Tag Archives: 2026

Strategic Investment in Chinese Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (2024 Rules in Force for 2026)

  • The revised Measures (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; published 1 Nov 2024, effective 2 Dec 2024) are the governing rule for foreign strategic investment in A-share listed companies.
    修订后的《办法》(六部门,第3号令,2024;2024年11月1日公布,2024年12月2日施行)是外国投资者对A股上市公司战略投资的主管规则。
  • Qualifying methods are three: directed new issue, agreement transfer, and tender offer — all requiring medium-to-long-term holding of A-shares.
    合格方式三种:上市公司定向发行新股、协议转让、要约收购——均须中长期持有A股。
  • The 2024 revision allows foreign natural persons, eases asset thresholds (USD 50m owned / USD 3bn managed for non-controlling; USD 100m / USD 500m for controlling), and permits overseas unlisted-company equity in directed issues and tender offers (cross-border share swap).
    2024修订允许外国自然人、放宽资产门槛(非控股实有5000万美元/管理3亿美元;控股1亿/5亿美元),并允许定向发行与要约收购中使用境外非上市公司股权(跨境换股)。
  • The holding-ratio requirement for agreement transfer / tender offer is cut from 10% to 5% (and eliminated for directed issues); the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (or longer if other rules require).
    协议转让/要约收购的持股比例要求由10%降至5%(定向发行取消比例);锁定期由3年降至12个月(其他规则有更长要求从其规定)。
  • No commerce-department approval is needed; the deal runs through information reporting and securities-market rules, with interfaces to security review and merger control preserved.
    无需商务部门审批;交易经信息报告与证券市场规则办理,安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。
  • Restrictions bind: no investment in negative-list prohibited sectors; restricted sectors must meet the list’s equity/management conditions; and security review applies where national security is or may be affected.
    限制有效:不得投资负面清单禁止领域;限制领域须满足清单股权/管理条件;影响或可能影响国家安全的须通过安全审查。

Strategic Investment in Chinese Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (2024 Rules in Force for 2026) | 外国投资者对上市公司战略投资(2024规则2026年适用)

The rule that governs listed-company stake-building

For a foreign investor taking a strategic stake in a Chinese A-share listed company, the governing instrument is the revised *Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors*. Adopted at the 13th ministerial executive meeting of MOFCOM on 15 August 2024, agreed by CSRC, SASAC, the State Taxation Administration, SAMR and SAFE, it was promulgated as six-agency Order No. 3 of 2024 on 1 November 2024 and took effect on 2 December 2024, repealing the 2005 version. In 2026 it is the live framework, and every foreign strategic investment in a listed company routes through it.

“Strategic investment” here means a foreign investor acquiring and medium-to-long-term holding A-shares through a listed company’s directed new issue (定向发行), agreement transfer (协议转让) or tender offer (要约收购), or other legally permitted means. The statutory principles are clear: comply with law, no harm to national security or public interest, open/fair/just treatment, medium-to-long-term investment (no speculation), and no exclusion or restriction of competition.

Who qualifies, and how

A foreign investor is a foreign natural person, enterprise or other organisation. To qualify, the investor must be lawfully established and operating, financially sound, creditworthy, with mature management experience, sound governance and internal controls; a foreign natural person must have corresponding risk-identification and risk-bearing capacity. Asset thresholds were eased in 2024: a non-controlling investor needs owned tangible assets of no less than USD 50 million or managed tangible assets of no less than USD 3 billion; a controlling investor needs USD 100 million owned or USD 500 million managed. The investor must not have suffered criminal punishment or a major regulatory penalty at home or abroad in the prior three years.

Crucially, the 2024 revision allows foreign natural persons to make strategic investment (previously excluded). It also permits cross-border share swaps: where the investor uses equity in an overseas company, or its own newly issued shares, as consideration, the overseas company must be lawfully established in a jurisdiction with a sound company-law system and its management must not have had a major regulatory penalty in three years; for agreement-transfer structures, that overseas company must itself be listed.

Three methods and the relaxed thresholds

The three permitted methods each carry a tailored path:

  • Directed new issue — the foreign investor subscribes new A-shares as a pre-determined or competitively determined issuer. The 2024 revision eliminates the prior 10% minimum holding requirement for this method.
  • Agreement transfer — the acquired stake must be no less than 5% of issued shares (cut from 10%).
  • Tender offer — the预定的 acquired stake must be no less than 5% (cut from 10%).

The lock-up was cut from no less than three years to no less than twelve months (longer if the Securities Law, the Acquisition Management Measures or the Securities Issuance Registration Measures require). Shares acquired via strategic investment may not be transferred within 12 months; transfers before expiry are permitted only for death, legal-person termination or court enforcement, subject to securities rules.

These changes directly lower the cost and raise the flexibility of a foreign strategic position — a 5% agreement-transfer stake with a one-year lock is a fundamentally different proposition from the old 10%/three-year regime.

Information reporting, not approval

Post-Foreign-Investment-Law, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval. The investor and the listed company file foreign-investment information after completion (and after each shareholding change exceeding 5% or a change in foreign control/relative-control status). Securities-market disclosure and other obligations under the Securities Law and CSRC/ exchange rules apply.

Intermediaries (financial advisers, sponsors or law firms registered in China) must conduct due diligence and issue opinions on compliance — notably whether the investment affects national security, touches the negative list, and meets the qualification conditions. If the opinion finds non-compliance, the securities registration and clearing institution will not process the relevant procedures. This makes intermediary selection and a clean due-diligence file decisive to a successful closing.

Negative list and security interfaces

Two hard limits bind. First, the negative list: a foreign investor may not strategically invest in a listed company in a sector the negative list prohibits; where the list restricts a sector, the investment must satisfy the list’s equity and senior-management conditions. Second, security review: if the investment affects or may affect national security, the *Foreign Investment Security Review Measures* apply (see the dedicated article in this series). Third, merger control: if the strategic investment constitutes a concentration reaching the State Council thresholds, SAMR notification is required before implementation.

The 2024 revision also clarifies carve-outs: QFII/RQFII investments, Stock Connect (沪深港通) investments, shares obtained when a foreign-invested joint-stock company lists on A-shares, and certain foreign-natural-person secondary-market or incentive purchases are outside the Measures but remain subject to other rules. A foreign investor’s aggregate holdings through multiple channels (including QFII/RQFII and Connect) must still respect the sector limits and control caps.

What to do next

  • Confirm the target’s sector against the negative list before structuring — prohibited sectors are out, restricted sectors need list-compliant conditions.
  • Choose the method by intent: directed issue (no min ratio, flexible), agreement transfer or tender offer (≥5%, one-year lock).
  • Prepare the asset-evidence package (USD 50m/USD 3bn, or USD 100m/USD 500m if controlling) and the three-year clean-record proof.
  • Engage a China-registered intermediary early for the compliance opinion; non-compliant opinions block registration.
  • Route the filing through information reporting, not commerce approval, and respect disclosure duties.
  • Screen security review and merger control in parallel; they can override an otherwise clean strategic investment.

Post-investment obligations and the reporting cadence

After closing, the obligations continue. The investor and the listed company must file foreign-investment information upon completion, and again each time the foreign shareholding changes by more than 5% or the foreign control / relative-control status changes. Securities-law disclosure duties (change-of-interest reports, tender-offer documents, voting-right disclosures) run in parallel. The 12-month lock-up bars transfer except for death, legal-person termination or court enforcement; breaches can draw warnings, fines or a prohibition on exercising voting or disposing shares until cured.

Aggregation with QFII and Connect holdings

A subtle trap is aggregation. The Measures carve out QFII/RQFII and Stock Connect investments, but the intermediary’s due-diligence opinion must state the investor’s and its concert parties’ total holdings across all channels — including those carve-outs — to confirm the sector limits and control caps are respected. A foreign investor that holds 4% via QFII and seeks a 5% strategic agreement-transfer stake therefore approaches, and must plan around, the relevant sector ceiling and any control test. Modelling the combined position before signing avoids a last-minute structure change.

A short worked example

A foreign investment fund (not a natural person) wishes a 5% strategic stake in an A-share manufacturer via agreement transfer, with no board control. It must evidence USD 50m owned or USD 3bn managed, a clean three-year record, and engage a China-registered intermediary for the compliance opinion. Post-closing, it files investment information and respects the 12-month lock-up. Because it holds no board seat and under 50%, “actual control” is unlikely — but if the manufacturer is in a negative-list restricted sector, the investment must still meet the list’s equity/senior-management conditions, and the 5% stake plus any QFII holding must be aggregated for the sector ceiling. The structure is lawful and light, exactly the 2024 revision’s intent.


外国投资者对上市公司战略投资(2024规则2026年适用)

管辖上市公司入股的规则

外国投资者对中国A股上市公司进行战略入股,主管文件为修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》。该办法于2024年8月15日经商务部第13次部务会议审议通过,并经证监会、国资委、税务总局、市场监管总局、外汇局同意,2024年11月1日以六部门2024年第3号令公布,2024年12月2日施行,同时废止2005年版。2026年它是现行框架,一切外国投资者对上市公司的战略投资均经此办理。

此处”战略投资”指外国投资者通过上市公司定向发行新股、协议转让、要约收购或其他法定方式,取得并中长期持有A股股份。法定原则明确:遵守法律,不危害国家安全与社会公共利益,公开、公平、公正,中长期投资(不得炒作),不妨碍公平竞争、不排除限制竞争。

谁合格、如何投资

外国投资者指外国的自然人、企业或其他组织。合格须依法设立经营、财务稳健、资信良好、具成熟管理经验、治理与内控健全;外国自然人须具备相应风险识别与承担能力。资产门槛在2024年放宽:非控股股东实有资产总额不低于5000万美元或管理实有资产总额不低于3亿美元;控股股东实有资产总额不低于1亿美元或管理不低于5亿美元。近3年未受境内外刑事处罚或监管重大处罚。

关键的是,2024修订允许外国自然人战略投资(此前排除)。亦允许跨境换股:投资者以持有境外公司股权或以其增发股份作为支付手段的,境外公司须依法设立、注册地具完善公司法律制度、管理层近3年未受重大处罚;协议转让方式下该境外公司须为上市公司。

三种方式与放宽门槛

三种允许方式各有路径:

  • 定向发行——外国投资者作为董事会预先确定或竞价确定的发行对象认购新股。2024修订取消此方式原10%最低持股要求。
  • 协议转让——取得股份比例不得低于已发行股份5%(由10%降至5%)。
  • 要约收购——预定收购比例不得低于已发行股份5%(由10%降至5%)。

锁定期由不低于3年降至不低于12个月(若《证券法》《收购管理办法》《证券发行注册管理办法》有更长要求从其规定)。战略投资取得A股12个月内不得转让;期满前仅因死亡、法人终止或司法扣划等方可转让,并须遵守证券规则。

这些变化直接降低了外国战略持仓的成本、提升了灵活性——5%协议转让加一年锁定期,与旧制10%/3年全然不同。

信息报告而非审批

《外商投资法》后,战略投资不再需商务审批。投资者与上市公司在完成后(及每次持股变动超5%或外资控股/相对控股地位变化后)报送外商投资信息。证券法及证监会、交易所规则下的信息披露等义务适用。

中介机构(中国注册的财务顾问、保荐机构或律所)须尽职调查并就合规性出具意见——尤其是否影响国家安全、是否触及负面清单、是否符合资格条件。若意见认定不合规,证券登记结算机构不予办理相关手续。这使得中介机构选择与干净的尽调档案成为成功交割的关键。

负面清单与安全审查接口

两道硬约束。其一,负面清单:外国投资者不得对负面清单禁止领域上市公司战略投资;限制领域须满足清单股权与高管条件。其二,安全审查:影响或可能影响国家安全的,适用《外商投资安全审查办法》(见本系列专文)。其三,经营者集中:若战略投资构成达国务院门槛的集中,须在实施前通知SAMR。

2024修订亦明确排除情形:QFII/RQFII投资、沪深港通投资、外商投资股份公司A股上市取得股份、以及符合证监会规定的外国自然人二级市场或股权激励取得,不在本办法范围但仍受其他规则约束。外国投资者经多通道(含QFII/RQFII与互联互通)的合计持股仍须遵守行业限制与控制上限。

下一步

  • 架构设计前将目标行业对照负面清单——禁止领域排除,限制领域须满足清单条件。
  • 按意图选方式:定向发行(无最低比例、灵活)、协议转让或要约收购(≥5%、一年锁定期)。
  • 准备资产证明包(5000万/3亿,或控股1亿/5亿)及三年无处罚记录。
  • 尽早聘请中国注册中介机构出具合规意见;不合规意见将阻断登记。
  • 经信息报告而非商务审批路径申报,并遵守披露义务。
  • 并行筛查安全审查与经营者集中,二者可推翻原本干净的战略投资。

投资后义务与申报节奏

交割后义务仍在继续。投资者与上市公司须于完成后报送外商投资信息,并在外国持股变动超5%或外资控股/相对控股地位变化后再次报送。证券法下的披露义务(权益变动报告、要约收购文件、表决权披露)并行适用。12个月锁定期禁止转让,仅死亡、法人终止或司法扣划除外;违约可招致警告、罚款或暂停表决权与处分权直至纠正。

与QFII及互联互通持股的合并计算

一个隐蔽陷阱是合并计算。《办法》排除QFII/RQFII与沪深港通投资,但中介尽调意见须列示投资者及其一致行动人经所有通道(含上述排除)的合计持股,以确认遵守行业限制与控制上限。故通过QFII持有4%、又拟以协议转让战略持股5%的外国投资者,已逼近且须筹划相关行业上限与控制测试。签约前建模合并持仓,可避免临门更改结构。

简例演示

某外国投资基金(非自然人)拟以协议转让取得某A股制造商5%战略股,不谋董事会控制。它须证明实有5000万美元或管理3亿美元、三年无处罚记录,并聘请中国注册中介出具合规意见。交割后报送投资信息、遵守12个月锁定期。因其无董事席位且低于50%,”实际控制”大概率不触发——但若制造商处负面清单限制领域,投资仍须满足清单股权/高管条件,且5%持股与任何QFII持仓须合并计算行业上限。该结构合法且轻量,正是2024修订的用意。

Sources

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review

  • The notifiable thresholds (Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024) are: worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China; sub-threshold deals with competition concerns can still be called in.
    申报门槛(第773号令,2024年1月26日施行):全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元,或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元;未达门槛但有竞争关切的交易仍可被要求申报。
  • In 2025 SAMR concluded 706 concentrations (+9.8%); in May 2025–April 2026 it cleared 232 involving private firms with total value RMB 353.4bn, averaging 26.72 days to conclude (15.64 days acceptance / 18.9 days conclusion for simplified cases).
    2025年SAMR审结706件(+9.8%);2025年5月至2026年4月审结涉民营企业232起、总额3534亿元,平均审结26.72天(简易案件受理15.64天/审结18.9天)。
  • Delegated review became formal in August 2025 and was refined in March 2026; provincial bureaus have cleared deals in as little as 11 days (e.g., Qingyuan Desheng & Shengli Steel).
    委托审查于2025年8月转为正式、2026年3月完善;省级局最快11天审结(如清远德晟与圣力钢制品案)。
  • SAMR issued the Concentration Filing Norms and Non-Horizontal Review Guidelines, plus a penalty-discretion baseline, giving parties a transparent, predictable filing environment.
    SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》及处罚裁量基准,为企业提供透明可预期的申报环境。
  • A June 2026 special enforcement campaign (June–December) will explore “green channels” for specific industries and strengthen compliance reminders and local guidance windows.
    2026年6月启动的专项行动(6–12月)将探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”,并强化申报提醒与地方指导窗口。
  • Gun-jumping is policed: in 2025 SAMR publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95m in fines, and below-threshold deals with competition risk can be called in.
    “抢跑”受监管:2025年SAMR公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元,且有竞争风险的未达门槛交易可被要求申报。

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review | 2026年经营者集中申报:门槛、简易案件与委托审查

When a filing is required

Under the *Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings* (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified to SAMR before implementation where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures use sector-specific calculation rules. A concentration is notifiable even where it does not meet these thresholds if there is evidence it may eliminate or restrict competition — SAMR may require a filing.

The 2024 revision raised the earlier levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30%, lowering transaction costs for smaller mergers while keeping scrutiny on competitively risky ones.

Throughput and the simplified track

SAMR’s 2025 performance was substantial: 706 concentrations lawfully concluded, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. The agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” in automotive, photovoltaic and lithium-battery fields to support restructuring.

The simplified track targets a “double 20-day” standard (acceptance and review). In the May 2025–April 2026 window, SAMR concluded 232 concentrations involving private firms, with total transaction value of RMB 353.4 billion; average acceptance time was 17.13 days and average conclusion time 26.72 days. For simplified cases, average acceptance was just 15.64 days and average conclusion 18.9 days — better than the internal “double 20” requirement. For a foreign acquirer, this means a clean, below-concern deal can clear in roughly three to four weeks.

Delegated review: closer to the market

A notable 2025–2026 reform is delegated review. In August 2025, SAMR moved the pilot delegated review with selected provincial market-regulation bureaus to formal delegated review; in March 2026 it issued an announcement further refining the system. Delegated bureaus use their proximity to bring faster, more localised service. Examples: the Chongqing bureau concluded the Zhejiang Jirun Automobile / Maichi Zhixing joint-venture case in 18 days from filing to clearance; the Guangdong bureau handled the Qingyuan Desheng Investment / Shengli Steel new joint-venture case in just 11 days of review. For foreign investors with deals centred in a delegated province, this can materially shorten the clock.

Transparency and compliance tooling

To make filing predictable, SAMR has issued the *Concentration Filing Norms* and the *Non-Horizontal Concentration Review Guidelines*, opened the operator-concentration antitrust business system with a 6,000-plus-case historical library for real-time query, and released a penalty-discretion baseline (trial) with a self-calculation tool so parties “see and understand at a glance”. It also warned of and acted on “gun-jumping”: in 2025 it publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95 million in fines, and in key fields (semiconductors, shipping, minerals) conditionally approved 5 and prohibited 1 to protect supply-chain competition.

The June 2026 efficacy campaign

On 30 June 2026, SAMR launched a special enforcement campaign (June–December) to raise operator-concentration antitrust regulatory efficacy. Its three pillars matter to deal-makers:

  1. Regulatory capacity — explore “green channels” for specific industries, strengthen complex-issue research, and support delegated provincial bureaus with expert backing.
  2. Full-chain efficacy — maintain the simplified “double 20-day” standard, optimise the business system, publish typical cases, and handle major-merger reviews with close listening to relevant parties.
  3. Compliance guidance — improve filing reminders, issue policy guidance, run targeted training for firms above the threshold, and support local “filing guidance windows”.

For foreign acquirers, the practical signals are: faster, more transparent review; a realistic prospect of industry-specific fast lanes; and a clear expectation that below-threshold but competition-risky deals will still be scrutinised.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early; if close to the line, assume a filing and budget the timeline.
  • Prefer the simplified track where the deal is clean (no overlap or minor overlap); target the ~3–4 week clearance.
  • Check whether your province runs delegated review; if so, file there to use local proximity.
  • Use SAMR’s case library and filing norms to pre-assess overlap and prepare a tight submission.
  • Do not close before clearance — gun-jumping draws public penalties even for foreign parties.
  • Watch for industry “green channels” announced in the 2026 campaign when planning sensitive-sector deals.

What to submit and how long it really takes

A filing package centres on the notification form, the parties’ audited turnover, the transaction documents (SPA, shareholder agreements), and a competitive-effects analysis where overlap exists. SAMR’s published norms and the 6,000-plus case library let counsel benchmark whether a deal is “simple” (little or no horizontal overlap, no vertical foreclosure) and thus eligible for the simplified track. For a clean deal, the realistic clock is acceptance (~15 days) plus review (~20 days) — about a month — though parties should still build buffer for information requests.

Sector sensitivity: semiconductors, minerals, pharma

2025–2026 enforcement shows where scrutiny concentrates. SAMR prohibited one deal and conditionally approved five in semiconductors, shipping and minerals, protecting supply-chain competition. In the May 2025–April 2026 window, notable conditional approvals included the Synopsys–Ansys (新思科技收购安似科技) and Bunge–Viterra (邦吉收购蔚特) cases, and the Chilean copper / Chilean chemical joint venture (lithium carbonate supply) — conditioned to secure stable, reasonably priced supply for downstream Chinese firms, including private new-energy buyers. The lesson: deals touching critical inputs or semiconductor capacity should expect a substantive review even if turnover is modest.

Avoiding gun-jumping penalties

“Gun-jumping” — closing or integrating before clearance — is actively policed, with RMB 6.95m in fines across four cases in 2025 and public naming. Foreign parties are not exempt. The safe pattern is to sign subject to a condition precedent (merger-control clearance), keep the businesses separate until approval, and resist operational integration (shared pricing, combined sales forces, unified procurement) during the pending period. Where a deal is below the thresholds but competitively sensitive, assume SAMR may call it in and pre-empt by consulting the agency.

Filing readiness: a pre-filing checklist

To avoid avoidable delay, assemble the package before signing. Confirm the correct turnover figures from audited statements for the relevant fiscal year; map the overlap matrix (horizontal shares, vertical relationships) across the parties’ product markets; prepare the transaction documents and any remedy proposals; and decide whether to request the simplified track. Where a party is foreign, localise the turnover evidence and appoint a China-registered agent if needed. Engagement with SAMR or the delegated provincial bureau ahead of formal filing — using the published norms and case library — often surfaces a fatal overlap early, when it is still cheap to restructure rather than after a prohibition.

Looking ahead from the 2026 campaign

The June–December 2026 efficacy campaign signals a steady-state direction: faster, more transparent, and more sector-aware review. The exploration of industry “green channels” means that, later in 2026, certain strategic sectors may get a dedicated fast lane, while the emphasis on filing reminders and local guidance windows lowers the cost of getting it right the first time. For foreign acquirers, the trend is favourable — provided the deal is genuinely clean and the submission is well-prepared. The agency’s message is consistent: support lawful consolidation, police the rest.


2026年经营者集中申报:门槛、简易案件与委托审查

何时需要申报

依《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行),上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,须在实施前通知SAMR。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。即使未达上述门槛,若有证据证明可能排除、限制竞争,SAMR亦可要求申报。

2024年修订将原有标准(100亿/20亿/4亿)提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元,SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%,在降低中小并购交易成本的同时,保留对具竞争风险交易的审查。

审结量与简易案件

SAMR 2025年表现突出:依法审结经营者集中706件,同比增长9.8%,83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。该局在汽车、光伏、锂电池领域”快审不降质”以支持重组。

简易案件目标为”双20天”(受理与审查)。2025年5月至2026年4月,SAMR审结涉民营企业经营者集中232起,交易总额3534亿元;平均受理17.13天、平均审结26.72天。简易案件平均受理仅15.64天、审结18.9天,优于内部”双20″要求。对外国收购方而言,这意味着干净、无竞争关切的交易约三至四周即可通过。

委托审查:更贴近市场

2025–2026年一项显著改革是委托审查。2025年8月,SAMR将试点委托审查转为正式委托;2026年3月发布公告进一步完善制度。受委托省级局发挥贴近优势,提供更快速、本地化服务。例证:重庆市局审结浙江吉润汽车与迈驰智行新设合营企业案,自申报到审结仅18天;广东省局审查清远德晟投资与圣力钢制品新设合营企业案,审查阶段仅11天。对交易集中于受委托省份的外国投资者,此举可显著缩短周期。

透明度与合规工具

为提升申报可预期性,SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》,开放经营者集中反垄断业务系统(6000余件历史案例库实时查询),并发布处罚裁量基准(试行)及”行政处罚自算器”,使企业”一看就懂、一算便知”。该局亦警示并查处”抢跑”:2025年公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元;在半导体、航运、矿产等关键领域附条件批准5件、禁止1件,以保障产业链竞争。

2026年6月效能专项行动

2026年6月30日,SAMR启动经营者集中反垄断监管效能提升专项行动(6–12月)。其三大支柱对交易方重要:

  1. 监管基础能力——探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”,加强复杂问题研究,以外部专家支撑受委托省级局。
  2. 全链条质效——认真执行简易案件”双20天”,优化业务系统,做好典型案例公开,充分听取相关方对重大并购审查意见。
  3. 合规指导——完善申报提醒,发布政策指引,对达申报标准企业开展专项培训,支持有条件地区建立申报指导窗口。

对外国收购方的实务信号是:审查更快更透明;特定行业快车道可期待;未达门槛但有竞争风险的交易仍将被审查。

下一步

  • 尽早做门槛测试;若接近临界,按需申报并排期。
  • 交易干净(无重叠或轻微重叠)时优先走简易案件,目标约3–4周通过。
  • 查核所在省份是否实行委托审查;若是,就地申报以利用就近优势。
  • 利用SAMR案例库与申报规范预先评估重叠并准备精炼材料。
  • 未获核准前不得交割——”抢跑”即便对外方也招致公开处罚。
  • 规划敏感行业交易时,关注2026专项行动中宣布的行业”绿色通道”。

应提交什么及真实耗时

申报材料以申报表、各方经审计营业额、交易文件(SPA、股东协议)及存在重叠时的竞争影响分析为核心。SAMR已发布的规范与6000余件案例库,使律师可基准判断交易是否”简单”(横向重叠小或无、无纵向封锁)从而适用简易案件。对干净交易,现实时钟为受理(约15天)加审查(约20天)——约一个月,但仍应为信息补充请求留出缓冲。

行业敏感性:半导体、矿产、医药

2025–2026年执法显示审查集中于何处。SAMR在半导体、航运、矿产领域禁止1件、附条件批准5件,以保障产业链竞争。2025年5月至2026年4月,显著附条件批准包括新思科技收购安似科技、邦吉收购蔚特,以及智利铜业与智利化工新设合营企业案(碳酸锂供应)——附条件以确保下游中国企业(含民营新能源买方)获得稳定、合理价格的供应。启示:触及关键投入或半导体产能的交易,即便营业额不大,也应预期实质审查。

避免”抢跑”处罚

“抢跑”——核准前交割或整合——被积极监管,2025年4起案件罚款695万元并公开点名。外国当事方不豁免。安全做法是签署以经营者集中核准为先决条件的协议,核准前保持业务分离,并在待审期抵制运营整合(共享定价、合并销售队伍、统一采购)。对未达门槛但有竞争敏感性的交易,应预期SAMR可能要求申报,并主动与当局沟通以防患未然。

申报准备:申报前清单

为避免无谓延误,应在签约前备齐材料。依经审计报表确认相关会计年度的正确营业额;绘制各方产品市场的重叠矩阵(横向份额、纵向关系);准备交易文件与可能的救济方案;并决定是否申请简易案件。当事人一方为外国的,应本土化营业额证据,必要时委任中国注册代理人。在正式申报前借助已发布规范与案例库与SAMR或受委托省级局沟通,往往能尽早暴露致命重叠——此时重构成本低,远胜禁止之后。

自2026专项行动看未来

2026年6–12月效能专项行动指向一个稳态方向:更快、更透明、更具行业意识。对特定行业”绿色通道”的探索意味着,2026年下半年某些战略行业或获专属快车道;而强调申报提醒与地方指导窗口,降低了”一次做对”的成本。对外国收购方,趋势有利——前提是交易确属干净、申报准备充分。该局信号一致:支持合法整合,监管其余。

Sources

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines

  • Since the Foreign Investment Law (2020), acquiring a domestic firm is no longer a commerce-approval event; it runs through the negative list, information reporting, plus merger control and security review where triggered.
    自《外商投资法》(2020)以来,并购境内企业不再是商务审批事件——经负面清单、信息报告办理,并在触发时通过经营者集中与安全审查。
  • Merger-control thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024): worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China.
    经营者集中门槛(国务院第773号令,2024年1月26日施行):全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元,或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元。
  • SAMR cleared 706 concentrations in 2025 (up 9.8%); 83% closed at the 30-day preliminary stage, with a “double 20-day” simplified track for straightforward cases.
    市场监管总局2025年审结经营者集中706件(增长9.8%);83%在30天初步审查阶段结案,简易案件推行”双20天”审查目标。
  • Security review is mandatory where the target is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor obtains actual control — and its control test is broader than merger control’s.
    当目标位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时须通过安全审查——其控制标准宽于经营者集中标准。
  • The 2024 strategic-investment rules (six-agency Order No. 3, effective 2 Dec 2024) ease listed-company investment: foreign natural persons allowed, lower asset thresholds, tender offers added, lock-up cut to 12 months, no commerce approval.
    2024年战投规则(六部门第3号令,2024年12月2日施行)放宽上市公司投资:允许外国自然人、降低资产门槛、新增要约收购、锁定期降至12个月、无需商务审批。
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.
    将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进;未获所有强制核准前不得交割,并在条款书阶段启动两项审查。

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines | 2026年外资并购中国:审查地图与时间线

The post-2020 deal frame

Acquiring a Chinese company as a foreign investor now sits inside the Foreign Investment Law regime rather than the older approval-based M&A rules. The behavioural shift is decisive: the deal is no longer a commerce-department approval event by itself. Instead, the investor incorporates or transfers under company law, clears any negative-list condition, files foreign-investment information, and — where triggered — separately clears merger control (antitrust) with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and national security review with the NDRC-led mechanism. Understanding which gates actually apply, and running them in parallel, is the core of a smooth closing.

Gate 1 — the negative list and information reporting

The 2024 national negative list for foreign investment contains 29 items and took effect on 1 November 2024. If the target’s sector is on the list, the acquisition must satisfy its conditions (equity caps, Chinese-control requirements, etc.); if off the list, the deal is treated on equal terms with domestic M&A. Cross-border share swaps are permitted but conditioned — generally the foreign equity used as consideration should be in a listed overseas company, though the 2024 strategic-investment rules relaxed this for certain directed-issue and tender-offer structures. Post-deal, the foreign investor files investment information rather than seeking approval.

Gate 2 — merger control (antitrust) filing

A foreign acquirer must notify SAMR before implementing a concentration that meets the thresholds. Under the revised State Council regulation (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures are calculated with sector-specific rules.

The 2024 revision raised the prior levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30% and reduce transaction costs. A deal must not close before clearance; “gun-jumping” draws penalties. SAMR runs a simplified track with a “double 20-day” target (acceptance and review) for straightforward cases, and has moved pilot delegated review with provincial bureaus to formal delegated review (trial delegation转为正式委托 in August 2025, refined by an announcement in March 2026).

The throughput is real: in 2025 SAMR lawfully concluded 706 concentration cases, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. In key fields such as automotive, photovoltaics and lithium batteries, the agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” to support restructuring.

Gate 3 — national security review

Where the acquisition is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor acquires actual control, security review is required before implementation. The *Measures for Foreign Investment Security Review* (NDRC and MOFCOM, issued 19 December 2020, effective 18 January 2021) define the covered scope: national defence and surrounding areas; and important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important culture, important IT and internet products/services, important financial services, key technologies and other important areas — where the investor obtains actual control.

The “actual control” test is broader than merger control’s: it includes holding 50%+ equity; holding under 50% but with voting rights that materially influence board/shareholder resolutions; or other circumstances where the investor materially influences business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. Procedure runs preliminary (15 working days to decide whether to review) → general review (30 working days) → special review (60 working days, extendable); the decision is final and may prohibit, condition or clear the deal. Because it can override a cleared merger filing, security review is the gate an acquirer must screen first — and, as the 2026 Meta–Manus prohibition showed, it is actively enforced (see the dedicated article in this series).

Listed-company strategic investment (2024 update)

Where the target is a listed company, the foreign investor must also comply with the revised *Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors* (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; published 1 November 2024, effective 2 December 2024). The revision materially lowers the bar: foreign natural persons are allowed; asset thresholds are eased (non-controlling investors need only USD 50m owned or USD 3bn managed; controlling investors need USD 100m owned or USD 500m managed); cross-border share swaps are eased for directed issues and tender offers; the strategic-investment methods add tender offers; the holding-ratio requirement for agreement-transfer/tender-offer is cut from 10% to 5% (and eliminated for directed issues); and the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (or longer if other rules require). Importantly, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval — it is handled through information reporting and securities-market rules, with security-review and merger-control interfaces preserved.

A realistic timeline

A straightforward, unrestricted, below-threshold acquisition can complete in roughly 2–4 months: due diligence and SPA, the foreign-investment information report and company-law filings, and any sector licence. Add merger control where thresholds are met — the simplified track targets about 20 days for review plus filing time; the standard track can run longer. Add security review where scope and control are present — the 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions) can extend well beyond a year for sensitive cases. The three workstreams should run in parallel, but closing is gated by the slowest mandatory clearance.

Do not sequence the clearances serially. Begin merger-control and security-review analyses at term-sheet stage, because the documents and substantive analysis overlap with diligence; locking the structure before the reviews are scoped risks a late redesign. Build the long-stop date around the special-review maximum, not the preliminary-review minimum.

What to do next

  • Screen the target sector against the 2024 negative list; if restricted, confirm the equity/control condition can be met before signing.
  • Run a merger-control threshold test early (worldwide >RMB 12bn & two parties >RMB 800m China; or China aggregate >RMB 4bn & two parties >RMB 800m China).
  • Test security-review scope and “actual control” (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
  • For listed targets, apply the 2024 strategic-investment rules and route through information reporting, not commerce approval.
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand.
  • Set the long-stop around the special-review maximum, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.

Common misreads

Three mistakes recur. First, sequencing the clearances serially (merger control, then security review, then licence) when they should run in parallel — serial handling is the usual cause of a missed long-stop. Second, assuming that because a deal is below the merger-control thresholds no ex-ante review applies at all; security review can still be triggered by a covered sector and control, independent of size. Third, underestimating “actual control” for security review — a minority stake with veto rights can count — which leads teams to skip the screen and discover the gap late. Scoping both reviews at term-sheet stage is the single best defence.


2026年外资并购中国:审查地图与时间线

2020年后的交易框架

外国投资者收购中国公司现今置于《外商投资法》框架下,而非旧有的审批式并购规则。行为变化是决定性的:交易本身不再是商务部门审批事件。投资者依据公司法设立或转让,清除任何负面清单条件,报送外商投资信息,并在触发时分别通过市场监管总局(SAMR)的经营者集中(反垄断)审查与发改委牵头机制的国家安全审查。厘清究竟哪些关口适用并并行推进,是顺利交割的核心。

关口一——负面清单与信息报告

2024年全国外资负面清单含29条,于2024年11月1日施行。若目标行业在清单上,收购须满足其条件(股权上限、中方控股要求等);若不在清单上,则与境内并购平等对待。跨境换股允许但有条件——一般作为对价的外国股权应为境外上市公司股权,不过2024年战投规则对特定定向发行与要约收购结构有所放宽。交易后,外国投资者报送投资信息而非申请审批。

关口二——经营者集中(反垄断)申报

外国收购方须在实施达到门槛的集中前通知SAMR。依修订后的国务院规定(第773号令,2024年1月26日施行),上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元,须申报。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。

2024年修订将原有标准(100亿/20亿/4亿)提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元,SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%、降低交易成本。交易不得在未获核准前实施;”抢跑”受罚。SAMR对简易案件设”双20天”目标(受理与审查各20天),并将试点委托地方审查转为正式委托(2025年8月试点转正式,2026年3月公告完善)。

成效实在:2025年SAMR依法审结经营者集中706件,同比增长9.8%,83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。在汽车、光伏、锂电池等重点领域,该局”快审不降质”以支持重组。

关口三——国家安全审查

当收购位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时,须在实施前通过安全审查。《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委、商务部,2020年12月19日发布,2021年1月18日施行)界定范围:国防及周围地区;以及重要农产品、能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域——且投资者取得实际控制权。

“实际控制”标准宽于经营者集中:包括持股50%以上;持股不足50%但表决权对董事会/股东会决议产生重大影响;或其他对经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。程序为初步(15个工作日决定是否审查)→一般审查(30个工作日)→特别审查(60个工作日,可延长);决定具终局性,可禁止、附条件批准或准予。因其可推翻已通过的经营者集中,安全审查是收购方须首先筛查的关口——且如2026年Meta–Manus禁止案所示,它正被积极执行(详见本系列专文)。

上市公司战略投资(2024更新)

若目标为上市公司,外国投资者还须遵守修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》(六部门,第3号令,2024;2024年11月1日公布,2024年12月2日施行)。修订大幅降低门槛:允许外国自然人;资产门槛放宽(非控股者实有5000万美元或管理3亿美元;控股者1亿美元或管理5亿美元);跨境换股对定向发行与要约收购放宽;战略投资方式新增要约收购;协议转让/要约收购持股比由10%降至5%(定向发行取消比例要求);锁定期由3年降至12个月(其他规则有更长要求从其规定)。重要的是,战略投资不再需商务审批——经信息报告与证券市场规则办理,安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。

现实时间线

一项简单、无限制、未达门槛的收购约2–4个月可完成:尽调与SPA、外商投资信息报告与公司法律文件、以及行业许可。若达门槛则叠加经营者集中——简易案件审查约20天加申报时间;标准案件更久。若涉范围且取得控制权则叠加安全审查——15+30+60工作日路径(含延期)对敏感案件可远超一年。三项工作流应并行,但交割受最慢的强制核准制约。

切勿串行处理核准。应在条款书阶段即启动经营者集中与安全审查分析,因其文件与实质分析与尽调重叠;在审查范围确定前锁定结构,可能导致后期重构。长停日应围绕特别审查上限设定,而非初步审查下限。

下一步

  • 将目标行业对照2024年负面清单筛查;若受限,签约前确认股权/控制条件可满足。
  • 尽早做经营者集中门槛测试(全球超120亿且两方中国各超8亿;或中国合计超40亿且两方中国各超8亿)。
  • 测试安全审查范围与”实际控制”(50%以上股权、重大表决影响、或对决策/人事/财务/技术重大影响)。
  • 对上市公司目标,适用2024年战投规则,经信息报告而非商务审批路径。
  • 经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行;未获所有强制核准前不得交割。
  • 长停日围绕特别审查上限设定,并在条款书阶段即启动两项审查。

常见误读

三类错误反复出现。其一,将核准串行处理(先经营者集中、再安全审查、再许可),而它们本应并行——串行是错过长停日的常见原因。其二,以为交易未达经营者集中门槛便无需任何事前审查;安全审查可因受涵盖领域与控制独立触发,与规模无关。其三,低估安全审查的”实际控制”——具否决权的少数股权亦可能计入——导致团队跳过筛查、后期才发现缺口。在条款书阶段即并行界定两项审查,是最佳防御。

Sources

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

  • From 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s refined delegated-review system adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original provincial bureaus and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,市场监管总局完善后的经营者集中委托审查制度在原 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个受委托部门。
  • Delegated simple-case bureaus now total eight, and the delegated average acceptance and completion times have both stayed within roughly 20 days, materially faster than national review.
    简易案件受委托省级部门增至 8 个;受委托部门平均受理与审结时间均在约 20 天内,明显快于全国审查。
  • Zhejiang handles simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi from August 2026, giving regional companies near-by filing and review.
    2026 年 8 月起,浙江受委托承担浙江、福建、江西三省区域内经营者集中简易案件审查,区域企业可就近申报办理。
  • The SAMR also published six typical concentration cases on 21 August 2026, showing how review supports restructuring in platforms, PV, batteries, auto parts and coal logistics while curbing “involutionary” competition.
    市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、锂电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。
  • For foreign-invested groups, the changes affect where and how quickly qualifying deals are cleared, but the mandatory prior-filing threshold and substantive standards are unchanged.
    对外资集团而言,变化影响合格交易的审查地点与速度;强制事先申报门槛与实体标准不变。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026) | 经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)

Why this matters now

On 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s Announcement on Further Improving the Delegated Review System for Concentrations of Undertakings took effect. The system, which began as a pilot in August 2022 and was formalised in July 2025, now adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original delegated provincial bureaus — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi — and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases. A week later, on 21 August 2026, the SAMR published six typical cases of concentration review used to support restructuring in platform, solar-PV, battery, auto-parts and coal-logistics sectors while curbing “involutionary” competition. For foreign-invested enterprises and their advisers, the combination of wider delegation, faster regional clearance and clearer enforcement signals changes the practical geography of merger control in China.

What the expanded delegation changes

The delegated-review system is a division of work within China’s unitary concentration-review regime: the SAMR remains the reviewing authority, receives filings through the central business system, and delegates qualifying cases to provincial bureaus, which conduct the review and report back. The August 2026 changes operate on three axes. First, scope: in addition to simple cases, certain non-simple cases may now be delegated to the five original bureaus. The delegation criteria for non-simple cases include a combined market share of 15–25% in the same relevant market; or 25–35% shares in upstream and downstream markets respectively; or 25–35% shares in each relevant market for parties without horizontal or vertical relationships. Second, coverage: Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan join as delegated bureaus for simple cases, bringing the total to eight, each responsible for a defined regional territory. Zhejiang, for example, reviews simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi. Third, procedure: the SAMR has upgraded its concentration-review business system, revised the working handbook for provincial bureaus, and retained the rule that non-simple delegated cases must still have documents such as clearance decisions issued under the SAMR’s authority, while decisions with conditions or prohibitions are issued centrally by the SAMR.

Operationally, the delegated bureaus report average acceptance and completion times of about 16 and 18 days respectively — both within roughly 20 days — under the “double twenty” working standard, and simple cases account for about 90% of all concentration filings. For companies in the covered regions, the practical effect is faster, closer review: the Zhejiang bureau published a consultation phone line and a pre-filing consultation mechanism, and the entire process runs online.

The typical cases and enforcement signals

The six typical cases published on 21 August 2026 illustrate how the SAMR balances support for restructuring with restraint on harmful competition. Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five restrictive conditions (May 2026) to protect competition in online-audio and online-music markets; TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy was cleared unconditionally to consolidate solar-PV capacity; Hubei Jingjiang’s acquisition of East Group was cleared to support transformation into an “AI + new energy” services provider; and joint-venture cases in battery separators, automotive air-suspension components and coal logistics were cleared to integrate regional capacity and reduce low-level duplication. For foreign-invested companies, the enforcement posture is double-sided: genuine restructuring that improves efficiency and quality is supported, but transactions that entrench dominance or enable coordinated “involutionary” behaviour will attract conditions or prohibition — and the delegated bureaus apply the same substantive standards as the SAMR.

Practical steps

  1. Check whether delegation affects your filing. Determine whether your transaction meets the simple-case thresholds and whether the relevant market or parties sit in a delegated bureau’s territory; if so, expect local filing and faster clearance.
  2. Use pre-filing consultation. The business system and delegated bureaus (for example Zhejiang’s published hotline) allow pre-filing discussion of whether a filing is needed and how to frame the transaction.
  3. Plan the timeline around the “double twenty” standard. For qualifying cases, acceptance and completion are each targeted within 20 days; align signing, closing and financing steps accordingly.
  4. Treat simple-case status carefully. Simple-case filing is faster but still requires full and accurate notification; mischaracterisation invites correction and delay.
  5. Watch the substantive lines. The typical cases show that restrictive conditions and prohibitions are live tools for platform and network effects; conduct a realistic competition assessment before filing.
  6. Maintain group-wide notification discipline. The delegation does not lower the mandatory filing thresholds — turnover-based thresholds remain — and failure to file before closing (“gun-jumping”) remains a serious violation.

Compliance notes

The delegated-review system is administrative division of work, not decentralisation of substantive standards. The SAMR still issues conditional-approval and prohibition decisions; delegated bureaus act within their mandates and under the SAMR’s supervision. For foreign investors, the important practical change is speed and location of review, plus a clearer picture of how the SAMR treats sector restructuring. Nothing in the August 2026 changes alters the prior-filing obligation, the notification thresholds, or the penalties for closing before approval. Keep the transaction diary, engage the business system early, and treat the six typical cases as a practical guide to how restructuring proposals will be framed and assessed.


经营者集中委托审查扩容:区域化并购审查与新典型案例(2026 年 8 月)/ Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 1 日,《市场监管总局关于进一步完善经营者集中委托审查制度的公告》正式施行。这一始于 2022 年 8 月试点、2025 年 7 月转正的制度,如今在原北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上,增加部分非简易案件的委托审查,并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个简易案件受委托部门。一周后,市场监管总局于 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例,展示审查如何在平台、光伏、电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。对外资企业及其顾问而言,委托扩容、区域快速审结与更清晰的执法信号,共同改变了中国经营者集中的实务版图。

扩容改变了什么

委托审查制度是中国单一集中的审查体制内的分工:市场监管总局是审查机关,通过全国经营者集中业务系统统一接收申报,将符合条件的案件转受委托省级部门办理,后者审查并报告,总局作出决定。2026 年 8 月的调整沿三条轴展开。其一,范围:除简易案件外,部分非简易案件现在可委托原 5 个省级部门审查。非简易案件委托标准包括:同一相关市场合计份额 15%–25%;上下游市场份额均 25%–35%;无横向纵向关系者在每个相关市场份额均 25%–35%。其二,覆盖面:辽宁、浙江、四川加入简易案件受委托名单,受委托部门增至 8 个,各负责相应区域。例如,浙江受理浙江、福建、江西三省的简易案件。其三,程序:总局升级经营者集中反垄断业务系统、修订省级审查工作手册;非简易案件委托仍以总局名义出具批准文书,附条件批准或禁止的由总局统一发布决定。

运营层面,受委托部门在”双二十”工作标准下,平均受理约 16 天、审结约 18 天,均不超过约 20 天;简易案件约占全部申报的九成。对覆盖区域内的企业,实际效果是更快、更近的审查:浙江省局公布咨询电话并实行申报前商谈机制,全流程线上办理。

典型案例与执法信号

2026 年 8 月 21 日公布的六起典型案例展示总局如何在支持重组与遏制有害竞争之间平衡。腾讯收购喜马拉雅股权案于 2026 年 5 月附加五项限制性条件批准,以保护在线音频、网络音乐市场竞争;TCL 中环收购一道新能源案无条件批准,以整合光伏产能;湖北荆江收购易事特案批准,支持转型”AI+新能源”综合服务商;电池隔膜、汽车空气悬架部件与煤炭物流的新设合营案均无条件批准,以整合区域产能、减少低水平重复。对外资企业,执法姿态是双面的:改善效率与质量的真实重组受到支持,但固化支配地位或促成协同性”内卷”的交易将面临条件或禁止——受委托部门适用与总局一致的实体标准。

操作步骤

  1. 核验委托是否影响申报。 判断交易是否满足简易案件门槛,以及相关市场或当事方是否位于受委托部门辖区;若是,将属地申报并更快审结。
  2. 利用申报前商谈。 业务系统与受委托部门(如浙江公布的咨询电话)支持申报前讨论是否需要申报及如何构架交易。
  3. 按”双二十”标准排期。 合格案件受理与审结各目标 20 天内;据此安排签约、交割与融资节点。
  4. 审慎对待简易地位。 简易申报更快,但仍需完整准确申报;错误定性将招致更正与延误。
  5. 关注实体红线。 典型案例显示,对平台与网络效应,限制性条件与禁止是活跃工具;申报前应作现实竞争评估。
  6. 保持集团申报纪律。 委托不降低强制申报门槛——营业额门槛不变——交割前未申报(抢跑)仍是严重违规。

合规提示

委托审查是行政分工,不是实体标准的分散化。总局仍统一作出附条件批准与禁止决定;受委托部门在其职责内、在总局监督下行事。对外资投资者,实际变化主要是审查速度与地点,以及对总局如何处理行业重组的更清晰图景。2026 年 8 月的调整不改变事先申报义务、申报门槛或未批先交的处罚。保留交易台账、尽早接入业务系统,并将六起典型案例视为理解重组方案如何被构架与评估的实务指南。

Sources

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026)

  • A concentration must be notified to SAMR before closing if it meets the turnover thresholds; failing to file or closing early triggers investigation and penalties.
    达到营业额标准的经营者集中,须在实施前事先向市场监管总局申报;未申报或获批前实施将面临调查与处罚。
  • Current thresholds (raised in the 2024 revision): global aggregate turnover > RMB 12bn, or China aggregate > RMB 4bn with at least two parties each > RMB 0.8bn in China.
    现行标准(2024 年修订提高):全球合计营业额 > 120 亿元,或中国境内合计 > 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内各 > 8 亿元。
  • The industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (effective 1 Oct 2025) consolidates prior guidance into one filing playbook — conditions, materials, workflow.
    市场监管行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)将既往零散指引整合为统一申报手册——申报条件、材料、流程。
  • From 1 August 2026, SAMR delegates part of non-simplified-case review to five provincial bureaus (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, Shaanxi), shortening timelines for non-problematic deals.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起,总局将部分非简易案件委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查,加速无竞争问题交易的落地。
  • Foreign-to-foreign deals can also be caught when they acquire control of, or decisive influence over, a China-business; the same thresholds and suspensory rule apply.
    外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,同样触发;适用相同标准与「停表」规则。
  • Practical tip: run a control-and-turnover test at term sheet; use SAMR’s pre-filing consultation and the online system to compress the clock.
    实操提示:在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额测试;善用总局商谈与在线系统压缩周期。

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026) | 中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

China’s merger-control regime is built on the *Anti-Monopoly Law* and the *State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings*. The core rule is suspensory: where a concentration reaches the notification thresholds, the parties must file with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and may not implement it before clearance. Implementing early — or not filing at all — exposes the parties to investigation and fines.

The thresholds were raised in the 2024 revision. A concentration must be notified if: (a) the aggregate global turnover of all parties in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion; or (b) the aggregate China turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion. SAMR is required to assess the thresholds against economic development and may adjust them.

To make filing predictable, SAMR issued the industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (released 26 September 2025, effective 1 October 2025). It is the first SAMR industry standard to set out concentration notification in a single, structured document, integrating four prior guidance papers (now repealed). It clarifies what constitutes a concentration (merger; acquisition of control via equity/assets; control or decisive influence via contract), the materials required (notification form, simplified-case requirements, appendices on control and turnover calculation), and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For foreign investors, this means a clearer, more standardised path to clearance.

A notable efficiency change took effect on 1 August 2026. SAMR expanded its delegated-review system: certain non-simplified cases may be entrusted to the provincial bureaus of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi, within defined market-share bands (e.g., combined share 15–25% in the same relevant market). Simple cases remain delegated to an expanded set of provincial bureaus. The policy aim is “complexity分流” — fast-track deals with no competition concerns so investment closes sooner, while SAMR retains the sensitive matters.

Cross-border relevance is direct. A foreign-to-foreign transaction that acquires control of, or decisive influence over, a Chinese business is not exempt. The same thresholds and the same standstill obligation apply, and SAMR coordinates with foreign enforcers where relevant. Parties should therefore (1) screen control and turnover at the term-sheet stage, (2) consider a pre-filing consultation for novel structures, and (3) use the online system to reduce avoidable back-and-forth. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest way to keep a deal on schedule.


中国经营者集中审查:申报标准与 2026 委托审查

中国的经营者集中制度以《反垄断法》与《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》为框架。核心规则是「事前审查、停表」:达到申报标准的集中,须事先向市场监管总局(SAMR)申报,未获批准不得实施;抢跑或未申报将触发调查与罚款。

申报标准已在 2024 年修订提高。满足以下之一即须申报:(a)参与集中的所有经营者上一会计年度全球合计营业额超过 120 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元;或(b)中国境内合计营业额超过 40 亿元,且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元。总局应根据经济发展情况评估标准实施。

为提升可预期性,总局发布行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》(2025 年 9 月 26 日发布,2025 年 10 月 1 日施行)。这是首部以行业标准形式系统规定经营者集中申报的文件,整合了此前的 4 部申报指导性文件(同步废止),统一明确申报条件(构成集中的情形、控制权判断、营业额计算)、申报材料(申报表、简易案件要求、控制权与营业额计算附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对外资而言,这意味着更清晰、标准化的获批路径。

一项提效变化于 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效。总局完善委托审查制度:符合份额区间(如同一相关市场份额合计 15%–25%)的部分非简易案件,可委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查;简易案件受托省级局相应扩容。政策意图是「繁简分流」——让无竞争问题的交易加速落地,敏感事项仍由总局把关。

跨境适用性直接。外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响,并不豁免;同样适用该标准与停表义务,总局在必要时与境外执法机构协调。交易方应:(1)在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额筛查;(2)对新颖结构善用商谈;(3)用在线系统减少无效往返。早而规范的申报,是让交易按期完成的最低成本方式。

Filing Playbook for Foreign Investors

Start with the control test. Acquisition of a China business — even as part of a global transaction — can constitute a concentration if it confers control or decisive influence. Map the target’s China revenue and the parties’ global and China turnover against the thresholds before signing. If the deal is close to a threshold, model both the global and the Chinaaggregate tests; the lower of the two can still trigger.

Use the 2025 *Specification* as your template. It consolidates what to submit (notification form, simplified-case annexes, control and turnover appendices) and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For straightforward, non-problematic deals, consider the simplified procedure and the expanded provincial delegation effective 1 August 2026, which can shift routine non-simplified review to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing or Shaanxi within defined share bands.

Mind the standstill. Do not close, integrate or exercise control before clearance — interim integration (sharing confidential info, appointing managers, consolidating accounts) can be read as early implementation. Build a conditionality and long-stop that reflects the review period, keep the CSRC/security-review workstreams in view if the deal is also an inbound acquisition, and document a clean competition narrative. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest insurance for deal certainty.

外资申报实操手册

从控制权测试入手。取得中国业务控制权或决定性影响的交易——即便作为全球交易一部分——可能构成集中。签约前将标的中国营收与各党全球/中国营业额对照标准;若接近阈值,同时建模全球与境内合计两种测试,较低者亦可能触发。

以 2025 年《申报规范》为模板。它整合了提交内容(申报表、简易案件附件、控制权与营业额附录)与流程(商谈、在线提交、受理审查)。对清晰无问题的交易,可考虑简易程序及 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效的省级委托扩容——在既定份额区间内将常规非简易案件移至北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西。

遵守停表。获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制;过渡期整合(共享机密信息、委派管理人、合并账务)可能被认定为提前实施。设定反映审查周期的条件与长停,若同时属 inbound 并购则留意证监会/安审工作流,并备好清晰竞争叙事。早而规范的申报,是交易确定性的最低成本保险。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Suspensory rule: file with SAMR before closing once thresholds are met; early closing triggers investigation and fines.
  • Thresholds: global aggregate > RMB 12bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China); or China aggregate > RMB 4bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China).
  • Concentration: merger; equity/asset acquisition of control; control/decisive influence by contract.
  • 2025 standard: *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* effective 1 Oct 2025 consolidates prior guidance.
  • Delegation: from 1 Aug 2026, part of non-simplified cases delegated to Beijing/Shanghai/Guangdong/Chongqing/Shaanxi.
  • Standstill: no closing, integration or control exercise before clearance.
  • Cross-border: foreign-to-foreign deals acquiring control of a China business are equally caught.

实务速查

  • 停表规则: 达阈值须向 SAMR 申报后方可交割;抢跑触发调查与罚款。
  • 标准: 全球合计 > 120 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国);或中国合计 > 40 亿元(至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国)。
  • 集中: 合并;取得控制权的股权/资产收购;依合同取得控制或决定性影响。
  • 2025 标准: 《经营者集中申报规范》2025 年 10 月 1 日施行,整合既往指引。
  • 委托: 2026 年 8 月 1 日起部分非简易案件委托北京/上海/广东/重庆/陕西。
  • 停表: 获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制。
  • 跨境: 取得中国业务控制权的外资间交易同样被纳入。

Sources

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review

  • China’s 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 empowers SAMR to review concentrations that fall below the notification thresholds where they may eliminate or restrict competition.
    中国2022年修订的《反垄断法》授权市场监管总局对未达申报标准、但可能排除限制竞争的集中进行审查。
  • “Killer” or “sniping” (掐尖式) acquisitions—buying a nascent rival to discontinue or absorb it—are a stated SAMR enforcement priority, especially in the platform economy.
    “扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购——收购新生竞争对手以停用或吸收之——是市场监管总局明确的执法重点,尤其在平台经济领域。
  • Below-threshold deals are not a safe harbour; the authority can call them in, impose remedies, or unwind completed transactions.
    未达门槛的交易并非安全港;监管可主动立案,附加救济,或撤销已完成的交易。
  • The theory targets potential competition: a small or pre-revenue target’s future trajectory is what makes the deal reviewable.
    该理论针对潜在竞争:标的虽小或尚无营收,其未来轨迹正使交易具有可审查性。
  • As of 2026, the focus has extended from platforms to biotech, semiconductors, and AI, where a startup’s talent or IP is the real asset.
    截至2026年,重点已从平台延伸至生物医药、半导体及人工智能,其中初创企业的人才或知识产权才是真正资产。
  • Entrants should document a genuine, pro-competitive rationale and preserve standalone-viability evidence for any acquisition of an early-stage rival.
    准入者应就收购早期竞争对手记录真实、促进竞争的理据,并保存其独立存续可行性的证据。

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review | 中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

The Legal Hook: Below-Threshold Review

A defining innovation of the 2022 《反垄断法》 amendment is explicit authority for the enforcer to examine concentrations that do not meet the turnover notification thresholds yet “have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” This closes the gap that previously let small, strategic acquisitions escape scrutiny simply because the target’s revenue was negligible. SAMR may, on its own initiative or following a complaint, open a below-threshold review—even after closing.

What Is a “Killer” or “Sniping” Acquisition?

The term “killer acquisition” (and its Chinese framing 掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购) describes a dominant firm buying an emerging competitor chiefly to shut it down, shelf the product, or absorb its talent and IP rather than to compete with it. The competitive harm is forward-looking: the market loses a future rival, and innovation is chilled. In platform and deep-tech contexts, the acquired asset is often pre-revenue, so classic turnover-based thresholds would never catch it—hence the below-threshold power is the relevant tool.

Why 2026 Makes This Salient

Entering 2026, several forces elevate below-threshold scrutiny:

  • Platform precedent. SAMR’s platform-economy guidance names eliminating potential competition as a core concern, and 掐尖式并购 is repeatedly cited in enforcement rhetoric.
  • Deep-tech race. In semiconductors, AI, and biotech, acquisitions of tiny startups for their talent or patents are strategically loaded; the real value is not current sales but future capability.
  • Talent and data. Buying a team or dataset to neutralize a rival’s trajectory is exactly the harm the below-threshold rule targets.

How SAMR Assesses These Deals

The authority looks beyond current overlap to potential competition:

  • Would the target, absent the deal, likely have become a significant rival?
  • Is the acquirer a dominant or strategically placed firm?
  • Does the transaction remove a nascent competitive constraint?
  • Is there a genuine efficiency or pro-competitive rationale, or merely elimination?

Evidence of “shelving” intent—internal plans to discontinue the product, retain talent only, or refuse to invest—sharpens the case against the deal.

Remedies and Consequences

For below-threshold deals found anticompetitive, SAMR may:

  • Prohibit the transaction;
  • Order divestiture or restructuring of the acquired asset;
  • Impose behavioural remedies (e.g., keep the product alive, license the technology, maintain investment);
  • Unwind a completed concentration and impose turnover-based fines.

Because the acquirer may already have integrated the target, unwinding is disruptive and value-destroying—so the ex ante risk calculus matters more than the (often low) notification threshold.

2026 Practice Notes

  • The below-threshold power is used selectively, not as a dragnet; cases cluster in platform, tech, and innovation-heavy sectors.
  • SAMR signals intent through guidelines and public statements more than through a fixed numerical trigger, so sector context governs.
  • Acquirers of early-stage rivals should expect that a deal’s *strategic logic*, not its size, determines scrutiny.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Do not assume “small = safe.” A below-threshold acquisition of a rival still invites review if its trajectory matters.
  2. Document pro-competitive rationale. Business plans, investment commitments, and roadmaps showing the target will thrive post-deal are protective.
  3. Preserve standalone-viability evidence. Demonstrate the target was not on a clear path to become a rival, or that the deal genuinely accelerates its offering.
  4. Consider voluntary engagement. Where a deal is sensitive, a proactive explanation to SAMR can pre-empt a contested proceeding.
  5. Contract for remediation. Allocate unwinding and remedy risk in the SPA, with appropriate long-stop dates.

Bottom Line

The below-threshold review power reframes China’s merger control: size is no longer the sole gate. For 2026, any acquisition by a dominant or strategically placed firm of an early-stage innovator—especially in platforms, AI, semiconductors, or biotech—should be planned as if scrutinised for its effect on future competition, with the evidentiary file built accordingly.


中国”掐尖式”并购审查:未达门槛的审查

法律抓手:未达门槛的审查

2022年《反垄断法》修订的一项标志性创新,是明确授权执法机关审查未达营业额申报标准、但”具有或者可能具有排除、限制竞争效果”的经营者集中。这填补了此前的漏洞——即小型战略性收购仅因标的营收微薄便可逃避审查。市场监管总局可主动或依举报,开展未达门槛审查,甚至在交割后启动。

何为”扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购?

“扼杀式收购”(中文亦称掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购)指支配企业收购新兴竞争对手,主要目的为关停、搁置产品,或吸收其人才与知识产权,而非与之竞争。其竞争损害是前瞻性的:市场失去一个未来竞争对手,创新受抑。在平台与深科技场景中,被收购资产常处于尚无营收阶段,经典营业额门槛本无从捕获——因此未达门槛的审查权才是适用工具。

2026年为何凸显

进入2026年,多重力量抬升了未达门槛审查:

  • 平台先例。 市场监管总局平台经济指引将消除潜在竞争列为核心关切,”掐尖式并购”在执法论述中屡被援引。
  • 深科技竞赛。 在半导体、人工智能与生物医药领域,为人才或专利而收购微型初创企业具有战略载荷;真正价值不在当前销售,而在未来能力。
  • 人才与数据。 收购团队或数据集以中性化对手轨迹,正是未达门槛规则所欲针对的损害。

市场监管总局如何评估此类交易

监管超越当前重叠,审视潜在竞争:

  • 若交易不发生,标的是否可能成为重要竞争对手?
  • 收购方是否为支配或具战略地位的企业?
  • 交易是否消除了新生的竞争约束?
  • 是否存在真实的效率或促进竞争理据,抑或仅为消除?

“搁置”意图的证据——内部关停产品、仅留人才、拒绝投入的计划——会使案件对交易更为不利。

救济与后果

对认定具反竞争效果的未达门槛交易,市场监管总局可:

  • 禁止交易;
  • 责令剥离或重组被收购资产;
  • 附加行为性救济(如保持产品存续、许可技术、维持投入);
  • 撤销已完成的集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。

由于收购方可能已整合标的,撤销具有破坏性且摧毁价值——因此事前的风险权衡,比(往往很低的)申报门槛更关键。

2026年实践要点

  • 未达门槛审查权被选择性使用,而非撒网;案件集中于平台、科技及创新密集型行业。
  • 市场监管总局更多通过指引与公开表态释放意图,而非固定数值触发,故行业语境决定一切。
  • 收购早期竞争对手者须预期:决定审查的是交易的*战略逻辑*,而非其规模。

准入者实务指引

  1. 勿假定”小即安全”。 未达门槛但轨迹重要的竞品收购,仍会招致审查。
  2. 记录促进竞争的理据。 商业计划、投入承诺及标的交易后仍将壮大的路线图,具有保护作用。
  3. 保存独立存续可行性证据。 证明标的并非清晰走向成为竞争对手,或交易确实加速了其产品供给。
  4. 考虑主动沟通。 交易敏感时,主动向市场监管总局说明可避免陷入争议的程序。
  5. 在合同中约定补救。 于协议中分配撤销与救济风险,并设置适当的最晚截止日。

要点总结

未达门槛审查权重塑了中国经营者集中制度:规模不再是唯一关口。就2026年而言,任何支配或具战略地位企业对早期创新者的收购——尤其在平台、人工智能、半导体或生物医药领域——都应按”审查其对未来竞争的影响”来规划,并据此构建证据案卷。

Sources

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market

  • Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
    数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范,该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。
  • Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
    巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查,即便标的规模小或尚无营收。
  • VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
    采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖;”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。
  • Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
    在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济,正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
    截至2026年,审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态,以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。
  • Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
    准入者应预判:任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购,都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

The Platform Antitrust Framework

China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.

Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review

Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:

  • Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
  • Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
  • Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
  • Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).

These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.

VIE Structures Are In Scope

A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.

Substantive Theories SAMR Applies

In platform cases SAMR weighs:

  • Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
  • Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
  • Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
  • Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.

Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.

2026 Trajectory

Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:

  • Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
  • AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
  • Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.

The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
  2. Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
  3. Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
  4. Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
  5. Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.

Stakes

Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.


中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

平台反垄断框架

中国转向平台经济反垄断,以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场,阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时,如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言,定义的不是 bare AML 文本,而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。

平台并购为何受到更高审查

平台收购引发独特关切:

  • 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者,可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
  • 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河,并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
  • 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
  • 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品(见下篇)。

这些理论意味着,市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠,更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。

VIE 结构在管辖之内

一种长期误解认为可变利益实体(VIE)结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确:采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查,达标须申报,且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞,并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。

市场监管总局适用的实质理论

在平台案件中,市场监管总局考量:

  • 跨边市场界定(如匹配、支付、配送),承认多边性;
  • 支配地位,由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断;
  • 消除潜在竞争,包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购;
  • 纵向封阻,即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。

结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济,如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。

2026年走向

至2026年,平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至:

  • 算法驱动的整合,合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切;
  • 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购,就加深护城河进行评估;
  • 超级应用生态,就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。

其内在逻辑是:平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判,而不只看今日的份额。

准入者实务指引

  1. 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
  2. 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
  3. 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
  4. 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免;达标即申报。
  5. 标的涉大规模或重要数据时,统筹数据安全审查。

利害关系

误判审查的平台交易,面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济,或被禁止。无论外资还是内资,陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作,是审慎之道。

Sources

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice

  • A concentration is notifiable to SAMR when the parties’ turnover meets the State Council thresholds; the deal is suspensory and cannot close before clearance.
    当各方营业额达到国务院标准时,集中须向市场监管总局申报;交易具有暂停效力,获批前不得交割。
  • The State Council raised the notification thresholds in its 2024 revision, recalibrating the global and China turnover benchmarks to current economic scale.
    国务院在2024年修订中上调了申报标准,使全球及中国营业额基准与当前经济规模重新校准。
  • SAMR operates a simplified (简易) procedure for non-issue, non-rivalrous transactions, materially shortening review time versus the standard track.
    市场监管总局对无非竞争关切的集中适用简易程序,相较标准程序显著缩短审查时间。
  • The 2022 AML introduced a stop-the-clock (停钟) mechanism; incomplete filings or further-review needs pause the statutory clock.
    2022年《反垄断法》引入”停钟”机制;申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限暂停计算。
  • Gun-jumping—closing or integrating before clearance—draws substantially higher fines under the 2022 amendments, making procedural discipline essential.
    抢跑——在获批前交割或整合——依2022年修订面临显著提高的罚款,程序纪律因而至关重要。
  • As of 2026, expect tighter scrutiny of minority acquisitions that confer decisive influence and of filings’ substantive accuracy.
    截至2026年,须预期对赋予决定性影响的少数股权收购,以及申报实质准确性,将受到更严审视。

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice | 中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

When a Filing Is Required

Under the 《反垄断法》 and SAMR’s implementing rules, a “concentration” ( merger; acquisition of control; or acquisition of decisive influence over another undertaking) must be notified where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s thresholds. The original thresholds, set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, turned on combined global turnover and China turnover. In its 2024 revision, the State Council raised these thresholds to reflect China’s enlarged economic scale—reducing filings for routine small deals while keeping strategically significant transactions within scope. Because the precise figures are set by State Council regulation and periodically adjusted, deal teams should confirm the current thresholds against the latest SAMR guidance at the time of signing.

The Suspensory Principle

The cardinal rule: a notifiable concentration is suspensory. The parties may sign, but they may not implement the concentration—no control change, no asset integration, no voting-rights exercise—until SAMR clears it. Premature implementation (“gun-jumping”) is an independent violation under the 2022 AML, carrying far higher fines than under the prior regime. This makes the filing not a formality but a gating condition in the SPA.

Two Procedures: Standard and Simplified

SAMR administers two tracks:

TrackApplicabilityTypical duration
Standard (普通)Likely competitive concerns or complex factsUp to 30 days initial + extended phase
Simplified (简易)No substantive concern; e.g., low combined share, non-competitors, passive minorityMaterially shorter, often cleared within the initial phase

The simplified procedure applies where the combined market share is low, the parties are not actual or potential competitors in the same market, or the acquisition is a passive minority stake. Choosing the correct track—and presenting a clean, complete file—directly affects clearance speed.

The Stop-the-Clock Mechanism

A defining feature of the 2022 AML is the stop-the-clock (停钟) rule, operationalised in SAMR’s 经营者集中审查规定. The statutory review clock pauses when:

  • The notifying party fails to provide required materials and SAMR requests supplementation; or
  • A circumstance arises requiring further review (e.g., third-party opposition, new evidence).

Practically, a careless or incomplete filing can double the effective timeline. Diligent, complete first submission is the cheapest insurance against clock-stoppage.

Substantive Assessment

SAMR assesses whether the concentration would eliminate or restrict competition, considering market share, concentration ratios, entry barriers, efficiencies, and failing-firm defences. Remedies—structural (divestiture) or behavioural (access, non-discrimination)—may be imposed. For market entrants, the key is to demonstrate that the combination does not foreclose rivals or raise barriers in the relevant China market.

2026 Filing Practice

Entering 2026, SAMR’s practice shows:

  • Tighter look at “decisive influence” acquisitions—minority stakes that nonetheless confer control-like influence are caught.
  • Greater demands for data accuracy in notifications, with scrutiny of market definition.
  • Continued use of simplified procedure for clean, non-rivalrous deals, keeping routine inbound acquisitions efficient.
  • Coordination with security and data reviews where the target sits in a sensitive sector.

Practical Steps for Filers

  1. Screen early. Test the transaction against current thresholds at term-sheet stage.
  2. Choose the track correctly. Mislabeling a standard case as simplified invites rejection and delay.
  3. Prepare a complete file. Accurate turnover, market definition, and supporting evidence prevent clock-stoppage.
  4. Sequence with other regimes. Where security or data review applies, align filing timelines.
  5. Contractual protection. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and allocate gun-jumping risk in the SPA.

Exposure and Remedies

Beyond clearance denial, SAMR may unwind completed unlawful concentrations and impose turnover-based fines. The 2022 amendments raised these ceilings, and responsible individuals can be penalised. For foreign acquirers, disciplined filing practice—correct track, complete file, no pre-clearance integration—is the difference between a routine clearance and a value-destroying remediation.


中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

何时需要申报

依据《反垄断法》及市场监管总局实施规则,”经营者集中”(合并;取得控制权;或取得对其他经营者的决定性影响)于各方营业额达到国务院标准时须申报。原始门槛由国务院2008年规定设定,以合计全球营业额与中国营业额为准。在2024年修订中,国务院上调了这些门槛,以反映中国扩大的经济规模——在减少常规小规模交易申报的同时,将具有战略意义的交易保留在范围内。由于具体数字由国务院规定设定并定期调整,交易团队应在签约时对照市场监管总局最新指引确认现行门槛。

暂停原则

首要规则是:须申报的集中具有暂停效力。各方可以签约,但在市场监管总局批准前,不得实施集中——不得变更控制、不得整合资产、不得行使表决权。提前实施(”抢跑”)依2022年《反垄断法》构成独立违法,罚款远高于此前制度。这使得申报不再是形式,而是协议中的一项先决条件。

两种程序:标准与简易

市场监管总局设有两条路径:

路径适用情形通常时长
标准(普通)可能存在竞争关切或事实复杂初始30日+延长阶段
简易无非实质关切,如合计份额低、非竞争者、被动少数股权显著更短,常在初始阶段内审结

简易程序适用于合计市场份额低、各方非同一市场现实或潜在竞争者,或收购为被动少数股权等情形。选择正确的路径并提交干净、完整的案卷,直接影响获批速度。

停钟机制

2022年《反垄断法》的标志性特征是“停钟”规则,由市场监管总局《经营者集中审查规定》落实。在以下情形,法定审查时限暂停:

  • 申报方未提供所需材料,市场监管总局要求补充;或
  • 出现需进一步审查的情形(如第三方异议、新证据)。

实践中,草率或不完整的申报可能使实际时间表翻倍。勤勉、完整地首次提交,是防止停钟最廉价的保障。

实质审查

市场监管总局评估集中是否排除、限制竞争,考量市场份额、集中度、进入壁垒、效率及困境企业抗辩等。可能附加救济——结构性(剥离)或行为性(开放接入、非歧视)。对准入者而言,关键在于证明该结合不会在中国相关市场封阻竞争对手或抬高壁垒。

2026年申报实践

进入2026年,市场监管总局的实践显示:

  • 对”决定性影响”收购审查更严——虽为少数股权但赋予类控制性影响的交易亦被纳入。
  • 对申报数据准确性要求更高,并审视市场界定。
  • 继续对干净、非竞争类交易适用简易程序,使常规 inbound 收购保持高效。
  • 与安全和数据审查统筹,当标的位于敏感行业时。

申报者实务步骤

  1. 尽早筛查。 在条款书阶段即对照现行门槛测试交易。
  2. 正确选择路径。 将标准案件误标为简易将招致退回与延误。
  3. 备妥完整案卷。 准确的营业额、市场界定及佐证可防止停钟。
  4. 与其他制度统筹。 如涉及安全或数据审查,须对齐申报时间表。
  5. 合同保护。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,并在协议中分配抢跑风险。

风险与救济

除不予批准外,市场监管总局可撤销已完成的违法集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。2022年修订提高了这些上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外国收购方而言,纪律化的申报实践——正确路径、完整案卷、获批前不整合——决定着是顺利获批还是陷入摧毁价值的补救。

Sources

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework

  • China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
    中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石,主要由市场监管总局执行,其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。
  • Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
    经营者集中具有暂停效力:达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割,而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。
  • The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
    2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制,提高了处罚幅度,并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。
  • The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
    2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断,与市场准入壁垒直接相关。
  • As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
    截至2026年,执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议,以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。
  • Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
    外资投资者进入中国市场时,应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

The Statutory Foundation

China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.

Three Pillars of Enforcement

  1. Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
  2. Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
  3. Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.

For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.

Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover

A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.

The 2022 Amendments: What Changed

The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:

  • Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
  • Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
  • Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
  • “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.

These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.

Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus

SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.

Fair Competition Review and Market Entry

The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.

Practical Compliance for Entrants

  1. Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
  2. Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
  3. Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
  4. Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
  5. Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.

Penalties and Exposure

Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.


中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

法律基础

中国竞争法是《反垄断法》,于2007年通过,2022年作重大修订,修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中,并授权国家市场监督管理总局(市场监管总局)作为国家级主要执法机构,会同省级市场监管部门执法。

执法的三大支柱

  1. 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
  2. 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位(如不公平定价、排他、搭售)。
  3. 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。

对市场准入者而言,三者均具意义:第一项管控交易,第二项约束市场行为,第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。

经营者集中:暂停效力且以营业额为触发

“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权,以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时,交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛(由国务院2008年规定设定,并于2024年修订中上调)以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大,在减少小规模交易申报的同时,仍将战略性交易纳入范围。

2022年修订:变化何在

2022年修订显著加强了制度:

  • 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限可暂停,从而延长实际审查时间。
  • 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制,将面临显著提高的罚款。
  • 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素,并提高处罚。
  • 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口,由市场监管总局指引落实。

这些变化意味着,时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。

平台经济与行为监管重点

市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架:”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年,市场监管总局持续关注平台行为,以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。

公平竞争审查与市场准入

《公平竞争审查条例》(2024年8月1日施行)要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言,这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时,公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致,却是一条被认可的救济路径。

准入者实务合规

  1. 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
  2. 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表;在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
  3. 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款,避免触犯行为规则。
  4. 监测支配力指标;若份额超过约50%,须以更高谨慎对待行为。
  5. 遇地方规则阻碍准入时,运用公平竞争审查。

处罚与风险敞口

违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言,暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织,使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题,而非后台形式。

Sources

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots

  • The State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly calls for expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steadily advancing international medical services pilots.
    国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出”推动医疗领域有序扩大开放,进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点,稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点”。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots now cover nine locations — Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and all of Hainan — with foreign hospitals landing in 2026 (e.g. Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital).
    外商独资医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛 9 个地方,2026 年外资医院加速落地(如鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院)。
  • Value-added telecoms opening continues at scale: 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals since February 2025, covering all ten value-added telecom business categories, and foreign-invested telecom enterprises nationwide exceed 3,100.
    增值电信开放持续推进:2025 年 2 月以来已有 166 家外资企业获经营试点批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务;全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家。
  • Education, finance and services opening are broadening in parallel: nine new services-opening comprehensive pilot cities since 2025, foreign vocational training pilots, and more foreign institutions using fund-investment and risk-management tools.
    教育、金融等服务业开放同步拓宽:2025 年以来服务业扩大开放综合试点新增 9 个城市,推进职业技能培训开放试点,支持外资机构运用基金投顾与风险管理工具。
  • The National Health Plan also advances innovation-drug and medical-device channels, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs, and AI-enabled pharma value chains — relevant to foreign pharma and device companies entering China.
    《国民健康”十五五”规划》还推进创新药械审评审批、商业保险覆盖创新药、人工智能赋能医药全产业链,对进入中国的外资药械企业直接相关。
  • For foreign investors, the practical takeaway is that sector restrictions are being dismantled industry by industry through pilots: confirm whether the target sector is in an expanded pilot, prepare the sectoral licence application early, and use the provincial commerce one-stop channels.
    对外国投资者,实操要点是分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除:确认目标行业是否在扩容试点内、尽早准备行业牌照申请、善用省级商务一站式通道。

Sector-by-Sector Opening in 2026: Hospitals, Telecoms and Services Pilots | 2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

Why this matters now

China’s sector restrictions on foreign investment are being dismantled industry by industry through pilot programmes rather than through a single omnibus measure. Three tracks are moving in parallel in 2026. First, healthcare: the State Council’s National Health 15th Five-Year Plan (Guo Fa [2026] No. 23) explicitly supports expanding the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and advancing international medical services pilots, and wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots already cover nine locations. Second, telecoms: the value-added telecoms pilot has issued approvals to 166 foreign enterprises since February 2025, covering all ten value-added categories. Third, education and finance: the services-opening comprehensive pilots added nine new cities in 2025, and the utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports foreign vocational training institutions, fund-investment advisory and risk-management tools for foreign institutions. For foreign companies whose target sector still carries restrictions, the operative question is which pilot applies and how the licence process runs. This article maps the 2026 sector-opening landscape.

Healthcare: hospital and pharma channels

The National Health 15th Five-Year Plan, issued under Guo Fa [2026] No. 23, directs orderly expansion of medical-sector opening, further expansion of the wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot and steady advancement of international medical services pilots. The hospital pilot already covers Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and the whole of Hainan. Foreign hospital groups have been landing: Pengruili International Hospital, Fuzhou Xingyao Eye Hospital and Nanjing Hanmei Viti Cosmetic Hospital are cited as examples of foreign-invested hospitals entering the market. The plan also supports optimised review and approval for innovative and clinically urgent drugs, commercial insurance coverage of innovative drugs and medical devices, and AI-enabled pharma value chains. For foreign pharma and device companies, the plan signals sustained demand-side support for innovative products alongside the supply-side opening of hospital ownership.

Telecoms: the value-added pilot at scale

The value-added telecoms pilot, launched in October 2024 in Beijing (services opening-up comprehensive demonstration zone), the Shanghai FTZ Lin-gang New Area and Shanghai’s socialist modernisation leading zone, Hainan Free Trade Port and Shenzhen’s socialist demonstration zone, removed foreign shareholding caps on specified value-added services including internet data centres (IDC), content delivery networks (CDN), internet access services (ISP), online data processing and transaction processing, and information publication platform services. Since the first batch of approvals in February 2025, 166 foreign enterprises have received pilot approvals, and some wholly foreign-owned enterprises have obtained IDC qualifications — relevant for AI data-centre investment. Nationwide, foreign-invested telecom enterprises exceed 3,100, covering all ten value-added categories under the Telecommunications Business Classification Catalogue. The utilisation of foreign capital action plan supports continuing and expanding the pilot.

Education and finance

Education opening is advancing through the services-opening comprehensive pilots, which added nine new cities in 2025, and through the action plan’s commitment to steadily expand pilots for foreign vocational training institutions, vocational colleges and high-level science, engineering, agriculture and medicine universities. In finance, the action plan supports more foreign institutions using risk-management tools including government bond futures, foreign institutions carrying out fund-investment advisory business, and facilitation of cross-border business for key foreign-invested enterprises. These items matter for foreign financial institutions and education groups assessing entry.

How sector pilots actually run

Each pilot follows the same shape: a national policy statement names the sector and the pilot regions; the competent ministry (NHSA/MOFCOM for hospitals, MIIT for telecoms, MOE for education) issues implementation rules; provincial authorities process applications; and foreign enterprises apply for the sectoral licence or approval. For hospitals, the provincial health commission and commerce department jointly review the establishment; for value-added telecoms, MIIT issues the pilot approval and the enterprise obtains the value-added telecom business licence (ICP/EDI) locally; for education, the MOE approves cooperative or independent institutions. Timing differs: hospital establishment can take months of review; telecoms approvals have been issued in batches; education approvals follow the MOE’s periodic batches.

Practical steps

First, verify the target sector’s current restriction level: full opening, pilot opening, conditional or prohibited. Second, where a pilot applies, confirm the pilot region covers the planned location and that the business line is within the pilot’s service scope. Third, prepare the sectoral application package: for hospitals, the feasibility study, qualifications of the foreign hospital group, and the cooperation or independent-establishment plan; for telecoms, the corporate structure demonstrating shareholding compliance and the security assessment materials; for education, the partner credentials and curriculum plan. Fourth, engage the provincial commerce department’s one-stop window and the competent ministry’s pre-communication channel early. Fifth, monitor pilot expansion announcements — hospital, biotech and telecom expansions are explicitly in the pipeline.

Compliance notes

Sector pilots do not remove all restrictions: negative-list limits still apply to fields outside the pilots, and each licence carries conditions (e.g. service scope, foreign shareholding, security review for telecoms). The National Health Plan is a planning document; implementing rules for hospital and international medical pilots will follow from the competent authorities. Foreign investors should not assume that a pilot in one region extends to others, and should confirm current regional scope before committing.


2026 年分行业开放:医院、电信与服务业试点

为什么当下重要

中国对外资的分行业限制正通过试点逐行业拆除,而非依赖一部一揽子法规。2026 年有三条线并行推进。其一,医疗:国务院《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)明确提出扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点,外商独资医院试点已覆盖 9 个地方。其二,电信:增值电信开放试点自 2025 年 2 月以来已向 166 家外资企业发放经营批复,覆盖全部 10 项增值电信业务。其三,教育与金融:服务业扩大开放综合试点 2025 年新增 9 个城市,稳外资行动方案支持外资职业技能培训机构、基金投顾业务与风险管理工具。对目标行业仍带限制的外国公司,操作性问题在于适用哪个试点、牌照流程如何运转。本文梳理 2026 年分行业开放版图。

医疗:医院与药械通道

《国民健康”十五五”规划》(国发〔2026〕23 号)部署推动医疗领域有序扩大开放、进一步扩大外商独资医院开放试点、稳妥推进国际医疗服务试点。医院试点已覆盖北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛。外资医院集团加速落地:鹏瑞利国际医院、福州星耀眼科医院、南京韩美维媞整形医院被作为外资医院进入市场的案例提及。规划还支持优化创新药和临床急需药品审评审批、商业健康保险覆盖创新药械、人工智能赋能医药全产业链。对外资药械企业,规划在供给侧开放医院股权的同时,提供需求侧对创新产品的持续支持信号。

电信:增值电信试点规模化

增值电信开放试点于 2024 年 10 月在北京(服务业扩大开放综合示范区)、上海自贸试验区临港新片区及社会主义现代化建设引领区、海南自由贸易港、深圳中国特色社会主义先行示范区启动,取消互联网数据中心(IDC)、内容分发网络(CDN)、互联网接入服务(ISP)、在线数据处理与交易处理、信息发布平台服务等指定增值业务的外资股比限制。自 2025 年 2 月首批批复以来,已有 166 家外资企业获试点批复,部分全外资企业取得 IDC 资质——这对 AI 数据中心投资具有参照价值。全国外商投资电信企业超 3100 家,经营范围覆盖《电信业务分类目录》全部 10 项增值电信业务。稳外资行动方案支持继续推进并扩大试点。

教育与金融

教育开放依托服务业扩大开放综合试点(2025 年新增 9 个城市)与行动方案关于稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学开放试点的承诺推进。金融端,行动方案支持更多外资机构运用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、优化重点外资企业跨境业务管理。这些对外资金融机构与教育集团评估进入都直接相关。

试点如何实际运转

各试点遵循同一形态:国家政策文件点名行业与试点区域;主管部委(医院为卫生健康部门与商务部、电信为工信部、教育为教育部)发布实施细则;省级部门处理申请;外资企业申办行业牌照或批复。医院由省卫健委与商务部门联合审查设立;增值电信由工信部核发试点批复、企业再就地申领增值电信业务许可证(ICP/EDI);教育由教育部审批合作或独立机构。时序不同:医院设立审查可能长达数月;电信批复分批发放;教育审批跟随教育部周期性批次。

实操步骤

其一,核验目标行业当前限制级别:全面开放、试点开放、有条件开放还是禁止。其二,适用试点的,确认试点区域覆盖计划地点且业务线在试点业务范围内。其三,准备行业申请材料:医院为可行性研究、外资医院集团资质、合作或独立设立方案;电信为企业架构证明股比合规与安全评估材料;教育为伙伴资质与课程方案。其四,尽早对接省商务部门一站式窗口与主管部委的预沟通渠道。其五,紧盯试点扩容公告——医院、生物技术、电信扩容明确在推进之列。

合规提示

行业试点并未消除全部限制:试点之外领域仍适用负面清单限制,每张牌照都附带条件(如业务范围、外资股比、电信安全审查)。《国民健康”十五五”规划》是规划性文件,医院与国际医疗试点的实施细则将由主管机关后续出台。外资投资者不应假设一地的试点扩展至其他地区,投入前应确认现行区域范围。

Sources