Tag Archives: 2026

2026 State Council Action Plan on Foreign Capital: Stabilizing and Upgrading Investment

  • The State Council-approved Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment (商资发〔2026〕97号) was issued on 16 June 2026 and published on 22 June, with 5 areas and 15 measures.
    经国务院同意的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)于2026年6月16日印发、22日发布,含5方面15条举措。
  • The plan was built with 27 departments around concerns gathered from foreign-enterprise roundtables and key-project task forces.
    方案由27个部门围绕外资企业圆桌会、重点项目专班收集的关切制定。
  • Market-access measures deepen services, finance and pharma opening — vocational-education pilots, treasury-futures access, and drug segmented-production rules.
    市场准入举措深化服务业、金融、医药开放——职教试点、国债期货准入、药品分段生产细则。
  • Convenience measures ease foreign M&A, data export and reinvestment, including tax preferences for profit-reinvestment and strategic-investor status for qualified foreign equity funds.
    便利举措放宽外资并购、数据出境与再投资,含利润再投资税收优惠及合格外资股权基金的战略投资者身份。
  • The plan pledges full national treatment, fair-competition review in procurement and bidding, and a cyber-rights complaint mechanism for foreign firms.
    方案承诺全面落实外资国民待遇、招投标公平竞争审查,并建外资企业网络侵权举报联动机制。
  • Its core goal is to “stabilise the scale and upgrade the quality” of foreign investment — the “固稳促优” agenda for the 15th Five-Year Plan.
    其核心目标是外资”稳规模、提质量”——十五五的”固稳促优”议程。

2026 State Council Action Plan on Foreign Capital: Stabilizing and Upgrading Investment | 2026年国务院稳外资行动方案:固稳促优

The Plan at a Glance

On 16 June 2026, the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued the *Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment* (商资发〔2026〕97号), published on 22 June after State Council approval (经国务院同意). It is the centrepiece of Beijing’s 2026 “stabilise foreign capital” (稳外资) push and the operative document for the foreign-investment chapter of the 15th Five-Year Plan. Crucially, it was not drafted in isolation: as MOFCOM explained at the State Council Information Office briefing, the plan was built with 27 departments, drawing on concerns collected month by month from foreign-enterprise roundtables, key foreign-invested-project task forces, and bilateral and multilateral economic mechanisms. Its framing slogan is 固稳促优 — “consolidate, stabilise, and optimise” — and its stated aim is to stabilise the scale of foreign investment while upgrading its quality.

Five Areas, Fifteen Measures

The plan organises 15 measures under five headings:

  1. Expand market access (扩大市场准入)
  2. Improve the convenience of foreign investment (提升外商投资便利度)
  3. Raise the level of investment promotion (提高投资促进水平)
  4. Strengthen the foreign-investment service guarantee system (健全外商投资服务保障体系)
  5. Optimise foreign-investment management (优化外资管理)

The structure moves deliberately from “can you enter?” (market access) to “is it easy to operate?” (convenience) to “are you treated fairly?” (service guarantee) to “is administration efficient?” (management) — a full-lifecycle view of the foreign-investor experience.

Expanding Market Access

The first area is where the plan touches the negative list most directly:

  • Services. It proposes steadily expanding pilot openings for vocational training institutions, vocational schools, and high-level universities in science, technology, agriculture and medicine; supports Beijing in upgrading its Comprehensive Demonstration Zone for Services Opening to trial digital-economy and health-care moves first; and upgrades the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macao to open services to them first.
  • Finance. It supports more foreign institutions in using risk-management tools including treasury futures, in conducting fund-investment-advisory business, and provides qualified key foreign firms with cross-border financing facilitation quotas and “customer-billed” international settlement services; it optimises pre-communication before exchange listing and supports qualified foreign enterprises in domestic listing.
  • Pharma and industry. It commits to issuing rules on cross-border segmented drug production (药品分段生产) to let overseas marketing-authorisation holders manufacture biologics and chemicals across borders, to expanding the geographic scope of biotech and wholly foreign-owned-hospital pilots, and to bringing innovative drugs and devices into commercial insurance and retail channels.

Lowering the Cost of Doing Business

The second area attacks frictions that foreign firms cite most often:

  • Foreign M&A. It will revise the rules on foreign investors acquiring domestic enterprises, streamline the process and payment terms, and — notably — allow qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to act as strategic investors in the securities issuance of non-related listed companies.
  • Data export. It supports FTZs and services-opening pilot cities in exploring scenario-based, field-level data-export negative lists, and promotes national standards for identifying important data across industries such as industry, telecom, geographic information, automotive, pharma, seeds, aerospace and civil aviation.
  • Reinvestment. It implements the tax preference for foreign investors using distributed profits for direct investment, and pulls more reinvestment projects into the major/key foreign-project lists for service support.
  • R&D centres. It eases the introduction of high-level foreign talent, supports open innovation platforms and training bases, and extends import-tax preferences for research supplies.

Raising the Level of Investment Promotion

The third area builds the “Invest in China” (投资中国) brand: it establishes a digital comprehensive service platform and portal, issues an encouragement/prohibition list for local government investment promotion, requires governments to honour policy commitments, and uses foreign economic and trade development funds to support foreign investment. The explicit intent is to make investment promotion more rules-based and less ad hoc, and to give foreign firms a clearer, nationally consistent picture of where incentives lie.

Strengthening the Service Guarantee

The fourth area is about fairness. The plan requires full implementation of national treatment for foreign firms, strengthens fair-competition review in government procurement and bidding, and supports foreign firms in consumer-boosting campaigns, government procurement and bidding on an equal footing. It also establishes a linked mechanism for reporting online infringements of foreign-enterprise rights, responding to a recurring complaint that foreign brands are exposed to unfair online treatment.

Optimising Foreign-Investment Management

The fifth area upgrades the plumbing: it will comprehensively optimise the foreign-investment information-reporting system, build direct reporting channels, and improve information sharing to support foreign-exchange registration, administrative licensing and fixed-asset-investment management. The subtext is that lighter, better-integrated reporting reduces compliance cost without loosening oversight.

Why It Matters for Investors

The plan arrives against a specific backdrop. MOFCOM data for Jan–May 2026 show actual utilised FDI at 327.29 billion yuan, down 8.6% year-on-year, though the decline narrowed by 4.6 points and May alone rose 5.9%. Officials describe foreign investment as exhibiting “four stabilities” — stable scale, stable operation, stable contribution, and stable expectations (规模稳、经营稳、贡献稳、预期稳) — with stock foreign capital rising and incremental flows broadly stable above outflows. The Action Plan is the policy response designed to defend and improve that position during the 15th FYP’s opening years.

How to Act on It

  1. Map your sector to a measure. Services, finance and pharma players should trace their plans to the specific opening clause.
  2. Use the M&A and strategic-investor route. Qualified foreign equity funds now have a clearer path into listed companies.
  3. Claim reinvestment tax preferences. If you reinvest distributed profits, confirm eligibility for the direct-investment tax preference.
  4. Engage the roundtable channel. The plan institutionalises the foreign-enterprise roundtable — use it to surface blockers.
  5. Plan for national treatment. Expect equal footing in procurement and bidding; document any deviation.

The 2026 Action Plan is less a single concession than a system: it pairs further opening with concrete fixes to the everyday frictions that determine whether foreign capital stays.


2026年国务院稳外资行动方案:固稳促优

方案概览

2026年6月16日,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部联合印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号),经国务院同意后于6月22日发布。它是2026年”稳外资”部署的核心文件,也是十五五规划外资篇章的落地文件。关键在于,它并非孤立起草:正如商务部在国新办发布会上所言,方案由27个部门参与制定,吸纳了通过外资企业圆桌会、重点外资项目专班、多双边经贸机制逐月收集的关切。其主题词为”固稳促优”,明确目标是稳外资规模、提外资质量。

五方面,十五条

方案将15条举措归入五类:

  1. 扩大市场准入
  2. 提升外商投资便利度
  3. 提高投资促进水平
  4. 健全外商投资服务保障体系
  5. 优化外资管理

结构刻意由”能否进入”(市场准入)走向”是否易营”(便利度)、”是否受公平对待”(服务保障),再到”行政是否高效”(管理)——对外资全生命周期体验的系统性审视。

扩大市场准入

第一方面是方案与负面清单交集最直接之处:

  • 服务业。 稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点;支持北京提升服务业扩大开放综合示范区水平,在数字经济、医药健康等领域先行先试;升级与港澳 CEPA,在服务业对港澳投资者率先加大开放。
  • 金融业。 支持更多外资机构使用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具、依法开展基金投资顾问业务;为符合条件的重点外资企业提供跨境融资便利化额度与”代客制单”国际结算服务;优化上市申报前预沟通,支持符合条件的重点外资企业境内上市融资。
  • 医药与产业。 出台药品分段生产细则便利境外上市许可持有人跨境分段生产;扩大生物技术与外商独资医院试点地域范围;推动创新药械纳入商业保险与零售渠道。

降低经营成本

第二方面直面外资最常提及的摩擦:

  • 外资并购。 修订外国投资者并购境内企业规定、优化流程与对价支付;并允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行。
  • 数据出境。 支持自贸区与服务业开放试点城市探索场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单;推动工业、电信、地理信息、汽车、医药、种业、航天、民航等行业重要数据识别目录国家标准。
  • 再投资。 落实境外投资者以分配利润直接投资税收优惠;将更多再投资项目纳入重大/重点外资项目清单享受服务保障。
  • 研发中心。 便利外籍高层次人才引进,支持开放式创新平台与实训基地,落实科研用品进口税收优惠。

提高投资促进水平

第三方面打造”投资中国”品牌:建设数字综合服务平台与门户;出台地方政府招商引资鼓励/禁止事项清单;要求政府严格兑现政策承诺;运用外经贸发展资金支持外资。其明确意图是使招商更规则化、更少临时化,并为外资提供全国统一、更清晰的激励图景。

健全服务保障

第四方面关乎公平。方案要求全面落实外资国民待遇,加强政府采购、招投标公平竞争审查,支持外资平等参与提振消费、政府采购、招投标。并建立外资企业网络侵权举报联动机制,回应外资品牌常遭不公平网络对待的反复诉求。

优化外资管理

第五方面升级”管道”:全面优化外商投资信息报告制度,健全直报渠道与信息共享,支撑外汇登记、行政许可、固定资产投资管理。其潜台词是:更轻、更融合的报告在放宽监管成本的同时不松懈监督。

对投资者为何重要

方案出台于特定背景。商务部2026年1—5月数据显示,实际使用外资3,272.9亿元,同比降8.6%,但降幅收窄4.6个百分点,5月当月增5.9%。官方将外资描述为”四稳”——规模稳、经营稳、贡献稳、预期稳——存量外资稳中有升、增量总体稳定且高于流出。行动方案正是为在十五五开局之年守住并改善这一态势的政策回应。

如何据此行动

  1. 将行业对应到举措。 服务业、金融、医药玩家应将自身规划追溯至具体开放条款。
  2. 利用并购与战略投资者路径。 合格外资股权基金现有了更清晰的上市公司进入通道。
  3. 申领再投资税收优惠。 若以分配利润再投资,确认是否符合直接投资税收优惠资格。
  4. 运用圆桌渠道。 方案将外资企业圆桌会制度化——用之暴露堵点。
  5. 规划国民待遇。 预期在采购、招投标中平等对待;对任何偏差留证。

2026年行动方案与其说是一项让步,不如说是一套系统:它将进一步开放与针对日常摩擦的具体修复相配,而这些摩擦正决定外资去留。

Sources

Investment and Data Security Review in China: The 2026 Compliance Matrix

  • The CAC’s Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Internet Enterprises (2026-2030), issued on 21 August 2026, commits to efficient implementation of data-export security assessments, standard contracts and certification, and to FTZ data-export negative lists and cross-border data service centres.
    中央网信办 2026 年 8 月 21 日印发《促进网信企业高质量发展行动计划(2026-2030 年)》,承诺高效实施数据出境安全评估、个人信息出境标准合同、个人信息出境认证等制度,支持自贸区发布数据出境负面清单、设立数据跨境服务中心。
  • The first batch of data-export security assessment results, mostly issued in 2023, are expiring in 2026: extensions must be requested within 60 working days before expiry, meeting six conditions including a cap of 20% growth over three years.
    首批数据出境安全评估结果(多在 2023 年出具)2026 年集中到期:须在有效期届满前 60 个工作日内申请延期,同时满足六项条件(含未来三年出境数量增幅不超过原准予数量的 20%)。
  • Foreign investment security review is controller-piercing and substance-over-form: the April 2026 prohibition of a foreign takeover of a Chinese-founded AI company illustrates that review extends to indirect transactions over Chinese-controlled assets.
    外商投资安全审查遵循穿透式、”实质重于形式”原则:2026 年 4 月对一起收购中国背景 AI 公司交易的禁止投资决定显示,审查延伸到涉及中国控制资产的间接交易。
  • Under the Foreign Investment Security Review Measures (effective January 2021), investment in military-related or critical sectors (important IT and internet products, key technologies, etc.) that obtains de facto control must be declared before implementation.
    依《外商投资安全审查办法》(2021 年 1 月施行),投资军工及关系国家安全的重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、关键技术等重要领域并取得实际控制权的,应在实施投资前主动申报。
  • The four-part review matrix for foreign companies covers: foreign investment security review, cyber-security review (for platforms with over one million users going offshore), data-export security assessment and the network data security risk assessment regime.
    外资企业面对的”四大安全审查”矩阵包括:外商投资安全审查、网络安全审查(超 100 万用户平台赴国外上市)、数据出境安全评估与网络数据安全风险评估制度。
  • For foreign-invested companies, the 2026 checklist is to audit assessment expiry dates, map data flows against the three export routes, confirm security-review thresholds for any offshore listing or sensitive acquisition, and monitor CAC and NDRC implementation guidance.
    对外资企业,2026 年合规清单是:核查评估到期日、对照三条出境路径映射数据流、确认境外上市或敏感并购的安全审查门槛、跟踪网信办与发改委实施指引。

Investment and Data Security Review in China: The 2026 Compliance Matrix | 中国投资与数据安全审查:2026 年合规矩阵

Why this matters now

Two developments in 2026 concentrate the security-review agenda for foreign-invested companies. First, on 21 August 2026 the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CAC) issued the Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Internet Enterprises (2026-2030), which commits to efficiently implementing data-export security assessments, personal-information-outbound standard contracts and personal-information-outbound certification, supporting FTZs in issuing data-export negative lists and encouraging data cross-border service centres. Second, the first batch of data-export security assessment results — mostly issued in 2023 — are expiring in 2026, forcing companies through the extension or re-application window. Separately, the April 2026 decision by the Foreign Investment Security Review Working Mechanism Office (NDRC) to prohibit a foreign acquisition of a Chinese-founded AI company demonstrates the reach of foreign investment security review. This article maps the four-part compliance matrix and the practical calendar.

The four-part review matrix

For a foreign-invested company, four regimes intersect. First, foreign investment security review under the Measures (NDRC and MOFCOM Order, effective 18 January 2021): investment in military-related fields, or in critical sectors — important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, critical infrastructure, key transport services, important culture products, important IT and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies and other important fields — that obtains actual control must be declared before implementation. Review is substance-over-form and controller-piercing: the April 2026 prohibition decision applied to a transaction between two foreign parties because the underlying assets, technology and data originated in China. Second, cyber-security review under the Cyber Security Review Measures (2021): network platform operators holding data of more than one million users must declare before going public abroad. Third, data-export security assessment under the Data Export Security Assessment Measures and the Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions: critical information infrastructure operators, important data exports, and personal-information exports above volume thresholds must pass assessment. Fourth, the network data security risk assessment regime introduced by the Measures on Network Data Security Risk Assessment (effective 20 August 2026): important data processors must conduct an annual assessment.

The 2026 expiry wave and the extension conditions

The first batch of data-export security assessment results was mostly issued in 2023. Under Article 9 of the Provisions, the assessment result is valid for three years from issuance; the validity period was extended from two to three years by the March 2024 Provisions. Companies wishing to continue exporting must apply for an extension within 60 working days before expiry, through the provincial cyberspace administration to the national office. Six conditions must all be met: the purpose and scope of data export are unchanged; the data processor and overseas recipient are unchanged; for personal information, the number of individuals involved over the next three years does not exceed 20% of the amount approved in the original assessment; for important data, the volume growth over three years does not exceed 20%; the legal documents with the overseas recipient comply with Article 9 of the Measures; and no major data-security incident occurred during the past three years. Where any condition fails, the company must re-apply, a longer process.

The CAC action plan and data-flow facilitation

The CAC’s 2026-2030 action plan, issued 21 August 2026, signals both enforcement and facilitation. It commits to guiding internet enterprises to establish sound data-security compliance systems, efficiently implementing the three data-export routes, supporting FTZs in issuing data-export negative lists under the national classification system, organising industry-specific guidelines on cross-border data flows, and encouraging regions to set up data cross-border service centres. For foreign-invested companies, this means the three-route framework will be administered more efficiently, but compliance obligations are not relaxed — the plan also calls for cracking down on data-related violations.

Practical calendar for foreign companies

First, locate every data-export security assessment notice and check its issue date; calendar the 60-working-day extension window before expiry. Second, run the six-condition self-check for extension eligibility; where growth will exceed 20% or other conditions fail, budget for a full re-application. Third, map data flows against the three routes — security assessment, standard contract (with provincial filing within 10 working days of execution) and certification — and confirm which applies to HR data, global-system access and SaaS operations. Fourth, for any offshore listing or acquisition of a sensitive-sector target, assess cyber-security review and foreign investment security review thresholds before signing. Fifth, monitor CAC Q&A releases (the July 2026 Q&A clarified extension conditions) and NDRC guidance. Sixth, for important-data processors, complete the first annual network data security risk assessment under the regime effective 20 August 2026.

Compliance notes

Extension is not automatic: approval is discretionary and re-application is materially longer, so start compliance self-audits six months before expiry. The 20% growth cap is measured against the amount approved in the original assessment, not current volumes, and companies should keep annual data-transfer ledgers. Foreign investment security review applies to indirect and “substance-over-form” transactions; the April 2026 prohibition shows that Chinese-founded, Chinese-asset AI companies remain in scope even after restructuring abroad. Finally, the security-review landscape is evolving — the CAC plan and pending sectoral data-classification catalogues will reshape the map, so treat 2026 as a year for proactive mapping rather than reactive compliance.


中国投资与数据安全审查:2026 年合规矩阵

为什么当下重要

2026 年两项动态把安全审查议程推到外资企业面前。其一,2026 年 8 月 21 日,中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室印发《促进网信企业高质量发展行动计划(2026-2030 年)》,承诺高效实施数据出境安全评估、个人信息出境标准合同、个人信息出境认证等制度,支持自贸区发布数据出境负面清单,鼓励设立数据跨境服务中心。其二,首批数据出境安全评估结果(多在 2023 年出具)2026 年集中到期,迫使企业进入延期或重新申报窗口。此外,2026 年 4 月外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室(国家发展改革委)对一起外国企业收购中国背景 AI 公司的交易作出禁止投资决定,展示了外商投资安全审查的穿透范围。本文梳理四大审查矩阵与实务时间表。

四大审查矩阵

对外资企业,四个制度相交织。其一,《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令,2021 年 1 月 18 日施行)下的外商投资安全审查:投资军工领域,或投资关系国家安全的重要农产品、重要能源和资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域并取得实际控制权的,须在实施投资前申报。审查”实质重于形式”且穿透式:2026 年 4 月禁止决定适用于两个境外主体之间的交易,因为底层资产、技术与数据源于中国。其二,《网络安全审查办法》(2021 年修订)下的网络安全审查:掌握超 100 万用户个人信息的网络平台运营者赴国外上市前须申报。其三,《数据出境安全评估办法》及《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》下的数据出境安全评估:关键信息基础设施运营者、重要数据出境、超数量阈值个人信息出境须通过评估。其四,《网络数据安全风险评估办法》(2026 年 8 月 20 日施行)确立的网络数据安全风险评估制度:重要数据处理者须开展年度评估。

2026 到期潮与延期条件

首批数据出境安全评估结果多在 2023 年出具。依《规定》第九条,评估结果自出具之日起 3 年内有效(2024 年 3 月《规定》将有效期由 2 年调整为 3 年)。企业继续出境的,须在有效期届满前 60 个工作日内,经所在地省级网信部门向国家网信部门提出延期申请。六项条件须同时满足:数据出境目的、范围未变化;数据处理者与境外接收方未变化;出境个人信息的,未来三年涉及自然人数量增幅不超过原评估结果准予过去三年出境数量的 20%;出境重要数据的,未来三年出境数据规模增幅不超过 20%;与境外接收方订立的法律文件符合《办法》第九条;过去三年按评估结果合规开展且未发生重大数据安全事件。任一项不满足即须重新申报,周期明显更长。

网信办行动计划与数据流动便利化

网信办 2026-2030 行动计划(8 月 21 日印发)释放执法与便利双重信号。它承诺引导网信企业建立健全数据安全合规体系,高效实施三条数据出境路径,支持自贸区在国家数据分类分级保护制度框架下制定发布数据出境负面清单,组织重点行业制定网络数据跨境流动合规指引,鼓励有条件地区设立数据跨境服务中心。对外资企业,这意味着三条路径管理更高效,但合规义务并未放松——计划同时要求依法严厉打击涉数据违法犯罪活动。

外资企业实务时间表

其一,找出每份数据出境安全评估通知书并核对出具日期;在到期前把 60 个工作日延期窗口列入日历。其二,按六项条件自检延期资格;增长率将超 20% 或其他条件不满足的,为完整重新申报做预算。其三,对照三条路径——安全评估、标准合同(签署后 10 个工作日内省级备案)、认证——映射数据流,确认 HR 数据、全球系统访问与 SaaS 运营适用哪条。其四,任何境外上市或敏感行业标的收购,签署前评估网络安全审查与外商投资安全审查门槛。其五,跟踪网信办问答(2026 年 7 月问答已明确延期条件)与发改委指引。其六,重要数据处理者须在 8 月 20 日生效制度下完成首次年度网络数据安全风险评估。

合规提示

延期非自动:批准存在裁量空间,重新申报周期显著更长,建议在到期前 6 个月启动合规自检。20% 增幅上限以原评估结果准予的数量为基准而非当前数量,企业应留存逐年数据出境台账。外商投资安全审查适用于间接与”实质重于形式”的交易;2026 年 4 月禁止决定表明,中国创始、中国资产的 AI 公司即使在境外重组后仍在审查范围。最后,安全审查版图仍在演进——网信办行动计划与待出台的行业数据分类目录将重塑地图,2026 年应视为主动映射之年而非被动合规之年。

Sources

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: What Investors Must File and When (2026)

  • Foreign investments that may affect national security must be self-filed with the working mechanism office before implementation; the office may also require filing.
    可能影响国家安全的外商投资,须在实施前主动向工作机制办公室申报;办公室亦可要求当事人申报。
  • The mandatory filing scope centres on military/defence-related fields and on acquiring controlling interest in important sectors such as key infrastructure, important information technology and internet, and important financial services.
    强制申报范围聚焦军工国防领域,以及取得重要农产品、重要基础设施、重要信息技术与互联网、重要金融服务等领域实际控制权的投资。
  • Review has two stages — general (30 working days) and special (60 working days, extendable) — during which the investor may not close the deal.
    审查分一般审查(30 个工作日)与特别审查(60 个工作日,可延长)两阶段,审查期间不得实施投资。
  • Outcomes are pass, prohibition, or conditional pass; a prohibition requires unwinding to the pre-investment state.
    结论分为通过、禁止、附条件通过;禁止类须限期处分股权资产、恢复到投资前状态。
  • The 2026 “stabilise and optimise foreign investment” action plan reaffirms improving the foreign M&A management regime, signalling tighter coordination between market-entry and security review.
    2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》重申完善外资并购管理制度,预示准入与安审的协同将更紧密。
  • The Manus case (April 2026) is the first prohibition decision under the 2020 rules for an AI-sector inbound deal, a clear warning on tech-export and data-export overlap.
    2026 年 4 月 Manus 案是 2020 年办法下首例针对人工智能领域 inbound 交易的「禁止投资」决定,凸显技术出口与数据出境的叠加风险。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: What Investors Must File and When (2026) | 外商投资安全审查:投资者必须申报什么、何时申报(2026)

China operates a standing foreign investment security review mechanism. The *Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment* (NDRC and MOFCOM Order No. 37, 2020; in force since 18 January 2021) set the framework. A working mechanism, with its office hosted at the NDRC and led by the NDRC and MOFCOM, organises, coordinates and guides reviews.

Which investments must be filed? The investor (or relevant domestic party) must proactively file before implementation when the deal falls in the declared scope: (1) investment in military, military-support or adjacent sensitive areas; or (2) investment in important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport, important cultural products and services, important information technology and internet products and services, important financial services, key technologies and other important fields, where the foreign investor obtains actual control. “Actual control” includes holding over 50% equity, holding less but able to materially influence board/shareholder resolutions, or otherwise materially influencing operations, finance or technology. The office may also require filing for any investment in scope.

The timeline is strict. Upon receiving a complete filing, the office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; during this period the deal must not proceed. If a review is opened, general review completes within 30 working days. If the office finds a possible national-security effect, it launches special review, which completes within 60 working days (extendable). Throughout, the investor may not implement the investment. Outcomes: pass; prohibition (with unwinding to the pre-investment state); or conditional pass where added conditions can eliminate the effect and the investor accepts them in writing.

Enforcement is real. In April 2026 the foreign investment security review working mechanism issued its first “prohibit investment” decision against an inbound acquisition of a Chinese-background AI agent company, citing overlap with export-control, data-security and security-review laws. The transaction had to be unwound. This is a strong signal that deals touching sensitive algorithms, data and key technologies will face heightened scrutiny, and that “re-domiciliation” does not remove the need for compliance.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (Commerce, NDRC and Finance ministries, No. 97 [2026]) reinforces the environment: it commits to revising the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimising merger procedures and payment terms, and strengthening inter-agency coordination. For dealmakers, security review is no longer a back-office afterthought — it is a gating item that should be assessed at term-sheet stage alongside antitrust merger control.


外商投资安全审查:投资者必须申报什么、何时申报(2026)

中国建立了常态化的外商投资安全审查机制。《外商投资安全审查办法》(国家发展改革委、商务部令第 37 号,2020 年;2021 年 1 月 18 日起施行)确立框架。国家建立工作机制,办公室设在国家发展改革委,由国家发改委、商务部牵头,组织、协调、指导安审工作。

哪些投资必须申报?当事人在下列范围内应在实施前主动申报:(一)投资军工、军工配套等国防安全领域,以及在军事设施周边地域投资;(二)投资重要农产品、重要能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化产品与服务、重要信息技术与互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域,并取得所投资企业的实际控制权。「实际控制」包括持股 50% 以上、持股不足 50% 但能重大影响董事会/股东会决议,或能以其他方式重大影响经营、财务、技术。工作机制办公室也可要求当事人申报。

时限严格。办公室收到齐备材料后 15 个工作日内决定是否审查,期间不得实施投资。决定审查的,一般审查 30 个工作日内完成;认为可能影响国家安全的,启动特别审查,60 个工作日内完成(可延长),期间亦不得实施。结论:通过;禁止(须限期处分股权资产、恢复至投资前状态);或附条件通过(附加条件能消除影响且当事人书面承诺接受)。

执法是实打的。2026 年 4 月,外商投资安全审查工作机制对一宗涉及中国背景 AI 智能体企业的 inbound 收购作出首例「禁止投资」决定,理由指向与《出口管制法》《数据安全法》及安审办法的叠加。交易须复原。这强烈提示:触及敏感算法、数据与关键技术的交易将面临更高审查,且「迁册」不能免除合规义务。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、发改委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97 号)强化了这一环境:提出加快修订外国投资者并购境内企业的规定、优化并购流程与对价支付、强化部门协同。对交易方而言,安审不再是后台事项,而是应在 term sheet 阶段与反垄断经营者集中审查并列评估的「闸口」。

How Deal Teams Should Operate

Treat security review as a gating item, not a formality. At term sheet, screen the target’s business against the mandatory-scope fields and ask whether the deal confers actual control. If both are true, build the filing into the signing and long-stop mechanics; do not sign a deal that closes unconditionally before clearance. The 15-working-day triage, then 30 (or 60) working days of review, must be priced into the timeline.

Coordinate with merger control. A deal can be both notifiable to SAMR for antitrust and to the security-review office; the two run on different statutory clocks and can overlap. A combined project plan — with one owner tracking both — avoids the classic mistake of assuming “antitrust cleared” means “investment allowed.” Where the target is in a sensitive tech or data field, also check export-control and data-export angles early, as the Manus case shows they can converge.

Finally, use the consultation channel. Parties may consult the working-mechanism office before filing, and may modify or withdraw the investment during review. Designing the structure to be adjustable — and documenting a clean national-security narrative — materially improves the odds of a pass or a conditional pass rather than a prohibition.

交易团队应如何操作

把安全审查视为闸口,而非形式。在 term sheet 阶段即将标的业务对照强制申报领域,并判断交易是否取得实际控制;若两者皆然,须将申报嵌入签约与长停机制,切勿签署一个在获批前无条件交割的交易。15 个工作日初筛、再 30(或 60)个工作日审查,必须计入时间表。

与经营者集中审查协同。一宗交易可能既须向 SAMR 作反垄断申报,又须向安审办公室申报;两者法定期限不同且可重叠。设单一负责人统筹两者的合并计划,可避免「反垄断过了就等于投资获批」的典型误判。若标的处敏感技术或数据领域,还应早查出口管制与数据出境,正如 Manus 案所示,它们可能汇合。

善用商谈渠道。当事人可在申报前咨询工作机制办公室,并在审查中修改或撤销投资。将结构设计为可调整、并备好清晰的国家安全叙事,能显著提升「通过」或「附条件通过」而非「禁止」的概率。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Filing duty: self-file before implementation when in scope; office may also require filing.
  • Mandatory scope: military/defence fields; acquiring control in important agriculture, energy, infrastructure, IT/internet, financial services, key tech.
  • Control test: >50% equity, or <50% but material board/shareholder influence, or other material influence.
  • Clock: 15 working days triage; 30 (general) / 60 (special, extendable) working days review; no closing during review.
  • Outcomes: pass; prohibition (unwind); conditional pass (written acceptance).
  • Recent signal: April 2026 first prohibition under the 2020 rules for an AI inbound deal.
  • Coordinate: run security review alongside merger control and (if relevant) export-control/data-export checks.

实务速查

  • 申报义务: 在范围内须实施前主动申报;办公室亦可要求申报。
  • 强制范围: 军工国防领域;取得重要农业、能源、基础设施、信息技术与互联网、金融服务、关键技术控制。
  • 控制测试: 持股超 50%,或不足 50% 但重大影响董事会/股东会,或其他重大影响。
  • 时限: 15 工作日初筛;30(一般)/60(特别,可延)工作日审查;审查期间不得交割。
  • 结论: 通过;禁止(复原);附条件通过(书面接受)。
  • 近期信号: 2026 年 4 月 2020 办法下首例 AI inbound 交易禁止。
  • 协同: 安审与经营者集中及(如适用)出口管制/数据出境一并考量。

Sources

Critical Infrastructure Security Review in China: The CII Gate

  • Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) protection is codified in the 2021 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》, effective 1 September 2021 and reinforced through 2026 implementing rules.
    关键信息基础设施(CII)保护由2021年《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(2021年9月1日施行)确立,并通过2026年相关实施规则持续强化。
  • CII operators must pass CAC-led network security review before procuring network products or services that may affect national security—a direct gate on inbound technology supply.
    关基运营者在采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务前,须通过网信办主导的网络安全审查——这构成对境外技术供给的直接关口。
  • A multi-sector identification mechanism designates CII across telecommunications, energy, finance, transport, public services, and e-government.
    跨行业认定机制在电信、能源、金融、交通、公共服务及电子政务等领域认定关基。
  • Foreign suppliers face “secure and controllable” expectations, localisation of core data, and ongoing compliance audits once inside a CII supply chain.
    外国供应商一旦进入关基供应链,即面临”安全可控”要求、核心数据本地化及持续合规审计。
  • As of 2026, designations have broadened to cloud, data centres, and large platforms, raising diligence obligations for entrants selling into these sectors.
    截至2026年,认定范围已扩展至云、数据中心及大型平台,提高了向这些行业销售的准入者尽调义务。
  • Missteps can exclude a vendor from CII procurement entirely, a commercial outcome more damaging than a single deal loss.
    失误可能导致供应商被整体排除在关基采购之外,其商业后果甚于单一交易损失。

Critical Infrastructure Security Review in China: The CII Gate | 中国关键基础设施安全审查:CII关口

The Statutory Backbone

Critical Information Infrastructure protection in China is anchored by the 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》 (Regulations on the Security Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure), promulgated as State Council Order No. 745 on 30 July 2021 and effective from 1 September 2021. It sits beneath the 《网络安全法》 (2017) and works in tandem with the CAC’s 《网络安全审查办法》 (2022). Through 2026, implementing rules from the CAC and sector regulators have progressively sharpened the obligations on operators and their suppliers.

What Counts as CII?

CII means information infrastructure whose impairment or data leakage would gravely endanger national security, the national economy, or public welfare. Designation follows a multi-sector identification mechanism led by the CAC together with industry regulators. Sectors typically captured include:

  • Telecommunications and broadcasting;
  • Energy and power;
  • Finance;
  • Transport and logistics;
  • Water, public-health, and other public services;
  • E-government and national defence-adjacent systems.

By 2026, cloud computing platforms, large data centres, and systemically important internet platforms have been drawn into the CII perimeter, widening the population of operators—and their vendors—subject to review.

The Procurement Gate

The most consequential rule for foreign suppliers: a CII operator intending to procure network products or services that may affect national security must apply for a CAC-led network security review and may not proceed with the procurement until cleared. The review assesses:

  • Risk of foreign-government control or coercion;
  • Risk of tampering, surveillance, or data leakage;
  • Supply-chain continuity and “secure and controllable” (安全可控) attributes.

This makes CII procurement a hard gate: a foreign technology vendor cannot close a sale into a CII operator without the operator first clearing review, often with the vendor’s own architecture and provenance under examination.

Supplier Obligations Once Designated

Suppliers that enter a CII supply chain assume durable duties:

  • Secure-and-controllable commitments, including source transparency and remediation cooperation;
  • Core-data localisation, keeping important and core data onshore;
  • Ongoing audits, with the operator required to conduct annual self-assessments and report to the regulator;
  • Incident response, with strict breach-notification timelines.

Foreign vendors should expect contractual clauses嵌入 (embedded) these obligations and should price the compliance burden accordingly.

2026 Trajectory

The 2024–2026 period has seen CII rules extended to emerging environments—edge computing, AI services, and cross-border cloud—and a tightening of the “secure and controllable” standard. For market entrants, the practical effect is that selling advanced IT, security, or cloud products into Chinese state-linked and platform customers now presupposes CII readiness. Early engagement with the operator’s regulatory channel is advisable before a bid is finalised.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Determine if your customer is a CII operator. If so, assume the procurement gate applies and plan for review lead time.
  2. Pre-position compliance artefacts: source provenance, security certifications, data-handling statements, and a local support entity.
  3. Avoid sole-source foreign dependencies where a domestic alternative can be paired, easing the “secure and controllable” assessment.
  4. Negotiate allocation of review risk in the contract—who bears delay, cost, and disqualification.
  5. Localise core data and operations to reduce the surface area of review.

Commercial Stakes

Exclusion from CII procurement is not a one-deal loss; it can be an industry-wide disqualification. Because CII operators span the backbone of the economy, a vendor barred on security grounds loses access to the most strategic and durable customer base in China. Treating CII readiness as a market-entry prerequisite—rather than a reactive clearance—is the disciplined approach for 2026.


中国关键基础设施安全审查:CII关口

法律主干

中国关键信息基础设施保护由《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》确立。该条例于2021年7月30日以国务院第745号令公布,自2021年9月1日起施行。它位于《网络安全法》(2017年)之下,并与网信办《网络安全审查办法》(2022年)协同运作。2026年,网信办及各行业主管部门的实施规则持续细化运营者及其供应商的义务。

何为CII?

CII 指一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或数据泄露,可能严重危害国家安全、国计民生或公共利益的网络基础设施。认定遵循由网信办会同行业主管部门主导的跨部门认定机制。通常被纳入的行业包括:

  • 电信与广播电视;
  • 能源与电力;
  • 金融;
  • 交通运输与物流;
  • 水利、公共卫生及其他公共服务;
  • 电子政务及国防相关系统。

至2026年,云计算平台、大型数据中心及具有系统重要性的互联网平台已被纳入 CII 范围,扩大了须接受审查的运营者及其供应商群体。

采购关口

对外国供应商最具约束力的规则是:关基运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务,须申报网信办主导的网络安全审查,且未获通过前不得采购。审查评估以下方面:

  • 受外国政府控制或胁迫的风险;
  • 被篡改、监视或数据泄露的风险;
  • 供应链连续性及”安全可控”属性。

这使关基采购成为一道硬关口:外国技术供应商若未先由运营者通过审查(往往需审查供应商自身的架构与来源),便无法向关基运营者完成销售。

认定后的供应商义务

进入关基供应链的供应商须承担持续性义务:

  • 安全可控承诺,包括来源透明与配合整改;
  • 核心数据本地化,将重要数据与核心数据留存境内;
  • 持续审计,运营者须开展年度自评估并向监管报告;
  • 事件响应,须遵守严格的泄露通报时限。

外国供应商应预期合同中嵌入上述义务条款,并据此核算合规成本。

2026年走向

2024–2026年间,CII 规则已扩展至新兴场景——边缘计算、人工智能服务及跨境云——并收紧了”安全可控”标准。对市场准入者而言,其实质影响是:向中国的国资关联及平台客户销售先进 IT、安全或云产品,如今须以 CII 就绪为前提。在投标最终确定前,宜尽早与运营者的监管渠道沟通。

市场准入实务指引

  1. 判定客户是否为 CII 运营者。 若是,应假定适用采购关口,并为审查预留前置时间。
  2. 预先备妥合规材料:来源溯源、安全认证、数据处理说明及本地支持实体。
  3. 避免 sole-source 外国依赖,在可搭配境内替代方案处采用,以缓解”安全可控”评估。
  4. 在合同中约定审查风险分配——由谁承担延误、成本与失格。
  5. 将核心数据与运营本地化,以缩减受审查的暴露面。

商业利害关系

被排除于关基采购之外,并非单一交易损失,而可能构成全行业失格。由于关基运营者横跨经济骨干,因安全原因被禁入的供应商将失去中国最具战略性与最稳定的客户群。将 CII 就绪作为市场准入前提——而非被动应对的审批——是2026年应有的纪律化做法。

Sources

Data Security Review in China: CAC-Led Controls for 2026

  • China’s data-security review is led by the CAC under the 2022 《网络安全审查办法》, reinforced by the 2021 《数据安全法》 and 《个人信息保护法》, all in force through 2026.
    中国的数据安全审查由网信办依据2022年《网络安全审查办法》主导,并辅以2021年《数据安全法》与《个人信息保护法》,上述规则在2026年持续有效。
  • Network security review is mandatory for CII operators procuring network products/services that may affect national security, and for platforms holding over one million users’ personal information seeking overseas listing.
    网络安全审查对采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品/服务的关基运营者,以及拟境外上市、掌握超100万用户个人信息的平台具有强制性。
  • A “data export” security assessment by the CAC is required before important data or large-scale personal information leaves China, gating many inbound and outbound deals.
    重要数据或大规模个人信息出境前,须通过网信办的数据出境安全评估,这构成众多境内外交易的关口。
  • As of 2026, review focus has sharpened on cross-border data flows, algorithm filing, and the security of core data centres and cloud services.
    截至2026年,审查重点已聚焦跨境数据流动、算法备案,以及核心数据中心与云服务的安全。
  • Deal teams must screen data assets for “important data” classification and build CAC assessment timelines into the transaction schedule.
    交易团队须对数据资产是否构成”重要数据”进行筛查,并将网信办评估时限纳入交易时间表。
  • Penalties for non-compliance include rectification, suspension of data-export activities, fines, and in serious cases criminal referral.
    违规后果包括责令改正、暂停数据出境活动、罚款,严重者移送刑事处理。

Data Security Review in China: CAC-Led Controls for 2026 | 中国数据安全审查:2026年网信办主导的管控

The Legal Triad

China’s data governance rests on three pillars, all operative in 2026:

  • The 《网络安全法》 (Cybersecurity Law, effective 1 June 2017);
  • The 《数据安全法》 (Data Security Law, effective 1 September 2021);
  • The 《个人信息保护法》 (PIPL, effective 1 November 2021).

These are implemented and enforced, for security-review purposes, primarily by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC, 国家互联网信息办公室). The central procedural instrument is the 《网络安全审查办法》 (Network Security Review Measures), revised by the CAC with twelve other departments and effective from 1 June 2022 (CAC Order No. 8).

When Network Security Review Is Mandatory

Two scenarios trigger a mandatory CAC-led review:

  1. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) operators procuring network products or services that may affect national security. The CII operator must apply for review through its industry regulator; the product or service cannot be procured before clearance.
  2. Platform operators with personal information of more than one million users that seek an overseas listing (initial public offering outside mainland China). Such a listing requires a CAC security review beforehand.

The review examines risks of control by foreign governments, data tampering or leakage, supply-chain disruption, and the concentration of important data.

Data Export Security Assessment

Perhaps the most transaction-relevant mechanism is the CAC’s security assessment for cross-border data transfers. Under PIPL and the Data Security Law, before “important data” or large volumes of personal information are transferred outside China, the handler must pass a CAC-led assessment (or meet an alternative pathway such as certification or a standard contract, subject to thresholds). For market entrants, this gates:

  • Sharing group data with an overseas parent;
  • Cloud or SaaS arrangements routing data offshore;
  • M&A where the target’s data must be integrated into a foreign group.

The assessment evaluates the necessity of the transfer, the volume and sensitivity of data, and the protection level in the receiving jurisdiction.

2026 Enforcement Emphasis

Entering 2026, CAC activity has concentrated on:

  • Cross-border flow governance, including tightening of important-data inventories and the promotion of free-trade-zone “negative lists” for data export;
  • Algorithmic governance, with the 2022 《互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定》 requiring algorithm filing for recommendation services;
  • Core infrastructure security, covering data centres, cloud, and large-platform resilience.

The through-line is that data is treated as a sovereign asset: control over it, and its movement across borders, is a national-security question, not merely a privacy one.

Practical Steps for Entrants

  1. Classify the data. Determine whether the target holds “important data” or “core data”, and quantify personal-information volumes against the one-million-user and export thresholds.
  2. Map transfer pathways. Identify every outbound flow—group reporting, vendor access, cloud replication—and match it to the correct mechanism (assessment, certification, standard contract).
  3. File early for listings. Any overseas IPO by a qualifying platform must clear CAC review before launch.
  4. Negotiate the SPA. Make data-export clearance a condition precedent and allocate remediation costs.
  5. Localise where needed. In-sector data centres and in-China storage reduce exposure.

Consequences of Non-Compliance

CAC can order rectification, suspend data-export activities, confiscate unlawful gains, and impose fines reaching significant sums; serious cases may trigger criminal referral. For an acquirer, unmitigated data-export risk can destroy the value of a data-rich target and delay or block an overseas listing. Treating data-security review as a parallel, co-equal workstream to antitrust and foreign-investment review is now standard prudence.


中国数据安全审查:2026年网信办主导的管控

法律三重支柱

中国数据治理建立在三大支柱之上,均于2026年有效:

  • 《网络安全法》(2017年6月1日施行);
  • 《数据安全法》(2021年9月1日施行);
  • 《个人信息保护法》(2021年11月1日施行)。

就安全审查而言,上述法律主要由国家互联网信息办公室(网信办)实施与执行。其核心程序性文件是《网络安全审查办法》——由网信办联合其他十二部门修订,自2022年6月1日起施行(第8号令)。

网络安全审查的强制触发

两类情形触发网信办主导的强制性审查:

  1. 关键信息基础设施运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品或服务。关基运营者须通过行业主管部门申报审查,且在获批前不得采购该产品或服务。
  2. 掌握超过100万用户个人信息的平台运营者拟赴境外上市(在中国大陆以外首次公开发行)。此类上市须事先通过网信办安全审查。

审查评估被外国政府控制、数据被篡改或泄露、供应链中断,以及重要数据集中等方面的风险。

数据出境安全评估

最具交易相关性的机制,或许是网信办主导的数据出境安全评估。依据《个人信息保护法》与《数据安全法》,在”重要数据”或大规模个人信息向境外提供前,处理者须通过网信办评估(或满足认证、标准合同等替代路径,并受门槛限制)。对市场准入者而言,这构成以下交易的关口:

  • 与境外母公司共享集团数据;
  • 将数据离岸路由的云或 SaaS 安排;
  • 标的的数据须并入外国集团的并购交易。

评估考察传输的必要性、数据的体量及敏感性,以及接收方所在法域的保护水平。

2026年执法重点

进入2026年,网信办的工作集中于:

  • 跨境流动治理,包括收紧重要数据目录,并推动自贸试验区数据出境”负面清单”;
  • 算法治理,依据2022年《互联网信息服务算法推荐管理规定》对推荐服务实行算法备案;
  • 核心基础设施安全,涵盖数据中心、云及大型平台韧性。

其内在逻辑在于:数据被视为一种主权资产——对其的控制及跨境流动,是一个国家安全问题,而非单纯的隐私问题。

市场准入实务步骤

  1. 对数据分类。 判定标的是否持有”重要数据”或”核心数据”,并量化个人信息体量,对照100万用户及出境门槛。
  2. 梳理传输路径。 识别每一处出境流向——集团报告、供应商访问、云端复制——并匹配正确机制(评估、认证、标准合同)。
  3. 上市前尽早申报。 符合条件的平台赴境外上市须在启动前通过网信办审查。
  4. 协商协议条款。 将数据出境审批设为先决条件,并分配补救成本。
  5. 必要时本地化。 境内数据中心与境内存储可降低风险敞口。

违规后果

网信办可责令整改、暂停数据出境活动、没收违法所得,并处以可观罚款;严重者可移送刑事处理。对收购方而言,未缓释的数据出境风险可能摧毁数据富集型标的的价值,并拖延或阻断境外上市。将数据安全审查视为与反垄断、外商投资审查并行且同等重要的工作流,已成为标准审慎做法。

Sources

Key Technology M&A Review in China: Security Meets Competition

  • Foreign acquisitions of Chinese technology companies are swept into three overlapping regimes: MOFCOM/NDRC security review, SAMR antitrust clearance, and technology-export licensing.
    外资收购中国科技企业同时落入三套相互叠加的制度:发改委/商务部安全审查、市场监管总局反垄断审批,以及技术出口许可。
  • The Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports (revised 2020, with ongoing 2023–2025 refinement) can block or condition the transfer of sensitive know-how embedded in a target.
    《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》(2020年修订,并在2023–2025年持续完善)可阻止或附条件于标的中敏感技术诀窍的转移。
  • “Control” of a critical-technology enterprise triggers mandatory national security review even below merger thresholds, and semiconductors sit at the centre of 2026 scrutiny.
    取得关键技术企业”控制权”即便未达并购门槛亦触发强制性国家安全审查,而半导体正处于2026年审查的核心。
  • The 2022 revised Anti-Monopoly Law and SAMR guidance treat entanglements between tech giants and startups as potentially competition-reducing, adding a second gate.
    2022年修订《反垄断法》及市场监管总局指引将科技巨头与初创企业间的捆绑视为可能减损竞争,构成第二道关口。
  • Deals should budget for parallel timelines and build a technology-export clearance condition into the SPA before signing.
    交易应为并行的审查时限预留预算,并在签约前于股权转让协议中设置技术出口审批先决条件。
  • As of 2026, the “small yard, high fence” approach means narrow but strict controls on frontier tech rather than blanket bans, raising the premium on precise target mapping.
    截至2026年,”小院高墙”思路意味着对前沿技术采取范围窄但强度高的管控,而非全面禁止,这进一步凸显精确梳理标的的重要性。

Key Technology M&A Review in China: Security Meets Competition | 中国关键技术并购审查:安全与竞争的双重关口

Three Regimes, One Deal

A foreign buyer pursuing a Chinese technology target rarely faces a single clearance. Three regimes routinely converge:

  1. National security review under the 2020 《外商投资安全审查办法》 (MOFCOM/NDRC Order No. 37) where the target sits in a key sector or holds critical technology.
  2. Antitrust merger control under the 《反垄断法》 administered by SAMR, where turnover thresholds are met.
  3. Technology-export control under the 《技术进出口管理条例》 and the 《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》 (Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports), which governs whether the underlying know-how can lawfully leave Chinese control.

The third regime is the one most often missed by foreign teams who plan only for antitrust and security review.

The Technology Export Catalogue

The Catalogue, administered by MOFCOM, lists technologies whose export is prohibited or restricted. The 2020 revision significantly expanded restricted entries—adding or tightening items across civilian drones, AI, quantum computing, laser, and satellite technologies. It was further refined through 2023–2025 consultations, and as of 2026 the restricted list captures a broad band of frontier and dual-use know-how. Where a target’s value depends on a restricted technology, the buyer must obtain an export licence (or restructure to keep the technology in China) before the deal can close. Failure to do so can void the transaction or attract penalties.

Security Review of Tech Targets

Under Order No. 37, acquiring “control” of an enterprise in critical and emerging technologies triggers mandatory security review. The 2026 posture is unambiguous: semiconductors, advanced packaging, EDA tools, and certain AI model capabilities are treated as core national-security assets. The review’s two-stage clock (30 + 60+ working days) applies, and conditions short of prohibition—such as onshore retention of R&D, governance limits, or data-localisation—are common outcomes.

The Antitrust Overlay

Even where security review is cleared, SAMR merger control may independently bite. The 2022 revised 《反垄断法》 strengthened the treatment of “gun-jumping” and introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism for deficient filings. For tech deals, SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 and subsequent guidance signal that acquisitions by dominant platforms of nascent competitors warrant close scrutiny for potential elimination of future competition. A clean security clearance does not immunise a deal from an antitrust hold.

“Small Yard, High Fence” in Practice

China’s 2024–2026 technology-control posture is often described as “small yard, high fence”: the restricted perimeter is deliberately narrow but the controls within it are strict. For market entrants this means most ordinary technology transactions proceed, but any target touching listed frontier items—advanced chips, certain algorithms, cryptography, and dual-use sensors—will face a high wall. Precise target mapping against the Catalogue and the key-sector annex is therefore the single highest-leverage step in deal planning.

Practical Deal Structuring

  • Run a tri-regime screen early. Map the target to the security-review key sectors, the merger thresholds, and the export Catalogue simultaneously.
  • Sequence the filings. Export-licence applications and security-review filings often inform each other; begin both before signing.
  • Use SPA conditions precedent for export approval and security clearance, with long-stop dates reflecting the special-review clock.
  • Consider onshore carve-outs. Retaining restricted technology and R&D within a Chinese subsidiary, while the foreign parent acquires non-restricted assets, can clear the export gate.
  • Plan for behavioural remedies. Expect possible commitments on R&D location, local data storage, and board governance.

Consequences of Missteps

A technology-export violation is distinct from, and can be more severe than, a security-review failure: the restricted know-how cannot lawfully transfer, which may collapse the deal’s value thesis. Combined with possible antitrust hold and security-order unwinding, the cumulative risk is substantial. Foreign acquirers should treat the Catalogue as a first-read document, not an afterthought.


中国关键技术并购审查:安全与竞争的双重关口

三套制度,一项交易

外资收购中国科技标的,鲜少只需一道审批。三套制度通常会汇聚于同一交易:

  1. 国家安全审查:依据2020年《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委/商务部第37号令),当标的位于关键领域或掌握关键技术时适用。
  2. 反垄断经营者集中审查:依据《反垄断法》,由市场监管总局主管,于营业额达标时适用。
  3. 技术出口管制:依据《技术进出口管理条例》及《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》,规范底层技术诀窍能否合法移出中国控制。

第三套制度最常被只规划反垄断与安全审查的外资团队忽视。

技术出口目录

该目录由商务部主管,列明禁止或限制出口的技术。2020年修订大幅扩充了限制类条目——在民用无人机、人工智能、量子计算、激光及卫星技术等方面新增或收紧了项目。该目录在2023–2025年通过征求意见持续完善,截至2026年,限制清单已覆盖广泛的前沿与两用技术诀窍。当标的价值依赖某项受限技术时,买方须在交割前取得出口许可(或将技术留在中国境内并重组交易)。否则交易可能被认定无效或招致处罚。

科技标的的安全审查

依据第37号令,取得关键和新兴技术企业”控制权”将触发强制性安全审查。2026年的立场十分明确:半导体、先进封装、EDA工具及部分人工智能模型能力被视为核心国家安全资产。审查的两段式时限(30 + 60个工作日起)适用,而低于禁止水平的附条件措施——如研发境内留存、治理限制或数据本地化——是常见结果。

反垄断叠加

即便安全审查通过,市场监管总局的经营者集中审查仍可能独立介入。2022年修订的《反垄断法》强化了对”抢跑”行为的规制,并引入了针对瑕疵申报的”停钟”机制。对于科技交易,市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》及后续指引表明, dominant 平台收购新生竞争对手的交易,将因可能消除未来竞争而受到密切审视。安全审查的通过并不能使交易豁免反垄断阻却。

“小院高墙”的实践

中国2024–2026年的技术管控态势常被概括为”小院高墙”:受限范围刻意收窄,但其中的管控强度很高。对市场准入者而言,这意味着多数普通技术交易可正常推进,但凡触及所列前沿项目——先进芯片、特定算法、密码学及两用传感器——的交易都将面临高墙。因此,对照目录与关键领域附件精确梳理标的,是交易规划中杠杆率最高的一步。

交易结构实务

  • 尽早开展三制度筛查。 同步将标的映射至安全审查关键领域、并购门槛及出口目录。
  • 统筹申报顺序。 出口许可申请与安全审查申报常相互影响,应在签约前同步启动。
  • 在协议中设置审批先决条件,针对出口批准与安全审查设置反映特别审查时限的最晚截止日。
  • 考虑境内分拆。 将受限技术与研发保留于中国子公司,由外国母公司收购非受限资产,可越过出口关口。
  • 为行为性救济作准备。 应预判可能涉及研发地点、本地数据存储及董事会治理方面的承诺。

失误后果

技术出口违规不同于安全审查失败,且可能更为严重:受限技术诀窍无法合法转移,可能从根本上瓦解交易的价值逻辑。叠加可能的反垄断阻却与安全审查撤销令,累积风险相当可观。外资收购方应将技术目录视为首要审阅文件,而非事后补充。

Sources

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Market-Entry Guide

  • China’s foreign investment security review is a mandatory, two-stage regime administered by MOFCOM and NDRC under the 2020 Measures (Order No. 37), in force since 18 January 2021.
    中国外商投资安全审查是由商务部与国家发展改革委依据2020年《外商投资安全审查办法》(第37号令,自2021年1月18日起施行)实施的强制性两段式审查制度。
  • Acquiring “control” of a Chinese entity in defined key sectors—defence, technology, energy, transport, and data-intensive industries—triggers review even where merger-control thresholds are not met.
    在国防、科技、能源、交通及数据密集型等规定关键领域内取得中国实体”控制权”的交易,即便未达经营者集中申报标准亦触发审查。
  • The general review runs 30 working days; a triggered special national security review lasts at least 60 working days and is extendable, materially affecting deal timelines.
    一般性审查时限为30个工作日;一旦启动特别审查,至少持续60个工作日且可延长,对交易时间表影响显著。
  • Deals closed without clearance can be unwound, restructured, or subjected to divestment and penalties, so pre-closing analysis is essential for inbound investors.
    未经审查即完成的交易可能被责令恢复原状、变更或转让,并面临处罚,因此外资方在交割前开展分析至关重要。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny has intensified around critical and emerging technologies, semiconductors, and data-rich targets, reflecting a broader whole-of-government national security posture.
    截至2026年,对关键及新兴技术、半导体以及数据富集型标的的审查明显趋严,反映出更广泛的整体政府国家安全立场。
  • Foreign investors should map the key-sector catalogue, consider minority or non-control structures, and engage qualified PRC counsel early to avoid irreversible remediation.
    外资方应梳理关键领域目录,考虑少数股权或非控制型交易结构,并尽早聘请合格中国法律顾问,以避免不可逆的补救措施。

Foreign Investment Security Review in China: A 2026 Market-Entry Guide | 中国外商投资安全审查:2026年市场准入指南

The Regulatory Anchor: Order No. 37

The foreign investment national security review of the People’s Republic of China is governed by the 《外商投资安全审查办法》 (Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment), jointly promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) as Order No. 37 on 19 December 2020. The Measures entered into force on 18 January 2021 and remain the operative rulebook for 2026. They sit alongside—but are legally distinct from—the Negative List for market access and the SAMR-led antimonopoly merger-control system. A transaction can be perfectly lawful under the Negative List yet still be unwound for failing security review, a point that surprises many first-time entrants.

When Does a Review Trigger?

The Measures cast a wide net. Two principal scenarios require mandatory review:

  • Military and adjacent zones. Any foreign investment in enterprises engaged in military-industrial production or in scientific research and design units serving national defence, and any foreign investment within the prescribed perimeter around military facilities and military-use ports, airports, and border crossings.
  • Control of key-sector enterprises. Where a foreign investor acquires “control” (控制权) of a domestic enterprise whose business falls within the key areas enumerated in the Measures’ annex. These cover national defence and the military; agriculture, energy and mineral resources; infrastructure, transport, and utilities; and critical and emerging technologies.

“Control” is defined functionally—holding 50% or more of voting rights, or otherwise being able to exert a decisive influence over the target’s resolutions, board, or operations. Importantly, the review can bite even where the deal is too small to meet SAMR’s merger-notification thresholds, making it a trap for unwary minority-led acquisitions structured as control.

The Two-Stage Adjudicative Process

The system is deliberately sequential:

StageWhat happensStatutory timeframe
General review (一般性审查)The inter-ministerial office screens the filing30 working days
Special review (特别审查)Escalated to a national security assessmentAt least 60 working days, extendable

If the general review finds no national security concern, the transaction clears. If concerns arise, it escalates to the special review, which may impose conditions, prohibit the deal, or—retrospectively—order restructuring or divestment. Parties may also file voluntarily where uncertain, buying certainty at the cost of timetable.

Interaction with the Negative List and Other Regimes

Security review operates in parallel with the foreign investment Negative List. The 2024 edition of the 《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)》 issued by NDRC and MOFCOM continues to restrict or prohibit foreign investment in a catalogue of sectors; a transaction permitted by the Negative List is not exempt from security review. The same deal can concurrently require SAMR merger clearance, a CAC data-security assessment, and MOFCOM/NDRC security review. Sequencing these workstreams deliberately is now standard deal hygiene for China inbound M&A.

The 2026 Enforcement Posture

Although Order No. 37 dates from 2020, its application has sharpened. Entering 2026, reviewing authorities have visibly prioritised:

  • Critical and emerging technologies, especially semiconductors, advanced computing, and dual-use items;
  • Data-rich targets, where control would concentrate sensitive personal or important data in foreign hands;
  • Infrastructure and utilities with geopolitical sensitivity.

This intensification tracks the broader national-security framing of the 2021 《数据安全法》 (Data Security Law) and the 2022 revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), and the steady refinement of the foreign investment Negative List’s restricted catalogues. Inbound investors should assume that any deal touching these sectors will receive heightened scrutiny and should budget for the full special-review clock.

Practical Steps for Market Entrants

  1. Map the target against the key-sector annex before signing. A control transaction in a listed area is presumptively reviewable.
  2. Model alternative structures. Minority stakes, golden-share arrangements held by domestic partners, or contractual (rather than equity) control may avoid a “control” finding—each carries its own legal nuance and must be assessed on the facts.
  3. File early and voluntarily when in doubt. The 30-working-day general clock starts on acceptance; waiting until signing can compress the deal timeline dangerously.
  4. Build remediation into the SPA. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and reverse termination fees calibrated to a possible special review.
  5. Coordinate with merger-control and cybersecurity reviews so that one clearance does not silently prejudice another.

Consequences of Getting It Wrong

Transactions completed without required clearance are vulnerable: the reviewing authority may order the foreign investor to dispose of the interest, transfer assets, change the structure, or restore the original state, and may impose penalties. Because unwinding a closed deal is costly and often practically impossible, the commercial risk is borne almost entirely by the buyer. For this reason, security-review analysis is now a standard workstream in any China inbound transaction involving sensitive sectors.

How This Compares Globally

The Chinese regime is frequently compared with the U.S. CFIUS process. Both are ex ante, national-security-oriented, and capable of blocking or conditioning foreign acquisitions. China’s system is distinctive in its explicit sector catalogue, its codified two-stage timeline, and its tight coupling with the Negative List and the data-security regime. Investors familiar with CFIUS will recognise the logic but should not assume the timelines or sector scope translate directly.


中国外商投资安全审查:2026年市场准入指南

制度基石:第37号令

中国的外商投资国家安全审查由《外商投资安全审查办法》规范。该办法由国家发展改革委与商务部于2020年12月19日联合发布(第37号令),自2021年1月18日起施行,并仍是2026年适用的规则基础。它与市场准入负面清单以及国家市场监管总局主导的经营者集中反垄断审查在法律上相互独立。实践中,一项交易即便完全符合负面清单规定,仍可能因未通过安全审查而被否决或撤销,这一点常令初次进入中国市场的投资者感到意外。

哪些交易触发审查?

《办法》的适用范围相当广泛,主要存在两类强制审查情形:

  • 军工及邻近区域。 外国投资者对军工生产企业和军工科研设计单位,以及对军工设施、军用港口、机场、边境口岸周边划定区域内的投资。
  • 关键领域企业控制权。 外国投资者取得境内企业”控制权”(控制权),且该企业经营业务落入《办法》附件所列关键领域,包括国防军工、农业、能源与矿产资源、基础设施、交通运输,以及关键和新兴技术。

“控制权”采功能化定义——持有50%以上表决权,或能够对被审查企业决议、董事会或经营施加决定性影响。值得注意的是,即便交易规模过小而未达市场监管总局的经营者集中申报标准,仍可能触发安全审查,这对以控制为目的、却采用少数股权安排的收购构成潜在陷阱。

两段式审查程序

该制度在程序设计上呈顺序递进:

阶段审查内容法定时限
一般性审查联席会议办公室对申报进行筛查30个工作日
特别审查启动国家安全评估至少60个工作日,可延长

若一般性审查未发现国家安全风险,交易即获通过。若存在风险,则进入特别审查,审查机关可附加条件、禁止交易,或在事后责令变更或剥离。当事人亦可在不确定时主动申报,以时间换取确定性。

与负面清单及其他制度的衔接

安全审查与外商投资负面清单并行。国家发展改革委、商务部发布的《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)》2024年版继续在目录中对部分领域采取限制或禁止。符合负面清单的交易并不豁免安全审查。同一项交易可能同时需要市场监管总局的经营者集中审批、网信办的数据安全评估,以及发改委/商务部的安全审查。审慎地统筹这些工作流,已成为中国 inbound 并购的标准操作。

2026年执法态势

尽管第37号令颁布于2020年,但其适用在近年明显趋严。进入2026年,审查机关明显优先关注以下领域:

  • 关键和新兴技术,特别是半导体、先进计算与两用物项;
  • 数据富集型标的,控制此类标的将使敏感个人信息或重要数据集中于外资之手;
  • 具有地缘政治敏感性的基础设施与公用事业。

这一趋严态势与2021年《数据安全法》及2022年修订《反垄断法》所确立的广义国家安全框架一脉相承,也与外商投资负面清单受限目录的持续完善相呼应。外资方应预判:任何涉及上述领域的交易都将受到更高强度审查,并应为完整的特别审查时限预留预算。

市场准入实务步骤

  1. 签约前对照关键领域附件梳理标的。 在列明领域内取得控制权的交易,原则上具有可审查性。
  2. 设计替代交易结构。 少数股权、由境内合作方持有的”金股”安排,或合同控制(而非股权控制)可能避免构成”控制权”认定——但每种安排均有其法律细微差别,须依事实评估。
  3. 存疑时尽早主动申报。 30个工作日的一般性审查时限自受理起算;等到签约后再申报会严重压缩交易时间表。
  4. 在股权转让协议中嵌入补救机制。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,以及针对可能出现的特别审查的反向终止费。
  5. 统筹经营者集中与网络安全审查,避免一项审批在无意中损及另一项。

违规后果

未经审查即完成的交易面临风险:审查机关可责令外国投资者转让股权、转移资产、变更结构或恢复原状,并可能处以处罚。由于已交割交易的撤销成本高昂且往往在实操中难以实现,商业风险几乎完全由买方承担。正因如此,安全审查分析已成为任何涉及敏感领域的中国 inbound 交易的标准工作流。

国际比较

中国的审查制度常被与美国 CFIUS 程序比较。二者均属事前、以国家安全为导向、并可禁止或附加条件于外资收购。中国的制度特点在于其明确的行业目录、成文的二段式时限,以及与负面清单及数据安全制度紧密耦合。熟悉 CFIUS 的投资者可识别其逻辑,但不应想当然地认为时限或行业范围可直接对应。

Sources

Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026)

  • China’s Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment Utilisation, issued on 16 June 2026, commits to accelerating the revision of the 2006 Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“the 10-Order”).
    2026 年 6 月 16 日印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺加快修订 2006 年《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(”10 号令”)。
  • The Action Plan also allows qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-related industries, widening foreign access to China’s A-share capital market.
    行动方案允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,拓宽外资进入 A 股资本市场的路径。
  • The planned revision is expected to remove obsolete approval clauses, modernise consideration and payment rules, and align cross-share-swap and strategic-investment frameworks with the Foreign Investment Law and the new strategic-investment measures.
    修订预计将删除过时审批条款,现代化对价与支付规则,并使跨境换股、战投框架与《外商投资法》及新战投办法相衔接。
  • Provincial government and media commentary in August 2026 underscores the Action Plan as a shift from “admission” to “post-admission operations” for foreign investment.
    2026 年 8 月地方政府与媒体解读普遍强调,行动方案标志外资政策从”准入”转向”准营”。
  • For foreign acquirers, the expected revision and strategic-investment relaxation could reduce transaction friction, but the current rules and mandatory filings remain fully applicable today.
    对外国收购方,预期的修订与战投放宽可能降低交易摩擦,但现行规则与强制申报在当下完全适用。

Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026) | 中国外资并购:修订 2006 年并购规定与新的战略投资通道(2026 年)

Why this matters now

The Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment Utilisation (《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》, Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97), issued on 16 June 2026 by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance with State Council approval, is the first comprehensive foreign-investment policy document of the “15th Five-Year Plan” period. Among its fifteen measures, two provisions speak directly to foreign M&A. First, the Action Plan commits to “accelerating the revision of the Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors and optimising the merger-control process and consideration-payment requirements”. Second, it allows qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate, as strategic investors, in securities issuance of listed companies in industries unrelated to their own, opening a broader channel for foreign capital into the A-share market. Analysts in August 2026 — including commentary published through the Shanghai municipal foreign-affairs weekly — read the Action Plan as marking the shift from “admission” to “post-admission operations” in China’s foreign-investment regime, with M&A modernisation at its centre.

The 2006 M&A Measures and why revision matters

The Measures on M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “10-Order”, 2006, amended 2009) remain the most important ministerial regulation in foreign M&A, nearly two decades after issuance. Since the Foreign Investment Law took effect in 2020, the pre-approval clauses of the 10-Order that conflict with the new framework — including the approval of affiliated acquisitions — are no longer implemented, but other provisions on transaction-consideration pricing basis, payment deadlines, payment forms and valuation models remain effective. The revision is urgent on three levels. First, with pre-approval gone, the commercial department has fully exited ex-ante examination of foreign M&A, so the 10-Order’s approval provisions must be formally deleted. Second, the consideration and payment rules — pricing basis, payment period, payment form, valuation method — need to be re-expressed so they operate without an approval gateway. Third, the cross-share-swap and strategic-investment frameworks need to align with the Foreign Investment Law and the new strategic-investment measures, since the current text was written for a different regulatory era. The Action Plan’s commitment to “optimise merger-control process and consideration-payment requirements” is precisely the mandate for this modernisation.

Strategic investment by foreign equity-investment institutions

The second M&A-relevant measure — allowing qualified foreign equity-investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-related industries — addresses a long-standing gap. The strategic-investment regime for foreign investors had historically been tied to related industries and controlled through specific approval and lock-up mechanics. Opening non-related-industry issuance to qualified foreign PE/VC institutions gives long-term foreign capital a clearer, more flexible path into A-share issuances, complementing the QFII and Stock Connect channels. For foreign institutional investors and for listed Chinese companies seeking strategic foreign capital, this is a structural widening of the market, provided the qualification criteria and lock-up rules are finalised in the implementing rules.

Practical implications for foreign acquirers

For foreign acquirers in 2026, the practical position is: the reform direction is clear, but the current rules govern today’s deals. Until the revised 10-Order is published, transactions must comply with the existing consideration, valuation and payment rules, and with the mandatory concentration-filing thresholds under the Anti-Monopoly Law for transactions that meet the notification standards. Companies should also note the interaction with the strategic-investment measures for listed-company deals, the security-review framework for transactions in sensitive sectors, and the data-export and PIPL implications for deals involving data-heavy targets. The August 2026 commentary consistently emphasises that the Action Plan’s benefit is predictability and the modernisation pipeline, not an immediate relaxation of today’s obligations.

Practical steps

  1. Treat current rules as the operative baseline. Structure 2026 deals under the existing 10-Order consideration, valuation and payment rules; do not rely on the expected revision.
  2. Assess concentration-filing exposure. Map the transaction against the turnover-based notification thresholds and, where the deal meets them, plan the mandatory prior filing.
  3. Screen for security review and sector restrictions. For sensitive sectors, run the national-security review assessment and confirm the negative-list treatment before committing.
  4. Prepare for strategic-investment opportunities. Institutional investors should monitor the implementing rules for the non-related-industry strategic-investment channel and position around the qualification and lock-up conditions.
  5. Model cross-share-swap structures. Where a share swap is contemplated, plan for the current foreign-exchange and securities-registration treatment, and revisit the structure once the revised measures issue.
  6. Coordinate with data and governance diligence. For targets holding personal information or important data, run data-export, PIPL and governance diligence alongside the legal merger work.

Compliance notes

Nothing in the Action Plan or the August 2026 commentary has changed the operative legal text: the 2006 M&A Measures, the Anti-Monopoly Law filing thresholds, the strategic-investment measures for listed companies and the security-review rules all remain in force. Foreign investors should not read the reform signals as a licence to adopt unapproved structures today. The revision timeline is not fixed, and its content may differ from expectations; M&A teams should build transactions that are robust under current law and adjustable if the new rules arrive before closing. As with all China cross-border M&A, document retention, valuation support and filing discipline remain the backbone of a defensible deal.


中国外资并购:修订 2006 年并购规定与新的战略投资通道(2026 年)/ Foreign M&A in China: The Push to Revise the 2006 M&A Measures and New Strategic-Investment Channels (2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 6 月 16 日,商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部经国务院同意联合印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97 号),这是”十五五”开局之年外资领域的首份综合性政策文件。在 15 条举措中,有两条直接指向外资并购。其一,行动方案承诺”加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求”。其二,允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,为外资进入 A 股资本市场开辟更宽通道。2026 年 8 月的分析(包括上海外办周报刊发的解读)普遍把行动方案视为外资政策从”准入”转向”准营”的标志,并购现代化居于中心。

2006 年并购规定及修订为何重要

《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》(”10 号令”,2006 年发布、2009 年修订)在发布近二十年后仍是最重要的外资并购部门规章。2020 年《外商投资法》施行后,10 号令中与上位法冲突的事前审批条款(包括关联并购审批)已不再实施,但关于交易对价定价依据、支付期限、支付形式、评估模式等条款仍然有效。修订在三层意义上紧迫。其一,事前审批取消后,商务部门已全面退出外资并购的事前审查,10 号令的审批条款须明确删除。其二,对价与支付规则——定价依据、支付期限、支付形式、评估方式——需要重新表述,使其在无审批网关的情况下落地执行。其三,跨境换股与战略投资框架须与《外商投资法》及新战投办法衔接,因为现行文本写就于不同的监管时代。行动方案”优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求”的承诺,正是这一现代化的授权。

外资股权投资机构参与战略投资

第二项与并购相关的举措——允许符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行——回应了一个长期空白。外国投资者的战投制度历史上与关联行业绑定,并受特定审批与锁定期机制控制。向符合条件的外资 PE/VC 开放非相关行业发行,为长期外资进入 A 股发行提供了更清晰、更灵活的路径,补充 QFII 与互联互通渠道。对外资机构投资者以及寻求战略外资的中国上市公司,这是市场结构的拓宽——前提是资格标准与锁定期规则在实施规则中最终明确。

对外国收购方的实操含义

对 2026 年的外国收购方,现实立场是:改革方向清晰,但现行规则支配当下的交易。在修订版 10 号令发布前,交易必须遵守现有的对价、估值与支付规则,并在交易达到申报标准时履行《反垄断法》下的强制集中申报。企业还应留意与上市公司交易战投办法的互动、敏感行业交易的安全审查框架,以及对持有大量个人数据或重要数据标的交易的数据出境与 PIPL 影响。2026 年 8 月的解读一致强调,行动方案的收益是可预期性与现代化管线,而非当下义务的立即放宽。

操作步骤

  1. 以现行规则为操作基准。 2026 年交易按现有 10 号令对价、估值与支付规则构架;不要依赖预期中的修订。
  2. 评估集中申报敞口。 将交易对照营业额申报门槛,达标的规划强制事先申报。
  3. 筛查安全审查与行业限制。 敏感行业在承诺前进行国家安全审查评估并确认负面清单待遇。
  4. 为战投机会做准备。 机构投资者应跟踪非相关行业战投通道的实施规则,并围绕资格与锁定期条件定位。
  5. 建模跨境换股结构。 若考虑换股,按现行外汇与证券登记待遇规划,并在修订版办法出台后重新审视结构。
  6. 与数据与治理尽调协同。 对持有个人信息或重要数据的标的,在法律并购工作之外同步开展数据出境、PIPL 与治理尽调。

合规提示

行动方案与 2026 年 8 月的解读均未改变现行法律文本:2006 年并购规定、《反垄断法》申报门槛、上市公司战投办法与安全审查规则全部仍然有效。外国投资者不应将改革信号解读为今天就可采用未经批准的结构。修订时间表未定,内容可能与预期不同;并购团队应构建在现行法律下稳健、若新规在交割前出台则可调整的交易。与所有中国跨境并购一样,文档留存、估值支撑与申报纪律仍是可辩护交易的主干。

Sources

Foreign Investor M&A of Chinese Enterprises: The 2026 Reform Direction

  • China is revising the rules on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises to streamline procedure and payment terms, with stronger inter-agency coordination.
    中国正修订外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程与对价支付要求,并强化部门协同。
  • The 2026 “stabilise and optimise foreign investment” action plan explicitly tasks MOFCOM with accelerating the revised M&A provisions.
    2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》明确由商务部加快修订出台相关并购规定。
  • M&A is distinct from greenfield: it triggers the security-review gateway, the anti-monopoly concentration notification, and the foreign-investment information report, often in parallel.
    并购不同于绿地投资:它往往同时触发安全审查、反垄断经营者集中申报与外商投资信息报告。
  • Equity or asset deals, VIE/restructuring, and foreign-invested M&A of domestic targets each carry specific filing and timing obligations.
    股权或资产收购、VIE/重组、外资并购境内标的,各有特定的申报与时限义务。
  • Payment flexibility is a stated reform direction — allowing more staggered or in-kind consideration to ease deal execution.
    支付灵活性是明确的改革方向——允许更分期或以非现金对价,便利交易执行。
  • Investors should build a parallel-compliance checklist (access + security + merger control + filing) at LOI stage to avoid post-signing blockers.
    建议投资人在 LOI 阶段即建立并行合规清单(准入 + 安审 + 经营者集中 + 信息报告),避免签约后卡壳。

Foreign Investor M&A of Chinese Enterprises: The 2026 Reform Direction | 外资并购境内企业:2026 改革方向

Foreign direct investment into China is not only greenfield. Acquiring an existing Chinese company — by equity or asset purchase, or via contractual control — is a core route for multinationals seeking speed, local licences and teams. The regulatory treatment of such deals is now being refreshed.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* (Commerce, NDRC and Finance ministries, No. 97 [2026]) states plainly: “accelerate the revision and issuance of provisions on foreign investors’ acquisition of domestic enterprises, optimise the M&A management process and consideration-payment requirements, and strengthen inter-department regulatory coordination.” This is the clearest signal yet that the M&A rulebook for foreign buyers is being modernised after years of incremental practice.

Why does M&A deserve its own discipline? Because a single transaction can sit at the intersection of several regimes. If the target operates in a sensitive field or the buyer gains control, the *Foreign Investment Security Review* gateway opens. If turnover thresholds are met, the *Anti-Monopoly Law* concentration-notification suspensory rule applies (see the companion note on merger control). Separately, the deal must be reflected in the foreign-investment information report. Coordinating these workstreams — rather than sequencing them ad hoc — is what the action plan means by “inter-agency coordination.”

The reform direction favours facilitation. Officials have described goals including more flexible consideration: allowing staged cash payments, and exploring in-kind or structured consideration where permitted, so that deals do not stall on rigid payment mechanics. The plan also emphasises “access after admission” — solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem so that, once a deal is cleared, the combined entity can actually operate, obtain licences and integrate supply chains.

For a foreign buyer, the practical playbook is: (1) at LOI, map the target’s licences and restricted businesses against the negative list and any security-review scope; (2) model the control and turnover tests for merger control early; (3) agree a conditionality and long-stop structure that reflects possible review periods; (4) prepare the information report and any sector approvals in parallel; and (5) engage local commerce authorities, who are being equipped with “investment service” channels under the plan. Done well, an M&A can close faster than building from scratch — and the 2026 reforms are designed to make that the default.


外资并购境内企业:2026 改革方向

外商来华直接投资不止绿地投资。通过股权或资产收购、或以合同控制方式并购一家现存中国企业,是跨国企业获取速度、本地牌照与团队的核心路径。此类交易的监管规则正在更新。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、发改委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97 号)明确写道:「加快修订出台关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定,优化并购管理流程和对价支付要求,强化部门监管协同。」这是迄今最明确的信号:外资并购规则书将在多年渐进实践后被现代化。

为何并购需要独立纪律?因为一宗交易可能同时落在多个制度交叉点上。若标的处于敏感领域或买方取得控制,则触发《外商投资安全审查》闸口;若达营业额标准,则适用《反垄断法》经营者集中「停表」申报(参见经营者集中专文);此外,交易还须反映在外商投资信息报告中。协调这些工作流——而非临时串行——正是方案中「部门协同」的含义。

改革方向偏向便利。官方描述的取向包括更灵活的对价:允许分期现金支付,并在允许范围内探索非现金或结构化对价,使交易不因僵化的支付机制卡顿。方案还强调「准入之后准营」——解决「大门开、小门不开」,让交易获批后合并实体真能运营、拿照、整合供应链。

对外国买方,实操手册是:(1)在 LOI 阶段即将标的牌照与受限业务对照负面清单及安审范围;(2)尽早做控制权与营业额测试;(3)约定反映可能审查周期的条件与长停结构;(4)并行准备信息报告与行业审批;(5)对接地方商务主管部门——方案正为其配备「投资服务」通道。做得好,并购可比从零建设更快完成,而 2026 年改革旨在让这成为默认路径。

Structuring the Deal Around the Reform

Use the reform to compress execution. Where the revised rules permit staged or in-kind consideration, negotiate a payment schedule that matches the target’s cash-flow and approval milestones, rather than a single upfront close. This reduces the buyer’s exposure if a review runs long, and aligns consideration with value realised. Confirm with counsel which consideration forms are expressly permitted, since the detailed provisions are still being finalised.

Run a parallel-clearance matrix. For an inbound acquisition, lay out, on one page: (1) negative-list and security-review scope; (2) merger-control thresholds; (3) sector approvals (e.g., telecom, healthcare, education); (4) the foreign-investment information report; and (5) any antitrust filings in other jurisdictions. Assign owners and deadlines to each, and set a single long-stop. The action plan’s emphasis on “inter-agency coordination” means the authorities are building shared channels — use the local commerce “investment service” window to pre-align rather than discover gaps at signing.

Finally, plan integration before close. “Access after admission” is the watchword: once cleared, the combined entity must be able to obtain licences, hire, and move goods. Buyers who prepare the post-clearance licensing and supply-chain steps in parallel — not after — capture the speed advantage that M&A is supposed to deliver.

围绕改革设计交易

用改革压缩执行。若修订规则允许分期或以物对价,应谈一个与标的现金流及审批里程碑匹配的支付节奏,而非一次性前置交割。这降低审查拖长时买方风险,并使对价与实现价值对齐。与律师确认哪些对价形式被明文允许,因细则仍在制定。

跑并行核准矩阵。对 inbound 并购,在一页上列明:(1)负面清单与安审范围;(2)经营者集中阈值;(3)行业审批(电信、医疗、教育等);(4)外商投资信息报告;(5)其他司法辖区反垄断申报。各指派负责人与期限,设单一长停。方案强调「部门协同」意味着当局正建共享通道——善用地方商务「投资服务」窗口预先对齐,而非签约时才发现缺口。

最后,交割前规划整合。「准入之后准营」是关键词:获批后合并实体须能拿照、用人、运货。买方若能并行准备交割后牌照与供应链步骤——而非事后——才能拿到并购本应带来的速度优势。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Reform anchor: the 2026 action plan tasks MOFCOM with revising the foreign-investor acquisition rules and easing payment terms.
  • Access vs operation: M&A sits at the intersection of negative list, security review, merger control and the information report.
  • Payment: staged and in-kind consideration are being explored to ease deal execution.
  • Parallel matrix: one page covering access, security, merger control, sector approvals and the information report.
  • Long-stop: set a single deadline that reflects possible review periods; avoid unconditional closing.
  • Service window: use the local commerce “investment service” channel to pre-align licences.
  • Goal: capture M&A’s speed by preparing post-clearance licensing in parallel, not after.

实务速查

  • 改革锚点: 2026 方案责成商务部修订外资并购规则并放宽对价支付。
  • 准入与运营: 并购处于负面清单、安审、经营者集中与信息报告的交叉点。
  • 对价: 探索分期与以物对价以便利交易执行。
  • 并行矩阵: 一页覆盖准入、安审、经营者集中、行业审批与信息报告。
  • 长停: 设反映可能审查周期的单一期限;避免无条件交割。
  • 服务窗口: 用地方商务「投资服务」通道预先对齐牌照。
  • 目标: 并行准备交割后牌照以拿到并购的速度,而非事后。

Bottom Line

The 2026 reform makes foreign-invested M&A in China faster and more predictable, not looser on scrutiny. The practical edge goes to buyers who pre-clear the three gates — market access, security review and merger control — and who use the local commerce service window to align licences before signing. Treat filing as a gating workstream, not paperwork, and the deal will close on schedule; treat it as an afterthought, and a cleared deal can still stall at the operating stage.

底线

2026 年改革让中国外资并购更快、更可预期,而非放松审查。实务优势属于预先理清三道闸口——市场准入、安全审查、经营者集中——并用地方商务服务窗在签约前对齐牌照的买方。把申报当作闸口工作流而非文书,交易才能按期交割;若当事后,获批的交易仍可能在运营阶段卡壳。

Sources

National Security Review of Foreign M&A in 2026: Scope, Process and the Meta–Manus Precedent

  • The Foreign Investment Security Review Measures (NDRC & MOFCOM, issued 19 Dec 2020, effective 18 Jan 2021) are the legal basis; the review working-mechanism office sits in the NDRC, led by NDRC and MOFCOM.
    《外商投资安全审查办法》(发改委、商务部,2020年12月19日发布,2021年1月18日施行)是法律依据;安全审查工作机制办公室设在发改委,由发改委、商务部牵头。
  • Review is mandatory where the investment is in a covered sector (defence; important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT-internet/finance/key tech) AND the foreign investor obtains actual control (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
    当投资位于受涵盖领域(国防;重要农产品/能源/装备/基础设施/运输/文化/信息技术互联网/金融/关键技术)且外国投资者取得实际控制权(50%以上股权、重大表决影响、或对决策/人事/财务/技术重大影响)时须审查。
  • The timeline: 15 working days to decide whether to review, then 30 working days general review, then 60 working days special review (extendable); implementation is prohibited until a clearance decision.
    时间线:15个工作日决定是否审查,再30个工作日一般审查,再60个工作日特别审查(可延长);作出核准决定前不得实施投资。
  • On 27 April 2026 the working-mechanism office issued a prohibition decision on Meta’s ~USD 2bn acquisition of AI firm Manus — the first publicly halted foreign acquisition in the AI field under the Measures.
    2026年4月27日,工作机制办公室就Meta约20亿美元收购AI企业Manus作出禁止投资决定——是该《办法》下首例被公开叫停的AI领域外资收购案。
  • The Manus case turned on “technology origin” (R&D-location standard) and asset-in-China control: moving core tech/IP offshore without filing triggered review and a forced unwind, with repayment of the ~USD 2bn consideration.
    Manus案聚焦”技术原产地”(研发地标准)与境内资产控制:未申报即将核心技术/知识产权转移境外触发审查并被强制撤销,须退还约20亿美元对价。
  • Practical rule: screen security review before merger control — its control test is broader, it can prohibit where antitrust would clear, and non-filing carries corrective orders, credit blacklisting and joint punishment.
    实务规则:先于经营者集中筛查安全审查——其控制标准更宽、可在反垄断通过时禁止,且未申报将招致责令申报、信用黑名单与联合惩戒。

National Security Review of Foreign M&A in 2026: Scope, Process and the Meta–Manus Precedent | 2026年外资并购国家安全审查:范围、程序与Meta–Manus先例

The legal backbone

China’s foreign-investment national security review is founded on the *Foreign Investment Law* (Art. 35) and implemented through the *Measures for Foreign Investment Security Review* (外商投资安全审查办法), issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOFCOM on 19 December 2020 and effective 18 January 2021. The security-review working mechanism is led by the NDRC and MOFCOM, with its office housed in the NDRC. The mechanism coordinates and guides review work and, where needed, can require a party to file even where the party has not self-identified a trigger.

For a foreign acquirer, the single most important behavioural point is sequencing: security review can prohibit a deal that merger control would have cleared, and its “actual control” test is broader than antitrust’s. Screen it first.

When review is mandatory

Review is required before implementation where the investment falls in a covered scope AND the foreign investor obtains actual control:

  • Covered scope — investment in defence and defence-supporting areas, and around military facilities; or investment in important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important culture, important IT and internet products/services, important financial services, key technologies and other important areas.
  • Actual control — the investor holds 50%+ equity; or holds under 50% but its voting rights can materially influence board/shareholder resolutions; or other circumstances where the investor can materially influence the target’s business decisions, personnel, finance or technology.

Where the deal is in scope but control is not obtained, filing is generally not mandated — though the mechanism may still call it in. And where a deal is below the merger-control turnover thresholds, security review can still be triggered independently by scope and control. This is the trap: size alone never settles the security question.

The process and its clock

The procedure is staged. Upon receiving a complete filing, the working-mechanism office decides within 15 working days whether a review is needed; the parties may not implement the investment before that decision. If a review proceeds, general review is completed within 30 working days. If general review finds a possible national-security effect, a special review is launched and completed within 60 working days (extendable in special circumstances, with written notice). Decisions are: pass; prohibit; or pass with conditions (where conditions can eliminate the effect and the party accepts them in writing). During all review stages, implementation is suspended, and the parties may modify or withdraw the scheme.

A prohibited decision requires the party to unwind — dispose of equity/assets and take other necessary steps to restore the pre-investment state and eliminate the national-security effect. Non-filing where filing was required draws a corrective order to file; refusal leads to an order to dispose of equity/assets and restore the prior state, plus inclusion in the national credit system as a bad-records entry and joint punishment under relevant rules.

The 2026 Meta–Manus precedent

The most consequential 2026 development is the Meta–Manus case. Manus is a general-purpose AI agent product launched in China in March 2025 and quickly became a high-profile domestic AI success. In December 2025, US tech giant Meta announced a roughly USD 2 billion acquisition. On 8 January 2026, MOFCOM spokesperson He Yadong said authorities would assess the transaction’s consistency with export-control, technology import/export and outward-investment rules; on 2 April 2026 MOFCOM reiterated that relevant conduct must comply with Chinese law and procedures. On 27 April 2026, the NDRC security-review working-mechanism office issued a prohibition decision on the foreign acquisition of the Manus project, requiring the parties to rescind the transaction.

This is the first AI-field foreign acquisition publicly halted under the Measures in the nearly six years since their issuance. The stated logic: although the transacting entities were formally offshore, Manus’s core technology, team and data were deeply rooted in China; restructuring the entity offshore while moving core code, documentation and IP out of China without filing constituted, in substance, transferring key Chinese assets to foreign control — squarely within the covered “key technologies / important IT and internet” scope with actual control obtained.

The case also invoked the export-control dimension: China applies a “technology origin” (technology nationality by R&D location) standard, so moving China-developed technology offshore can constitute a de facto technology export requiring a licence. Parties that fail to obtain one risk civil, administrative or even criminal liability under export-control law. For foreign acquirers, the lesson is that the form of an offshore red-chip-style restructuring does not remove the substance of China-based assets from review.

Interaction with merger control and the negative list

Security review operates alongside — not instead of — merger control and the negative list. A strategic investment in a listed company, for example, must respect the negative list (no prohibited sectors; restricted sectors meet list conditions) and, if it constitutes a concentration above the thresholds, clear SAMR; and if it affects national security, clear security review. The three gates are independent: a pass from one does not substitute for another, and security review can override the others. This is why the deal team should run a security-review scope-and-control screen at term-sheet stage, in parallel with the antitrust analysis.

What to do next

  • Screen the target’s sector against the covered-security list; if in scope and control is likely, assume a mandatory filing.
  • Map “actual control” broadly — minority stakes with veto/influence rights can qualify; do not assume only majority ownership triggers review.
  • File and wait: no implementation before the 15-working-day decision, and stay suspended through general/special review.
  • For China-origin technology or data assets, assess export-control licensing alongside security review — offshore restructuring does not escape either.
  • Expect the security screen to run in parallel with, and potentially override, merger control and sector licensing.
  • Build the long-stop around the full 15+30+60 (extendable) path, and reserve the right to modify or withdraw the scheme during review.

Cross-border structuring lessons

The Meta–Manus outcome reframes how offshore restructurings are read in China. Moving an operating company’s domicile or IP offshore, while the technology, team and data remain in China, does not remove the assets from the security-review and export-control net — the “technology origin” standard looks to where R&D occurred, not where the entity is registered. Acquirers should therefore map China-based intangible assets and key personnel explicitly, and treat any transfer of them as a potential review and licensing event, not a purely corporate step.

Coordination across agencies

Security review does not sit alone. In the Manus matter, MOFCOM assessed consistency with export-control, technology import/export and outward-investment rules alongside the NDRC security review — a multi-agency lens. Deal teams should expect the same: a sensitive technology or data transaction will be examined by the security-review mechanism, the export-control authority and, if a concentration, SAMR, often on overlapping facts. Building one consistent factual and legal narrative across all three is cheaper than retrofitting it after a challenge.

A practical pre-filing screen

Before term sheet, run four questions: (1) Is the target in a covered-security sector (defence, key tech, IT/internet, energy, infrastructure, finance, etc.)? (2) Will the foreign investor obtain actual control — including minority veto or material-influence rights? (3) Does the deal move China-origin technology, data or IP offshore, triggering export-control licensing? (4) Could it also be a concentration above the SAMR thresholds? If any answer is yes, build the review/licence track into the deal timeline and budget, and keep implementation suspended until clearance. This screen, done early, prevents the late rediscovery that doomed the Manus transaction.


2026年外资并购国家安全审查:范围、程序与Meta–Manus先例

法律主干

中国外商投资国家安全审查以《外商投资法》(第35条)为基础,通过《外商投资安全审查办法》实施。该办法由国家发展改革委、商务部于2020年12月19日联合发布,2021年1月18日施行。安全审查工作机制由发改委、商务部牵头,办公室设在发改委,负责组织协调指导审查工作,并在必要时可要求当事人申报,即便当事人未自行识别触发情形。

对外国收购方而言,最关键的行为要点是排序:安全审查可在经营者集中通过时禁止交易,且其”实际控制”标准宽于反垄断。应首先筛查。

何时须审查

当投资落入受涵盖范围且外国投资者取得实际控制权时,须在实施前审查:

  • 受涵盖范围——军工、军工配套及军事设施周边;或重要农产品、能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域。
  • 实际控制——投资者持股50%以上;或持股不足50%但表决权对董事会/股东会决议产生重大影响;或其他对经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。

交易在范围内但未取得控制权的,一般不强制申报——但机制仍可要求申报。而未达经营者集中营业额门槛的交易,亦可因范围与控制独立触发安全审查。这就是陷阱:规模本身从不决定安全问题。

程序与时钟

程序分阶段。收到齐备材料后,工作机制办公室于15个工作日内决定是否审查;当事人在该决定前不得实施投资。若进入审查,一般审查于30个工作日内完成。若一般审查认为可能影响国家安全,启动特别审查并于60个工作日内完成(特殊情况可延长并书面通知)。决定为:通过、禁止、或附条件通过(条件可消除影响且当事人书面接受)。各审查阶段均暂停实施,当事人可修改或撤销方案。

禁止决定要求当事人撤销——处分股权/资产并采取其他必要措施,恢复投资前状态、消除国家安全影响。应申报而未申报的,责令申报;拒不申报的,责令处分股权/资产恢复前状,并作为不良信用记录纳入国家信用系统、依规定联合惩戒。

2026年Meta–Manus先例

2026年最具影响的进展是Meta–Manus案。Manus是2025年3月在中国发布的通用AI智能体产品,迅速成为国内AI标杆。2025年12月,美国科技巨头Meta宣布约20亿美元收购。2026年1月8日,商务部发言人何亚东表示将同相关部门评估该交易与出口管制、技术进出口、对外投资规则的一致性;2026年4月2日商务部重申相关行为须遵守中国法律与程序。2026年4月27日,发改委外商投资安全审查工作机制办公室就外资收购Manus项目作出禁止投资决定,要求当事人撤销交易。

这是该《办法》发布近6年来首例被公开叫停的AI领域外资收购案。其逻辑:尽管交易主体形式在境外,Manus核心技术、团队与数据深植中国;在境外重组实体并将核心代码、文档与知识产权移出中国而未申报,实质上构成将中国关键技术资产转移给外国控制——正落入”关键技术/重要信息技术互联网”受涵盖范围并取得实际控制。

该案亦触及出口管制维度:中国采用”技术原产地”(按研发地认定技术国籍)标准,将中国研发技术转移境外可构成事实上的技术出口,须申领许可。未获许可者面临出口管制法下的民事、行政乃至刑事责任。对外国收购方的启示是:离岸红筹式重组的形式,并不使基于中国的资产脱离审查。

与安全审查、负面清单的衔接

安全审查与经营者集中、负面清单并行而非替代。例如对上市公司战略投资,须遵守负面清单(禁止领域不得投资、限制领域满足清单条件),若构成达门槛的集中须通过SAMR,若影响国家安全须通过安全审查。三道关口相互独立:一道通过不替代另一道,安全审查可推翻其他。因此交易团队应在条款书阶段并行启动安全审查的范围与控制筛查与反垄断分析。

下一步

  • 将目标行业对照受涵盖安全清单筛查;若在范围内且可能取得控制,按强制申报处理。
  • 广义界定”实际控制”——具否决权/影响力的少数股权亦可触发;勿假设仅控股才触发审查。
  • 先申报后等待:15个工作日决定前不得实施,并贯穿一般/特别审查保持暂停。
  • 对中国原产地技术或数据资产,将出口管制许可与安全审查并行评估——离岸重组不脱逃任一者。
  • 预期安全筛查与经营者集中、行业许可并行,且可能推翻后两者。
  • 长停日围绕完整15+30+60(可延长)路径设定,并保留审查期间修改或撤销方案的权利。

跨境重组的启示

Meta–Manus的结果重塑了中国对离岸重组的解读。将运营主体的注册地或知识产权移至境外,而技术、团队与数据仍留在中国,并不能使资产脱离安全审查与出口管制之网——”技术原产地”标准看研发发生地,而非实体注册地。因此收购方应明确梳理基于中国的无形资产与关键人员,并将任何转移视为潜在的审查与许可事件,而非纯粹的公司行为。

跨机构协调

安全审查并不孤立。在Manus案中,商务部就出口管制、技术进出口、对外投资规则的一致性,与发改委安全审查一并评估——一种多机构视角。交易团队应预期同样情形:敏感技术或数据交易将被安全审查机制、出口管制主管部门,以及(若构成集中)SAMR就重叠事实审查。在三方面构建一致的事实与法律叙事,远比事后补建更省成本。

实务申报前筛查

签约前自问四题:(1)目标是否处受涵盖安全领域(国防、关键技术、信息技术互联网、能源、基础设施、金融等)?(2)外国投资者是否会取得实际控制——含少数否决权或重大影响权?(3)交易是否将中国原产地技术、数据或知识产权转移境外,触发出口管制许可?(4)是否同时构成达SAMR门槛的集中?任一为是,即将审查/许可轨道纳入交易时间表与预算,并在核准前保持实施暂停。此筛查若早做,可避免Manus交易那种后期才发现的窘境。

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