Tag Archives: 2026

Seat of Arbitration and Interim Measures (Emergency Arbitrator): A 2026 Practical Guide for Foreign-Related Disputes in China

  • The “seat” (legal place) of arbitration, not the hearing venue, determines which courts supervise the proceedings and where awards are enforced — choosing it is one of the most consequential clauses in a foreign-related contract.
    仲裁的”仲裁地”(法律所在地)而非开庭地点,决定由哪国法院监督程序及在何处执行裁决——选择仲裁地是涉外合同中最具后果的条款之一。
  • China’s leading institutions — CIETAC and others — introduced emergency-arbitrator procedures in their 2024 rules, letting a party obtain a binding interim measure before the tribunal is even constituted.
    中国主要机构(贸仲等)在 2024 年版规则中引入紧急仲裁员程序,使当事人在仲裁庭组成前即可获得有约束力的临时措施。
  • CIETAC’s emergency arbitrator is designated within one day of a complete application and must decide within 15 days; the decision binds both parties and may later be modified by the tribunal.
    贸仲紧急仲裁员在申请完备后 1 日内指定,须于 15 日内作出决定;决定对双方具有约束力,并可由仲裁庭后续修改。
  • In mainland China, emergency-arbitrator decisions are contractually binding but are not directly enforceable by courts; parties typically pair them with court preservation or rely on the tribunal’s later measures.
    在中国内地,紧急仲裁员决定具合同约束力,但不能由法院直接强制执行;当事人通常将其与法院保全结合,或依赖仲裁庭后续措施。
  • Interim measures can also be ordered by the arbitral tribunal once constituted, and Chinese courts will, in appropriate cross-border cases, recognise and support such measures.
    仲裁庭组成后可自行决定临时措施;中国法院在适当的跨境案件中会承认并支持此类措施。
  • Foreign-related disputes benefit from a “seat–assets–enforcement” assessment at the contracting stage, so the chosen seat aligns with where assets and enforcement actually sit.
    涉外争议应在缔约阶段做”仲裁地—资产—执行”三维评估,使选定仲裁地与资产和执行的真实所在地相匹配。

Seat of Arbitration and Interim Measures (Emergency Arbitrator): A 2026 Practical Guide for Foreign-Related Disputes in China | 仲裁地与临时措施(紧急仲裁员):中国涉外争议 2026 实务指南

Why this matters now

When a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) drafts a dispute-resolution clause, the two details that most affect outcomes are often the ones given least thought: the seat of arbitration and the availability of interim measures. Get them wrong and a winning award may be unenforceable, or a critical asset may vanish before the tribunal is even formed.

This article explains how the seat functions in Chinese-connected arbitration, how emergency-arbitrator and tribunal interim measures work under 2024 institutional rules, and what FIEs should specify in their contracts. It pairs with our international-arbitration and foreign-related-litigation coverage.

The seat, not the venue

The seat (legal place) of arbitration is a legal concept, distinct from where hearings are held. The seat determines:

  • which country’s courts have supervisory jurisdiction (e.g., to set aside or assist the proceedings);
  • the procedural law that fills gaps in the arbitral rules; and
  • the legal character of the award (a “seat” award is enforced under the New York Convention as an award made in that place).

For an FIE, a well-chosen seat — mainland China, Hong Kong, Singapore, or elsewhere — should match where the counterparty’s assets and enforcement realistically lie. China’s institutions now expressly address the seat in their rules, and CIETAC’s 2024 rules confirm that the emergency-arbitrator proceeding is located at the seat.

Emergency arbitration before the tribunal exists

A core problem: by the time a three-member tribunal is constituted, the asset may already be gone. China’s leading arbitral institutions responded by embedding emergency-arbitrator (EA) procedures in their 2024 rules. Under CIETAC’s rules:

  • A party may apply for urgent interim relief before the tribunal is formed.
  • The arbitration court designates an emergency arbitrator within one day of receiving the application and fee.
  • The EA must render a decision within 15 days; the decision is binding on both parties.
  • The EA’s powers cease when the tribunal is constituted, which may modify, suspend, or terminate the decision.

Other major Chinese institutions (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou) follow a similar model, with designation in one to two days and decisions in ten to fifteen days.

Enforcement reality in mainland China

The honest caveat: under current PRC law, an emergency-arbitrator decision is contractually binding but is not directly enforceable by a Chinese court as a preservation order — the power to order property or conduct preservation rests with the people’s courts. In practice, parties use the EA decision to (a) obtain the counterparty’s voluntary compliance, (b) support a parallel court preservation application, or (c) secure recognition in a foreign enforcement jurisdiction (e.g., Hong Kong, which has legislated enforceability).

Once the tribunal is constituted, it may order interim measures, and Chinese courts have, in appropriate cross-border cases, shown a pragmatic willingness to recognise and support arbitral relief.

What FIEs should specify

  1. Seat: choose deliberately, aligning the seat with asset location and enforcement strategy.
  2. Rules: adopt 2024 institutional rules that include an EA procedure (CIETAC, BAC/BIAC, SHIAC, etc.).
  3. Interim-measure clause: expressly contemplate EA relief and, where relevant, court-preservation coordination.
  4. Security: be prepared to post appropriate security — EA tribunals routinely require it.
  5. Cross-border plan: if assets are offshore, pair the EA decision with recognition strategy in the asset jurisdiction.

Practical steps

  • At contracting, run a “seat–assets–enforcement” assessment rather than defaulting to a familiar institution.
  • Preserve evidence of urgency and a prima-facie case; EA relief turns on both.
  • Coordinate EA and court-preservation timelines so relief is not lost in the gap.
  • Brief counsel early — EA windows are measured in days.

Cost and timing in practice

EA relief is cheap relative to a full arbitration: institutions set modest EA fees, and the decision arrives in days. By contrast, a constituted tribunal’s interim measure and the underlying arbitration can run for months and cost substantially more. The practical calculus for an FIE is therefore: use EA for urgent, time-critical preservation; use the tribunal’s measures (or court preservation) for the main proceeding; and reserve litigation for points that turn on precedent or high damages. Documenting the urgency and a prima-facie case from day one is what makes any of these routes work.

Related reading

  • Enforcing foreign arbitral awards in China.
  • The Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC) and foreign-related jurisdiction.
  • Foreign-related civil jurisdiction and service rules.

仲裁地与临时措施(紧急仲裁员):中国涉外争议 2026 实务指南

为何重要

当 ded 外商投资企业起草争议解决条款时,最影响结果的往往是最少被思考的两处细节:仲裁地与临时措施的可得性。若选错,胜诉裁决可能无从执行,或关键资产在仲裁庭组成前就已流失。

本文说明仲裁地在中国相关仲裁中的功能、2024 年机构规则下紧急仲裁员与仲裁庭临时措施的运作,以及外资企业应在合同中明确的要点,与本站国际仲裁与涉外诉讼专题相互呼应。

仲裁地,而非开庭地

仲裁地(法律所在地)是法律概念,不同于开庭地点。仲裁地决定:

  • 哪国法院拥有监督管辖权(如撤销或协助程序);
  • 填补仲裁规则漏洞的程序法;以及
  • 裁决的法律属性(”仲裁地”裁决依《纽约公约》作为该地作出的裁决执行)。

对外资企业而言,妥善选定的仲裁地——中国内地、香港、新加坡或其他——应与对方资产与执行的真实所在地相匹配。中国机构如今在规则中明确处理仲裁地,贸仲 2024 年规则确认紧急仲裁员程序位于仲裁地。

仲裁庭组成前的紧急仲裁

核心难题:三人仲裁庭组成时,资产或许早已转移。中国主要仲裁机构以在 2024 年规则中嵌入紧急仲裁员(EA)程序应对。依贸仲规则:

  • 当事人可在仲裁庭组成前申请紧急性临时救济。
  • 仲裁院在收到申请及费用后 1 日内指定紧急仲裁员。
  • 紧急仲裁员须于 15 日内作出决定;决定对双方具有约束力。
  • 紧急仲裁员的权力于仲裁庭组成时终止,仲裁庭可修改、中止或终止该决定。

北京、上海、广州等主要中国机构遵循类似模型,指定在 1 至 2 日内、决定在 10 至 15 日内作出。

中国内地的执行现实

坦诚的提醒:依现行中国法,紧急仲裁员决定具合同约束力,但不能由法院作为保全裁定直接强制执行——财产或行为保全的权力属于人民法院。实践中,当事人以 EA 决定(a)促使对方自愿遵守,(b)支持平行的法院保全申请,或(c)在外国执行地(如已立法确认可执行性的香港)寻求承认。

仲裁庭组成后可自行决定临时措施;中国法院在适当的跨境案件中,已展现务实承认并支持仲裁救济的意愿。

外资企业应明确的要点

  1. 仲裁地:慎重选择,使其与资产所在地及执行策略一致。
  2. 规则:采用含 EA 程序的 2024 年机构规则(贸仲、北仲/北国仲、上国仲等)。
  3. 临时措施条款:明确预见 EA 救济,并在相关时约定法院保全衔接。
  4. 担保:准备提供适当担保——EA 庭通常要求。
  5. 跨境方案:若资产在境外,将 EA 决定与资产地承认策略结合。

实务步骤

  • 缔约时做”仲裁地—资产—执行”评估,而非默认熟悉机构。
  • 留存紧急性与表面胜诉可能性的证据;EA 救济正取决于二者。
  • 协调 EA 与法院保全的时间线,避免救济在空窗期流失。
  • 尽早向律师简报——EA 窗口以天计。

实务中的成本与时点

相较完整仲裁,EA 救济成本低:机构仅收取适度的 EA 费用,决定数日内作出。反之,仲裁庭临时措施与 underlying 仲裁可能耗时数月、成本显著更高。因此外资企业的实务取舍是:对紧急、时间关键的保全用 EA;对主程序用仲裁庭措施(或法院保全);将诉讼留给依赖先例或高额赔偿的争点。从第一天起留存紧急性与表面胜诉可能性的证据,是令任一路径奏效的关键。

延伸阅读

  • 外国仲裁裁决在中国的执行。
  • 最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)与涉外管辖权。
  • 涉外民事管辖权与送达规则。

Sources

  • 中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会(CIETAC):《仲裁规则》(2024版),2024-01-01 施行 — https://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=19377
  • 中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会:紧急仲裁员程序(附件三)— http://bj.cietac.org/categories/34/articles
  • 最高人民法院 国际商事法庭(CICC)— https://cicc.court.gov.cn

Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in Mainland China: A Practical Guide under the New York Convention

  • The New York Convention has applied in mainland China since 22 April 1987, subject to China’s reciprocity reservation and commercial reservation.
    《纽约公约》自1987年4月22日起在中国内地施行,并受中国作出的互惠保留与商事保留两项声明的约束。
  • The seat of arbitration—not the institution’s nationality, the hearing place, or the rules’ governing law—is the sole test of an award’s nationality.
    仲裁地——而非仲裁机构国籍、开庭地或仲裁规则所适用法域——是判定裁决国籍的唯一标准。
  • Awards seated in mainland China are domestic; awards from the Hong Kong SAR or Macao SAR follow special mutual-enforcement arrangements, not the Convention.
    仲裁地位于中国内地的裁决为内国裁决;中国香港特别行政区、中国澳门特别行政区作出的裁决依专项相互执行安排处理,而非《纽约公约》。
  • File with the intermediate people’s court at the debtor’s domicile or where its property is located; the limitation period is two years under the Civil Procedure Law.
    应向被执行人住所地或财产所在地的中级人民法院提出申请;依《民事诉讼法》申请期间为两年。
  • Non-compliant documents are not accepted: submit the original award or certified copy, the arbitration agreement, and a certified Chinese translation.
    材料不合规将不予受理:须提交裁决正本或经证明副本、仲裁协议,以及经认证的中文译本。
  • Article V of the Convention exhaustively lists the only grounds for refusal, and they are narrowly construed in favour of enforcement.
    《纽约公约》第五条穷尽列举了拒绝承认与执行的唯一事由,且应作有利于执行的严格限缩解释。
  • Any proposed refusal must be escalated through the cascade reporting system to the Supreme People’s Court before a rejection can be issued.
    凡拟不予承认执行的,均须通过逐级报核制度层报最高人民法院,方可作出驳回裁定。

Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards in Mainland China: A Practical Guide under the New York Convention | 外国仲裁裁决在中国内地的承认与执行实操:《纽约公约》项下实务指引

The New York Convention and China’s Two Reservations

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) entered into force for China on 22 April 1987, after China’s accession on 2 December 1986. It remains the cornerstone of cross-border award enforcement in mainland China, and China made two declarations every foreign investor should understand before drafting a dispute clause.

First, the reciprocity reservation: China applies the Convention only to awards made in the territory of another Contracting State, so an award from a non-Contracting State cannot be enforced through the Convention and would need a different, less certain basis.

Second, the commercial reservation: China applies the Convention only to disputes arising from legal relationships, contractual or not, considered commercial under Chinese law; non-commercial disputes fall outside it. In short, seat the arbitration in a Contracting State and ensure the dispute is commercial under Chinese law.

How the Nationality of an Award Is Determined: The Seat Rule

A recurring source of confusion is whether an award is “foreign” for New York Convention purposes. Chinese courts apply a single, exclusive test—the seat of arbitration (仲裁地); the institution’s nationality, the hearing place, and the governing law of the rules are all irrelevant.

If the seat is in mainland China, the award is a domestic award and the Convention does not apply; enforcement follows the ordinary route under the Arbitration Law and the Civil Procedure Law. If the seat is outside mainland China and in a Contracting State, the award is a “foreign award” enforceable under the Convention. Thus an award by a foreign institution (such as the ICC or SIAC) seated in mainland China is still domestic, while a Chinese institution’s award seated abroad is, for enforcement purposes, foreign. This seat-based test guards against forum-shopping and aligns with the “delocalised” nature of international arbitration, though a clause that fixes the seat ambiguously can still trigger a costly nationality dispute.

Awards Excluded from the New York Convention

Three categories fall outside the New York Convention in China:

  1. Awards seated in mainland China — enforced as domestic awards.
  2. Awards made in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China or the Macao Special Administrative Region of China — enforced under the special mutual-enforcement arrangements with the two Special Administrative Regions, not the Convention. The mainland-Hong Kong arrangement (2000, supplemented 2019) and the mainland-Macao arrangement (2007) apply.
  3. Awards made in the Taiwan region of China — handled through the cross-strait judicial mutual-assistance framework rather than the Convention.

The Convention and these arrangements are mutually exclusive; choosing the correct channel at the outset determines the court, procedure, and limitation period.

Where to File: Jurisdiction of the Intermediate People’s Court

Applications are heard by an intermediate people’s court (中级人民法院) at the domicile of the person subjected to enforcement (the debtor) or where its property is located; where property spans multiple jurisdictions, the applicant may choose among the courts with property jurisdiction.

Before filing, map the debtor’s registered address, place of business, and bank accounts, equity, and real estate in mainland China; a court lacking both domicile and assets in its territory has no jurisdiction, and the application will be transferred or rejected.

The Two-Year Time Limit

The application is subject to the two-year limitation under the Civil Procedure Law. The starting point follows the award: from the last day of a fixed performance period, from each installment’s last day if installments are specified, or from the award’s effective date if no period is fixed.

Crucially, the limitation is a defence the debtor may raise; the court does not examine it on its own motion. Parties should still file promptly: once the period lapses the right to apply is effectively lost, and early filing preserves the ability to seek property preservation in mainland China.

Documents You Must Prepare

Under the Supreme People’s Court’s 1987 notice and later practice, the applicant must submit:

  • a written application;
  • the original award or a duly certified copy;
  • the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy; and
  • a Chinese translation of the award and the arbitration agreement, certified by an entity qualified to provide translation.

The translation requirement is strict: foreign-language materials must carry a Chinese translation. If the documents are incomplete or non-compliant, the court will not accept the application; it will notify the applicant to cure the defects within a prescribed period, and if they are not cured the application is rejected. Getting the paperwork right the first time is decisive.

Grounds for Refusal under Article V

The New York Convention is pro-enforcement: Article V exhaustively lists the grounds on which a court may—but need not—refuse recognition and enforcement, and they are construed narrowly:

(a) incapacity of a party, or invalidity of the arbitration agreement under the law applicable to it; (b) the party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case; (c) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by, or beyond the scope of, the submission to arbitration (if the separable part can be enforced, only that part is refused); (d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or, failing such agreement, with the law of the seat; (e) the award has not yet become binding, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made.

In addition, recognition and enforcement may be refused if the subject matter is not arbitrable under Chinese law, or if it would be contrary to China’s public policy. Chinese courts apply the public-policy exception restrictively, confining it to the most fundamental principles and basic social interests of Chinese law, and not as a general escape hatch for dissatisfied debtors.

The Cascade Reporting and Approval System

The most distinctive feature of award enforcement in China is the cascade reporting and approval system (逐级报核制度). Because local courts once showed protectionist tendencies toward local debtors, the Supreme People’s Court requires any intermediate court proposing to refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign award to report first to the Higher People’s Court; if the High Court agrees, it must report further to the Supreme People’s Court, whose decision binds the lower courts. A refusal cannot be issued without that authorisation.

For domestic (non-foreign-related) arbitration judicial-review matters, the Supreme People’s Court later streamlined the reporting level: such cases are reported only to the Higher People’s Court, without Supreme People’s Court approval. The foreign-award track, by contrast, retains the full two-tier escalation to the Supreme People’s Court.

How the Supreme People’s Court Unifies Review Standards

To curb inconsistency across localities, the Supreme People’s Court has deployed several instruments:

  • The Minutes of the National Courts’ Forum on Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial Work (《全国法院涉外商事海事审判工作座谈会会议纪要》), consolidating judicial views on recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards.
  • Guiding Cases (指导性案例) on arbitration, binding lower courts and showing how Article V defences apply.
  • The bilingual Annual Report on Judicial Review of International Commercial Arbitration in China, publishing representative cases with English and Chinese reasoning.
  • The inclusion of 24 Chinese New York Convention cases in the UNCITRAL CLOUT (Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts) database.

Together these measures raise predictability and weaken the old local-protectionist route for a debtor’s Article V objection.

A Practical Checklist for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

For a foreign-invested enterprise that may enforce or resist a foreign award in mainland China, the following steps improve outcomes.

  • Draft the arbitration clause for the enforcement stage. Fix the seat in a New York Convention Contracting State, name a neutral institution, and avoid ambiguous seat language. The seat—not the institution or the rules—decides whether the Convention applies.
  • Pre-set a service address and keep records. Build a clear service address and a reliable notice channel into the contract and the proceeding, and preserve every dispatch. A clean record defeats the “no proper notice” defence before it is raised.
  • Map assets and time your preservation. Before and during arbitration, identify the debtor’s bank accounts, equity, and real property in mainland China. Chinese courts have, in practice, granted interim property preservation in support of foreign-seated arbitration; applying early can freeze assets before the award is final.
  • Use the settlement window. Between the award and enforcement—and even during recognition proceedings—a structured settlement is sometimes more valuable than contested enforcement against an asset-poor debtor.

Related Reading

See CIETAC international arbitration (No. 40), the Supreme People’s Court and CICC (No. 185), and the 2026 Arbitration Law revision (No. 166).


外国仲裁裁决在中国内地的承认与执行实操:《纽约公约》项下实务指引

《纽约公约》与中国两项保留

《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》(以下简称”《纽约公约》”)于1987年4月22日对中国正式施行(中国于1986年12月2日加入)。它至今仍是中国内地跨境仲裁裁决承认与执行的基石;中国加入时作出的两项声明,外资企业拟定争议条款前须充分理解。

第一项是互惠保留:中国仅对另一缔约国领土内作出的裁决适用《纽约公约》予以承认和执行,非缔约国境内作出的裁决无法经该公约在中国内地执行,而须依赖其他(且确定性更低的)基础。

第二项是商事保留:中国仅对按照中国法律认定为契约性或非契约性商事法律关系所引起的争议适用《纽约公约》,非商事事项被排除在外。简而言之,将仲裁地设于缔约国,并确保基础争议具有商事性质。

裁决国籍的判定标准:仲裁地规则

一个反复造成混淆的问题是:一项裁决在《纽约公约》意义上究竟是否”外国裁决”。中国法院采用唯一且排他性的判断标准——仲裁地(seat);仲裁机构的国籍、开庭地所在国、仲裁规则所适用法域,均与裁决国籍的判定无关。

如果仲裁地位于中国内地,该裁决被视为内国裁决,《纽约公约》不予适用,其执行遵循《仲裁法》与《民事诉讼法》的普通内国路径。如果仲裁地位于中国内地境外且属于某一缔约国,则该裁决为可据《纽约公约》执行的”外国裁决”。由此推之:一家外国机构(例如国际商会 ICC 或新加坡国际仲裁中心 SIAC)作出但仲裁地设在中国内地的裁决,仍属内国裁决;而一家中国机构但在境外设仲裁地作出的裁决,在执行意义上反而是外国裁决。这一以仲裁地为核心的判断标准,既防范当事人挑选法院,也契合国际仲裁”非本地化”的普遍理解;但对仲裁地约定模糊的条款,仍可能在执行阶段引发成本高昂的国籍争议。

被排除在《纽约公约》之外的裁决

有三类裁决不属于《纽约公约》的适用范围:

  1. 仲裁地位于中国内地的裁决——作为内国裁决执行。
  2. 在中国香港特别行政区或中国澳门特别行政区作出的裁决——依据内地与两个特别行政区之间的专项相互执行安排执行,而非《纽约公约》。内地与香港特区的安排(2000年订立,2019年补充)以及内地与澳门特区的安排(2007年)适用。
  3. 在中国台湾地区作出的裁决——通过两岸司法互助框架处理,而非《纽约公约》。

《纽约公约》与这些专项安排相互排斥;在起点选对渠道,决定了由哪一家法院、适用何种程序以及何种时效。

管辖法院:中级人民法院

承认与执行外国仲裁裁决的申请,由被执行人住所地或者被执行财产所在地的中级人民法院管辖。当财产分布于多个管辖区域时,申请人可在有财产管辖权的法院中择一提出申请。

实践中,提起申请前应摸清债务人的登记地址、主要营业地,以及位于中国内地的银行账户、股权与不动产。一家辖区内既无财产又无住所的法院将欠缺管辖权,申请会被移送或驳回。

两年的申请期间

承认与执行外国裁决的申请,受《民事诉讼法》两年期间约束。起算点取决于裁决内容:确定履行期限的,自履行期限届满之日起算;分期履行的,自每次履行期限届满之日起算;未确定履行期限的,自裁决生效之日起算。

关键在于,该期间是债务人可提出的抗辩,法院并不会在立案阶段依职权主动审查。尽管如此,当事人仍应及时提出申请:一旦期间届满,申请权实际上即告丧失;及早申请也保留了就债务人位于中国内地的财产申请保全的可能。

必须准备好的文件

根据最高人民法院1987年实施意见及后续实践,申请人应当提交:

  • 书面申请;
  • 裁决正本或者经证明无误的副本;
  • 仲裁协议正本或者经证明无误的副本;
  • 裁决书与仲裁协议的中文译本,且译本须由具备资质的翻译机构认证。

翻译要求十分严格:以外文提交的材料必须附具中文译本。若材料不齐全或不符合要求,法院将不予受理,并通知申请人在指定期限内补正;逾期未补正的,申请将被驳回。因此,第一次就把文书备齐备对,具有决定性意义。

《纽约公约》第五条的抗辩事由

《纽约公约》以支持执行为基调:第五条穷尽列举了法院”可以”(而非”必须”)拒绝承认与执行的事由,且应作严格限缩解释:

(a) 当事人无行为能力,或仲裁协议依其应适用的法律无效; (b) 被申请人未获关于指派仲裁员或仲裁程序的适当通知,或因其他缘故未能申辩; (c) 裁决处理的争议非提交仲裁的标的,或超出提交仲裁的范围(可分离部分仍可执行的,仅该部分被拒绝); (d) 仲裁庭的组成或仲裁程序与当事人约定不符,或在无约定时与仲裁地法不符; (e) 裁决尚未对当事人发生拘束力,或已被作出裁决的国家或依其法律作出裁决的国家的主管机关撤销或中止。

此外,若争议事项依中国法不可仲裁,或承认与执行将违背中国公共政策,亦可拒绝。中国法院对公共政策例外作限制解释,仅将其局限于中国法律最根本的原则与基本社会公益,绝非债务人可随意借用的逃逸通道。

逐级报核制度

中国裁决执行中最具特色的一项制度,或许是逐级报核制度。鉴于地方法院曾对本地债务人表现出保护主义倾向,最高人民法院要求:凡拟拒绝承认与执行外国裁决的中级法院,须先报所在高级人民法院;若高级人民法院同意,还须进一步层报最高人民法院,且其决定对下级法院具有约束力。未经最高人民法院核准,不得作出不予承认执行的裁定。

对于非涉外(即内国仲裁审查)的仲裁司法审查事项,最高人民法院后续精简了报核层级:此类案件通常仅层报高级人民法院,不再要求最高人民法院核准。相比之下,外国裁决的执行轨道保留了完整的”高院—最高院”两级上核。

最高人民法院统一审查标准的举措

为遏制各地尺度不一,最高人民法院采取了多项举措:

  • 《全国法院涉外商事海事审判工作座谈会会议纪要》,系统梳理了承认与执行外国仲裁裁决的司法观点。
  • 仲裁领域的指导性案例,对下级法院具有拘束力,并示范第五条抗辩应如何适用。
  • 中英双语的《中国国际商事仲裁司法审查年度报告》,以中英文发布典型案例并阐释法院推理。
  • 中国有24篇适用《纽约公约》的案例被联合国国际贸易法委员会 CLOUT(贸法会法规判例法)数据库收录。

上述举措共同提升了可预见性,并压缩了债务人借地方保护获取第五条异议支持的空间。

外资企业的实操清单

对于可能在中国内地执行或抗拒外国裁决的外商投资企业,以下步骤能改善结果:

  • 为执行阶段拟定仲裁条款。 将仲裁地固定为《纽约公约》缔约国,指定中立机构,并避免模糊的仲裁地措辞。切记:决定《纽约公约》是否适用的,是仲裁地,而非机构或规则。
  • 预设送达地址并留痕。 在合同与仲裁程序中嵌入清晰的送达地址与可靠通知渠道,并保留每一次送达记录。干净完整的记录,能在异议提出前就击破”未获适当通知”的抗辩。
  • 摸清资产并把握保全时点。 在仲裁前与仲裁中,梳理债务人位于中国内地的银行账户、股权与不动产。中国法院在实践中已就境外仲裁地仲裁准予临时财产保全;及早申请,可在裁决终局前冻结资产。
  • 善用和解窗口。 在裁决作出后至执行前,乃至承认与执行程序进行中,结构化和解有时价值高于对抗式执行一个资产匮乏的债务人。

相关阅读

可参阅本站 CIETAC 国际仲裁(编号40)、最高人民法院与国际商事法庭 CICC(编号185),以及2026年《仲裁法》修订(编号166)。

Sources

China’s Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC) and the 2026 Arbitration Law: a foreign-party guide

  • The Supreme People’s Court’s International Commercial Court (CICC, 国际商事法庭) provides first- and second-instance adjudication of foreign-related commercial disputes and centralized recognition of foreign judgments and awards.
    最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)集中审理涉外民商事一审、二审案件,并集中受理外国判决与裁决的承认案件。
  • The revised Arbitration Law (effective 1 March 2026) adds the “seat of arbitration,” ad-hoc “special arbitration” for defined foreign-related disputes, and online arbitration — aligning with the UNCITRAL Model Law.
    修订后的《仲裁法》(2026年3月1日施行)新增”仲裁地”、特定涉外纠纷的临时”特别仲裁”与在线仲裁,对接《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事仲裁示范法》。
  • Chinese courts apply a “validate-the-agreement” stance: a misnamed institution is valid if identifiable, and silence-plus-no-denial at first hearing can constitute an agreement.
    中国法院秉持”有利于仲裁协议有效”立场:机构名称不准确但可确定的即认定有效;首次开庭前不予否认的沉默可视为存在协议。
  • Courts strengthened support: pre-arbitration preservation, timely handling of all preservation applications, and authority for tribunals to request evidentiary assistance.
    法院支持强化:仲裁前保全、各类保全申请依法及时处理、仲裁庭有权请求有关方面协助收集证据。
  • CICC’s “one-stop” platform connects international commercial mediation and arbitration, letting parties seek recognition/enforcement and judicial review in one window.
    CICC”一站式”国际商事纠纷多元化解决平台联通国际商事调解与仲裁,当事人可于一窗申请承认执行与司法审查。
  • Foreign awards are recognized under the New York Convention; the revised law also details recognition of awards made inside and outside China.
    外国裁决依《纽约公约》承认;修订法并就中国域内、域外作出的生效裁决的承认与执行作了具体规定。
  • Foreign parties should draft clear arbitration clauses (institution, seat, rules) and use CICC’s one-stop route for recognition and review.
    外国当事人应拟定清晰仲裁条款(机构、仲裁地、规则),并借CICC一站式路径办理承认与审查。

China’s Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC) and the 2026 Arbitration Law: a foreign-party guide | 最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)与2026年《仲裁法》:外国当事人指南

Overview: a specialized forum for foreign-related disputes

Foreign investors in China increasingly resolve high-value cross-border disputes through arbitration and specialized adjudication. Two pillars matter in 2026: the Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court (CICC, 国际商事法庭), established to hear foreign-related commercial cases and centralize recognition of foreign judgments and awards; and the revised Arbitration Law of the PRC, effective 1 March 2026, the statute’s first full revision since 1995.

The CICC: mandate and “one-stop” platform

The CICC hears, as a matter of centralized jurisdiction, first- and second-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases and accepts applications for the recognition of foreign court judgments and arbitral awards. It operates a “one-stop” international commercial dispute resolution platform linking international commercial mediation and arbitration institutions, so parties can pursue mediation, arbitration, recognition/enforcement and judicial review through a single window. For foreign parties, this means a predictable, specialized channel rather than disparate local courts.

The revised Arbitration Law (effective 1 March 2026)

Adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 12 September 2025 and effective 1 March 2026, the revised law has 8 chapters / 96 articles. Its headline foreign-related reforms: (1) a new “seat of arbitration” (仲裁地) system aligning with the UNCITRAL Model Law — the seat determines the applicable procedural law and the court of judicial supervision unless parties agree otherwise; (2) special (ad-hoc) arbitration for defined foreign-related disputes — foreign-related maritime disputes, or foreign-related disputes between enterprises established and registered within pilot free-trade zones, the Hainan Free Trade Port or other state-designated areas — requiring a written agreement, a China-seated arbitration, qualified arbitrators, and filing with the arbitration association within three working days of constitution; (3) online arbitration by information network, absent objection; and (4) explicit support for Chinese institutions to “go global” and foreign institutions to operate in designated FTZs/Hainan.

The court’s pro-arbitration stance

Chinese courts apply a “favor validity” approach to arbitration agreements. Under the revised law, a clause naming an institution inaccurately is valid if a specific institution is identifiable; and where one party asserts an arbitration agreement at filing and the other does not deny it before the first hearing, after the tribunal prompts and records, an agreement is deemed to exist. The law also confirms arbitration-agreement independence: a contract’s non-formation, invalidity, termination, revocation or nullity does not affect an already-reached arbitration agreement. The SPC’s guiding cases (e.g., a Hong Kong-invested dispute where negotiation did not defeat a subsequently un-signed contract’s arbitration clause) illustrate this pro-enforcement philosophy.

Stronger court support and supervision

The revision reinforces judicial support: parties may seek pre-arbitration preservation (property, conduct, evidence) under the Civil Procedure Law; courts must timely handle both institution-submitted and directly-filed preservation applications; and tribunals may request relevant parties to assist in evidence collection. On supervision, the time to apply to set aside an award is shortened from six months to three months, promoting finality. The SPC has long held that it will, consistent with the New York Convention, recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards where fundamental principles, sovereignty, security, public interest and domestic creditors’ rights are not breached.

Recognition of foreign awards and judgments

For foreign arbitral awards, the New York Convention path remains central; our separate article details enforcement of foreign awards and judgments in China. The revised law additionally specifies recognition and enforcement of effective awards made within China’s territory and applications to Chinese courts for awards made outside China, and aligns with the Civil Procedure Law on judicial assistance. CICC’s centralized recognition function makes it the natural venue for foreign parties enforcing offshore awards or judgments against China-seated assets.

Drafting tips for foreign parties

  1. Name the institution precisely (e.g., CIETAC, CICC, HKIAC where permitted) to avoid validity fights.
  2. Specify the seat to fix procedural law and supervisory court.
  3. Choose rules and language expressly; for FTZ/Hainan foreign-related disputes, consider special arbitration with a written China-seat clause.
  4. Use CICC’s one-stop platform for recognition, enforcement and review.
  5. Preserve evidence and timeliness — the three-month set-aside clock and preservation windows are strict.
  6. Coordinate with institutional arbitration (CIETAC’s new 2026 arbitrator list and the 2026 China Arbitration Week) for appointments.

Related reading

The revised Arbitration Law’s foreign-party essentials, CIETAC and international arbitration, and enforcement of foreign awards and judgments are covered in separate articles; this piece is the CICC-and-2026-Law briefing plus the action list.


最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC)与2026年《仲裁法》:外国当事人指南

概览:涉外纠纷的专门法庭

在华外国投资者日益通过仲裁与专门审判解决高价值跨境争议。2026年有两大支柱:为审理涉外民商事案件、集中受理外国判决与裁决承认而设的最高人民法院国际商事法庭(CICC);以及自2026年3月1日施行的修订后《中华人民共和国仲裁法》——该法自1995年以来首次全面修订。

CICC:职能与”一站式”平台

CICC以集中管辖方式审理涉外民商事一审、二审案件,并受理外国法院判决与仲裁裁决的承认申请。其运营”一站式”国际商事纠纷多元化解决平台,联通国际商事调解与仲裁机构,使当事人得以一窗办理调解、仲裁、承认执行与司法审查。对外国当事人而言,这意味着可预期、专门的渠道,而非分散的地方法院。

修订后《仲裁法》(2026年3月1日施行)

该法于2025年9月12日由全国人大常委会通过,2026年3月1日施行,共8章96条。其涉外改革要点:(1)新增对接《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事仲裁示范法》的”仲裁地”制度——除当事人另有约定外,仲裁地决定程序适用法与司法监督法院;(2)针对特定涉外纠纷的”特别仲裁”(临时仲裁)——涉外海事纠纷,或经国务院批准的自贸试验区、海南自贸港及国家规定的其他区域内设立登记企业之间的涉外纠纷——须书面约定、以中国为仲裁地、仲裁员符合资格,且组庭后三个工作日内向仲裁协会备案;(3)经信息网络在线仲裁(当事人无反对);并(4)明确支持中国机构”走出去”与外国机构在指定自贸区/海南设立业务机构。

法院支持仲裁的立场

中国法院对仲裁协议秉持”有利于有效”立场。依修订法,机构名称不准确但可确定的即认定有效;一方申请时主张有仲裁协议、另一方首次开庭前不予否认的,经仲裁庭提示并记录,视为存在协议。法律并确认仲裁协议独立性:合同不成立、无效、终止、被撤销或无效,不影响已达成的仲裁协议。最高法指导性案例(如一香港投资争议中磋商未阻却未签署合同的仲裁条款)体现这一支持执行理念。

更强有力的法院支持与监督

修订强化司法支持:当事人可依《民事诉讼法》申请仲裁前保全(财产、行为、证据);法院对机构提交与当事人直接申请的保全均须及时处理;仲裁庭有权请求有关方面协助收集证据。监督方面,申请撤销裁决期限由六个月缩短为三个月,促进一裁终局。最高法一贯立场是依《纽约公约》在恪守基本原则、国家主权安全、公共利益与境内债权人权益前提下承认执行外国仲裁裁决。

外国裁决与判决的承认

对外国仲裁裁决,《纽约公约》路径仍是核心;承认与执行外国裁决和判决本站另有专文。修订法另就中国域内作出的生效裁决的承认执行、向中国法院申请承认执行域外裁决作了规定,并与《民事诉讼法》司法协助相衔接。CICC的集中承认职能,使其成为外国当事人针对中国境内资产执行境外裁决或判决的自然管辖地。

外国当事人的起草要点

  1. 精确写明机构(如贸仲、CICC、获准的HKIAC),避免效力之争。
  2. 指定仲裁地,以固定程序法与监督法院。
  3. 明示规则与语言;自贸区/海南涉外纠纷可考虑附书面中国仲裁地条款的特别仲裁。
  4. 使用CICC一站式平台办理承认、执行与审查。
  5. 保全证据与时效——三个月撤销期与保全窗口严格。
  6. 与机构仲裁协同(贸仲2026年新仲裁员名册与2026中国仲裁周)安排组庭。

延伸阅读

修订《仲裁法》的外方要点、贸仲与涉外仲裁、外国裁决与判决的承认执行本站另有专文;本文为CICC与2026年《仲裁法》简报加行动清单。

Sources

China’s Revised Arbitration Law (2026): what foreign parties and FIEs need to know

  • China’s Arbitration Law has been comprehensively revised for the first time since 1994: the new law was passed on 12 September 2025, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, and takes effect on 1 March 2026 with eight chapters and 96 articles.
    中国《仲裁法》迎来 1994 年以来首次全面修订:新法于 2025 年 9 月 12 日通过,以第 54 号主席令公布,自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行,共八章 96 条。
  • The revision introduces the “seat of arbitration” (仲裁地) concept aligned with international practice — the seat determines the law governing the arbitral procedure and the courts with supervisory jurisdiction, so foreign parties should now state it expressly in their clauses.
    修订引入与国际接轨的”仲裁地”制度——仲裁地决定仲裁程序适用法及行使司法监督权的法院,外方当事人今后应在仲裁条款中明确约定。
  • A new “special (ad hoc) arbitration” regime lets parties in foreign-related maritime disputes, or between enterprises registered in a Free Trade Zone or the Hainan Free Trade Port, choose a tribunal outside any institution — a first for the mainland.
    新增”特别仲裁”(临时仲裁)制度:涉外海事纠纷,或自贸试验区、海南自贸港内登记企业之间的涉外纠纷,当事人可在仲裁机构之外自组仲裁庭——系内地首创。
  • Foreign arbitration institutions may now set up business offices in FTZs and Hainan to conduct foreign-related arbitration, and Chinese institutions may handle international investment (treaty) arbitration.
    境外仲裁机构今后可在自贸区、海南自贸港等区域设立业务机构办理涉外仲裁,中国仲裁机构亦可办理国际投资(条约)仲裁案件。
  • Online arbitration is expressly recognised — proceedings may be conducted over the internet unless a party objects — reflecting practice where 93 institutions handled online cases worth ¥300 billion in 2024.
    在线仲裁获明文确认——除当事人明确不同意外,仲裁可通过信息网络在线进行——呼应 2024 年 93 家机构在线办案、标的额 3000 亿元的实践。
  • Court support is strengthened: parties can seek pre-arbitration property, conduct and evidence preservation, courts must handle preservation promptly, and the period to apply to set aside an award is cut from six months to three.
    法院支持力度加大:当事人可申请仲裁前的财产、行为与证据保全,法院应及时处理保全,申请撤销裁决的期限由六个月缩短为三个月。
  • The law adds a good-faith principle and anti-sham-arbitration rules, an arbitrator disclosure system, and defines arbitration institutions as public-interest non-profit legal persons.
    新法增设诚信原则与防范虚假仲裁规定、仲裁员信息披露制度,并明确仲裁机构为公益性非营利法人。

China’s Revised Arbitration Law (2026): what foreign parties and FIEs need to know | 中国修订《仲裁法》(2026 年施行):外方当事人与外资企业须知

Overview

Arbitration is the default forum for cross-border commercial disputes: it is confidential, final in a single instance, and — thanks to the 1958 New York Convention — enforceable in over 170 jurisdictions. For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) or an overseas counterparty contracting with a Chinese business, the arbitration clause is often the single most important dispute-resolution decision in the contract.

On 12 September 2025 the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress passed a comprehensively revised Arbitration Law. It was promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54 and takes effect on 1 March 2026. This is the first full overhaul since the original 1994 statute (in force from 1995). The new law runs to eight chapters and 96 articles — 16 more than before — and is squarely aimed at raising the credibility and international competitiveness of Chinese arbitration. This article explains the changes that matter most to foreign parties. It is general information, not legal advice.

Why the revision, and how big it is

By August 2025 China had 285 arbitration commissions handling disputes involving parties from more than 100 countries and regions, across finance, e-commerce, construction, maritime and intellectual property. The 1994 law, however, predated modern practice: it did not recognise a “seat” of arbitration, permitted only institutional arbitration (no ad hoc tribunals), and said little about online hearings or interim relief. The revision closes those gaps and consciously converges with the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.

Change 1 — the “seat of arbitration”

The headline reform for international users is the introduction of the seat (仲裁地). Except where the parties have agreed otherwise on the law applicable to the procedure, the seat now determines both the procedural law and the court that exercises supervisory jurisdiction (for interim measures, set-aside and the like). Where parties do not agree the seat, it is fixed by the agreed arbitration rules; if the rules are silent, the tribunal designates it by reference to the principle of convenient dispute resolution. Practical effect: foreign parties should state the seat expressly — e.g. “the seat of arbitration shall be Shanghai” — separately from the hearing venue, because the two are now distinct legal concepts.

Change 2 — special (ad hoc) arbitration

The mainland has, until now, recognised only institutional arbitration. The new law adds a “special arbitration” regime with four defining features:

  • Eligible cases only. It is limited to foreign-related disputes — either foreign-related maritime disputes, or foreign-related disputes between enterprises registered in a State Council-approved Free Trade Zone, the Hainan Free Trade Port, or other areas designated by the State.
  • Written agreement, seat in China. The parties must agree in writing and designate a place in China as the seat, so Chinese arbitration law applies, the award is a Chinese award, and Chinese courts conduct judicial review.
  • Qualified arbitrators. The tribunal members must meet the statutory qualification requirements for arbitrators.
  • Filing. Within three working days of forming the tribunal, the parties must file details (names, seat, tribunal composition, rules) with the arbitration association.

For FTZ and Hainan-registered FIEs, this opens a genuinely new option for disputes with foreign counterparties — closer to the flexibility of ad hoc arbitration abroad, but with defined guardrails.

Change 3 — opening to foreign institutions and investment arbitration

The law codifies two opening measures already piloted: it supports Chinese institutions “going out” to establish offices abroad, and permits overseas arbitration institutions to establish business offices in FTZs and the Hainan FTP to conduct foreign-related arbitration. It also confirms that Chinese institutions and tribunals may administer international investment arbitration under the relevant investment treaties and the rules agreed by the disputing parties — a foundation for China to position itself as a seat for investor-state cases.

Change 4 — online arbitration and stronger court support

Two further reforms speak directly to efficiency:

  • Online arbitration. Article 11 provides that arbitration may be conducted online through information networks unless a party expressly disagrees. This reflects reality: in 2024, 93 institutions handled online cases worth ¥300 billion.
  • Interim measures and evidence. The law aligns with the Civil Procedure Law so that, in urgent cases, a party may apply to a court for property preservation, conduct preservation (an order requiring or prohibiting an act) and evidence preservation before commencing arbitration. Courts must handle such applications promptly, whether relayed by the institution or filed directly. The tribunal may also request relevant parties to assist in collecting evidence.

Change 5 — credibility, disclosure and a shorter set-aside window

Several provisions raise trust in the process and speed up finality:

  • Arbitration must follow the good-faith principle, with new rules against sham arbitration.
  • Arbitrators must disclose any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts about their independence or impartiality; the institution informs the parties.
  • The methods for recognising an arbitration agreement are broadened (e.g. where one party asserts an agreement and the other does not deny it before the first hearing).
  • The period to apply to set aside an award is shortened from six months to three months.
  • Arbitration institutions are defined as public-interest, non-profit legal persons, with the State Council authorised to issue registration rules.

What this means for foreign investors and FIEs

  • Review your arbitration clauses. State the institution (or, if eligible, ad hoc arbitration), the seat, the rules and the language. Distinguish seat from hearing venue.
  • Consider ad hoc arbitration only if eligible — maritime, or FTZ/Hainan-registered enterprises in foreign-related disputes.
  • Plan for interim relief. Pre-arbitration preservation is now clearer; identify assets and evidence early.
  • Diarise the three-month set-aside window — challenges must move faster than before.
  • Enforcement. Awards seated in China are Chinese awards; foreign awards continue to be recognised and enforced through the New York Convention and the Civil Procedure Law’s judicial-assistance provisions.

What to do next

  1. Audit existing China-related contracts and update dispute-resolution clauses ahead of the 1 March 2026 effective date.
  2. Decide seat and institution deliberately; do not leave the seat undefined.
  3. If you operate in an FTZ or Hainan, evaluate whether special arbitration suits your commercial relationships.
  4. Brief your legal and finance teams on the shorter set-aside period and the strengthened interim-measures toolkit.
  5. Confirm specifics with qualified PRC counsel before signing or amending clauses.

Sources

  • Ministry of Justice press conference on the revised Arbitration Law (official): https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/?CTPIC=ecc680
  • MOJ briefing transcript — key changes and special arbitration explained: https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/mtgz20250925/202509/t20250930_525844.html
  • Supreme People’s Court International Commercial Court — Q&A on the revision (People’s Court Daily): https://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/149/156/12620.html
  • China Court Net — commentary on the revised Arbitration Law: https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2025/09/id/8991625.shtml
  • MOJ feature — “Advancing high-quality development of arbitration” (on the law’s entry into force): http://legalinfo.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbzhfx/zt/2025nzt0120/xcgvxxddzcf/202603/t20260302_532106.html

Related reading

  • CIETAC & international arbitration — 贸仲与涉外仲裁
  • Enforcing foreign arbitral awards and judgments in China — 在中国承认与执行外国仲裁裁决和判决
  • Foreign-related dispute resolution: litigation vs arbitration — 涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁

中国修订《仲裁法》(2026 年施行):外方当事人与外资企业须知

概述

仲裁是跨境商事纠纷的首选解决方式:保密、一裁终局,并且凭借 1958 年《纽约公约》可在 170 多个法域获得承认与执行。对与中国企业签约的外资企业或境外交易对手而言,仲裁条款往往是合同中最重要的一项争议解决安排。

2025 年 9 月 12 日,十四届全国人大常委会表决通过全面修订的《仲裁法》,以第 54 号主席令公布,自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行。这是 1994 年原法(1995 年施行)以来的首次全面修订。新法共八章 96 条,比修订前增加 16 条,核心目标是提升中国仲裁的公信力与国际竞争力。本文说明对外方当事人最重要的变化,仅为一般性信息,非法律意见。

为什么修、改动有多大

截至 2025 年 8 月,全国依法设立 285 家仲裁委员会,当事人涉及 100 多个国家和地区,纠纷涵盖金融、电子商务、建筑工程、海事海商、知识产权等领域。但 1994 年的仲裁法落后于现代实践:不承认”仲裁地”,只允许机构仲裁(无临时仲裁庭),对在线开庭与临时措施着墨极少。此次修订弥补了这些空白,并有意与《联合国国际商事仲裁示范法》相融通。

变化一——”仲裁地”制度

对国际用户而言,最重磅的改革是引入”仲裁地”。除当事人对仲裁程序适用法另有约定外,仲裁地现同时决定程序适用法与行使司法监督权的法院(保全、撤销等)。当事人未约定仲裁地的,按约定的仲裁规则确定;规则没有规定的,由仲裁庭按便利争议解决原则确定。实务影响: 外方应在条款中明确约定仲裁地——例如”仲裁地为上海”——并与开庭地相区分,因为二者现已是不同的法律概念。

变化二——特别仲裁(临时仲裁)

内地此前只承认机构仲裁。新法增设”特别仲裁”制度,有四个特征:

  • 仅限特定案件。 限于涉外纠纷——涉外海事纠纷,或在国务院批准设立的自贸试验区、海南自贸港及国家规定的其他区域内登记的企业之间发生的涉外纠纷。
  • 书面约定、仲裁地在中国。 当事人须书面约定并选择中国境内地点为仲裁地,从而适用中国仲裁法、裁决为中国裁决、由中国法院进行司法审查。
  • 仲裁员合格。 仲裁庭成员须符合仲裁法关于仲裁员资格的统一要求。
  • 备案。 组庭后三个工作日内,须将当事人名称、仲裁地、仲裁庭组成、仲裁规则向仲裁协会备案。

对自贸区和海南登记的外资企业,这为与外方对手的纠纷开辟了全新选项——更接近境外临时仲裁的灵活度,又设有明确边界。

变化三——向境外机构与投资仲裁开放

新法将两项试点措施法制化:支持中国仲裁机构”走出去”到境外设立业务机构,允许境外仲裁机构在自贸区、海南自贸港等区域设立业务机构办理涉外仲裁。同时明确,中国仲裁机构、仲裁庭可依据有关投资条约、协定并按争议双方约定的仲裁规则办理国际投资仲裁案件——为中国打造投资者—国家案件仲裁地奠定基础。

变化四——在线仲裁与更强的法院支持

另有两项改革直指效率:

  • 在线仲裁。 第十一条规定,除当事人明确表示不同意外,仲裁活动可通过信息网络在线进行。这呼应现实:2024 年 93 家机构办理在线案件,标的额 3000 亿元。
  • 临时措施与证据。 新法与《民事诉讼法》衔接:情况紧急时,当事人可在申请仲裁前向法院申请财产保全、行为保全(责令作出或禁止某行为)与证据保全。无论由机构转交还是当事人直接提交,法院都应及时处理。仲裁庭亦可请求有关方面协助收集证据。

变化五——公信力、披露与更短的撤销期限

多项条款提升过程可信度并加快终局:

  • 仲裁应遵循诚信原则,增设防范虚假仲裁规定。
  • 仲裁员须披露可能导致对其独立性、公正性产生合理怀疑的情形,由机构告知当事人。
  • 扩大仲裁协议的认定方式(如一方主张有协议、另一方在首次开庭前不予否认的)。
  • 申请撤销裁决的期限由六个月缩短为三个月。
  • 明确仲裁机构为公益性非营利法人,授权国务院制定登记管理办法。

对外资投资者与外资企业的意义

  • 审查你的仲裁条款。 明确机构(或在符合条件时选择临时仲裁)、仲裁地、规则和语言,并区分仲裁地与开庭地。
  • 仅在符合条件时考虑临时仲裁——涉外海事,或自贸区/海南登记企业的涉外纠纷。
  • 提前谋划临时救济。 仲裁前保全更清晰,尽早锁定资产与证据。
  • 牢记三个月撤销窗口——异议须比以往更快启动。
  • 执行。 仲裁地在中国的裁决为中国裁决;外国裁决继续通过《纽约公约》与《民事诉讼法》司法协助条款获得承认与执行。

下一步建议

  1. 在 2026 年 3 月 1 日生效前,梳理现有涉华合同并更新争议解决条款;
  2. 审慎确定仲裁地与机构,切勿让仲裁地处于未约定状态;
  3. 若在自贸区或海南经营,评估特别仲裁是否契合你的商业关系;
  4. 就更短的撤销期限与增强的保全工具,向法务与财务团队做说明;
  5. 签署或修订条款前,与执业中国律师确认具体事项。

Sources

  • 司法部关于新修订仲裁法的新闻发布会(官方):https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/?CTPIC=ecc680
  • 司法部发布会实录——主要修改与特别仲裁制度解读:https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/sfbxwfbhzb/2025nsfbfbh/acf20250925/mtgz20250925/202509/t20250930_525844.html
  • 最高人民法院国际商事法庭——仲裁法修订答记者问(人民法院报):https://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/149/156/12620.html
  • 中国法院网——新修订仲裁法评论:https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2025/09/id/8991625.shtml
  • 司法部专题——《推进新时代仲裁事业高质量发展》(写在实施之际):http://legalinfo.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbzhfx/zt/2025nzt0120/xcgvxxddzcf/202603/t20260302_532106.html

相关阅读

  • 贸仲与涉外仲裁 / CIETAC & international arbitration
  • 在中国承认与执行外国仲裁裁决和判决 / Enforcing foreign arbitral awards and judgments
  • 涉外争议解决:诉讼与仲裁 / Foreign-related dispute resolution

China Daily-Life Apps Guide: Payments, Maps, Transport & Stays for Foreign Visitors

  • Alipay and WeChat Pay now accept foreign cards (UnionPay, Visa, Mastercard, JCB).
    支付宝与微信支付已支持绑定境外银行卡(银联、Visa、Mastercard、JCB),覆盖绝大多数线下扫码付款场景。
  • Baidu Maps and AMap (Gaode) are the two essential navigation apps in China.
    百度地图与高德地图是来华必备的导航工具,提供公交、地铁、步行与驾车实时路线。
  • Both maps also handle hotel booking and ride-hailing in one place.
    高德与百度地图均可直接预订酒店、呼叫网约车,不必额外安装多个 App。
  • Dianping and Meituan are the go-to platforms for restaurants and reviews.
    大众点评与美团是查找餐厅、查看评价、点外卖的主要平台;高德、百度也能直接搜美食。
  • A single smartphone covers payments, transport, food and stays.
    一部手机即可完成支付、出行、就餐与住宿预订,来华日常高度数字化、现金需求很低。
  • Shanghai Metro (and Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou) accepts foreign cards tapped directly at the gate.
    上海地铁(以及北京、成都、广州)支持直接刷境外银行卡过闸,无需购票或下载 App;卡片需开通小额免密闪付。
  • Set up before arrival to hit the ground running.
    出发前可先在应用商店下载 App 并完成绑卡,落地即可使用,减少现场摸索。
  • Instant-retail apps deliver food and daily goods from nearby stores in about 30 minutes.
    淘宝闪购、京东秒送等即时零售平台可从附近门店送吃食、日用、商超与药店商品,约 30 分钟送达。

China Daily-Life Apps Guide: Payments, Maps, Transport & Stays for Foreign Visitors | 来华生活便利工具指南:支付、地图、交通与住宿

Payments: Alipay & WeChat Pay

Mobile payment is the default in China. Cash is rarely needed, and many small shops, taxis and street vendors accept only QR-code scans. The two dominant wallets are Alipay (支付宝) and WeChat Pay (微信支付), both of which now support binding international bank cards.

移动支付是中国最主流的付款方式。现金几乎用不上,许多小店、出租车和路边摊只收扫码。两大钱包是支付宝(Alipay)与微信支付(WeChat Pay),二者现在都支持绑定境外银行卡。

Key points for foreign visitors:

  • Bind a foreign card inside the app; a simplified “Tour Pass / 外卡内绑” flow is available.
  • Show the QR code to the merchant scanner, or scan the merchant’s code yourself.
  • Use it for meals, supermarkets, metros, taxis, and most online orders.

外国访客要点:

  • 在 App 内绑定外卡,系统提供简化的”外卡内绑”流程。
  • 向商家扫码枪出示付款码,或自己扫商家的收款码。
  • 吃饭、超市、地铁、打车以及多数线上订单均可使用。

官方英文页面 / Official English pages:

App / 应用Chinese / 中文Foreign-card binding / 外卡绑定Typical use / 典型用途
Alipay支付宝Yes / 支持Everyday pay, transport, some bookings / 日常付款、交通、部分预订
WeChat Pay微信支付Yes / 支持Chat-integrated pay, shops, taxis / 社交内支付、商店、打车

现金兜底 / Cash backup: a few spots still take only cash — withdraw with a foreign card at any UnionPay (银联) ATM; UnionPay settlement rates beat airport exchange. 现金兜底:少数场景只收现金,可凭境外银行卡在任意银联(UnionPay) ATM 取现;按银联结算汇率,通常优于机场兑换。

Communication: WeChat Beyond Pay

WeChat (微信) is China’s all-in-one communication hub, not just a wallet. Foreign visitors will rely on it daily for messaging, group chats (work, school, building groups), and scan-to-interact features.

微信(WeChat) 是中国的”万能通讯入口”,远不止支付。来华日常几乎离不开:发消息、群聊(工作群、班级群、小区群)、以及”扫码即办”的各种功能。

What you can do in WeChat / 微信里能做的事:

  • Chat & groups / 聊天与群聊: text, voice, video, and group conversations with anyone in China.
    文字、语音、视频,以及与国内任何人的群聊。
  • Official Accounts / 公众号: follow brands, banks, hospitals and government bodies for news and services.
    关注品牌、银行、医院与政府机构的公众号,获取资讯与办事入口。
  • Mini Programs / 小程序: lightweight apps inside WeChat — scan a restaurant’s code to order, book a hospital visit, pay bills, hail a ride, all without installing anything.
    微信内的轻量应用——扫码点餐、预约挂号、缴费、叫车,全都不用额外装 App。
  • Scan everything / 扫码即办: the “Scan” button opens menus, payments, shared bikes and official forms via QR.
    “扫一扫”可点餐、付款、解锁共享单车、填写政务表单。

> 提示:建议抵华前先注册微信并完成实名/绑卡,落地即可用。 > Tip: register WeChat and finish card binding before arrival so it works the moment you land.

Two map apps dominate: Baidu Maps (百度地图) and AMap (高德地图, also called Gaode). Both provide accurate public-transport routing, real-time traffic, and walking directions, and both work well for foreigners with English UI options. A third, lighter option is Tencent Maps (腾讯地图).

国内主流地图有两款:百度地图(Baidu Maps)与高德地图(AMap / Gaode)。二者都提供精准的公交地铁路线、实时路况与步行导航,并带有可切换的英文界面,对外国用户友好。另一款较轻量的备选是腾讯地图(Tencent Maps)。

英文界面 / English support:

  • 高德地图 AMap 支持包括英文在内的 14 种语言,海外用户可在 Google Play 下载 AMap Go;官方站 https://www.amap.com。
  • 百度地图 Baidu Maps 设置内可切换英文模式,并提供境内英文地图能力(详见百度地图开放平台英文地图方案 https://lbs.baidu.com);官方站 https://map.baidu.com。

Beyond navigation, both apps bundle several daily-life functions:

  • Ride-hailing / 网约车: hail a taxi or private car directly inside the map app.
  • Hotel booking / 酒店预订: search, compare and book hotels on the map.
  • Place search / 找地点: restaurants, hospitals, banks, parks, EV chargers.
  • Transit cards / 公交卡: some cities let you add a virtual transit card.

除导航外,两款 App 还整合了多种生活功能:

  • 网约车: 直接在地图内呼叫出租车或网约车。
  • 酒店预订: 在地图上搜索、比价并下单酒店。
  • 找地点: 餐厅、医院、银行、公园、充电桩一搜即得。
  • 公交卡: 部分城市可开通虚拟交通卡。
Feature / 功能Baidu Maps / 百度地图AMap / 高德地图
Navigation & transit / 导航与公交Yes / 支持Yes / 支持
Ride-hailing / 网约车Yes / 支持Yes / 支持
Hotel booking / 酒店预订Yes / 支持Yes / 支持
Food search / 搜美食Yes / 支持Yes / 支持
English UI / 英文界面Partial / 部分Partial / 部分

Metro Tap-to-Ride: Foreign Cards Accepted

A growing number of Chinese metros let you tap a contactless foreign card straight at the gate — no ticket, no app. Shanghai Metro rolled this out across its entire network on 2025-06-28 (piloted on the Maglev line from 2025-06-14) and accepts UnionPay, Visa, Mastercard, American Express and JCB chip cards, mobile wallets (Apple/Google Pay linked to a foreign card), and e-CNY hard wallets. Beijing, Chengdu and Guangzhou have since enabled the same at their gates.

越来越多中国地铁支持直接刷境外银行卡过闸——无需购票、无需 App。上海地铁于 2025-06-28 在全线网开通(磁浮线自 2025-06-14 试点),支持银联、Visa、Mastercard、美国运通、JCB 芯片闪付卡、手机 Pay(绑定外卡)以及数字人民币硬钱包。北京、成都、广州也已开通闸机拍卡。

How to use / 使用要点:

  • Enable contactless + small-value no-PIN on your card before travel.
    出发前在银行卡开通”闪付 + 小额免密”功能。
  • Tap the same card in and out; the gate charges the distance-based fare.
    进出站使用同一张卡拍卡,按里程计费。
  • In Shanghai, the entry tap is a pre-authorisation — a card at its limit may be refused on exit; the station service centre settles it by card, cash or QR.
    上海进站为预授权,余额不足的卡出站可能遭拒,可到车站服务中心用卡/现金/扫码结清。
  • Backup / 备选: an Alipay or WeChat ride code works in every major city, so set one up before you fly.
    支付宝或微信”乘车码”在各大城市通用,建议出发前设好作为兜底。
City / 城市Foreign-card tap at gate / 闸机外卡拍卡Since / 开通
Shanghai / 上海Yes / 支持 (UnionPay, Visa, MC, AmEx, JCB)2025-06-28 全线网
Beijing / 北京Yes / 支持全网闸机
Chengdu / 成都Yes / 支持2026-06 新增 Diners/Discover
Guangzhou / 广州Yes / 支持带卡组织标识闸机

Unified Travel Codes Inside Super-Apps

Beyond dedicated transit cards, Alipay, WeChat and DiDi each have a built-in “Travel / 出行” entry that issues one QR code covering several transport modes at once — metro/subway, bus, ride-hailing, shared bikes, and in some cases flights — and lets you switch between cities in the same screen. You scan the same code across participating cities, so there’s no need for a separate card per place.

除专用交通卡外,支付宝、微信、滴滴各自都有内置的”出行”入口,发放一张聚合多种出行方式的二维码——轨道地铁、公交、网约车、共享单车,部分还含机票——并且可在同一界面切换城市。在支持城市里刷同一张码即可,无需每到一个城市另办卡。

  • Alipay / 支付宝: open 出行 (Travel) → choose the city → show the unified transit QR for metro/bus; bike-sharing and ride-hailing tiles sit on the same screen.
    打开”出行”→选择城市→出示地铁/公交通用乘车码;共享单车与打车入口同屏。
  • WeChat / 微信: 我 (Me) → 服务 (Services) → 出行服务 (Travel) (or the mini-program); one QR for buses/metro, with ride-hailing and bike options, city-switchable.
    “我→服务→出行服务”(或小程序);一张码通公交/地铁,含打车与骑行,可切城市。
  • DiDi / 滴滴: beyond hailing, its 出行 QR covers metro/bus/cycling and links to flights; switch cities in the same view.
    除叫车外,其”出行”二维码覆盖地铁/公交/骑行并接机票,同界面切城市。

> Tip / 提示: set up the Travel code in your main city before you fly — it doubles as the backup to foreign-card metro tapping (see above). > 出发前在主要城市设好出行码,可作为境外银行卡拍卡乘地铁的兜底(见上)。

Shanghai MaaS: Suishenxing (SH MaaS)

If you’re in Shanghai, add Suishenxing (随申行) — the city’s official Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) app. Its English version is branded “SH MaaS”, and it is the most complete way to ride Shanghai’s public transport with one app.

若在上海,再装一个随申行(Suishenxing)——上海市官方出行即服务(MaaS)平台。其英文版名为”SH MaaS”,是用一个 App 坐遍上海公共交通最完整的方案。

How to find it / 如何找到:

  • In Chinese app stores search “随申行” or “Suishenxing”; in the overseas App Store search “SH MaaS”, then download “随申行”.
    国内应用商店搜”随申行 / Suishenxing”;海外 App Store 搜”SH MaaS”,下载”随申行”。
  • The app supports switching between Chinese and English; new users can register with a domestic or foreign phone number, or via third-party authorization.
    App 支持中英文切换;新用户可用国内/境外手机号注册,或第三方授权登录。

What it covers / 覆盖范围:

  • One app for bus, metro, suburban rail, the Maglev, ferries, shared bikes, taxis and smart parking across Shanghai.
    一个 App 通办上海公交、地铁、市域铁路、磁悬浮、轮渡、共享单车、出租车与智慧停车。
  • Suishen Code / 随申码 gives one-code access to metro, bus and ferry; you can add up to 2 companions on one phone and scan them through in turn.
    “随申码”一码通地铁、公交、轮渡;一部手机最多添加 2 名同行人,依次刷码乘车。
  • Buy a transit day pass (联程日票: 1 / 3 / 7-day) for unlimited metro/bus/ferry within the validity window — handy for short visits.
    可购”联程日票”(一日/三日/七日票),在有效期内不限次畅坐地铁、公交、轮渡,适合短期访客。
  • Real-time transit info (routes, stops, first/last trains, next-bus countdowns); at airports and stations use “枢纽通 — 上海交通信息服务专区”.
    实时公交/轨交/轮渡信息(线路、站点、首末班、到站倒计时);机场与火车站可进”枢纽通—上海交通信息服务专区”。

> Note / 说明: the Suishen Code / 随申码 here is the same Shanghai QR issued by Suishenban (随申办) for some venue and transport checks — one code, many uses. > 此处”随申码”与随申办发放、用于部分场所与交通核验的上海二维码为同一码,一码多用。

Source / 来源: “随申行”APP 英文版再升级(上海交通, 2025-01-27)— https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/2owZgko61K56LzXUqPpL2Q

Translation

Google Translate works poorly or not at all inside mainland China, so install a local translation tool before you fly. Two kinds work well — and the AI assistant route is often the most convenient for day-to-day talking and reading.

谷歌翻译在中国内地基本不可用或很不稳定,出发前请装好本地翻译工具。有两类很好用——其中AI 助手路线在面对面沟通、读图这类日常场景往往最省事。

1) AI assistants (best for live conversation & photo reading) / AI 助手(实时对话 + 拍图最顺手) Domestic AI chat apps double as translators: you can talk to them in real time (ask “how do I say X”, or hold a back-and-forth with a shopkeeper via the mic) and send a photo of a menu, sign or document for instant explanation. They understand context far better than phrasebook apps. 国产 AI 对话 App 本身就是翻译器:可实时语音对话(问”这句话怎么说”,或对着麦克风跟店员来回聊),也能发照片给它看菜单、路牌、单据,立刻给出解释。它们比短语本 App 更懂上下文。

  • Doubao / 豆包 (ByteDance) — free, fast, strong Chinese↔English chat and camera understanding; a top pick for visitors.
    豆包(字节跳动)——免费、快,中英文对话与拍图识别都很强,强烈推荐。
  • Other domestic assistants (Kimi, Wenxin Yiyan / 文心一言, Tongyi Qianwen / 通义千问, etc.) work similarly and run fine inside China.
    其他国产助手(Kimi、文心一言、通义千问等)用法相近,在内地都能稳定使用。

2) Dedicated translation apps (best for quick dictionary & phrases) / 专用翻译 App(查词、短语更快) Handy when you want a clean dictionary, document translation, or a lightweight phrase tool. 想要干净词典、文档翻译或轻量短语工具时仍很方便。

  • Baidu Translate / 百度翻译 — https://fanyi.baidu.com; camera, voice and conversation modes.
    百度翻译——拍照、语音与对话翻译。
  • Tencent Translate / 腾讯翻译君 — https://fanyi.qq.com; fast conversation translation.
    腾讯翻译君——对话翻译快捷。
  • Youdao / 有道 — https://www.youdao.com; strong on dictionaries and documents (now also AI-enhanced, but the dedicated apps above and AI assistants cover most live needs).
    有道——词典与文档翻译见长(如今也加了 AI 能力,但实时沟通多被上面的 AI 助手取代)。
  • Papago — handy for Korean/Japanese travellers.
    Papago——对日韩语使用者方便。

Most tools above also read Chinese menus and street signs via the camera. WeChat’s in-chat translate helps with messages; an AI assistant is the easiest fallback when you’re stuck reading something unfamiliar. 上述多数工具也支持摄像头识别中文菜单与路牌;微信对话内的”翻译”能处理消息;遇到看不懂的东西,AI 助手是最顺手的兜底。

Short Trips: Bike-Sharing

For distances too short to hail a car, shared bikes are everywhere — scan a QR code to unlock and ride.

短途不愿叫车,共享单车随处可见——扫码即解锁骑行。

  • Hello / 哈啰 — the largest operator; bikes and e-bikes.
    哈啰——规模最大的运营商,单车与电单车。
  • Meituan Bike / 美团单车 — integrated with the Meituan app.
    美团单车——与美团 App 打通。
  • Qingju / 青桔 — Didi’s bike brand.
    青桔——滴滴旗下单车。

You pay per ride inside the operator’s app or via Alipay/WeChat; mind parking zones (no riding on sidewalks, park in designated spots). 按次计费,在各自 App 或支付宝/微信内支付;注意停车区(不骑上人行道、停在指定点位)。

Finding Food: Dianping, Meituan & Maps

For restaurants, reviews and delivery, the main platforms are Dianping (大众点评) and Meituan (美团) — two apps under the same group (Meituan Dianping / 美团点评) whose features largely overlap. Dianping leans toward reviews and discovery (menus, photos, ratings); Meituan leans toward food delivery, local deals and even ride-hailing (美团打车 / Meituan ride) — but each can do both. Beyond the two, instant-retail apps Taobao Instant / 淘宝闪购 and JD Now / 京东秒送 deliver from nearby stores and supermarkets — food, daily goods, groceries or pharmacy items in roughly 30 minutes. The maps above also surface nearby restaurants with ratings.

找餐厅、看评价、点外卖,主要平台是大众点评(Dianping)与美团(Meituan)——同属美团点评集团、功能高度互通的两款 App。大众点评更偏评价与发现(菜单、照片、评分),美团更偏外卖与本地优惠、还带网约车(美团打车);但两者基本都能做彼此的事。此外,淘宝闪购与京东秒送这类即时零售平台,可从附近门店与超市送外卖——吃食、日用、商超、药店商品约 30 分钟送达。上面的两款地图也能直接搜出周边带评分的餐厅。

App / 应用Strength / 强项Good for / 适合
Dianping / 大众点评Reviews & discovery (delivery too) / 评价与发现(亦可外卖)Picking where to eat / 选餐厅
Meituan / 美团Delivery, deals, ride-hailing (reviews too) / 外卖·优惠·打车(亦可评价)Order in, local offers, rides / 点外卖·本地折扣·出行
Taobao Instant / 淘宝闪购Instant retail / 即时零售Food, daily goods, supermarket / 吃食·日用·商超
JD Now / 京东秒送Instant retail / 即时零售Groceries, pharmacy, stores / 商超·药店·门店
AMap / Baidu / 高德·百度Map + food search / 地图+美食Quick “what’s near me” / 随手搜附近

Stays & Ride-hailing

  • Hotels / 酒店: book via AMap, Baidu Maps, Meituan, or dedicated travel apps; map apps are handy for location-based choice.
    酒店可通过高德、百度地图、美团或专门的旅行 App 预订;地图 App 便于按位置挑选。
  • Ride-hailing / 网约车: tap “打车 / Ride” inside AMap, Baidu Maps or Meituan; you can also use DiDi (滴滴) directly.
    网约车可在高德、百度地图或美团内点”打车”;也可直接使用滴滴(DiDi)。
  • Trains & flights / 火车机票: dedicated booking apps complement the map tools for inter-city travel.
    城际出行可用专门的购票 App 配合地图工具。

Trains, Flights & Travel Booking

For inter-city travel, combine the map apps with dedicated booking platforms:

城际出行,可把地图 App 与专门的购票平台配合起来:

  • 12306 / 铁路12306 — China’s official railway app/site (https://www.12306.cn); book high-speed and regular trains. Foreign-passport booking is supported, though some find Trip.com (携程, Ctrip) or Fliggy (飞猪) easier with international cards.
    12306——中国铁路官方购票 App/网站,订高铁与普速列车;支持护照购票,但部分用户觉得携程 Trip.com或飞猪 Fliggy用国际银行卡更顺手。
  • Trip.com / 携程 — https://www.trip.com; English UI, trains, flights, hotels, international cards accepted.
    携程 Trip.com——英文界面,火车/机票/酒店,支持国际银行卡。
  • Fliggy / 飞猪 — https://www.fliggy.com; Alibaba’s travel platform, flights and packages.
    飞猪 Fliggy——阿里旅行平台,机票与套餐。

Connectivity & SIM

Mobile data is essential for almost everything above. Options:

上网流量几乎是用好上面所有 App 的前提。选择有:

  • Local SIM at the airport / 机场本地卡: China Mobile (中国移动), China Unicom (中国联通) and China Telecom (中国电信) sell tourist SIMs at airport counters — cheap and instant.
    机场柜台可买中国移动/联通/电信的旅游卡,便宜即办即通。
  • eSIM before you fly / 出发前买 eSIM: providers like Airalo and RedteaGO issue China eSIMs you activate on arrival.
    Airalo、RedteaGO 等可在出发前购中国 eSIM,落地激活。
  • A note on apps / 关于 App 的提醒: many global apps and services (Google, WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, etc.) are restricted or unstable in mainland China. WeChat is the local standard for messaging, and the apps in this guide are the practical daily toolkit.
    许多海外 App 与服务(Google、WhatsApp、Facebook、Instagram 等)在内地受限或不稳定;微信是本地通讯标准,本指南中的 App 才是实用的日常工具箱。

Government Services: Shanghai Suishenban

If you stay in Shanghai, install Suishenban (随申办) — the city’s official one-stop government-services app. It consolidates municipal services (social-security queries, residence and visa-related matters, certificates, and the Suishen Code / 随申码 used for some transport and venue checks). The app offers an English interface (international / English mode), so foreign residents can read and apply in English.

若在上海停留,装好随申办(Suishenban)——上海市官方的一站式政务服务 App。它整合了各类市级服务(社保查询、居留与签证相关事项、证明开具,以及用于部分交通与场所核验的随申码)。该 App 提供英文界面(国际版 / English 模式),外国居民可用英文阅读与办理。

  • Official portal / 官方门户: https://english.shanghai.gov.cn
    上海市政府英文门户:https://english.shanghai.gov.cn
  • Bilingual foreigner service package (Pudong) / 中英双语外籍人士服务包(浦东): https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/_60TW73bKXb7ip_ycFen_A
    浦东新区《外籍人士便利化服务包·生活安居篇》,含随申办等生活办事指引。
  • Other cities have their own equivalents (e.g. 粤省事 in Guangdong, 浙里办 in Zhejiang); check the local government site.
    其他城市也有类似 App(如广东”粤省事”、浙江”浙里办”),可查当地政务网站。
Need / 需求Recommended app / 推荐应用Notes / 说明
Pay in shops / 店内付款Alipay, WeChat PayBind foreign card / 绑外卡
Navigate / 导航Baidu Maps, AMapTransit + traffic / 公交+路况
Hail a ride / 打车AMap, Baidu Maps, DiDiIn-map or standalone / 地图内或独立
Book hotel / 订酒店AMap, Baidu Maps, MeituanLocation-based / 按位置
Find restaurant / 找餐厅Dianping, Meituan, MapsReviews + delivery / 评价+外卖
Order food / 点外卖Meituan, MapsTo your door / 送上门
Instant retail / 即时零售Taobao Instant, JD NowFood, daily goods, supermarket / 吃食·日用·商超
Ride metro / 坐地铁Tap foreign card, or Alipay/WeChat ride codeNo ticket needed / 免购票
Unified travel QR / 聚合出行码Alipay, WeChat, DiDi “出行”Metro, bus, taxi, bike, flights; switch cities / 地铁·公交·打车·骑行·机票,可切城市
Shanghai transit / 上海公交出行Suishenxing (随申行 / SH MaaS)One app: metro, bus, ferry & more / 一 App 通地铁·公交·轮渡等
Translate / 翻译Doubao & other AI assistants, Baidu/Tencent TranslateLive chat, photo, menus & signs / 实时对话·拍图·菜单路牌
Bike-share / 共享单车Hello, Meituan Bike, QingjuScan to ride / 扫码骑行
Trains & flights / 火车机票12306, Trip.com, FliggyInter-city travel / 城际出行
SIM & data / 上网 SIMChina Mobile/Unicom/Telecom, eSIMAirport or pre-bought / 机场或预购
Shanghai services / 上海政务Suishenban (随申办)One-stop gov app / 一站式政务

> 提示:本表仅列出各 App 的核心功能,并非全部;更多能力(账单管理、会员积分、城市服务、出行联程等)可下载 App 亲自体验。 > Note: this table lists only the core functions of each app — far from exhaustive. Download the apps to explore more (bill management, loyalty points, city services, multi-modal trip planning, and beyond).

Sources


The Foreign Investment Negative List in 2026: “Timely Reduction” Commitments and the Shift to Post-Access Regulation

  • In 2026 the national foreign investment negative list stays at 29 items, but regulators have committed to “timely reduction”, with services as the priority and telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare named as the next opening fronts.
    2026 年全国版外商投资准入负面清单保持 29 条,但主管部门明确承诺”适时缩减”,以服务业为重点,增值电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗被列为下一步开放前沿。
  • The National Health Commission confirmed in August 2026 that it is building a dynamic adjustment mechanism for a foreign investment negative list specific to medical projects, alongside a second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities.
    国家卫生健康委 2026 年 8 月确认,正在建立外商投资医疗项目负面清单动态调整机制,并同步遴选第二批外商独资医院试点城市。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospitals have now landed in four cities — Tianjin, Shanghai, Boao and Fuzhou — under the 2024 pilot scheme, and pilot-zone policy now allows foreign-invested firms to develop human stem-cell and gene-diagnosis technologies for product registration.
    2024 年试点方案落地后,外商独资医院已先后在天津、上海、博鳌、福州 4 地落地;自贸试验区与海南自由贸易港已允许外商投资企业从事人体干细胞、基因诊断与治疗技术开发应用,以用于产品注册上市和生产。
  • The June 2026 Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment adds education and finance opening and pilots the removal of equity caps for app stores and internet-access services in the telecom sector.
    2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》新增教育与金融领域开放,并在电信领域试点取消应用商店、互联网接入等服务业务的外资股比限制。
  • The practical implication is that the binding constraint for foreign investors is shifting from “access” (准入) to “operation permission” (准营): the negative list is no longer the only gate, and sector-specific licensing, registration and standards now do most of the screening work.
    对境外投资者的实际含义是约束重心正从”准入”转向”准营”:负面清单不再是唯一门槛,行业许可、产品注册与标准合规承担了大部分筛选工作。
  • Investors should track four watchpoints: a possible 2026/2027 national list revision, the second batch of hospital pilots, the first items migrated from the medical negative-list adjustment mechanism, and the actual telecom equity-cap pilots in designated zones.
    投资者应跟踪四个看点:2026/2027 年全国清单可能的修订、第二批外商独资医院试点、医疗负面清单动态调整机制产出的首批条目,以及指定区域电信股比试点实际落地情况。

The Foreign Investment Negative List in 2026: “Timely Reduction” Commitments and the Shift to Post-Access Regulation | 2026 年外商投资准入负面清单:适时缩减承诺与”准入后监管”转向

The state of the list in 2026

The operative national foreign investment negative list remains the 2024 edition — NDRC and MOFCOM Order No. 23 — with 29 items, the shortest version in the instrument’s history. Manufacturing restrictions have been fully “zeroed out”, and the list now concentrates on services and a narrow set of security-sensitive sectors: news and publishing, culture, education, telecom, mining, agriculture breeding and a few others. Through 2026 no new national edition has been issued, and in August 2026 no formal revision has been gazetted. What has changed is the policy conversation around the list. At the June 2026 State Council Information Office press conference on foreign investment, the NDRC’s foreign investment department explicitly promised a “timely reduction” of the negative list and named telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare as the sectors where orderly opening will be pursued. The 2026 Government Work Report and the 15th Five-Year Plan repeat the same commitment.

The medical negative list: a new mechanism in the making

The most concrete new development in August 2026 comes from the health sector. In a reply to a CPPCC proposal published in August 2026, the National Health Commission confirmed several steps: (1) steadily expanding the hospital pilot from “point trials” to regional rollout and accelerating the selection of a second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities; (2) including high-end specialist medical, rehabilitation and nursing in the national encouraged-catalogue scope; (3) building a dynamic adjustment mechanism for the foreign investment negative list specific to medical projects, and revising departmental rules that are inconsistent with the opening policy; and (4) in the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong FTZs and the Hainan FTP, permitting foreign-invested enterprises to conduct R&D and application of human stem-cell and gene-diagnosis and therapy technologies for the purpose of product registration and marketing, with approved products usable nationwide. The first four wholly foreign-owned hospitals — in Tianjin, Shanghai, Boao and Fuzhou — are already operating under the 2024 scheme. The phrase “dynamic adjustment mechanism” for a medical negative list signals that healthcare opening will be managed by a sector-specific, frequently updated instrument rather than by waiting for the next full national revision.

Beyond the list: the “access to operation permission” shift

The strategic shift that frames all of 2026’s policy documents is the move from “access” (准入) to “operation permission” (准营). MOFCOM officials have repeatedly described the current phase as solving the “big door open, small door closed” problem: the negative list no longer blocks most foreign entry, but operating licences, product registration, data compliance and standards certification now do the screening that the list used to do. For a foreign investor, this means the compliance map is broader than the list: an auto manufacturer must handle catalogue and emission rules; a pharma firm must navigate drug registration and clinical trials; a telecom operator must secure the sectoral licence; a hospital must pass setting approval, medical institution licensing and insurance network access. The negative list is the first checkbox, not the last.

Education and finance: the new opening fronts

The June 2026 Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment (MOFCOM, NDRC and MOF published as Shangzi Fa [2026] No. 97, approved by the State Council) goes beyond the medical sector. It commits to expanding opening in education and finance, supports qualified foreign-invested equity investment institutions to participate as strategic investors in securities issuance of listed companies in non-affiliated industries, and in the telecom field pilots the removal of foreign equity caps for app stores, internet access and similar service businesses. For the negative-list conversation, the significance is that the next revision is likely to delete or soften precisely these service items: value-added telecom caps, education cooperative restrictions and finance-related conditions are the most probable candidates for the next trimming round.

What has not changed: security carve-outs

It would be a mistake to read the 2026 signals as unconditional liberalisation. The negative list’s security carve-outs remain firmly in place: news and internet information services, online publishing and broadcast-television production stay prohibited; education institutions remain limited to Chinese-foreign cooperative forms with Chinese dominance; basic telecom remains Chinese-controlled; and the countermeasures framework in the revised Foreign Trade Law provides statutory authority to restrict trade with foreign persons or organisations that harm China’s sovereignty, security or development interests. Foreign investors in sensitive sectors should continue to plan on the basis of joint-venture or cooperative structures and should monitor the security review regime for mergers and acquisitions in critical areas.

Practical steps for investors in the 2026/2027 window

First, screen your business scope against the current 29-item national list and, if entering a pilot zone, the FTZ list. Second, for medical investments, watch the second batch of wholly foreign-owned hospital pilot cities and the medical negative-list dynamic adjustment mechanism; the first four pilots show that the practical route runs through setting approval and hospital licensing, not just the list. Third, for education and telecom, treat the June Action Plan as a strong directional signal and prepare structures that can convert to higher ownership if the caps are lifted. Fourth, keep the encouraged catalogue in view: high-end specialist medical, rehabilitation and nursing are now encouraged nationwide, with associated import-duty, land and tax benefits. Fifth, maintain documentation that demonstrates trade policy compliance — the “timely reduction” commitment cuts both ways, and regulators will scrutinise scope wording, sector licences and data flows more, not less.

Outlook

The negative list in 2026 is best understood as a stable floor with a sliding ceiling: no new national edition has been published, but every major policy document of the year commits to further service-sector trimming, and the health, education, telecom and finance fronts are each being prepared through pilots and mechanism-building. For foreign investors the strategy is to build around the current list, structure for upside optionality, and treat the post-access operating permit journey as the real competitive battlefield.

Sources


2026 年外商投资准入负面清单:适时缩减承诺与”准入后监管”转向

2026 年清单现状

现行有效的全国版外商投资准入负面清单仍是 2024 年版(国家发展改革委、商务部第 23 号令),共 29 条,为制度设立以来最短版本。制造业限制已全面”清零”,清单现集中于服务业与少数安全敏感领域:新闻出版、文化、教育、电信、采矿、农业育种等。2026 年全年尚未发布新版全国清单,截至 2026 年 8 月亦无正式修订公告。变化发生在围绕清单的政策语境。2026 年 6 月国新办利用外资发布会,国家发展改革委外资司负责人明确承诺”适时缩减外资准入负面清单”,并点名电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗为有序扩大开放的方向。2026 年《政府工作报告》与十五五规划《纲要》重申同一承诺。

医疗负面清单:一项新机制的形成

2026 年 8 月最具体的新进展来自医疗领域。国家卫生健康委 2026 年 8 月公开的政协提案答复函确认多项部署:(1)稳步推动医院试点从”点状试点”向”区域推广”拓展,加快遴选第二批外商独资医院试点城市;(2)将高端专业医疗、康复、护理纳入全国鼓励范围(落实《鼓励外商投资产业目录(2025年版)》);(3)建立外商投资医疗项目负面清单动态调整机制,并修订与开放政策不相适应的部门规章;(4)在北京、上海、广东自贸试验区和海南自由贸易港,允许外商投资企业从事人体干细胞、基因诊断与治疗技术开发应用,以用于产品注册上市和生产,经注册上市与批准生产的产品可在全国使用。2024 年试点方案下的首批 4 家外商独资医院——天津、上海、博鳌、福州——已先后落地。医疗领域负面清单”动态调整机制”的提法意味着医疗开放将交由一张行业专属、高频更新的清单管理,而不必等待下一轮全国清单全面修订。

清单之外:”准入”到”准营”的转向

贯穿 2026 年全部政策文件的战略转向,是从”准入”到”准营”。商务部官员多次将当前阶段描述为解决”大门开、小门不开”问题:负面清单不再阻挡多数外资进入,但经营许可、产品注册、数据合规与标准认证现在承担了清单原先的筛选职能。对外国投资者,合规地图比清单更宽:整车厂要应对目录与排放规则,药企要面对药品注册与临床试验,电信运营商要取得行业牌照,医院要通过设置审批、医疗机构执业登记与保险网络准入。负面清单是第一个勾选项,而不是最后一个。

教育与金融:新的开放前沿

2026 年 6 月《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部印发,商资发〔2026〕97 号,经国务院同意)超出医疗领域。它承诺扩大教育与金融开放,支持符合条件的外资股权投资机构以战略投资者身份参与非相关行业上市公司证券发行,并在电信领域试点取消应用商店、互联网接入等服务业务的外资股比限制。对负面清单讨论的意义在于:下一轮修订最可能删除或放松的正是这些服务条目——增值电信股比上限、教育中外合作限制与金融相关条件,是下一轮压缩的最大候选。

未变之处:安全保留

把 2026 年信号读作无条件开放将是误读。负面清单的安全保留依旧坚固:新闻与互联网信息服务、网络出版、广播电视节目制作保持禁止;教育机构仍限于中方主导的中外合作办学;基础电信仍须中方控股;修订后《对外贸易法》的反制框架为限制危害中国主权、安全与发展利益的境外个人、组织的贸易活动提供了法定依据。敏感行业的外国投资者应继续按合资或合作结构规划,并关注关键领域并购安全审查制度。

2026/2027 窗口期的投资者实操

其一,将经营范围对照现行 29 条全国清单,进入试点区域再对照自贸试验区版。其二,医疗投资关注第二批外商独资医院试点城市与医疗负面清单动态调整机制;首批 4 家试点表明实际路径走的是设置审批与医院执业登记,而非单纯清单。其三,教育与电信领域把 6 月《行动方案》作为强方向信号,若股比上限放开,准备可转换为更高持股的结构。其四,别忘鼓励目录:高端专业医疗、康复、护理现为全国鼓励类,附带进口设备关税、用地与税收优惠。其五,留存证明贸易政策合规的文件——”适时缩减”承诺是一把双刃剑,监管机构对经营范围表述、行业牌照与数据流的审查只多不少。

展望

2026 年的负面清单最适合理解为”稳定的地板 + 滑动天花板”:全年未发布新版全国清单,但年度每份重大政策文件都承诺进一步压减服务业条目,医疗、教育、电信与金融前沿各自以试点和机制建设推进。对外国投资者的策略是围绕现行清单搭建结构、为上行期权预留弹性,并把”准入后准营”许可旅程当作真正的竞争战场。

Sources

China’s Cross-Border Services Trade Negative List: The New Legal Foundation and What It Means for Foreign Suppliers

  • The revised Foreign Trade Law, which took effect on 1 March 2026, is the first law to codify a cross-border services trade negative list at the national level, placing cross-border delivery, consumption abroad and movement of natural persons under a “everything not listed is permitted” regime.
    2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行的新修订《对外贸易法》,首次在法律层面确立跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度,将跨境交付、境外消费、自然人移动等模式下开展的跨境服务贸易置于”非禁即入”的清单管理之下。
  • The negative list for cross-border services trade is a different instrument from the foreign investment negative list: it governs services supplied across borders without a commercial presence, while the investment list governs services supplied through locally established entities.
    跨境服务贸易负面清单与外商投资准入负面清单是两项不同工具:前者管理不设商业存在而跨境提供的服务,后者管理以在华设立实体方式提供的服务。
  • A supplier delivering services into China from abroad must screen its activities against both lists: the cross-border services list for its offshore supply model, and the foreign investment list if it sets up a local presence.
    从境外向中国提供服务的外国服务提供者须对两张清单同时筛查:离岸供应模式对照跨境服务贸易清单,若在华设立商业存在则再对照外商投资准入清单。
  • The revised law empowers the State Council’s commerce department to formulate, adjust and publish the cross-border services negative list together with other departments, leaving room for pilot zones and the Hainan FTP to test broader opening first.
    修订后的法律授权商务部会同有关部门制定、调整并发布跨境服务贸易负面清单,为自贸试验区与海南自由贸易港先行先试更大开放留出空间。
  • Restrictions on cross-border services remain grounded in national security, public health and safety, domestic industry development and balance-of-payments grounds, mirroring GATS-style flexibilities.
    对跨境服务贸易的限制仍以国家安全、公共健康安全、国内特定服务产业培育和外汇收支平衡等事由为依据,与 GATS 式灵活性安排相衔接。
  • For foreign service firms, the 2026 legal upgrade converts policy pledges into statutory certainty: digital trade, green trade and new business models are explicitly encouraged, and a service-supplier’s compliance burden becomes a checklist exercise rather than an open-ended approval process.
    对境外服务企业而言,2026 年的法律升级把政策承诺转化为法律确定性:数字贸易、绿色贸易与新业态获明确鼓励,服务提供者的合规负担从开放式审批变为清单式核对。

China’s Cross-Border Services Trade Negative List: The New Legal Foundation and What It Means for Foreign Suppliers | 中国跨境服务贸易负面清单:新的法律基础与对外国服务提供者的意义

Why the new legal foundation matters

For decades, foreign suppliers of services to China faced an asymmetry: the goods trade was governed by tariffs and quota schedules, and investment was governed by the foreign investment negative list, but cross-border services — consulting, software, cloud services, engineering design, market research, payments and a wide range of business services supplied from abroad without a local entity — sat in a grey zone of sectoral licences and discretionary approvals. The revised Foreign Trade Law, adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 27 December 2025 and in force since 1 March 2026, changes the architecture. Article 31 of the revised law establishes a “cross-border services trade negative list management system”: the State Council’s commerce department, together with other departments, formulates, adjusts and publishes the list, and any activity not on the list may be supplied cross-border without an item-by-item approval. The law itself does not enumerate the items — the list is a separate regulatory instrument — but it fixes the governing principle in legislation, giving foreign suppliers statutory predictability for the first time.

The list as distinct from the foreign investment negative list

It is important to keep the two negative lists separate. The foreign investment negative list (currently 29 national items, as the 2024 edition) applies to services supplied through a “commercial presence” in China — that is, a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, joint venture or branch. The cross-border services trade negative list applies to the other three modes of service supply recognised in trade-policy terms: cross-border delivery (mode 1, services transmitted from abroad), consumption abroad (mode 2, a Chinese consumer travelling or staying abroad and consuming a service there) and movement of natural persons (mode 4, an individual entering China to deliver a service without establishing an entity). Article 31 makes this division explicit: services supplied through commercial presence are governed by the Foreign Investment Law, while services supplied under the other three modes are governed by the cross-border services negative list. A foreign software company that sells licences remotely from its home office, for example, is regulated under the cross-border list; if it sets up a Chinese subsidiary to sell the same licences, the subsidiary is regulated under the investment list.

What the revised Foreign Trade Law adds beyond the list

The 2025 revision, the law’s most substantial since 2004, contains several provisions that matter for foreign service suppliers. First, the law explicitly encourages digital trade and green trade, and commits China to promoting mutual recognition of digital certificates and electronic signatures, which eases cross-border contracting. Second, it strengthens the trade policy compliance mechanism: government measures affecting trade must undergo a compliance assessment aligned with international rules, which disciplines local regulators from imposing ad hoc barriers. Third, it codifies countermeasures: where a foreign country or region takes discriminatory measures against Chinese persons or organisations in trade, or harms China’s sovereignty, security or development interests, China may restrict trade with the responsible foreign individuals or organisations — including by prohibiting Chinese persons and organisations from providing them agency, freight, customs, warehousing or platform services. Fourth, it reaffirms the services-trade relief framework, allowing safeguard measures where a surge in imported services causes serious injury to domestic service industries.

The relationship between the national list and pilot-zone liberalisation

China already operates a cross-border services negative list for the Hainan Free Trade Port, issued in 2021 with 70 items, later compressed, and the FTZ cross-border services negative list, which has been progressively trimmed in successive editions. The 2026 legal codification does not itself shorten these lists, but it provides the statutory anchor that allows the national list to be built by extending pilot-zone experiments nationwide. In practice, the reform path mirrors the investment-list experience: pilot zones test a compressed list, the Hainan port tests a freer regime, and successful items migrate to the national list. Foreign suppliers should therefore watch three layers: the national list (once issued in its post-2026 form), the FTZ list for pilot-zone entry, and the Hainan list for port-based services.

What restricted categories look like

Although the operative national list is still being updated, the structure of the existing FTZ and Hainan lists gives a clear picture of where restrictions concentrate: (1) financial services — cross-border insurance, securities brokerage, fund distribution and certain payment services are either prohibited or subject to establishment requirements; (2) professional services — legal practice, certain accounting and certification activities, and some consulting services require local qualification or establishment; (3) telecommunications and internet — cross-border provision of basic and some value-added telecom services is restricted; (4) medical and health services — remote diagnosis and certain medical activities face qualification conditions; (5) cultural and information services — internet content, news and publishing activities remain restricted; and (6) transport and logistics — certain cabotage and cross-border logistics activities are conditioned on licensed local operators. The general test for a foreign supplier is straightforward: if the activity is not listed, it may be supplied cross-border; if it is listed, the supplier must look for a licensed route, typically by establishing a commercial presence.

Practical steps for foreign service suppliers

First, map your service model to the four modes and confirm whether your activity is cross-border (list applies) or commercial-presence based (investment list applies). Second, review the current FTZ and Hainan cross-border services lists as the best available proxy for the direction of the national list. Third, screen for sectoral regulators’ rules even where the list permits supply: data localisation, personal information cross-border transfer rules, payment licences and professional qualification requirements sit outside the list and continue to apply. Fourth, where the activity is restricted, consider structuring via a licensed joint venture or a pilot-zone entity. Fifth, document the trade policy compliance of your entry plan — the new statutory regime rewards clean, checklist-based compliance and penalises grey-zone operations.

Outlook for 2026 and beyond

The Government Work Report for 2026 and the 15th Five-Year Plan both direct that the cross-border services negative list be further compressed, with services as the priority for market-access opening. The Commerce Ministry has continued to expand the comprehensive pilot programme for services trade opening, and the “Services China” data for the first half of 2026 show knowledge-intensive services trade growing strongly. For foreign suppliers, the direction of travel is unambiguous: China is converting its services-opening policy into codified, list-based regulation, and the winners will be the firms that screen against the list, structure their mode of supply deliberately, and keep their offshore and onshore compliance aligned.

Sources


中国跨境服务贸易负面清单:新的法律基础与对外国服务提供者的意义

新的法律基础为何重要

数十年来,向中国提供服务的境外供应商面对一种不对称格局:货物贸易受关税与配额表约束,投资受外商投资负面清单约束,而跨境服务——咨询、软件、云服务、工程设计、市场调研、支付及各类不需在华设立实体的商业服务——长期处于部门许可与自由裁量审批的灰色地带。2025 年 12 月 27 日全国人大常委会表决通过、2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行的新修订《对外贸易法》改变了这一架构。修订后法律第三十一条确立”跨境服务贸易负面清单管理制度”:国务院对外贸易主管部门会同有关部门制定、调整并发布跨境服务贸易负面清单,凡未列入清单的活动即可跨境提供,无需逐项审批。法律本身不列举条目——清单是独立的监管文件——但它在立法层面固定了管理原则,首次给予境外供应商以法律层面的可预期性。

与外商投资准入负面清单的区别

必须把两张清单区分开来。外商投资准入负面清单(当前为 2024 年版,全国版 29 条)适用于以”商业存在”方式在华提供的服务——即外商独资企业、合资企业或分支机构。跨境服务贸易负面清单适用于贸易政策意义上另外三种服务供应模式:跨境交付(模式一,从境外传输服务)、境外消费(模式二,中国消费者出境在境外消费服务)与自然人移动(模式四,个人进入中国提供服务而不设立实体)。第三十一条明确划界:以商业存在提供的服务适用《外商投资法》,以其他三种模式提供的服务适用跨境服务贸易负面清单。例如,一家外国软件公司从境外总部远程销售许可,按跨境清单监管;若它设立中国子公司销售同样的许可,子公司按投资清单监管。

修订后的《对外贸易法》在清单之外增加了什么

2025 年修订是 2004 年以来最实质的一次修法,对外国服务提供者有多项相关条款。其一,法律明确鼓励数字贸易与绿色贸易,并承诺推动数字证书、电子签名国际互认,便利跨境缔约。其二,强化贸易政策合规机制:影响贸易的政府措施须按与国际规则衔接的标准开展合规评估,约束地方监管者不得随意设置障碍。其三,成文规定反制措施:外国国家或地区对中国个人、组织实施歧视性措施,或危害中国主权、安全与发展利益的,中国可对该境外个人、组织限制相关贸易——包括禁止中国境内组织、个人为其提供代理、货运、报关、仓储、平台等服务。其四,重申服务贸易救济框架:进口服务激增对国内服务产业造成严重损害的,可采取保障措施。

国家清单与试点开放的关系

中国已有一张海南自由贸易港跨境服务贸易负面清单(2021 年发布时 70 条,后经压缩)与自贸试验区跨境服务贸易负面清单(历经多版压缩)。2026 年的法律成文本身并不缩短这些清单,但它提供了让国家清单得以”先试点、后推广”的立法锚点。实践中,改革路径与投资清单经验一致:试验区试验压缩版清单,海南试验更开放制度,成功条目向全国迁移。境外供应商应关注三层:国家清单(2026 年后新版一旦发布)、自贸试验区版(试点区域进入)、海南版(港口型服务)。

受限类别的样貌

尽管现行国家清单仍在更新中,既有自贸试验区与海南清单的结构已清楚显示限制集中的领域:(1)金融服务——跨境保险、证券经纪、基金销售及部分支付服务或被禁止或要求设立机构;(2)专业服务——法律执业、部分会计与认证活动、部分咨询服务要求本地资质或设立;(3)电信与互联网——基础电信及部分增值电信服务的跨境提供受限;(4)医疗卫生——远程诊疗及部分医疗活动有资质条件;(5)文化与信息服务——互联网内容、新闻与出版活动仍受限;(6)运输物流——部分国内运输与跨境物流活动须由持证本地经营者承接。对外国供应商的通用测试很简单:未列入清单即可跨境提供;列入清单则须寻找持牌路径,通常以设立商业存在实现。

外国服务提供者的实操步骤

其一,把服务模式映射到四种模式,确认属跨境(适用清单)还是商业存在(适用投资清单)。其二,研读现行自贸试验区与海南跨境服务贸易清单,作为国家清单方向的最近代理。其三,即便清单允许供应,仍须筛查行业主管部门规则:数据本地化、个人信息跨境传输规则、支付牌照与职业资质要求均在清单之外继续适用。其四,活动受限时,考虑以持牌合资或试验区主体结构进入。其五,让准入方案经得起贸易政策合规检验——新的成文制度奖励清晰、清单式的合规,惩戒灰色经营。

2026 年及之后展望

2026 年《政府工作报告》与十五五规划《纲要》均要求进一步压缩跨境服务贸易负面清单,并以服务业为扩大开放重点。商务部持续推进服务业扩大开放综合试点,2026 年上半年服务贸易数据显示知识密集型服务进出口强劲增长。对境外供应商,方向毋庸置疑:中国正把服务业开放政策转化为成文、清单式监管,胜者将是那些对照清单筛查、刻意设计供应模式、使离岸与在岸合规保持一致的机构。

Sources

China’s Unified Market Access Negative List System and Foreign Investment: The 2025 Edition, Barrier Clean-up, and the Shift from Manufacturing to Services

  • China’s unified market-access negative list was cut to 106 items in the 2025 edition, down from 117 in 2022, extending the “national single list” model and enforcing the “non-prohibited-is-open” principle.
    2025年版市场准入负面清单由2022年版117项缩减至106项,全国统一清单模式持续拓宽,”非禁即入”原则刚性落地。
  • The 2025 version deletes or relaxes measures across seal-engraving, TV-production setup, and online pharmaceutical/medical-device information services, while adding statutory emerging-sector items such as drone operations and e-cigarettes.
    2025版直接删除或放开公章刻制、电视剧制作单位设立、药品医疗器械互联网信息服务等一批措施,并依法纳入无人机运营、电子烟等新业态准入事项。
  • Foreign investors remain subject to the separate Foreign Investment Access Negative List; as of 2026 the manufacturing sector’s restrictions are fully zeroed at 29 national items, with services the next opening front.
    外资仍适用单独的外商投资准入负面清单;截至2026年制造业限制已全面清零、全国版保留29条,服务业成为下一阶段开放重点。
  • A market-access barrier clean-up campaign is running, publicising typical cases and using a closed-loop rectification mechanism to remove “glass doors” and “revolving doors” outside the list.
    市场准入壁垒清理整治行动已启动,通过公开通报典型案例与核实整改闭环机制,破除清单之外的”玻璃门””弹簧门””旋转门”。
  • The 2026 “Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment” action plan anchors the post-access phase: solving “access granted but operation blocked” through services opening and national treatment.
    2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》聚焦”准入后准营”,以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”。
  • Practical step: map the target sector against both the market-access and the foreign-investment negative lists, and use pilot zones plus the one-stop service window for licensing.
    实操建议:将目标行业同时对照市场准入负面清单与外资准入负面清单,并借助试点区域与一站式服务专窗办理许可。

China’s Unified Market Access Negative List System and Foreign Investment: The 2025 Edition, Barrier Clean-up, and the Shift from Manufacturing to Services | 全国统一市场准入负面清单制度与外资准入:2025版清单、准入壁垒清理与制造业清零后的服务业开放

China’s market-access governance rests on two parallel but distinct negative lists: the Market Access Negative List (市场准入负面清单), which binds every business form equally inside China, and the Foreign Investment Access Negative List (外商投资准入负面清单), which adds a layer of sector restrictions specific to foreign capital. For a foreign investor, understanding both is the first step to a compliant market entry. The 2025 edition of the market-access list and the 2026 foreign-investment posture together define the current opening trajectory.

The 2025 Market Access Negative List

In April 2025, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) jointly released the *Market Access Negative List (2025 Edition)*. The item count fell from 117 in the 2022 edition to 106, with national sub-measures reduced from 486 to 469 and local measures from 36 to 20. The revision follows four improvements: a strengthened “national single list” authority, clearer implementation rules for licensed items, better alignment with other access regimes, and more standardised, convenient access.

Concrete relaxations include moving seal-engraving from a licence to a filing, reforming the sale of computer-information-security products into standards-based certification, and removing licences for TV-production-unit setup, pharmaceutical and medical-device internet information services, and the trial operation of certain telecom services. At the same time, the list brings in new-economy items under statutory authority — drone-operation certificates (except micro drones) under the *Unmanned Aircraft Operation Administration Regulation*, and e-cigarette production, wholesale and retail approvals under the *Tobacco Monopoly Law*.

Foreign investment access after manufacturing zeroing

The foreign-investment negative list has been compressed to 29 national items. Critically, all manufacturing-sector access restrictions have been zeroed — the first industry to achieve full liberalisation. At a March 2026 State Council policy briefing, NDRC confirmed the list now stands at 29 items nationally and 27 in pilot free-trade zones, with the next phase focused on services: telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare will be opened “orderly”. The 2026 *Stabilise and Improve Foreign Investment Action Plan* (MOFCOM, NDRC, Ministry of Finance; 商资发〔2026〕97号) frames the task as moving from “access” to “operation” — fixing the “big door open, small door closed” problem through services opening and national treatment.

Barrier clean-up campaign

A core message of the 2025 list is that items outside the list must be genuinely open. To that end, NDRC, MOFCOM and SAMR launched a market-access barrier clean-up, publicly notifying typical cases (seven batches, 115 cases to date) and building a clue-collection, verification, rectification and disclosure loop. The campaign targets local rules and practices that unlawfully add access conditions or erect “glass doors” and “revolving doors”. For foreign investors, this means a provincial measure that quietly blocks a listed-open sector can be reported and corrected.

Practical steps for foreign investors

  1. Screen both lists. Confirm the sector is outside — or acceptably inside — both the market-access and the foreign-investment negative lists before committing capital.
  2. Use the pilot pathway. Telecom, medical and education openings are proceeding via designated pilot zones; apply there rather than assuming nationwide access.
  3. Engage the one-stop window. Provincial investment-service desks and the “Invest in China” digital platform consolidate licensing, consultation and feedback.
  4. Watch the barrier clean-up. If a local rule impedes an otherwise-open sector, use the disclosure channel; the campaign is designed to remove it.
  5. Plan for operation, not just access. Post-entry, align with data-security, Anti-Monopoly and tax obligations early.

全国统一市场准入负面清单制度与外资准入:2025版清单、准入壁垒清理与制造业清零后的服务业开放

中国的市场准入治理建立在两张并行却又不同的负面清单之上:对境内各类经营主体一体适用的市场准入负面清单,以及针对外资额外叠加行业限制的外商投资准入负面清单。对外资而言,同时读懂两张清单是合规进入市场的第一步。2025年版市场准入清单与2026年外资准入姿态,共同定义了当前的开放路径。

2025年版市场准入负面清单

2025年4月,国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局联合发布《市场准入负面清单(2025年版)》。清单事项由2022年版的117项缩减至106项,全国性具体管理措施由486条减至469条,地方性措施由36条减至20条。本次修订围绕”四个完善”展开:强化”全国一张清单”权威、明确许可准入事项的实施要求、完善与其他准入规定的衔接、提升规范化便利化水平。

具体的放宽包括:公章刻制业由许可改为备案,计算机信息系统安全专用产品销售改为基于强制性国家标准的检测认证,取消电视剧制作单位设立、药品和医疗器械互联网信息服务、试办新型电信业务等管理措施。与此同时,清单依据法定授权纳入新业态事项——依《无人驾驶航空器运营管理条例》将民用无人驾驶航空器运营合格证核发纳入,依《烟草专卖法实施条例》将电子烟等新型烟草制品生产、批发、零售审批纳入。

制造业清零后的外资准入

外商投资准入负面清单已压缩至全国版29条。关键突破在于制造业领域准入限制全面”清零”——成为首个实现全面开放的产业。在2026年3月的国务院政策吹风会上,国家发展改革委确认全国版保留29项、自贸试验区版27项,下一阶段以服务业为重点,推动电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗等领域”有序扩大开放”。2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》(商务部、国家发展改革委、财政部,商资发〔2026〕97号)将任务定位于从”准入”转向”准营”——以服务业开放与国民待遇破解”大门开、小门不开”的具体问题。

准入壁垒清理整治

2025版清单的核心信号是:清单之外必须真放开。为此,国家发展改革委、商务部、市场监管总局联合开展市场准入壁垒清理整治行动,已向社会公开通报7期115个违背清单的典型案例,并建立线索归集、核实整改、案例通报的闭环机制。行动剑指违规增设准入条件、设立”玻璃门””弹簧门””旋转门”的地方性规定与做法。对外资而言,这意味着某省份悄悄阻断本已开放行业的做法,可以被举报并纠正。

外资实操步骤

  1. 双清单筛查。 在投入资本前,确认目标行业同时处于市场准入负面清单与外资准入负面清单的”之外”或”可承受之内”。
  2. 走试点路径。 电信、医疗、教育等开放正通过指定试点区域推进,应在试点区内申请,而非假设全国放开。
  3. 对接一站式窗口。 省级投资服务专窗与”投资中国”数字综合服务平台整合了许可、咨询与反馈功能。
  4. 关注壁垒清理。 若地方规定阻碍本已开放的行业,可走披露渠道;行动的设计目的就是清除此类障碍。
  5. 既谋准入也谋准营。 进入后尽早对齐数据安全、反垄断与税务义务。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Two lists, not one: the market-access negative list binds every entity; the foreign-investment negative list adds foreign-capital sector limits on top.
    两张清单而非一张:市场准入负面清单约束所有主体;外资准入负面清单在其上额外叠加外资行业限制。
  • 2025 edition = 106 items: down from 117 in 2022; study the deleted and relaxed measures for fresh openings.
    2025版=106项:较2022版117项缩减;研究被删除与放开的措施以发现新开放。
  • Manufacturing zeroed, services next: 29 national items remain, concentrated in services (telecom, medical, education, culture).
    制造业清零、服务业接棒:全国版保留29项,集中在服务业(电信、医疗、教育、文化)。
  • Barrier clean-up is live: report local “glass doors” through the disclosure channel; typical cases are publicised.
    壁垒清理已启动:经披露渠道举报地方”玻璃门”;典型案例公开通报。
  • Use the window: provincial investment desks and the “Invest in China” portal consolidate licensing and consultation.
    善用窗口:省级投资专窗与”投资中国”门户整合许可与咨询。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming nationwide access: pilot-zone openings (telecom, medical, education) are not automatic national licences.
    误以为全国放开:试点区域开放(电信、医疗、教育)并非自动生效的全国牌照。
  • Ignoring the clean-up campaign: a local rule blocking an otherwise-open sector is challengeable, not final.
    忽视清理行动:地方规定阻碍本已开放的行业是可被纠正的,并非终局。
  • Confusing the two lists: screening only one of them risks missing a foreign-capital-specific restriction.
    混淆两张清单:只筛查其中一张,可能漏掉外资专项限制。

Sources

China’s 2026 Services Opening: Telecom, Finance, Healthcare and Education Pilots

  • Services now account for about 70% of actual utilised foreign capital, making the services sector the main battleground for 2026 opening.
    服务业现已占实际使用外资约七成,成为2026年开放的主战场。
  • Value-added telecom pilots had approved 90-plus foreign-invested firms by end-2025, with foreign equity above the standard 50% cap in qualifying cases.
    增值电信试点截至2025年底已批准90多家外资企业,符合条件者外资股比可高于标准50%上限。
  • Wholly foreign-owned hospital pilots span nine cities, and the first such hospital opened in Tianjin in February 2025.
    外商独资医院试点横跨9城,首家于2025年2月在天津开诊。
  • Finance opening deepens: foreign institutions may use treasury futures and fund-advisory businesses, and qualified firms get domestic-listing and cross-border financing support.
    金融开放深化:外资机构可使用国债期货与基金投资顾问业务,合格企业获境内上市与跨境融资支持。
  • Biotech pilots cover the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong FTZs plus Hainan, with 100-plus foreign firms already in scope by end-2025.
    生物技术试点覆盖北京、上海、广东自贸区及海南,至2025年底已有百余家外资企业纳入范围。
  • Education opening expands to vocational training, vocational schools and selected science, technology, agriculture and medical universities.
    教育开放扩展至职业培训、职业院校及部分理工农医类高校。
  • Beijing’s Comprehensive Demonstration Zone for Services Opening and the cross-border services-trade negative list are the institutional backbone.
    北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区与跨境服务贸易负面清单是制度骨架。

China’s 2026 Services Opening: Telecom, Finance, Healthcare and Education Pilots | 中国2026年服务业开放:电信、金融、医疗与教育的试点突破

Why Services Are the 2026 Priority

With manufacturing access fully “zeroed out,” the frontier of China’s foreign-investment opening has moved decisively to services. The arithmetic explains why. In the first five months of 2026, services absorbed 234.15 billion yuan of actual utilised foreign capital — roughly 70% of the 327.29 billion yuan total — while manufacturing took 86.97 billion. As MOFCOM’s foreign-investment department put it, services are “the main field for expanding opening and attracting foreign capital.” The 2026 Government Work Report accordingly names services as the focus of market-access expansion, and the 15th Five-Year Plan commits to “orderly” opening of telecom, internet, education, culture and healthcare. Services are also where the national negative list still binds hardest, so opening there is delivered through pilots and incremental reform rather than a single deletion.

Telecom: Value-Added Opening

Telecom is the clearest services win for foreign investors. Although basic telecom services remain Chinese-controlled and value-added telecom is generally capped at 50% foreign equity, the 2024–2025 pilot programme has opened real space. By the end of 2025, more than 90 foreign-invested enterprises had been approved for value-added-telecom pilot licences, many inside free-trade zones, covering cloud computing, internet data services and related activities where foreign equity above the standard cap is permitted in qualifying cases. The 2026 Action Plan for Stabilizing and Optimizing Foreign Investment reaffirms “steadily implementing” the value-added-telecom pilot and narrowing the gap between “access and operating permission.” For cloud, data-centre and CDN players, the pilot route is now a genuine, if still scoped, entry path.

Healthcare: Hospitals and Biotech

Healthcare is the most visible services opening. Two pilot tracks run in parallel:

  • Wholly foreign-owned hospitals. The pilot spans nine locations — Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Nanjing, Suzhou, Fuzhou, Guangdong, Shenzhen and Hainan island. The first such hospital, Tianjin鹏瑞利 (a Singapore-invested tertiary general hospital), opened in February 2025 with about 1 billion yuan of investment; a rehabilitation hospital in Guangzhou and another in Hainan followed. The 2026 Action Plan commits to “study expanding” the pilot’s geographic scope.
  • Biotechnology. Pilot scope covers the Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong FTZs plus the Hainan Free Trade Port. By end-2025, over 100 foreign firms had brought piloted biotech business within their scope. The Action Plan promises to research expanding both biotech and hospital pilot regions, and to issue rules on cross-border segmented drug production (药品分段生产) to let overseas marketing-authorisation holders manufacture biologics and chemicals across borders.

Together these measures begin to open a sector long closed to foreign control.

Finance: Deeper Access

Financial services opening is advancing on several fronts under the 2026 Action Plan. Foreign institutions are supported to use risk-management tools including treasury futures to manage financial risk, and to conduct fund-investment-advisory business in accordance with law. For qualified key foreign firms, the plan provides a cross-border financing facilitation quota and “customer-billed” international settlement document services through domestic banks. Critically for exit and funding, it optimises pre-communication before exchange listing applications and supports qualified key foreign enterprises in raising capital on domestic exchanges. These steps do not rewrite the negative list but ease the operating environment for foreign financial and foreign-invested operating companies alike.

Education: Cautious Opening

Education remains the most controlled services area, but the 2026 Action Plan nudges it open. It proposes steadily expanding pilot openings for vocational training institutions, vocational schools, and high-level universities in science, technology, agriculture and medicine. This is deliberately narrow — compulsory and general higher education stay in Chinese-foreign cooperative, Chinese-led forms — but it creates a licit lane for foreign vocational, technical and specialised-institution investment, especially where it serves advanced manufacturing and the “new quality productive forces” agenda.

The Institutional Backbone

Two structures carry the services opening:

  1. Beijing’s Comprehensive Demonstration Zone for Services Opening. The 2026 Action Plan explicitly supports Beijing in upgrading this zone to trial first moves in digital economy and health-care and other modern services.
  2. The cross-border services-trade negative list. Both the Government Work Report and the Action Plan commit to compressing this list, which governs how foreign service suppliers can serve the China market cross-border. Narrowing it is the structural counterpart to the inbound pilots.

Alongside these, the national services-trade innovation demonstration zones and digital-trade demonstration zones named in the 15th FYP provide platforms that share the opening dividend with foreign firms.

Pilot / instrumentScope (2026)Investor relevance
Value-added telecom90+ firms approved by end-2025Cloud, data, CDN
Wholly foreign-owned hospitals9 citiesHealthcare operators
BiotechBeijing/Shanghai/Guangdong FTZs + HainanPharma, biologics
Finance toolsNationwide (Action Plan)FIs and operating cos.
Education pilotsVocational / STEM-agri-medTraining, specialised schools
Cross-border services-trade negative listTo be compressedAll cross-border service suppliers

What Investors Should Watch

  • Geographic scope expansions. The Action Plan repeatedly promises to “study expanding” the hospital and biotech pilot regions — watch for new cities added in 2026–2027.
  • From pilot to national. Successful pilots (value-added telecom especially) tend to be generalised; position to scale.
  • Data-cross-border rules. FTZs are exploring scenario-based, field-level data-export negative lists; these affect telecom, biotech and health operators directly.
  • Operating permission, not access. As in manufacturing, the live constraint is the licence and standards path, not equity.

For service-sector investors, 2026 is less about a shorter negative list and more about a widening set of pilots — the real, if still bounded, opening.


中国2026年服务业开放:电信、金融、医疗与教育的试点突破

为何服务业是2026年重点

随着制造业准入全面”清零”,中国外资开放的前沿已决定性转向服务业。数据说明原因:2026年前5个月,服务业吸收实际使用外资2,341.5亿元,约占总计3,272.9亿元的七成,而制造业为869.7亿元。正如商务部外资司所言,服务业是”扩大开放、吸引外资的主要领域”。2026年《政府工作报告》因此将服务业列为市场准入扩大的重点,十五五规划承诺对电信、互联网、教育、文化、医疗”有序”开放。服务业也是全国版负面清单束缚最紧之处,故其开放通过试点与渐进改革实现,而非一次性删除条目。

电信:增值业务开放

电信是外资最清晰的服务业利好。尽管基础电信仍须中方控股、增值电信一般限外资50%股比,2024—2025年试点已开真实空间。截至2025年底,90多家外资企业获批增值电信业务试点牌照,多位于自贸区,涵盖云计算、互联网数据服务等符合条件者外资股比可高于标准上限的活动。2026年《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》重申”稳妥实施”增值电信试点,缩小”准入与准营”落差。对云、数据中心、CDN 玩家,试点路径已是真实(虽仍受限)的准入通道。

医疗:医院与生物技术

医疗是最显眼的服务业开放,两条试点并行:

  • 外商独资医院。 试点横跨9地——北京、上海、天津、南京、苏州、福州、广东、深圳及海南全岛。首家此类医院天津鹏瑞利(新加坡投资的三级综合医院)于2025年2月开诊,投资约10亿元;广州康复医院与海南医院相继落地。2026年行动方案承诺”抓紧研究报批进一步扩大”试点地域范围。
  • 生物技术。 试点范围覆盖北京、上海、广东自贸区及海南自由贸易港。至2025年底,百余家外资企业已将试点生物技术业务纳入经营范围。行动方案承诺研究扩大生物技术与医院试点区域,并出台药品分段生产细则,便利境外上市许可持有人开展生物制品、化学药跨境分段生产。

两项并举,开始开放这一长期禁止外资控股的领域。

金融:更深层次准入

金融服务开放在2026年行动方案下多线推进。支持更多外资机构使用包括国债期货在内的风险管理工具,依法开展基金投资顾问业务。对符合条件的重点外资企业,方案提供跨境融资便利化额度,并通过境内银行提供”代客制单”国际结算单证服务。对退出与融资至为关键的是,方案优化交易所上市申报前预沟通,支持符合条件的重点外资企业在境内上市融资。这些举措不改负面清单,却为外资金融机构与外资运营企业改善了经营环境。

教育:谨慎开放

教育仍是最受控的服务业领域,但2026年行动方案谨慎推门。方案提出稳步扩大职业技能培训机构、职业院校、高水平理工农医类大学对外开放试点。这一开放刻意收窄——义务教育与一般高等教育仍限于中外合作、中方主导——但为外国职业、技术与专门机构投资开辟了合法通道,尤其服务于先进制造业与”新质生产力”议程。

制度骨架

两项结构承载服务业开放:

  1. 北京服务业扩大开放综合示范区。 2026年行动方案明确支持北京提升该示范区水平,在数字经济、医药健康等现代服务业重点领域先行先试。
  2. 跨境服务贸易负面清单。 《政府工作报告》与行动方案均承诺压缩该清单,它规范外国服务供应商如何跨境服务中国市场。压缩它是与境内试点对应的结构性举措。

此外,十五五规划提出的国家服务贸易创新发展示范区、国家数字贸易示范区等平台,与外资共享开放红利。

试点/工具2026范围投资者相关性
增值电信2025年底已批90余家云、数据、CDN
外商独资医院9城医疗运营商
生物技术北京/上海/广东自贸区+海南医药、生物制品
金融工具全国(行动方案)金融机构与运营企业
教育试点职业/理工农医培训、专门学校
跨境服务贸易负面清单待压缩所有跨境服务供应商

投资者应关注

  • 地域扩容。 行动方案多次承诺”研究扩大”医院与生物技术试点区域——关注2026—2027年新增城市。
  • 从试点到全国。 成功试点(尤其增值电信)往往被普遍化;提前布局以规模化。
  • 数据跨境规则。 自贸区正探索场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单;直接影响电信、生物技术、医疗运营商。
  • 准营而非准入。 与制造业同,实际约束是许可与标准路径,而非股权。

对服务业投资者,2026年要义不在更短的负面清单,而在不断拓宽的试点集——真实却仍受界的开放。

Sources

China’s 2026 Manufacturing Liberalization: Full Market Access for Foreign Investors

  • Every manufacturing sub-sector is open to foreign investors at 100% ownership in 2026, after the 2024 list removed the last two restrictions.
    2026年制造业所有细分领域均向外开开放、可100%持股,2024年版清单删除了最后两项限制。
  • The 2024 revision deleted the publication-printing Chinese-control rule and the traditional-Chinese-medicine secret-formula production ban.
    2024年修订删除了出版物印刷须中方控股的规定,以及中成药保密处方产品生产禁令。
  • With “access” solved, Beijing’s policy focus has shifted to “operating permission” — closing the “big door open, small door closed” gap.
    “准入”问题解决后,政策重心转向”准营”——消除”大门开、小门不开”的落差。
  • Foreign manufacturing investment remains substantial: the sector drew 86.97 billion yuan of actual FDI in the first five months of 2026.
    制造业外资仍可观:2026年前5个月制造业实际使用外资869.7亿元。
  • High-tech manufacturing is the growth engine, with electronic and communications equipment FDI up 18.2% and computer/office-equipment FDI up 29.7% year-on-year in early 2026.
    高技术制造业是增长引擎,2026年初电子及通信设备制造外资增18.2%、计算机及办公设备制造增29.7%。
  • Post-access hurdles — product registration, standards, GMP, licensing — now matter more than equity caps for manufacturers.
    准入后壁垒——产品注册、标准、GMP、许可——对制造商而言已比股比上限更重要。
  • The 2025 Encouraged Catalogue (1,679 entries) steers foreign manufacturers toward advanced and green manufacturing with incentives.
    2025年版鼓励目录(1,679条)以激励引导外资制造商投向先进与绿色制造。

China’s 2026 Manufacturing Liberalization: Full Market Access for Foreign Investors | 中国2026年制造业全面放开:外资准入全面解禁

From Restricted to Fully Open

Manufacturing is the field where China’s foreign-investment opening is most complete. Over little more than a decade, the negative list moved from capping foreign equity across wide swaths of industry to removing every manufacturing restriction. The decisive step came with the *Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative List) (2024 Edition)* (NDRC & MOFCOM Order No. 23, effective 1 November 2024), which cut the national list to 29 items and deleted the final two manufacturing limitations. As NDRC officials stated in March 2026, “manufacturing access restrictions have been fully zeroed out.” For a foreign manufacturer, the question of whether it may own 100% of a Chinese plant is, in principle, settled: the answer is yes, across automobiles, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, food, chemicals, and machinery alike.

What the 2024 List Actually Removed

The two manufacturing items deleted in 2024 were specific but symbolic:

  1. Publication printing. The long-standing requirement that publication printing be controlled by the Chinese party was removed, ending a restriction that had sat on the list since the early reform era.
  2. Traditional Chinese medicine. A prohibition on the application of certain TCM processing techniques (steaming, stir-frying, calcining, roasting) and on the production of pharmaceuticals based on confidential formulae was lifted.

Their removal brought the national list from 31 to 29 items and, more importantly, emptied the manufacturing column entirely. Earlier tranches had already opened automaking — the phased removal of the 50% passenger-vehicle joint-venture cap was completed at the end of 2022 — and had relaxed limits on rail equipment, mining, and shipbuilding. By 2026, no manufacturing sub-sector carries a mandated Chinese partner or foreign-equity ceiling.

The “Big Door Open, Small Door Closed” Problem

Opening the access door, however, is not the same as being able to operate. Chinese officials now openly describe a “big door open, small door closed” (大门开、小门不开) problem: the equity barrier is gone, but operating permissions — licences, product registrations, technical standards, and certification — can still delay or block a foreign manufacturer from actually selling. MOFCOM and NDRC have made clear that the 2026 priority is to move from 准入 (access) to 准营 (operating permission), ensuring that once a manufacturer is admitted it can genuinely do business. This reframing matters for advisors: the diligence that once centred on equity structure must now centre on the permitting and certification pathway.

The 2026 Investment Picture

The data show manufacturing remains a major destination for foreign capital even after full liberalisation. According to MOFCOM, in the first five months of 2026 China recorded 25,297 newly established foreign-invested enterprises (up 5.3% year-on-year) and actual utilised foreign capital of 327.29 billion yuan. Of that, manufacturing absorbed 86.97 billion yuan. The structure is shifting toward higher value:

Indicator (Jan–May 2026)Value / change
New FIEs established25,297 (+5.3% yoy)
Actual utilised FDI (total)327.29 billion yuan (−8.6% yoy)
Manufacturing actual FDI86.97 billion yuan
High-tech industry actual FDI130.14 billion yuan (+19.4% yoy, 39.8% of total)
Electronic & communications equipment mfg FDI+18.2% yoy
Computer & office equipment mfg FDI+29.7% yoy
R&D and design services FDI+96.2% yoy

The high-tech share — nearly 40% of all utilised FDI — and the double-digit growth in advanced manufacturing confirm that liberalisation is channeling foreign money into exactly the segments Beijing wants to deepen.

Where the Growth Is: High-Tech Manufacturing

The strongest momentum is in technology-intensive manufacturing. Electronic and communications equipment manufacturing drew 18.2% more foreign capital year-on-year in early 2026, and computer and office equipment manufacturing grew 29.7%. These are precisely the sectors where the encouraged catalogue (see below) offers the richest incentives and where China’s complete supply chains give foreign investors a reason to localise rather than export. Semiconductors, new-energy vehicles, high-end medical devices, and advanced materials all sit in this zone — fully open on the negative list and actively courted through the encouraged catalogue and local investment-promotion packages.

Operating Permission, Not Access, Is the New Bottleneck

For a manufacturer entering China in 2026, the binding constraints are almost never equity. They are:

  • Product registration. Drugs and medical devices must be registered with the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA); food and cosmetics face similar registration or filing.
  • Standards and certification. China Compulsory Certification (CCC) and a widening set of national and industry standards apply; conformity assessment can be lengthy.
  • Environmental and safety permitting. Manufacturing sites need environmental-impact approvals and safety production licences.
  • Data and cross-border flows. Where a plant’s operations touch important data, the cross-border data rules introduced in recent years add a compliance layer.

A market-entry plan should map each of these early, because they — not the negative list — determine time-to-market.

Practical Guidance for Manufacturers

  1. Assume 100% ownership is available. Structure as a WFOE unless non-manufacturing ancillary activities pull you into a restricted sector.
  2. Screen ancillary services. A manufacturing WFOE that also wants to distribute, do R&D, or run a testing lab should check whether those add-on activities hit the services restrictions still on the list.
  3. Check the encouraged catalogue. The 2025 edition (effective 1 February 2026, 1,679 entries) lists advanced and green manufacturing for tariff, land, and tax incentives — confirm your product lines qualify.
  4. Build the permitting timeline first. Model NMPA/CCC/environmental approvals before committing a launch date.
  5. Use the FTZ pre-check. Inside an FTZ, the access pre-check system surfaces hidden licence needs early.
  6. Plan localisation. With supply chains complete and incentives available, a localised footprint often beats an import-only model.

Manufacturing is, in 2026, the easiest manufacturing-sector entry China has ever offered a foreign investor — provided the entrant plans for operating permission, not just ownership.


中国2026年制造业全面放开:外资准入全面解禁

从受限到全面开放

制造业是中国外资开放最彻底的领域。在十余年间,负面清单从对工业广泛领域设股比上限,走向取消每一项制造业限制。决定性一步来自《外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)(2024年版)》(国家发展改革委、商务部第23号令,2024年11月1日施行),它将全国版清单减至29条,删除最后两项制造业限制。正如国家发展改革委2026年3月所言,”制造业领域外资准入限制全面清零”。对外国制造商而言,能否100%持有中国工厂的问题原则上已解决:汽车、半导体、医药、食品、化工、机械皆然。

2024年版究竟删除了什么

2024年删除的两项制造业条目虽具体却具象征意义:

  1. 出版物印刷。 长期存在的”出版物印刷须由中方控股”要求被取消,结束了自改革初期即列于清单的限制。
  2. 中药。 禁止投资中药饮片蒸、炒、炙、煅等炮制技术应用及中成药保密处方产品生产的禁令被解除。

两项删除使全国版由31条降至29条,更重要的是将制造业栏目彻底清空。此前的批次已开放汽车制造——乘用车合资股比50%上限的渐进取消于2022年底完成——并放宽了轨道交通设备、采矿、船舶制造的限制。至2026年,无任何制造业细分领域强制要求中国伙伴或设外资股比上限。

“大门开、小门不开”问题

然而,打开准入之门不等于能够经营。中国官员现公然描述”大门开、小门不开”问题:股权壁垒已去,但经营许可证、产品注册、技术标准与认证仍可能拖延或阻止外国制造商实际销售。商务部与国家发展改革委已明确,2026年重心是从”准入”转向”准营”,确保制造商准入后真正能开展业务。这一重构对顾问至关重要:曾经围绕股权结构的尽职调查,如今须围绕许可与认证路径展开。

2026年投资图景

数据显示,全面放开后制造业仍是外资重要目的地。据商务部,2026年前5个月全国新设外商投资企业25,297家(同比+5.3%),实际使用外资3,272.9亿元;其中制造业吸收869.7亿元。结构向高价值迁移:

指标(2026年1—5月)数值/变化
新设外资企业25,297家(同比+5.3%)
实际使用外资(合计)3,272.9亿元(同比−8.6%)
制造业实际使用外资869.7亿元
高技术产业实际使用外资1,301.4亿元(同比+19.4%,占总额39.8%)
电子及通信设备制造外资同比+18.2%
计算机及办公设备制造外资同比+29.7%
研发与设计服务外资同比+96.2%

高技术占比接近四成,先进制造业双位数增长,印证开放正将外资引入北京希望深化的细分领域。

增长所在:高技术制造业

最强动能来自技术密集型制造。2026年初电子及通信设备制造外资同比增18.2%,计算机及办公设备制造增29.7%。这些正是鼓励目录(见下)激励最丰、且中国完整供应链令外资倾向本地化而非出口的领域。半导体、新能源汽车、高端医疗器械、先进材料均处此区——负面清单上完全开放,又通过鼓励目录与地方招商包积极争取。

准营而非准入成为新瓶颈

对2026年进入中国的制造商,约束几乎从不是股权,而是:

  • 产品注册。 药品与医疗器械须向国家药品监督管理局(NMPA)注册;食品、化妆品亦有注册或备案。
  • 标准与认证。 中国强制性产品认证(CCC)及日益增多的国标、行标适用;符合性评估可能漫长。
  • 环保与安全许可。 制造场所需环评批复与安全生产许可证。
  • 数据与跨境流动。 运营触及重要数据时,近年出台的数据跨境规则新增合规层。

市场准入计划应尽早梳理上述每一项,因为它们——而非负面清单——决定上市时间。

给制造商的实操指引

  1. 默认可100%持股。 除非非制造附属活动将你拉入受限行业,否则设为外商独资企业。
  2. 筛查附属服务。 制造型 WFOE 若兼营分销、研发或检测实验室,须查这些附加活动是否触及清单上仍受限的服务业。
  3. 核对鼓励目录。 2025年版(2026年2月1日施行,1,679条)列明先进与绿色制造,享关税、用地、税收优惠——确认你的产品线符合。
  4. 先建许可时间表。 在锁定上市日期前,先建模 NMPA/CCC/环评审批。
  5. 利用自贸区预检。 区内准入预检系统可尽早暴露隐性许可需求。
  6. 规划本地化。 供应链完整且激励可用,本地化布局往往优于纯进口模式。

2026年,制造业是历史上中国向外开投资者提供的最易进入的制造领域——前提是进入者规划的是”准营”,而不仅是”持股”。

Sources