应将服务业视为”紧盯试点目录”的行业。例如,外资医院可能在试点城市走备案路径,但在其他地方仍受约束;教育(学前、普通高中和高等教育机构)仍限于中方主导的中外合作办学;文化及互联网内容服务多项在全国层面仍禁止。由于试点按城市、按区域陆续公布,全国清单与对应地方试点目录须一并阅读,且区内适用更宽松的本地规则。

区域叠加与试点开放

自由贸易试验区与海南自贸港可试点清单之外开放。试点之处,以更宽松规则为准,但仅在区内适用。这形成两层地图:全国 2024 年版(29 条)设定底线,自贸区/海南试点目录可进一步放宽特定限制。比较上海、海南、广东合作区及其他试点平台时,在电信、医疗、教育及部分金融服务上应预期存在实质差异——这些差异对服务业商业模式可能具决定性。

鼓励外商投资产业目录是与负面清单互补的政策:引导外资投向先进制造业、现代服务业、绿色技术、中西部地区等可享受优惠(符合条件时适用倾斜的企业所得税等)的领域。2025 年版(2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)已将目录扩至 1,679 条。将负面清单与鼓励目录并读可得全貌:清单说明何处关闭或附条件,目录说明何处适用优惠。

常见误读

实务中三种误读反复出现。其一,投资者有时以为行业不在负面清单即无需任何许可——但一般行业许可仍可能适用,外资准入限制的缺失不等于无监管。一家工厂仍须像内资同行一样满足环保与产品安全要求。其二,部分规划者以为更新的”2026 版清单”已取代 2024 年版;截至 2026 年 2024 年版仍现行有效,正确动作是据此筛查而非等待未必到来的修订。其三,团队仅比全国清单,漏掉自贸区/海南试点目录——更宽松规则对服务业商业模式可能具决定性。读全三层(全国清单、试点目录、鼓励目录)可避免三类错误,并防止围绕实际已在地方放开的限制去设计结构。

下一步建议

  • 对照 2024 年版负面清单(29 条)确认目标行业,并另行对照自贸区/海南试点目录——区内适用更宽松规则。
  • 制造业:默认全国层面无外资股比条件;按普通许可与产品标准规划,而非外资准入审批。
  • 服务业(电信、医疗、教育、文化):在确定架构前,按城市逐一核对现行试点开放清单,并预期地图持续变动。
  • 尽早厘清许可路径——受限项的约束通常是许可耗时,而非许可本身。
  • 查阅鼓励外商投资产业目录(2025 年版,2026-02-01 施行),判断项目是否适用优惠。
  • 每年重新筛查行业;清单是动态工具且趋势收窄,进一步收窄为既定政策方向。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见:分行业外资限制速览地图
  • 参见:外资企业准入:审批与备案
  • 参见:负面清单修订正式生效

Hunan FTZ Upgrade Plan: Six Tasks to Deepen Institutional Opening

  • Hunan has issued a comprehensive FTZ upgrade plan built around six core tasks to advance institutional opening. 湖南已发布以六大核心任务为支撑、推进制度型开放的自贸试验区全面提升方案。
  • The plan sets 2030 targets across four designated zones covering industry, China–Africa, regional coordination, and talent. 方案设定到 2030 年建成产业、对非、区域协同与人才四类重点区域的目标。
  • Trade facilitation hinges on a full “customs–tax–FX–clearing” chain for new trade forms and an innovated tariff guarantee model. 贸易便利化依托新业态”关—税—汇—清”全链条与创新的关税担保模式。
  • Two-way investment opening advances QFLP balance-management-system innovation to attract overseas and private-equity capital. 投资双向开放推进合格境外有限合伙人(QFLP)余额管理制度创新,吸引海外与私募资本。
  • Industrial innovation backs core manufacturing equipment and builds “AI+” public training grounds for application scenarios. 产业创新支持关键基础制造装备,并建设”人工智能+”特色应用场景公共训练场。
  • China–Africa cooperation deepens via a pilot zone, African specialty parks, cross-border logistics, and a dedicated payment-settlement system. 对非合作通过先行区、非洲特色产业园、跨境物流与专属支付结算体系走向纵深。
  • A foreign-professional service platform and easier FX access round out the plan’s people-centred measures. 外籍人士服务平台与更便利的用汇安排,构成方案以人为中心的配套举措。

Hunan FTZ Upgrade Plan: Six Tasks to Deepen Institutional Opening | 湖南自贸试验区提升战略实施方案:六大任务深化制度型开放

Overview

In August 2026, the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee and the People’s Government of Hunan Province jointly issued the *Implementation Plan for the In-Depth Implementation of the Free Trade Zone Upgrade Strategy and the High-Standard Construction of China (Hunan) Pilot Free Trade Zone* (hereinafter “the Plan”). The Plan is the province’s flagship roadmap for translating the national free trade zone (FTZ) upgrade strategy into concrete, measurable actions within the Hunan Pilot FTZ.

At its core, the Plan organises Hunan’s next phase of reform around six major tasks, each aimed at deepening *institutional opening*—opening not merely at the border, but through rules, regimes, and services that make the zone more connective, efficient, and attractive to both domestic and foreign participants.

The Plan articulates a clear principal objective: by 2030, Hunan aims to build (1) an integrated innovation development zone across the full industrial chain, (2) an institutional opening promotion zone for China–Africa cooperation, (3) a regional coordinated opening hub zone, and (4) a modern opening-up talent cultivation zone for inland regions. Together, these four zones frame what “high-standard construction” means for an inland FTZ seeking to punch above its weight in global and continental trade.

The Six Tasks at a Glance

The Plan’s six tasks can be summarised as follows:

  1. Upgrade foreign trade — optimise and upgrade external trade through platforms and new trade forms.
  2. Open investment in both directions — broaden channels for foreign and outbound investment.
  3. Raise the modern industrial innovation level — strengthen core manufacturing and emerging-tech capacity.
  4. Deepen substantive China–Africa cooperation — build pilots, parks, logistics, and payment systems for the African market.
  5. Build a foreign-professional innovation and entrepreneurship service platform — serve incoming global talent.
  6. Further facilitate foreign exchange use for domestic and overseas talent — ease cross-border personal and business FX.

The following sections expand on the substantive measures attached to each cluster of tasks.

Trade Facilitation: Upgrading Foreign Trade

The Plan places strong emphasis on promoting the optimisation and upgrading of foreign trade. A central instrument is the construction of a cross-border trade public service platform that connects the various actors and procedures involved in external trade into a single, coherent service environment.

Crucially, the Plan seeks to open up the full “customs–tax–FX–clearing” chain (关—税—汇—清) for new trade forms such as cross-border e-commerce and market procurement trade. By linking customs, taxation, foreign exchange, and clearing into one uninterrupted pipeline, the platform is designed to reduce friction, compress processing time, and give smaller traders the same backbone infrastructure previously reserved for large exporters.

On the customs side, the Plan calls for an innovated tariff guarantee model, under which qualified guarantee institutions issue tariff guarantee letters of undertaking on behalf of importers. This shifts the burden of upfront duty payment toward a guarantee-based mechanism, improving cash-flow efficiency for traders.

To support importers’ working capital, the Plan also proposes the launch of “import advance payment” credit insurance, mitigating the risk that buyers bear when paying foreign suppliers ahead of shipment or delivery.

Two-Way Investment: Opening Both Channels

The Plan’s second task is to promote two-way opening of investment. Rather than treating inbound and outbound capital as separate tracks, the Plan treats them as a single, reciprocally reinforcing system.

On the inbound side, Hunan will broaden foreign investment channels and attract overseas capital and private equity to carry out diversified investment cooperation. This signals a welcome for more varied foreign capital structures—beyond wholly foreign-owned vehicles—including partnership and fund-based formats.

A headline reform is the implementation of innovation in the balance-management system for Qualified Foreign Limited Partners (QFLP). By managing QFLP quotas on a balance basis rather than through rigid, transaction-by-transaction approvals, the reform is intended to give foreign limited partners greater flexibility and speed when deploying capital into Hunan-based projects.

Industrial Innovation: Raising the Modern Industry Level

The third task focuses on enhancing the innovation capacity of modern industries. The Plan recognises that an FTZ upgrade is only as strong as the real economy it supports, and it therefore backs the innovation of key basic manufacturing equipment—explicitly naming industrial mother machines, control systems, and instruments and meters as priorities. Strengthening these foundational layers is intended to raise the self-reliance and quality of Hunan’s advanced manufacturing base.

In parallel, the Plan supports the construction of “AI+” characteristic application-scenario public training grounds. These shared environments are meant to let enterprises experiment with and scale artificial-intelligence applications under realistic conditions, lowering the cost of adoption and accelerating the diffusion of intelligent manufacturing and services across the zone.

China–Africa Cooperation: Deepening Substantive Ties

The fourth task—and one of Hunan’s distinctive comparative advantages—is to advance deep, substantive cooperation with Africa. Hunan positions itself as a national bridgehead for China–Africa economic and trade links, and the Plan reinforces this role on several fronts.

First, it supports the construction of a China–Africa economic and trade in-depth cooperation pilot zone, providing an institutional sandbox for rules and models tailored to African trade and investment flows.

Second, the Plan supports African characteristic industrial parks built around products such as coffee, cocoa, and nuts, helping to channel African agricultural and processed goods into China through dedicated, well-serviced channels.

Third, it calls for the formation of cross-border logistics enterprises oriented toward Africa, improving the physical connectivity and reliability of freight between Hunan and African markets.

Fourth, the Plan seeks to introduce and cultivate cross-border payment platforms for Africa and to build a safe and efficient cross-border payment and settlement system for Africa. Reliable settlement infrastructure is a recognised bottleneck in China–Africa commerce, and addressing it directly is central to the zone’s “institutional opening promotion zone for China–Africa cooperation” goal.

Talent and Foreign Exchange: Serving People

The fifth and sixth tasks centre on people. The Plan proposes to build an innovation and entrepreneurship service platform for foreign professionals, lowering the practical barriers that overseas talent face when starting businesses, hiring, and operating within the zone.

Complementing the platform, the Plan commits to further facilitating the use of foreign exchange by domestic and overseas talent. Simpler, more predictable FX procedures for individuals and enterprises reduce a persistent source of friction for internationally mobile founders, specialists, and cross-border teams.

Related Reading

Readers seeking the authoritative basis for the measures above may consult the following official sources: the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which acts as the competent authority for pilot free trade zones; the People’s Government of Hunan Province, which issued the implementation plan; and the State Council, which provides the top-level deployment of the national FTZ upgrade strategy. Direct links appear in the Sources section below.


湖南自贸试验区提升战略实施方案:六大任务深化制度型开放

概述

2026 年 8 月,中共湖南省委、湖南省人民政府联合印发《深入实施自由贸易试验区提升战略高标准建设中国(湖南)自由贸易试验区实施方案》(以下简称《方案》)。《方案》是湖南落实国家自由贸易试验区提升战略、在自贸试验区框架下转化为可衡量行动的总体路线图。

《方案》以六大任务为核心,组织湖南下一阶段的改革开放,每一项任务都指向深化制度型开放——不仅是边境上的开放,更是通过规则、制度和服务的完善,使片区更具联通性、效率与对内对外吸引力。

《方案》明确了清晰的主要目标:到 2030 年,湖南要打造(1)全产业链集成创新发展区、(2)中非制度型开放促进区、(3)区域协同开放枢纽区、(4)内陆地区现代开放人才培育区。这四类区域共同定义了内陆型自贸试验区”高标准建设”的内涵。

六大任务一览

《方案》的六大任务可概括如下:

  1. 推动对外贸易优化升级——以平台与新业态优化提升外贸。
  2. 促进投资双向开放——拓宽引进来与走出去的投资渠道。
  3. 提升现代产业创新发展能级——强化核心制造与新兴技术能力。
  4. 推进对非深层次合作——建设先行区、产业园、物流与支付体系对接非洲市场。
  5. 搭建外籍人士创新创业服务平台——服务引进来的全球人才。
  6. 进一步便利境内外人才用汇——简化跨境个人与企业的外汇使用。

下文对各项任务所附的具体举措展开说明。

贸易便利化:优化升级对外贸易

《方案》高度重视推动对外贸易优化升级。核心抓手之一是建设跨境贸易公共服务平台,将外贸涉及的各类主体与环节整合为统一、连贯的服务环境。

关键之处在于,《方案》着力打通跨境电商、市场采购贸易等新业态”关—税—汇—清”全链条。把海关、税务、外汇与清结算连成不间断的管道,旨在降低摩擦、压缩办理时间,并让中小贸易者也能享有过去仅面向大型出口商的基础支撑。

在海关环节,《方案》提出创新关税担保模式,由符合条件的担保机构开具关税担保保函,代进口商提供税款担保。这把提前缴税的负担转向基于担保的机制,改善贸易商的资金周转效率。

为支持进口商营运资金,《方案》还提出开展“进口预付款”信用保险,对冲买方在发货或交货前向外方付款所承担的风险。

投资双向开放:引进来与走出去并举

第二项任务是促进投资双向开放。湖南不把引进来与走出去视为两条孤立轨道,而是作为相互强化的统一体系。

在引进来方面,湖南将拓宽外商投资渠道,吸引海外资本、私募股权开展多元化投资合作。这释放出欢迎更多元外资结构的信号——除独资外,也包括合伙、基金等形态。

一项标志性改革是实施合格境外有限合伙人(QFLP)余额管理制度创新。以余额方式管理 QFLP 额度,替代逐笔 rigid 审批,旨在让境外有限合伙人在向湖南项目投放资金时获得更高灵活度与速度。

产业创新:提升现代产业能级

第三项任务聚焦提升现代产业创新发展能级。《方案》认识到,自贸试验区提升归根结底要靠其支撑的实体经济,因此支持关键基础制造装备创新,明确将工业母机、控制系统、仪器仪表列为重点。夯实这些基础层,意在提升湖南先进制造的自立能力与质量。

与此同时,《方案》支持建设“人工智能+”特色应用场景公共训练场。这类共享环境让企业在贴近真实的条件下试验并放大人工智能应用,降低采纳成本,加速智能制造与智能服务在片区的扩散。

对非合作:走向深层次

第四项任务——也是湖南鲜明的比较优势之一——是推进对非深层次合作。湖南把自己定位为中非经贸往来的国家级桥头堡,《方案》从多个层面强化这一角色。

首先,支持建设中非经贸深度合作先行区,为契合非洲贸易与投资流的规则与模式提供制度”沙盒”。

其次,《方案》支持围绕咖啡、可可、坚果等产品建设非洲特色产业园,以专属、配套完善的渠道,把非洲农产及加工品引入中国。

第三,提出组建对非跨境物流企业,提升湖南与非洲市场之间货运的物理连通性与可靠性。

第四,《方案》着力引进培育对非跨境支付平台,并建设安全高效的对非跨境支付结算体系。可靠的结算基础设施是中非商贸公认的瓶颈,直接破解这一瓶颈,正契合”中非制度型开放促进区”目标。

人才与外汇:以人为中心

第五、第六项任务以人为中心。《方案》提出搭建外籍人士创新创业服务平台,降低海外人才在片区内创业、用工与运营所面临的实际门槛。

与之配套,《方案》承诺进一步便利境内外人才用汇。更简单、可预期的个人与企业外汇流程,能减少国际化创始人、专才与跨境团队长期面临的摩擦。

延伸阅读

欲了解上述举措的权威依据,可查阅以下官方来源:作为自由贸易试验区主管部门的商务部、印发本实施方案的湖南省人民政府,以及作出自贸试验区提升战略顶层部署的国务院。具体链接见下方”来源”部分。

Sources

  • 商务部(自由贸易试验区主管部门):https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/
  • 湖南省人民政府(实施方案印发单位):https://www.hunan.gov.cn/
  • 国务院(自由贸易试验区提升战略顶层部署):https://www.gov.cn/

China’s FTZ Upgrading Strategy: What the 2026 Provincial Plans Open (2026)

  • China is implementing the “FTC upgrading strategy”; Hunan published its implementation plan on 4 August 2026 with targets to 2030.
    中国正实施「自贸试验区提升战略」;湖南于 2026 年 8 月 4 日发布实施方案,目标至 2030 年。
  • The plans widen market access inside FTZs: foreign-owned vocational training, qualified foreign arbitrators, and relaxed cultural/Medical/arbitration openings.
    方案在自贸区内放宽准入:外商独资经营性职业技能培训机构、符合条件的境外仲裁机构、放宽文化/医疗/仲裁等领域。
  • Investment facilitation measures include QFLP balance-management innovation and exemption from registration for foreign-invested onshore reinvestment.
    投资便利化含 QFLP 余额管理创新、外商投资企业境内再投资免予登记。
  • Trade upgrades cover cross-border trade public-service platforms, “bonded +” and bonded-remanufacturing breakthroughs, and smoother “customs-tax-FX-clearing” chains.
    贸易升级涵盖跨境贸易公共服务平台、「保税+」与保税再制造突破,以及更顺畅的「关—税—汇—清」全链条。
  • Provinces are localising the national strategy: Shaanxi lists 17 reform measures; Yangling’s 2026 list has 27 tasks for agro-openness.
    各省正本地化落地:陕西明确 17 项改革举措;杨凌 2026 年清单列 27 项农业开放任务。
  • For foreign investors, FTZs are the fastest sandbox for pilot openings; watch provincial work-guidelines and “investment China” service windows.
    对外资,自贸区是试点开放最快的沙盒;应关注各省工作指引与「投资中国」服务窗口。

China’s FTZ Upgrading Strategy: What the 2026 Provincial Plans Open (2026) | 自贸试验区提升战略:2026 省级方案开放了什么

The Free Trade Zone (FTZ) is China’s primary sandbox for institutional opening. Following the central directive to implement the FTZ upgrading strategy, provinces are now publishing concrete 2026 implementation plans that go beyond tariff facilitation into market access, investment and cross-border flows.

Hunan is a recent example. On 4 August 2026, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and Government issued the *Implementation Plan for Deeply Implementing the FTZ Upgrading Strategy and Building China (Hunan) FTZ to High Standards*. Its 2030 goals: a batch of institutional-innovation and reform-pilot tasks, a set of Hunan-characteristic opening scenarios, and roles as an integrated industrial-chain innovation zone, a China–Africa institutional-opening promotion zone, and a modern opening-talent cultivation zone.

What does it open? On investment, it widens foreign-investment channels — attracting overseas capital and PE/VC cooperation, piloting QFLP balance-management innovation, exempting foreign-invested onshore reinvestment from registration, and advancing services-sector opening. On market access within the zone, it permits wholly foreign-owned for-profit vocational-training institutions, allows qualified foreign arbitral institutions to set up operations, and relaxes cultural, medical and arbitration openings. On trade, it builds cross-border trade public-service platforms to connect “customs–tax–FX–clearing” for new formats like cross-border e-commerce and market-procurement trade, innovates tariff-guarantee models, and pushes bonded-remanufacturing breakthroughs.

Hunan is not alone. Shaanxi is executing 17 reform measures under its FTZ upgrading plan: relaxing the Chinese-creative ratio for Sino-foreign TV co-production from one-third to one-quarter, lifting limits on foreigners sitting auctioneer/veterinarian/real-estate-appraiser exams, allowing foreign-owned for-profit vocational training, and permitting qualified Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan doctors to open clinics in the zone. Yangling’s 2026 reform list carries 27 tasks — allowing off-zone bonded-maintenance pilots, a “whitelist” for imported R&D items and food/medicine substances, and opening securities/futures consulting to foreign individuals.

The through-line is “access after admission”: pilots are meaningless unless the combined entity can operate. The plans therefore pair opening with services — single windows, credit-grade alignment across commerce, finance, FX, customs and tax, and “investment China” branding. For a foreign investor, the practical move is to track the provincial work-guidelines for the FTZ you target, confirm whether your business is in the widened scope, and use the zone’s service window to compress licensing. FTZs remain the lowest-friction entry point for testing China’s next round of openings.


自贸试验区提升战略:2026 省级方案开放了什么

自由贸易试验区是中国制度型开放的主要沙盒。在「实施自贸试验区提升战略」的中央部署下,各省正发布具体的 2026 实施方案,从关税便利走向市场准入、投资与跨境流动。

湖南是近期例子。2026 年 8 月 4 日,湖南省委、省政府印发《深入实施自由贸易试验区提升战略高标准建设中国(湖南)自由贸易试验区实施方案》。其 2030 目标:一批制度创新与改革试点任务、一批湖南特色开放场景,定位为全产业链集成创新发展区、中非制度型开放促进区、现代开放人才培育区。

开放了什么?投资上,拓宽外资渠道——吸引海外资本与 PE/VC 合作、试点 QFLP 余额管理创新、外商投资企业境内再投资免予登记、推进服务业扩大开放。区内准入上,允许外商独资设立经营性职业技能培训机构、符合条件的境外仲裁机构设业务机构、放宽文化/医疗/仲裁等领域。贸易上,建设跨境贸易公共服务平台打通跨境电商、市场采购等新业态「关—税—汇—清」,创新关税担保模式,推动保税再制造突破。

湖南并非孤例。陕西落实提升战略 17 项举措:中外合作电视剧中方主创占比由三分之一放宽至四分之一,取消境外个人参加拍卖师/兽医/房地产估价师考试限制,允许外商独资经营性职业培训,允许符合条件的港澳台医生在区内开诊所。杨凌 2026 年清单列 27 项:允许区外保税维修试点、进口研发用物品与食药物质「白名单」、放开境外个人从事证券投资咨询。

主线是「准入之后准营」:试点若不能让合并实体运营便无意义。因此方案将开放与服务配对——单一窗口、商务/金融/外汇/海关/税务信用等级衔接、「投资中国」品牌。对外资,实操动作是跟踪目标自贸区省级工作指引、确认业务是否落入放宽范围、并用区内服务窗口压缩拿照周期。自贸区仍是测试中国下一轮开放的最低摩擦入口。

Picking the Right Zone and Using the Sandbox

Match the business to the zone’s character. Hunan leans into China–Africa trade, agro-tech and cultural-technology; Shaanxi and Yangling emphasise agriculture openness and bonded maintenance; coastal FTZs lead on finance and digital trade. A foreign investor should target the zone whose pilot list contains its exact sub-sector, then confirm whether the opening is “pilot” (needs approval) or “liberalised” (open by rule).

Use the service window proactively. The plans pair opening with single windows and credit-grade alignment across commerce, finance, FX, customs and tax. Bring a concrete project and ask the zone’s investment-service team to map the licences and approvals end to end — this is where “access after admission” is solved in practice. For pilot openings such as foreign-owned vocational training or qualified foreign arbitrators, expect a case-by-case green light rather than automatic registration.

Track the rolling updates. FTZ plans are living documents: provincial work-guidelines, negative lists for investment promotion, and “investment China” campaigns refresh through the year. Set a watch on the target province’s FTZ office and the commerce department, and revisit the scope each quarter. The zones remain China’s lowest-friction entry point for testing the next round of openings — but only for those who read the localised rules, not just the national headline.

选对片区、用好沙盒

将业务与片区特征匹配。湖南侧重中非贸易、农业技术与文化科技;陕西与杨凌强调农业开放与保税维修;沿海自贸区领跑金融与数字贸易。外资应锁定其细分领域恰在试点清单的片区,再确认开放是「试点」(需批复)还是「放开」(依规则开放)。

主动用服务窗口。方案将开放与单一窗口、商务/金融/外汇/海关/税务信用衔接配对。带着具体项目请片区投资服务团队端到端梳理牌照与审批——「准入之后准营」在此实处解决。对外商独资职业培训、合格境外仲裁机构等试点开放,预期逐案绿灯而非自动登记。

跟踪滚动更新。自贸区方案是活文件:省级工作指引、招商引资正面/负面清单与「投资中国」活动年内持续刷新。对目标省自贸区办与商务厅设关注,每季度重审范围。自贸区仍是中国测试下一轮开放的最低摩擦入口——但只属于读懂本地化规则、而非仅看全国标题者。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Strategy: China is implementing the FTZ upgrading strategy; provinces issue 2026 local plans.
  • Hunan plan: published 4 Aug 2026, targets to 2030 as an integrated-innovation and China–Africa opening zone.
  • Access widened: foreign-owned vocational training, qualified foreign arbitrators, relaxed cultural/medical openings.
  • Investment: QFLP balance-management pilot; foreign-invested onshore reinvestment exempt from registration.
  • Trade: cross-border public-service platforms; “bonded +”; bonded-remanufacturing breakthroughs.
  • Shaanxi: 17 reform measures; Yangling 2026 list carries 27 agro-openness tasks.
  • Action: match business to zone character; use the single window; track rolling updates quarterly.

实务速查

  • 战略: 中国实施自贸试验区提升战略;各省出台 2026 本地方案。
  • 湖南方案: 2026 年 8 月 4 日发布,目标至 2030 年建成集成创新与中非开放区。
  • 准入放宽: 外商独资职业培训、合格境外仲裁机构、放宽文化/医疗开放。
  • 投资: QFLP 余额管理试点;外商投资企业境内再投资免登记。
  • 贸易: 跨境公共服务平台;「保税+」;保税再制造突破。
  • 陕西: 17 项改革举措;杨凌 2026 清单列 27 项农业开放任务。
  • 行动: 业务匹配片区特征;用单一窗口;每季度跟踪滚动更新。

Bottom Line

The FTZ upgrading strategy is where China pilots its next openings first, and the 2026 provincial plans are the operating manual. Investors should match the business to a zone’s character, use the single window to solve “access after admission”, and track the rolling provincial updates through the year. The zones reward those who read the localised rules — not those who quote only the national headline.

底线

自贸试验区提升战略是中国先行试点下一轮开放之处,2026 年省级方案即操作手册。投资者应让业务匹配片区特征,用单一窗口解决「准入之后准营」,并年内跟踪各省滚动更新。自贸区奖励读懂本地化规则者——而非只引用全国标题者。

Sources

Lingang & free trade zones playbook

  • China’s FTZs pilot openness before nationwide roll-out; the Lin-gang Special Area (announced 6 Aug 2019, Guofa [2019] No. 15) is explicitly built as a “special economic function zone” with a 119.5 sq km start-up area.
    中国自贸区先行试点开放再向全国推广;临港新片区(2019 年 8 月 6 日宣布设立,国发〔2019〕15 号)明确定位为”特殊经济功能区”,先行启动区面积 119.5 平方公里。
  • Lin-gang offers a reduced 15% corporate income tax for five years from establishment for enterprises in key fields — integrated circuits, AI, biomedicine and civil aviation — engaged in core-segment production and R&D.
    临港对集成电路、人工智能、生物医药、民用航空等关键领域从事核心环节生产研发的企业,自设立起 5 年内减按 15% 征收企业所得税。
  • The Yangshan Special Comprehensive Bonded Zone (25.31 sq km) is the only “special comprehensive bonded zone” among China’s customs special supervision areas, running a “frontier fully open, second line highly free” model.
    洋山特殊综合保税区(25.31 平方公里)是中国海关特殊监管区域中唯一的特殊综合保税区,运行”一线充分放开、二线高度自由”模式。
  • FTZs apply “pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list”, so foreign and domestic capital are treated alike outside the list and FIE steps move from approval to filing.
    自贸区实行”准入前国民待遇加负面清单”,清单之外内外资一致,外商投资项目及外资企业的设立变更由审批改为备案。
  • A Free Trade Account (FTA) lets qualified enterprises handle cross-border RMB with simplified procedures.
    自由贸易账户(FTA)使优质企业以简化流程办理跨境人民币业务。
  • A Comprehensive Bonded Zone suspends duty: imported goods are bonded, Mainland-to-zone goods qualify as exports with refund, and in-zone processing, logistics, R&D and e-commerce are permitted.
    综合保税区暂缓征税:进口货物保税,境内货物入区视同出口并退税,区内可开展加工、物流、研发与跨境电商。
  • Lin-gang relaxes barriers for high-end talent with overseas qualifications (finance, construction, planning, design) and opens a green channel for R&D teams’ work permits and residence.
    临港放宽具有境外金融、建筑、规划、设计等职业资格的高端人才从业限制,并为研发团队开设工作许可与居留”绿色通道”。
  • Lin-gang also signals an IIT differential subsidy for overseas talent so high-end foreign professionals are not penalised by the China–home tax gap.
    临港还提出对境外人才实施个税税负差额补贴,使高端外籍人才不因中外税负差受损。

Lingang & free trade zones playbook | 临港新片区与自贸区实操手册

Overview

China’s free trade zones (FTZs, 自由贸易试验区) are designated geographic areas where the state pilots openness and regulatory reforms before they are extended nationwide. The first — the China (Shanghai) Pilot FTZ — was launched in 2013. By the end of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 18 FTZs accounted for 17.6% of national foreign investment and 14.7% of imports and exports on under 0.4% of the country’s land area, making them the single most concentrated channel for foreign-invested activity. Within this system, the Lin-gang Special Area (临港新片区) stands apart: approved by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council and announced on 6 August 2019 (the *Overall Plan* is Guofa [2019] No. 15), it is explicitly built as a “special economic function zone” benchmarked against the world’s most competitive free-trade ports.

This playbook explains what Lin-gang offers, what general FTZ benefits a foreign firm can rely on anywhere in the network, and a practical landing sequence for setting up.

Lin-gang Special Area: the policy package

The Lin-gang Special Area’s initial启动 area covers 119.5 square kilometres in south-east Shanghai — Nanhui New City, the Lingang equipment industrial zone, Xiaoyangshan Island and the area south of Pudong Airport. Its stated goal is to deliver “investment freedom, trade freedom, capital freedom, transport freedom and freedom of employment” (投资自由、贸易自由、资金自由、运输自由、人员从业自由). The five freedoms, plus information connectivity and an internationally competitive tax regime, are what distinguish Lin-gang from an ordinary FTZ.

On trade, the Plan creates a physically fenced zone inside Lin-gang — the Yangshan Special Comprehensive Bonded Zone (洋山特殊综合保税区) — which, at 25.31 sq km and accepted by a State Council joint inspection in May 2020, is the only “special comprehensive bonded zone” among China’s customs special supervision areas. It operates a “frontier fully open, second line highly free” (一线充分放开、二线高度自由) model: goods from outside China enter the zone bonded or duty-free, and goods moving from the Mainland into the zone are treated as exports with refund. On capital, the Plan supports piloting integrated RMB/foreign-currency functions for the Free Trade Account (FTA, 自由贸易账户), exploring free capital inflow/outflow and convertibility within the zone, and allowing funds raised offshore by in-zone enterprises to be used freely for in-zone and offshore operations.

The tax edge and talent provisions

The most concrete benefit for an investor is the corporate income tax (CIT) break. For enterprises in Lin-gang engaged in the production and R&D of core segments in key fields — integrated circuits, artificial intelligence, biomedicine and civil aviation — the CIT is levied at a reduced 15% rate for the five years from the date of establishment. The Plan also signals a policy of subsidising the individual income tax (IIT) differential for overseas talent, so that high-end foreign professionals are not penalised by the gap between Chinese and home-country tax rates. Foreign-invested firms in advanced manufacturing and R&D should treat the 15% CIT window as a location decision variable, not just a tax footnote.

On people, Lin-gang relaxes barriers for high-end talent in modern services: it allows qualified professionals with overseas qualifications in finance, construction, planning and design, after filing, to provide services in the zone, and counts overseas professional experience as domestic experience. It also opens a “green channel” for work permits and permanent or long-term residence for leading research and innovation teams.

General FTZ benefits available to foreign firms

Outside Lin-gang specifically, every FTZ in the national network gives a foreign firm a common toolkit. The headline reform is “pre-establishment national treatment plus a negative list” (准入前国民待遇加负面清单) for foreign investment: outside the list, foreign and domestic capital are treated alike, and foreign-invested projects and the incorporation/change of FIEs move from approval to filing. Complementary reforms include the “separating licences from certificates” (证照分离) reform, which cuts the permits needed to start operating, and the FTA cross-border settlement and financing framework that lets qualified enterprises handle cross-border RMB with simplified procedures.

On the customs side, FTZs host Comprehensive Bonded Zones (综合保税区) and other customs special supervision areas where imported goods are bonded, goods sent from the Mainland into the zone qualify for export refund, and in-zone processing, logistics, R&D, testing, repair, cross-border e-commerce, commodity display and international entrepôt trade are permitted. The combination — easier market entry, a bonded customs environment and an FTA for cross-border cash — is the core “FTZ advantage” a foreign SME should expect regardless of which zone it picks.

A landing playbook for foreign firms

A disciplined sequence works as follows. First, screen the sector against the national negative list and the FTZ negative list; if the activity is in a pilot-opened area (e.g., certain modern-service and professional-service sub-sectors), the zone route removes the restriction. Second, pick the zone by function — Lin-gang and its Yangshan zone for manufacturing/R&D and offshore-oriented trade, other coastal FTZs for sector-specific strengths — and confirm the local “indent catalogs” (鼓励类/重点产业) that unlock fiscal incentives. Third, decide the entity form (WFOE is the default for operational control) and prepare the filing rather than approval package. Fourth, open an FTA and, if importing or exporting through the zone, structure the supply chain to use bonded warehousing. Fifth, model the CIT/IIT incentives early, because the 15% Lin-gang CIT only applies to the named key fields and only for the five-year window from establishment.

What to do next

  • Screen your sector against both the national and the FTZ negative lists before committing to a location.
  • If you are in IC, AI, biomedicine or civil aviation R&D/manufacturing, model the 15% Lin-gang CIT over the five-year establishment window.
  • Choose a zone by function, not prestige — Lin-gang/Yangshan for manufacturing and offshore trade, others for sector fit.
  • Prepare a filing-based incorporation package; most FIE steps in an FTZ are filing, not approval.
  • Open a Free Trade Account to simplify cross-border RMB receipt and payment.
  • Use the zone’s Comprehensive Bonded Zone for bonded imports, processing and re-export to cut working-capital and duty cost.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Greater Bay Area: opportunities for SMEs
  • see also: Free trade zone bonded logistics playbook
  • see also: Tax treaty benefits for foreign investors

临港新片区与自贸区实操手册

概述

中国的自由贸易试验区(FTZ)是国家在局部区域先行试点开放与监管改革、再向全国推广的指定区域。首个——中国(上海)自由贸易试验区——于 2013 年设立。到”十三五”末,全国 18 个自贸试验区以不到全国千分之四的国土面积,贡献了 17.6% 的外商投资和 14.7% 的进出口,是外商投资活动最集中的单一渠道。在这一体系中,临港新片区地位特殊:经党中央、国务院批准,于 2019 年 8 月 6 日宣布设立(总体方案为《国发〔2019〕15 号》),明确定位为对标全球竞争力最强自由贸易园区的”特殊经济功能区”。

本手册说明临港新片区提供什么、外国企业可在全国自贸区网络中依赖的通用优惠,以及一套务实的落地步骤。

临港新片区:政策组合

临港新片区先行启动区域位于上海东南,面积 119.5 平方公里,涵盖南汇新城、临港装备产业区、小洋山岛及浦东机场南侧。其目标是实现”投资自由、贸易自由、资金自由、运输自由、人员从业自由”。这五大自由,加上信息快捷联通与国际竞争力的税收制度,正是临港区别于普通自贸区的标志。

在贸易方面,总体方案在临港内设立物理围网区域——洋山特殊综合保税区,面积 25.31 平方公里,于 2020 年 5 月通过国务院联合验收,是中国海关特殊监管区域中唯一的特殊综合保税区。其运行”一线充分放开、二线高度自由”的模式:境外货物入区保税或免税,境内区外货物入区视同出口并退税。在资金方面,方案支持开展自由贸易账户本外币一体化功能试点,探索区内资本自由流入流出与自由兑换,并允许区内企业从境外募集的资金自主用于区内及境外经营投资活动。

税收红利与人才条款

对投资者最具体的利好是企业所得税(CIT)优惠。对临港新片区内符合条件的从事集成电路、人工智能、生物医药、民用航空等关键领域核心环节生产研发的企业,自设立之日起 5 年内减按 15% 的税率征收企业所得税。方案还提出研究实施境外人才个人所得税税负差额补贴政策,使高端外籍人才不因中外税负差而受损。从事先进制造与研发的外商投资企业,应将这 15% 的 CIT 窗口视为选址决策变量,而非仅仅一项税务注脚。

在人员方面,临港放宽现代服务业高端人才的从业限制:允许具有境外金融、建筑、规划、设计等领域职业资格且符合条件的专业人才,经备案后在区内提供服务,其在境外的从业经历可视同国内经历;并为科研创新领军人才及团队开设工作许可与永久或长期居留的”绿色通道”。

外国企业可享的通用自贸区优惠

除临港专属政策外,全国自贸区网络为外国企业提供一套通用工具箱。核心改革是对外商投资实行”准入前国民待遇加负面清单”:清单之外内外资一致,外商投资项目及外商投资企业的设立、变更由审批改为备案。配套改革包括”证照分离”,削减开业所需许可;以及自由贸易账户(FTA)跨境结算与融资框架,使优质企业以简化流程办理跨境人民币业务。

在海关层面,自贸区设有综合保税区等海关特殊监管区域:进口货物保税,境内货物入区享受出口退税,区内可开展加工、物流、研发、检测、维修、跨境电商、商品展示与国际转口贸易。市场进入更便利、保税监管环境、以及用于跨境资金的自由贸易账户——这三者的组合,就是无论选择哪个片区都应有的”自贸区核心优势”。

外国企业落地实操手册

一套有纪律的步骤如下。第一,对照全国负面清单与自贸区负面清单筛查行业;若业务属于先行开放领域(如部分现代服务业与专业服务子项),走片区路径即可解除限制。第二,按功能选片区——临港及洋山片区适合制造/研发与离岸导向贸易,其他沿海自贸区按各自产业强项——并确认能解锁财政激励的本地”鼓励类/重点产业”目录。第三,确定主体形式(追求经营控制通常以 WFOE 为默认),准备备案而非审批材料。第四,开立自由贸易账户;若经片区进出口,应将供应链结构设计为使用保税仓储。第五,尽早测算 CIT/IIT 优惠,因为临港 15% CIT 仅适用于所列关键领域,且仅自设立起 5 年窗口内有效。

下一步建议

  • 在确定选址前,先同时对照全国与自贸区负面清单筛查行业。
  • 若从事集成电路、人工智能、生物医药或民用航空的研发/制造,测算临港 15% CIT 在五年设立窗口内的效益。
  • 按功能而非名气选片区——制造与离岸贸易看临港/洋山,其他产业看匹配度。
  • 准备以备案为基础的设立材料;自贸区内的外资步骤多为备案而非审批。
  • 开立自由贸易账户,简化跨境人民币收付款。
  • 利用片区综合保税区开展保税进口、加工与复出口,降低营运资金与关税成本。

来源

相关阅读

  • see also: 粤港澳大湾区:中小企业的机遇
  • see also: 自贸区保税物流实操手册
  • see also: 外商投资企业的税收协定待遇