Tag Archives: NDRC

Foreign Firms’ Green Power Procurement and Carbon Market Compliance

  • China has built a unified national green-power trading framework and a nationwide Green Electricity Certificate (GEC) system; foreign-invested enterprises registered in China can open accounts and procure GECs like any domestic user.
    中国已建立全国统一的绿色电力交易框架与覆盖全国的绿色电力证书(绿证)制度;在境内合法注册的外商投资企业与境内用户一样可开设账户并采购绿证。
  • The 2024 “Green Power Trading Chapter” folds green-power trading into the medium- and long-term electricity market, letting users buy renewable attributes together with the power they consume.
    2024年《绿色电力交易专章》将绿色电力交易融入电力中长期交易,使用户可随所用电量一并购买可再生能源环境属性。
  • The 2026 “Implementation Rules for GEC Administration (Trial)” set a full-lifecycle regime — account opening, issuance, transfer and cancellation — and require, from 1 January 2026, that the GEC’s generation year match the consumption year.
    2026年《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》建立了账户、核发、划转、核销的全生命周期机制,并要求自2026年1月1日起绿证电量生产年份与消费年份保持一致。
  • The State Council’s 2026 opinion on a unified national electricity market calls for a mandatory-plus-voluntary green-power consumption system and studies linking GECs into carbon accounting.
    国务院办公厅2026年关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见提出建立强制与自愿相结合的绿证消费制度,并研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算的可行路径。
  • Foreign investors should treat green-power procurement as part of ESG and carbon-compliance strategy: GECs are the recognised proof of renewable consumption and increasingly feed into carbon disclosures.
    外资投资者应将绿电采购纳入ESG与碳合规战略:绿证是公认的可再生能源消费凭证,并日益衔接碳披露。
  • Cross-border green-power trading with Hong Kong and Macao follows the same green-power trading principles, giving Greater Bay Area users a practical cross-boundary option.
    与港澳的跨境绿电交易参照同一绿色电力交易原则,为粤港澳大湾区用户提供切实可行的跨境选项。

Foreign Firms’ Green Power Procurement and Carbon Market Compliance | 外资企业绿电采购、绿证与碳市场履约

Why this matters now

As multinational groups face tightening Scope 2 (purchased electricity) disclosure and supply-chain decarbonisation requirements, China’s rapid build-out of a green-power market has become directly relevant to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating on the mainland. Two developments converge: a mature, unified green-power trading mechanism, and a standardised Green Electricity Certificate (GEC) system that serves as the recognised proof of renewable consumption. For an FIE, buying green power in China is no longer a niche procurement choice — it is a core instrument for meeting global ESG commitments, customer requirements and emerging carbon-accounting rules.

The green-power trading framework

The “Green Power Trading Chapter” of the Basic Rules for Medium- and Long-Term Electricity Trading (NDRC and NEA, Fa Gai Neng Yuan [2024] No. 1123, July 2024) embeds green-power trading within the broader electricity market. Its design principles are straightforward: renewable generation and eligible users trade green power under medium- and long-term contracts, and the GEC is the foundational certificate evidencing renewable production, consumption and environmental attributes. Provincial authorities guide users to participate on a “within-province primary, cross-region supplementary” basis, and cross-border green-power trading with Hong Kong and Macao follows the same principles.

The Green Electricity Certificate system

The GEC is the national voucher for renewable environmental attributes. The Implementation Rules for GEC Administration (Trial) (NEA, issued late 2025 and published January 2026) codify the full lifecycle:

  • Accounts. Power users — including business entities lawfully registered in China — may open a unique real-name GEC account on the national GEC issuance-and-trading system or any GEC trading platform. Foreign-related users with renewable energy exchange with China may also register with valid documentation.
  • Issuance. One GEC is issued per 1,000 kWh of renewable generation, monthly, covering wind, solar, biomass, geothermal, marine and eligible hydro.
  • Transfer. GECs are transferred in real time from seller to buyer upon transaction completion; green-power trading volumes carry their GECs and cannot be re-traded.
  • Cancellation. GECs are cancelled upon expiry (two years), upon declaration of green-power consumption, or upon CCER registration — and from 1 January 2026 the GEC generation year must match the consumption year, raising the bar for time-matched claims.

The 2026 unified electricity market opinion

The State Council’s 2026 opinion on improving the unified national electricity market strengthens the green dimension. It calls for improving the nationally unified GEC market, giving GECs a fuller role as the basis for renewable production, consumption and environmental-attribute recognition, and accelerating a mandatory-plus-voluntary green-power consumption system. It also promotes green-power consumption certification using blockchain, strengthens traceability, and studies viable paths to incorporate GECs into carbon-emission accounting — a signal that green-power proof may increasingly offset carbon obligations.

Carbon-market linkage and compliance posture

Green-power procurement does not sit in isolation from China’s carbon regime. The national carbon-emissions trading market (ETS) covers large emitters, and the policy direction is toward *dual control* — shifting from controlling energy intensity to controlling total carbon emissions — which raises the strategic value of renewable-consumption evidence. For an FIE, the practical chain is: buy green power and receive GECs (proof of renewable consumption), account for residual emissions through the ETS where applicable, and document both for global Scope 2 and supply-chain disclosures. The 2026 opinion’s study of incorporating GECs into carbon accounting is the thread to watch: if GECs become an accepted offset against carbon obligations, early movers with clean procurement records gain a measurable compliance advantage. Foreign groups should therefore build green-power procurement into the China ESG playbook now, rather than treating it as an ad-hoc purchase.

Practical steps for foreign-invested enterprises

  1. Open a GEC account early. A lawfully registered FIE can register directly; group entities should consolidate procurement to maximise matching and traceability.
  2. Buy green power through the trading centre. Sign medium- and long-term green-power contracts and let the associated GECs flow to your account automatically.
  3. Match year and attribute. From 2026, align the GEC generation year with your consumption year and keep cancellation records as ESG evidence.
  4. Connect to carbon strategy. Track the evolving linkage between GECs and carbon accounting; prepare to use GECs in both disclosures and any future offset mechanism.
  5. Use GBA cross-border options. For Greater Bay Area operations, explore Hong Kong–Macao cross-border green-power arrangements under the same trading principles.

Related reading

Green-power procurement sits beside China’s national carbon-emissions trading market and the dual-control transition on carbon emissions. FIEs should read the three together: buy green power (GEC), account for residual emissions (carbon market), and document both for global reporting.


外资企业绿电采购、绿证与碳市场履约

为何当下值得关注

随着跨国集团面临日益收紧的范围二(外购电力)披露与供应链脱碳要求,中国快速建成的绿色电力市场已与在岸运营的外商投资企业(FIE)直接相关。两股趋势交汇:成熟的全国统一绿色电力交易机制,以及作为可再生能源消费公认凭证的标准化绿色电力证书(绿证)制度。对外资企业而言,在中国采购绿电已不再是小众采购选择,而是履行全球ESG承诺、满足客户要求并衔接新兴碳核算规则的核心工具。

绿色电力交易框架

《电力中长期交易基本规则——绿色电力交易专章》(国家发展改革委、国家能源局,发改能源〔2024〕1123号,2024年7月)将绿色电力交易嵌入更广泛的电力市场。其设计原则清晰:可再生能源发电企业与符合条件的用户以中长期合同交易绿电,绿证作为证明可再生能源生产、消费与环境属性的基础凭证。地方政府按照”省内为主、跨省区为辅”引导用户参与,与港澳的跨境绿电交易参照同一原则执行。

绿色电力证书制度

绿证是中国可再生能源环境属性的国家级凭证。《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》(国家能源局,2025年底印发、2026年1月发布)对全生命周期作出规范:

  • 账户。 电力用户——包括在境内合法注册的经营主体——可在国家绿证核发交易系统或任一绿证交易平台开设唯一实名绿证账户;与中国境内有可再生能源电量交换的国外用户亦可凭有效证件注册。
  • 核发。 每1000千瓦时可再生能源电量核发1个绿证,按月核发,覆盖风电、太阳能、生物质、地热、海洋能及符合条件的水电。
  • 划转。 交易完成后绿证由卖方账户实时划转至买方;绿色电力交易电量对应的绿证随交易划转且不得再次交易。
  • 核销。 绿证在有效期届满(两年)、声明绿色电力消费或完成CCER登记时核销;自2026年1月1日起,绿证电量生产年份须与消费年份一致,提高了年份匹配要求的门槛。

2026年统一电力市场意见

国务院办公厅2026年关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见强化了绿色维度。其提出完善全国统一的绿证市场,进一步发挥绿证作为可再生能源电力生产、消费与环境属性认定的基础凭证作用,并加快建立强制与自愿相结合的绿证消费制度。意见还倡导以区块链等技术开展绿电消费认证、强化溯源,并研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算的可行路径——这预示着绿电凭证可能日益用于抵减碳义务。

碳市场衔接与合规姿态

绿电采购并非孤立于中国碳制度之外。全国碳排放权交易市场(ETS)覆盖重点排放单位,政策方向正转向”双控”——由管控能耗强度转向管控碳排放总量——这提升了可再生能源消费凭证的战略价值。对外资企业而言,实操链条是:采购绿电并取得绿证(可再生能源消费凭证)、在适用时通过ETS核算剩余排放,并为全球范围二与供应链披露留痕。2026年意见关于”研究将绿证纳入碳排放核算”的提法值得持续跟踪:若绿证成为可抵减碳义务的认可凭证,拥有清洁采购记录的先行者将获得可量化的合规优势。因此,外资集团应将绿电采购纳入在华ESG打法,而非将其视为临时采购。

外商投资企业实务步骤

  1. 尽早开设绿证账户。 依法注册的FIE可直接注册;集团内主体宜统筹采购以提升匹配度与可追溯性。
  2. 通过交易中心购买绿电。 签订中长期绿电合同,使对应绿证自动流入本方账户。
  3. 对齐年份与属性。 2026年起使绿证生产年份与消费年份一致,并留存核销记录作为ESG证据。
  4. 衔接碳战略。 跟踪绿证与碳核算的衔接演进,为在披露与潜在抵减机制中运用绿证做好准备。
  5. 善用大湾区跨境选项。 大湾区运营可依据同一交易原则探索与港澳的跨境绿电安排。

延伸阅读

绿电采购与中国全国碳排放权交易市场及碳双控转型并列。外资企业应将三者一并研读:购买绿电(绿证)、核算剩余排放(碳市场)、并为全球报告留痕。

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局:《电力中长期交易基本规则——绿色电力交易专章》(发改能源〔2024〕1123号)— https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202408/content_6970133.htm
  • 国家能源局:《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》解读(2026-01-07)— https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260107/3f7a58d6f6a54b1a96b29e0f50cbd04d/c.html
  • 国务院办公厅:《关于完善全国统一电力市场体系的实施意见》(2026年国务院公报)— https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2026/issue_12586/202602/content_7059937.html

New-type storage — foreign participation pathways

  • Document 114 (发改价格〔2026〕114号, Jan 2026) is the first national-level rule to explicitly create a capacity-price mechanism for grid-side standalone new-type storage, treating it on a par with coal power as a capacity resource.
    114号文(发改价格〔2026〕114号,2026年1月)是首个在国家层面明确建立电网侧独立新型储能容量电价机制的规则,将其与煤电同等视为容量资源。
  • New-type storage can now earn a “three-in-one” revenue: capacity price + energy arbitrage + ancillary services; the capacity price is benchmarked to local coal capacity price and scaled by peak-shifting ability.
    新型储能如今可获得”三位一体”收入:容量电价+能量价差+辅助服务;容量电价以当地煤电容量价为基准,按顶峰能力折算。
  • Pumped hydro is refined under a “stock-stable, increment-active” principle: pre-633-file plants keep government pricing; post-633-file plants get a unified capacity price plus market-revenue sharing.
    抽水蓄能在”存量保稳、增量促活”原则下完善:633号文前开工者延续政府定价;之后开工者获统一容量电价加市场收益分享。
  • A reliable-capacity compensation mechanism will follow once spot markets run continuously, paying all qualified resources by the same “peak capability” yardstick — moving from “classified compensation” to “equal pay for equal work.”
    现货市场连续运行后将建立可靠容量补偿机制,以同一”顶峰能力”标尺补偿所有合格资源——由”分类补偿”走向”同工同酬”。
  • No foreign-ownership cap exists on storage investment; foreign capital enters via local project companies and can supply equipment (lithium, flow, compressed-air, flywheel) or invest in projects.
    储能投资无外资股比上限;外资经由本地项目公司进入,可提供设备(锂电、液流、压缩空气、飞轮)或投资项目。
  • Technology choice now competes on function, not just cost: short-duration storage suits high-frequency regulation, long-duration (flow, compressed air) suits peak-shifting and wins more capacity value.
    技术路线如今按功能而非仅成本竞争:短时储能适合高频调频,长时(液流、压缩空气)适合削峰填谷、获更多容量价值。
  • User affordability assessment is a new gate: projects lacking it cannot be planned, approved, or given capacity payment — disciplining over-build.
    用户承受能力评估成为新门槛:未开展评估的项目不得纳入规划及核准、不得给予容量电费或可靠容量补偿。

New-type storage — foreign participation pathways | 新型储能(电化学/抽水蓄能)外资参与路径

Overview

China is building the world’s largest renewable system, and variability makes storage a strategic pillar of the new power system. In January 2026 the NDRC and NEA issued Document 114 (发改价格〔2026〕114号), overhauling the capacity-price mechanism for regulating resources — coal, gas, pumped hydro and, for the first time at national level, grid-side standalone new-type storage. For foreign investors, storage is open (no ownership cap) and now has a clearer revenue floor.

This article explains the 2026 pricing reform, the pumped-hydro and new-storage mechanics, the foreign-participation pathway, and where capital can win. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2026 capacity-price reform (Document 114)

Document 114’s logic: as renewables become the largest installed source, the system needs regulating capacity that “shows up” at peak. It classifies and improves capacity prices for coal, gas, pumped hydro and grid-side standalone new storage, and previews a reliable-capacity compensation mechanism.

  • Coal and gas. Regions raise the fixed-cost recovery via capacity price to at least 50% (coal: RMB 165/kW-year baseline); gas can get a comparable mechanism.
  • Pumped hydro. Pre-633-file (发改价格〔2021〕633号) plants keep government pricing; post-633-file plants get a provincially set unified capacity price (every 3–5 years, cost-recovery basis, with duration折减) plus a share of market revenue.
  • Grid-side standalone new-type storage. For the first time nationally, plants serving system security, not in behind-the-meter pairing, and on a provincial list, may receive a capacity price. The price is benchmarked to the local coal capacity price and scaled by peak-shifting ability (ratio = full-power discharge duration ÷ longest net-load-peak duration, capped at 1), adjusted for market and system needs.

The “three-in-one” revenue for new storage

The reform gives grid-side standalone storage a composite income:

  1. Capacity price — a stable, regulated floor scaled to peak capability.
  2. Energy arbitrage — charge/discharge spread in the electricity market.
  3. Ancillary services — regulation, peak-shifting and other system-value payments.

A reliable-capacity compensation mechanism follows once spot markets run continuously: qualified resources (coal, gas, eligible grid-side storage, later pumped hydro) are paid by the same “reliable capacity” yardstick, ending type-by-type capacity pricing — “equal pay for equal work.” This rewards genuine peak contribution regardless of technology.

Pumped hydro: stock-stable, increment-active

Pumped hydro, the largest existing flexible resource, is refined rather than reinvented:

  • Stock (pre-633). Continue government pricing; after the operating term, re-price to cover necessary upgrades and O&M.
  • Increment (post-633). Unified capacity price + market-revenue sharing, with the share set by the province; revenue mix shifts from high capacity-fee share toward diversified market income, pushing cost discipline and siting quality.

For foreign investors, pumped hydro is capital-intensive and long-cycle; the clearer price path improves bankability but the asset itself is usually a domestic-led, grid-adjacent play.

Foreign-participation pathway

There is no foreign-ownership cap on storage investment or equipment manufacturing. Foreign capital typically enters via:

  • Equipment supply. Lithium, flow (vanadium), compressed-air, flywheel and BMS/PCS technologies — China’s storage manufacturing is large but foreign IP in long-duration chemistry, safety and power electronics remains attractive for local JV or supply agreements.
  • Project investment. A locally incorporated project company builds and operates a grid-side standalone storage plant, joins the provincial list, and earns the three-in-one revenue. Because there is no ownership cap, the entity can be wholly foreign-owned.
  • Integrated plays. Pair storage with wind/solar (see the wind-solar article) or green-hydrogen bases (see the green-hydrogen article) to capture co-located value.

The practical gate is no longer ownership but user affordability assessment: provinces must assess user capacity to pay, and projects without it cannot be planned, approved, or granted capacity payment. This disciplines over-build and ties approvals to genuine system need.

Where capital can win

  • Long-duration storage. Flow and compressed-air gain more capacity value under the peak-ability scaling — a differentiated play versus lithium’s frequency strength.
  • Safety and power electronics. PCS, BMS and fire-safety IP are recurring needs as fleets scale.
  • Project development with offtake certainty. Plants sited where the grid needs peak capacity, on the provincial list, capture the capacity floor plus market upside.
  • Cross-border technology transfer. Foreign long-duration or safety IP localised via JV meets both the speed and compliance bar.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming storage revenue is just energy arbitrage. The 2026 reform adds a capacity floor and ancillary services — model all three.
  • Ignoring the user-affordability gate. Projects without the assessment cannot be approved or paid.
  • Competing on cell cost alone. Technology choice now competes on function (duration, response) under a uniform capacity yardstick.
  • Over-building without grid need. The assessment discipline reduces speculative permits.
  • Treating pumped hydro as a quick entry. It is capital-heavy and long-cycle; the clearer price helps bankability, not speed.

What to do next

  • Decide the entry mode — equipment supply, project investment, or integrated with renewables/H2.
  • For projects, incorporate a local company and target the provincial grid-side standalone storage list.
  • Model the three-in-one revenue (capacity + arbitrage + ancillary) under Document 114.
  • Pre-clear the user-affordability assessment with provincial authorities before committing capital.
  • Choose technology by function: short-duration for frequency, long-duration for peak value.
  • Track the rollout of the reliable-capacity compensation mechanism in spot-market-running regions.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于完善发电侧容量电价机制的通知》(发改价格〔2026〕114号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202601/t20260130_1403525_ext.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策解读 完善发电侧容量电价机制答记者问(2026-01):https://gbdy.ndrc.gov.cn/gbdyzcjd/202601/t20260130_1403528.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 能源价格与新型储能政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 新型储能电站建设与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

新型储能(电化学/抽水蓄能)外资参与路径

概述

中国正在建设全球最大的可再生能源体系,而波动性使储能成为新型电力系统的战略支柱。2026年1月,发改委与能源局发布114号文(发改价格〔2026〕114号),重构调节性资源的容量电价机制——煤电、气电、抽水蓄能,并首次在国家层面纳入电网侧独立新型储能。对外国投资者,储能开放(无股比上限)且如今有了更清晰的收益底。

本文解释2026年电价改革、抽水蓄能与新型储能机制、外资参与路径与资本可胜出之处。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2026年容量电价改革(114号文)

114号文的逻辑:随可再生成为第一大装机电源,系统需要”顶峰时能顶上”的调节容量。它分类完善煤电、气电、抽水蓄能与电网侧独立新型储能的容量电价,并预告可靠容量补偿机制。

  • 煤电与气电。 各地通过容量电价回收煤电机组固定成本比例提至不低于50%(煤电基准165元/千瓦·年);气电可建可比机制。
  • 抽水蓄能。 633号文(发改价格〔2021〕633号)前开工者延续政府定价;之后开工者获省级统一容量电价(每3–5年、按成本回收、按时长折减)加市场收益分享。
  • 电网侧独立新型储能。 首次在国家层面,对服务系统安全、未参与配储、纳入省级清单的电站可给予容量电价。电价以当地煤电容量价为基准,按顶峰能力折算(比例=满功率放电时长÷全年最长净负荷高峰持续时长,上限1),并考虑市场与系统需求。

新型储能的”三位一体”收入

改革赋予电网侧独立储能复合收入:

  1. 容量电价 —— 按顶峰能力折算的稳定管制底价。
  2. 能量价差 —— 电力市场中的充放电价差。
  3. 辅助服务 —— 调频、调峰等系统价值支付。

现货市场连续运行后将建立可靠容量补偿机制:合格资源(煤电、气电、合格电网侧储能,后续含抽水蓄能)按同一”可靠容量”标尺补偿,终结按类型分别定价——”同工同酬”。这不论技术、只奖真实顶峰贡献。

抽水蓄能:存量保稳、增量促活

作为既有最大灵活资源,抽水蓄能是完善而非重塑:

  • 存量(633前)。 延续政府定价;经营期满后按弥补必要技改与运维重新核价。
  • 增量(633后)。 统一容量电价+市场收益分享,分享比例由省级定;收入结构从高容量电费占比转向多元化市场收入,倒逼成本约束与选址质量。

对外资,抽水蓄能资本密集、周期长;更清晰的价格路径提升可融资性,但资产本身通常为国内主导、邻近电网的玩法。

外资参与路径

储能投资与设备制造均无外资股比上限。外资通常经以下方式进入:

  • 设备供应。 锂电、液流(钒)、压缩空气、飞轮及BMS/PCS技术——中国储能制造规模大,但国外在长时化学、安全与功率电子上的IP仍具本地合资或供货吸引力。
  • 项目投资。 本地设立项目公司建设运营电网侧独立储能电站,进入省级清单,赚取三位一体收入。因无所有权上限,实体可为外商独资。
  • 一体化玩法。 将储能与风光(见风光篇)或绿氢基地(见绿氢篇)配对,捕捉协同价值。

实务门槛不再是所有权,而是用户承受能力评估:各省须评估用户支付能力,未开展评估的项目不得纳入规划及核准、不得给予容量电费或可靠容量补偿。这约束过度建设,把核准与真实系统需求挂钩。

资本可胜出之处

  • 长时储能。 液流与压缩空气在顶峰能力折算下获更多容量价值——与锂电的调频强项形成差异化。
  • 安全与功率电子。 随装机扩张,PCS、BMS与消防安全IP是持续需求。
  • 有承购确定性的项目开发。 落在电网需顶峰容量处、进入省级清单的电站,可获容量底价加市场上行。
  • 跨境技术转移。 经合资本地化的国外长时或安全IP,同时满足速度与合规门槛。

常见误读

  • 以为储能收益仅是能量价差。 2026改革新增容量底价与辅助服务——三者须一并建模。
  • 忽视用户承受能力门槛。 未评估的项目不得核准或获付费。
  • 仅以电芯成本竞争。 在统一容量标尺下,技术路线如今按功能(时长、响应)竞争。
  • 不顾电网需求过度建设。 评估纪律减少投机性核准。
  • 把抽水蓄当快速入口。 其资本重、周期长;更清晰的价格助可融资性,而非速度。

下一步建议

  • 决定进入模式——设备供应、项目投资,或与可再生/氢一体化。
  • 对项目,设立本地公司并瞄准省级电网侧独立储能清单。
  • 依114号文建模三位一体收入(容量+价差+辅助服务)。
  • 在投入资本前,与省级部门预先厘清用户承受能力评估。
  • 按功能选技术:短时用于调频,长时用于顶峰价值。
  • 跟踪现货市场运行区域可靠容量补偿机制的落地。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于完善发电侧容量电价机制的通知》(发改价格〔2026〕114号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/tzgg/202601/t20260130_1403525_ext.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策解读 完善发电侧容量电价机制答记者问(2026-01):https://gbdy.ndrc.gov.cn/gbdyzcjd/202601/t20260130_1403528.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 能源价格与新型储能政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 新型储能电站建设与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

National carbon market expansion — impact on foreign-invested enterprises

  • In March 2025 the national ETS first expanded beyond power: steel, cement and aluminium smelting were added, lifting covered CO2 to over 60% of national emissions and adding about 1,500 entities and ~3 billion tonnes of new coverage.
    2025年3月,全国碳市场首次扩围至电力之外:纳入钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼,覆盖二氧化碳占全国总量超60%,新增约1500家企业与约30亿吨新增覆盖。
  • The 2024, 2025 and 2026 compliance years are the “start-up phase”: 2024 allocations equalled verified emissions (no deficit), and 2025–2026 are balanced overall with capped surplus/deficit rates — no contractionary shock to foreign-invested plants.
    2024、2025、2026履约年度为”启动实施阶段”:2024年配额等于经核查排放(无缺口),2025–2026整体盈亏平衡、盈缺率受限——对外资工厂无收缩性冲击。
  • Only direct process emissions are covered (fuel combustion + industrial-process reactions); indirectly purchased electricity/heat is excluded, protecting electricity-intensive but low-direct-emission operations.
    仅覆盖直接过程排放(化石燃料燃烧+工业过程反应);外购电力/热力导致的间接排放不纳入,保护高电耗但直接排放低的运营。
  • Allocation is free and intensity-based; from 2027 the scheme deepens, with sector totals and progressively tighter caps, and paid allocation is to be introduced over time.
    配额为免费且基于强度;2027年起深化,逐步设行业总量并适度收紧,并适时引入有偿分配。
  • Foreign-invested manufacturers in steel/cement/aluminium must register, file monthly key-parameter electronic evidence, report and verify annually, and complete first clearance — with data-quality obligations enforced via blockchain/big-data oversight.
    钢铁/水泥/铝冶炼的外资制造企业须登记、按月报送关键参数信息化存证、年度报告与核查,并完成首次清缴——数据质量义务由区块链/大数据监管执行。
  • Downstream effects reach auto and other exporters: green certificates, CBAM exposure and supply-chain decarbonisation requests flow through to suppliers, including foreign firms.
    下游效应触及汽车等出口商:绿证、CBAM敞口与供应链脱碳要求传导至包括外资在内的供应商。
  • Next sectors in preparation are chemical, petrochemical, civil aviation and paper; by 2027 the ETS is to basically cover major industrial emitting sectors.
    后续准备行业为化工、石化、民航、造纸;到2027年碳市场基本覆盖工业主要排放行业。

National carbon market expansion — impact on foreign-invested enterprises | 全国碳市场扩容(钢铁/建材/有色)对外资企业影响

Overview

China’s national Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), run under the ecology/environment authority (MEE), began with the power sector in 2021. In March 2025 it achieved its first expansion: steel, cement and aluminium smelting were brought into the market. For foreign-invested manufacturers in these sectors — and for any foreign firm whose Chinese supply chain touches them — the ETS is now a direct compliance cost and a strategic signal.

This article explains the 2025/2026 expansion, the allocation and compliance mechanics, the foreign-enterprise obligations, and how to respond. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2025 expansion

On 26 March 2025 the MEE released the *Work Plan for Covering Steel, Cement and Aluminium Smelting in the National ETS*. Approved by the State Council, the move added three high-emitting sectors. Coverage now exceeds 60% of national CO2 emissions; about 1,500 new key emitters are added, with roughly 3 billion tonnes of new covered emissions. The covered gases expand to CO2, CF4 and C2F6.

The expansion follows a “implement while refining” two-phase approach: 2024–2026 is the start-up phase (launch and bedding-in), and from 2027 is the deepening phase. A November 2025 allocation plan (《2024、2025年度…配额总量和分配方案》) set the rules for the first two years.

Allocation and the no-shock design

Crucially for business planning, the first years are deliberately non-punitive:

  • 2024. Allocations to steel, cement and aluminium enterprises equalled verified actual emissions — every enterprise had zero deficit and paid no compliance cost.
  • 2025–2026. Each sector is overall balanced; a performance-coefficient band caps every enterprise’s surplus/deficit rate within a small range, so there is no contractionary effect on sector development.
  • Intensity-based, free allocation. Allocation tracks actual output and is benchmarked by industry; lower-intensity firms earn higher surplus rates, creating an incentive to abate. Only direct emissions (fuel combustion, industrial-process reactions) are covered; indirectly purchased electricity/heat is excluded.
  • “Grasp the large, release the small.” Only the most emissions-concentrated producers are included — e.g., BF-BOF long-process steel, clinker lines, aluminium electrolysis — capturing 98%+ of each sector’s full-process emissions, while smaller segments (independent EAF short-process, steel rolling) are not yet included.

From 2027 the scheme deepens: explicit sector totals, progressively tighter caps, and — per the August 2025 opinion on building a stronger national carbon market — a gradual shift to paid allocation alongside free.

Foreign-enterprise obligations

A foreign-invested enterprise in steel, cement or aluminium that meets the threshold is a “key emitting entity” and must:

  • Register on the national ETS management platform and be included in the provincial key-emitter list.
  • File monthly electronic evidence of key carbon-accounting parameters via the management platform; provincial ecology/environment authorities technically review the data.
  • Report and verify annually greenhouse-gas emissions; the 2025 allocation is issued in H1 2026 (pre-allocation) with true-up by year-end.
  • Complete first clearance — the 2024 allowances are cleared within the year of the plan’s release.
  • Meet data-quality duties under a strengthened MRV system, with blockchain/big-data/”three-tier review”/flight inspections enforcing accuracy and punishing fabrication.

Foreign ownership does not change these duties; a China legal entity carries them. The practical risk is not the cost today (near-zero in 2024, balanced in 2025–2026) but the trajectory: tightening caps and paid allocation from 2027 onward mean early abatement investment protects against future liability.

Downstream and cross-sector effects

The ETS radiates beyond the three sectors:

  • Auto and other exporters. Steel, aluminium and cement are upstream inputs; their carbon costs and green-premium requests flow to suppliers. Foreign auto and machinery firms with China plants face both their own ETS exposure (if in covered segments) and supply-chain decarbonisation requests from EU/brand customers.
  • Green certificates and green power. Covered entities and their customers increasingly use 绿证 to evidence renewable consumption; the 2026 green-certificate lifecycle rules broaden availability.
  • CBAM interaction. The EU’s CBAM indirectly raises carbon cost on steel/aluminium enclosures and inputs; Chinese producers’ ETS compliance and certificates become part of export cost competitiveness.
  • Next sectors. MEE has started preparatory work on chemical, petrochemical, civil aviation and paper, targeting basic coverage of major industrial emitting sectors by 2027.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming the ETS is someone else’s problem. If you operate a covered plant in China, you are the key emitter regardless of foreign ownership.
  • Expecting a 2024–2026 cost shock. The design deliberately avoids contraction; the real cost arrives from 2027 with tighter caps and paid allocation.
  • Ignoring monthly evidence filing. Data quality is enforced by tech-enabled oversight; gaps trigger penalties.
  • Confusing direct and indirect emissions. Only direct process emissions are covered now; purchased power is excluded — plan abatement on the right boundary.
  • Treating ETS in isolation. Green certificates, CBAM and supply-chain requests are linked; manage them together.

What to do next

  • Confirm whether your China entity is a covered key emitter in steel/cement/aluminium; register on the national ETS platform.
  • Stand up a data-quality system: monthly key-parameter electronic evidence, annual reporting, and verification readiness.
  • Model the 2027+ trajectory — tightening caps and paid allocation — into capex for abatement now.
  • Use green certificates and green-power procurement to manage renewable-consumption and export-customer requests.
  • If exporting to the EU, integrate ETS compliance and CBAM exposure into product cost.
  • Track MEE’s next-sector preparations (chemical, petrochemical, aviation, paper) for future exposure.

Sources

  • 生态环境部 — 《2024、2025年度全国碳排放权交易市场钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业配额总量和分配方案》答记者问(2025-11):https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/zbft/202511/t20251119_1134197.shtml
  • 国务院 — 全国碳市场首次扩围(钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼)新闻发布(2025-03):https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202503/content_7015718.htm
  • 生态环境部(MEE)门户网站 — 全国碳排放权交易市场管理:https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • 光明日报 — 首次扩围报道(2025-03-27):https://news.gmw.cn/2025-03/27/content_37929458.htm

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)

全国碳市场扩容(钢铁/建材/有色)对外资企业影响

概述

中国全国碳排放权交易体系(ETS)由生态环境主管部门(MEE)管理,2021年以电力行业起步。2025年3月实现首次扩围:纳入钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼。对身处这些行业的外资制造企业——以及任何中国供应链触及它们的外国公司——ETS如今是直接的合规成本与战略信号。

本文解释2025/2026扩围、配额与履约机制、外资企业义务与应对。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2025年扩围

2025年3月26日,生态环境部发布《全国碳排放权交易市场覆盖钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业工作方案》。经国务院办公厅,纳入三个高排放行业。覆盖二氧化碳占全国总量超60%;新增约1500家重点排放单位,新增覆盖排放约30亿吨。覆盖气体扩展至CO2、CF4与C2F6。

扩围按”边实施、边完善”两阶段:2024–2026为启动实施阶段,2027年起为深化完善阶段。2025年11月的《2024、2025年度…配额总量和分配方案》设定了前两年规则。

配额与无冲击设计

对经营规划至关重要的是,最初几年刻意非惩罚性:

  • 2024年。 钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼企业配额等于经核查实际排放——每家企业无缺口、无需支付履约成本。
  • 2025–2026年。 各行业整体盈亏平衡;以绩效系数带将每家企业盈缺率控制在较小范围内,不对行业发展产生收缩性效应。
  • 基于强度、免费分配。 配额与实际产出挂钩并按行业基准;强度越低企业盈余率越高,形成减排激励。仅覆盖直接排放(化石燃料燃烧、工业过程反应);外购电力/热力导致的间接排放不纳入。
  • “抓大放小”。 仅纳入排放最集中的生产者——如高炉-转炉长流程钢铁、熟料线、铝电解——覆盖各行业全流程排放98%以上,而较小环节(独立电炉短流程、钢压延)暂不纳入。

2027年起深化:明确行业总量、逐步适度收紧,并依2025年8月《关于推进绿色低碳转型 加强全国碳市场建设的意见》逐步引入有偿分配(与免费并行)。

外资企业义务

钢铁、水泥或铝冶炼中达到门槛的外商投资企业,属”重点排放单位”,须:

  • 登记 于全国碳市场管理平台,并纳入省级重点排放单位名录。
  • 按月报送 关键核算参数的信息化存证;省级生态环境主管部门技术审核。
  • 年度报告与核查 温室气体排放;2025年配额于2026年上半年预分配、年底多退少补核定清缴。
  • 完成首次清缴 —— 2024年配额在方案发布当年内清缴。
  • 履行数据质量义务 —— 在强化的MRV体系下,以区块链/大数据/”三级联审”/飞行检查 enforcement,造假受罚。

外资所有权不改变这些义务;由中国法律实体承担。现实风险不是当下的成本(2024近零、2025–2026平衡),而是趋势:2027年起收紧的配额与有偿分配意味着提早的减排投资可防范未来负债。

下游与跨行业效应

ETS辐射超出三个行业:

  • 汽车等出口商。 钢铁、铝、水泥是上游投入;其碳成本与绿色溢价请求传导至供应商。在中国设厂的外资汽车与机械企业,既面临自身(若处覆盖环节)ETS敞口,也面临来自欧/品牌客户的供应链脱碳要求。
  • 绿证与绿电。 覆盖实体及其客户日益用绿证证明可再生消费;2026年绿证全生命周期规则扩大可得性。
  • 与CBAM互动。 欧盟CBAM通过钢铝外壳与投入间接抬高碳成本;中国生产者的ETS合规与绿证成为出口成本竞争力的一部分。
  • 后续行业。 生态环境部已启动化工、石化、民航、造纸前期准备,目标2027年基本覆盖工业主要排放行业。

常见误读

  • 以为ETS与己无关。 若在中国运营覆盖行业工厂,无论外资与否你就是重点排放单位。
  • 预期2024–2026成本冲击。 设计刻意避免收缩;真实成本自2027年随收紧与有偿分配而来。
  • 忽视按月存证。 数据质量由技术赋能监管执行;缺口触发处罚。
  • 混淆直接与间接排放。 当前仅覆盖直接过程排放;外购电力不纳入——在正确边界上规划减排。
  • 孤立看待ETS。 绿证、CBAM与供应链请求相互关联;应统一管理。

下一步建议

  • 确认中国实体是否属钢铁/水泥/铝的覆盖重点排放单位;在全国碳市场平台登记。
  • 建立数据质量体系:按月关键参数信息化存证、年度报告与核查准备。
  • 将2027+趋势——收紧配额与有偿分配——建模进当前减排资本开支。
  • 用绿证与绿电采购管理可再生消费与出口客户请求。
  • 若出口欧盟,将ETS合规与CBAM敞口纳入产品成本。
  • 跟踪生态环境部后续行业准备(化工、石化、民航、造纸)以预判未来敞口。

来源

  • 生态环境部 — 《2024、2025年度全国碳排放权交易市场钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼行业配额总量和分配方案》答记者问(2025-11):https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/zbft/202511/t20251119_1134197.shtml
  • 国务院 — 全国碳市场首次扩围(钢铁、水泥、铝冶炼)新闻发布(2025-03):https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/bumen/202503/content_7015718.htm
  • 生态环境部(MEE)门户网站 — 全国碳排放权交易市场管理:https://www.mee.gov.cn
  • 光明日报 — 首次扩围报道(2025-03-27):https://news.gmw.cn/2025-03/27/content_37929458.htm

相关阅读

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)

Green hydrogen — foreign investment opportunities and demonstration zones

  • Green hydrogen is a 2026 policy priority: the “15th Five-Year Plan” names hydrogen and green fuels as new growth points, and Inner Mongolia alone targets large-scale green-H2 clusters with costs of RMB 17–20/kg (about 60% of the national average).
    绿氢是2026年政策重点:”十五五”规划将氢能、绿色燃料列为新增长点;仅内蒙古即瞄准规模化绿氢集群,成本17–20元/公斤(约全国均价的60%)。
  • Green-power direct connection (绿电直连, 发改能源〔2025〕650号 and 〔2026〕688号) is the key enabler — it gives electrolytic hydrogen 100% physical green-power traceability and removes the public-grid “middle leg,” cutting cost and certifying origin.
    绿电直连(发改能源〔2025〕650号、〔2026〕688号)是关键赋能手段——为电解制氢提供100%物理绿电溯源,去掉公共电网”中转”,降本并认证来源。
  • By February 2026, 84 green-direct-connection projects had been approved nationwide (32.59 GW of renewable capacity); at least eight large green-H2 projects advanced in 2026 across Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Heilongjiang and Hubei.
    截至2026年2月,全国已审批84个绿电直连项目(可再生装机3259万千瓦);2026年新疆、内蒙古、广东、黑龙江、湖北等地至少8个大型绿氢项目推进。
  • Demonstration is moving from pilot to scale: the world’s largest green-hydrogen-ammonia project (Oriental Energy, Chifeng) shipped its first green ammonia export in 2026 and holds ISCC GHG certification — a template for export-oriented green fuels.
    示范正从试点走向规模:全球最大绿氢制氨项目(远景赤峰)2026年首发绿氨出海并获ISCC GHG认证——是可出口绿色燃料的范本。
  • Foreign investors enter via local project companies and partnerships; the sector has no generation-ownership cap, and green-direct-connection rules explicitly welcome foreign-related and private capital in new energy.
    外资经由本地项目公司与合作进入;该领域无发电所有权上限,且绿电直连规则明确欢迎涉外与民营资本进入新能源。
  • Watch the cost and certification stack: electrolyser capex, renewable power price (as low as RMB 0.15–0.21/kWh in the west), green-certificate/ISCC traceability, and provincial pilots (Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Xinjiang) defining上网 electricity ratios.
    关注成本与认证栈:电解槽资本开支、可再生电价(西部低至0.15–0.21元/千瓦时)、绿证/ISCC溯源,以及界定上网电量比例的内蒙古、吉林、新疆等省级试点。
  • Opportunities span the value chain: green-H2 for refining/chemicals, green ammonia/methanol/Sustainable Aviation Fuel, hydrogen pipelines and equipment, and “wind-solar-hydrogen-storage” integrated bases.
    机会覆盖价值链:炼化/化工绿氢、绿氨/绿醇/可持续航空燃料、氢管网与装备,以及”风光氢储”一体化基地。

Green hydrogen — foreign investment opportunities and demonstration zones | 绿氢/氢能产业:外资投资机会与示范区

Overview

Hydrogen — especially green hydrogen produced from renewable power — has moved from pilot exploration to ordered scale-up in China. The “15th Five-Year Plan” explicitly names hydrogen and green fuels as new growth points, and 2026 is seeing a wave of large green-direct-connection (绿电直连) hydrogen projects. For foreign investors, the sector is open and policy-backed, but success hinges on mastering the green-power-direct-connection mechanism, the cost stack, and international certification for export.

This article outlines the 2026 policy push, demonstration clusters, the foreign-investor access path, and where capital can win. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

The 2026 policy push

Two national instruments anchor green hydrogen:

  • Green-power direct connection. The NDRC/NEA *Notice on Orderly Promoting Green-Power Direct Connection* (发改能源〔2025〕650号, May 2025) defined the model and standards; a September 2025 transmission-and-distribution price notice clarified the cost rules (capacity/demand-based payment, no system-reserve or transmission energy charge on downside power). The 2026 multi-user version (发改能源〔2026〕688号) extends it to several off-takers. For electrolytic hydrogen this is decisive: dedicated lines deliver 100% green power with clear physical traceability, solving both the cost (power is 60–80% of green-H2 cost) and the origin-certification problem for export markets.
  • “15th Five-Year Plan” and local pilots. The national plan lays out green-H2 demonstration bases in Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Xinjiang. Inner Mongolia alone has issued 19 hydrogen policies covering the full “produce–store–transport–use” chain, built 8 green-H2 projects (≈80,000 t/yr capacity), and in early 2026 reported output of 12,694 t in 2025 (3.6× YoY) at RMB 17–20/kg — about 60% of the national average. Provinces such as Jilin and Xinjiang have issued their own green-direct-connection implementation schemes, with defined caps on grid-fed electricity ratios (e.g., Inner Mongolia: ≤40% in 2027, ≤20% from 2028 for grid-connected hydrogen-based green-fuel projects).

Demonstration at scale

By February 2026 the NEA had disclosed 84 approved green-direct-connection projects (32.59 GW of renewable capacity). At least eight large green-H2 projects advanced in 2026:

  • Xinjiang Iwu off-grid wind-solar hydrogen — 690 MW renewable + 160 MW/320 MWh storage, ~30,000 t/yr green H2, RMB 2.459 billion.
  • Baowu Qingneng (Yangjiang) green-H2 park — Guangdong’s only green-power-supplied demonstration park, 1.5 GW offshore-wind direct hydrogen, 80,000 t/yr, RMB 11.09 billion.
  • Oriental Energy (Chifeng) 1.52 Mt green ammonia — world’s largest, 100% green-direct-connection, first green-ammonia export shipped in 2026 with ISCC GHG certification.
  • Heilongjiang Huanan 1.2 GW off-grid wind hydrogen + methanol — ~300,000 t/yr green methanol.
  • Inner Mongolia Arunqi wind-hydrogen SAF — 1 GW wind, 35,000 t/yr green aviation kerosene.
  • Hubei Daye, Inner Mongolia Dengkou, and others — varied off-grid/grid-connected configurations.

The pattern: large “wind-solar-hydrogen-storage” integrated bases in resource-rich western/northern provinces, with downstream products (H2, ammonia, methanol, SAF) aimed at both domestic decarbonisation and export.

Foreign-investor access

Hydrogen production and renewable generation are not on the restricted negative list; there is no foreign-ownership cap on generation, and green-direct-connection rules explicitly welcome foreign-related and private capital in new energy. The practical vehicle is a locally incorporated project company (often in an FTZ or demonstration zone) that builds renewable generation, electrolysers and (optionally) downstream plants, and signs green-direct-connection and offtake arrangements.

Foreign capital can enter as: (a) an equity investor in a Chinese project company or JV; (b) an equipment/technology supplier (electrolysers, compressors, fuel cells, ammonia synthesis); or (c) an offtaker/partner for green fuels (shipping, aviation, chemicals) seeking certified green molecules. The 2026 environment is unusually welcoming because local governments compete to attract green-industry anchor projects with land, grid and fiscal support (some western regions offer up to ~20% investment subsidies).

Where capital can win

  • Electrolyser and balance-of-plant supply. China’s electrolyser manufacturing is cost-competitive; foreign IP in high-efficiency stacks, membranes and controls can partner locally.
  • Green-fuel offtake and certification. Export-oriented green ammonia/methanol/SAF needs ISCC/equivalent certification and traceable green power — a service and trading niche.
  • Integrated bases and pipelines. Inner Mongolia’s provincial hydrogen-pipeline plan (“one trunk, two loops, four outlets”) and storage/transport equipment are open to investment.
  • Demonstration-zone first-movers. Bases in Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang and Guangdong offer the clearest policy certainty and infrastructure.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming grid parity alone solves green-H2 economics. Power cost is necessary but not sufficient; electrolyser utilisation, capex and offtake certainty matter more.
  • Ignoring green-direct-connection rules. Without dedicated-line traceability, export-market certification (ISCC/CBAM) is hard.
  • Over-looking provincial caps on grid-fed ratios. Some provinces limit how much a green-H2 project may export to the grid.
  • Treating hydrogen as a single market. Downstream products (H2/NH3/MeOH/SAF) have very different offtakers and certification needs.
  • Underestimating certification and logistics. Export green fuels requires ISCC GHG and traceable power; pipelines/trucks add cost.

What to do next

  • Target resource-rich, policy-certain bases (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Guangdong) for a project company.
  • Master the green-direct-connection application: dedicated line, traceability, and provincial grid-fed-ratio caps.
  • Build the cost stack: renewable power price, electrolyser capex/utilisation, and offtake contracts.
  • Secure ISCC/equivalent certification early if aiming at export; align traceable green power.
  • Consider equipment supply + offtake partnership rather than sole-project ownership.
  • Track the 2026 green-direct-connection project approvals and provincial pilot rules.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号)及2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 氢能、新型能源体系与绿电直连政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿电直连项目审批与可再生能源规划:https://www.nea.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 我国绿证全生命周期管理机制全面细化(2026-01-07):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gdxw/2026-01/07/content_458646.html

Related reading

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

绿氢/氢能产业:外资投资机会与示范区

概述

氢——尤其由可再生电力生产的绿氢——在中国已从试点探索走向有序规模化。国家”十五五”规划明确将氢能、绿色燃料列为新增长点,2026年正涌现一批大型绿电直连制氢项目。对外国投资者,该领域开放且有政策支撑,但成败取决于掌握绿电直连机制、成本栈与出口所需的国际认证。

本文勾勒2026年政策推动、示范集群、外资准入路径与资本可胜出之处。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

2026年政策推动

两项国家级文件锚定绿氢:

  • 绿电直连。 发改委/能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号,2025年5月)明确了模式与标准;2025年9月输配电价通知细化成本规则(按容/需量缴纳,下网电量不再缴系统备用费与输配电量电费)。2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号)扩展至多个用户。对电解制氢这具决定性:专用线路送达100%绿电并清晰物理溯源,同时解决成本(电力占绿氢成本60–80%)与出口市场的来源认证问题。
  • “十五五”与地方试点。 国家规划在内蒙古、甘肃、新疆布局绿氢示范基地。仅内蒙古即出台19项氢能政策,覆盖”制储输用”全链,建成8个绿氢项目(约8万吨/年产能),2026年初披露2025年产量12694吨(同比增3.6倍),成本17–20元/公斤——约全国均价的60%。吉林、新疆等省出台各自绿电直连实施方案,并界定上网电量比例上限(如内蒙古:并网型氢基绿色燃料项目2027年前上网≤40%、2028年起≤20%)。

规模化示范

截至2026年2月,能源局披露全国已审批84个绿电直连项目(可再生装机3259万千瓦)。2026年至少8个大型绿氢项目推进:

  • 新疆伊吾离网风光制氢 —— 69万千瓦可再生+16万千瓦/32万千瓦时储能,约3万吨/年绿氢,投资24.59亿元。
  • 宝武清能(阳江)绿氢产业园 —— 广东唯一绿电直供示范园,1.5GW海上风电直连制氢,8万吨/年,投资110.9亿元。
  • 远景赤峰152万吨绿氨 —— 全球最大、100%绿电直连,2026年首发绿氨出海并获ISCC GHG认证。
  • 黑龙江桦南1.2GW离网风电制氢+甲醇 —— 约30万吨/年绿色甲醇。
  • 内蒙古阿荣旗风光制氢SAF —— 1GW风电,3.5万吨/年绿色航空煤油。
  • 湖北大冶、内蒙古磴口等 —— 多样的离网/并网配置。

模式是:资源富集的西部/北部省份建设大型”风光氢储”一体化基地,下游产品(氢、氨、甲醇、SAF)兼顾国内脱碳与出口。

外资准入

氢生产与可再生发电不在负面清单限制之列;发电无外资股比上限,且绿电直连规则明确欢迎涉外与民营资本进入新能源。务实载体是本地设立的项目公司(常在自贸片区或示范区),建设可再生发电、电解槽及(可选)下游装置,并签署绿电直连与购售安排。

外资可进入为:(a)中国项目公司或合资企业的股权投资者;(b)设备/技术供应商(电解槽、压缩机、燃料电池、合成氨);(c)寻求认证绿色分子的绿燃料(航运、航空、化工)承购方或伙伴。2026年环境格外友好,因地方政府以土地、电网与财政支持(西部部分地区最高约20%投资补助)竞逐绿色产业锚定项目。

资本可胜出之处

  • 电解槽与辅助系统供应。 中国电解槽制造具成本竞争力;国外在高效率电堆、膜与控制系统上的IP可本地合作。
  • 绿燃料承购与认证。 出口型绿氨/绿醇/SAF需要ISCC/等效认证与可溯源绿电——一个服务与贸易利基。
  • 一体化基地与管网。 内蒙古省级氢管网规划(”一干双环四出口”)及储运装备对外开放投资。
  • 示范区先行者。 内蒙古、甘肃、新疆、广东的基地提供最清晰的政策确定性与基础设施。

常见误读

  • 以为平价上网 alone 解决绿氢经济性。 电力成本必要但不充分;电解槽利用率、资本开支与承购确定性更重要。
  • 忽视绿电直连规则。 无专用线溯源,出口市场认证(ISCC/CBAM)困难。
  • 忽视省级上网比例上限。 部分省份限制绿氢项目向电网送电的比例。
  • 把氢当作单一市场。 下游产品(氢/氨/醇/SAF)的承购方与认证需求截然不同。
  • 低估认证与物流。 出口绿色燃料需ISCC GHG与可溯源绿电;管输/槽车增加成本。

下一步建议

  • 瞄准资源富集、政策确定的基地(内蒙古、甘肃、新疆、广东)设立项目公司。
  • 吃透绿电直连申请:专用线路、溯源与省级上网比例上限。
  • 构建成本栈:可再生电价、电解槽资本开支/利用率与承购合同。
  • 若瞄准出口,尽早取得ISCC/等效认证;对齐可溯源绿电。
  • 考虑设备供应+承购合作,而非 sole 项目持股。
  • 跟踪2026年绿电直连项目审批与省级试点规则。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于有序推动绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2025〕650号)及2026年多用户版(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 氢能、新型能源体系与绿电直连政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿电直连项目审批与可再生能源规划:https://www.nea.gov.cn
  • 科技日报 — 我国绿证全生命周期管理机制全面细化(2026-01-07):https://www.stdaily.com/web/gdxw/2026-01/07/content_458646.html

相关阅读

  • 风光发电外资项目核准与并网政策(146-wind-solar-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

Wind and solar — foreign project approval and grid-connection policy

  • Wind and solar power generation has no foreign-ownership cap; equipment manufacturing is fully open. The binding constraint is provincial planning and grid absorption, not nationality.
    风电与光伏发电无外资股比上限,设备制造完全开放。真正约束在于省级规划与电网消纳,而非投资者国籍。
  • Document 136 (发改价格〔2025〕136号) ended the “guaranteed-offtake” era: from 2025, new wind/solar goes fully into the market, with a sustainable-price settlement mechanism smoothing the transition; 2026 is the first full year of “all-market + differential settlement.”
    136号文(发改价格〔2025〕136号)终结”保障性收购”时代:2025年起新建风光全面入市,以可持续发展价格结算机制平滑过渡;2026年是”全量入市+差价结算”的首个完整年度。
  • The 2026 mechanism auction produced about 220 GW of bidding capacity; average on-grid prices fell, signalling a “revenue-downward and restructuring” period for developers.
    2026年机制竞价申报装机约2.2亿千瓦;平均上网电价下行,标志开发商进入”收益下行与重构期”。
  • Green certificates (绿证) now have a full lifecycle rule (《实施细则》, effective 2026-01-07): one certificate per 1,000 kWh, tradable vs non-tradable classes, and coverage extended to non-public-grid projects.
    绿证已有全生命周期细则(《实施细则》,2026-01-07施行):每1000千瓦时1张,分可交易与不可交易,并扩展至非公共电网项目。
  • Multi-user green-power direct connection (发改能源〔2026〕688号) lets wind/solar supply several off-takers via dedicated lines with clear traceability — a route well suited to export-oriented and zero-carbon-park users.
    多用户绿电直连(发改能源〔2026〕688号)允许风光通过专用线路向多个用户供电并清晰溯源——极适合出口型与零碳园区用户。
  • Foreign investors enter via a locally incorporated project company; the negative list does not restrict generation ownership, but grid assets/distribution networks are treated differently.
    外资经由本地设立的项目公司进入;负面清单不限制发电所有权,但电网资产/配电网被区别对待。
  • Revenue must be modelled without feed-in subsidy — stack grid-parity power price, green-power trading, green certificates, and (where co-located) storage value.
    收入须在毫无度电补贴下建模——叠加平价电价、绿电交易、绿证,以及(协同储能时)储能价值。

Wind and solar — foreign project approval and grid-connection policy | 风光发电:外资项目核准与并网政策

Overview

China operates the world’s largest renewable-energy system. For foreign investors, wind and solar are broadly open: generation has no foreign-ownership cap, and PV-module and wind-turbine manufacturing is fully open and globally competitive. The constraint that matters is not ownership but provincial planning and grid absorption.

The 2026 policy frame is defined by Document 136 (NDRC/NEA, Feb 2025), which moved new wind/solar from guaranteed offtake to full market participation with a settlement backstop, and by the 2026 green-certificate and green-direct-connection rules. This article outlines foreign-investor access, the new pricing era, and the practical approval/grid path. It is informational; confirm current detail with qualified PRC advisers.

Foreign-investor access

There is no foreign-ownership cap on renewable power generation. Foreign-funded enterprises may invest in wind, solar, biomass and hydropower on the same footing as domestic firms, typically through a locally incorporated project company. The NDRC and NEA set the planning and pricing framework; provincial authorities handle project filing/approval and grid-connection. Equipment manufacturing is fully open.

The foreign-investment negative list does not restrict generation ownership, so a wholly foreign-owned project company is permitted. The restrictions that remain are sectoral — certain grid assets, distribution-network ownership and power-grid operation are treated differently and are not the natural vehicle for a generation-focused entrant. This is why the practical structure is a project company that builds and operates generation assets but does not own the transmission backbone. Confirming the negative-list status early avoids designing a holding structure that later hits a sector cap.

The Document 136 pricing era

Document 136 (发改价格〔2025〕136号) is the pivotal 2026-relevant rule. Its logic: push wind/solar on-grid electricity fully into the power market, with prices formed by trading, while a “sustainable development price settlement mechanism” smooths the transition.

  • Stock vs incremental projects. Projects commissioned before 1 June 2025 are “stock”: their mechanism electricity volume and price衔接 existing policy, mechanism price generally not above the local coal-benchmark tariff, for a defined period. Projects from 1 June 2025 are “incremental”: each year’s mechanism volume is set by the province based on non-hydro renewable absorption-weight completion and user affordability; the mechanism price is set by market-based bidding (lowest successful bid sets the clearing price, capped).
  • Settlement. For electricity included in the mechanism, the grid settles the difference between the market average price and the mechanism price; the differential is pooled into local system-operation costs. Projects may voluntarily exit the mechanism.
  • No forced storage. The document explicitly says configuring storage must not be made a前置 condition for new-project approval, grid-connection or on-grid.

The effect: the “guaranteed-offtake” era is over. Developers must model merchant risk. By 2026 the first mechanism auctions showed about 220 GW of bidding capacity (wind bid ~120 GW, won ~68.5 GW; solar bid ~100 GW, won ~65 GW); mechanism prices ranged roughly 0.15–0.4155 RMB/kWh by technology and province, with average on-grid prices down — a “revenue-downward and restructuring” period.

Green certificates and green-direct-connection

Two 2026 rules reshape revenue and traceability.

  • Green certificates (绿证). The *Implementation Rules for Renewable Green-Power Certificate Management (Trial)*, effective 7 January 2026, build a full-lifecycle framework: one certificate per 1,000 kWh of renewable generation; tradable certificates for grid-fed and (from 2023-01-01) fully marketised conventional hydro on-grid electricity, non-tradable for self-use and off-grid; independent storage discharge is not certificated. NEA is also advancing green-certificate issuance for non-public-grid renewable projects (notice of June 2026), broadening coverage.
  • Multi-user green-direct-connection (发改能源〔2026〕688号). This lets wind/solar/biomass supply several different legal-person off-takers via dedicated lines with clear power traceability and allocation, supporting nearby local consumption. It prioritises computing-power facilities, green hydrogen/ammonia/methanol and zero-carbon parks — a structure well suited to export-oriented manufacturers needing verified green power for CBAM/ESG reasons.

The approval and grid-connection path

Practically, a foreign developer:

  1. Incorporates a local project company (often in an FTZ) that holds the generation assets and signs grid-connection and power-purchase arrangements. Because generation has no ownership cap, this entity can be wholly foreign-owned.
  2. Confirms the provincial annual construction plan and a grid-absorption study. This is the real gate — not nationality. The provincial energy bureau’s plan and a grid study confirm the project fits within local distribution/grid capacity.
  3. Files/obtains approval. Centralised wind is subject to approval (核准制); centralised PV and most distributed PV are filed (备案制). The 2026 trend is “all-market” and “source-grid-load-storage integration” pilots, with provinces (e.g., Guizhou’s 2026 management measure) detailing planning, annual plans and approval/filing.
  4. Signs grid-connection and power-purchase contracts, modelling revenue without feed-in subsidy: stacking grid-parity price, green-power trading, green certificates, and co-located storage value.
  5. Explores green finance — green loans/bonds and settlement-receivable financing eligible under NDRC/NEA carbon-reduction instruments.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming a feed-in subsidy still exists. Major wind/solar has run grid-parity (no per-kWh subsidy) since 2021; revenue rests on market price, green certificates and trading.
  • Treating ownership as the binding constraint. Provincial planning and grid absorption are the real gate; model them first.
  • Ignoring the 136 settlement mechanism. New projects face merchant risk and mechanism bidding, not a fixed benchmark.
  • Assuming storage is mandatory. Document 136 forbids making storage a前置 condition for approval/grid/on-grid.
  • Overlooking green-certificate revenue and traceability. Certificates are a distinct, growing revenue and ESG stream.

What to do next

  • Confirm the provincial plan and grid-absorption study before committing capital — planning, not ownership, is the binding constraint.
  • Assume no feed-in subsidy; model revenue on market price, green-power trading and green certificates.
  • Incorporate a local project company; foreign ownership of generation is permitted but the entity drives permits and grid connection.
  • Track the 2026 mechanism auctions in your target province to benchmark clearing prices.
  • Evaluate multi-user green-direct-connection if you serve export-oriented or zero-carbon-park off-takers.
  • Explore green finance: green loans/bonds and subsidy-receivable financing for eligible projects.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于深化新能源上网电价市场化改革 促进新能源高质量发展的通知》(发改价格〔2025〕136号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/jd/jd/202502/t20250209_1396070.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策公开 《发改价格〔2025〕136号》全文:https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?id=20482
  • 国家能源局《关于有序推动多用户绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿证、新能源项目建档立卡与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

风光发电:外资项目核准与并网政策

概述

中国拥有全球最大的可再生能源体系。对外国投资者,风电与光伏大体开放:发电无外资股比上限,光伏组件与风机设备制造完全开放且具全球竞争力。真正重要的约束不是所有权,而是省级规划与电网消纳。

2026年的政策框架由136号文(发改委/能源局,2025年2月)界定——它将新建风光由保障性收购推向全面市场化并辅以结算托底,以及2026年的绿证与绿电直连规则。本文勾勒外资准入、新电价时代与务实的核准/并网路径。本文仅为信息参考,具体细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

外资准入

可再生能源发电无外资股比上限。外资企业可与内资同等投资风电、光伏、生物质与水电,通常经由本地设立的项目公司。发改委与能源局设定规划与电价框架;省级部门负责项目核准/备案与并网。设备制造完全开放。

外商投资负面清单不限制发电所有权,故外商独资项目公司被允许。剩余限制具有行业性——部分电网资产、配电网所有权与电网运营被区别对待,并非以发电为核心的进入者之自然载体。正因如此,实务结构通常是设立建设并运营发电资产、但不持有输电主干的项目公司。尽早确认负面清单状态,可避免设计出后续遭遇行业股比上限的持股结构。

136号文电价时代

136号文(发改价格〔2025〕136号)是与2026密切相关的关键规则。其逻辑:推动风光上网电量全面进入电力市场、价格由交易形成,同时以”新能源可持续发展价格结算机制”平滑过渡。

  • 存量与增量项目。 2025年6月1日前投产为”存量”:机制电量与价格衔接现有政策,机制电价一般不高于当地燃煤基准价,执行一定期限。2025年6月1日起为”增量”:每年机制电量由各省依非水可再生能源消纳权重完成与用户承受能力确定;机制电价由市场化竞价形成(最低入选项目报价为出清价,设上限)。
  • 结算。 对纳入机制的电量,电网结算市场交易均价与机制电价的差额,差额纳入当地系统运行费用。项目可自愿退出机制。
  • 不得强制配储。 文件明确,不得将配置储能作为新建新能源项目核准、并网、上网的前置条件。

影响:”保障性收购”时代结束。开发商须建模市场化风险。至2026年,首轮机制竞价申报装机约2.2亿千瓦(风电申报约1.2亿、中标6850万千瓦;光伏申报约1亿、中标6521万千瓦);机制电价按技术与省份介于约0.15–0.4155元/千瓦时,平均上网电价下行——进入”收益下行与重构期”。

绿证与绿电直连

两项2026规则重塑收入与溯源。

  • 绿证。 《可再生能源绿色电力证书管理实施细则(试行)》2026年1月7日施行,构建全生命周期框架:每1000千瓦时可再生发电量核发1张绿证;对上网电量及(2023-01-01起)完全市场化常规水电上网电量核发可交易绿证,自发自用与离网核发不可交易绿证;独立储能放电不核发。能源局2026年6月通知推进非公共电网可再生项目绿证核发,扩大覆盖面。
  • 多用户绿电直连(发改能源〔2026〕688号)。 允许风电/光伏/生物质通过专用线路向多个不同法人用户供电,实现电量清晰溯源与分配,支撑就近消纳。优先支持算力设施、绿色氢氨醇与零碳园区——极适合因CBAM/ESG需要可验证绿电的出口型企业。

核准与并网路径

实务上,外资开发商:

  1. 设立本地项目公司(常在自贸片区),持有发电资产并签署并网与购售电安排。因发电无所有权上限,该实体可为外商独资。
  2. 确认省级年度建设计划与电网消纳研究。 这才是真正的门槛——而非国籍。省能源局计划与电网研究确认项目落在当地配电/电网容量之内。
  3. 核准/备案。 集中式风电实行核准制;集中式光伏与多数分布式光伏实行备案制。2026年趋势是”全面入市”与”源网荷储一体化”试点,各省(如贵州2026年管理办法)细化规划、年度计划与核准/备案。
  4. 签署并网与购售电合同,在毫无度电补贴下建模收入:叠加平价电价、绿电交易、绿证与协同储能价值。
  5. 探索绿色金融 —— 符合发改委/能源局碳减排工具的绿色信贷/债券与结算应收融资。

常见误读

  • 以为仍有度电补贴。 主要风光自2021年起平价上网(无度电补贴);收入取决于市场价格、绿证与交易。
  • 把所有权当约束。 省级规划与电网消纳才是真正门槛;应先建模它们。
  • 忽视136号结算机制。 新项目面临市场化风险与机制竞价,而非固定标杆。
  • 以为储能强制。 136号文禁止将储能作为核准/并网/上网的前置条件。
  • 忽视绿证收入与溯源。 绿证是独立且增长的收入与ESG流。

下一步建议

  • 在投入资本前确认省级计划与电网消纳研究——约束在于规划而非所有权。
  • 假定无度电补贴;以市场价格、绿电交易与绿证建模收入。
  • 设立本地项目公司;发电外资所有权虽被允许,但实体驱动许可与并网。
  • 跟踪目标省份2026年机制竞价以对标出清价。
  • 若服务出口型或零碳园区用户,评估多用户绿电直连。
  • 探索绿色金融:符合条件项目的绿色信贷/债券与补贴应收融资。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委、国家能源局《关于深化新能源上网电价市场化改革 促进新能源高质量发展的通知》(发改价格〔2025〕136号):https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/jd/jd/202502/t20250209_1396070.html
  • 国家发展改革委 政策公开 《发改价格〔2025〕136号》全文:https://zfxxgk.ndrc.gov.cn/web/iteminfo.jsp?id=20482
  • 国家能源局《关于有序推动多用户绿电直连发展有关事项的通知》(发改能源〔2026〕688号):https://www.nea.gov.cn/20260520/9e1c4277ce324c8ab82a84da98da7980/c.html
  • 国家能源局(NEA)门户网站 — 绿证、新能源项目建档立卡与并网:https://www.nea.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 绿氢/氢能产业外资投资机会与示范区(147-green-hydrogen-2026)
  • 新型储能外资参与路径(149-storage-2026)
  • 全国碳市场扩容对外资企业影响(148-carbon-market-2026)

Automotive and NEV Market Access for Foreign Investors: The Post-Restriction Landscape (2026)

  • All manufacturing foreign-investment access restrictions are now abolished; the 2024 negative list cleared the last manufacturing items, including passenger-vehicle equity caps.
    制造业外资准入限制已全部取消;2024 年负面清单清除了最后制造业条目,包括乘用车股比限制。
  • The 2025 Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment (in force 1 Feb 2026) lists new-energy and smart-vehicle supply-chain items as encouraged.
    2025 年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)将新能源与智能网联汽车供应链条目列为鼓励类。
  • The 2026 stabilise-and-optimise-FDI action plan reaffirms solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem — i.e., access plus operating permission.
    2026 年稳外资行动方案重申解决「大门开、小门不开」,即准入加准营。
  • Foreign auto and NEV investors can now fully own WFOEs, JVs are no longer equity-capped, and encouraged items enjoy preferential treatment.
    外国汽车与新能源投资者可全资设 WFOE,合资不再受股比限制,鼓励类条目享优惠。
  • Practical focus shifts from “can I enter?” to “can I operate?” — licences, standards, data and localisation now dominate the agenda.
    实务焦点从「能否进入」转向「能否运营」——牌照、标准、数据与本地化成为议程主线。
  • Watch the negative list’s service-sector items (29 national / 27 FTZ) and the encouraged catalogue’s annual updates for the next opening wave.
    关注负面清单服务业条目(全国 29 / 自贸区 27)与鼓励目录的年度更新,捕捉下一波开放。

Automotive and NEV Market Access for Foreign Investors: The Post-Restriction Landscape (2026) | 汽车与新能源汽车外资准入:限制清零后的格局(2026)

China’s manufacturing sector is now fully open to foreign investment. The *Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative List) (2024)* removed the final manufacturing restrictions, including the passenger-vehicle foreign-equity cap and the limit of two same-segment JVs per foreign maker. Combined with the 2021 removal of satellite-TV equipment restrictions, the FTZ negative list achieved “manufacturing items cleared to zero.” For automotive and new-energy-vehicle (NEV) investors, this means full freedom to choose structure: a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, a majority-owned JV, or a 50/50 JV — the cap is gone.

The encouraging side is equally explicit. The *Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment (2025 Edition)*, promulgated 15 December 2025 and effective 1 February 2026, carries a deep set of automotive and NEV supply-chain items — from power batteries and key materials to smart-vehicle components, hydrogen preparation and CCUS. Encouraged items, consistent with access policy, enjoy preferential treatment (e.g., tax incentives) where they are not excluded by other industrial catalogues. This steers foreign capital toward the high-value, green and smart segments rather than mere assembly.

The 2026 *Action Plan for Stabilising and Optimising Foreign Investment* frames the next problem precisely: with manufacturing access “zeroed,” the bottleneck is “access after admission” — making sure a cleared investment can actually operate. Officials describe the “big door open, small door closed” issue and commit to solving licensing, standards and local operating frictions. For auto/NIV investors this is the real work: vehicle-type approval, battery and recycling rules, data-security for connected vehicles, and local supply-chain integration.

Structurally, the path is: (1) confirm the specific product sits in the encouraged catalogue (for incentives) and is outside any residual restriction; (2) choose WFOE vs JV on commercial grounds, not because of a cap; (3) map the operating licences — production, product certification, battery/NEV-specific approvals; (4) build a data-compliance plan for connected and intelligent vehicles; and (5) use the “investment China” service window and any applicable FTZ pilot to compress licensing. The era of negotiation over equity caps is over; the era of operating-permission mastery has begun.


汽车与新能源汽车外资准入:限制清零后的格局(2026)

中国制造业已对外资全面开放。《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024 年版)》取消了最后制造业限制,包括乘用车外资股比限制与同一外商两家同类整车合资限制。叠加 2021 年取消卫星电视设备限制,自贸区负面清单实现「制造业条目清零」。对汽车与新能源汽车(NEV)投资者,这意味着可自由选择结构:外商独资、控股合资或 50/50 合资——上限已无。

鼓励侧同样明确。2025 年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(2025 年 12 月 15 日公布,2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)包含大量汽车与 NEV 供应链条目——从动力电池、关键材料到智能网联零部件、制氢与 CCUS。鼓励类条目在符合准入政策前提下享优惠(如税收激励),引导外资流向高价值、绿色与智能环节,而非单纯组装。

2026 年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》精准框定下一问题:制造业准入「清零」后,瓶颈在「准入之后准营」——确保获批投资真能运营。官方直指「大门开、小门不开」,承诺破解牌照、标准与本地运营摩擦。对汽车/NIV 投资者,真正功课是:车辆型式准入、电池与回收规则、智能网联汽车数据安全、本地供应链整合。

结构上,路径是:(1)确认具体产品落入鼓励目录(享优惠)且不在任何残留限制内;(2)基于商业而非上限选择 WFOE 或合资;(3)梳理运营牌照——生产、产品认证、电池/NV 专项审批;(4)为智能网联汽车建数据合规方案;(5)用「投资中国」服务窗口与适用自贸区试点压缩拿照周期。谈判股比上限的时代结束,掌握准营的时代开始。

From “Can I Enter?” to “Can I Operate?”

With the equity cap gone, the real constraints are operational. A foreign NEV maker should focus on vehicle-type approval, battery production and recycling approvals, and the data-security rules for connected and intelligent vehicles — these, not ownership, now shape time-to-market. Build a local compliance and data-governance function early; for smart vehicles, cross-border data and mapping rules are as strategic as the factory permit.

Use the encouraged catalogue for economics. If your product sits in the 2025 encouraged list (power batteries, key materials, smart components, hydrogen, CCUS), confirm eligibility for preferential treatment and pair it with any applicable FTZ pilot. The action plan’s “access after admission” commitment means licensing and standards should become more predictable — but only if you engage the “investment China” service window and pre-align with regulators rather than wait for a surprise at operating stage.

Plan the structure on commercial grounds. WFOE versus JV is now a strategy choice, not a legal ceiling. A JV may still help with local ecosystem, distribution and policy access; a WFOE maximises control and IP protection. Either way, the 2026 agenda is operating-permission mastery: whoever clears licences, standards and data fastest will capture the China NEV and smart-vehicle opportunity — the cap era is definitively over.

从「能否进入」到「能否运营」

股比上限取消后,真正约束在运营。外资新能源车企应聚焦车辆型式准入、电池生产与回收审批、智能网联汽车数据安全规则——这些而非所有权,如今决定上市速度。早建本地合规与数据治理职能;对智能车,跨境数据与地图规则与工厂许可同样战略。

用鼓励目录换经济账。若产品落入 2025 鼓励目录(动力电池、关键材料、智能零部件、制氢、CCUS),确认优惠资格并与适用自贸区试点配对。方案「准入之后准营」承诺意味着牌照与标准更可预期——但前提是善用「投资中国」服务窗口、预先与监管对齐,而非运营阶段才遇 surprises。

基于商业选结构。WFOE 还是合资,如今是战略选择而非法律天花板。合资仍有助于本地生态、渠道与政策触达;WFOE 最大化控制与 IP 保护。无论如何,2026 议程是准营 mastery:谁能最快清牌照、标准与数据,谁就拿下中国新能源与智能车机会——上限时代已彻底结束。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Manufacturing open: the 2024 negative list cleared the last manufacturing items, including passenger-vehicle caps.
  • Encouraged: the 2025 catalogue (effective 1 Feb 2026) lists NEV/smart-vehicle supply-chain items.
  • Structure free: WFOE, majority JV or 50/50 JV all permitted; cap abolished.
  • Bottleneck: “access after admission” — licences, standards, data now dominate.
  • Data duty: connected/intelligent vehicles face cross-border data and mapping rules.
  • Economics: confirmed encouraged items may enjoy preferential treatment.
  • Action: use the “investment China” window; pre-align with regulators before operating stage.

实务速查

  • 制造业放开: 2024 负面清单清除最后制造业条目,含乘用车股比限制。
  • 鼓励: 2025 目录(2026 年 2 月 1 日施行)列新能源/智能车供应链条目。
  • 结构自由: 外商独资、控股合资或 50/50 合资均允许;上限取消。
  • 瓶颈: 「准入之后准营」——牌照、标准、数据成为主线。
  • 数据义务: 智能网联汽车面临跨境数据与地图规则。
  • 经济账: 确认鼓励类条目或可享优惠。
  • 行动: 用「投资中国」窗口;运营前预先与监管对齐。

Bottom Line

With the equity cap abolished, the NEV and smart-vehicle race in China is won on operating permission — licences, standards and data — not on ownership. Use the encouraged catalogue for economics, choose WFOE or JV on commercial grounds, and engage the “investment China” service window early to pre-align with regulators. The cap era is over; the capability era has begun, and speed-to-licence is the new competitive edge.

底线

股比上限取消后,中国新能源与智能车的竞赛赢在准营——牌照、标准、数据——而非所有权。用鼓励目录换经济账,基于商业选 WFOE 或合资,并早接「投资中国」服务窗与监管预先对齐。上限时代结束,能力时代开始,拿照速度成为新的竞争优势。

Sources

NEV manufacturing access after foreign-ownership liberalisation

  • China’s entire vehicle and parts manufacturing chain has been open to foreign investment without equity caps since 1 January 2022, and the 2024 negative list went further by clearing all manufacturing restrictions (“manufacturing zeroed-out”).
    自2022年1月1日起,整车与零部件全链条已对外资开放、不设股比上限;2024年版负面清单进一步清除制造业全部限制(”制造业清零”)。
  • 2026 is the first full year in which the policy focus has shifted from opening manufacturing to “access-plus-operation” in services; for vehicle manufacturing itself, the question is no longer “can a foreigner own it” but “how to operate competitively.”
    2026年是政策重心由制造业开放转向服务业”既准入又准营”的首个完整年度;对整车制造本身,问题已不是”外资能否控股”,而是”如何具竞争力地运营”。
  • Tesla’s wholly foreign-owned Shanghai plant (operational since 2020) and BMW’s 75% control of its Chinese JV (effective 2022) are the templates; new entrants can now choose a WFOE from day one.
    特斯拉上海全资工厂(2020年投产)与宝马对中国合资企业75%控股(2022年生效)已成为范本;新进入者可一开局即选择外商独资企业。
  • The NEV purchase-tax relief is extended to end-2027: 2024–2025 fully exempt (cap RMB 30,000/vehicle), 2026–2027 halved (cap RMB 15,000/vehicle).
    新能源汽车购置税减免延续至2027年底:2024–2025年全免(每辆乘用车上限3万元),2026–2027年减半(上限1.5万元)。
  • Vehicle and battery type-approval against Chinese GB standards (CCC + MIIT announcement/catalogue) remains mandatory and is not substituted by UN/ECE or US approval.
    依中国GB标准的车辆与电池型式准入(CCC+工信部公告/目录)仍为强制,UN/ECE或美国批准不能替代。
  • Adjacent auto activities — mapping, connected-vehicle data, and certain telecom/ICT services — still face ownership or licensing limits under the negative list and sector rules.
    汽车相邻业务——地图测绘、智能网联汽车数据及部分电信/ICT服务——在负面清单与行业规则下仍受股比或许可限制。
  • China is increasingly used as an export base; a WFOE plant can serve both the domestic market and third-country exports, but US and EU trade barriers reshape the destination mix.
    中国日益被用作出口基地;外商独资工厂可同时服务国内与第三国市场,但美欧贸易壁垒重塑了目的地组合。

NEV manufacturing access after foreign-ownership liberalisation | 外资股比放开后的新能源汽车整车制造准入

Overview

China is the world’s largest car market and the global leader in new-energy vehicles (NEVs — battery electric, plug-in hybrid, and fuel-cell vehicles). For foreign carmakers, the single most important structural change of the last decade was the staged removal of the joint-venture (JV) foreign-ownership cap, completed on 1 January 2022. Since then the entire vehicle and parts chain has been open to foreign investment without equity limits. The 2024 negative list then deleted the last manufacturing restrictions, achieving a de facto “manufacturing zeroed-out” position.

This article reviews the opening trajectory, the post-liberalisation market structure in 2026, the incentive backdrop (notably the 2026–2027 halved NEV purchase tax), and the boundaries that ownership liberalisation did not remove — data, mapping and telecom. It is informational; confirm current policy detail with qualified PRC advisers.

From JV caps to a manufacturing-cleared market (2018–2024)

China’s automotive opening was staged over years. The 2018 negative-list revision began a five-year transition: foreign caps were removed on special-purpose and new-energy vehicle manufacturing in 2018, on commercial vehicles in 2020, and finally on passenger vehicles and the “at most two JVs per vehicle category” rule on 1 January 2022. Since then, the entire vehicle and parts chain is open to foreign investment without equity caps, co-led by the NDRC and MIIT; the negative list is jointly issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM.

The 2024 negative list (effective 1 November 2024) went further. It deleted the two remaining manufacturing restrictions — “publication printing must be Chinese-controlled” and the bar on certain traditional Chinese medicine preparation techniques — completing the clearance of manufacturing-sector foreign-access limits. In the words used by Chinese officials, manufacturing restrictions were “zeroed out.” For a foreign carmaker this means a WFOE plant is legally permitted from day one, with no mandatory partner and no fixed local-share requirement in the entry rule itself.

Two clarifications prevent misreading the opening. First, the lift applies to vehicle and parts manufacturing equity, not to every adjacent activity. The negative list and sector rules still govern related services such as automotive data, mapping, and certain telecom/ICT elements; a foreign entrant in those areas may still face ownership or licensing limits. Second, “no JV required” is not “no local footprint advised.” Even a wholly foreign-owned plant must satisfy local content indirectly through the supply chain to be price-competitive, and provincial investment-promotion terms, land and talent still favour entities with a real in-China operation.

2026 market structure: who owns what

The post-2022 market shows two clear templates. Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory, a wholly foreign-owned plant operational since 2020, demonstrated that a foreign OEM can build, certify and export from China without a local JV. BMW raised its stake in its Chinese JV to 75% (effective 2022), exercising the freed cap. Volkswagen had earlier taken full control of its JAC Volkswagen (SOL) venture in 2020. These moves were not merely financial restructurings; they re-centred product, software and export decisions inside China.

By 2026 the practical question is strategy, not permission. A foreign entrant choosing a WFOE accepts full control and full compliance responsibility; a JV with a Chinese partner still offers faster local sourcing, licensing and government-relations leverage. Many foreign brands that entered via JV decades ago are now renegotiating the balance — some buying up stakes, others deepening local R&D so that China becomes the global product-definition hub. MOFCOM has explicitly said that, with manufacturing limits cleared, the 2026 emphasis is on attracting R&D and high-end manufacturing links to China and on ensuring foreign-invested enterprises can both “access and operate” (既准入又准营) in the opened sectors.

The 2026 incentive backdrop: purchase tax and beyond

The direct NEV purchase subsidy fully exited at end-2022. Today the main national demand lever is the vehicle purchase-tax relief, extended by the Ministry of Finance, SAT and MIIT to end-2027: NEVs purchased in 2024–2025 are exempt (per-passenger-vehicle cap RMB 30,000); those purchased in 2026–2027 are taxed at half rate (cap RMB 15,000). For a 2026 buyer of a RMB 300,000 NEV, the taxable base is RMB 30,000 at 10%, the half-rate relief is RMB 1,500, so RMB 1,500 of tax is due — a material but shrinking advantage versus the 2024–2025 full exemption.

City-level licence and traffic privileges in restricted cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and others) still carry real value, but rules differ sharply — some cities allocate separate NEV quotas, others tighten plug-in hybrids, and fuel-cell vehicles remain in demonstration phase. The dual-credit regime (average fuel-consumption and NEV credits) also binds both foreign and domestic OEMs and must be folded into any market-entry plan. Because these levers shift year to year, treat any specific rate as time-bound and verify before relying on it.

Where ownership is still not free

Liberalisation of manufacturing equity must be distinguished from liberalisation of the data and connectivity stack that rides on the vehicle. Three boundaries remain:

  • Mapping and surveying. High-definition map surveying is a restricted activity; foreign ownership and cross-border map-data flows are constrained. L3+ autonomy that depends on HD maps therefore touches a sector that is not opened by the manufacturing rule.
  • Connected-vehicle data. Automotive data collection, storage and cross-border transfer are governed by the data-security and personal-information regimes; a foreign OEM must plan for in-China data localisation and, where relevant, a security assessment for outbound transfer.
  • Telecom/ICT elements. Certain onboard connectivity, V2X and cloud services sit in sectors with ownership or licensing limits under the negative list and the cross-border services negative list.

These are addressed in a separate article on intelligent and connected vehicles; the point here is that “I can own the factory” does not automatically mean “I can own the map, the data platform and the connectivity layer.”

Market-access paths and the export-hub angle

A foreign carmaker can (1) import vehicles as general trade (subject to tariffs, CAFC/NEV credit rules and China-unique type-approval / CCC); (2) manufacture locally via a WFOE or JV; or (3) focus on NEVs where the policy and incentive tilt is strongest. Component and battery suppliers typically set up manufacturing or R&D entities and pursue CCC and MIIT catalogue inclusion.

A newer path is the export hub: a China WFOE that serves the domestic market and also ships to third countries (Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America). This works best where the destination does not impose the high US/EU barriers. The 2024–2026 US 301 tariff increases — EVs from China at 100% and lithium batteries at 25% — and the EU’s rising local-content and carbon requirements mean that, for the US and increasingly the EU, direct export from China is constrained, pushing foreign OEMs toward localising production in those regions or routing via third countries. China remains the lowest-cost, densest NEV supply base in the world, which is precisely why it is attractive as both a market and an export platform.

Common pitfalls

  • Assuming the JV-cap removal opens every auto-adjacent business. Manufacturing equity is free, but data, mapping and some ICT/services tied to vehicles can still carry ownership or licensing limits.
  • Believing the NEV purchase subsidy still exists. The direct subsidy exited at end-2022; today the lever is the 2026–2027 halved purchase-tax relief and city privileges, which change yearly.
  • Treating overseas homologation as Chinese certification. A UN/ECE or US type-approval does not substitute for China’s CCC and MIIT vehicle-type approval against GB standards.
  • Overlooking the dual-credit regime. Average-fuel-consumption and NEV-credit rules bind vehicle makers; a foreign entrant, importing or building locally, must fold credit compliance into its plan.
  • Assuming wholly foreign ownership removes the need for a local footprint. Without local sourcing and a real in-China operation, cost and lead-time disadvantages usually outweigh the equity freedom.

What to do next

  • Decide WFOE vs JV early — the choice drives control, compliance and government-relations exposure, not just ownership.
  • Plan CCC and MIIT vehicle-type approval / NEV catalogue before any sale; budget for GB-standard testing.
  • Size the business case on the 2026–2027 halved purchase-tax relief and city privileges, verified annually; assume the direct subsidy is gone.
  • Separate the manufacturing question from the data/mapping/connectivity question; engage cybersecurity and surveying advisers before promising L3+ features.
  • Evaluate China as an export hub but model US/EU tariff and carbon barriers into destination mix.
  • Track the 2025 edition of the Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries (205 net new items, emphasising advanced manufacturing) for potential incentives.

Sources

  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 外资准入与制造业开放政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 2025年版鼓励外商投资产业目录、稳外资政策:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国务院 — 《延续和优化新能源汽车车辆购置税减免政策的公告》(2024–2027,2026–2027减半):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202306/content_6887717.htm
  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 车辆与电池准入、双积分管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 可再生能源与绿色投资激励(49-renewable-energy-green-investment)

外资股比放开后的新能源汽车整车制造准入

概述

中国是全球最大的汽车市场,也是新能源汽车(NEV,含纯电动、插电式混动与燃料电池)的全球领跑者。对外国车企而言,过去十年最重要的结构性变化,是分阶段取消合资(JV)外资股比限制、并于2022年1月1日完成。自此,整车与零部件全链条对外资开放、不再设股比上限。2024年版负面清单进一步删除制造业剩余限制,实现事实上的”制造业清零”。

本文回顾开放路径、2026年股比放开后的市场格局、激励背景(尤其是2026–2027年购置税减半),以及股权放开并未消除的边界——数据、地图与电信。本文仅为信息参考,具体政策细节请以合格中国顾问确认。

从股比限制到制造业清零(2018–2024)

中国汽车业的开放分阶段推进。2018年负面清单修订启动五年过渡:2018年取消专用车与新能源汽车外资股比限制,2020年取消商用车限制,最终于2022年1月1日取消乘用车股比及”同一类整车产品合资企业不超过两家”的限制。此后整车与零部件全链条对外资开放、不设股比上限,由发改委与工信部共同牵头,负面清单由发改委与商务部联合发布。

2024年版负面清单(2024年11月1日施行)更进一步,删除制造业仅剩的两条限制——”出版物印刷须由中方控股”与部分中药饮片炮制技术限制——完成制造业外资准入限制的清除。用官方表述,即制造业限制”清零”。对国外车企而言,这意味着外商独资企业自第一天起即合法可行,无强制伙伴、准入规则本身也无固定本地股比要求。

两点澄清可避免误读开放。其一,股比放开适用于整车与零部件制造股权,而非所有相邻活动:负面清单与行业规则仍监管汽车数据、地图测绘及部分电信/ICT要素,外资在这些领域仍可能面临股比或许可限制。其二,”无需合资”不等于”无需本地布局”:即便全资工厂,为保持价格竞争力仍须通过供应链间接满足本地配套,且地方招商引资条件、土地与人才仍向真正在华运营的实体倾斜。

2026市场格局:谁持有什么

2022年后的市场呈现两种清晰范本。特斯拉上海超级工厂作为2020年投产的外商独资企业,证明了外资OEM无需本地合资即可在中国建厂、认证与出口。宝马于2022年将其中国合资企业股比提升至75%,行使了被放开的限制。大众则早在2020年取得江淮大众(SOL)全资控制权。这些动作不只是财务重组,更把产品、软件与出口决策重新收归中国。

到2026年,实操问题已转向战略而非许可。选择WFOE的外资接受完全控制与完全合规责任;与中国伙伴合资则仍能获得更快的本地采购、牌照与政府关系杠杆。许多数十年前以合资进入的外国品牌正在重新平衡——有的增持股份,有的深化本地研发,使中国成为全球产品定义中心。商务部明确表示,制造业限制清零后,2026年的重点是吸引跨国公司将研发与高端制造环节放在中国,并保障外资企业在已开放领域”既准入又准营”。

2026激励背景:购置税及更多

新能源汽车直接购置补贴已于2022年底全面退出。当前主要全国性需求杠杆是车辆购置税减免,由财政部、税务总局与工信部延续至2027年底:2024–2025年购置的新能源汽车免征(每辆乘用车上限3万元);2026–2027年减半征收(上限1.5万元)。以2026年购买一辆30万元NEV为例,计税价3万元、税率10%,减半 relief 为1.5万元,须缴税1.5万元——相比2024–2025年全免,优势仍在但逐步收窄。

限牌城市(北京、上海、广州、深圳等)的牌照与通行优待仍具实质价值,但规则差异极大:有的城市对NEV单独配置指标,有的收紧插电混动,燃料电池车仍处示范阶段。双积分(平均燃料消耗量与新能源汽车积分)政策约束外资与本土OEM,须纳入任何市场准入计划。因这些杠杆逐年变化,任何具体税率均应视为时效性数字,引用前须核实。

股权仍未自由之处

制造股权的放开,须与搭载于车辆之上的数据与连接栈的放开区分开来。三道边界仍在:

  • 地图测绘。 高精地图测绘属受限活动;外资持股与跨境地图数据流动受限。依赖高精地图的L3+自动驾驶因此触及制造业规则并未放开的领域。
  • 智能网联汽车数据。 汽车数据收集、存储与跨境传输受数据安全与个人信息制度监管;外资OEM须规划数据境内本地化,并在需要时履行出境安全评估。
  • 电信/ICT要素。 部分车载连接、V2X与云服务处于负面清单及跨境服务贸易负面清单下有股比或许可限制的 sector。

这些在另一篇智能网联汽车文章中详述;此处要点是”我能拥有工厂”并不自动等于”我能拥有地图、数据平台与连接层”。

准入路径与出口基地角度

外国车企可(1)以一般贸易进口车辆(须缴关税,满足CAFC/NEV积分规则,以及中国特有的型式准入/CCC);(2)通过WFOE或合资本地制造;或(3)聚焦政策与激励倾斜最明显的NEV。零部件与电池供应商通常设立制造或研发实体,并争取CCC与工信部目录列入。

一条较新的路径是出口基地:中国WFOE既服务国内市场,也向第三国(东南亚、中东、拉美)发货。这在不施加美欧高壁垒的目的地效果最佳。2024–2026年美国301关税上调——中国电动车100%、锂电池25%——以及欧盟日益提高的本地含量与碳要求,意味着对美乃至对欧的直接出口受约束,推动外资OEM在那些区域本地化生产或经第三国绕道。中国仍是全球成本最低、最密集的NEV供应链基地,正因如此,它既是市场也是出口平台。

常见误读

  • 以为取消合资限制即放开所有汽车相关业务。 制造股权已自由,但车辆相关的数据、地图测绘及部分ICT/服务仍可能受股比或许可限制。
  • 以为新能源车购置补贴仍在。 直接补贴已于2022年底退出;如今杠杆是2026–2027年减半的购置税减免与城市优待,且逐年变化。
  • 把境外认证当作中国认证。 UN/ECE或美国型式批准不能替代中国CCC与工信部依GB标准的车辆型式准入。
  • 忽视双积分。 双积分政策约束整车企业;外资以进口或本地制造整车,均须纳入积分合规。
  • 以为全资即可不要本地布局。 缺乏本地采购与真实在华运营,成本与交期劣势通常盖过股权自由的好处。

下一步建议

  • 尽早决定WFOE还是合资——该选择决定控制权、合规与政府关系敞口,而非仅仅是所有权。
  • 在任何销售前规划CCC与工信部车辆型式准入/新能源目录;为GB标准测试预留预算。
  • 以2026–2027年减半的购置税减免与城市优待为基础做商业测算,逐年核实;假定直接补贴已取消。
  • 把制造问题与数据/地图/连接问题分开;在承诺L3+功能前,先对接网络安全与测绘顾问。
  • 将中国视为出口基地评估,但把美欧关税与碳壁垒纳入目的地组合模型。
  • 关注2025年版《鼓励外商投资产业目录》(净增205条,侧重先进制造)可能带来的激励。

来源

  • 国家发展改革委(NDRC)门户网站 — 外资准入与制造业开放政策:https://www.ndrc.gov.cn
  • 商务部(MOFCOM)门户网站 — 2025年版鼓励外商投资产业目录、稳外资政策:https://www.mofcom.gov.cn
  • 国务院 — 《延续和优化新能源汽车车辆购置税减免政策的公告》(2024–2027,2026–2027减半):https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202306/content_6887717.htm
  • 工业和信息化部(MIIT)门户网站 — 车辆与电池准入、双积分管理:https://www.miit.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 智能网联汽车(自动驾驶)外资测试牌照与数据合规(144-icv-2026)
  • 动力电池产业链外资机会与本地化配套(143-battery-supply-2026)
  • 可再生能源与绿色投资激励(49-renewable-energy-green-investment)

China’s Vocational-Training and Education Opening for Foreign Investors: The 2026 Action Plan

  • The “Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment” action plan (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97) explicitly expands the opening of vocational-skill training institutions, vocational schools and leading polytechnic/medical/agricultural universities to foreign investment.
    《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)明确稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点。
  • The plan also broadens services-sector opening via Beijing’s comprehensive services-opening demonstration zone and deeper CEPA liberalisation for Hong Kong and Macao investors.
    方案还通过北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区、以及对港澳投资者升级CEPA,拓宽服务业开放。
  • Foreign investors may pair the education opening with related plan items: R&D centres, data-export negative lists in pilot zones, and reinvestment incentives.
    外资可将教育开放与方案中相关条目结合:研发中心、试点区数据出境负面清单、再投资激励。
  • The plan frames the task as moving from “access” to “operation” — solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem through national treatment.
    方案将任务定位为从”准入”转向”准营”——以国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”。
  • A State Council Information Office briefing (22 June 2026) confirmed the services sector is the next opening front after manufacturing restrictions were zeroed.
    2026年6月22日国新办发布会确认,在制造业限制清零后,服务业成为下一开放重点。
  • Practical step: scope a vocational-training or school JV against the pilot list; combine with R&D-centre and reinvestment incentives.
    实操建议:按试点清单框定职业培训或院校合资;并与研发中心、再投资激励组合。

China’s Vocational-Training and Education Opening for Foreign Investors: The 2026 Action Plan | 外资教育开放:2026年行动方案中的职业培训与院校试点

The *Action Plan for Stabilising and Improving Foreign Investment* (Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97), issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance and released in June 2026, is the most explicit recent statement of where foreign capital may enter China’s services sector. Among its market-access measures, education and training stand out as a concrete, name-checked opening.

The education and training opening

Under “deepening services-sector opening,” the plan states it will steadily expand the pilot opening of vocational-skill training institutions, vocational schools, and high-level polytechnic/agricultural/medical universities to foreign investment. This is a targeted, pilot-based liberalisation rather than blanket nationwide access — foreign education investors should expect to enter through designated pilot zones and approved formats.

The same paragraph supports Beijing in upgrading its national comprehensive demonstration zone for services-sector opening, piloting modern-services opening in digital economy and healthcare, and upgrading the Mainland–Hong Kong/Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) to grant Hong Kong and Macao investors earlier and broader access in services.

The broader services opening around it

Education does not sit alone. The plan’s market-access section also covers:

  • Financial services: more foreign institutions using risk-management tools including government-bond futures, foreign-institution fund-investment advisory, cross-border financing facilitation quotas, and pre-communication for onshore listings.
  • Pharmaceuticals: drug segment-manufacturing rules, broader biotechnology and wholly-foreign-owned-hospital pilot zones, and insurance coverage for innovative devices.

A 22 June 2026 State Council Information Office briefing made the architecture explicit: with manufacturing access restrictions fully zeroed, the services sector is the next front — telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare will open “orderly,” and the plan adds the vocational-training/school/university pilot to that agenda.

How foreign investors can use it

The education opening is best read as one tile in a services-opening mosaic. Practical combinations:

  1. Vocational training + R&D centre. The plan strongly encourages foreign-invested R&D centres (imported research supplies duty preferences, open innovation platforms). A training institute can feed a centre’s talent pipeline.
  2. School/polytechnic JV + reinvestment. Profits reinvested in China enjoy tax preferences; education entities can be folded into a broader China reinvestment plan.
  3. Data-export negative lists in pilot zones. Training and edtech platforms handle learner data; the plan lets pilot free-trade zones and services-opening cities trial field-level data-export negative lists — relevant for any cloud-based learning product.
  4. CEPA route for Hong Kong/Macao investors. Earlier and broader services access via CEPA is a faster lane for eligible investors.

Practical steps

  1. Scope the format. Decide whether the target is a vocational-training institution, a vocational school, or a university cooperation; each maps to a different pilot pathway.
  2. Pick the pilot zone. Beijing’s demonstration zone, the services-opening pilot cities, and CEPA channels are the realistic entry points.
  3. Pair with incentives. Bundle the education entity with an R&D centre and a reinvestment structure to capture tax and import preferences.
  4. Plan data compliance. For edtech, pre-map learner-data flows against pilot-zone data-export negative lists.
  5. Watch the rollout. The plan directs “steady” expansion; track which zones are designated and when approvals open.

外资教育开放:2026年行动方案中的职业培训与院校试点

商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部印发的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)于2026年6月发布,是近期对外资可进入中国服务业最明确的表述。在其扩大市场准入的措施中,教育培训作为一项被点名的开放格外醒目。

教育培训开放

在”深化服务业领域开放”下,方案提出稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点。这是有针对性的、基于试点的开放,而非全国一刀切放开——外国教育投资者应预期通过指定试点区域与经批准的形态进入。

同段支持北京提升国家服务业扩大开放综合示范区建设水平,推动数字经济、医药健康等现代服务业重点领域开放举措先行先试,并推动全面升级内地与港澳关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排(CEPA),在服务业领域加大对港澳投资者率先开放力度。

周边服务业开放

教育并非孤立。方案市场准入部分还涵盖:

  • 金融业: 更多外资机构利用含国债期货的风险管理工具、外资机构依法开展基金投资顾问业务、为重点外资企业提供跨境融资便利化额度、优化上市申报前预沟通。
  • 医药: 药品分段生产细则、扩大生物技术与外商独资医院试点区域、创新药械纳入商业保险。

2026年6月22日国新办发布会明确了架构:在制造业准入限制全面清零后,服务业成为下一开放重点——电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗将”有序”扩大开放,方案将职业培训/院校/大学试点纳入该议程。

外资如何运用

教育开放最好理解为服务业开放拼图中的一块。实务组合:

  1. 职业培训 + 研发中心。 方案大力鼓励外资研发中心(进口科研用品免税、开放创新平台);培训机构可为其输送人才。
  2. 院校合资 + 再投资。 利润在华再投资享税收优惠;教育实体可纳入更广的中国再投资计划。
  3. 试点区数据出境负面清单。 培训与Edtech平台处理学习者数据;方案允许自贸试验区与服务业开放试点城市探索字段级数据出境负面清单——对云化学习产品至关重要。
  4. 港澳投资者CEPA路径。 经CEPA更早更广的服务业准入,是合格投资者的快车道。

实操步骤

  1. 框定形态。 判断目标是职业培训机构、职业院校还是高校合作;各自对应不同试点路径。
  2. 选试点区。 北京示范区、服务业开放试点城市与CEPA通道是现实入口。
  3. 组合激励。 将教育实体与研发中心、再投资结构捆绑,以获取税收与进口优惠。
  4. 规划数据合规。 对Edtech,预先按试点区数据出境负面清单梳理学习者数据流向。
  5. 关注落地。 方案强调”稳步”扩大;跟踪哪些区域被指定、何时开放审批。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Shang Zi Fa [2026] No. 97: the action plan that name-checks vocational training, schools and universities for pilot foreign opening.
    商资发〔2026〕97号:点名职业培训、院校、大学试点对外开放的方案。
  • Pilot, not blanket: entry is via designated pilot zones and approved formats, not nationwide auto-access.
    试点而非普开:经指定试点区与批准形态进入,非全国自动准入。
  • CEPA fast lane: Hong Kong/Macao investors get earlier, broader services access.
    CEPA快车道:港澳投资者获更早更广服务业准入。
  • Pair with R&D + reinvestment: capture tax and import preferences alongside the education entity.
    与研发中心加再投资组合:在教育实体之外获取税收与进口优惠。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming nationwide access: the opening is pilot-based; non-pilot locations may still bar foreign education investment.
    以为全国放开:开放基于试点;非试点地仍可能限制外资教育投资。
  • Ignoring data-export rules: edtech learner data triggers pilot-zone negative-list mapping.
    忽视数据出境规则:Edtech学习者数据须对照试点区负面清单。
  • Going solo on education: the best value appears when education is bundled with R&D and reinvestment incentives.
    教育单干:当教育与研发中心、再投资激励捆绑时价值最大。

Sources

Segmented Pharmaceutical Production in China: A New Manufacturing Option for Foreign MAHs

  • On 15 May 2026 the revised Implementation Regulations of the Drug Administration Law took effect, with Article 32 expressly allowing segmented (split-site) production of qualifying innovative drugs under a unified quality-assurance system.
    2026年5月15日,新修订的《药品管理法实施条例》施行,其中第三十二条明确允许符合条件的创新药在统一质量保证体系下分段委托生产。
  • The State Drug Administration has separately worked on biological-product segmented production; the 2026 Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment now calls for detailed rules for cross-border segmented production of both biologicals and chemical drugs.
    国家药监局已就生物制品分段生产单独发文推进;2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》进一步提出研究出台药品分段生产实施细则,便利境外药品上市许可持有人开展生物制品、化学药品跨境分段生产。
  • Segmented production applies to innovative drugs with special production-process or facility requirements, clinically urgent drugs, and drugs needed for public-health emergencies, as designated by the State Council.
    分段生产适用于生产工艺、设施设备有特殊要求的创新药,临床急需的药品,以及突发公共卫生事件急需或储备需要的药品等国务院规定情形。
  • The marketing authorisation holder (MAH) remains the single, final quality-responsible party and must build a unified quality-assurance system spanning all production sites.
    药品上市许可持有人(MAH)仍是唯一、最终的质量责任主体,必须建立覆盖药品生产全过程和全部生产场地的统一质量保证体系。
  • For foreign MAHs, the combination of segmented production and the FIE action plan opens a path to structure cross-border biologics and chemical manufacturing while keeping Chinese regulatory responsibility centralised.
    对外资MAH而言,分段生产与稳外资行动方案的组合,为跨境生物制品与化学药品生产布局开辟了路径,同时保持中国监管责任集中化。
  • Commercial insurers are also being encouraged to cover more innovative drugs and devices, and foreign-made drugs gain smoother entry into retail channels.
    政策同时鼓励保险公司将更多创新药械纳入商业保险保障范围,并便利外资企业生产的药品进入药品零售渠道。

Segmented Pharmaceutical Production in China: A New Manufacturing Option for Foreign MAHs | 中国药品分段生产:外资上市许可持有人的制造新选项

Why this matters now

Pharmaceutical manufacturing has traditionally meant one site, one product, one end-to-end process. China’s 2026 regulatory wave is deliberately unpicking that assumption. On 15 May 2026, the revised Implementation Regulations of the Drug Administration Law took effect, and Article 32 explicitly permits the segmented production of qualifying innovative drugs — where manufacturing steps run at different sites and potentially through different companies — as long as the marketing authorisation holder maintains a unified quality-assurance system. The move is paired with an explicit signal to foreign investors: the June 2026 Action Plan to Stabilise and Optimise Foreign Investment (issued by MOFCOM, NDRC and MOF) commits to detailed rules for cross-border segmented production of biological products and chemical drugs, building on the earlier biological-product segmented-production pilot. For a global pharma company with an approved innovative molecule, this changes how production for the Chinese market can be structured.

What segmented production covers

Article 32 of the revised Implementation Regulations permits segmented production for three categories: innovative drugs whose production process, equipment or facilities have special requirements; clinically urgent drugs requested by relevant State Council departments; and drugs needed for emergency response or stockpiling. The MAH may commission qualified production enterprises to handle separate production steps. Critically, the law does not decentralise responsibility: the MAH must establish a unified quality-assurance system covering the entire production process and all production sites, and remains the single final responsible party for product quality. The State Drug Administration’s inspection guidance for biological-product segmented production further requires the MAH to align quality-management systems across segment producers, apply quality-risk management to contamination and cross-contamination risks, and ensure the quality authorisation holder can base final release decisions on a full review of data from all segments.

The foreign-investment angle

The FIE Action Plan published in June 2026 explicitly says the authorities will move quickly to issue implementation rules for segmented production, to facilitate overseas drug marketing authorisation holders in carrying out cross-border segmented production of biologicals and chemical drugs. This is the first time the policy explicitly opens the door to cross-border arrangements — a Chinese plant handling one production step, an overseas site another. For foreign MAHs, the practical attraction is manufacturing flexibility: an API or biologic intermediate can be produced at the site with the best economics and IP-protection profile, with final formulation and packaging in China, while quality oversight remains anchored in one unified system. The same plan adds supporting measures: expanding the pilot scope for biotechnology and wholly foreign-owned hospitals, encouraging commercial insurers to cover more innovative drugs and devices, and easing foreign-made drugs into retail pharmacy channels.

Practical steps for foreign MAHs

  1. Map your portfolio. Identify molecules that qualify for segmented production — innovative drugs with special process or facility needs, clinically urgent products, or emergency/stockpile candidates.
  2. Decide the China anchor. Choose which production step will be performed in China and by which qualified manufacturer, and where the MAH quality-authorisation function will sit.
  3. Design the unified quality system. Draft the single quality-assurance framework covering all sites and segments, including technology transfer, change control, deviation handling and CAPA procedures.
  4. Engage the SDA early. Because implementation rules for chemical cross-border segmented production are still being drafted, use pre-submission consultation channels to align on expectations before committing investment.
  5. Review supply-chain economics. Model the tax, customs and logistics treatment of intermediates moving across borders, including bonded and duty-free options where available.
  6. Coordinate with insurance and retail access. Plan for how the product will reach patients — commercial insurance coverage and retail channel entry both affect market-access planning.

Risks and compliance notes

Segmented production is a permission, not a relaxation. The MAH’s single-responsibility rule means a failure at any segment is ultimately the MAH’s failure; contract manufacturers’ systems must be auditable and aligned. Foreign MAHs should also track the still-evolving implementation rules for chemical cross-border segmented production — until they issue, cross-border arrangements for small-molecule drugs should be structured conservatively. IP protection of process know-how across borders, GMP consistency between sites, and batch-release responsibilities all need contractual precision. Finally, the SDA’s on-site inspection and post-market supervision powers are unchanged, so documentation and traceability must satisfy the same standards as single-site production.


中国药品分段生产:外资上市许可持有人的制造新选项

为什么当下重要

药品生产传统上意味着”一个场地、一个产品、一条端到端流程”。中国2026年的监管浪潮正有意拆解这一假设。2026年5月15日,新修订的《药品管理法实施条例》施行,第三十二条明确允许符合条件的创新药分段生产——即制造环节在不同场地、甚至经由不同公司运行——只要上市许可持有人维护统一质量保证体系。该举措与对外资投资者的明确信号相配合:2026年6月商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部发布的《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》承诺研究出台生物制品与化学药品跨境分段生产实施细则,在早期生物制品分段生产试点基础上推进。对拥有获批创新分子的全球制药企业而言,这改变了中国市场的生产布局方式。

分段生产覆盖哪些情形

修订后《实施条例》第三十二条允许三类药品分段生产:生产工艺、设施设备有特殊要求的创新药;国务院有关部门提出的临床急需药品;以及应对突发公共卫生事件急需或储备需要的药品。MAH可以委托符合条件的生产企业承担不同生产步骤。关键在于,法律并未分散责任:MAH必须建立覆盖药品生产全过程和全部生产场地的统一质量保证体系,并作为产品质量唯一且最终的责任主体。国家药监局生物制品分段生产现场检查指南进一步要求MAH使各分段生产企业的质量管理体系有效衔接与统一,运用质量风险管理方法识别控制污染、交叉污染及差错风险,并确保质量受权人能基于对各分段数据的全面审核作出最终放行决定。

外资维度

2026年6月发布的稳外资行动方案明确提出,抓紧研究出台药品分段生产实施细则,便利境外药品上市许可持有人开展生物制品、化学药品跨境分段生产。这是政策首次明确为跨境安排敞开大门——中国工厂承担一个生产步骤,海外场地承担另一个。对外资MAH而言,实际吸引力在于制造灵活性:原料药或生物制品中间体可在经济性与知识产权保护最优的场地生产,最终制剂与包装放在中国,而质量监督仍锚定于一个统一体系。同一方案还附带了配套措施:扩大生物技术、外商独资医院开放试点区域范围,支持保险公司将更多创新药械纳入商业保险,并便利外资企业生产的药品进入零售药店渠道。

外资MAH的操作步骤

  1. 梳理产品组合。 识别符合分段生产条件的分子——生产工艺或设施有特殊要求的创新药、临床急需产品或应急/储备候选品。
  2. 确定中国锚点。 选择哪个生产步骤在中国、由哪家合格生产商执行,以及MAH质量受权职能设在何处。
  3. 设计统一质量体系。 起草覆盖全部场地与分段的单一质量保证框架,包括技术转移、变更控制、偏差处理与CAPA程序。
  4. 尽早与国家药监局沟通。 由于化学药品跨境分段生产实施细则仍在起草中,在投入投资前应利用预沟通渠道对齐预期。
  5. 审查供应链经济性。 建模中间体跨境流动的税收、海关与物流处理,在可行时考虑保税与免税选项。
  6. 协同保险与零售准入。 规划产品如何触达患者——商业保险覆盖与零售渠道进入都影响市场准入规划。

风险与合规提示

分段生产是许可,不是放松。MAH单一责任规则意味着任何分段的失败最终都是MAH的失败;合同生产商的体系必须可审计、可对齐。外资MAH还应跟踪仍在制定的化学药品跨境分段生产实施细则——在细则出台前,小分子药物跨境安排应保守设计。跨境工艺know-how的知识产权保护、场地间GMP一致性、批次放行责任都需要合同上的精确性。最后,药监局现场检查与上市后监管权限不变,因此文档与可追溯性必须满足与单一场地生产相同的标准。

Sources

  • 商务部 国家发展改革委 财政部《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商资发〔2026〕97号)——第三条”支持外资参与医药等产业高质量发展”(研究出台药品分段生产实施细则、便利境外MAH跨境分段生产):https://sxdofcom.shaanxi.gov.cn/fdi/yhzc/40265.jhtml
  • 商务部副部长凌激出席国新办发布会介绍利用外资固稳促优有关政策措施(王亚回应医药开放措施,生物制品分段生产试点、化学药品跨境分段生产细则):https://swj.wulanchabu.gov.cn/zxft/1994919.html
  • 中国医药创新促进会《药品管理法实施条例大家谈 在鼓励创新与严守底线间找到平衡》(第三十二条分段生产、MAH统一质量保证体系解读):https://www.phirda.com/artilce_43447.html
  • 山西省民营经济发展局官网《外资企业可重点关注哪些扩大准入领域?》(2026-08-10,摘自商资发〔2026〕97号:药品分段生产、生物技术和外商独资医院领域扩大开放):https://myj.shanxi.gov.cn/ztzl/bwbd/lywzgw/202608/t20260810_10196322.shtml

CNIPA PPH Network Expands: Faster Patent Examination for Foreign Applicants in 2026

  • On 1 August 2026 China and Europe launched a bilateral Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) pilot, while a separate PPH pilot between CNIPA and Indonesia’s DGIP also took effect the same day.
    2026年8月1日,中国与欧洲的双边专利审查高速路(PPH)试点正式启动,同日中国国家知识产权局与印度尼西亚司法部知识产权总司之间的PPH试点项目也同步生效。
  • The CNIPA-EPO bilateral PPH runs in parallel with the existing IP5 PPH and has no fixed end date, giving European and Chinese applicants a faster route to aligned patent protection.
    中欧双边PPH与既有的IP5 PPH并行运行,未设定固定终止日期,为欧洲与中国申请人提供了更快的专利保护协同通道。
  • CNIPA’s PPH network now spans 38 offices; the CNIPA-CIPO (Canada) PPH was extended for five more years from 1 September 2026 to 31 August 2031.
    国家知识产权局PPH合作网络已覆盖38个专利审查机构;中加(拿大)PPH试点自2026年9月1日起再延长五年,至2031年8月31日。
  • Under PPH, an applicant whose claims are found allowable by one office can request accelerated examination at the other office using the earlier search and examination results.
    在PPH机制下,申请人的权利要求若已在一个审查机构被认定可授权,即可依据在先检索与审查结果,向另一机构申请加快审查。
  • Separately, CNIPA revised the Measures for Administration of Priority Examination of Patents (Order No. 85), effective 1 September 2026, prioritising emerging, future and core-technology industries.
    此外,国家知识产权局修订发布《专利优先审查管理办法》(局令第85号),自2026年9月1日起施行,优先支持新兴产业、未来产业与关键核心技术攻关。
  • For foreign companies holding Chinese or European patent families, PPH cuts review cycles and costs, and strengthens patent certainty before entering commercial licensing or litigation.
    对持有中国或欧洲专利族的外资企业而言,PPH可压缩审查周期、降低费用,并在进入商业许可或诉讼前增强专利确定性。
  • PPH speeds up examination timing but does not lower patentability standards; applicants must still verify eligibility, claim correspondence and the applicable request guidelines case by case.
    PPH改变的是审查节奏而非授权标准;申请人仍须逐案核验适用条件、权利要求对应关系及对应PPH请求指南。

CNIPA PPH Network Expands: Faster Patent Examination for Foreign Applicants in 2026 | 国家知识产权局PPH网络扩容:2026年外资申请人的专利快速审查新通道

Why this matters now

For a multinational enterprise with parallel patent families in China and overseas, one of the most persistent pain points has been the gap between when a patent becomes commercially critical and when the Chinese examination is finished. Two CNIPA announcements in August 2026 directly address that friction. On 1 August 2026, the bilateral PPH pilot between the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) and the European Patent Office (EPO) officially commenced, and on the same day the CNIPA-DGIP PPH pilot with Indonesia’s Directorate General of Intellectual Property also launched. Both run alongside the long-standing IP5 PPH framework, giving applicants in those corridors a dedicated, predictable fast track. The CNIPA-CIPO PPH with Canada was extended for another five years from 1 September 2026. For European, Southeast Asian and Canadian investors in China, the practical message is simple: the Chinese side of a global patent family can now move noticeably faster.

What the new pilots actually change

PPH is a work-sharing mechanism between patent offices. When the office of first filing has determined that at least one claim in an application is allowable, the applicant can ask the office of second filing to use that earlier search and examination result to accelerate the corresponding application. The CNIPA-EPO bilateral pilot is deliberately additive rather than replacing: it coexists with the IP5 PPH, applies the same substantive conditions, and — unlike the original time-boxed trials — has no fixed termination date, although it can still be suspended, amended or ended by mutual agreement. For a European company, this means that a favourable examination outcome obtained at the EPO can be carried into CNIPA examination, and vice versa for Chinese applicants filing at the EPO. The CNIPA-DGIP pilot with Indonesia similarly opens a fast track into the fast-growing ASEAN market, useful for companies building supply chains across Southeast Asia.

The wider 2026 procedural picture

The PPH expansion lands in the middle of a broader modernisation of Chinese examination tools. On 30 July 2026, CNIPA issued the revised Measures for Administration of Priority Examination of Patents (Order No. 85), effective 1 September 2026. The revised measures tilt priority examination towards emerging industries, future industries and key core-technology breakthroughs, stress innovation value and transformation prospects, and tighten the procedure: invention requests must be filed during substantive examination before the first office action, the response deadline for applicants in priority examination is shortened from two months to one, and the circumstances for refusing or terminating priority treatment are clarified. Integrity constraints were added as well — requesters or agencies found violating good-faith principles can be barred from filing priority-examination requests for one year. Where PPH addresses the international pipeline, priority examination addresses the domestic one; together they compress the time from filing to grant.

Practical steps for foreign applicants

  1. Map the family. Identify which counterpart applications have already received an allowable opinion abroad (EPO, DGIP or an IP5 office) and which Chinese applications correspond to them.
  2. Check eligibility. Confirm the earliest priority date, the one-to-one claim correspondence, and whether usable national or PCT work product exists.
  3. File the PPH request properly. Submit it to CNIPA under the bilateral pilot rules for the relevant corridor; the request procedure and fees mirror existing PPH practice.
  4. Consider priority examination for strategic filings. For key-core and emerging-technology cases, the revised 2026 measures offer a domestic fast track with new integrity and timing rules to respect.
  5. Budget for acceleration. Neither PPH nor priority examination adds official fees for the basic request, but response deadlines tighten, so plan attorney capacity.
  6. Track and maintain. Because PPH changes timing but not standards, keep quality-focused drafting and portfolio maintenance discipline throughout.

Risks and compliance notes

PPH should not be mistaken for an easier grant. Accelerated cases go through the same substantive examination; using work product from one office is a time-saver, not a standards waiver. Foreign applicants should also be careful with the tightened priority-examination deadlines — a one-month response window demands prompt instructions. Finally, because CNIPA has expanded to 38 PPH partners, multinationals should review which of their corridors now qualify, since the cost of ignoring an available fast track is measured in lost market lead time for products and licensing positions.


国家知识产权局PPH网络扩容:2026年外资申请人的专利快速审查新通道

为什么当下重要

对在中国与海外同时布局专利族的大型跨国企业而言,最常见的痛点之一,是专利变得具有商业价值的时间与国内审查完成的时间之间存在的落差。国家知识产权局(CNIPA)2026年8月的两项公告直接回应了这种摩擦。2026年8月1日,中国国家知识产权局与欧洲专利局(EPO)之间的双边专利审查高速路(PPH)试点正式启动;同一天,中印(尼)专利审查高速路(CNIPA-DGIP PPH)试点也正式生效。二者与长期运行的IP5 PPH框架并行,为这些通道的申请人提供了专门、可预期的快速路径。中国与加拿大之间的PPH试点自2026年9月1日起再延长五年。对在华投资的欧洲、东南亚及加拿大企业而言,实际含义十分直白:全球专利族中的中国侧审查,现在可以明显更快。

新试点究竟改变了什么

PPH是审查机构之间的工作共享机制。当首次审查机构已认定申请中至少一项权利要求可以授权时,申请人可以请求后续审查机构利用此前的检索与审查结果,对相应申请进行加快审查。中欧双边PPH试点是刻意做”增量”而非”替代”:它与IP5 PPH并存,适用相同实质性条件,并且与早期设定期限的试验不同,不设固定终止日期,但仍可经双方同意暂停、修改或提前终止。对欧洲企业而言,这意味着在EPO获得的有利审查结论可以被带入CNIPA审查,反之亦然,中方申请人在EPO提出申请时同样适用。与印尼DGIP的PPH试点则为增长迅速的东盟市场打开了快速通道,对在东南亚建设供应链的企业尤其有用。

2026年更宏观的程序图景

PPH扩容正好发生在中国审查工具整体现代化的过程中。2026年7月30日,国家知识产权局发布修订后的《专利优先审查管理办法》(局令第85号),自2026年9月1日起施行。修订后的办法将优先审查向新兴产业、未来产业与关键核心技术攻关倾斜,强调创新价值与转化前景,并收紧程序:发明专利申请须在实质审查阶段且尚未作出首次处理时提出请求;优先审查中申请人答复审查意见的期限由两个月缩短为一个月;并细化了不予优先审查与终止优先审查的情形。办法还增加了诚信约束——违反诚信原则的请求人或代理机构,可能一年内被停止受理优先审查请求。如果说PPH解决的是国际管线,那么优先审查解决的是国内管线;二者合力压缩从申请到授权的整体周期。

外资申请人的操作步骤

  1. 梳理专利族。 找出哪些对应申请已在海外(EPO、DGIP或任一IP5机构)获得可授权意见,以及哪些中国申请与其对应。
  2. 核验条件。 确认最早优先权日、权利要求一一对应关系,以及是否存在可用的国家或PCT工作成果。
  3. 正确提出PPH请求。 按相关通道的双边试点规则向国家知识产权局提交请求;请求程序与费用与既有PPH实践一致。
  4. 战略性申请可考虑优先审查。 对关键核心技术与新兴产业案件,2026年修订办法提供了国内快速通道,但须遵守新的诚信与时限规则。
  5. 为加速做好准备。 PPH与优先审查的基本请求均不另收官方费用,但答复期限收紧,须提前规划代理能力。
  6. 跟踪与维护。 因为PPH改变的是节奏而非标准,应始终保持以质量为导向的撰写与组合维护纪律。

风险与合规提示

PPH不应被误解为更容易授权。加速案件仍要经历相同的实质审查;利用某一机构的工作成果只是节省时间,不是降低标准。外资申请人还应注意收紧后的优先审查期限——一个月的答复窗口要求及时作出指示。最后,由于国家知识产权局的PPH合作伙伴已达38个,跨国企业应重新审视哪些通道现在符合条件,因为忽视可用的快速通道,其代价是以产品上市与许可地位的市场领先时间衡量的。

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