Category Archives: Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market

  • Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
    数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范,该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。
  • Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
    巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查,即便标的规模小或尚无营收。
  • VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
    采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖;”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。
  • Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
    在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济,正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
    截至2026年,审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态,以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。
  • Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
    准入者应预判:任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购,都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

The Platform Antitrust Framework

China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.

Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review

Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:

  • Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
  • Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
  • Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
  • Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).

These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.

VIE Structures Are In Scope

A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.

Substantive Theories SAMR Applies

In platform cases SAMR weighs:

  • Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
  • Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
  • Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
  • Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.

Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.

2026 Trajectory

Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:

  • Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
  • AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
  • Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.

The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
  2. Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
  3. Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
  4. Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
  5. Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.

Stakes

Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.


中国平台并购审查:数字市场中的反垄断

平台反垄断框架

中国转向平台经济反垄断,以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场,阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时,如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言,定义的不是 bare AML 文本,而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。

平台并购为何受到更高审查

平台收购引发独特关切:

  • 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者,可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
  • 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河,并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
  • 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
  • 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品(见下篇)。

这些理论意味着,市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠,更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。

VIE 结构在管辖之内

一种长期误解认为可变利益实体(VIE)结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确:采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查,达标须申报,且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞,并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。

市场监管总局适用的实质理论

在平台案件中,市场监管总局考量:

  • 跨边市场界定(如匹配、支付、配送),承认多边性;
  • 支配地位,由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断;
  • 消除潜在竞争,包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购;
  • 纵向封阻,即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。

结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济,如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。

2026年走向

至2026年,平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至:

  • 算法驱动的整合,合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切;
  • 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购,就加深护城河进行评估;
  • 超级应用生态,就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。

其内在逻辑是:平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判,而不只看今日的份额。

准入者实务指引

  1. 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
  2. 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
  3. 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
  4. 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免;达标即申报。
  5. 标的涉大规模或重要数据时,统筹数据安全审查。

利害关系

误判审查的平台交易,面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济,或被禁止。无论外资还是内资,陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作,是审慎之道。

Sources

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice

  • A concentration is notifiable to SAMR when the parties’ turnover meets the State Council thresholds; the deal is suspensory and cannot close before clearance.
    当各方营业额达到国务院标准时,集中须向市场监管总局申报;交易具有暂停效力,获批前不得交割。
  • The State Council raised the notification thresholds in its 2024 revision, recalibrating the global and China turnover benchmarks to current economic scale.
    国务院在2024年修订中上调了申报标准,使全球及中国营业额基准与当前经济规模重新校准。
  • SAMR operates a simplified (简易) procedure for non-issue, non-rivalrous transactions, materially shortening review time versus the standard track.
    市场监管总局对无非竞争关切的集中适用简易程序,相较标准程序显著缩短审查时间。
  • The 2022 AML introduced a stop-the-clock (停钟) mechanism; incomplete filings or further-review needs pause the statutory clock.
    2022年《反垄断法》引入”停钟”机制;申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限暂停计算。
  • Gun-jumping—closing or integrating before clearance—draws substantially higher fines under the 2022 amendments, making procedural discipline essential.
    抢跑——在获批前交割或整合——依2022年修订面临显著提高的罚款,程序纪律因而至关重要。
  • As of 2026, expect tighter scrutiny of minority acquisitions that confer decisive influence and of filings’ substantive accuracy.
    截至2026年,须预期对赋予决定性影响的少数股权收购,以及申报实质准确性,将受到更严审视。

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice | 中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

When a Filing Is Required

Under the 《反垄断法》 and SAMR’s implementing rules, a “concentration” ( merger; acquisition of control; or acquisition of decisive influence over another undertaking) must be notified where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s thresholds. The original thresholds, set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, turned on combined global turnover and China turnover. In its 2024 revision, the State Council raised these thresholds to reflect China’s enlarged economic scale—reducing filings for routine small deals while keeping strategically significant transactions within scope. Because the precise figures are set by State Council regulation and periodically adjusted, deal teams should confirm the current thresholds against the latest SAMR guidance at the time of signing.

The Suspensory Principle

The cardinal rule: a notifiable concentration is suspensory. The parties may sign, but they may not implement the concentration—no control change, no asset integration, no voting-rights exercise—until SAMR clears it. Premature implementation (“gun-jumping”) is an independent violation under the 2022 AML, carrying far higher fines than under the prior regime. This makes the filing not a formality but a gating condition in the SPA.

Two Procedures: Standard and Simplified

SAMR administers two tracks:

TrackApplicabilityTypical duration
Standard (普通)Likely competitive concerns or complex factsUp to 30 days initial + extended phase
Simplified (简易)No substantive concern; e.g., low combined share, non-competitors, passive minorityMaterially shorter, often cleared within the initial phase

The simplified procedure applies where the combined market share is low, the parties are not actual or potential competitors in the same market, or the acquisition is a passive minority stake. Choosing the correct track—and presenting a clean, complete file—directly affects clearance speed.

The Stop-the-Clock Mechanism

A defining feature of the 2022 AML is the stop-the-clock (停钟) rule, operationalised in SAMR’s 经营者集中审查规定. The statutory review clock pauses when:

  • The notifying party fails to provide required materials and SAMR requests supplementation; or
  • A circumstance arises requiring further review (e.g., third-party opposition, new evidence).

Practically, a careless or incomplete filing can double the effective timeline. Diligent, complete first submission is the cheapest insurance against clock-stoppage.

Substantive Assessment

SAMR assesses whether the concentration would eliminate or restrict competition, considering market share, concentration ratios, entry barriers, efficiencies, and failing-firm defences. Remedies—structural (divestiture) or behavioural (access, non-discrimination)—may be imposed. For market entrants, the key is to demonstrate that the combination does not foreclose rivals or raise barriers in the relevant China market.

2026 Filing Practice

Entering 2026, SAMR’s practice shows:

  • Tighter look at “decisive influence” acquisitions—minority stakes that nonetheless confer control-like influence are caught.
  • Greater demands for data accuracy in notifications, with scrutiny of market definition.
  • Continued use of simplified procedure for clean, non-rivalrous deals, keeping routine inbound acquisitions efficient.
  • Coordination with security and data reviews where the target sits in a sensitive sector.

Practical Steps for Filers

  1. Screen early. Test the transaction against current thresholds at term-sheet stage.
  2. Choose the track correctly. Mislabeling a standard case as simplified invites rejection and delay.
  3. Prepare a complete file. Accurate turnover, market definition, and supporting evidence prevent clock-stoppage.
  4. Sequence with other regimes. Where security or data review applies, align filing timelines.
  5. Contractual protection. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and allocate gun-jumping risk in the SPA.

Exposure and Remedies

Beyond clearance denial, SAMR may unwind completed unlawful concentrations and impose turnover-based fines. The 2022 amendments raised these ceilings, and responsible individuals can be penalised. For foreign acquirers, disciplined filing practice—correct track, complete file, no pre-clearance integration—is the difference between a routine clearance and a value-destroying remediation.


中国经营者集中申报:门槛、程序与2026年实践

何时需要申报

依据《反垄断法》及市场监管总局实施规则,”经营者集中”(合并;取得控制权;或取得对其他经营者的决定性影响)于各方营业额达到国务院标准时须申报。原始门槛由国务院2008年规定设定,以合计全球营业额与中国营业额为准。在2024年修订中,国务院上调了这些门槛,以反映中国扩大的经济规模——在减少常规小规模交易申报的同时,将具有战略意义的交易保留在范围内。由于具体数字由国务院规定设定并定期调整,交易团队应在签约时对照市场监管总局最新指引确认现行门槛。

暂停原则

首要规则是:须申报的集中具有暂停效力。各方可以签约,但在市场监管总局批准前,不得实施集中——不得变更控制、不得整合资产、不得行使表决权。提前实施(”抢跑”)依2022年《反垄断法》构成独立违法,罚款远高于此前制度。这使得申报不再是形式,而是协议中的一项先决条件。

两种程序:标准与简易

市场监管总局设有两条路径:

路径适用情形通常时长
标准(普通)可能存在竞争关切或事实复杂初始30日+延长阶段
简易无非实质关切,如合计份额低、非竞争者、被动少数股权显著更短,常在初始阶段内审结

简易程序适用于合计市场份额低、各方非同一市场现实或潜在竞争者,或收购为被动少数股权等情形。选择正确的路径并提交干净、完整的案卷,直接影响获批速度。

停钟机制

2022年《反垄断法》的标志性特征是“停钟”规则,由市场监管总局《经营者集中审查规定》落实。在以下情形,法定审查时限暂停:

  • 申报方未提供所需材料,市场监管总局要求补充;或
  • 出现需进一步审查的情形(如第三方异议、新证据)。

实践中,草率或不完整的申报可能使实际时间表翻倍。勤勉、完整地首次提交,是防止停钟最廉价的保障。

实质审查

市场监管总局评估集中是否排除、限制竞争,考量市场份额、集中度、进入壁垒、效率及困境企业抗辩等。可能附加救济——结构性(剥离)或行为性(开放接入、非歧视)。对准入者而言,关键在于证明该结合不会在中国相关市场封阻竞争对手或抬高壁垒。

2026年申报实践

进入2026年,市场监管总局的实践显示:

  • 对”决定性影响”收购审查更严——虽为少数股权但赋予类控制性影响的交易亦被纳入。
  • 对申报数据准确性要求更高,并审视市场界定。
  • 继续对干净、非竞争类交易适用简易程序,使常规 inbound 收购保持高效。
  • 与安全和数据审查统筹,当标的位于敏感行业时。

申报者实务步骤

  1. 尽早筛查。 在条款书阶段即对照现行门槛测试交易。
  2. 正确选择路径。 将标准案件误标为简易将招致退回与延误。
  3. 备妥完整案卷。 准确的营业额、市场界定及佐证可防止停钟。
  4. 与其他制度统筹。 如涉及安全或数据审查,须对齐申报时间表。
  5. 合同保护。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日,并在协议中分配抢跑风险。

风险与救济

除不予批准外,市场监管总局可撤销已完成的违法集中,并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。2022年修订提高了这些上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外国收购方而言,纪律化的申报实践——正确路径、完整案卷、获批前不整合——决定着是顺利获批还是陷入摧毁价值的补救。

Sources

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework

  • China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
    中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石,主要由市场监管总局执行,其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。
  • Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
    经营者集中具有暂停效力:达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割,而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。
  • The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
    2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制,提高了处罚幅度,并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。
  • The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
    2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断,与市场准入壁垒直接相关。
  • As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
    截至2026年,执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议,以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。
  • Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
    外资投资者进入中国市场时,应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

The Statutory Foundation

China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.

Three Pillars of Enforcement

  1. Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
  2. Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
  3. Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.

For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.

Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover

A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.

The 2022 Amendments: What Changed

The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:

  • Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
  • Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
  • Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
  • “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.

These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.

Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus

SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.

Fair Competition Review and Market Entry

The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.

Practical Compliance for Entrants

  1. Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
  2. Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
  3. Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
  4. Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
  5. Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.

Penalties and Exposure

Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.


中国反垄断与并购审查:2026年框架

法律基础

中国竞争法是《反垄断法》,于2007年通过,2022年作重大修订,修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中,并授权国家市场监督管理总局(市场监管总局)作为国家级主要执法机构,会同省级市场监管部门执法。

执法的三大支柱

  1. 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
  2. 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位(如不公平定价、排他、搭售)。
  3. 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。

对市场准入者而言,三者均具意义:第一项管控交易,第二项约束市场行为,第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。

经营者集中:暂停效力且以营业额为触发

“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权,以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时,交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛(由国务院2008年规定设定,并于2024年修订中上调)以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大,在减少小规模交易申报的同时,仍将战略性交易纳入范围。

2022年修订:变化何在

2022年修订显著加强了制度:

  • 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时,法定时限可暂停,从而延长实际审查时间。
  • 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制,将面临显著提高的罚款。
  • 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素,并提高处罚。
  • 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口,由市场监管总局指引落实。

这些变化意味着,时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。

平台经济与行为监管重点

市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架:”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年,市场监管总局持续关注平台行为,以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。

公平竞争审查与市场准入

《公平竞争审查条例》(2024年8月1日施行)要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言,这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时,公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致,却是一条被认可的救济路径。

准入者实务合规

  1. 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
  2. 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表;在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
  3. 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款,避免触犯行为规则。
  4. 监测支配力指标;若份额超过约50%,须以更高谨慎对待行为。
  5. 遇地方规则阻碍准入时,运用公平竞争审查。

处罚与风险敞口

违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限,相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言,暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织,使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题,而非后台形式。

Sources