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Foreign M&A / 外资并购

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review

  • The notifiable thresholds (Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024) are: worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China; sub-threshold deals with competition concerns can still be called in.
    申报门槛（第773号令，2024年1月26日施行）：全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元，或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元；未达门槛但有竞争关切的交易仍可被要求申报。
  • In 2025 SAMR concluded 706 concentrations (+9.8%); in May 2025–April 2026 it cleared 232 involving private firms with total value RMB 353.4bn, averaging 26.72 days to conclude (15.64 days acceptance / 18.9 days conclusion for simplified cases).
    2025年SAMR审结706件（+9.8%）；2025年5月至2026年4月审结涉民营企业232起、总额3534亿元，平均审结26.72天（简易案件受理15.64天/审结18.9天）。
  • Delegated review became formal in August 2025 and was refined in March 2026; provincial bureaus have cleared deals in as little as 11 days (e.g., Qingyuan Desheng & Shengli Steel).
    委托审查于2025年8月转为正式、2026年3月完善；省级局最快11天审结（如清远德晟与圣力钢制品案）。
  • SAMR issued the Concentration Filing Norms and Non-Horizontal Review Guidelines, plus a penalty-discretion baseline, giving parties a transparent, predictable filing environment.
    SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》及处罚裁量基准，为企业提供透明可预期的申报环境。
  • A June 2026 special enforcement campaign (June–December) will explore “green channels” for specific industries and strengthen compliance reminders and local guidance windows.
    2026年6月启动的专项行动（6–12月）将探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”，并强化申报提醒与地方指导窗口。
  • Gun-jumping is policed: in 2025 SAMR publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95m in fines, and below-threshold deals with competition risk can be called in.
    “抢跑”受监管：2025年SAMR公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元，且有竞争风险的未达门槛交易可被要求申报。

Merger-Control Filing in 2026: Thresholds, Simplified Track and Delegated Review | 2026年经营者集中申报：门槛、简易案件与委托审查

When a filing is required

Under the *Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings* (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified to SAMR before implementation where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures use sector-specific calculation rules. A concentration is notifiable even where it does not meet these thresholds if there is evidence it may eliminate or restrict competition — SAMR may require a filing.

The 2024 revision raised the earlier levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30%, lowering transaction costs for smaller mergers while keeping scrutiny on competitively risky ones.

Throughput and the simplified track

SAMR’s 2025 performance was substantial: 706 concentrations lawfully concluded, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. The agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” in automotive, photovoltaic and lithium-battery fields to support restructuring.

The simplified track targets a “double 20-day” standard (acceptance and review). In the May 2025–April 2026 window, SAMR concluded 232 concentrations involving private firms, with total transaction value of RMB 353.4 billion; average acceptance time was 17.13 days and average conclusion time 26.72 days. For simplified cases, average acceptance was just 15.64 days and average conclusion 18.9 days — better than the internal “double 20” requirement. For a foreign acquirer, this means a clean, below-concern deal can clear in roughly three to four weeks.

Delegated review: closer to the market

A notable 2025–2026 reform is delegated review. In August 2025, SAMR moved the pilot delegated review with selected provincial market-regulation bureaus to formal delegated review; in March 2026 it issued an announcement further refining the system. Delegated bureaus use their proximity to bring faster, more localised service. Examples: the Chongqing bureau concluded the Zhejiang Jirun Automobile / Maichi Zhixing joint-venture case in 18 days from filing to clearance; the Guangdong bureau handled the Qingyuan Desheng Investment / Shengli Steel new joint-venture case in just 11 days of review. For foreign investors with deals centred in a delegated province, this can materially shorten the clock.

Transparency and compliance tooling

To make filing predictable, SAMR has issued the *Concentration Filing Norms* and the *Non-Horizontal Concentration Review Guidelines*, opened the operator-concentration antitrust business system with a 6,000-plus-case historical library for real-time query, and released a penalty-discretion baseline (trial) with a self-calculation tool so parties “see and understand at a glance”. It also warned of and acted on “gun-jumping”: in 2025 it publicly investigated 4 illegal-concentration cases with RMB 6.95 million in fines, and in key fields (semiconductors, shipping, minerals) conditionally approved 5 and prohibited 1 to protect supply-chain competition.

The June 2026 efficacy campaign

On 30 June 2026, SAMR launched a special enforcement campaign (June–December) to raise operator-concentration antitrust regulatory efficacy. Its three pillars matter to deal-makers:

  1. Regulatory capacity — explore “green channels” for specific industries, strengthen complex-issue research, and support delegated provincial bureaus with expert backing.
  2. Full-chain efficacy — maintain the simplified “double 20-day” standard, optimise the business system, publish typical cases, and handle major-merger reviews with close listening to relevant parties.
  3. Compliance guidance — improve filing reminders, issue policy guidance, run targeted training for firms above the threshold, and support local “filing guidance windows”.

For foreign acquirers, the practical signals are: faster, more transparent review; a realistic prospect of industry-specific fast lanes; and a clear expectation that below-threshold but competition-risky deals will still be scrutinised.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early; if close to the line, assume a filing and budget the timeline.
  • Prefer the simplified track where the deal is clean (no overlap or minor overlap); target the ~3–4 week clearance.
  • Check whether your province runs delegated review; if so, file there to use local proximity.
  • Use SAMR’s case library and filing norms to pre-assess overlap and prepare a tight submission.
  • Do not close before clearance — gun-jumping draws public penalties even for foreign parties.
  • Watch for industry “green channels” announced in the 2026 campaign when planning sensitive-sector deals.

What to submit and how long it really takes

A filing package centres on the notification form, the parties’ audited turnover, the transaction documents (SPA, shareholder agreements), and a competitive-effects analysis where overlap exists. SAMR’s published norms and the 6,000-plus case library let counsel benchmark whether a deal is “simple” (little or no horizontal overlap, no vertical foreclosure) and thus eligible for the simplified track. For a clean deal, the realistic clock is acceptance (~15 days) plus review (~20 days) — about a month — though parties should still build buffer for information requests.

Sector sensitivity: semiconductors, minerals, pharma

2025–2026 enforcement shows where scrutiny concentrates. SAMR prohibited one deal and conditionally approved five in semiconductors, shipping and minerals, protecting supply-chain competition. In the May 2025–April 2026 window, notable conditional approvals included the Synopsys–Ansys (新思科技收购安似科技) and Bunge–Viterra (邦吉收购蔚特) cases, and the Chilean copper / Chilean chemical joint venture (lithium carbonate supply) — conditioned to secure stable, reasonably priced supply for downstream Chinese firms, including private new-energy buyers. The lesson: deals touching critical inputs or semiconductor capacity should expect a substantive review even if turnover is modest.

Avoiding gun-jumping penalties

“Gun-jumping” — closing or integrating before clearance — is actively policed, with RMB 6.95m in fines across four cases in 2025 and public naming. Foreign parties are not exempt. The safe pattern is to sign subject to a condition precedent (merger-control clearance), keep the businesses separate until approval, and resist operational integration (shared pricing, combined sales forces, unified procurement) during the pending period. Where a deal is below the thresholds but competitively sensitive, assume SAMR may call it in and pre-empt by consulting the agency.

Filing readiness: a pre-filing checklist

To avoid avoidable delay, assemble the package before signing. Confirm the correct turnover figures from audited statements for the relevant fiscal year; map the overlap matrix (horizontal shares, vertical relationships) across the parties’ product markets; prepare the transaction documents and any remedy proposals; and decide whether to request the simplified track. Where a party is foreign, localise the turnover evidence and appoint a China-registered agent if needed. Engagement with SAMR or the delegated provincial bureau ahead of formal filing — using the published norms and case library — often surfaces a fatal overlap early, when it is still cheap to restructure rather than after a prohibition.

Looking ahead from the 2026 campaign

The June–December 2026 efficacy campaign signals a steady-state direction: faster, more transparent, and more sector-aware review. The exploration of industry “green channels” means that, later in 2026, certain strategic sectors may get a dedicated fast lane, while the emphasis on filing reminders and local guidance windows lowers the cost of getting it right the first time. For foreign acquirers, the trend is favourable — provided the deal is genuinely clean and the submission is well-prepared. The agency’s message is consistent: support lawful consolidation, police the rest.

2026年经营者集中申报：门槛、简易案件与委托审查

何时需要申报

依《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》（国务院第773号令，2024年1月26日施行），上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元，或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元，须在实施前通知SAMR。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。即使未达上述门槛，若有证据证明可能排除、限制竞争，SAMR亦可要求申报。

2024年修订将原有标准（100亿/20亿/4亿）提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元，SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%，在降低中小并购交易成本的同时，保留对具竞争风险交易的审查。

审结量与简易案件

SAMR 2025年表现突出：依法审结经营者集中706件，同比增长9.8%，83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。该局在汽车、光伏、锂电池领域”快审不降质”以支持重组。

简易案件目标为”双20天”（受理与审查）。2025年5月至2026年4月，SAMR审结涉民营企业经营者集中232起，交易总额3534亿元；平均受理17.13天、平均审结26.72天。简易案件平均受理仅15.64天、审结18.9天，优于内部”双20″要求。对外国收购方而言，这意味着干净、无竞争关切的交易约三至四周即可通过。

委托审查：更贴近市场

2025–2026年一项显著改革是委托审查。2025年8月，SAMR将试点委托审查转为正式委托；2026年3月发布公告进一步完善制度。受委托省级局发挥贴近优势，提供更快速、本地化服务。例证：重庆市局审结浙江吉润汽车与迈驰智行新设合营企业案，自申报到审结仅18天；广东省局审查清远德晟投资与圣力钢制品新设合营企业案，审查阶段仅11天。对交易集中于受委托省份的外国投资者，此举可显著缩短周期。

透明度与合规工具

为提升申报可预期性，SAMR出台《经营者集中申报规范》《非横向经营者集中审查指引》，开放经营者集中反垄断业务系统（6000余件历史案例库实时查询），并发布处罚裁量基准（试行）及”行政处罚自算器”，使企业”一看就懂、一算便知”。该局亦警示并查处”抢跑”：2025年公开查处4起违法实施经营者集中案件、罚款695万元；在半导体、航运、矿产等关键领域附条件批准5件、禁止1件，以保障产业链竞争。

2026年6月效能专项行动

2026年6月30日，SAMR启动经营者集中反垄断监管效能提升专项行动（6–12月）。其三大支柱对交易方重要：

  1. 监管基础能力——探索特定行业审查”绿色通道”，加强复杂问题研究，以外部专家支撑受委托省级局。
  2. 全链条质效——认真执行简易案件”双20天”，优化业务系统，做好典型案例公开，充分听取相关方对重大并购审查意见。
  3. 合规指导——完善申报提醒，发布政策指引，对达申报标准企业开展专项培训，支持有条件地区建立申报指导窗口。

对外国收购方的实务信号是：审查更快更透明；特定行业快车道可期待；未达门槛但有竞争风险的交易仍将被审查。

下一步

  • 尽早做门槛测试；若接近临界，按需申报并排期。
  • 交易干净（无重叠或轻微重叠）时优先走简易案件，目标约3–4周通过。
  • 查核所在省份是否实行委托审查；若是，就地申报以利用就近优势。
  • 利用SAMR案例库与申报规范预先评估重叠并准备精炼材料。
  • 未获核准前不得交割——”抢跑”即便对外方也招致公开处罚。
  • 规划敏感行业交易时，关注2026专项行动中宣布的行业”绿色通道”。

应提交什么及真实耗时

申报材料以申报表、各方经审计营业额、交易文件（SPA、股东协议）及存在重叠时的竞争影响分析为核心。SAMR已发布的规范与6000余件案例库，使律师可基准判断交易是否”简单”（横向重叠小或无、无纵向封锁）从而适用简易案件。对干净交易，现实时钟为受理（约15天）加审查（约20天）——约一个月，但仍应为信息补充请求留出缓冲。

行业敏感性：半导体、矿产、医药

2025–2026年执法显示审查集中于何处。SAMR在半导体、航运、矿产领域禁止1件、附条件批准5件，以保障产业链竞争。2025年5月至2026年4月，显著附条件批准包括新思科技收购安似科技、邦吉收购蔚特，以及智利铜业与智利化工新设合营企业案（碳酸锂供应）——附条件以确保下游中国企业（含民营新能源买方）获得稳定、合理价格的供应。启示：触及关键投入或半导体产能的交易，即便营业额不大，也应预期实质审查。

避免”抢跑”处罚

“抢跑”——核准前交割或整合——被积极监管，2025年4起案件罚款695万元并公开点名。外国当事方不豁免。安全做法是签署以经营者集中核准为先决条件的协议，核准前保持业务分离，并在待审期抵制运营整合（共享定价、合并销售队伍、统一采购）。对未达门槛但有竞争敏感性的交易，应预期SAMR可能要求申报，并主动与当局沟通以防患未然。

申报准备：申报前清单

为避免无谓延误，应在签约前备齐材料。依经审计报表确认相关会计年度的正确营业额；绘制各方产品市场的重叠矩阵（横向份额、纵向关系）；准备交易文件与可能的救济方案；并决定是否申请简易案件。当事人一方为外国的，应本土化营业额证据，必要时委任中国注册代理人。在正式申报前借助已发布规范与案例库与SAMR或受委托省级局沟通，往往能尽早暴露致命重叠——此时重构成本低，远胜禁止之后。

自2026专项行动看未来

2026年6–12月效能专项行动指向一个稳态方向：更快、更透明、更具行业意识。对特定行业”绿色通道”的探索意味着，2026年下半年某些战略行业或获专属快车道；而强调申报提醒与地方指导窗口，降低了”一次做对”的成本。对外国收购方，趋势有利——前提是交易确属干净、申报准备充分。该局信号一致：支持合法整合，监管其余。

Sources

Foreign M&A / 外资并购

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines

  • Since the Foreign Investment Law (2020), acquiring a domestic firm is no longer a commerce-approval event; it runs through the negative list, information reporting, plus merger control and security review where triggered.
    自《外商投资法》（2020）以来，并购境内企业不再是商务审批事件——经负面清单、信息报告办理，并在触发时通过经营者集中与安全审查。
  • Merger-control thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 Jan 2024): worldwide turnover >RMB 12bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn with two parties each >RMB 800m in China.
    经营者集中门槛（国务院第773号令，2024年1月26日施行）：全球合计超120亿元且两方中国各超8亿元，或中国合计超40亿元且两方中国各超8亿元。
  • SAMR cleared 706 concentrations in 2025 (up 9.8%); 83% closed at the 30-day preliminary stage, with a “double 20-day” simplified track for straightforward cases.
    市场监管总局2025年审结经营者集中706件（增长9.8%）；83%在30天初步审查阶段结案，简易案件推行”双20天”审查目标。
  • Security review is mandatory where the target is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor obtains actual control — and its control test is broader than merger control’s.
    当目标位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时须通过安全审查——其控制标准宽于经营者集中标准。
  • The 2024 strategic-investment rules (six-agency Order No. 3, effective 2 Dec 2024) ease listed-company investment: foreign natural persons allowed, lower asset thresholds, tender offers added, lock-up cut to 12 months, no commerce approval.
    2024年战投规则（六部门第3号令，2024年12月2日施行）放宽上市公司投资：允许外国自然人、降低资产门槛、新增要约收购、锁定期降至12个月、无需商务审批。
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.
    将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进；未获所有强制核准前不得交割，并在条款书阶段启动两项审查。

Foreign M&A in China in 2026: Review Map and Timelines | 2026年外资并购中国：审查地图与时间线

The post-2020 deal frame

Acquiring a Chinese company as a foreign investor now sits inside the Foreign Investment Law regime rather than the older approval-based M&A rules. The behavioural shift is decisive: the deal is no longer a commerce-department approval event by itself. Instead, the investor incorporates or transfers under company law, clears any negative-list condition, files foreign-investment information, and — where triggered — separately clears merger control (antitrust) with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and national security review with the NDRC-led mechanism. Understanding which gates actually apply, and running them in parallel, is the core of a smooth closing.

Gate 1 — the negative list and information reporting

The 2024 national negative list for foreign investment contains 29 items and took effect on 1 November 2024. If the target’s sector is on the list, the acquisition must satisfy its conditions (equity caps, Chinese-control requirements, etc.); if off the list, the deal is treated on equal terms with domestic M&A. Cross-border share swaps are permitted but conditioned — generally the foreign equity used as consideration should be in a listed overseas company, though the 2024 strategic-investment rules relaxed this for certain directed-issue and tender-offer structures. Post-deal, the foreign investor files investment information rather than seeking approval.

Gate 2 — merger control (antitrust) filing

A foreign acquirer must notify SAMR before implementing a concentration that meets the thresholds. Under the revised State Council regulation (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures are calculated with sector-specific rules.

The 2024 revision raised the prior levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, which SAMR estimated would cut notifiable deals by about 30% and reduce transaction costs. A deal must not close before clearance; “gun-jumping” draws penalties. SAMR runs a simplified track with a “double 20-day” target (acceptance and review) for straightforward cases, and has moved pilot delegated review with provincial bureaus to formal delegated review (trial delegation转为正式委托 in August 2025, refined by an announcement in March 2026).

The throughput is real: in 2025 SAMR lawfully concluded 706 concentration cases, up 9.8% year-on-year, with 83% closing at the 30-day preliminary-review stage. In key fields such as automotive, photovoltaics and lithium batteries, the agency applies “fast review without lowering quality” to support restructuring.

Gate 3 — national security review

Where the acquisition is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor acquires actual control, security review is required before implementation. The *Measures for Foreign Investment Security Review* (NDRC and MOFCOM, issued 19 December 2020, effective 18 January 2021) define the covered scope: national defence and surrounding areas; and important agriculture, energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, important infrastructure, important transport services, important culture, important IT and internet products/services, important financial services, key technologies and other important areas — where the investor obtains actual control.

The “actual control” test is broader than merger control’s: it includes holding 50%+ equity; holding under 50% but with voting rights that materially influence board/shareholder resolutions; or other circumstances where the investor materially influences business decisions, personnel, finance or technology. Procedure runs preliminary (15 working days to decide whether to review) → general review (30 working days) → special review (60 working days, extendable); the decision is final and may prohibit, condition or clear the deal. Because it can override a cleared merger filing, security review is the gate an acquirer must screen first — and, as the 2026 Meta–Manus prohibition showed, it is actively enforced (see the dedicated article in this series).

Listed-company strategic investment (2024 update)

Where the target is a listed company, the foreign investor must also comply with the revised *Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors* (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; published 1 November 2024, effective 2 December 2024). The revision materially lowers the bar: foreign natural persons are allowed; asset thresholds are eased (non-controlling investors need only USD 50m owned or USD 3bn managed; controlling investors need USD 100m owned or USD 500m managed); cross-border share swaps are eased for directed issues and tender offers; the strategic-investment methods add tender offers; the holding-ratio requirement for agreement-transfer/tender-offer is cut from 10% to 5% (and eliminated for directed issues); and the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (or longer if other rules require). Importantly, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval — it is handled through information reporting and securities-market rules, with security-review and merger-control interfaces preserved.

A realistic timeline

A straightforward, unrestricted, below-threshold acquisition can complete in roughly 2–4 months: due diligence and SPA, the foreign-investment information report and company-law filings, and any sector licence. Add merger control where thresholds are met — the simplified track targets about 20 days for review plus filing time; the standard track can run longer. Add security review where scope and control are present — the 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions) can extend well beyond a year for sensitive cases. The three workstreams should run in parallel, but closing is gated by the slowest mandatory clearance.

Do not sequence the clearances serially. Begin merger-control and security-review analyses at term-sheet stage, because the documents and substantive analysis overlap with diligence; locking the structure before the reviews are scoped risks a late redesign. Build the long-stop date around the special-review maximum, not the preliminary-review minimum.

What to do next

  • Screen the target sector against the 2024 negative list; if restricted, confirm the equity/control condition can be met before signing.
  • Run a merger-control threshold test early (worldwide >RMB 12bn & two parties >RMB 800m China; or China aggregate >RMB 4bn & two parties >RMB 800m China).
  • Test security-review scope and “actual control” (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
  • For listed targets, apply the 2024 strategic-investment rules and route through information reporting, not commerce approval.
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand.
  • Set the long-stop around the special-review maximum, and begin both reviews at term-sheet stage.

Common misreads

Three mistakes recur. First, sequencing the clearances serially (merger control, then security review, then licence) when they should run in parallel — serial handling is the usual cause of a missed long-stop. Second, assuming that because a deal is below the merger-control thresholds no ex-ante review applies at all; security review can still be triggered by a covered sector and control, independent of size. Third, underestimating “actual control” for security review — a minority stake with veto rights can count — which leads teams to skip the screen and discover the gap late. Scoping both reviews at term-sheet stage is the single best defence.

2026年外资并购中国：审查地图与时间线

2020年后的交易框架

外国投资者收购中国公司现今置于《外商投资法》框架下，而非旧有的审批式并购规则。行为变化是决定性的：交易本身不再是商务部门审批事件。投资者依据公司法设立或转让，清除任何负面清单条件，报送外商投资信息，并在触发时分别通过市场监管总局（SAMR）的经营者集中（反垄断）审查与发改委牵头机制的国家安全审查。厘清究竟哪些关口适用并并行推进，是顺利交割的核心。

关口一——负面清单与信息报告

2024年全国外资负面清单含29条，于2024年11月1日施行。若目标行业在清单上，收购须满足其条件（股权上限、中方控股要求等）；若不在清单上，则与境内并购平等对待。跨境换股允许但有条件——一般作为对价的外国股权应为境外上市公司股权，不过2024年战投规则对特定定向发行与要约收购结构有所放宽。交易后，外国投资者报送投资信息而非申请审批。

关口二——经营者集中（反垄断）申报

外国收购方须在实施达到门槛的集中前通知SAMR。依修订后的国务院规定（第773号令，2024年1月26日施行），上一会计年度所有当事人全球合计营业额超120亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元，或当事人中国境内合计营业额超40亿元且至少两方中国境内各超8亿元，须申报。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别规则计算。

2024年修订将原有标准（100亿/20亿/4亿）提高至120亿/40亿/8亿元，SAMR估计可使申报量减少约30%、降低交易成本。交易不得在未获核准前实施；”抢跑”受罚。SAMR对简易案件设”双20天”目标（受理与审查各20天），并将试点委托地方审查转为正式委托（2025年8月试点转正式，2026年3月公告完善）。

成效实在：2025年SAMR依法审结经营者集中706件，同比增长9.8%，83%在30天初步审查阶段结案。在汽车、光伏、锂电池等重点领域，该局”快审不降质”以支持重组。

关口三——国家安全审查

当收购位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时，须在实施前通过安全审查。《外商投资安全审查办法》（发改委、商务部，2020年12月19日发布，2021年1月18日施行）界定范围：国防及周围地区；以及重要农产品、能源资源、重大装备制造、重要基础设施、重要运输服务、重要文化、重要信息技术和互联网产品与服务、重要金融服务、关键技术等重要领域——且投资者取得实际控制权。

“实际控制”标准宽于经营者集中：包括持股50%以上；持股不足50%但表决权对董事会/股东会决议产生重大影响；或其他对经营决策、人事、财务、技术产生重大影响的情形。程序为初步（15个工作日决定是否审查）→一般审查（30个工作日）→特别审查（60个工作日，可延长）；决定具终局性，可禁止、附条件批准或准予。因其可推翻已通过的经营者集中，安全审查是收购方须首先筛查的关口——且如2026年Meta–Manus禁止案所示，它正被积极执行（详见本系列专文）。

上市公司战略投资（2024更新）

若目标为上市公司，外国投资者还须遵守修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》（六部门，第3号令，2024；2024年11月1日公布，2024年12月2日施行）。修订大幅降低门槛：允许外国自然人；资产门槛放宽（非控股者实有5000万美元或管理3亿美元；控股者1亿美元或管理5亿美元）；跨境换股对定向发行与要约收购放宽；战略投资方式新增要约收购；协议转让/要约收购持股比由10%降至5%（定向发行取消比例要求）；锁定期由3年降至12个月（其他规则有更长要求从其规定）。重要的是，战略投资不再需商务审批——经信息报告与证券市场规则办理，安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。

现实时间线

一项简单、无限制、未达门槛的收购约2–4个月可完成：尽调与SPA、外商投资信息报告与公司法律文件、以及行业许可。若达门槛则叠加经营者集中——简易案件审查约20天加申报时间；标准案件更久。若涉范围且取得控制权则叠加安全审查——15+30+60工作日路径（含延期）对敏感案件可远超一年。三项工作流应并行，但交割受最慢的强制核准制约。

切勿串行处理核准。应在条款书阶段即启动经营者集中与安全审查分析，因其文件与实质分析与尽调重叠；在审查范围确定前锁定结构，可能导致后期重构。长停日应围绕特别审查上限设定，而非初步审查下限。

下一步

  • 将目标行业对照2024年负面清单筛查；若受限，签约前确认股权/控制条件可满足。
  • 尽早做经营者集中门槛测试（全球超120亿且两方中国各超8亿；或中国合计超40亿且两方中国各超8亿）。
  • 测试安全审查范围与”实际控制”（50%以上股权、重大表决影响、或对决策/人事/财务/技术重大影响）。
  • 对上市公司目标，适用2024年战投规则，经信息报告而非商务审批路径。
  • 经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行；未获所有强制核准前不得交割。
  • 长停日围绕特别审查上限设定，并在条款书阶段即启动两项审查。

常见误读

三类错误反复出现。其一，将核准串行处理（先经营者集中、再安全审查、再许可），而它们本应并行——串行是错过长停日的常见原因。其二，以为交易未达经营者集中门槛便无需任何事前审查；安全审查可因受涵盖领域与控制独立触发，与规模无关。其三，低估安全审查的”实际控制”——具否决权的少数股权亦可能计入——导致团队跳过筛查、后期才发现缺口。在条款书阶段即并行界定两项审查，是最佳防御。

Sources

Foreign M&A / 外资并购

Foreign M&A in China: process & approvals

  • Since 2020, domestic-enterprise M&A is no longer a commerce-department approval event — it runs through the negative list, information reporting, plus merger control and security review where triggered.
    2020 年后，并购境内企业不再是商务部门审批事件——经负面清单、信息报告办理，并在触发时通过经营者集中与安全审查。
  • Merger-control thresholds (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024): worldwide >RMB 12bn and two parties >RMB 800m China, OR China aggregate >RMB 4bn and two parties >RMB 800m China; below-threshold deals can still need security review where scope and control exist.
    经营者集中门槛（第 773 号令，2024 年 1 月 26 日施行）：全球 >120 亿且两方中国 >8 亿，或中国合计 >40 亿且两方中国 >8 亿；未达门槛的交易在涉范围且取得控制权时仍可能需安全审查。
  • SAMR’s simplified track targets a “double 20-day” review; gun-jumping (closing before clearance) draws penalties.
    市场监管总局简易案件推行”双 20 天”审查目标；”抢跑”（获批前实施）受罚。
  • Security review is required where the target is in a covered sensitive sector and the foreign investor acquires actual control; the control test is broader than merger control’s.
    当目标位于受涵盖敏感领域且外国投资者取得实际控制权时须通过安全审查；控制标准宽于经营者集中标准。
  • The 2024 strategic-investment rules (Order No. 3, effective 2 December 2024) ease listed-company investment: foreign natural persons allowed, lower asset thresholds (USD 50m owned / USD 3bn managed for non-controlling), tender offers added, lock-up cut to 12 months, and no commerce approval needed.
    2024 年战投规则（第 3 号令，2024 年 12 月 2 日施行）放宽上市公司投资：允许外国自然人、降低资产门槛（非控股者实有 5,000 万美元或管理 3 亿美元）、新增要约收购、锁定期降至 12 个月，且无需商务审批。
  • A straightforward below-threshold acquisition can close in roughly 2–4 months; security review’s 15+30+60 working-day path (extendable) can exceed a year for sensitive cases.
    一项简单未达门槛的收购约 2–4 个月可完成；安全审查 15+30+60 工作日路径（可延长）对敏感案件可超一年。
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand, and begin the two reviews at term-sheet stage.
    将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进；未获所有强制 clearance 前不得交割，并在条款书阶段启动两项审查。

Foreign M&A in China: process & approvals | 外资并购中国企业的流程与审批

Overview

Acquiring a domestic Chinese company as a foreign investor runs through the same foreign-investment framework as greenfield entry, plus two deal-specific gates: merger control (antitrust) clearance with SAMR and national security review where a covered sensitive sector and control are involved. The foundational rule is the Provisions on Foreign Investors’ Mergers of and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises (MOFCOM Order No. 6, 2009), now operating inside the Foreign Investment Law’s negative-list and information-reporting regime. This article maps the process, the filing thresholds, the security review, and a realistic timeline.

A key behavioural change since 2020: M&A of a domestic enterprise is no longer a commerce-department approval event by itself. The investor incorporates/transfers under company law, clears any negative-list condition, reports foreign-investment information, and separately clears merger control and security review where triggered. Understanding which gates actually apply — and running them in parallel — is the core of a smooth closing.

The M&A rule and negative-list applicability

The 2009 M&A provisions govern how a foreign investor acquires equity or assets of a domestic enterprise, or obtains control through other means. They sit beneath the Foreign Investment Law: if the target’s sector is on the negative list, the acquisition must satisfy the list’s conditions (equity caps, Chinese-control, etc.); if off the list, the deal is treated on equal terms with domestic M&A.

Cross-border share swaps are permitted but conditioned: as a general rule the foreign equity used as consideration should be in a listed overseas company, though the 2024 strategic-investment rules relaxed this for certain directed-issue and tender-offer structures (allowing unlisted overseas company equity). Where the target is a listed company, the foreign investor must also comply with the Measures for the Administration of Foreign Investors’ Strategic Investment in Listed Companies, and the deal must respect the negative list — for example, a foreign investor may not acquire control of a sector that the list reserves to Chinese control.

Merger control (antitrust) filing

A foreign acquirer must notify SAMR before implementing a concentration that meets the thresholds. Under the revised State Council regulation (Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024), a concentration must be notified where, in the prior fiscal year, the worldwide aggregate turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 12 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million; OR the parties’ aggregate China turnover exceeds RMB 4 billion and at least two parties each had China turnover above RMB 800 million. Banking, insurance, securities and futures are calculated with sector-specific rules.

The 2024 thresholds raised the prior levels (RMB 10bn / RMB 2bn / RMB 400m) to RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m, cutting the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30%. A deal must not close before clearance; “gun-jumping” draws penalties. SAMR runs a simplified track with a “double 20-day” target for straightforward cases, and has piloted delegated review with selected provincial market-regulation bureaus to bring examination closer to the market.

National security review

Where the acquisition is in a covered sensitive sector (defence, important agriculture/energy/equipment/infrastructure/transport/culture/IT/finance/key tech) and the foreign investor acquires actual control, security review is required before implementation. The control test is broader than the merger-control test, so review can be triggered even when no antitrust filing is needed. The procedure runs preliminary (15 working days) → general (30) → special (60, extendable) review; the decision is final and can prohibit or condition the deal. Because it can override a cleared merger filing, security review is the gate an acquirer must screen first.

Strategic investment in listed companies (2024 update)

The revised Measures for Foreign Investors’ Strategic Investment in Listed Companies (six agencies, Order No. 3, 2024; effective 2 December 2024) lower the bar materially: foreign natural persons are allowed; asset thresholds are eased (non-controlling investors need only USD 500m owned or USD 3bn managed); tender offers are added as a method; cross-border share swaps are eased for directed issues and tender offers; and the lock-up is cut from three years to twelve months (longer if other rules require). Importly, post-Foreign-Investment-Law, strategic investment no longer requires commerce-department approval — it is handled through information reporting and the securities-market rules, with security-review and merger-control interfaces preserved.

Typical timeline

A straightforward, unrestricted, below-threshold acquisition can complete in roughly 2–4 months: due diligence and SPA (variable), the foreign-investment information report and company-law filings (weeks), and any sector licence. Add merger control where thresholds are met (the simplified track targets ~20 days for review plus filing time; the standard track can run longer). Add security review where scope and control are present — the 15 + 30 + 60 working-day path (plus extensions) can extend well beyond a year for sensitive cases. The three workstreams should run in parallel, but closing is gated by the slowest mandatory clearance.

A practical tip: do not sequence the clearances serially. Begin merger-control and security-review analyses at term-sheet stage, because the documents and the substantive analysis overlap with diligence; locking the structure before the reviews are scoped risks a redesign late in the process. Build the long-stop date around the special-review maximum, not the preliminary-review minimum.

What to do next

Common misreads

Three mistakes recur in cross-border deals. The first is sequencing the clearances serially — merger control, then security review, then licence — when they should run in parallel; serial handling is the usual cause of a missed long-stop. The second is assuming that because a deal is below the merger-control turnover thresholds, no ex-ante review applies at all; security review can still be triggered by a covered sector and control, independent of size. The third is underestimating the breadth of “actual control” for security review — a minority stake with veto rights can count — which leads teams to skip the screen and discover the gap late. Scoping both reviews at term-sheet stage is the single best defence.

  • Screen the target sector against the 2024 negative list; if restricted, confirm the equity/control condition can be met before signing.
  • Run a merger-control threshold test early (worldwide >RMB 12bn & two parties >RMB 800m China; or China aggregate >RMB 4bn & two parties >RMB 800m China).
  • Test security-review scope and “actual control” (50%+ equity, material voting influence, or material influence on decisions/personnel/finance/tech).
  • For listed-company targets, apply the 2024 strategic-investment rules and route through information reporting, not commerce approval.
  • Run merger control, security review and sector licensing in parallel; do not close until every mandatory clearance is in hand.
  • Set the long-stop around the special-review maximum, and begin the two reviews at term-sheet stage rather than after signing.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: National security review of foreign investment
  • see also: FIE admission rules: approval vs. filing
  • see also: One-stop foreign investment service windows

外资并购中国企业的流程与审批

概述

外国投资者收购中国境内企业，遵循与绿地投资相同的外资框架，外加两道交易专属关卡：市场监管总局的经营者集中（反垄断）审查，以及涉及受涵盖敏感领域并取得控制权时的外商投资安全审查。基础规则是《关于外国投资者并购境内企业的规定》（商务部 2009 年第 6 号令），现运行于《外商投资法》的负面清单与信息报告制度之下。本文梳理流程、申报门槛、安全审查与合理时间表。

2020 年后的关键行为变化：并购境内企业本身不再是商务部门审批事件。投资者依公司法完成转让／设立，满足负面清单条件，报送外商投资信息，并在触发时另行通过经营者集中与安全审查。弄清哪些关卡真正适用——并并行推进——是顺利交割的核心。

并购规则与负面清单适用

2009 年并购规定规范外国投资者取得境内企业股权或资产，或通过其他方式取得控制权。其置于《外商投资法》之下：若目标行业在负面清单上，收购须满足清单条件（股比上限、中方控股等）；若不在清单上，则按内资并购同等对待。

跨境换股被允许但有条件：一般规则下作为支付对价的外国股权应为境外上市公司股权，但 2024 年战投规则对特定定向发行与要约收购结构有所放宽（允许境外非上市公司股权）。目标为上市公司的，还须遵守《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》，且交易须尊重负面清单——例如，外国投资者不得取得清单保留由中方控股行业的控制权。

经营者集中（反垄断）申报

外国收购方须在实施达到门槛的集中前，向市场监管总局申报。依修订后的国务院规定（第 773 号令，2024 年 1 月 26 日施行），上一会计年度参与集中各方全球合计营业额超 120 亿元且至少两方中国境内营业额均超 8 亿元；或各方中国境内合计营业额超 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内营业额均超 8 亿元，即须申报。银行、保险、证券、期货按行业特别办法计算。

2024 年门槛将原标准（100 亿／20 亿／4 亿）提高至 120 亿／40 亿／8 亿，预计减少约 30% 应申报交易。交易须在获批前不得实施；”抢跑”受罚。市场监管总局简易案件推行受理与审查”双 20 天”目标，并试点委托部分省级市场监管局开展审查，使审查更贴近市场。

外商投资安全审查

当收购位于受涵盖敏感领域（军工、重要农业／能源／装备／基础设施／运输／文化／信息技术／金融／关键技术）且外国投资者取得实际控制权时，须在实施前通过安全审查。控制标准宽于经营者集中标准，故即便无需反垄断申报，仍可能触发审查。程序为初步审查（15 个工作日）→ 一般审查（30）→ 特别审查（60，可延长）；决定为最终决定，可禁止或附条件。因其可凌驾于已通过的经营者集中申报，安全审查是收购方须最先筛查的关卡。

上市公司战略投资（2024 更新）

修订后的《外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法》（六部门，2024 年第 3 号令，2024 年 12 月 2 日施行）大幅降低门槛：允许外国自然人；资产要求放宽（非控股股东仅需实有资产 5,000 万美元或管理资产 3 亿美元）；新增要约收购方式；定向发行与要约收购的跨境换股放宽；锁定期由三年降至十二个月（其他规则有更长要求的从其规定）。重要的是，在外商投资法后，战略投资不再需商务部门审批——经信息报告与证券市场规则办理，安全审查与经营者集中接口保留。

典型时间表

一项简单、不受限、未达门槛的收购约 2–4 个月可完成：尽调与股权协议（可变）、外商投资信息报告与公司法项下登记（数周）、及相关行业许可。达到门槛的加经营者集中（简易案件审查目标约 20 天加申报时间；普通案件可能更久）。涉范围且取得控制权的加安全审查——15 + 30 + 60 工作日路径（可延长）对敏感案件可远超一年。三道工作流应并行，但交割受最慢的强制 clearance 约束。

实务提示：勿将各项 clearance 串行。在条款书阶段即启动经营者集中与安全审查分析，因其文件与实质分析与尽调重叠；在审查范围确定前锁定结构，可能导致流程后期重构。长止期应围绕特别审查上限而非初步审查下限设定。

下一步建议

常见误读

跨境交易中有三类反复出现的错误。其一，将各项 clearance 串行——先经营者集中，再安全审查，再许可——而它们应并行；串行处理是错过长止期的常见原因。其二，以为交易未达经营者集中营业额门槛即完全无需事前审查；受涵盖领域加控制权仍可触发安全审查，与规模无关。其三，低估安全审查”实际控制”的广度——具否决权的少数股权亦可计入——导致团队跳过筛查、后期才发现缺口。在条款书阶段即对两项审查做范围筛查，是最佳防御。

  • 将目标行业对照 2024 年版负面清单；若受限，签约前确认股比／控股条件可满足。
  • 尽早做经营者集中门槛测试（全球 >120 亿且两方中国 >8 亿；或中国合计 >40 亿且两方中国 >8 亿）。
  • 测试安全审查范围与”实际控制”（50% 以上股权、重大表决影响，或对决策／人事／财务／技术的重大影响）。
  • 目标为上市公司的，适用 2024 年战投规则，经信息报告而非商务审批办理。
  • 将经营者集中、安全审查与行业许可并行推进；未获所有强制 clearance 前不得交割。
  • 长止期围绕特别审查上限设定，并在条款书阶段而非签约后启动两项审查。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见：外商投资安全审查
  • 参见：外资企业准入：审批与备案
  • 参见：外商投资一站式服务窗口
Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing

  • Foreign acquisitions, mergers, or acquisitions of control over a Chinese business may trigger a concentration filing to SAMR; the regime is mandatory and suspensory.
    外资收购、合并或取得中国企业控制权可能触发向国家市场监督管理总局的经营者集中申报；该制度具有强制性与暂停性。
  • The 2024 thresholds (State Council Order No. 773, effective 26 January 2024) are global RMB 12bn / China RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties), cutting notifiable deals by an estimated 30%.
    2024年阈值（国务院第773号令，2024年1月26日施行）为全球120亿／中国40亿／两方各8亿元，预计减少约30%的申报量。
  • A minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a notifiable concentration; pure intra-group reorganizations are exempt.
    赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属应申报集中；纯集团内部重组可豁免。
  • SAMR review runs an ordinary 30+90 day (extendable 60) procedure or a simplified “double 20 days” procedure, with outcomes of unconditional clearance, remedies, or prohibition.
    SAMR审查分普通程序30+90日（可延长60）或简易程序”双20天”，结果含无条件批准、附加条件批准或禁止。
  • “Gun-jumping” (acting before clearance) risks divestiture, fines up to RMB 5 million, and up to 10% of prior-year turnover for serious violations under the 2022 AML amendment.
    “抢跑”（获批前实施）风险包括责令恢复原状、最高500万元罚款，及依2022年修法情节严重最高处上一年度营业额10%罚款。
  • Foreign investors must keep closing, control, and integration waiting for SAMR clearance, and carve out China if a global deal closes elsewhere first.
    外国投资者须使交割、控制权与整合等待SAMR批准，若全球交易先在其他法域关闭则应拆分中国部分。

Anti-monopoly & Merger Control Filing | 反垄断与经营者集中申报

Overview

When a foreign investor acquires a Chinese company, merges with a local competitor, or takes control of a domestic business, the transaction may trigger a concentration filing (经营者集中申报) under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). The filing is made to the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), the national antitrust enforcement authority. The regime is mandatory and suspensory: if thresholds are met, the deal may not close (and control may not be exercised) until clearance is granted. Getting this wrong exposes the parties to “gun-jumping” penalties that, since the 2022 AML amendment, can reach a percentage of turnover.

This article sets out the 2024 turnover thresholds, how SAMR reviews a concentration, the simplified versus ordinary procedure, and the practical risk of closing before clearance.

Turnover thresholds for concentration filing

The current notification thresholds are set by the State Council’s “Provisions on the Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings” (Order No. 773), revised and effective 26 January 2024. A concentration must be notified to SAMR in advance, and may not be implemented until cleared, where either of the following is met (based on the parties’ turnover in the previous accounting year):

  • Global test: the worldwide aggregate turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million; or
  • China test: the aggregate China turnover of all participating undertakings exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two of them each had China turnover exceeding RMB 800 million.

These thresholds were raised from the prior RMB 10 billion / RMB 2 billion / RMB 400 million, reducing the number of notifiable deals by an estimated 30% and lowering transaction costs. Turnover of the relevant group (not just the target) counts, and special rules apply to banking, insurance, securities, and futures. Even below the thresholds, SAMR may call in a transaction if it is likely to eliminate or restrict competition (the “fall below but suspect” power).

A concentration is defined as: (a) a merger; (b) acquisition of control through equity or assets; or (c) acquisition of control or decisive influence through contracts. Note that acquiring a minority stake that confers control or decisive influence can still be a notifiable concentration. Two exemptions apply: where one party already holds >50% of the other, or where a common parent holds >50% of each — i.e., pure intra-group reorganizations.

SAMR review procedure

Upon submission, SAMR decides whether to accept the filing. Once accepted, the ordinary (non-simplified) review has two phases: an initial 30-day phase, and, if it proceeds, a further 90-day phase (extendable by 60 days in specified circumstances). A simplified procedure applies to non-controversial deals — for example, where the parties are not competitors in the same market, or one party acquires a sole control stake in a joint venture — with a compressed timetable (the regulator targets “double 20 days” for acceptance and review of simplified cases). SAMR may clear unconditionally, clear with behavioural or structural remedies (附加条件批准), or prohibit the concentration.

Parties should expect to submit a notification form, market definitions, turnover calculations, competitive-effects analysis, and (for foreign-to-China deals) information on global filings. Early pre-filing consultation with SAMR is common and reduces the risk of a long Phase 2. Since 2023, SAMR has also piloted delegated review to five provincial market-regulation bureaus for certain simplified cases, improving speed for deals centered in those regions.

Gun-jumping and enforcement risk

“Gun-jumping” means implementing a concentration — or exercising control — before clearance. The 2022 AML amendment significantly strengthened enforcement. Implementing a notifiable concentration without filing, or implementing before clearance, can result in an order to restore the prior state (divestiture / undo the deal), a fine of up to RMB 5 million for the undertaking, and — importantly — for the 2022 amendment’s proportional penalty regime, fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s turnover in the prior year where the violation is serious. Responsible individuals may also be fined. Even signing and partially closing (e.g., taking board control, consolidating financials, or integrating the business) before clearance can be caught.

The lesson for foreign investors: structure the timetable so that closing, control, and integration wait for SAMR clearance. Use a long-stop date and conditions precedent, and keep the businesses separate (no joint management, no shared systems, no consolidated reporting) until the green light. Where a global deal must close elsewhere first, carve out the China leg or ring-fence the Chinese target to avoid premature exercise of control in China.

What to do next

  • Run the threshold test early using worldwide and China turnover of the whole group for the prior year; remember the RMB 12bn / RMB 4bn / RMB 800m (two parties) 2024 thresholds.
  • Map the control question — a minority stake conferring control or decisive influence is still a concentration.
  • Plan for suspension — make SAMR clearance a condition precedent; do not close, integrate, or exercise control in China before approval.
  • Consider simplified procedure if markets don’t overlap, and use pre-filing consultation to compress the timeline.
  • Watch the gun-jumping traps — no board control, consolidation, or integration pre-clearance; carve out China if the global deal closes earlier.

Sources

Related reading

  • see also: Cybersecurity & MLPS (等保) for FIEs — M&A can reset system grading and trigger new filings.
  • see also: Foreign-related dispute resolution — litigation vs. arbitration — challenging or enforcing merger decisions.
  • see also: CIETAC & international arbitration — arbitrating competition and shareholder disputes.

反垄断与经营者集中申报

概述

当外国投资者收购中国企业、与本土竞争者合并，或取得境内企业的控制权时，该交易可能触发《反垄断法》项下的经营者集中申报。申报向国家市场监督管理总局（SAMR）——反垄断执法机构——提出。该制度具有强制性与暂停性：一旦达到阈值，在获得批准前不得实施集中（亦不得行使控制权）。若处理不当，当事人将面临”抢跑”（gun-jumping）处罚；自 2022 年《反垄断法》修订后，罚款可达营业额的一定比例。

本文列明 2024 年营业额阈值、SAMR 如何审查集中、简易与普通程序的区分，以及”获批前Closing”的实务风险。

经营者集中申报的营业额阈值

现行申报阈值由《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》（第 773 号令）设定，于 2024 年 1 月 26 日修订施行。集中达到以下任一标准（按参与者上一会计年度营业额计算），须事先向 SAMR 申报，未申报不得实施：

  • 全球标准：参与集中的所有经营者全球合计营业额超过120 亿元人民币，且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元；或
  • 中国标准：参与集中的所有经营者中国境内合计营业额超过40 亿元，且其中至少两个上一会计年度在中国境内营业额均超过8 亿元。

上述阈值较此前的 100 亿 / 20 亿 / 4 亿元上调，预计减少约 30% 的申报量，降低交易成本。计算以相关集团（而非仅标的）营业额为准，银行、保险、证券、期货等行业另有特别办法。即便未达阈值，若具有或可能具有排除、限制竞争效果，SAMR 仍可主动要求申报（”未达阈值但有嫌疑”权力）。

集中指：（一）经营者合并；（二）通过股权或资产取得控制权；（三）通过合同取得控制权或决定性影响。注意：取得赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍可能构成应申报集中。两类豁免适用：一方已持有另一方 50% 以上表决权股份，或同一未参与集中的经营者持有各方 50% 以上表决权股份——即纯集团内部重组。

SAMR 审查程序

受理申报后，SAMR 决定是否予以立案。立案后，普通程序分两阶段：初始30 日审查期；若进一步审查，再加90 日（特定情形下可延长 60 日）。简易程序适用于无争议的 Deal——例如当事方不在同一市场竞争，或一方取得合营企业单独控制权——时间表压缩（监管目标为简易程序”受理与审查双 20 天”）。SAMR 可无条件批准、附行为性或结构性条件批准（附加条件批准），或禁止集中。

当事人应准备申报书、相关市场界定、营业额计算、竞争效果分析，以及（外资赴华交易）全球申报信息。与 SAMR 的事前商谈十分常见，可降低进入第二阶段的风险。自 2023 年起，SAMR 还试点将部分简易案件委托五个省级市场监管部门审查，提升区域集中交易的效率。

抢跑与执法风险

“抢跑”指在未获批准前实施集中或行使控制权。2022 年《反垄断法》修订显著强化了执法。应申报而未申报，或在获批前实施集中，可能导致责令恢复原状（剥离/撤销交易）、对经营者最高500 万元罚款；更重要的是，依 2022 年修订的比例罚款机制，情节严重的可被处上一年度营业额 10% 以下的罚款。直接责任人员亦可能被罚。即便签约并部分 closing（如取得董事会控制、合并财务报表或整合业务），也可能被认定为抢跑。

对外国投资者的启示：时间表应安排为交割、控制权与整合均等待 SAMR 批准。使用最晚截止日与先决条件，在绿灯前保持标的独立（不共同管理、不共享系统、不合并报告）。若全球交易须在其他法域先 closing，应拆分中国部分或对中国标的”隔离”，以避免在中国境内过早行使控制权。

下一步建议

  • 尽早做阈值测试：使用整个集团上一年度的全球与中国营业额；牢记 2024 年 120 亿 / 40 亿 / 8 亿（两方）标准。
  • 厘清控制权问题——赋予控制权或决定性影响的少数股权仍属集中。
  • 规划暂停性：将 SAMR 批准设为先决条件；获批前不在华交割、整合或行使控制权。
  • 考虑简易程序：若市场不重叠，并利用事前商谈压缩周期。
  • 警惕抢跑陷阱：获批前不得董事会控制、合并报表或整合；若全球先 closing，拆分中国部分。

来源

相关阅读

  • 参见：网络安全与等保（外资适用）— 并购可能重置系统定级并触发新备案。
  • 参见：涉外争议解决：诉讼与仲裁 — 对集中决定的异议与执行。
  • 参见：贸仲与涉外仲裁 — 仲裁竞争与股东纠纷。
Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

  • From 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s refined delegated-review system adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original provincial bureaus and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起，市场监管总局完善后的经营者集中委托审查制度在原 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上，增加部分非简易案件委托审查，并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个受委托部门。
  • Delegated simple-case bureaus now total eight, and the delegated average acceptance and completion times have both stayed within roughly 20 days, materially faster than national review.
    简易案件受委托省级部门增至 8 个；受委托部门平均受理与审结时间均在约 20 天内，明显快于全国审查。
  • Zhejiang handles simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi from August 2026, giving regional companies near-by filing and review.
    2026 年 8 月起，浙江受委托承担浙江、福建、江西三省区域内经营者集中简易案件审查，区域企业可就近申报办理。
  • The SAMR also published six typical concentration cases on 21 August 2026, showing how review supports restructuring in platforms, PV, batteries, auto parts and coal logistics while curbing “involutionary” competition.
    市场监管总局 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例，展示审查如何在平台、光伏、锂电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。
  • For foreign-invested groups, the changes affect where and how quickly qualifying deals are cleared, but the mandatory prior-filing threshold and substantive standards are unchanged.
    对外资集团而言，变化影响合格交易的审查地点与速度；强制事先申报门槛与实体标准不变。

Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026) | 经营者集中委托审查扩容：区域化并购审查与新典型案例（2026 年 8 月）

Why this matters now

On 1 August 2026, the SAMR’s Announcement on Further Improving the Delegated Review System for Concentrations of Undertakings took effect. The system, which began as a pilot in August 2022 and was formalised in July 2025, now adds review of certain non-simple concentration cases by the five original delegated provincial bureaus — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi — and adds Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan as delegated bureaus for simple cases. A week later, on 21 August 2026, the SAMR published six typical cases of concentration review used to support restructuring in platform, solar-PV, battery, auto-parts and coal-logistics sectors while curbing “involutionary” competition. For foreign-invested enterprises and their advisers, the combination of wider delegation, faster regional clearance and clearer enforcement signals changes the practical geography of merger control in China.

What the expanded delegation changes

The delegated-review system is a division of work within China’s unitary concentration-review regime: the SAMR remains the reviewing authority, receives filings through the central business system, and delegates qualifying cases to provincial bureaus, which conduct the review and report back. The August 2026 changes operate on three axes. First, scope: in addition to simple cases, certain non-simple cases may now be delegated to the five original bureaus. The delegation criteria for non-simple cases include a combined market share of 15–25% in the same relevant market; or 25–35% shares in upstream and downstream markets respectively; or 25–35% shares in each relevant market for parties without horizontal or vertical relationships. Second, coverage: Liaoning, Zhejiang and Sichuan join as delegated bureaus for simple cases, bringing the total to eight, each responsible for a defined regional territory. Zhejiang, for example, reviews simple cases for Zhejiang, Fujian and Jiangxi. Third, procedure: the SAMR has upgraded its concentration-review business system, revised the working handbook for provincial bureaus, and retained the rule that non-simple delegated cases must still have documents such as clearance decisions issued under the SAMR’s authority, while decisions with conditions or prohibitions are issued centrally by the SAMR.

Operationally, the delegated bureaus report average acceptance and completion times of about 16 and 18 days respectively — both within roughly 20 days — under the “double twenty” working standard, and simple cases account for about 90% of all concentration filings. For companies in the covered regions, the practical effect is faster, closer review: the Zhejiang bureau published a consultation phone line and a pre-filing consultation mechanism, and the entire process runs online.

The typical cases and enforcement signals

The six typical cases published on 21 August 2026 illustrate how the SAMR balances support for restructuring with restraint on harmful competition. Tencent’s acquisition of Ximalaya was approved with five restrictive conditions (May 2026) to protect competition in online-audio and online-music markets; TCL Zhonghuan’s acquisition of Yidao New Energy was cleared unconditionally to consolidate solar-PV capacity; Hubei Jingjiang’s acquisition of East Group was cleared to support transformation into an “AI + new energy” services provider; and joint-venture cases in battery separators, automotive air-suspension components and coal logistics were cleared to integrate regional capacity and reduce low-level duplication. For foreign-invested companies, the enforcement posture is double-sided: genuine restructuring that improves efficiency and quality is supported, but transactions that entrench dominance or enable coordinated “involutionary” behaviour will attract conditions or prohibition — and the delegated bureaus apply the same substantive standards as the SAMR.

Practical steps

  1. Check whether delegation affects your filing. Determine whether your transaction meets the simple-case thresholds and whether the relevant market or parties sit in a delegated bureau’s territory; if so, expect local filing and faster clearance.
  2. Use pre-filing consultation. The business system and delegated bureaus (for example Zhejiang’s published hotline) allow pre-filing discussion of whether a filing is needed and how to frame the transaction.
  3. Plan the timeline around the “double twenty” standard. For qualifying cases, acceptance and completion are each targeted within 20 days; align signing, closing and financing steps accordingly.
  4. Treat simple-case status carefully. Simple-case filing is faster but still requires full and accurate notification; mischaracterisation invites correction and delay.
  5. Watch the substantive lines. The typical cases show that restrictive conditions and prohibitions are live tools for platform and network effects; conduct a realistic competition assessment before filing.
  6. Maintain group-wide notification discipline. The delegation does not lower the mandatory filing thresholds — turnover-based thresholds remain — and failure to file before closing (“gun-jumping”) remains a serious violation.

Compliance notes

The delegated-review system is administrative division of work, not decentralisation of substantive standards. The SAMR still issues conditional-approval and prohibition decisions; delegated bureaus act within their mandates and under the SAMR’s supervision. For foreign investors, the important practical change is speed and location of review, plus a clearer picture of how the SAMR treats sector restructuring. Nothing in the August 2026 changes alters the prior-filing obligation, the notification thresholds, or the penalties for closing before approval. Keep the transaction diary, engage the business system early, and treat the six typical cases as a practical guide to how restructuring proposals will be framed and assessed.

经营者集中委托审查扩容：区域化并购审查与新典型案例（2026 年 8 月）/ Merger Control Goes Regional: China’s Expanded Delegated Review System and New Typical Cases (August 2026)

为什么当下重要

2026 年 8 月 1 日，《市场监管总局关于进一步完善经营者集中委托审查制度的公告》正式施行。这一始于 2022 年 8 月试点、2025 年 7 月转正的制度，如今在原北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西 5 个省级市场监管部门审查部分简易案件的基础上，增加部分非简易案件的委托审查，并新增辽宁、浙江、四川 3 个简易案件受委托部门。一周后，市场监管总局于 2026 年 8 月 21 日公布六起经营者集中审查典型案例，展示审查如何在平台、光伏、电池、汽车零部件与煤炭物流领域支持整合重组、遏制”内卷式”竞争。对外资企业及其顾问而言，委托扩容、区域快速审结与更清晰的执法信号，共同改变了中国经营者集中的实务版图。

扩容改变了什么

委托审查制度是中国单一集中的审查体制内的分工：市场监管总局是审查机关，通过全国经营者集中业务系统统一接收申报，将符合条件的案件转受委托省级部门办理，后者审查并报告，总局作出决定。2026 年 8 月的调整沿三条轴展开。其一，范围：除简易案件外，部分非简易案件现在可委托原 5 个省级部门审查。非简易案件委托标准包括：同一相关市场合计份额 15%–25%；上下游市场份额均 25%–35%；无横向纵向关系者在每个相关市场份额均 25%–35%。其二，覆盖面：辽宁、浙江、四川加入简易案件受委托名单，受委托部门增至 8 个，各负责相应区域。例如，浙江受理浙江、福建、江西三省的简易案件。其三，程序：总局升级经营者集中反垄断业务系统、修订省级审查工作手册；非简易案件委托仍以总局名义出具批准文书，附条件批准或禁止的由总局统一发布决定。

运营层面，受委托部门在”双二十”工作标准下，平均受理约 16 天、审结约 18 天，均不超过约 20 天；简易案件约占全部申报的九成。对覆盖区域内的企业，实际效果是更快、更近的审查：浙江省局公布咨询电话并实行申报前商谈机制，全流程线上办理。

典型案例与执法信号

2026 年 8 月 21 日公布的六起典型案例展示总局如何在支持重组与遏制有害竞争之间平衡。腾讯收购喜马拉雅股权案于 2026 年 5 月附加五项限制性条件批准，以保护在线音频、网络音乐市场竞争；TCL 中环收购一道新能源案无条件批准，以整合光伏产能；湖北荆江收购易事特案批准，支持转型”AI+新能源”综合服务商；电池隔膜、汽车空气悬架部件与煤炭物流的新设合营案均无条件批准，以整合区域产能、减少低水平重复。对外资企业，执法姿态是双面的：改善效率与质量的真实重组受到支持，但固化支配地位或促成协同性”内卷”的交易将面临条件或禁止——受委托部门适用与总局一致的实体标准。

操作步骤

  1. 核验委托是否影响申报。 判断交易是否满足简易案件门槛，以及相关市场或当事方是否位于受委托部门辖区；若是，将属地申报并更快审结。
  2. 利用申报前商谈。 业务系统与受委托部门（如浙江公布的咨询电话）支持申报前讨论是否需要申报及如何构架交易。
  3. 按”双二十”标准排期。 合格案件受理与审结各目标 20 天内；据此安排签约、交割与融资节点。
  4. 审慎对待简易地位。 简易申报更快，但仍需完整准确申报；错误定性将招致更正与延误。
  5. 关注实体红线。 典型案例显示，对平台与网络效应，限制性条件与禁止是活跃工具；申报前应作现实竞争评估。
  6. 保持集团申报纪律。 委托不降低强制申报门槛——营业额门槛不变——交割前未申报（抢跑）仍是严重违规。

合规提示

委托审查是行政分工，不是实体标准的分散化。总局仍统一作出附条件批准与禁止决定；受委托部门在其职责内、在总局监督下行事。对外资投资者，实际变化主要是审查速度与地点，以及对总局如何处理行业重组的更清晰图景。2026 年 8 月的调整不改变事先申报义务、申报门槛或未批先交的处罚。保留交易台账、尽早接入业务系统，并将六起典型案例视为理解重组方案如何被构架与评估的实务指南。

Sources

Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026)

  • A concentration must be notified to SAMR before closing if it meets the turnover thresholds; failing to file or closing early triggers investigation and penalties.
    达到营业额标准的经营者集中，须在实施前事先向市场监管总局申报；未申报或获批前实施将面临调查与处罚。
  • Current thresholds (raised in the 2024 revision): global aggregate turnover > RMB 12bn, or China aggregate > RMB 4bn with at least two parties each > RMB 0.8bn in China.
    现行标准（2024 年修订提高）：全球合计营业额 > 120 亿元，或中国境内合计 > 40 亿元且至少两方中国境内各 > 8 亿元。
  • The industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (effective 1 Oct 2025) consolidates prior guidance into one filing playbook — conditions, materials, workflow.
    市场监管行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》（2025 年 10 月 1 日施行）将既往零散指引整合为统一申报手册——申报条件、材料、流程。
  • From 1 August 2026, SAMR delegates part of non-simplified-case review to five provincial bureaus (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, Shaanxi), shortening timelines for non-problematic deals.
    自 2026 年 8 月 1 日起，总局将部分非简易案件委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查，加速无竞争问题交易的落地。
  • Foreign-to-foreign deals can also be caught when they acquire control of, or decisive influence over, a China-business; the same thresholds and suspensory rule apply.
    外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响，同样触发；适用相同标准与「停表」规则。
  • Practical tip: run a control-and-turnover test at term sheet; use SAMR’s pre-filing consultation and the online system to compress the clock.
    实操提示：在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额测试；善用总局商谈与在线系统压缩周期。

Merger Control in China: Concentration Notification Thresholds and the 2026 Delegated Review (2026) | 中国经营者集中审查：申报标准与 2026 委托审查

China’s merger-control regime is built on the *Anti-Monopoly Law* and the *State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Undertakings*. The core rule is suspensory: where a concentration reaches the notification thresholds, the parties must file with the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and may not implement it before clearance. Implementing early — or not filing at all — exposes the parties to investigation and fines.

The thresholds were raised in the 2024 revision. A concentration must be notified if: (a) the aggregate global turnover of all parties in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 12 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion; or (b) the aggregate China turnover of all parties exceeds RMB 4 billion, and at least two parties each had China turnover exceeding RMB 0.8 billion. SAMR is required to assess the thresholds against economic development and may adjust them.

To make filing predictable, SAMR issued the industry standard *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* (released 26 September 2025, effective 1 October 2025). It is the first SAMR industry standard to set out concentration notification in a single, structured document, integrating four prior guidance papers (now repealed). It clarifies what constitutes a concentration (merger; acquisition of control via equity/assets; control or decisive influence via contract), the materials required (notification form, simplified-case requirements, appendices on control and turnover calculation), and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For foreign investors, this means a clearer, more standardised path to clearance.

A notable efficiency change took effect on 1 August 2026. SAMR expanded its delegated-review system: certain non-simplified cases may be entrusted to the provincial bureaus of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing and Shaanxi, within defined market-share bands (e.g., combined share 15–25% in the same relevant market). Simple cases remain delegated to an expanded set of provincial bureaus. The policy aim is “complexity分流” — fast-track deals with no competition concerns so investment closes sooner, while SAMR retains the sensitive matters.

Cross-border relevance is direct. A foreign-to-foreign transaction that acquires control of, or decisive influence over, a Chinese business is not exempt. The same thresholds and the same standstill obligation apply, and SAMR coordinates with foreign enforcers where relevant. Parties should therefore (1) screen control and turnover at the term-sheet stage, (2) consider a pre-filing consultation for novel structures, and (3) use the online system to reduce avoidable back-and-forth. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest way to keep a deal on schedule.

中国经营者集中审查：申报标准与 2026 委托审查

中国的经营者集中制度以《反垄断法》与《国务院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定》为框架。核心规则是「事前审查、停表」：达到申报标准的集中，须事先向市场监管总局（SAMR）申报，未获批准不得实施；抢跑或未申报将触发调查与罚款。

申报标准已在 2024 年修订提高。满足以下之一即须申报：（a）参与集中的所有经营者上一会计年度全球合计营业额超过 120 亿元，且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元；或（b）中国境内合计营业额超过 40 亿元，且至少两个经营者中国境内各超过 8 亿元。总局应根据经济发展情况评估标准实施。

为提升可预期性，总局发布行业标准《经营者集中申报规范》（2025 年 9 月 26 日发布，2025 年 10 月 1 日施行）。这是首部以行业标准形式系统规定经营者集中申报的文件，整合了此前的 4 部申报指导性文件（同步废止），统一明确申报条件（构成集中的情形、控制权判断、营业额计算）、申报材料（申报表、简易案件要求、控制权与营业额计算附录）与流程（商谈、在线提交、受理审查）。对外资而言，这意味着更清晰、标准化的获批路径。

一项提效变化于 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效。总局完善委托审查制度：符合份额区间（如同一相关市场份额合计 15%–25%）的部分非简易案件，可委托北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西五省市局审查；简易案件受托省级局相应扩容。政策意图是「繁简分流」——让无竞争问题的交易加速落地，敏感事项仍由总局把关。

跨境适用性直接。外资间交易若取得对中国境内企业的控制权或决定性影响，并不豁免；同样适用该标准与停表义务，总局在必要时与境外执法机构协调。交易方应：（1）在 term sheet 阶段即做控制权与营业额筛查；（2）对新颖结构善用商谈；（3）用在线系统减少无效往返。早而规范的申报，是让交易按期完成的最低成本方式。

Filing Playbook for Foreign Investors

Start with the control test. Acquisition of a China business — even as part of a global transaction — can constitute a concentration if it confers control or decisive influence. Map the target’s China revenue and the parties’ global and China turnover against the thresholds before signing. If the deal is close to a threshold, model both the global and the Chinaaggregate tests; the lower of the two can still trigger.

Use the 2025 *Specification* as your template. It consolidates what to submit (notification form, simplified-case annexes, control and turnover appendices) and the workflow (pre-filing consultation, online submission, acceptance review). For straightforward, non-problematic deals, consider the simplified procedure and the expanded provincial delegation effective 1 August 2026, which can shift routine non-simplified review to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing or Shaanxi within defined share bands.

Mind the standstill. Do not close, integrate or exercise control before clearance — interim integration (sharing confidential info, appointing managers, consolidating accounts) can be read as early implementation. Build a conditionality and long-stop that reflects the review period, keep the CSRC/security-review workstreams in view if the deal is also an inbound acquisition, and document a clean competition narrative. Early, disciplined filing is the cheapest insurance for deal certainty.

外资申报实操手册

从控制权测试入手。取得中国业务控制权或决定性影响的交易——即便作为全球交易一部分——可能构成集中。签约前将标的中国营收与各党全球/中国营业额对照标准；若接近阈值，同时建模全球与境内合计两种测试，较低者亦可能触发。

以 2025 年《申报规范》为模板。它整合了提交内容（申报表、简易案件附件、控制权与营业额附录）与流程（商谈、在线提交、受理审查）。对清晰无问题的交易，可考虑简易程序及 2026 年 8 月 1 日生效的省级委托扩容——在既定份额区间内将常规非简易案件移至北京、上海、广东、重庆、陕西。

遵守停表。获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制；过渡期整合（共享机密信息、委派管理人、合并账务）可能被认定为提前实施。设定反映审查周期的条件与长停，若同时属 inbound 并购则留意证监会/安审工作流，并备好清晰竞争叙事。早而规范的申报，是交易确定性的最低成本保险。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • Suspensory rule: file with SAMR before closing once thresholds are met; early closing triggers investigation and fines.
  • Thresholds: global aggregate > RMB 12bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China); or China aggregate > RMB 4bn (≥2 parties each > RMB 0.8bn China).
  • Concentration: merger; equity/asset acquisition of control; control/decisive influence by contract.
  • 2025 standard: *Specification for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings* effective 1 Oct 2025 consolidates prior guidance.
  • Delegation: from 1 Aug 2026, part of non-simplified cases delegated to Beijing/Shanghai/Guangdong/Chongqing/Shaanxi.
  • Standstill: no closing, integration or control exercise before clearance.
  • Cross-border: foreign-to-foreign deals acquiring control of a China business are equally caught.

实务速查

  • 停表规则： 达阈值须向 SAMR 申报后方可交割；抢跑触发调查与罚款。
  • 标准： 全球合计 > 120 亿元（至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国）；或中国合计 > 40 亿元（至少两方各 > 8 亿元中国）。
  • 集中： 合并；取得控制权的股权/资产收购；依合同取得控制或决定性影响。
  • 2025 标准： 《经营者集中申报规范》2025 年 10 月 1 日施行，整合既往指引。
  • 委托： 2026 年 8 月 1 日起部分非简易案件委托北京/上海/广东/重庆/陕西。
  • 停表： 获批前不得交割、整合或行使控制。
  • 跨境： 取得中国业务控制权的外资间交易同样被纳入。

Sources

Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review

  • China’s 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 empowers SAMR to review concentrations that fall below the notification thresholds where they may eliminate or restrict competition.
    中国2022年修订的《反垄断法》授权市场监管总局对未达申报标准、但可能排除限制竞争的集中进行审查。
  • “Killer” or “sniping” (掐尖式) acquisitions—buying a nascent rival to discontinue or absorb it—are a stated SAMR enforcement priority, especially in the platform economy.
    “扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购——收购新生竞争对手以停用或吸收之——是市场监管总局明确的执法重点，尤其在平台经济领域。
  • Below-threshold deals are not a safe harbour; the authority can call them in, impose remedies, or unwind completed transactions.
    未达门槛的交易并非安全港；监管可主动立案，附加救济，或撤销已完成的交易。
  • The theory targets potential competition: a small or pre-revenue target’s future trajectory is what makes the deal reviewable.
    该理论针对潜在竞争：标的虽小或尚无营收，其未来轨迹正使交易具有可审查性。
  • As of 2026, the focus has extended from platforms to biotech, semiconductors, and AI, where a startup’s talent or IP is the real asset.
    截至2026年，重点已从平台延伸至生物医药、半导体及人工智能，其中初创企业的人才或知识产权才是真正资产。
  • Entrants should document a genuine, pro-competitive rationale and preserve standalone-viability evidence for any acquisition of an early-stage rival.
    准入者应就收购早期竞争对手记录真实、促进竞争的理据，并保存其独立存续可行性的证据。

Killer-Acquisition Scrutiny in China: Below-Threshold Review | 中国”掐尖式”并购审查：未达门槛的审查

The Legal Hook: Below-Threshold Review

A defining innovation of the 2022 《反垄断法》 amendment is explicit authority for the enforcer to examine concentrations that do not meet the turnover notification thresholds yet “have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.” This closes the gap that previously let small, strategic acquisitions escape scrutiny simply because the target’s revenue was negligible. SAMR may, on its own initiative or following a complaint, open a below-threshold review—even after closing.

What Is a “Killer” or “Sniping” Acquisition?

The term “killer acquisition” (and its Chinese framing 掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购) describes a dominant firm buying an emerging competitor chiefly to shut it down, shelf the product, or absorb its talent and IP rather than to compete with it. The competitive harm is forward-looking: the market loses a future rival, and innovation is chilled. In platform and deep-tech contexts, the acquired asset is often pre-revenue, so classic turnover-based thresholds would never catch it—hence the below-threshold power is the relevant tool.

Why 2026 Makes This Salient

Entering 2026, several forces elevate below-threshold scrutiny:

  • Platform precedent. SAMR’s platform-economy guidance names eliminating potential competition as a core concern, and 掐尖式并购 is repeatedly cited in enforcement rhetoric.
  • Deep-tech race. In semiconductors, AI, and biotech, acquisitions of tiny startups for their talent or patents are strategically loaded; the real value is not current sales but future capability.
  • Talent and data. Buying a team or dataset to neutralize a rival’s trajectory is exactly the harm the below-threshold rule targets.

How SAMR Assesses These Deals

The authority looks beyond current overlap to potential competition:

  • Would the target, absent the deal, likely have become a significant rival?
  • Is the acquirer a dominant or strategically placed firm?
  • Does the transaction remove a nascent competitive constraint?
  • Is there a genuine efficiency or pro-competitive rationale, or merely elimination?

Evidence of “shelving” intent—internal plans to discontinue the product, retain talent only, or refuse to invest—sharpens the case against the deal.

Remedies and Consequences

For below-threshold deals found anticompetitive, SAMR may:

  • Prohibit the transaction;
  • Order divestiture or restructuring of the acquired asset;
  • Impose behavioural remedies (e.g., keep the product alive, license the technology, maintain investment);
  • Unwind a completed concentration and impose turnover-based fines.

Because the acquirer may already have integrated the target, unwinding is disruptive and value-destroying—so the ex ante risk calculus matters more than the (often low) notification threshold.

2026 Practice Notes

  • The below-threshold power is used selectively, not as a dragnet; cases cluster in platform, tech, and innovation-heavy sectors.
  • SAMR signals intent through guidelines and public statements more than through a fixed numerical trigger, so sector context governs.
  • Acquirers of early-stage rivals should expect that a deal’s *strategic logic*, not its size, determines scrutiny.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Do not assume “small = safe.” A below-threshold acquisition of a rival still invites review if its trajectory matters.
  2. Document pro-competitive rationale. Business plans, investment commitments, and roadmaps showing the target will thrive post-deal are protective.
  3. Preserve standalone-viability evidence. Demonstrate the target was not on a clear path to become a rival, or that the deal genuinely accelerates its offering.
  4. Consider voluntary engagement. Where a deal is sensitive, a proactive explanation to SAMR can pre-empt a contested proceeding.
  5. Contract for remediation. Allocate unwinding and remedy risk in the SPA, with appropriate long-stop dates.

Bottom Line

The below-threshold review power reframes China’s merger control: size is no longer the sole gate. For 2026, any acquisition by a dominant or strategically placed firm of an early-stage innovator—especially in platforms, AI, semiconductors, or biotech—should be planned as if scrutinised for its effect on future competition, with the evidentiary file built accordingly.

中国”掐尖式”并购审查：未达门槛的审查

法律抓手：未达门槛的审查

2022年《反垄断法》修订的一项标志性创新，是明确授权执法机关审查未达营业额申报标准、但”具有或者可能具有排除、限制竞争效果”的经营者集中。这填补了此前的漏洞——即小型战略性收购仅因标的营收微薄便可逃避审查。市场监管总局可主动或依举报，开展未达门槛审查，甚至在交割后启动。

何为”扼杀式”或”掐尖式”收购？

“扼杀式收购”（中文亦称掐尖式并购 / 猎杀式并购）指支配企业收购新兴竞争对手，主要目的为关停、搁置产品，或吸收其人才与知识产权，而非与之竞争。其竞争损害是前瞻性的：市场失去一个未来竞争对手，创新受抑。在平台与深科技场景中，被收购资产常处于尚无营收阶段，经典营业额门槛本无从捕获——因此未达门槛的审查权才是适用工具。

2026年为何凸显

进入2026年，多重力量抬升了未达门槛审查：

  • 平台先例。 市场监管总局平台经济指引将消除潜在竞争列为核心关切，”掐尖式并购”在执法论述中屡被援引。
  • 深科技竞赛。 在半导体、人工智能与生物医药领域，为人才或专利而收购微型初创企业具有战略载荷；真正价值不在当前销售，而在未来能力。
  • 人才与数据。 收购团队或数据集以中性化对手轨迹，正是未达门槛规则所欲针对的损害。

市场监管总局如何评估此类交易

监管超越当前重叠，审视潜在竞争：

  • 若交易不发生，标的是否可能成为重要竞争对手？
  • 收购方是否为支配或具战略地位的企业？
  • 交易是否消除了新生的竞争约束？
  • 是否存在真实的效率或促进竞争理据，抑或仅为消除？

“搁置”意图的证据——内部关停产品、仅留人才、拒绝投入的计划——会使案件对交易更为不利。

救济与后果

对认定具反竞争效果的未达门槛交易，市场监管总局可：

  • 禁止交易；
  • 责令剥离或重组被收购资产；
  • 附加行为性救济（如保持产品存续、许可技术、维持投入）；
  • 撤销已完成的集中，并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。

由于收购方可能已整合标的，撤销具有破坏性且摧毁价值——因此事前的风险权衡，比（往往很低的）申报门槛更关键。

2026年实践要点

  • 未达门槛审查权被选择性使用，而非撒网；案件集中于平台、科技及创新密集型行业。
  • 市场监管总局更多通过指引与公开表态释放意图，而非固定数值触发，故行业语境决定一切。
  • 收购早期竞争对手者须预期：决定审查的是交易的*战略逻辑*，而非其规模。

准入者实务指引

  1. 勿假定”小即安全”。 未达门槛但轨迹重要的竞品收购，仍会招致审查。
  2. 记录促进竞争的理据。 商业计划、投入承诺及标的交易后仍将壮大的路线图，具有保护作用。
  3. 保存独立存续可行性证据。 证明标的并非清晰走向成为竞争对手，或交易确实加速了其产品供给。
  4. 考虑主动沟通。 交易敏感时，主动向市场监管总局说明可避免陷入争议的程序。
  5. 在合同中约定补救。 于协议中分配撤销与救济风险，并设置适当的最晚截止日。

要点总结

未达门槛审查权重塑了中国经营者集中制度：规模不再是唯一关口。就2026年而言，任何支配或具战略地位企业对早期创新者的收购——尤其在平台、人工智能、半导体或生物医药领域——都应按”审查其对未来竞争的影响”来规划，并据此构建证据案卷。

Sources

Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market

  • Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
    数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范，该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。
  • Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
    巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查，即便标的规模小或尚无营收。
  • VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
    采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖；”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。
  • Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
    在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济，正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。
  • As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
    截至2026年，审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态，以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。
  • Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
    准入者应预判：任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购，都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。

Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查：数字市场中的反垄断

The Platform Antitrust Framework

China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.

Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review

Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:

  • Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
  • Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
  • Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
  • Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).

These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.

VIE Structures Are In Scope

A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.

Substantive Theories SAMR Applies

In platform cases SAMR weighs:

  • Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
  • Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
  • Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
  • Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.

Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.

2026 Trajectory

Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:

  • Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
  • AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
  • Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.

The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.

Practical Guidance for Entrants

  1. Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
  2. Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
  3. Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
  4. Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
  5. Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.

Stakes

Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.

中国平台并购审查：数字市场中的反垄断

平台反垄断框架

中国转向平台经济反垄断，以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场，阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时，如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言，定义的不是 bare AML 文本，而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。

平台并购为何受到更高审查

平台收购引发独特关切：

  • 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者，可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
  • 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河，并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
  • 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
  • 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品（见下篇）。

这些理论意味着，市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠，更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。

VIE 结构在管辖之内

一种长期误解认为可变利益实体（VIE）结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确：采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查，达标须申报，且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞，并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。

市场监管总局适用的实质理论

在平台案件中，市场监管总局考量：

  • 跨边市场界定（如匹配、支付、配送），承认多边性；
  • 支配地位，由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断；
  • 消除潜在竞争，包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购；
  • 纵向封阻，即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。

结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济，如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。

2026年走向

至2026年，平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至：

  • 算法驱动的整合，合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切；
  • 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购，就加深护城河进行评估；
  • 超级应用生态，就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。

其内在逻辑是：平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判，而不只看今日的份额。

准入者实务指引

  1. 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
  2. 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
  3. 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
  4. 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免；达标即申报。
  5. 标的涉大规模或重要数据时，统筹数据安全审查。

利害关系

误判审查的平台交易，面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济，或被禁止。无论外资还是内资，陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作，是审慎之道。

Sources

Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice

  • A concentration is notifiable to SAMR when the parties’ turnover meets the State Council thresholds; the deal is suspensory and cannot close before clearance.
    当各方营业额达到国务院标准时，集中须向市场监管总局申报；交易具有暂停效力，获批前不得交割。
  • The State Council raised the notification thresholds in its 2024 revision, recalibrating the global and China turnover benchmarks to current economic scale.
    国务院在2024年修订中上调了申报标准，使全球及中国营业额基准与当前经济规模重新校准。
  • SAMR operates a simplified (简易) procedure for non-issue, non-rivalrous transactions, materially shortening review time versus the standard track.
    市场监管总局对无非竞争关切的集中适用简易程序，相较标准程序显著缩短审查时间。
  • The 2022 AML introduced a stop-the-clock (停钟) mechanism; incomplete filings or further-review needs pause the statutory clock.
    2022年《反垄断法》引入”停钟”机制；申报不完整或需进一步审查时，法定时限暂停计算。
  • Gun-jumping—closing or integrating before clearance—draws substantially higher fines under the 2022 amendments, making procedural discipline essential.
    抢跑——在获批前交割或整合——依2022年修订面临显著提高的罚款，程序纪律因而至关重要。
  • As of 2026, expect tighter scrutiny of minority acquisitions that confer decisive influence and of filings’ substantive accuracy.
    截至2026年，须预期对赋予决定性影响的少数股权收购，以及申报实质准确性，将受到更严审视。

Merger Control Filing in China: Thresholds, Procedure, and 2026 Practice | 中国经营者集中申报：门槛、程序与2026年实践

When a Filing Is Required

Under the 《反垄断法》 and SAMR’s implementing rules, a “concentration” ( merger; acquisition of control; or acquisition of decisive influence over another undertaking) must be notified where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s thresholds. The original thresholds, set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, turned on combined global turnover and China turnover. In its 2024 revision, the State Council raised these thresholds to reflect China’s enlarged economic scale—reducing filings for routine small deals while keeping strategically significant transactions within scope. Because the precise figures are set by State Council regulation and periodically adjusted, deal teams should confirm the current thresholds against the latest SAMR guidance at the time of signing.

The Suspensory Principle

The cardinal rule: a notifiable concentration is suspensory. The parties may sign, but they may not implement the concentration—no control change, no asset integration, no voting-rights exercise—until SAMR clears it. Premature implementation (“gun-jumping”) is an independent violation under the 2022 AML, carrying far higher fines than under the prior regime. This makes the filing not a formality but a gating condition in the SPA.

Two Procedures: Standard and Simplified

SAMR administers two tracks:

TrackApplicabilityTypical duration
Standard (普通)Likely competitive concerns or complex factsUp to 30 days initial + extended phase
Simplified (简易)No substantive concern; e.g., low combined share, non-competitors, passive minorityMaterially shorter, often cleared within the initial phase

The simplified procedure applies where the combined market share is low, the parties are not actual or potential competitors in the same market, or the acquisition is a passive minority stake. Choosing the correct track—and presenting a clean, complete file—directly affects clearance speed.

The Stop-the-Clock Mechanism

A defining feature of the 2022 AML is the stop-the-clock (停钟) rule, operationalised in SAMR’s 经营者集中审查规定. The statutory review clock pauses when:

  • The notifying party fails to provide required materials and SAMR requests supplementation; or
  • A circumstance arises requiring further review (e.g., third-party opposition, new evidence).

Practically, a careless or incomplete filing can double the effective timeline. Diligent, complete first submission is the cheapest insurance against clock-stoppage.

Substantive Assessment

SAMR assesses whether the concentration would eliminate or restrict competition, considering market share, concentration ratios, entry barriers, efficiencies, and failing-firm defences. Remedies—structural (divestiture) or behavioural (access, non-discrimination)—may be imposed. For market entrants, the key is to demonstrate that the combination does not foreclose rivals or raise barriers in the relevant China market.

2026 Filing Practice

Entering 2026, SAMR’s practice shows:

  • Tighter look at “decisive influence” acquisitions—minority stakes that nonetheless confer control-like influence are caught.
  • Greater demands for data accuracy in notifications, with scrutiny of market definition.
  • Continued use of simplified procedure for clean, non-rivalrous deals, keeping routine inbound acquisitions efficient.
  • Coordination with security and data reviews where the target sits in a sensitive sector.

Practical Steps for Filers

  1. Screen early. Test the transaction against current thresholds at term-sheet stage.
  2. Choose the track correctly. Mislabeling a standard case as simplified invites rejection and delay.
  3. Prepare a complete file. Accurate turnover, market definition, and supporting evidence prevent clock-stoppage.
  4. Sequence with other regimes. Where security or data review applies, align filing timelines.
  5. Contractual protection. Include conditions precedent, long-stop dates, and allocate gun-jumping risk in the SPA.

Exposure and Remedies

Beyond clearance denial, SAMR may unwind completed unlawful concentrations and impose turnover-based fines. The 2022 amendments raised these ceilings, and responsible individuals can be penalised. For foreign acquirers, disciplined filing practice—correct track, complete file, no pre-clearance integration—is the difference between a routine clearance and a value-destroying remediation.

中国经营者集中申报：门槛、程序与2026年实践

何时需要申报

依据《反垄断法》及市场监管总局实施规则，”经营者集中”（合并；取得控制权；或取得对其他经营者的决定性影响）于各方营业额达到国务院标准时须申报。原始门槛由国务院2008年规定设定，以合计全球营业额与中国营业额为准。在2024年修订中，国务院上调了这些门槛，以反映中国扩大的经济规模——在减少常规小规模交易申报的同时，将具有战略意义的交易保留在范围内。由于具体数字由国务院规定设定并定期调整，交易团队应在签约时对照市场监管总局最新指引确认现行门槛。

暂停原则

首要规则是：须申报的集中具有暂停效力。各方可以签约，但在市场监管总局批准前，不得实施集中——不得变更控制、不得整合资产、不得行使表决权。提前实施（”抢跑”）依2022年《反垄断法》构成独立违法，罚款远高于此前制度。这使得申报不再是形式，而是协议中的一项先决条件。

两种程序：标准与简易

市场监管总局设有两条路径：

路径适用情形通常时长
标准（普通）可能存在竞争关切或事实复杂初始30日+延长阶段
简易无非实质关切，如合计份额低、非竞争者、被动少数股权显著更短，常在初始阶段内审结

简易程序适用于合计市场份额低、各方非同一市场现实或潜在竞争者，或收购为被动少数股权等情形。选择正确的路径并提交干净、完整的案卷，直接影响获批速度。

停钟机制

2022年《反垄断法》的标志性特征是“停钟”规则，由市场监管总局《经营者集中审查规定》落实。在以下情形，法定审查时限暂停：

  • 申报方未提供所需材料，市场监管总局要求补充；或
  • 出现需进一步审查的情形（如第三方异议、新证据）。

实践中，草率或不完整的申报可能使实际时间表翻倍。勤勉、完整地首次提交，是防止停钟最廉价的保障。

实质审查

市场监管总局评估集中是否排除、限制竞争，考量市场份额、集中度、进入壁垒、效率及困境企业抗辩等。可能附加救济——结构性（剥离）或行为性（开放接入、非歧视）。对准入者而言，关键在于证明该结合不会在中国相关市场封阻竞争对手或抬高壁垒。

2026年申报实践

进入2026年，市场监管总局的实践显示：

  • 对”决定性影响”收购审查更严——虽为少数股权但赋予类控制性影响的交易亦被纳入。
  • 对申报数据准确性要求更高，并审视市场界定。
  • 继续对干净、非竞争类交易适用简易程序，使常规 inbound 收购保持高效。
  • 与安全和数据审查统筹，当标的位于敏感行业时。

申报者实务步骤

  1. 尽早筛查。 在条款书阶段即对照现行门槛测试交易。
  2. 正确选择路径。 将标准案件误标为简易将招致退回与延误。
  3. 备妥完整案卷。 准确的营业额、市场界定及佐证可防止停钟。
  4. 与其他制度统筹。 如涉及安全或数据审查，须对齐申报时间表。
  5. 合同保护。 设置先决条件、最晚截止日，并在协议中分配抢跑风险。

风险与救济

除不予批准外，市场监管总局可撤销已完成的违法集中，并处罚以营业额为基础的罚款。2022年修订提高了这些上限，相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外国收购方而言，纪律化的申报实践——正确路径、完整案卷、获批前不整合——决定着是顺利获批还是陷入摧毁价值的补救。

Sources

Antitrust & Merger / 反垄断并购

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework

  • China’s competition regime is anchored by the 2022-revised 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law), enforced primarily by SAMR, with merger control, conduct enforcement, and fair-competition review as its three pillars.
    中国竞争制度以2022年修订的《反垄断法》为基石，主要由市场监管总局执行，其三大支柱为经营者集中、行为监管与公平竞争审查。
  • Merger control is suspensory: a notifiable concentration must be cleared by SAMR before closing, and “gun-jumping” attracts substantial fines under the 2022 amendments.
    经营者集中具有暂停效力：达申报标准的集中须在市场监管总局批准后方可交割，而”抢跑”依2022年修订面临高额罚款。
  • The 2022 amendments introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism, raised penalty levels, and strengthened rules against illegal concentration and abuse of dominance.
    2022年修订引入了”停钟”机制，提高了处罚幅度，并强化了针对违法集中与滥用市场支配地位的规则。
  • The 公平竞争审查条例 (Fair Competition Review Regulation), effective 1 August 2024, curbs administrative monopolies and is directly relevant to market-entry barriers.
    2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》抑制行政性垄断，与市场准入壁垒直接相关。
  • As of 2026, enforcement priorities include platform economies, vertical/restrictive agreements, and concentrations in technology and healthcare.
    截至2026年，执法重点包括平台经济、纵向/限制性协议，以及科技与医疗健康领域的集中。
  • Inbound investors should treat merger filing, behavioural compliance, and fair-competition review as integrated workstreams when entering the China market.
    外资投资者进入中国市场时，应将并购申报、行为合规与公平竞争审查视为一体化的工作流。

Antitrust and Merger Control in China: The 2026 Framework | 中国反垄断与并购审查：2026年框架

The Statutory Foundation

China’s competition law is the 《反垄断法》 (Anti-Monopoly Law, AML), first adopted in 2007 and substantially revised in 2022, with the amendment effective from 1 August 2022. The law prohibits monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominant market position, and anticompetitive concentrations, and it empowers the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR, 国家市场监督管理总局) as the leading enforcer at the national level, working with provincial market-regulation bureaus.

Three Pillars of Enforcement

  1. Merger control (经营者集中). Concentrations meeting turnover thresholds must be notified and cleared before closing.
  2. Conduct enforcement. SAMR attacks horizontal cartels, vertical/restrictive agreements, and abuse of dominance (e.g., unfair pricing, exclusivity, tying).
  3. Fair competition review (公平竞争审查). Government measures that restrict competition are reviewed and curbed—codified by the 公平竞争审查条例 effective 1 August 2024.

For a market entrant, all three matter: the first gates transactions, the second constrains go-to-market conduct, and the third shapes whether local rules themselves create barriers.

Merger Control: Suspensory and Triggered by Turnover

A “concentration” includes mergers, acquisitions of control, and acquisitions of decisive influence via assets or shares. Where the parties’ turnover meets the State Council’s notification thresholds, the transaction is suspensory—it cannot close before SAMR clearance. The long-standing thresholds (set by the State Council’s 2008 regulation, raised in its 2024 revision) turn on combined global and China turnover. The 2024 upward revision reflects China’s larger economic scale and reduces filings for small deals while keeping strategic transactions within scope.

The 2022 Amendments: What Changed

The 2022 revision materially toughened the regime:

  • Stop-the-clock (停钟). Where a filing is incomplete or the authority needs further review, the statutory clock can pause, extending effective review time.
  • Gun-jumping penalties. Closing without clearance, or implementing control prematurely, draws significantly higher fines.
  • Abuse of dominance. Factors for dominance and self-preferencing were clarified; penalties were increased.
  • “Safe harbour” for certain agreements. The law contemplates thresholds below which some agreements are presumed lawful, implemented through SAMR guidance.

These changes mean timing and process discipline now carry real financial risk.

Platform Economy and Behavioural Focus

SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy) reframed enforcement for digital markets: “choose-one-of-two” exclusivity, tie-in, and platform self-preferencing are scrutinised. Through 2026, SAMR has sustained attention on platform conduct and on concentrations that could entrench dominant positions or eliminate nascent rivals—a theme developed further in the dedicated platform-M&A article in this series.

Fair Competition Review and Market Entry

The 公平竞争审查条例 (effective 1 August 2024) requires that policies and measures of administrative organs not eliminate or restrict competition without justification. For entrants, this is the primary tool against local protectionism and discriminatory licensing. Where a provincial rule appears to favour incumbents, a fair-competition-review challenge is a recognised, if procedurally nuanced, recourse.

Practical Compliance for Entrants

  1. Run a merger-control screen on every acquisition, JV, and change-of-control at signing.
  2. Build the suspensory clock into deal timetables; do not exchange control or integrate pre-clearance.
  3. Audit go-to-market contracts for exclusivity, most-favoured-nation, and tying clauses that may offend conduct rules.
  4. Monitor dominance metrics; if share exceeds ~50%, treat conduct with heightened caution.
  5. Use fair-competition review where local rules impede market access.

Penalties and Exposure

Violations range from merger unwinding and behavioural injunctions to fines calculated on turnover. The 2022 amendments raised the ceiling for illegal concentrations and abuse, and individuals responsible can face penalties. For inbound investors, the blend of suspensory mergers, conduct risk, and administrative barriers makes antitrust a board-level consideration, not a back-office formality.

中国反垄断与并购审查：2026年框架

法律基础

中国竞争法是《反垄断法》，于2007年通过，2022年作重大修订，修订版自2022年8月1日起施行。该法禁止垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位及具有排除、限制竞争效果的经营者集中，并授权国家市场监督管理总局（市场监管总局）作为国家级主要执法机构，会同省级市场监管部门执法。

执法的三大支柱

  1. 经营者集中。 达到营业额标准的集中须申报并在交割前获批准。
  2. 行为监管。 市场监管总局打击横向卡特尔、纵向/限制性协议及滥用支配地位（如不公平定价、排他、搭售）。
  3. 公平竞争审查。 对限制竞争的政府措施进行审查和遏制——由2024年8月1日施行的《公平竞争审查条例》所确立。

对市场准入者而言，三者均具意义：第一项管控交易，第二项约束市场行为，第三项决定地方规则本身是否构成壁垒。

经营者集中：暂停效力且以营业额为触发

“经营者集中”包括合并、取得控制权，以及通过资产或股权取得决定性影响。当各方营业额达到国务院申报标准时，交易即具暂停效力——在市场监管总局批准前不得交割。长期适用的门槛（由国务院2008年规定设定，并于2024年修订中上调）以合计全球及中国营业额为准。2024年的上调反映了中国经济规模的扩大，在减少小规模交易申报的同时，仍将战略性交易纳入范围。

2022年修订：变化何在

2022年修订显著加强了制度：

  • 停钟。 申报不完整或需进一步审查时，法定时限可暂停，从而延长实际审查时间。
  • 抢跑处罚。 未获批即交割或提前实施控制，将面临显著提高的罚款。
  • 滥用支配地位。 明确了支配地位及自我优待的认定因素，并提高处罚。
  • 部分协议的”安全港”。 法律预留了对低于一定门槛的某些协议推定合法的接口，由市场监管总局指引落实。

这些变化意味着，时机与程序纪律如今承载真实的财务风险。

平台经济与行为监管重点

市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》重塑了数字市场的执法框架：”二选一”排他、搭售及平台自我优待均受审视。至2026年，市场监管总局持续关注平台行为，以及可能巩固支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中——本系列的平台并购专文对此有进一步展开。

公平竞争审查与市场准入

《公平竞争审查条例》（2024年8月1日施行）要求行政机关的政策措施不得无正当理由排除、限制竞争。对准入者而言，这是对地方保护主义和歧视性许可的主要工具。当某省级规则看似偏袒既得利益者时，公平竞争审查异议虽程序细致，却是一条被认可的救济路径。

准入者实务合规

  1. 对每一项收购、合营及控制权变更进行并购筛查。
  2. 将暂停时限纳入交易时间表；在获批前不得交换控制权或整合业务。
  3. 审查市场合同中的排他、最惠国及搭售条款，避免触犯行为规则。
  4. 监测支配力指标；若份额超过约50%，须以更高谨慎对待行为。
  5. 遇地方规则阻碍准入时，运用公平竞争审查。

处罚与风险敞口

违法后果从集中撤销、行为禁令到按营业额计算的罚款不等。2022年修订提高了违法集中与滥用的处罚上限，相关责任人员亦可能受罚。对外资投资者而言，暂停型并购、行为风险与行政壁垒三者交织，使反垄断成为董事会层面的议题，而非后台形式。

Sources