- China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石，主要由市场监管总局执行，其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。- Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
经营者集中具有暂停效力：达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割，而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。- The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制，提高了处罚幅度，并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。- The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断，与市场准入壁垒直接相关。- As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
截至2026年，执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议，以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。- Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
外资投资者进入中国市场时，应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。
Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查：2026年框架
The Statutory Foundation
China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.
Three Pillars of Enforcement
- Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
- Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
- Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.
For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.
Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover
A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.
The 2022 Amendments: What Changed
The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:
- Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
- Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
- Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
- “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.
These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.
Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus
SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.
Fair Competition Review and Market Entry
The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.
Practical Compliance for Entrants
- Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
- Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
- Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
- Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
- Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.
Penalties and Exposure
Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.
中国反垄断与并购审查：2026年框架
法律基础
中国竞争法是《反垄断法》，于2007年通过，2022年作重大修订，修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中，并授权国家市场监督管理总局（市场监管总局）作为国家级主要执法机构，会同省级市场监管部门执法。
执法的三大支柱
- 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
- 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位（如不公平定价、排他、搭售）。
- 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。
对市场准入者而言，三者均具意义：第一项管控交易，第二项约束市场行为，第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。
经营者集中：暂停效力且以营业额为触发
“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权，以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时，交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛（由国务院2008年规定设定，并于2024年修订中上调）以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大，在减少小规模交易申报的同时，仍将战略性交易纳入范围。
2022年修订：变化何在
2022年修订显著加强了制度：
- 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时，法定时限可暂停，从而延长实际审查时间。
- 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制，将面临显著提高的罚款。
- 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素，并提高处罚。
- 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口，由市场监管总局指引落实。
这些变化意味着，时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。
平台经济与行为监管重点
市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架：”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年，市场监管总局持续关注平台行为，以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。
公平竞争审查与市场准入
《公平竞争审查条例》（2024年8月1日施行）要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言，这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时，公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致，却是一条被认可的救济路径。
准入者实务合规
- 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
- 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表；在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
- 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款，避免触犯行为规则。
- 监测支配力指标；若份额超过约50%，须以更高谨慎对待行为。
- 遇地方规则阻碍准入时，运用公平竞争审查。
处罚与风险敞口
违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限，相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言，暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织，使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题，而非后台形式。
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