Tag Archives: Data Export

China’s Draft Rule for Large Personal-Information Processors: What Foreign-Invested Platforms and Apps Need to Know

  • China’s cyberspace regulator has released a draft rule for “large personal-information processors,” consolidating two earlier platform-focused drafts into one accountability regime for the biggest data holders.
    国家网信部门发布《大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定(征求意见稿)》,将早前两份聚焦平台的规定整合为面向最大规模数据处理者的统一责任制度。
  • A processor handling over 10 million individuals’ personal information, or meeting other significance tests, must self-assess and file a recognition application through its provincial cyberspace authority.
    处理超过1000万人个人信息的处理者,或符合其他重大影响标准的,须自评估并通过省级网信部门申报大型个人信息处理者认定。
  • Core duties include data minimisation, encryption, de-identification, access control, minor-protection safeguards and use of the national online identity authentication public service.
    核心义务涵盖最小必要、加密、去标识化、访问控制、未成年人保护,以及应用国家网络身份认证公共服务。
  • The consultation closes on 7 September 2026, giving foreign-invested platforms and apps a clear compliance horizon to assess exposure.
    征求意见截至2026年9月7日,为外资平台与App提供了评估合规敞口的明确窗口。
  • The draft sits atop the Personal Information Protection Law and the Network Data Security Management Regulation, signalling converging oversight of super-platforms.
    征求意见稿置于《个人信息保护法》与《网络数据安全管理条例》之上,预示着对超级平台的趋同监管。
  • Practical step: map data-volume and business-footprint triggers now, and pre-position a recognition filing before the threshold is crossed.
    实操建议:立即对照数据量与业务足迹触发条件制图,并在越过门槛前预先准备认定申报。

China’s Draft Rule for Large Personal-Information Processors: What Foreign-Invested Platforms and Apps Need to Know | 大型个人信息处理者规定征求意见:外资平台与App须知

On 7 August 2026, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) published the *Draft Provisions on the Personal Information Protection of Large Personal-Information Processors (for public comment)*. The draft consolidates two earlier consultation documents — the rules on establishing personal-information protection supervisory committees for large online platforms and the rules on large online platforms’ personal-information protection — into a single, broader regime that reaches any “large personal-information processor,” not only classic internet platforms.

For foreign-invested businesses operating consumer apps, e-commerce storefronts, ride-hailing or delivery services, social products, or any service that scales to millions of Chinese users, the draft is a material compliance event. This article explains who is captured, what changes, and the practical steps to take during the consultation window.

Who is a “large processor”

The draft applies a multi-factor test rather than a single mechanical threshold. Under Article 2, a “large personal-information processor” is a processor whose personal-information protection and supervision are subject to the provisions. Recognition is triggered when any of the following conditions is met:

  1. Scale: the processor handles the personal information of more than 10 million natural persons.
  2. Importance of service: it provides important online services involving personal-information processing, or its business scope covers multiple lines of business that involve personal-information processing.
  3. Impact: its personal-information processing activities have an important influence on national security, economic operation, social stability, public health and safety, or similar interests.

Article 3 obliges processors that handle more than 10 million individuals’ data, and those that self-assess into the second or third condition, to file a recognition application through the provincial cyberspace authority to the national cyberspace authority. Provincial authorities must complete a completeness check within 15 working days of receiving the materials; if complete, they forward the materials and a preliminary opinion to the national authority. Authorities may also urge a processor that meets the conditions but has not filed to do so.

Key compliance duties

The draft imposes obligations that go well beyond the baseline PIPL duties:

  • Data minimisation. Collection must be limited to what is necessary to provide the product or service; over-collection is prohibited.
  • Technical and organisational safeguards. Processors should adopt encryption, de-identification, access control and anonymisation, may apply the national data-label/identification technology, and are encouraged to obtain personal-information protection certification.
  • Minor protection. Processing personal information of minors under 14 requires the consent of a parent or guardian, and convenient channels must be provided for giving and withdrawing that consent.
  • National identity service. Processors are encouraged to use the national online identity authentication public service.
  • Monitoring and response. Processors must build internal management systems and operating procedures covering processing activities, rights-response and security obligations, strengthen monitoring and early warning of personal-information security, and detect and dispose of security incidents in a timely manner.
  • International engagement. The draft encourages large processors to participate in international standards and rule-making on personal-information protection and to promote mutual recognition of rules and standards with other countries and regions.

Consultation timeline and process

The CAC notice sets the comment deadline at 7 September 2026. Feedback may be submitted by email to shujuju@cac.gov.cn or by post to the Cyberspace Administration of China’s Network Data Administration Bureau in Beijing, with the envelope marked “大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定征求意见.” Because the draft is still at the consultation stage, the final obligations, recognition form and timetable may shift — but the direction is clear: accountability for the largest data holders is being formalised.

Practical steps for foreign-invested platforms

  1. Size the footprint. Quantify the number of natural persons whose personal information you process in China; if you are near or above 10 million, assume you are in scope.
  2. Assess the qualitative triggers. Even below 10 million, multi-line consumer businesses with systemic reach should self-assess the “importance” and “impact” prongs.
  3. Pre-position the filing. Prepare the recognition application materials (data-scale evidence, processing-activity description, safeguard design) so a filing can be lodged promptly if triggered.
  4. Harden the baseline. Encrypt and de-identify at rest and in transit, restrict access on least-privilege, and stand up a minor-consent workflow.
  5. Engage the consultation. Where group policy allows, submit comments through the recognised industry association channel before 7 September 2026.

大型个人信息处理者规定征求意见:外资平台与App须知

2026年8月7日,国家互联网信息办公室发布《大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定(征求意见稿)》。该稿将早前两份文件——关于大型网络平台设立个人信息保护监督委员会的规定、以及关于大型网络平台个人信息保护的规定——整合为一项覆盖任何”大型个人信息处理者”、而非仅限传统互联网平台的统一制度。

对于运营消费类App、电商店面、网约车或配送服务、社交产品,或任何在中国拥有数百万用户规模的外商投资企业而言,该征求意见稿是一项重要的合规事件。本文说明谁被纳入、有何变化,以及在征求意见窗口期应采取的实操步骤。

何为”大型个人信息处理者”

该稿采用的是多因素测试,而非单一机械门槛。根据第二条,大型个人信息处理者的个人信息保护及其监督管理适用本规定。符合下列条件之一的,应认定属于大型个人信息处理者:

  1. 规模: 处理1000万人以上自然人个人信息。
  2. 服务重要性: 提供涉及个人信息处理的重要网络服务,或者经营范围涵盖多种业务且涉及个人信息处理。
  3. 影响: 个人信息处理活动对国家安全、经济运行、社会稳定、公共健康和安全等具有重要影响。

第三条规定,处理1000万人以上自然人个人信息,以及自评估认为符合第二条第二款第二、三项条件的处理者,应当通过所在地省级网信部门向国家网信部门申报大型个人信息处理者认定并按要求提交材料。省级网信部门应自收到申报材料之日起15个工作日内完成完备性查验;材料齐全的,将材料与初步认定意见报送国家网信部门。省级以上网信、电信主管部门、公安机关等部门认为符合认定条件但未主动申报的,应督促其申报。

核心合规义务

该稿施加了超出《个人信息保护法》基线的义务:

  • 最小必要。 收集个人信息应限于提供产品或者服务所必需,不得过度收集。
  • 技术与组织保障。 采取加密、去标识化、访问控制、匿名化等措施;可应用国家数据标签标识技术;鼓励通过个人信息保护认证。
  • 未成年人保护。 处理不满十四周岁未成年人个人信息应取得监护人同意,并提供便捷的同意与撤回渠道。
  • 国家身份服务。 鼓励应用国家网络身份认证公共服务。
  • 监测与响应。 围绕处理活动、权利响应、安全义务建立健全内部管理制度与操作规程,加强监测预警,及时发现处置安全事件。
  • 国际参与。 鼓励参与个人信息保护国际标准和规则制定,推动与其他国家、地区规则标准协调互认。

征求意见时间与程序

网信办通知设定意见反馈截止时间为2026年9月7日。可通过电子邮件发送至 shujuju@cac.gov.cn,或邮寄至北京市海淀区阜成路15号国家互联网信息办公室网络数据管理局(信封注明”大型个人信息处理者个人信息保护规定征求意见”)。该稿尚处征求意见阶段,最终义务、认定表单与时间表可能调整,但方向明确:最大数据持有者的责任正在制度化。

外资平台实操步骤

  1. 测算足迹。 量化在华处理的自然人个人信息数量;若接近或高于1000万,应假定自身落入范围。
  2. 评估定性触发条件。 即便低于1000万,具有系统性触达的多线消费业务也应自评估”重要性”与”影响”两项。
  3. 预先准备申报。 备妥认定申报材料(数据规模证据、处理活动说明、保障措施设计),以便在触发时及时提交。
  4. 夯实基线。 对静态与传输中数据加密、去标识化,按最小权限限制访问,并建立未成年人同意工作流。
  5. 参与征求意见。 在集团政策允许范围内,于2026年9月7日前通过认可的行业协会议事渠道提交意见。

Practitioner Quick Reference

  • One regime, broader reach: the draft folds two platform rules into a single “large processor” regime covering 10M+ individuals or systemic-impact handlers.
    一项制度、更广覆盖:该稿将两份平台规则整合为覆盖1000万以上或具系统影响处理者的”大型处理者”制度。
  • File through the province: recognition applications go via the provincial cyberspace authority to the national CAC; completeness check is 15 working days.
    经省级申报:认定申请由省级网信部门报送国家网信办;完备性查验为15个工作日。
  • Deadline 7 September 2026: the consultation window is the time to assess and, if eligible, comment.
    截止2026年9月7日:征求意见窗口是评估并(如符合)提交意见的时机。
  • Baseline must rise: minimisation, encryption, de-identification, access control and minor-consent are explicit duties.
    基线须抬高:最小必要、加密、去标识化、访问控制与未成年人同意均为明示义务。

Common Pitfalls

  • Assuming “platform” only means social media: the test reaches any processor at 10M individuals or with systemic impact, including e-commerce and on-demand apps.
    误以为”平台”仅指社交媒体:测试覆盖任意达1000万或具系统影响的处理者,含电商与按需服务App。
  • Waiting for the final text: the recognition filing and safeguard build-out take months; starting during consultation is cheaper than scrambling after promulgation.
    等待终稿:认定申报与保障体系建设需数月;在征求意见期启动比颁布后仓促应对更划算。
  • Treating PIPL compliance as sufficient: the draft adds duties (minimisation, national identity service, minor workflows) beyond the PIPL baseline.
    以为符合个保法即足够:该稿新增了超出个保法基线的义务(最小必要、国家身份服务、未成年人流程)。

Sources

Cybersecurity Review and Critical Information Infrastructure Procurement Compliance for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

  • The Cybersecurity Review regime applies whenever a Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) operator procures network products or services that may affect national security — and foreign-invested enterprises supplying those products are squarely within scope.
    当关键信息基础设施(CII)运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品与服务时,网络安全审查制度即被触发;向这些运营者供应产品的外商投资企业同样被直接纳入监管视野。
  • The legal backbone is the Cybersecurity Law (2017), the Regulation on CII Protection (State Council Decree No. 745, 2021) and the Cybersecurity Review Measures (CAC Decree No. 8, 2022), now reinforced by active enforcement against foreign-made security products in 2026.
    制度主干为《网络安全法》(2017)、《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令745号,2021)与《网络安全审查办法》(国家网信办等13部门令第8号,2022),并在2026年针对境外安全产品的执法中持续强化。
  • CII operators must “prioritise the procurement of secure and trustworthy” products and submit to security review before signing; using unreviewed or failed products triggers fines of 1–10 times the procurement value.
    CII运营者须”优先采购安全可信的网络产品”,并在签约前申报审查;使用未申报或审查未通过的产品,将面临采购金额一倍以上十倍以下的罚款。
  • A supplier need not be a CII operator itself — providing products or services to a CII operator can independently trigger a review, as the August 2026 review of a US network-security vendor’s China-sold products illustrates.
    供应商本身不必是CII运营者——仅为CII运营者提供产品即可能单独触发审查,2026年8月对某美国网络安全厂商在华销售产品的审查即为例证。
  • Foreign-invested enterprises should embed review-trigger analysis into procurement playbooks, vendor due diligence and contract clauses, and retain evidence of supplier commitments not to extract user data or interrupt supply.
    外商投资企业应将”审查触发”分析嵌入采购流程、供应商尽调与合同条款,并留存供应商”不非法获取用户数据、不中断供应”的承诺证据。
  • The review is risk-based and time-bound (generally 30 + 15 working days, with a special procedure extending to about 90), and explicitly states it is not intended to restrict or discriminate against foreign products and services.
    审查以风险为本且有明确时限(一般30+15个工作日,特别审查最长约90个工作日),并明确规定其目的不是限制或歧视国外产品与服务。

Cybersecurity Review and Critical Information Infrastructure Procurement Compliance for Foreign-Invested Enterprises | 网络安全审查与关键信息基础设施采购合规:外商投资企业的实务指南

Why this matters now

For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) selling network equipment, cloud services, security software or industrial control components into the China market, the question is no longer whether cybersecurity rules apply, but *when a procurement crosses the line into a national-security review*. China’s cybersecurity framework has matured from a set of principles into an operational, enforcement-driven regime. The clearest recent signal came on 6 August 2026, when the Cybersecurity Review Office announced a review of products sold in China by a US network-security vendor — the second time, after the 2023 review of a US memory-chip maker, that the measure was applied to specific foreign-made products rather than to entities. For FIEs on either side of a CII procurement — as the operator, the supplier, or both — the compliance calculus has sharpened.

This article explains the statutory triggers, the three pillars of the legal framework, what the review actually assesses, the 2026 enforcement signal, and the concrete steps an FIE should take. It does not address the separate (though related) regimes of data-export security assessment, standard contracts and certification, which are covered elsewhere on this site.

The statutory trigger: who and when

The trigger is defined in Article 2 of the Cybersecurity Review Measures: a CII operator procuring network products and services, or a platform operator conducting data-processing activities, that *may affect or may affect* national security must undergo cybersecurity review. The wording is deliberately forward-looking — the operator must pre-assess the risk before signing and file for review where the risk exists.

Two points matter for foreign suppliers in particular. First, the obligation to file sits with the CII operator (the buyer), not the supplier. Second, and often overlooked, a supplier can be pulled into a review even when it is not itself a CII operator: providing products or services *to* a CII operator is exactly the scenario the 2026 review targeted. The Measures (Article 21) also state that where foreign-investment security review or data-security review have separate rules, those apply alongside.

CII itself is defined broadly in the Regulation on CII Protection: public communications and information services, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, public services, e-government, defence science and industry, and other networks/systems whose disruption or data breach would seriously endanger national security, the public interest or social stability. Telecom, finance, energy, transport, healthcare and government IT are the obvious sectors — precisely the sectors where foreign technology is most often deployed.

The three pillars of the legal framework

Pillar one — the Cybersecurity Law (adopted 2016, effective 2017). Article 35 imposes the core duty: a CII operator procuring network products and services that may affect national security shall pass the security review organised by the cyberspace authority and relevant departments. Article 37 separately restricts CII operators from storing personal information and important data overseas or providing it abroad without assessment.

Pillar two — the Regulation on CII Protection (State Council Decree No. 745, effective 1 September 2021). This fills in the duty-holder detail: operators must build a dedicated security-management organ, conduct at least one security testing and risk assessment per year, and — critically for procurement — “prioritise the procurement of secure and trustworthy network products and services” and put any potentially security-affecting procurement through the national cybersecurity review. Article 19 makes this a positive legal obligation, not mere guidance.

Pillar three — the Cybersecurity Review Measures (CAC Decree No. 8, effective 15 February 2022). Thirteen departments jointly issued the Measures, which specify the review objects (core network devices, important communications products, high-performance computers and servers, large-capacity storage, large databases and application software, network-security devices, cloud-computing services, and other products/services materially affecting CII, network and data security). They set the 45-working-day baseline (30 + 15, with a special procedure of about 90 working days) and the penalty ladder.

What the review assesses

Article 10 of the Measures lists the national-security risk factors the review weighs:

  • the risk that products/services, once in use, lead to illegal control of, interference with or destruction of CII;
  • the risk that supply interruption harms the business continuity of CII;
  • the security, openness, transparency and source diversity of the product/service, and the risk of supply interruption for political, diplomatic or trade reasons;
  • the provider’s compliance with Chinese laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules;
  • the risk of core data, important data or large volumes of personal information being stolen, leaked, destroyed, illegally used or illegally exported;
  • for listings abroad, the risk that CII, core data, important data or large volumes of personal information fall under foreign-government influence or control; and
  • other factors endangering CII, network and data security.

For a foreign supplier, the most relevant factors are supply-chain continuity, transparency of the product’s architecture, and — increasingly — whether the product could become a vector for data extraction or remote control. The 2026 enforcement action against a foreign security vendor centred precisely on the paradox that a security product can itself become a security risk if compromised or externally controlled.

The 2026 enforcement signal

On 6 August 2026 the Cybersecurity Review Office announced a review, under the Cybersecurity Law and the Measures, of products sold in China by a US network-security company, citing the need to safeguard CII and prevent cybersecurity risks. Chinese regulators had, earlier in 2026, directed domestic institutions to stop using certain US and Israeli security products and to complete migration to domestic alternatives within the first half of the year. The pattern is consistent: reviews now target *products* (not just entities), focus on CII supply-chain security, and operate alongside a broader “secure and trustworthy” procurement preference in sensitive sectors.

The practical takeaway for FIEs is not panic but preparation. The Measures explicitly state the review is “not intended to restrict or discriminate against foreign products and services,” and China continues to welcome foreign products into its market. The differentiator is demonstrable supply-chain resilience, source transparency and contractual commitments.

Practical compliance steps for FIEs

  1. Map your exposure. Identify whether your customers include CII operators or platform operators handling large-scale personal information. If so, your products are in the review’s line of sight even when you are not the filer.
  2. Build review-trigger analysis into the sales cycle. Equip local teams to recognise when a customer’s procurement will require a filing, and pre-empt delays by surfacing the issue early.
  3. Harden the supplier commitments. The Measures let CII operators require providers to promise not to illegally obtain user data, not to illegally control or manipulate user equipment, and not to interrupt supply without just cause. Put these in writing and be able to evidence them.
  4. Localise where it reduces risk. Source diversity, in-country support, transparent architecture and local data handling are exactly the factors the review rewards. A wholly import-dependent supply chain is the weakest posture.
  5. Keep contracts review-aware. Where a contract is signed before review, include a condition that it takes effect only after the product passes review, to avoid the “use unreviewed product” penalty of 1–10 times procurement value.
  6. Coordinate with the FIE’s data-export posture. Cybersecurity review overlaps with data-export security assessment and PIPL compliance; treat them as one programme rather than three silos.

Related reading

  • Critical information infrastructure recognition and the annual self-assessment obligation.
  • Data-export pathways: security assessment, standard contract and certification compared.
  • PIPL compliance for foreign-invested enterprises operating in China.

网络安全审查与关键信息基础设施采购合规:外商投资企业的实务指南

为何重要

对于向中国市销售网络设备、云服务、安全软件或工业控制部件的外商投资企业(FIE)而言,问题已不再是”网络安全规则是否适用”,而是”一项采购何时越过红线、进入国家安全审查”。中国的网络安全框架已从原则性规定,发展为可操作、强执法的制度体系。最清晰的近期信号出现在2026年8月6日——网络安全审查办公室宣布对某美国网络安全厂商在华销售产品启动审查,这是继2023年对某美国存储芯片企业之后,第二次将审查直接指向特定境外制造的产品而非实体。无论外商投资企业处于CII采购的哪一端——作为运营者、供应商或兼而有之——合规逻辑都已显著收紧。

本文阐释法定触发条件、法律框架的三大支柱、审查究竟评估什么、2026年的执法信号,以及外商投资企业应采取的具体步骤。数据出境安全评估、标准合同与认证等相对独立(但相关)的制度,不在本文讨论范围,本站点另有专文。

法定触发:谁、何时

触发条件规定于《网络安全审查办法》第二条:关键信息基础设施运营者采购网络产品与服务,或网络平台运营者开展可能影响国家安全的数据处理活动,应当进行网络安全审查。措辞具有前瞻性——运营者须在签约前预判风险,并在风险存在时申报审查。

有两点对外国供应商尤为重要。其一,申报义务落在CII运营者(买方)身上,而非供应商。其二(也最常被忽视):供应商即便自身不是CII运营者,也可能被卷入审查——仅为CII运营者提供产品,正是2026年审查所针对的情形。《办法》第二十一条还规定,外商投资安全审查、数据安全审查另有规定的,应一并适用。

CII的定义见于《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》,范围宽泛:公共通信和信息服务、能源、交通、水利、金融、公共服务、电子政务、国防科技工业,以及其他一旦遭到破坏、丧失功能或数据泄露可能严重危害国家安全、公共利益或社会稳定的网络设施与信息系统。电信、金融、能源、交通、医疗与政府IT是最典型的行业——也正是外国技术最常部署的领域。

法律框架的三大支柱

支柱一——《网络安全法》(2016通过,2017施行)。 第三十五条规定核心义务:CII运营者采购可能影响国家安全的网络产品与服务,应当通过国家网信部门会同有关部门组织的国家安全审查。第三十七条另限制CII运营者未经评估不得将个人信息与重要数据境外存储或提供境外。

支柱二——《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令745号,2021年9月1日施行)。 细化义务主体:运营者须设立专门安全管理机构、每年至少开展一次网络安全检测与风险评估,且——对采购尤为关键——”优先采购安全可信的网络产品”,并将任何可能影响安全的采购纳入国家网络安全审查。第十九条将其确立为积极的法定义务,而非软性指引。

支柱三——《网络安全审查办法》(国家网信办等13部门令第8号,2022年2月15日施行)。 该办法明确审查对象(核心网络设备、重要通信产品、高性能计算机与服务器、大容量存储设备、大型数据库与应用软件、网络安全设备、云计算服务,以及对CII、网络与数据安全有重要影响的其他产品服务),设定45个工作日的基准时限(30+15,特别审查约90个工作日),并规定罚则梯度。

审查评估什么

《办法》第十条列举审查权衡的国家安全风险因素:

  • 产品服务投入使用后导致CII被非法控制、干扰或破坏的风险;
  • 供应中断损害CII业务连续性的风险;
  • 产品服务的安全性、开放性、透明性、来源多样性,以及因政治、外交、贸易因素导致供应中断的风险;
  • 提供者遵守中国法律、行政法规与部门规章的情况;
  • 核心数据、重要数据或大量个人信息被窃取、泄露、毁损、非法利用或非法出境的风险;
  • 赴国外上市情形下,CII、核心数据、重要数据或大量个人信息受外国政府影响或控制的风险;
  • 其他危害CII、网络与数据安全的因素。

对外国供应商而言,最相关的因素依次是供应链连续性、产品架构的透明度,以及——日益重要——产品是否会成为数据提取或远程控制的载体。2026年对某外国安全厂商的执法,恰恰聚焦于”安全产品本身可能因其被控制或存在后门而转化为安全风险”这一悖论。

2026年的执法信号

2026年8月6日,网络安全审查办公室依据《网络安全法》与《办法》,宣布对某美国网络安全公司在华销售产品启动审查,理由为保障CII安全、防范网络安全风险。在此之前的2026年内,中国监管部门已要求境内机构停止使用该厂商等部分美国、以色列安全产品,并在上半年内完成向国产替代的迁移。脉络一致:审查如今指向*产品*(而非仅实体),聚焦CII供应链安全,并与敏感行业”安全可信”采购偏好并行推进。

对外商投资企业的实务启示不是恐慌,而是准备。《办法》明确审查”不是要限制或歧视国外产品和服务”,中国仍欢迎国外产品进入市场。差异点在于可证明的供应链韧性、来源透明度与合同承诺。

外商投资企业的实务步骤

  1. 梳理暴露面。 识别客户是否包含CII运营者或处理大规模个人信息的平台运营者。若是,即便你不是申报方,产品也已进入审查视野。
  2. 将审查触发分析嵌入销售周期。 让本地团队能够识别客户采购何时需要申报,并及早暴露问题以避免延误。
  3. 夯实供应商承诺。 《办法》允许CII运营者要求提供者承诺不非法获取用户数据、不非法控制或操纵用户设备、无正当理由不中断供应。将这些承诺书面化并备可佐证材料。
  4. 以本地化降低风险。 来源多样性、本地支持、透明架构与本地数据处理,正是审查所鼓励的因素。完全依赖进口供应链是最弱姿态。
  5. 让合同”审查友好”。 若合同在审查前签署,应附条件约定”经审查通过后方可生效”,以规避”使用未审查产品”面临的采购金额一倍以上十倍以下罚款。
  6. 与数据出境合规协同。 网络安全审查与数据出境安全评估、个保法合规相互重叠,应作为一个整体项目而非三座孤岛来管理。

延伸阅读

  • 关键信息基础设施认定与年度自评估义务。
  • 数据出境路径比较:安全评估、标准合同与认证。
  • 外商投资企业在华的个保法合规。

Sources

  • 国家互联网信息办公室等十三部门:《网络安全审查办法》(令 第8号,2022年2月15日施行)— https://www.cac.gov.cn/2022-01/04/c_1642894602182845.htm
  • 《关键信息基础设施安全保护条例》(国务院令 第745号,2021年9月1日施行)— https://www.cac.gov.cn/2021-08/17/c_1630785976988160.htm
  • 《中华人民共和国网络安全法》(主席令 第五十三号,2017年6月1日施行)— http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c12435/c12488/201905/t20190521_270249.html

Data Classification, Grading and Critical Information Infrastructure Obligations for Foreign-Invested Enterprises

  • China mandates a data classification and grading (数据分类分级) baseline; the national standard GB/T 43697-2024 took effect on 1 October 2024.
    中国确立了数据分类分级基线制度,国家标准GB/T 43697-2024于2024年10月1日施行。
  • The Network Data Security Management Regulations (State Council Order No. 790, effective 1 January 2025) require handlers to classify and grade network data and identify important data.
    《网络数据安全管理条例》(国务院令790号,2025年1月1日施行)要求处理者对网络数据分类分级并识别重要数据。
  • Data is graded into core, important and general; important data triggers catalogue reporting and stricter export control.
    数据分为核心、重要、一般三级;重要数据触发目录报送与更严格的出境管控。
  • A critical information infrastructure operator (CIIO) owes extra duties: a security assessment, a person in charge, and annual risk assessment.
    关键信息基础设施运营者承担额外义务:安全评估、安全负责人与年度风险评估。
  • The 2026 financial-information sector guide shows the model: three primary classes, four grades, and a 67-item third-level list.
    2026年金融信息服务数据分类分级指南给出范本:3个一级类、4级、67项三级分类。
  • Cross-border data flows are gated by grade: important data needs a security assessment; unidentified data generally does not.
    数据出境按级别设闸:重要数据须安全评估,未被认定为重要数据的通常无需申报。

Data Classification, Grading and Critical Information Infrastructure Obligations for Foreign-Invested Enterprises | 外资企业的数据分类分级与关键信息基础设施义务

The Baseline: Classify and Grade

China’s data-governance stack is built on one foundational duty: data classification and grading (数据分类分级). The Data Security Law (2021) created the system; the Cybersecurity Law, the PIPL and the Network Data Security Management Regulations (State Council Order No. 790, effective 1 January 2025) give it teeth. The national standard GB/T 43697-2024, Data Security Technology — Rules for Data Classification and Grading, released on 21 March 2024 and effective 1 October 2024, is the general rulebook that industry regulators and handlers follow.

How Grading Works

Under GB/T 43697-2024, data is graded by its importance to economic and social development and the harm that leakage, tampering, destruction or unlawful use would cause. The framework has three tiers:

  • Core data: covers areas or groups with high coverage or precision/scale/depth, whose unlawful use could directly affect political security—e.g. data on national security key areas, the national economic lifeline, major public welfare or major public interest.
  • Important data: specific fields, groups or regions, or data of a certain precision and scale, whose alteration or leakage could directly endanger national security, economic operation, social stability, public health or safety.
  • General data: everything else, further sub-divided by handlers as needed (often 2–4 internal levels).

Key principles: scientific and practical, clear boundaries, grade up where in doubt (就高从严), point-and-area combined, and dynamic updating.

What “Important Data” Actually Means for an FIE

Important-data identification is the practical flashpoint. The 2026 CAC guidance on the financial-information sector illustrates the live model: data is classified by business attribute into three primary classes (business, user, enterprise), then sub-divided into nine secondary and 67 tertiary classes; it is graded into core, important, sensitive-general and routine-general. Handlers follow a defined flow—data inventory, classification, grading, a graded catalogue, important-data directory reporting, and dynamic updating.

For an ordinary FIE, the safe reading is: you are expected to run a data inventory and apply the grading rules yourself, and to report important data to the competent department once identified. Under the Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows, data not notified or published as important by a department or region does not require a security assessment—but the action obligation to classify and identify is not waived.

Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) Duties

If a handler is designated a critical information infrastructure operator (CIIO), the obligations rise sharply:

  • a security assessment before commencing operations and on material change;
  • a person in charge of network security and a dedicated management body;
  • an annual risk-assessment report on network data processing;
  • stricter rules on data location and on cross-border transfer of personal information and important data, which generally requires a CAC security assessment.

CIIO status is determined by the relevant industry regulator; an FIE in telecom, finance, energy, healthcare, transport or cloud/services with national-scale reach should assume it may be in scope.

The Network Data Security Management Regulations in Practice

State Council Order No. 790 operationalises the above: it sets the classify-and-grade duty, the important-data catalogue and reporting obligation, the CIIO security assessment and person-in-charge requirements, and the dedicated duties of large platform providers (e.g. an easy-to-find option to turn off personalised recommendation, and an annual personal-information protection social-responsibility report for the largest platforms). It also optimises the cross-border mechanism: a handler may export personal information where it meets the conditions, and data not notified as important need not be assessed as such.

Why This Matters for Cross-Border Flows

Classification and grading is the gate to every export route. The chain is: inventory → classify → grade → identify important data → if important, security assessment before export; if general and within the standard-contract or certification bands, the lighter routes apply; if a CIIO, assessment is the default. An FIE that has not graded its data cannot know which route it needs, and mis-grading important data as general is a direct violation.

Practical Steps for a Foreign-Invested Enterprise

  1. Inventory the data you hold in China by business scene and entity.
  2. Apply GB/T 43697-2024 to classify (by industry/business attribute) and grade (core/important/general).
  3. Identify and report important data to the competent department; keep the catalogue dynamic.
  4. Check CIIO status with your industry regulator; if in scope, build the assessment, person-in-charge and annual-report files.
  5. Map each data stream to its export route before any transfer; do not move data you have not graded.

Related Reading

See our cross-border data transfer rules (No. 35), the field-level data export negative list (No. 57) and the amended Cybersecurity Law in force from 2026 (No. 178).


外资企业的数据分类分级与关键信息基础设施义务

基线:分类与分级

中国数据治理体系的基石是一项基础义务——数据分类分级。2021年《数据安全法》建立了制度;《网络安全法》《个人信息保护法》与《网络数据安全管理条例》(国务院令790号,2025年1月1日施行)赋予其执行力。国家标准GB/T 43697-2024《数据安全技术 数据分类分级规则》于2024年3月21日发布、2024年10月1日施行,是行业主管部门与数据处理者遵循的通用规则。

分级如何运作

根据GB/T 43697-2024,数据依其在经济社会发展中的重要程度,以及遭篡改、破坏、泄露或非法使用所造成的危害进行分级,框架分三级:

  • 核心数据:对领域、群体、区域具有较高覆盖度或达到较高精度、较大规模、一定深度,非法使用可能直接影响政治安全——如国家安全重点领域、国民经济命脉、重大民生、重大公共利益相关数据。
  • 重要数据:特定领域、特定群体、特定区域或达到一定精度规模,遭篡改或泄露可能直接危害国家安全、经济运行、社会稳定、公共健康与安全的数据。
  • 一般数据:其余数据,由处理者按需再细分(通常2—4级)。

基本原则:科学实用、边界清晰、就高从严、点面结合、动态更新。

“重要数据”对外资企业的实际含义

重要数据识别是实务焦点。网信办2026年金融信息服务领域指南给出了鲜活范本:数据按业务属性分为业务、用户、企业3个一级类,再细分9个二级、67个三级类;按核心、重要、敏感一般、常规一般分为4级。处理者按既定流程作业——数据梳理、分类、分级、形成分级清单、报送重要数据目录、动态更新。

对普通外资企业,稳妥理解是:应自行开展数据盘点并套用分级规则,并在识别到重要数据后向主管部门报送。依据《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》,未被相关部门、地区告知或公开发布为重要数据的,无需作为重要数据申报安全评估——但分类分级与识别的”作为”义务并不因此免除。

关键信息基础设施(CII)义务

若被认定为关键信息基础设施运营者(CIIO),义务显著加重:

  • 运营前及重大变更前开展安全评估;
  • 设置网络安全负责人与专门管理机构;
  • 每年提交网络数据处理风险评估报告;
  • 数据与系统的存放及个人信息、重要数据出境受到更严约束,通常须通过网信部门安全评估。

CIIO身份由相关行业主管部门认定;在电信、金融、能源、医疗、交通或云/服务领域具有全国规模的外资企业,应假定自己可能落入范围。

《网络数据安全管理条例》的落地

国务院令790号将上述要求落地:确立分类分级义务、重要数据目录与报送义务、CIIO安全评估与负责人要求,以及大型平台企业的专有责任(如提供易于查找的个性化推荐关闭选项、最大平台每年发布个人信息保护社会责任报告)。同时优化了跨境机制:处理者符合条件即可出境个人信息;未被通知为重要数据的,无需作为重要数据申报评估。

为何这关系到跨境流动

分类分级是每条出境路径的闸门。链条为:盘点→分类→分级→识别重要数据→若为重要数据,出境前安全评估;若为一般数据且落在标准合同或认证区间,走较轻路径;若为CIIO,评估为默认。未分级的外资企业无从判断该走哪条路;把重要数据误判为一般数据,属直接违规。

外资企业的实操步骤

  1. 盘点数据:按业务场景与主体梳理在华持有的数据。
  2. 套用GB/T 43697-2024:按行业/业务属性分类,按核心/重要/一般分级。
  3. 识别并报送重要数据给主管部门;目录保持动态更新。
  4. 核实CIIO身份:与行业主管部门确认;若落入范围,建立评估、负责人与年度报告档案。
  5. 每条数据流映射至出境路径后再传输;未分级的数据不要动。

延伸阅读

可参阅本站跨境数据传输规则(编号35)、字段级数据出境负面清单(编号57)与2026年施行的修订《网络安全法》(编号178)。

Sources

China’s amended Cybersecurity Law in force from 1 January 2026: AI clauses, tenfold penalties and wider extraterritorial reach

  • The Decision amending the Cybersecurity Law was adopted on 28 October 2025 and takes effect on 1 January 2026, with 14 amendments and a reissued text.
    修改《网络安全法》的决定于2025年10月28日通过、2026年1月1日起施行,共14项修改并重新公布。
  • A new Article 20 builds the first basic-law “development plus oversight” framework for artificial intelligence in China.
    新增第20条,在中国基础性法律层面首次为人工智能构建”发展保障+安全监管”双重框架。
  • Maximum fines jump from the million-yuan range to RMB 10 million, and dual liability on units and responsible individuals is now the norm.
    罚款上限由百万级跃升至1000万元级,单位与直接责任人的双罚制成常态。
  • Critical information infrastructure operators face procurement-linked penalties of one to ten times the purchase amount.
    关键信息基础设施运营者面临”采购金额1—10倍”的罚则。
  • Extraterritorial application is widened: overseas actors harming China’s cybersecurity may be pursued and sanctioned, including asset freezes.
    域外适用扩大,境外危害中国网络安全的机构、组织、个人可被追究法律责任并面临包括冻结财产在内的制裁。
  • Personal information handling is explicitly tied to the Civil Code and PIPL, tightening the legal basis for processing.
    个人信息处理被明确要求遵守《民法典》《个人信息保护法》,做实法律衔接。
  • Foreign-invested enterprises should re-screen CII status, verify product certifications, and re-align cross-border data and remote-access arrangements.
    外商投资企业应重新梳理关键信息基础设施认定、核验产品认证,并对齐跨境数据与远程访问安排。

China’s amended Cybersecurity Law in force from 1 January 2026: AI clauses, tenfold penalties and wider extraterritorial reach | 2026年1月1日施行的新修改《网络安全法》:人工智能专条、阶梯式重罚与域外适用扩围

Overview: Why This Matters to Foreign-Invested Enterprises

The *Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Cybersecurity Law* was adopted at the 18th session of the 14th NPC Standing Committee on 28 October 2025, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 61, and takes effect on 1 January 2026, with 14 amendments and a reissued text.

The Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law form the backbone of China’s network and data security legal system. The amendment raises the fine ceiling by an order of magnitude, introduces the first basic-law AI framework, tightens the Civil Code/PIPL link, and expands extraterritorial reach.

The Legislative Facts

The amending Decision was passed at the 18th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th NPC on 28 October 2025, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 61, and takes effect on 1 January 2026; the original law had been in force since 1 June 2017, and the amendment renumbers the articles and reissues the full text. Per the Constitution and Law Committee report of 27 October 2025, the Standing Committee deliberated on 25 October, the Committee studied the articles clause by clause that evening, and — after consulting relevant departments — fixed the effective date as 1 January 2026, adopting the suggestions to add AI-promotion content and to widen extraterritorial application.

A New Guiding Principle and the AI Article

The first amendment inserts a new Article 3: “Cybersecurity work adheres to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, implements the holistic view of national security, coordinates development and security, and advances the building of a cyber power.”

The headline addition is new Article 20 — the AI clause. It provides that the state supports foundational AI theoretical research and R&D of key technologies such as algorithms, promotes training-data and computing-power infrastructure, improves AI ethics norms, strengthens risk monitoring, assessment and security supervision, and promotes sound AI application and development; it also supports innovative cybersecurity management and the use of new technologies such as AI to raise protection levels.

Personal Information Linkage

The former Article 40 becomes new Article 42 and adds a second paragraph: a network operator processing personal information must comply with this Law and with laws and administrative regulations such as the Civil Code and the Personal Information Protection Law.

Stepped Penalties: The Order-of-Magnitude Jump

The former Article 59 becomes new Article 61 with a graded, stepped schedule; the maximum fine rises to RMB 10 million.

SeverityWhoUnit fine (RMB)Individual fine (RMB)
General duty failure (Art. 23/27), persistsNetwork operator50k–500k10k–100k
CII duty failure (Art. 35/36/38/40), persistsCII operator100k–1m10k–100k
Serious: large leak / CII partial lossEither500k–2m50k–200k
Especially serious: CII main-function lossEither2m–10m200k–1m

The design is graduated: a first-tier failure draws a warning and a modest fine; only persistence or actual harm escalates. The upper tiers — large-scale data leakage or a CII losing partial function, and a CII losing its main function — carry the RMB 10 million ceiling and individual liability up to RMB 1 million.

Product Certification and the Closing of Applications

New Article 63 targets the supply side: selling or providing network key equipment or dedicated cybersecurity products that have not passed security certification or detection, or that are unqualified, draws an order to stop sales or provision, a warning and confiscation of unlawful gains; where gains are below RMB 100,000 an additional RMB 20,000–100,000 fine applies, and where gains exceed RMB 100,000 an additional one-to-five-times fine applies; in serious cases, business may be suspended, rectified, or licences revoked.

The former Article 61 becomes new Article 64, and disposal measures add “closing the application” alongside “closing the website”.

Critical Information Infrastructure: Procurement and Offshore Storage

The former Article 65 becomes new Article 67: a CII operator using products or services not security-reviewed, or that failed review, in violation of Article 37, is ordered to rectify, stop use, eliminate effects on national security, and fined one to ten times the procurement amount, with responsible individuals fined RMB 10,000–100,000.

New Article 65 (former Article 62) covers unauthorised cybersecurity certification, detection, risk assessment, or publicly releasing vulnerabilities, viruses, attack or intrusion information: a warning and up to RMB 100,000; persistent or serious cases draw RMB 100,000–1,000,000 plus possible suspension, closure or licence revocation, with individuals fined up to RMB 100,000.

New Article 69 (merging former Articles 68 and 69(1)) covers failure to stop transmission of unlawful information, take elimination measures, keep records or report: a warning and up to RMB 500,000; persistent or serious cases draw RMB 500,000–2,000,000 plus possible suspension, closure or revocation, with individuals fined RMB 50,000–200,000; especially serious impact raises the fine to RMB 2,000,000–10,000,000 and individuals to RMB 200,000–1,000,000; electronic-information and app-download providers failing Article 50(2) duties are punished under the same paragraphs.

New Article 71 (merging former Articles 64, 66 and 70) routes three categories to other laws: (1) publishing or transmitting information prohibited under Article 13(2) and other laws; (2) infringing personal-information rights under Articles 24(3) and 43–45; and (3) a CII operator storing personal information and important data offshore, or providing such data offshore, in violation of Article 39; stealing or illegally obtaining, selling or providing personal information not yet constituting a crime is punished by public security authorities.

Proportionate Penalties and Extraterritorial Reach

New Article 73 introduces a general leniency clause: where a violation also meets circumstances for lighter, mitigated or exempt punishment under the Administrative Penalty Law, those provisions apply.

The final amendment changes the former Article 75 to new Article 77 and widens extraterritorial application. Overseas institutions, organisations or individuals endangering China’s cybersecurity are now “pursued for legal liability according to law”; where serious consequences are caused, the public security department and relevant State Council departments “may decide to take freezing of assets or other necessary sanctions.” Adding “pursued for legal liability” and broadening the trigger materially expands the law’s reach beyond China’s borders.

How Officials Framed the Revision

The CAC Network Rule-of-Law Bureau described the amended law as enriching guiding principles, adding AI security and development content, aligning personal-information protection with the Civil Code and PIPL, improving the liability system, and widening extraterritorial application. He Bo, director of the CAICT Internet Law Research Center, noted the stepped penalties categorise general, persistent/serious and especially serious cases, applying punishment and education so enforcement “has both strength and warmth,” and called the 1 January 2026 effective date a marker that “China’s cybersecurity rule-of-law has entered a new stage”; the NPC Standing Committee Economic Law Office stated the amendment implements the thought on building a cyber power and that the three laws together constitute China’s network and data security legal system.

What Foreign-Invested Enterprises Should Do Next

  1. Re-screen CII status. Determine whether your China entity, or parts of it, are or may be designated critical information infrastructure, since the heaviest tiers and the procurement multiple attach to that status.
  2. Verify product certifications. Audit network key equipment and dedicated cybersecurity products against the certification/detection catalogues; obtain and retain proof before purchase and deployment.
  3. Re-align the legal basis for personal-information processing. Update privacy notices, processing records and contracts to cite Article 42(2) and the Civil Code/PIPL linkage.
  4. Build an approval path for outward vulnerability and security-information release. Article 65 rules require internal sign-off before any external disclosure.
  5. Review group-level cross-border data and remote access. The Article 71 offshore route and widened Article 77 reach bear directly on group clouds, cross-border systems and remote operations by overseas parent or affiliate staff.
  6. Re-rate the compliance budget and individual exposure. With dual liability normalised and a RMB 10 million ceiling, assign board-level ownership and director-officer risk awareness.

Related Reading

Two companion articles on this site cover adjacent ground without overlap: the Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS) and foreign-invested enterprises, and the Regulations on Network Data Security Management; the cross-references are pointers.


2026年1月1日施行的新修改《网络安全法》:人工智能专条、阶梯式重罚与域外适用扩围

概览:本次修法对外商投资企业的含义

《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国网络安全法〉的决定》于2025年10月28日第十四届全国人大常委会第十八次会议通过,经国家主席令第六十一号公布,自2026年1月1日起施行,共14项修改并重新公布全文。

《网络安全法》与《数据安全法》《个人信息保护法》共同构成我国网络与数据安全法律体系的支柱;本次修法将罚款上限提高一个数量级,首次在基础性法律层面为人工智能设立框架,做实与《民法典》《个人信息保护法》的衔接,并扩大域外适用。

立法事实

修改决定于2025年10月28日第十四届全国人大常委会第十八次会议通过,由中华人民共和国主席令第六十一号公布,自2026年1月1日起施行。原法自2017年6月1日施行;本次修改相应调整条文顺序并重新公布全文。根据2025年10月27日宪法和法律委员会的报告,常委会于10月25日分组审议,宪法和法律委员会当晚逐条研究,并与有关部门研究后将施行时间确定为2026年1月1日;委员会采纳了”增加促进人工智能应用、运用人工智能提升网络安全保护水平”的意见,也采纳了”扩大域外适用情形”的建议。

新增指导原则与人工智能专条

第一项修改新增第3条:”网络安全工作坚持中国共产党的领导,贯彻总体国家安全观,统筹发展和安全,推进网络强国建设。”

实质性新增是第20条(人工智能专条)。其规定,国家支持人工智能基础理论研究和算法等关键技术研发,推进训练数据资源、算力等基础设施建设,完善人工智能伦理规范,加强风险监测评估和安全监管,促进人工智能应用和健康发展;同时规定,国家支持创新网络安全管理方式,运用人工智能等新技术,提升网络安全保护水平。这是中国基础性法律层面首次为人工智能构建”发展保障+安全监管”双重框架。

个人信息保护的衔接

修改将原第40条改为第42条并增加一款:网络运营者处理个人信息,应当遵守本法和《民法典》《个人信息保护法》等法律、行政法规的规定。这做实了与《民法典》《个人信息保护法》的衔接。

阶梯式罚则:量级的跃升

原第59条改为第61条,引入分级、阶梯式处罚安排,罚款上限由百万级跃升至1000万元级。

情节层级适用主体单位罚款(元)责任人罚款(元)
一般性义务未履行且拒不改正(第23、27条)网络运营者5万–50万1万–10万
关基义务未履行且拒不改正(第35、36、38、40条)关基运营者10万–100万1万–10万
严重后果:大量数据泄露、关基丧失局部功能二者均适用50万–200万5万–20万
特别严重后果:关基丧失主要功能二者均适用200万–1000万20万–100万

设计刻意呈阶梯状:第一层级仅招致警告与较低罚款;唯有拒不改正或实际造成危害才逐级抬升。但顶层——大规模数据泄露或关基丧失局部功能,以及关基丧失主要功能的特别严重情形——触及1000万元上限,责任人个人责任可达100万元。

产品认证检测与应用关停

新增第63条指向供给端:销售或提供未经安全认证、安全检测,或者不合格、不符合要求的网络关键设备和网络安全专用产品,将被责令停止销售或提供、警告并没收违法所得;无违法所得或不足10万元的,并处2万–10万元;违法所得10万元以上的,并处违法所得1–5倍;情节严重的,可责令暂停业务、停业整顿、吊销许可证或营业执照。

原第61条改为第64条,处置措施在”关闭网站”之外新增”关闭网站或者应用程序”。

关键信息基础设施:采购与境外存储

原第65条改为第67条:关基运营者违反第37条,使用未经安全审查或安全审查未通过的网络产品或者服务的,被责令限期改正、停止使用、消除对国家安全的影响,并处采购金额1–10倍罚款,责任人处1万–10万元。

新增第65条(原第62条)规制未经许可开展网络安全认证、检测、风险评估,或向社会发布系统漏洞、计算机病毒、网络攻击、网络侵入等网络安全信息:责令改正、警告,可处1万–10万元;拒不改正或情节严重的,处10万–100万元,并可责令暂停业务、停业整顿、关闭网站或应用程序、吊销许可证或营业执照,责任人处1万–10万元。

新增第69条(合并原第68条与第69条第1项)规制未停止传输违法信息、未采取消除处置措施、未保存记录或未报告:责令改正、警告、通报,可处5万–50万元;拒不改正或情节严重的,处50万–200万元,并可责令暂停业务、停业整顿、关闭网站或应用程序、吊销许可证或营业执照,责任人处5万–20万元;造成特别严重影响、特别严重后果的,处200万–1000万元,责任人处20万–100万元。电子信息发送服务提供者、应用软件下载服务提供者不履行第50条第2款安全管理义务的,依照前两款处罚。

新增第71条(合并原第64、66、70条)将三类行为交由其他法律、行政法规处理处罚:(一)发布或传输第13条第2款和其他法律禁止发布或传输的信息;(二)违反第24条第3款、第43至45条规定侵害个人信息权益;(三)违反第39条规定,关基运营者在境外存储个人信息和重要数据,或向境外提供个人信息和重要数据。窃取或非法获取、非法出售或非法提供个人信息尚不构成犯罪的,由公安机关依法处罚。

过罚相当与域外适用扩围

新增第73条引入一般从轻条款:违反本法规定但具有《行政处罚法》规定的从轻、减轻或不予处罚情形的,依照其规定。

最后一项修改将原第75条改为第77条,扩大域外适用。其现规定:境外的机构、组织、个人从事危害中华人民共和国网络安全活动的,”依法追究法律责任”;造成严重后果的,国务院公安部门和有关部门并可以决定对该机构、组织、个人采取冻结财产或者其他必要的制裁措施。原条文仅规定冻结财产等制裁,新增”依法追究法律责任”且触发情形扩大,使该法的域外辐射显著拓宽。

官方对本次修法的定调

中央网信办网络法治局指出,修改后的网络安全法”充实网络安全工作指导原则,增加促进人工智能安全与发展的内容,在个人信息保护方面做好与《民法典》和《个人信息保护法》的衔接,进一步完善网络安全法律责任制度,扩大域外适用情形”。中国信通院互联网法律研究中心主任何波在网信办官网刊文表示,新法设置阶梯式处罚,按一般性违法、拒不改正或情节严重、造成特别严重影响/后果分类施策,宽严相济,使执法”既有力度又有温度”;并称2026年1月1日施行”标志着我国网络安全法治建设进入新阶段”。全国人大常委会法工委经济法室表示,修改重点之一是贯彻网络强国重要思想、充实指导原则;网络安全法与数据安全法、个人信息保护法共同构成我国网络安全和数据安全法律体系。

外商投资企业下一步应做什么

  1. 重新梳理关基认定。 厘清中国实体或其部分是否被认定或可能被认定为关键信息基础设施,因为最重罚则层级与采购倍数均附着于该身份。
  2. 核验产品认证。 对照认证/检测目录审计网络关键设备与网络安全专用产品,在采购与部署前取得并留存证明。
  3. 对齐个人信息处理的法律依据。 更新隐私政策、处理记录与合同,引据第42条第2款及《民法典》《个人信息保护法》衔接。
  4. 建立漏洞与网络安全信息对外发布的审批路径。 第65条风险评估与信息发布规则要求任何对外披露前完成内部签批。
  5. 复核集团层面的跨境数据与远程访问。 第71条境外存储/提供路径与拓宽的第77条域外适用,直接关涉集团云、跨境系统与境外母公司或关联方人员的远程运维。
  6. 重估合规预算与个人风险。 双罚制常态化、上限1000万元,须配置董事会层级的责任归属与高管风险意识。

延伸阅读

本站另有两篇相邻主题文章,互不重叠:网络安全等级保护(MLPS)与外资企业、《网络数据安全管理条例》。新修改的《网络安全法》作为基础性法律居于二者之上;此处仅作交叉引用,不作重写。

Sources

China’s Network Data Security Regulation: what foreign-invested firms must do

  • China’s Network Data Security Regulation (State Council Order 790) took effect on 1 January 2025, turning the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and PIPL into operational, enforceable obligations for every network data processor — including foreign-invested firms.
    《网络数据安全管理条例》(国务院令790号)自 2025 年 1 月 1 日起施行,将《网络安全法》《数据安全法》《个人信息保护法》转化为对每一个网络数据处理者(含外资企业)可执行、可处罚的具体义务。
  • Foreign companies that process personal information of individuals in China must designate a domestic representative or set up a local body and file its details with the city-level Cyberspace Administration (CAC).
    处理中国境内自然人个人信息的境外企业,须在中国境内设立专门机构或指定代表,并将其信息报送所在地市级网信部门。
  • Sensitive personal information — biometrics, health, finance, religious belief, specific identity, whereabouts — requires separate consent, and data on children under 14 needs guardian consent.
    生物识别、医疗健康、金融账户、宗教信仰、特定身份、行踪轨迹等敏感个人信息须取得单独同意,不满十四周岁未成年人个人信息须取得监护人同意。
  • “Important data” handlers must appoint a security manager and team, run risk assessments before sharing or outsourcing, and file an annual risk report to provincial-or-above authorities.
    重要数据处理者须明确数据安全负责人与管理机构,在提供、委托、共同处理前开展风险评估,并每年向省级以上主管部门报送风险评估报告。
  • Cross-border transfers of important data require a CAC security assessment; personal information can exit via assessment, certification, standard contract, or one of several statutory exemptions.
    重要数据出境须通过网信部门安全评估;个人信息出境可通过安全评估、保护认证、标准合同或若干法定豁免路径。
  • Large platforms (50M+ registered users or 10M+ monthly actives) face extra duties: an annual personal-information protection social-responsibility report and stricter cross-border controls.
    大型网络平台(注册用户 5000 万以上或月活 1000 万以上)承担额外义务:每年发布个人信息保护社会责任报告,并遵守更严格的数据跨境要求。
  • Penalties are substantial: routine violations draw fines up to ¥1 million, while national-security-review breaches can reach ¥100 million plus business suspension.
    处罚力度显著:一般违规罚款最高 100 万元,违反国家安全审查规定的可处 1000 万元罚款并责令停业整顿。

China’s Network Data Security Regulation: what foreign-invested firms must do | 网络数据安全管理条例:外资企业需要做什么

Overview

On 1 January 2025, the Network Data Security Regulation (网络数据安全管理条例) — State Council Order No. 790, promulgated on 24 September 2024 — came into force. It is the implementing layer beneath three statutes that foreign operators already know by name: the Cybersecurity Law (2017), the Data Security Law (2021) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). Where those laws set principles, Order 790 sets procedures, assignees and penalties.

For a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) running a website, app, SaaS, e-commerce storefront, loyalty programme, HR system or IoT product in China, the Regulation is not background law — it is the rulebook that determines whether your data practices are lawful day to day. This article walks through the obligations that most often catch foreign operators off guard, the cross-border mechanics, and a practical compliance checklist. It is general information, not legal advice.

Who is in scope

The Regulation applies to “network data processing activities” in China — collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure and deletion of electronic data over a network. If you operate any digital service that touches users or employees in mainland China, you are a network data processor (网络数据处理者) and bear the primary responsibility for the security of the data you handle.

Two extraterritorial hooks matter for foreign parents and platforms:

  • Article 26 (mirroring PIPL Article 53): an overseas processor of personal information of individuals in China that is required to establish a local body or designate a representative must file the body’s name (or the representative’s name) and contact details with the city-level Cyberspace Administration. This is the practical foothold CAC uses to reach foreign groups.
  • Article 54: China may take necessary measures against overseas organisations or individuals whose network data activities harm national security, public interest, or the personal-information rights of Chinese citizens.

Personal-information obligations

Most foreign businesses handle personal information — customers, leads, employees, newsletter subscribers. The Regulation tightens the rules:

  • Transparency. Personal-information processing rules must be集中 displayed, easy to access and prominently placed; sensitive-PI handling, retention periods and the methods for exercising rights must be stated clearly.
  • Sensitive PI needs separate consent. Biometrics, religious belief, specific identity, medical/health, financial accounts and whereabouts all require separate consent, not merely bundling into a privacy policy.
  • Minors under 14 require guardian consent and a dedicated processing rule.
  • Data portability and rights. Users can request access, copy, transfer, correct, delete, restrict processing, cancel accounts and withdraw consent; you must provide convenient channels and not erect unreasonable barriers.
  • Compliance audit. Processors must periodically — themselves or via a professional firm — audit their personal-information compliance.
  • Scale threshold. A processor of over 10 million individuals’ personal information is pulled into the “important data” duties on security manager, team and annual risk reporting (Articles 28, 30, 32).

Important-data duties

“Important data” is data that, if tampered with, destroyed, leaked or misused, could directly endanger national security, economic operation, social stability or public health and safety. The regime:

  • Identification and reporting. Processors must identify and declare important data under national rules; once a region or authority informs or publishes that certain data is important, the handler must fulfil protection duties.
  • Security manager + institution. Important-data handlers must designate a data-security负责人 (a management-layer member with direct reporting rights to authorities) and a dedicated management body.
  • Risk assessment before sharing. Before providing, entrusting or co-processing important data, a risk assessment is required (statutory duties excepted), covering purpose, necessity, recipient trustworthiness, contract safeguards and technical measures.
  • Annual report. Each year, important-data handlers file a risk-assessment report to provincial-or-above authorities, covering processed data, safeguards, incidents and — critically — cross-border transfer circumstances.

Cross-border transfer mechanics

This is where foreign groups feel the pinch. The Regulation preserves the existing three main lawful channels for personal-information export and adds statutory exemptions:

  1. CAC security assessment — mandatory for important-data exports and for large-volume PI transfers.
  2. PIPL certification by a professional institution.
  3. Standard contract filed with CAC.
  4. Exemptions — necessary to conclude/perform a contract with the individual; cross-border HR management under lawful rules/collective contract; statutory duties; emergencies protecting life/property; and treaty-based routes.

Important data cannot leave China without a CAC security assessment. Even after approval, transfers must not exceed the purpose, scope, type and volume assessed. CAC runs a dedicated cross-border data-security mechanism (Article 34).

Platform and AI-specific duties

If your China operation runs a platform or uses automation, note:

  • App-distribution platforms must verify and, where needed, suspend or stop distributing non-compliant applications.
  • Personalised recommendation must offer an easy-to-find, easy-to-operate opt-out and let users delete their profile tags.
  • Generative-AI providers must secure training data and the training process.
  • Large platforms (registered users ≥50M or MAU ≥10M) must publish an annual personal-information protection social-responsibility report and apply stricter cross-border controls; their annual important-data risk reports must also cover key-business and supply-chain data security.

Penalties

Enforcement is graded. Routine breaches (e.g. Articles 12, 22, 40–42) draw warnings, confiscation of unlawful gains, and — if unremedied or serious — fines up to ¥1 million plus possible suspension, rectification, licence revocation, and ¥10,000–¥100,000 personal fines for responsible individuals. National-security-review violations (Article 13) escalate to ¥1 million–¥100 million, suspension/revocation, and ¥100,000–¥1 million personal liability. Mitigation exists for voluntary correction and minor first-time offences.

Practical checklist for foreign firms

  1. Map your data. Inventory what you collect, where it lives, who touches it, and whether any slice could be “important data” or sensitive PI.
  2. Appoint ownership. Name a data-security lead (management layer) and a working team; document them.
  3. Close the extraterritorial gap. If you are an overseas processor of China PI, designate a local representative and file with the city-level CAC.
  4. Fix consent flows. Separate consent for sensitive PI; guardian consent for under-14s; honour portability and deletion rights with real, low-friction channels.
  5. Choose a transfer path. For any data leaving China, pick assessment / certification / standard contract / exemption and document the basis; never export important data without CAC approval.
  6. Run the audits. Periodic PI-compliance audits; annual important-data risk reports where triggered; large-platform reports if thresholds are met.
  7. Train and record. Keep policies, risk-assessment reports, transfer records and training evidence — penalties hinge on demonstrable diligence.

Sources

  • 网络数据安全管理条例(中华人民共和国国务院令 第790号,2024-09-24 公布,2025-01-01 施行),中国政府网:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202409/content_6977766.htm
  • 国务院公报《网络数据安全管理条例》(国令第790号):https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2024/issue_11646/202410/content_6980863.html
  • 中华人民共和国个人信息保护法(PIPL),全国人大:http://www.npc.gov.cn
  • 中华人民共和国数据安全法,全国人大:http://www.npc.gov.cn

Related reading

  • 数据出境安全评估与标准合同 / Data export security assessment and standard contract
  • 个人信息保护合规审计 / PIPL compliance audit
  • 外资企业数据本地化与跨境 / Data localisation for FIEs

网络数据安全管理条例:外资企业需要做什么

概述

2025 年 1 月 1 日,《网络数据安全管理条例》(国务院令790号,2024 年 9 月 24 日公布)正式施行。它是三部法律——2017 年《网络安全法》、2021 年《数据安全法》、2021 年《个人信息保护法》——之下的实施层。三部法律确立原则,790 号条例把它们变成可操作、可处罚的具体程序、责任主体与罚则。

对于在中国运营网站、App、SaaS、电商门店、会员体系、HR 系统或物联网产品的外商投资企业(FIE)而言,本条例不是”背景法”,而是决定你日常数据操作是否合规的实操手册。本文梳理最容易被外资运营方忽略的义务、数据跨境机制与一份合规清单。本文为一般性信息,非法律意见。

谁在范围内

条例适用于中国境内的”网络数据处理活动”——通过网络对电子数据进行收集、存储、使用、加工、传输、提供、公开、删除。只要你在 mainland China 运营任何触达用户或员工的数字服务,你就是网络数据处理者,并对所处理数据的安全承担主体责任。

两条域外效力条款对外国母公司和平台尤为关键:

  • 第二十六条(对应个保法第五十三条):处理中国境内自然人个人信息的境外处理者,如依法须在中国境内设立专门机构或指定代表,应将其名称(或代表姓名)及联系方式报送市级网信部门。这是网信办触达外国集团的实务抓手。
  • 第五十四条:对中国国家安全、公共利益或公民个人信息权益造成危害的境外组织、个人,国家网信部门可会同有关部门采取必要措施。

个人信息义务

多数外资企业都处理个人信息——客户、线索、员工、订阅者。条例进一步收紧:

  • 透明性。 个人信息处理规则须集中展示、易于访问、置于醒目位置;敏感个人信息处理、保存期限与行权方式须清晰列明。
  • 敏感个人信息须单独同意。 生物识别、宗教信仰、特定身份、医疗健康、金融账户、行踪轨迹均须取得单独同意,不能仅裹挟进隐私政策。
  • 不满十四周岁未成年人须取得监护人同意,并制定专门处理规则。
  • 可携带权与行权。 用户可请求查阅、复制、转移、更正、删除、限制处理、注销账号、撤回同意;须提供便捷渠道,不得设置不合理障碍。
  • 合规审计。 处理者须定期(自行或委托专业机构)审计个人信息合规情况。
  • 规模门槛。 处理超过 1000 万人个人信息的处理者,被纳入”重要数据”级别的安全负责人、管理机构与年度风险评估义务(第二十八条、第三十条、第三十二条)。

重要数据义务

“重要数据”指一旦遭篡改、破坏、泄露或非法利用,可能直接危害国家安全、经济运行、社会稳定或公共健康安全的数据。其机制为:

  • 识别与申报。 处理者须按国家规定识别、申报重要数据;一旦地区或主管部门告知或公布某类数据为重要数据,处理者须履行保护义务。
  • 安全负责人 + 管理机构。 重要数据处理者须指定数据安全负责人(管理层成员,有权直接向主管部门报告)并设立专门管理机构。
  • 提供前风险评估。 在提供、委托处理、共同处理重要数据前须开展风险评估(法定职责除外),覆盖目的、必要性、接收方资信、合同保障措施与技术手段。
  • 年度报告。 重要数据处理者每年向省级以上主管部门报送风险评估报告,涵盖所处理数据、保障措施、安全事件,以及——关键地——数据出境情况。

数据跨境机制

这是外国集团感受最深的环节。条例保留了个人信息出境的三条主要合法路径并新增法定豁免:

  1. 网信部门安全评估——重要数据出境及大体量个人信息传输的强制路径。
  2. 个人信息保护认证(专业机构出具)。
  3. 标准合同(向网信部门备案)。
  4. 豁免情形——订立或履行与个人的合同所必需;依法制定的劳动规章制度/集体合同下的跨境人力管理;履行法定职责;紧急情况下保护自然人生命健康和财产安全;以及条约规定的路径。

重要数据未经网信部门安全评估不得出境。即便获批,传输也不得超出评估确定的目的、范围、种类与规模。网信部门建立数据出境安全管理专项工作机制(第三十四条)。

平台与人工智能专项义务

若你的中国业务运营平台或使用自动化,请注意:

  • 应用分发平台须核验应用,必要时警示、不予分发、暂停或终止分发不合规应用。
  • 个性化推荐须提供易于理解、便于操作的关闭选项,并允许用户删除个人特征标签。
  • 生成式人工智能提供者须保障训练数据及训练过程安全。
  • 大型网络平台(注册用户 ≥5000 万或月活 ≥1000 万)须每年发布个人信息保护社会责任报告,并施以更严格的跨境管控;其重要数据年度报告还须说明关键业务与供应链数据安全。

法律责任

执法分级。一般违规(如第十二、二十二、四十至四十二条)可处警告、没收违法所得,拒不改正或情节严重的罚款最高 100 万元,并可责令暂停业务、停业整顿、吊销许可,对责任人员处 1 万–10 万元罚款。违反国家安全审查规定(第十三条)可升至 100 万–1000 万元罚款、停业整顿/吊销,并对责任人员处 10 万–100 万元罚款。主动消除危害、轻微并及时改正的,可依法从轻、减轻或不予处罚。

外资企业实操清单

  1. 梳理数据。 盘点收集内容、存储位置、接触方,以及是否存在”重要数据”或敏感个人信息。
  2. 落实责任人。 指定管理层级的数据安全负责人与工作队,并形成文件。
  3. 补齐域外缺口。 若你是处理中国个人信息的境外处理者,指定境内代表并向市级网信部门报备。
  4. 修正同意流程。 敏感个人信息单独同意;不满十四周岁监护人同意;以真实、低摩擦渠道保障可携带与删除权。
  5. 选定出境路径。 任何出境数据须选择评估/认证/标准合同/豁免之一并留痕;重要数据未经评估不得出境。
  6. 开展审计。 定期个人信息合规审计;触发的年度重要数据风险评估;达标的大型平台报告。
  7. 培训与留证。 保存制度、评估报告、传输记录与培训证据——处罚往往取决于是否展现出可证明的勤勉。

Sources

  • 网络数据安全管理条例(中华人民共和国国务院令 第790号,2024-09-24 公布,2025-01-01 施行),中国政府网:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202409/content_6977766.htm
  • 国务院公报《网络数据安全管理条例》(国令第790号):https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/2024/issue_11646/202410/content_6980863.html
  • 中华人民共和国个人信息保护法(PIPL),全国人大:http://www.npc.gov.cn
  • 中华人民共和国数据安全法,全国人大:http://www.npc.gov.cn

相关阅读

  • 数据出境安全评估与标准合同 / Data export security assessment and standard contract
  • 个人信息保护合规审计 / PIPL compliance audit
  • 外资企业数据本地化与跨境 / Data localisation for FIEs

Cross-border data: scenario-based, field-level negative lists

  • The 2026 action plan supports FTZs and service-opening pilot cities in exploring scenario-based, field-level data-export negative lists.
    2026年行动方案支持自贸区、服务业扩大开放试点城市在更多领域制定场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单。
  • National standards for “important data” identification catalogs will be promoted for eight industries (industrial, telecom, geoinformation, automotive, pharma, seeds, aerospace, civil aviation).
    将推动工业、电信、地理信息、汽车、医药、种业、航天、民航等八个行业领域重要数据识别目录国家标准制定。
  • This refines the general PIPL cross-border-transfer rules with more granular, locally-tailored negative lists.
    这以更细粒度、因地制宜的负面清单,细化了个保法项下的一般跨境传输规则。
  • FIEs should check whether an applicable FTZ negative list or industry important-data catalog covers their cross-border transfers.
    外资企业应核实在适用的自贸区负面清单或行业重要数据目录是否覆盖其跨境传输。
  • It complements the existing cross-border data transfer rules and PIPL compliance articles rather than replacing them.
    该举措是对现有跨境数据传输规则与个保法合规文章的补充,而非替代。
  • Watch for releases from the Cyberspace Administration (CAC) and the pilot cities’ negative-list catalogs.
    请关注国家网信办及试点城市负面清单目录的发布。

Cross-border data: scenario-based, field-level negative lists | 数据跨境场景化、字段级负面清单

Overview

A specific measure in the Action Plan for Stabilizing and Improving Foreign Investment (利用外资固稳促优行动方案) targets cross-border data flows. Issued 16 June 2026 (商资发〔2026〕97号) and effective from 1 July 2026, it supports free-trade zones (FTZs) and service-opening pilot cities in exploring scenario-based, field-level data-export negative lists, and promotes national standards for “important data” identification catalogs across eight industries.

This article explains what changes for foreign-invested enterprises moving data out of China, building on the general cross-border data transfer rules.

Informational guidance only; the exact negative lists and catalogs are issued by the competent authorities and pilot cities, so verify before acting.

What is new

Scenario-based, field-level negative lists

  • FTZs and service-opening pilot cities may, in more areas, formulate scenario-based (i.e., by business scenario) and field-level (i.e., down to specific data fields) data-export negative lists.
  • A field-level list tells an enterprise precisely which data fields are restricted for export, instead of a broad category ban — reducing uncertainty for compliant transfers.

Important-data catalogs for eight industries

  • Promote national standards for important-data identification catalogs in: industrial, telecom, geoinformation, automotive, pharma, seeds, aerospace, and civil aviation.
  • Once published, these catalogs define which data is “important data” and therefore subject to stricter cross-border controls.

How it differs from the general rules

  • The general PIPL/cybersecurity framework still applies: important/large-volume/sensitive personal data exports follow the standard routes (security assessment, certification, or standard contract).
  • The new approach adds a local, granular negative list layer: within an FTZ or pilot city, if your specific scenario and fields are NOT on the negative list, the path can be clearer and faster.
  • It is a refinement and localisation, not a repeal, of the existing cross-border data transfer rules.

What to do next

  • Map your cross-border data flows by business scenario and by specific data field.
  • Check whether your FTZ or pilot city has published (or is consulting on) a scenario-based / field-level data-export negative list covering your scenario.
  • Determine whether your industry’s “important data” catalog (when issued) classifies your data as important.
  • If not on a negative list and not “important data”, document the basis and proceed under the applicable streamlined route.
  • Where uncertainty remains, use the standard statutory route (assessment / certification / standard contract) and consult the local cyberspace authority.
  • Keep records; negative lists and catalogs are expected to be updated iteratively.

Sources

  • 中华人民共和国中央人民政府(国务院)— 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》全文:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 国家互联网信息办公室(官方门户)— https://www.cac.gov.cn
  • 商务部 — 关于印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》的通知(商资发〔2026〕97号):https://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/zcfg/202606/183553.html

Related reading

  • see also: Cross-border data transfer rules (PIPL) / 跨境数据传输规则(个保法)
  • see also: PIPL compliance for foreign companies / 外资企业个人信息保护法合规
  • see also: Stabilizing Foreign Investment Action Plan: 15 measures at a glance / 利用外资固稳促优行动方案:15条举措总览

数据跨境场景化、字段级负面清单

概述

《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》中的一项具体举措指向数据跨境流动。方案于2026年6月16日印发(商资发〔2026〕97号),自2026年7月1日起落地,支持自由贸易试验区、服务业扩大开放试点城市探索场景化、字段级数据出境负面清单,并推动八个行业“重要数据”识别目录国家标准制定。

本文在一般跨境数据传输规则之上,说明外资企业数据出境有何变化。

本文仅为信息性指引;具体负面清单与目录由主管机关及试点城市发布,行动前请核实。

新在何处

场景化、字段级负面清单

  • 自贸区与服务业扩大开放试点城市可在更多领域制定场景化(按业务场景)与字段级(细化至具体数据字段)的数据出境负面清单。
  • 字段级清单精确告知企业哪些数据字段受限出境,而非笼统类别禁止,降低合规传输的不确定性。

八行业重要数据目录

  • 推动工业、电信、地理信息、汽车、医药、种业、航天、民航等八个行业领域重要数据识别目录国家标准制定。
  • 目录发布后,将界定何为”重要数据”,从而适用更严格的跨境管控。

与一般规则的区别

  • 个保法/网络安全一般框架仍然适用:重要、大体量或敏感个人信息出境走标准路径(安全评估、认证或标准合同)。
  • 新方案增加了一层地方、细粒度负面清单:在自贸区或试点城市内,若具体场景与字段不在负面清单上,路径可更清晰、更快。
  • 这是对现有跨境数据传输规则的细化与本地化,而非废止。

下一步建议

  • 按业务场景与具体数据字段梳理跨境数据流。
  • 核查所在自贸区或试点城市是否已发布(或正征求意见)覆盖你方场景的场景化/字段级数据出境负面清单。
  • 判断所在行业”重要数据”目录(发布后)是否将你方数据列为重要数据。
  • 若不在负面清单且非”重要数据”,留存依据并按适用的简化路径办理。
  • 仍有不确定时,走法定标准路径(评估/认证/标准合同)并咨询地方网信部门。
  • 保留记录;负面清单与目录预计将迭代更新。

来源

  • 中华人民共和国中央人民政府(国务院)— 《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》全文:https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202606/content_7072838.htm
  • 国家互联网信息办公室(官方门户)— https://www.cac.gov.cn
  • 商务部 — 关于印发《利用外资固稳促优行动方案》的通知(商资发〔2026〕97号):https://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/zcfg/202606/183553.html

相关阅读

  • see also: 跨境数据传输规则(个保法) / Cross-border data transfer rules (PIPL)
  • see also: 外资企业个人信息保护法合规 / PIPL compliance for foreign companies
  • see also: 利用外资固稳促优行动方案:15条举措总览 / Stabilizing Foreign Investment Action Plan: 15 measures at a glance

Cross-border data transfer rules (PIPL)

  • Under PIPL (in force 1 Nov 2021), personal information may leave China only through one of three mechanisms: a CAC security assessment, a standard contract (SCC), or certification.
    依《个人信息保护法》(2021 年 11 月 1 日施行),个人信息出境仅可经三种机制之一:安全评估、标准合同或认证。
  • The applicable route is driven mainly by who is exporting and the cumulative volume counted from 1 January of the current year.
    所适用的路径主要取决于出境方身份,以及自当年 1 月 1 日起累计的数量。
  • A CIIO exporting any PI, or a non-CIIO above 1 million non-sensitive PI / 10,000 sensitive PI / important data, must undergo the CAC security assessment.
    CIIO 出境任何个人信息,或非 CIIO 超过 100 万人非敏感个人信息 / 1 万人敏感个人信息 / 重要数据的,须申报安全评估。
  • A non-CIIO exporting 100,000–1,000,000 non-sensitive PI (or under 10,000 sensitive PI) uses the standard contract or certification.
    非 CIIO 出境 10 万至不满 100 万人非敏感个人信息(或不满 1 万人敏感个人信息)的,适用标准合同或认证。
  • A non-CIIO providing fewer than 100,000 individuals’ non-sensitive PI in the year is exempt from all three mechanisms.
    非 CIIO 当年累计提供不满 10 万人非敏感个人信息的,免予三种机制。
  • Regardless of route, separate consent from the individual and a Personal Information Protection Impact Assessment (PIPIA, retained ~3 years) are mandatory.
    无论采用何种路径,取得个人的单独同意并完成个人信息保护影响评估(PIPIA,留存约 3 年)均为强制义务。
  • Exemptions exist for contract necessity, cross-border HR management, emergencies, and data outside an FTZ’s published negative list.
    为订立/履行合同的必需、跨境人力资源管理、紧急情况,以及自贸区负面清单之外的数据,可获豁免。

Cross-border data transfer rules (PIPL) | 跨境数据传输规则(个保法)

Overview

For any foreign business operating in China, moving personal information (PI) out of the country — to a global HR system, a overseas parent, or a foreign cloud — triggers China’s cross-border data-transfer regime. The *Personal Information Protection Law* (PIPL, in force since 1 November 2021) makes cross-border PI provision lawful only through one of three recognised mechanisms, and the 2024 *Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-border Data Flows* clarified the thresholds that decide which mechanism applies. The trend is liberalisation, but the obligations are real and the thresholds are quantitative. This article explains the three mechanisms, the volume thresholds, the exemptions, and the baseline duties (separate consent and impact assessment).

Informational guidance only; the rules are technical and evolving, so validate your specific data flows with qualified PRC data-compliance counsel.

The three lawful mechanisms

A processor that needs to provide PI outside China must use one of three routes:

  1. CAC security assessment (安全评估). A review by the Cyberspace Administration of China (the national network regulator, CAC) for the highest-risk transfers.
  2. Standard contract (标准合同, SCC). The processor concludes the official *Personal Information Export Standard Contract* (PIESC) with the overseas recipient and files it with the provincial CAC.
  3. Certification (认证). The transfer is covered by personal-information-protection certification issued by a qualified certification body.

The choice among them is driven primarily by who is exporting and how much PI is involved.

Thresholds that decide the route

Under the 2024 Provisions, the triggers are calculated cumulatively from 1 January of the current year:

  • Security assessment is required when:
  • the exporter is a Critical Information Infrastructure Operator (CIIO) exporting any PI or important data; or
  • a non-CIIO exporter ships important data abroad; or
  • a non-CIIO exporter, since 1 Jan, has cumulatively provided more than 1,000,000 individuals’ PI (non-sensitive) or more than 10,000 individuals’ sensitive PI.
  • Standard contract or certification applies when a non-CIIO exporter, since 1 Jan, has cumulatively provided 100,000 to less than 1,000,000 individuals’ PI (non-sensitive) or fewer than 10,000 individuals’ sensitive PI.
  • Below the thresholds — essentially free: a non-CIIO exporter providing fewer than 100,000 individuals’ non-sensitive PI in the year is exempt from the assessment, the standard contract, and certification.
Exporter / volume (since 1 Jan)Mechanism required
CIIO exporting any PI / important dataSecurity assessment
Non-CIIO, important data, or >1m non-sensitive PI, or >10k sensitive PISecurity assessment
Non-CIIO, 100k–1m non-sensitive PI, or <10k sensitive PIStandard contract or certification
Non-CIIO, <100k non-sensitive PIExempt

Exemptions

The 2024 Provisions also exempt certain transfers from the three mechanisms entirely, including transfers:

  • necessary to conclude or perform a contract with the individual (e.g., cross-border shopping, remittance, payment, flight/hotel booking, visa processing, examinations);
  • necessary for cross-border HR management under lawfully formulated labour rules and collective contracts;
  • necessary to protect an individual’s life, health, or property in an emergency;
  • and, within Free Trade Zones, transfers of data outside the zone’s published negative list (FTZs may set their own negative lists exempting specified data from the mechanisms, filed with the national CAC and data authority).

Baseline duties regardless of route

Whichever mechanism applies, PIPL imposes duties that sit underneath all of them:

  • Separate consent (单独同意). Providing PI abroad generally requires the individual’s separate consent, distinct from general privacy consent.
  • Personal Information Protection Impact Assessment (PIPIA). The processor must conduct a PIPIA before export and retain it (commonly for at least three years).
  • Accountability documentation. Notice to individuals of the overseas recipient, purpose, type of PI, and means of contact; and the overseas recipient must meet PIPL’s protection standards.

What to do next

  • Map your data flows and count, per calendar year, the individuals whose PI you export and whether any is sensitive or important data.
  • Determine your exporter type (CIIO or not) — CIIO status pulls even small transfers into security assessment.
  • If you are below 100k non-sensitive PI, document the exemption rather than assuming you need to file.
  • For the middle band, choose the standard contract (file with provincial CAC) or certification; for the top band, prepare a CAC security assessment.
  • Always obtain separate consent and complete a PIPIA before any export; keep records.
  • If operating in a Free Trade Zone, check the zone’s negative list — it may exempt data categories relevant to you.

Sources

  • Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-border Data Flows (2024): https://www.cac.gov.cn/2024-03/22/c_1712776612187994.htm
  • Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — Data Export Security Management Policy Q&A (2025): https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-04/09/c_1745906286623776.htm
  • Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — Expert reading on the Personal Information Export Certification scheme (2025): https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-10/17/c_1762425522602315.htm
  • State Council (gov.cn) — Personal Information Protection Law enacted (2021): https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-08/20/content_5632486.htm

Related reading

  • see also: Copyright & trade secrets for foreign firms / 著作权与商业秘密
  • see also: Hiring local staff: contracts & social insurance / 雇佣本地员工:合同与社保

跨境数据传输规则(个保法)

概述

对任何在华经营的外国企业而言,将个人信息(PI)传出中国——传到全球 HR 系统、境外母公司或外国云——都会触发中国的跨境数据传输制度。《个人信息保护法》(PIPL,2021 年 11 月 1 日施行)规定,个人信息出境仅可经三种认可机制之一合法进行;2024 年《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》进一步明确了决定采用何种机制的门槛。总体趋势是放宽,但义务真实存在,且门槛是定量的。本文说明三种机制、数量门槛、豁免情形,以及基础义务(单独同意与影响评估)。

本文仅为信息性指引;规则技术性强且不断演进,请就具体数据流咨询合格的中国数据合规律师。

三种合法机制

需要向境外提供个人信息的处理者,必须采用以下路径之一:

  1. 安全评估。 由国家网信部门(CAC)对最高风险传输进行的审查。
  2. 标准合同。 处理者与境外接收方订立官方《个人信息出境标准合同》(PIESC),并向省级网信部门备案。
  3. 认证。 传输由具备资质的认证机构出具的个人信息保护认证所覆盖。

三者之间的选择,主要取决于谁在出关以及涉及多少个人信息。

决定路径的数量门槛

依 2024 年规定,门槛按当年 1 月 1 日起累计计算:

  • 须申报安全评估的情形:
  • 出境方为关键信息基础设施运营者(CIIO),出境任何个人信息或重要数据;或
  • 非 CIIO 出境重要数据;或
  • 非 CIIO 自 1 月 1 日起累计向境外提供超过 100 万人非敏感个人信息或超过 1 万人敏感个人信息。
  • 标准合同或认证适用的情形:非 CIIO 自 1 月 1 日起累计提供 10 万至不满 100 万人非敏感个人信息或不满 1 万人敏感个人信息。
  • 低于门槛——基本自由: 非 CIIO 当年累计提供不满 10 万人非敏感个人信息的,免予安全评估、标准合同与认证。
出境方 / 数量(自 1 月 1 日起)所需机制
CIIO 出境任何 PI / 重要数据安全评估
非 CIIO、重要数据,或 >100 万非敏感 PI,或 >1 万敏感 PI安全评估
非 CIIO、10 万–100 万非敏感 PI,或 <1 万敏感 PI标准合同 或 认证
非 CIIO、<10 万非敏感 PI豁免

豁免情形

2024 年规定还将若干传输整体豁免于三种机制,包括:

  • 为订立或履行个人作为一方当事人的合同所必需(如跨境购物、跨境汇款、跨境支付、机票酒店预订、签证办理、考试服务);
  • 依依法制定的劳动规章制度和依法签订的集体合同实施跨境人力资源管理所必需;
  • 紧急情况下为保护自然人生命健康和财产安全所必需;
  • 以及,在自由贸易区内,传输该区已公布负面清单之外的数据(自贸区可自定负面清单,将指定数据豁免于三种机制,并报国家网信部门与数据主管部门备案)。

不分路径的基础义务

无论采用何种机制,PIPL 均设定了底层义务:

  • 单独同意。 向境外提供个人信息一般须取得个人的单独同意,区别于一般隐私同意。
  • 个人信息保护影响评估(PIPIA)。 处理者须在出境前完成 PIPIA 并留存(通常至少三年)。
  • 问责文档。 向个人告知境外接收方、目的、个人信息种类与联系方式;境外接收方须达到 PIPL 的保护标准。

下一步建议

  • 梳理数据流,并按自然年统计出境个人信息涉及的人数,以及是否含敏感或重要数据。
  • 判定出境方类型(是否 CIIO)——CIIO 身份即便少量传输也纳入安全评估。
  • 若低于 10 万非敏感 PI,应记录豁免依据,而非默认需要申报。
  • 对中间区间,选择标准合同(向省级网信备案)或认证;对顶部区间,准备网信部门安全评估。
  • 任何出境前均须取得单独同意并完成 PIPIA;保留记录。
  • 若位于自贸区,核查该区负面清单——其可能豁免与你相关的数据类别。

来源

  • 国家互联网信息办公室(CAC)——《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》(2024):https://www.cac.gov.cn/2024-03/22/c_1712776612187994.htm
  • 国家互联网信息办公室(CAC)——数据出境安全管理政策问答(2025):https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-04/09/c_1745906286623776.htm
  • 国家互联网信息办公室(CAC)——个人信息出境认证制度专家解读(2025):https://www.cac.gov.cn/2025-10/17/c_1762425522602315.htm
  • 国务院办公厅(gov.cn)——《个人信息保护法》出台(2021):https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-08/20/content_5632486.htm

相关阅读

  • see also: 著作权与商业秘密 / Copyright & trade secrets for foreign firms
  • see also: 雇佣本地员工:合同与社保 / Hiring local staff: contracts & social insurance

Guangdong’s Data-Export Negative List and the First National Data Pilot: Compliance Relief for FIEs

  • In August 2026 Guangzhou, Shenzhen and the Guangdong-Macao In-Depth Cooperation Zone in Hengqin were selected as the first batch of national pilot zones for international cooperation in the data sector, supported by the National Data Administration.
    2026年8月,在国家数据局支持下,广州、深圳及横琴粤澳深度合作区入选国家数据领域国际合作首批试点。
  • The pilot designates Hengqin to build an international data hub focused on Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries via Brazil, leveraging the “Macao + Hengqin” combination.
    试点方案赋予横琴立足”澳门+横琴”独特优势,以巴西为突破口、重点面向葡语、西语系国家打造数据领域国际合作新枢纽、新通道。
  • Hengqin completed its first filing case under the data-export negative list in mid-2026: Macao International Airport reported a cross-border data transmission under the “use first, report later” mechanism.
    2026年年中,横琴完成首单数据出境负面清单报告案例:澳门国际机场依据”先用后报”机制申报跨境数据传输。
  • Guangdong’s FTZ data-export negative list (2025 version), covering intelligent equipment manufacturing and personal-credit services, was registered with the CAC and the National Data Administration in May 2026.
    广东自贸试验区数据出境负面清单(2025版)聚焦智能装备制造和个人征信服务业两大领域,2026年5月经国家网信办、国家数据局审核备案发布。
  • Under the “use first, report later” mechanism, enterprises self-assess against the list, transmit data promptly, and file a report within 15 working days; qualified transmissions are exempt from security assessment and standard-contract filing.
    “先用后报”机制下,企业对照清单自主研判、便捷出境,事后15个工作日内报告;符合清单条件的数据免于安全评估、免于标准合同备案。
  • For foreign-invested enterprises in Guangdong, the pilot and negative list reduce the compliance cost of cross-border data flows for manufacturing, logistics, finance and R&D operations.
    对广东外资企业而言,该试点与负面清单降低了制造、物流、金融与研发运营跨境数据流动的合规成本。

Guangdong’s Data-Export Negative List and the First National Data Pilot: Compliance Relief for FIEs | 广东数据出境负面清单与首批国家数据试点:外资企业的合规减负

Why this matters now

Cross-border data flows have been one of the hardest compliance areas for foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in China, caught between data-security rules and genuine business needs to transmit HR, manufacturing, logistics and financial data overseas. Two developments in 2026 materially ease that pressure in the country’s most trade-intensive province. First, in May 2026, Guangdong published the data-export management list (negative list, 2025 version) for its pilot free-trade zones, after registration with the Cyberspace Administration of China and the National Data Administration. Second, in August 2026, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and the Hengqin cooperation zone were selected as the first batch of national pilot zones for international cooperation in the data sector. The combination gives FIEs in Guangdong a compliance channel that is substantially cheaper than the default security-assessment route.

How the negative list works

The negative-list approach inverts the default. Under the cross-border data rules, data transfers generally require one of three routes: a data-export security assessment, a standard contract, or certification. A negative list changes the equation: data within the listed scope — as determined by the enterprise’s own assessment against clear data categories — can flow abroad without the assessment or standard-contract burden, subject to filing. Guangdong’s list covers two focus areas, intelligent equipment manufacturing and personal-credit services, spanning important data and personal information across 7 business scenarios and 67 data items. The Hengqin implementing guide issued on 5 June 2026 codifies the “use first, report later” mechanics: an enterprise evaluates its data against the list, transmits compliant data promptly, and files a report within 15 working days. At a policy briefing in Hengqin on 2 July 2026, officials confirmed that data within the list is exempt from security assessment and standard-contract filing.

The international cooperation pilot

The August 2026 selection of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hengqin as national data international-cooperation pilots deepens the infrastructure behind the list. The pilot scheme assigns differentiated roles: Guangzhou builds a “facilities-rules-carriers-ecosystem” system; Shenzhen leverages Qianhai to expand cooperation with Singapore, ASEAN and Belt-and-Road countries; Hengqin focuses on the “Macao + Hengqin” advantage and, via Brazil, the Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking world. For FIEs, the pilot matters because it signals sustained official investment in the enabling layer — cross-border data verification platforms, research data networks and a data cross-border service centre that has already advised more than 70 companies — making the negative-list channel more usable over time.

Practical steps for FIEs in Guangdong

  1. Determine whether your data falls in the list. Map the data your entity transmits overseas — production parameters, equipment data, credit data, HR records — and check each category against the Guangdong negative list.
  2. Choose the compliant route. Where data is within the list, use the “use first, report later” mechanism with the 15-working-day filing; where it is outside, fall back to security assessment, standard contract or certification as applicable.
  3. Build self-assessment capacity. Document how your team classifies data and reaches its conclusion, because the mechanism is self-assessment-based and subject to ex-post supervision.
  4. Leverage the Hengqin/Nansha service layer. Use the data cross-border service centre and the implementing guides (Hengqin and Nansha have both issued them) for questions and procedural support.
  5. Watch for industry lists. Other FTZs and pilot areas are issuing negative lists across industries; if your group operates in automotive, healthcare, aviation or other covered sectors, track the applicable provincial list.
  6. Coordinate data, legal and IT. Negative-list compliance touches data classification, security, contracts and systems; run it as a cross-functional programme rather than a compliance checkbox.

Risks and compliance notes

The negative list is a narrowing of obligations, not an exemption from the data-security legal framework. Data outside the list still requires the full route; misclassification by the enterprise can create real liability. The “report later” obligation must be met within 15 working days, and the authorities retain ex-post supervision. FIEs should also remember that personal information crosses the border under the PIPL framework as well — the negative list does not override the PIPL’s consent and minimisation principles, it addresses the administrative route. Finally, because the list is Guangdong-specific, an FIE with operations in multiple provinces should verify the applicable list for each location rather than assuming national application.


广东数据出境负面清单与首批国家数据试点:外资企业的合规减负

为什么当下重要

跨境数据流动一直是在华外资企业最难处理的合规领域之一——一边是数据安全规则,一边是向境外传输人力资源、制造、物流与财务数据的真实业务需求。2026年的两项进展在中国贸易最密集的省份实质性地缓解了这一压力。第一,2026年5月,广东在其自贸试验区发布数据出境管理清单(负面清单,2025版),经国家网信办与国家数据局审核备案。第二,2026年8月,广州、深圳及横琴合作区入选国家数据领域国际合作首批试点。二者结合,为广东外资企业提供了一条在成本上远低于默认安全评估路径的合规通道。

负面清单如何运作

负面清单方法反转了默认逻辑。在跨境数据规则下,数据传输通常需要三条路径之一:数据出境安全评估、标准合同或认证。负面清单改变了等式:清单范围内的数据——由企业对照清晰的数据类别自行判定——可以在不承担安全评估或标准合同负担的情况下出境,仅需备案。广东清单覆盖两大重点领域,智能装备制造与个人征信服务,涵盖重要数据与个人信息,涉及7个业务场景、67个数据项。2026年6月5日发布的横琴实施指南将”先用后报”机制成文化:企业对照清单研判数据、合规数据及时出境、事后15个工作日内报告。2026年7月2日横琴政策宣讲会上,官方确认清单内数据免于安全评估与标准合同备案。

国际合作试点

2026年8月广州、深圳与横琴入选国家数据领域国际合作首批试点,为清单背后的基础设施再添砖瓦。试点方案赋予差异化角色:广州构建”设施—规则—载体—生态”四位一体体系;深圳依托前海拓展与新加坡、东盟及共建”一带一路”国家合作;横琴立足”澳门+横琴”优势、经巴西面向葡语西语世界。对外资企业而言,该试点意味着官方对该使能层的持续投入——跨境数据验证平台、跨境科研数据网络,以及已服务超70家企业的数据跨境服务中心——使负面清单通道随时间推移更可用。

广东外资企业的操作步骤

  1. 判定数据是否落入清单。 梳理本实体向境外传输的数据——生产参数、设备数据、征信数据、HR记录——并逐类对照广东负面清单。
  2. 选择合规路径。 清单内数据走”先用后报”机制、15个工作日备案;清单外数据按适用情形走安全评估、标准合同或认证。
  3. 建设自评估能力。 文件化团队如何分类数据并得出结论,因为该机制以自评估为基础、接受事后监管。
  4. 利用横琴/南沙服务层。 就疑问与程序支持,使用数据跨境服务中心及实施指南(横琴、南沙均已发布)。
  5. 关注行业清单。 其他自贸试验区与试点地区正跨行业发布负面清单;若贵集团涉足汽车、医药、民航等覆盖行业,跟踪适用的省级清单。
  6. 协同数据、法务与IT。 负面清单合规涉及数据分类、安全、合同与系统;作为跨职能项目运行,而非合规勾选项。

风险与合规提示

负面清单收窄的是义务范围,不是豁免数据安全法律框架。清单外数据仍须走完整路径;企业分类错误可能产生真实责任。”事后报告”义务必须在15个工作日内履行,监管部门保留事后监督。外资企业还应记住,个人信息依PIPL框架出境——负面清单不替代PIPL的同意与最小化原则,它处理的是行政路径。最后,由于清单为广东专属,在多省运营的外资企业应核验各地适用清单,而非假设全国统一适用。

Sources

FTZ Data-Export Negative Lists Accelerate: Beijing, Hengqin, Chongqing and Nansha Go Live

  • China’s free-trade-zone (FTZ) data-export negative-list mechanism is moving from policy design to live, enforceable cases. 自贸试验区数据出境负面清单机制正从制度设计走向可落地的实际案例。
  • Beijing, Hengqin (Guangdong), Chongqing and Nansha (Guangzhou) have each recorded its first negative-list data-export case. 北京、横琴(广东)、重庆、南沙(广州)均已出现首单负面清单数据出境案例。
  • Beijing’s “Two Zones” negative list (May 2026) adopts a “1+9” design covering 67 business scenarios and 612 data fields across the whole municipality. 北京市”两区”数据出境负面清单(2026年5月)采用”1+9″制度设计,覆盖全市域 67 个业务场景、612 个字段。
  • NongHyup Bank Beijing Branch became China’s first banking institution to achieve compliant data export under the negative-list framework on 2026-08-03. 韩国农协银行北京分行于 2026-08-03 成为全国首家通过负面清单实现数据合规出境的银行业机构。
  • Hengqin’s list centers on a “use-first, report-later” model with a 15-working-day post-hoc reporting window for qualifying data. 横琴清单核心为”先用后报”,符合条件的企业可便捷出境,并于事后 15 个工作日内报告。
  • All published lists are filed and reviewed by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and the National Data Administration (NDA). 上述清单均经国家网信办、国家数据局审核备案。

FTZ Data-Export Negative Lists Accelerate: Beijing, Hengqin, Chongqing and Nansha Go Live | 自贸试验区数据出境负面清单加速落地:北京、横琴、重庆、南沙首单齐发

Overview

China’s cross-border data governance has entered a new phase in which free-trade zones (FTZs) are permitted to define “negative lists” of data that may NOT be freely exported, while everything else outside the list flows under a lighter, more predictable regime. Throughout 2026 this mechanism shifted decisively from design documents to real, booked cases. Four jurisdictions — Beijing, Hengqin (in Guangdong), Chongqing and Nansha (in Guangzhou) — have each announced a first negative-list data-export case, signalling that the framework is operational rather than aspirational. The confirming authority for the underlying regime, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), together with the National Data Administration (NDA), reviews and files every published list.

Negative-list mechanism

The negative-list approach inverts the traditional burden. Under the older standard-contract filing model, many routine transfers required case-by-case assessment. Under the negative-list model, an enterprise first checks whether its data falls within a listed sensitive category. If it does not, the data can leave in an orderly, secure and freer flow; if it does, the stricter pathways still apply. Each FTZ tailors its list to its local industrial strengths, so the same national principle produces different sector coverage across the country. Lists published so far have appeared in Tianjin, Beijing, Hainan, Shanghai, Zhejiang and Guangdong, among others.

Beijing

Beijing’s “Two Zones” (the integrated national demonstration zone for opening up the service sector and the FTZ) negative list, released in May 2026, follows a “1+9” architecture: one management measure plus nine sector lists, applicable citywide. Building on five previously covered domains, it adds four new ones — medical devices, autonomous driving (intelligent connected vehicles), trade logistics and banking — to reach 67 business scenarios and 612 data fields. The milestone banking case came on 2026-08-03, when NongHyup Bank Beijing Branch (Korea’s NongHyup Bank) became the first banking institution in China to achieve compliant data export under the negative-list framework. Its management mode shifted from standard-contract filing to the secure, orderly free flow enabled by the negative list — a template now watched closely by foreign-invested banks in the Beijing CBD.

Hengqin

Guangdong’s Hengqin FTZ negative list was issued as Yue Wang Ban Fa [2026] No.1 on 2026-05-15, focusing on two sectors: intelligent equipment manufacturing and personal credit reporting services. Its signature feature is “use-first, report-later” (先用后报). An enterprise self-assesses against the list; if its data qualifies, it may export conveniently, then files a report within 15 working days afterward. This reduces upfront friction for manufacturers and credit-service firms while preserving a clear audit trail.

Chongqing

Chongqing’s list — the China (Chongqing) Pilot FTZ Data Export Management List (Negative List) (2025 Edition) — delivered its first beneficiary on 2026-08-11, when Changan Automobile became the first enterprise in the Chongqing FTZ to enjoy the dividends of the negative-list regime. For an automotive exporter, the ability to move R&D and operational data under a predictable negative-list pathway is material to global product development cycles.

Nansha

Nansha, within the Guangzhou portion of the Guangdong FTZ, issued its implementation guide for the data-export negative list on 2026-08-18. The Nansha guide extends coverage to personal credit reporting services and intelligent equipment manufacturing, aligning with the Guangdong provincial direction while providing local implementation detail for enterprises in the Nansha New Area.

Practical steps

For an FDI enterprise weighing the mechanism, the practical sequence is: (1) map your data inventory to the relevant FTZ list by sector and field; (2) confirm whether the data sits outside the listed sensitive categories; (3) if it does, adopt the negative-list pathway and document your self-assessment; (4) where the local rule requires it, complete post-hoc reporting within the statutory window (e.g., 15 working days in Hengqin); (5) keep records defensible, because CAC and NDA review and file every list. Foreign banks, automakers, device makers, logistics and credit-service firms are the earliest movers.

Related reading

The mechanism is part of a broader opening of FTZs and “Two Zones” to foreign investment, with data mobility treated as infrastructure for trade and FDI rather than a pure compliance cost. Enterprises should monitor further list releases from Tianjin, Hainan, Shanghai and Zhejiang, and track CAC guidance for procedural updates.

Legal backbone

The negative-list model is one pillar of China’s three-track cross-border data regime. The backbone instrument is the CAC Provisions on Promoting and Regulating the Cross-Border Data Flows (promulgated in 2024), which, together with the earlier Measures for Data Exit Security Assessment and the Standard Contract Measures, forms a tiered system. The first track is a security assessment for important data and large-volume personal information. The second track is standard-contract filing or certification for routine transfers below the statutory thresholds. The third track is the FTZ negative list, which frees intra-list data from the heavier assessment and filing pathways. For an FDI enterprise, the practical upside is that siting data operations inside an FTZ can convert a transfer that would otherwise require assessment or filing into a self-assessed, list-based flow — provided the data stays outside the listed sensitive categories. The lists themselves remain filed and reviewed by CAC and the NDA, so the lighter pathway is a delegated, not abolished, control. Enterprises should therefore keep both the negative list and the national thresholds in view when designing a cross-border transfer architecture.


自贸试验区数据出境负面清单加速落地:北京、横琴、重庆、南沙首单齐发

概述

我国跨境数据治理已进入新阶段:自贸试验区被允许界定”数据出境负面清单”——即不得自由出境的数据类别,清单之外则适用更轻量、更可预期的管理路径。2026 年以来,这一机制从制度文本走向真实落地的案例。北京、横琴(广东)、重庆、南沙(广州)四个片区均已公布首单负面清单数据出境案例,表明该框架已实际运行而非停留在纸面。作为底层规制的主管部门,国家互联网信息办公室(网信办)与国家数据局对每一份发布的清单进行审核备案。

负面清单机制

负面清单思路颠覆了传统的合规负担逻辑。在过去的标准合同备案模式下,大量常规数据传输需逐案评估;而在负面清单模式下,企业先判断其数据是否落入清单所列的敏感类别。若未落入,数据即可在”安全有序自由流动”的框架下出境;若落入,则仍适用更严格的路径。各自贸试验区结合自身产业优势定制清单,因此同一国家原则在全国呈现不同的行业覆盖。目前天津、北京、海南、上海、浙江、广东等地已相继发布清单。

北京

北京市”两区”(国家服务业扩大开放综合示范区与自贸试验区)数据出境负面清单于 2026 年 5 月发布,采用”1+9″制度设计:1 套管理办法加 9 个领域清单,全市域覆盖。在原有 5 个领域基础上,新增医疗器械、自动驾驶(智能网联汽车)、贸易物流、银行业 4 大领域,覆盖 67 个业务场景、612 个字段。标志性银行业案例出现在 2026-08-03:韩国农协银行北京分行(NongHyup Bank Beijing Branch)成为全国首家通过负面清单实现数据合规出境的银行业机构,其管理模式由标准合同备案转为负面清单框架下的安全有序自由流动,已成为北京 CBD 外资银行重点关注的范本。

横琴

广东自贸试验区横琴片区数据出境负面清单以粤网办发〔2026〕1号于 2026-05-15 发布,聚焦智能装备制造业和个人征信服务业两大领域。其核心特色是”先用后报”:企业对照清单自主研判,符合条件即可便捷出境,并于事后 15 个工作日内报告。这一设计在降低制造企业及征信服务机构前期合规摩擦的同时,保留了清晰的审计痕迹。

重庆

重庆的清单——《中国(重庆)自由贸易试验区数据出境管理清单(负面清单)(2025版)》——于 2026-08-11 迎来首家受益企业:长安汽车成为重庆自贸区首家享负面清单红利企业。对汽车出口企业而言,能在可预期的负面清单路径下移动研发与运营数据,对其全球产品开发周期具有实质意义。

南沙

南沙(中国(广东)自由贸易试验区广州南沙新区片区)于 2026-08-18 发布数据出境负面清单实施指南,将覆盖拓展至个人征信服务业和智能装备制造业,既与广东省方向一致,又为南沙新区企业提供了本地化落地细则。

实务步骤

对于打算运用该机制的外商投资企业,实务顺序为:(1)按行业与字段将数据资产映射到所在片区清单;(2)确认数据是否落在清单所列敏感类别之外;(3)若未落入,即采用负面清单路径并留存自查记录;(4)若当地规则要求,在法定时限内完成事后报告(如横琴为 15 个工作日);(5)保持记录可抗辩,因为网信办与国家数据局对每份清单实施审核备案。外资银行、车企、设备制造商、物流及征信服务机构是最早的先行者。

延伸阅读

该机制是自贸试验区与”两区”更大范围对外开放的一部分,数据流动被视为贸易与外资的”基础设施”而非单纯的合规成本。企业应关注天津、海南、上海、浙江等地后续清单发布,并跟踪网信办的程序性指引更新。

规制基础

负面清单模式是我国跨境数据”三轨”治理框架的一根支柱。其底层文件是网信办《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》(2024 年公布),与更早的《数据出境安全评估办法》《个人信息出境标准合同办法》共同构成分层体系。第一轨针对重要数据与大体量个人信息走安全评估;第二轨针对低于法定阈值的常规传输走标准合同备案或认证;第三轨即自贸试验区负面清单,把清单内数据从更重的安全评估与备案路径中解放出来。对外商投资企业而言,务实红利在于:把数据运营布局在自贸试验区内,可使原本需评估或备案的传输转为”清单自检、自由流动”——前提是数据落在清单所列敏感类别之外。清单本身仍由网信办与国家数据局审核备案,因此更轻的路径是”下放”而非”取消”的管控。企业在设计跨境传输架构时,应同时关注负面清单与国家统一阈值两条线。

Sources

  • https://com.gd.gov.cn/gkmlpt/content/4/4897/post_4897452.html (广东省商务厅等:《中国(广东)自由贸易试验区数据出境负面清单管理办法(试行)》及管理清单(负面清单)(2025版),粤网办发〔2026〕1号)
  • https://english.beijing.gov.cn/latest/news/202608/t20260813_4821506.html (北京市政府:全国首个银行业数据出境负面清单备案落地北京 CBD,2026-08-13)
  • https://big5.china.com.cn/gate/big5/zw.china.com.cn/2026-08/07/content_118637480.shtml (新华社/中国网:我国首个银行业数据出境负面清单备案落地北京,2026-08-07)
  • https://www.cac.gov.cn/ (国家互联网信息办公室,数据出境相关规制主管部门)

FTZ Data Export Negative List and Facilitated Cross-Border Channels

  • The CAC “Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows” (CAC Decree No. 16, 22 March 2024) let free-trade zones formulate their own data-export negative lists under the national data classification framework.
    国家网信办《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》(2024年3月22日,第16号令)授权自由贸易试验区在国家数据分类分级保护制度框架下自行制定数据出境负面清单。
  • A free-trade zone’s negative list identifies the data whose outbound provision still requires security assessment, standard contract or certification; data outside the list may flow out freely without those filings.
    自贸试验区负面清单列明仍须申报安全评估、订立标准合同或通过认证方可出境的数据;清单外数据可免予申报、自由出境。
  • Tianjin released China’s first FTZ data-export negative list (May 2024), dividing outbound data into 13 categories and 46 sub-categories with concrete examples.
    天津于2024年5月发布全国首份自贸试验区数据出境负面清单,将出境数据分为13大类46子类并辅以具体示例。
  • Shanghai (Lin-gang) published its negative list (February 2024) covering finance (reinsurance), shipping and commerce across 6 scenarios and 84 data items, with field-level detail and a “use-first, file-later” approach.
    上海(临港)于2024年2月发布负面清单,覆盖金融(再保险)、航运、商贸3个领域6个场景84个数据项,细化至字段级并实行”先用后报”。
  • Beijing’s FTZ negative list (August 2024) is the first scenario- and field-level list, spanning autos, pharma, civil aviation, retail and AI training data across five industries.
    北京自贸试验区负面清单(2024年8月)为首个场景化、字段级清单,涵盖汽车、医药、民航、零售与现代服务业、人工智能训练数据5个行业。
  • Foreign-invested enterprises in FTZs should map outbound data to the applicable negative list, use the one-stop data centre service, and rely on the list’s free-flow carve-out to cut compliance cost.
    区内外商投资企业应将出境数据对照适用负面清单,利用一站式数据跨境服务中心,并借助清单”清单外自由流动”豁免降低合规成本。

FTZ Data Export Negative List and Facilitated Cross-Border Channels | 自由贸易试验区数据出境负面清单与便利化通道

Why this matters now

For a foreign-invested enterprise moving R&D, manufacturing, sales or HR data across borders, China’s data-export rules have long been criticised as uncertain — particularly the vague definition of “important data.” The 2024 reform changed the geometry of that problem. By empowering each free-trade zone (FTZ) to publish its own data-export negative list, Beijing created a field-level, scenario-based map that tells companies, with far greater precision, which data can leave freely and which still triggers a security assessment, standard contract or certification. For multinationals clustered in FTZs, the negative list is now the single most practical compliance instrument for cross-border data.

The enabling rule

The Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows (Cyberspace Administration of China Decree No. 16, effective 22 March 2024) is the legal foundation. Article 6 authorises an FTZ, within the national data classification and grading protection system, to formulate its own list of data that must enter the security-assessment / standard-contract / certification regime, subject to provincial cyberspace-authority approval and filing with the national cyberspace and data authorities. Critically, data exported by an FTZ entity that falls outside the negative list is exempt from the security assessment, standard contract and certification obligations. The Provisions also carve out routine cross-border scenarios — international trade, cross-border transport, academic cooperation, multinational manufacturing and marketing, and certain HR-management and low-volume personal-information transfers — from filing requirements altogether.

Tianjin: the first negative list

In May 2024, the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone became the first to issue a data-export negative list under the new rule — now filed with the national authorities. It organises outbound data into 13 major categories and 46 sub-categories spanning biomedicine, services outsourcing, finance, internet platforms, automotive, integrated circuits, meteorology and international trade, with detailed feature descriptions and concrete examples for each. The list makes “important data” identifiable rather than abstract: a chemical firm’s hazardous-materials transport-route planning, for instance, is explicitly mapped to a sub-category requiring security assessment. Together with Tianjin’s earlier data classification standard, it forms a “double first” policy system for cross-border data.

Shanghai (Lin-gang): field-level and “use-first”

Shanghai published its negative list (February 2024, with a management measure and implementation guide) covering finance (reinsurance), shipping (international shipping) and commerce (retail, food and beverage, accommodation) — six scenarios and 84 data items. Its distinguishing features:

  • Scenario names are listed first, so companies can match their activity directly.
  • Important-data features are refined in finance and shipping to aid identification.
  • Thresholds are eased where risk is controllable — for example, the sensitive personal-information assessment threshold in commerce membership management rises from 10,000 to 1,000,000, sharply lowering compliance cost.
  • A “use-first, file-later” principle applies: no entry barrier — a company simply submits its negative-list usage materials within 15 working days of starting the export.
  • Five district service centres plus a Lin-gang centre provide one-stop policy consultation and pre-check.

Beijing: scenario- and field-level pioneer

Beijing’s FTZ negative list (August 2024) was the first scenario- and field-level list, proposing a 13-category / 41-sub-category reference framework and enumerating compliance measures for five industries — automotive, pharmaceutical, civil aviation, retail and modern services, and AI training data — across 48 data categories. It added a provincial pre-review and pre-assessment mechanism and a green-channel service covering more than 100 enterprises in five sectors.

The compliance upside

The negative-list model turns data-export compliance from a national guess into a local, field-level answer. For an FIE, three gains stand out: first, certainty — once a dataset is mapped out-of-list, the assessment/contract/certification filings drop away; second, speed — Shanghai’s “use-first, file-later” removes the pre-clearance wait for in-list routine flows; third, cost — eased thresholds (such as Tianjin and Shanghai raising sensitive-PI triggers) materially lower the volume of filings. The trade-off is geography: the list is FTZ-specific, so an entity outside a pilot zone cannot rely on it and must fall back to the national thresholds in the CAC Provisions. Multinationals should therefore weigh FTZ location as a data-governance variable, not merely a tax or logistics one.

Practical steps for foreign-invested enterprises

  1. Locate your FTZ and list. Determine which FTZ your entity sits in (Tianjin, Shanghai/Lin-gang, Beijing, or others referencing them) and pull the applicable negative list.
  2. Map data to scenarios and fields. Use the scenario-first, field-level structure to classify each outbound dataset as in-list or out-of-list.
  3. Claim the free-flow carve-out. For out-of-list data, document the basis and export without the assessment/contract/certification filings.
  4. Use the one-stop centre. Submit materials within the prescribed window and use pre-check to de-risk.
  5. Watch interoperability. Shanghai and others mutually recognise negative lists; a list published by another FTZ may be referenced, so monitor second-batch lists in your sector.

Related reading

The negative list is one lane of China’s three-track data-export system — alongside the security assessment, the standard contract and certification. FIEs should read the FTZ list together with the national thresholds in the CAC Provisions and the general data-security and personal-information rules.


自由贸易试验区数据出境负面清单与便利化通道

为何当下值得关注

对跨境传输研发、制造、销售或人力资源数据的外商投资企业而言,中国的数据出境规则长期因”重要数据”界定模糊而被视为不确定。2024年的改革改变了这一问题的几何结构。通过授权每个自由贸易试验区(FTZ)发布各自的数据出境负面清单,决策层创建了一张字段级、场景化的地图,以更高精度告知企业:哪些数据可自由出境,哪些仍须触发安全评估、标准合同或认证。对聚集在自贸区的跨国企业而言,负面清单已成为跨境数据合规最务实的单一工具。

授权规则

《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》(国家互联网信息办公室令第16号,2024年3月22日施行)是法律基础。第六条授权自由贸易试验区在国家数据分类分级保护制度框架下,自行制定区内须纳入数据出境安全评估、个人信息出境标准合同、个人信息保护认证管理范围的数据清单,经省级网信委员会批准并报国家网信部门、国家数据管理部门备案。关键在于,自贸试验区内数据处理者向境外提供负面清单外的数据,可免予申报安全评估、订立标准合同、通过认证。该规定还将国际贸易、跨境运输、学术合作、跨国生产制造与市场营销,以及特定人力资源管理与低量级个人信息传输等常规场景,整体排除出申报要求。

天津:首份负面清单

2024年5月,中国(天津)自由贸易试验区率先发布新规下的数据出境负面清单(已完成国家备案)。其将出境数据分为13大类46子类,覆盖生物医药、服务外包、金融、互联网平台、汽车、集成电路、气象、国际贸易等领域,并对每一类给出详细特征描述与具体示例。清单使”重要数据”从抽象变为可识别:例如某化工企业的危化品运输路线规划,被明确映射至须申报安全评估的子类。叠加天津此前的数据分类分级标准,形成自贸试验区”双首个”数据跨境政策体系。

上海(临港):字段级与”先用后报”

上海于2024年2月发布负面清单(配套管理办法与实施指南),覆盖金融(再保险)、航运(国际航运)、商贸(零售与餐饮、住宿)三大领域,涉及6个场景84个数据项。其突出特征:

  • 场景名称前置单列,便于企业直接对应适用。
  • 在金融、航运领域对重要数据进一步细化,辅助识别。
  • 风险可控前提下放宽阈值——例如商贸会员管理场景的敏感个人信息安全评估阈值由1万提升至100万,显著降低合规成本。
  • 实行“先用后报”原则:不设准入门槛,企业自开展数据出境活动之日起15个工作日内提交使用材料即可。
  • 五大片区服务中心加临港中心提供一站式政策咨询与材料初核。

北京:场景化、字段级先锋

北京自贸试验区负面清单(2024年8月)为首个场景化、字段级清单,提出13大类41子类参考规则,并列举汽车、医药、民航、零售与现代服务业、人工智能训练数据5个行业48类数据的出境合规措施。其增设省级预审核、预评估机制,并建立覆盖5个行业100余家企业的绿色通道服务。

合规红利

负面清单模式将数据出境合规从”全国猜谜”转变为”本地、字段级作答”。对外资企业而言,三重收益突出:其一,确定性——数据集一旦被归入清单外,评估/合同/认证申报即告免除;其二,速度——上海”先用后报”免除了清单内常规流程的事前审批等待;其三,成本——放宽后的阈值(如天津、上海上调敏感个人信息触发线)大幅减少申报量。代价是地域性:清单以自贸区为界,区外实体无法依赖,须回退至《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》的全国统一阈值。因此,跨国企业应将自贸区选址视为数据治理变量,而非仅关乎税收或物流。

外商投资企业实务步骤

  1. 定位所在自贸区与清单。 确定实体所属自贸区(天津、上海/临港、北京或参照它们的其他区),调取适用负面清单。
  2. 将数据映射到场景与字段。 利用”场景前置、字段级”结构,将每个出境数据集归类为清单内或清单外。
  3. 主张自由流动豁免。 对清单外数据,留存依据并免予评估/合同/认证申报即可出境。
  4. 使用一站式中心。 在规定时限内提交材料,借助初核降低风险。
  5. 关注互认与扩围。 上海等地可参照执行其他自贸区清单;密切跟踪本行业第二批清单。

延伸阅读

负面清单是中国数据出境”三轨”(安全评估、标准合同、认证)中的一条快捷通道。外资企业应将自贸区清单与《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》中的全国统一阈值及数据安全、个人信息保护一般规则一并研读。

Sources

  • 国家互联网信息办公室令第16号:《促进和规范数据跨境流动规定》(2024-03-22)— https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/2024/issue_11366/202405/content_6954192.html
  • 天津自贸试验区数据出境管理清单(负面清单)(2024版)— https://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/lianbo/difang/202405/content_6950083.htm
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