Tag Archives: Arbitration Clause Design

Arbitration or Litigation for Foreign-Invested Company Governance Disputes: A Shanghai Forum Guide

  • Arbitration Clause Design decides the case before the dispute exists, because the Arbitration Law requires three elements and treats an unclear reference to the institution as a defect that voids the clause.
    仲裁条款的设计在争议发生之前就决定了案件走向:仲裁法要求三项内容齐备,机构约定不明将被认定为无效缺陷。
  • Exclusive Jurisdiction under Article 279 of the Civil Procedure Law tells a Chinese court that it must hear a case; it does not tell the parties that they must litigate, and a valid clause still keeps the court out.
    民事诉讼法第二百七十九条的专属管辖是告诉中国法院必须受理,而不是告诉当事人必须诉讼;有效的仲裁条款仍将法院挡在门外。
  • Shareholder Deadlock has a contractual half and a corporate half: the exit price and the buy-out can be arbitrated, while the judicial dissolution that ends the company’s legal existence sits with the court.
    股东僵局一半是合同问题、一半是组织法问题:退出价格与股权收购可以仲裁,而终结公司法人资格的司法解散属于法院。
  • Awards travel under the New York Convention, so the seat and the institution written into the clause matter more than the city where hearings happen to be held.
    裁决依《纽约公约》流转,因此条款写明的仲裁地与机构,比开庭所在城市更重要。
  • Shanghai now offers a full chain: a local regulation on building an international commercial arbitration centre, a 2024 institutional rulebook, and a dedicated commercial court that hears applications to set aside or enforce awards.
    上海已形成完整链条:一部建设国际商事仲裁中心的地方性法规、一套 2024 年机构仲裁规则,以及集中审理撤销与执行申请的专门商事法庭。
  • The three-month window to apply to set aside an award runs from receipt of the award, and it is shorter than the period it replaced.
    申请撤销裁决的三个月期限自收到裁决书起算,比此前适用的期限更短。

Arbitration or Litigation for Foreign-Invested Company Governance Disputes: A Shanghai Forum Guide | 外资公司治理争议走仲裁还是诉讼:上海的程序选择指引

The dispute this piece is about

A foreign investor and a Chinese partner set up a joint venture. A few years later the relationship has run into one of four familiar walls: the Chinese partner blocks a capital increase the foreign side needs in order to keep its ratio; the Chinese partner proposes to transfer its equity to a third party and the foreign side says its pre-emptive right has been ignored; the board passes a resolution on a related-party transaction that the foreign-nominated directors say was never properly convened; or the two sides cannot agree on anything and the company stops making decisions altogether.

Each of these is a company law problem. Each is also a contract problem, because the joint venture contract and the shareholders’ agreement will have something to say about all four. The question here is narrow and practical: where the parties wrote an arbitration clause, which of these disputes can go to arbitration, which must go to a Chinese court, and what should the clause say so that the answer is not decided by the other side’s procedural objection?

The scope is deliberately limited. This is not a survey of the revised Arbitration Law, not a general guide to enforcing foreign awards, and not a note on arbitration of sale-of-goods or construction disputes. It is about governance disputes inside a foreign-invested company — the capital increase, the pre-emptive right, the resolution, the deadlock — and about the forum that hears them.

Two framing points before the detail.

First, the revised Arbitration Law has been in force since 1 March 2026. It was adopted on 12 September 2025, runs to eight chapters and 96 articles, and replaces a statute that had served for three decades. Most of what matters for a governance clause is not new: the three required elements of an arbitration agreement, the separability doctrine, and the rule that a valid clause keeps a court out all predate the revision. What changed matters at the edges, and the edges are exactly where governance clauses sit. The terminology moved from “arbitration commission” to “arbitration institution”. The seat became a statutory concept. Ad hoc arbitration opened a narrow door for foreign-related disputes involving enterprises registered in free trade zones and the Hainan free trade port. The window for applying to set aside an award was shortened to three months.

Second, Shanghai is not a neutral backdrop. It has a local regulation on building an international commercial arbitration centre, in force since 1 December 2023. It has an institution whose current rulebook took effect on 1 January 2024. And it has a dedicated international commercial court, established at the end of December 2024 and hearing cases from 1 January 2025, which concentrates foreign-related commercial trials and applications for review of arbitral awards. For a company with operations in the Yangtze delta, the real choice is rarely “arbitration or litigation” in the abstract. It is which of two Shanghai institutions to name, on what terms, and what happens afterwards if the losing side does not pay.

Three elements, read strictly

Article 27 of the revised law says an arbitration agreement may be a clause in a contract or a separate agreement concluded before or after the dispute arises, and that it shall contain three things: an expression of intent to arbitrate, the matters to be arbitrated, and the chosen arbitration institution. Article 29 then supplies the consequence that gives the three elements their bite: where the matters or the institution are not agreed or are agreed unclearly, the parties may supplement the agreement, and if they cannot, the agreement is invalid.

Read together, those two articles are the single most expensive drafting lesson in this field. A clause that says disputes “shall be resolved by arbitration in Shanghai” names a city, not an institution. A clause that says disputes shall go to “the arbitration commission in Shanghai” is ambiguous, because Shanghai has more than one. A clause that names an institution which does not exist, or names a body that administers mediation rather than arbitration, fails the third element. In each case the failure is not cured by the parties’ obvious intention. Intention is not the test; the institution is.

The revised law softened the vocabulary without softening the requirement. Article 89 defines “arbitration institution” to include arbitration commissions and arbitration institutes established according to law, which closes an old argument about whether a body calling itself a centre or an institute could administer a case. It does not rescue a clause that names nothing. Article 27 also adds a route that did not exist in this form before: where one party asserts an arbitration agreement and the other does not deny it before the first hearing, the tribunal, having noted the point on the record, may treat the agreement as existing. That is a useful safety net for a sloppy clause where the respondent chooses not to fight, and a trap for a respondent that assumes silence preserves its position.

Two further provisions complete the picture. Article 30 restates separability: the arbitration agreement stands independently, and whether the contract was formed, varied, ineffective, terminated, revoked or void does not affect the validity of the agreement already reached. The tribunal may rule on the validity of the contract. This matters in governance disputes more than in ordinary sale contracts, because the usual defence to a governance claim is that the very instrument containing the clause — a capital increase agreement, a share transfer agreement, an amended joint venture contract — was itself invalid or never approved. Separability means that argument is heard by the tribunal, not by a court asked to dismiss the arbitration.

Article 31 governs challenges to the agreement itself: a party may ask the institution or the tribunal to decide, or ask a court to rule, and where one side goes to the institution and the other to a court, the court prevails. The objection must be raised before the first hearing. The practical translation is that forum fights in these cases are short, front-loaded and decided early. There is no long preliminary phase in which to test the waters.

Exclusive jurisdiction is about courts, not about arbitration

Article 279 of the Civil Procedure Law lists three categories of case over which Chinese courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The first covers disputes arising from the establishment, dissolution or liquidation of a legal person or other organisation established within Chinese territory, and from the validity of resolutions made by that legal person or organisation. The second covers disputes over the validity of intellectual property rights granted after examination within Chinese territory. The third covers disputes arising from the performance within Chinese territory of a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture contract, a Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture contract, and a contract for Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration and development of natural resources.

That first item is the one that lands directly on governance disputes, and it is often read as an answer to the forum question. It is not. Exclusive jurisdiction is a rule addressed to courts: it tells a Chinese court that it must take the case and cannot decline it in favour of a foreign court. Article 5 of the Arbitration Law addresses a different question: where the parties have reached an arbitration agreement and one of them brings a suit, the court shall not accept the case, unless the agreement is invalid or the law provides otherwise.

Those two rules operate on different planes. Exclusive jurisdiction decides the allocation of adjudicatory power among courts, including the question whether a foreign court’s judgment could be recognised. The arbitration agreement decides whether the parties have removed the dispute from adjudication altogether. A valid clause therefore does not offend Article 279; it operates one step earlier. What Article 279 does mean, in practice, is that the residual route — litigation — is not a route the parties can steer to a foreign court by agreement, and that if the clause fails, the case stays in China.

This distinction has a concrete consequence for drafting. A clause that provides for arbitration in Singapore or Hong Kong is not invalid because the underlying contract is a joint venture contract. But the fallback matters. If the clause is later held invalid, the dispute does not go to the chosen foreign forum; it goes to a Chinese court with exclusive jurisdiction. A party that negotiated hard for a foreign seat and accepted a vague institution name has, in effect, negotiated for Chinese litigation.

There is a genuine grey area, and it should be named rather than smoothed over. Where the claim attacks the validity of a shareholders’ resolution as an act of the company — a claim that the resolution never came into existence, or was adopted without the required majority — the subject matter looks like the first item of Article 279, and Chinese courts have tended to treat such organisational claims as belonging to the court. Where the claim is that a shareholder breached the shareholders’ agreement by voting a certain way, the same facts produce a contractual claim that is plainly arbitrable. The two claims can arise from one meeting. The statute does not resolve the boundary in terms, and no clause can eliminate the risk. What a clause can do is allocate the claims expressly, so that the arbitrable ones are pleaded as contract claims and the organisational ones are left where they belong.

One further rule completes the picture, and it is the one that decides how much a foreign forum is worth in a governance fight. Article 280 of the Civil Procedure Law addresses parallel proceedings: where the same dispute is brought before a foreign court by one party and before a Chinese court by the other, a Chinese court that has jurisdiction may accept the case. Where the parties have concluded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement choosing a foreign court, and that agreement does not offend the exclusive jurisdiction rules and does not involve sovereignty, security or public interest, the Chinese court may rule not to accept, or may dismiss a case already accepted. Article 281 then governs a stay application based on the foreign court having accepted the case first, and Article 282 sets out the conditions for declining jurisdiction in favour of a clearly more convenient foreign court — none of which is available where the dispute falls within exclusive jurisdiction.

The consequence for a governance clause is that a foreign court judgment on the dissolution of a Chinese company, or on the validity of its resolutions, has no route into China. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is not governed by a multilateral convention in the way awards are; it rests on treaties and reciprocity. An arbitration award does have a route, and it is the treaty route. That asymmetry, rather than any preference for arbitration as a process, is the strongest practical argument for putting these disputes into a clause.

The four governance scenarios

With that framework, the four scenarios can be separated.

Capital increase. A capital increase is usually documented twice: as a shareholders’ resolution, and as a subscription agreement or an amendment to the joint venture contract. The contractual claim — that a party promised to subscribe, or promised to vote in favour, or promised not to dilute — is arbitrable. The corporate act of increasing registered capital is a registration matter that runs through the market supervision system, and no tribunal can order the registry to act. In practice an arbitral award in this scenario awards damages or specifically requires a party to vote and to execute documents; the registration follows, or it does not, and enforcement of the second step is where these cases become difficult. A well-drafted clause anticipates this by making the voting obligation and the execution obligation explicit, and by providing that a party may sign on behalf of a recalcitrant counterparty only where the law allows it — which, for company law instruments, is a narrow permission.

Pre-emptive right on a share transfer. Where the joint venture contract gives a shareholder a right of first refusal, a transfer to a third party in breach of that right generates a claim that is contractual in form and arbitrable. The remedy is typically an order restraining the transfer, damages, or both. Timing decides everything: an arbitration commenced after the transferee has been registered as shareholder faces a third party whose interests the tribunal cannot dispose of, and the remedy collapses into damages. This is the scenario in which the interval between discovering the breach and filing the request for arbitration is the whole case, and in which interim relief — available under Article 39, with the institution transmitting the application to a court — is worth more than the final award.

Setting aside a board or shareholder resolution. As noted, the organisational claim sits with the court. But the same meeting usually generates contract claims: that directors nominated by one side were not given notice as the shareholders’ agreement requires, that a reserved matter was decided without the consent the agreement demanded, that a related-party transaction breached a contractual approval mechanism. Those claims are arbitrable, and an award finding that the consent mechanism was breached can support a damages claim even where the resolution itself remains on the register. Practitioners sometimes describe this as arbitration achieving indirectly what it cannot achieve directly. That is accurate, and it is worth planning for rather than discovering.

Deadlock and dissolution. This is the scenario where the limits are clearest. A petition for judicial dissolution of the company asks a court to end a legal personality; it is a statutory remedy available to shareholders holding a specified proportion of voting rights, and it is not a claim the parties can put to a tribunal. What arbitration can do is enforce the contractual exit that the shareholders’ agreement should have provided: a put option, a buy-out at a formula price, a right to appoint a third-party valuer, a right to require the other side to purchase at fair value determined by an expert. Companies that have litigated a deadlock to judgment often discover that the judgment dissolves the company and distributes proceeds at liquidation values, which is rarely what either side wanted. The contractual exit is usually the better commercial outcome and is the one an arbitration clause can deliver.

The pattern across all four is the same. Arbitration reaches the money and the promises. It does not reach the register, the legal personality, or the organisational act. Clauses that ignore the second half generate awards that are correct and hard to use.

Drafting the clause

The clause is short, so every word carries weight. Six elements are worth writing out.

The institution, in full. Use the registered name and, where the institution publishes one, the name it accepts as equivalent. Article 89 confirms that arbitration commissions and arbitration institutes both count, but the safer course is the exact name on the institution’s own website, in the language in which the institution is registered, with the Chinese name included where the counterparty is Chinese. Where a clause is bilingual, add a provision that the Chinese text prevails for the purpose of identifying the institution, so that a translation error does not become an invalidity argument.

The seat. Article 81 allows the parties to agree the seat in writing, and provides that, unless they have agreed a different law for the procedure, the seat determines the law applicable to the procedure and the court with supervisory jurisdiction, and that the award is deemed made at the seat. Naming a seat is not the same as naming a venue for hearings. A clause that says hearings will be held in Shanghai but names Singapore as the seat has chosen Singaporean curial law and Singaporean courts for set-aside purposes. That is a legitimate choice, but it must be a deliberate one.

The law governing the contract. Distinct from the seat, and frequently omitted. For a joint venture contract, the substantive law is Chinese law in most cases, and a clause that leaves it open invites an argument that the tribunal must first decide which law applies before it can decide anything else.

Language and the number of arbitrators. Article 42 allows one or three. For a governance dispute with documents in two languages and directors from three jurisdictions, three is the usual choice, and the clause should say whether the language of the arbitration is Chinese, English, or both, and whether documents may be submitted untranslated.

Consolidation and joinder. Governance disputes rarely involve two parties only. A capital increase may involve the company, two shareholders and a new investor; a share transfer may involve a transferee; a deadlock may involve a holding company above the joint venture. Article 27 permits one agreement covering several matters but says nothing about consolidating several arbitrations. Institutional rules fill the gap: the 2024 rulebook of the Shanghai institution provides for consolidated arbitration and for the addition of a party, on conditions the institution administers. A clause that does not address consolidation leaves the parties to run parallel arbitrations with inconsistent outcomes.

The scope of the submission. The most common defect after a misnamed institution is a scope that is either too narrow or too vague. A clause covering “disputes arising under this agreement” may not reach a claim under the joint venture contract, because they are different instruments. A clause covering “all disputes in connection with the company” may be attacked as covering matters that cannot be arbitrated. The workable formula is to list the instruments — the joint venture contract, the shareholders’ agreement, the articles of association to the extent a breach claim is contractual, any equity transfer or capital increase agreement — and then to add a residual clause covering disputes connected with the establishment, operation or termination of the company that the parties are legally entitled to refer to arbitration.

Two smaller points. First, service. Article 41 provides that arbitration documents are served in the manner agreed, failing which the institutional rules apply. A governance dispute frequently involves a party that has stopped answering; a clause that specifies an address for service, and provides that a change of address must be notified, converts a default into a routine step. Second, confidentiality. Article 52 makes arbitration private by default, with public hearings only by agreement and never where state secrets, trade secrets or personal privacy are involved. For a joint venture dispute involving pricing, customer lists and board minutes, the default is an advantage — but it is worth confirming that the institutional rules chosen do not permit disclosure in circumstances the parties would regret.

Shanghai: institution, seat and judicial review

Three layers make up the Shanghai offering, and they are often confused with one another.

The first is the policy and legal layer. Shanghai was among the first locations designated for the national pilot on building international commercial arbitration centres, and in December 2023 a local regulation on advancing that construction took effect. The regulation addresses the governance of arbitration institutions, the opening of the sector, temporary arbitration and the seat, and support policies. It is a local regulation, not a national statute, but it is the reason several institutional features appear in Shanghai before they appear elsewhere.

The second is the institution. The Shanghai institution’s current rulebook took effect on 1 January 2024, replacing the 2014 free trade zone rules. It is a package rather than a single text: a main rulebook, separate rules for aviation and for data disputes, an online arbitration guideline, and a guideline on assisting ad hoc arbitration. The features relevant to governance disputes are consolidation, joinder, interim measures and emergency arbitrator relief, a widened ability to choose arbitrators, and provision for a Hong Kong centre. Its free trade zone arbitration court, the aviation court and the specialised platforms sit under the same institution, and the rules treat a reference to a platform as a reference to the institution — which is a useful antidote to the naming problem described earlier.

The third is the court. The Shanghai International Commercial Court was established at the end of December 2024 and began receiving cases on 1 January 2025. It concentrates, among other matters, first and second instance foreign-related commercial cases, applications for review of arbitral awards, applications to confirm foreign-related mediation agreements, and applications to recognise and enforce foreign court judgments. By the end of August 2026 it had received more than 3,700 foreign-related commercial and arbitration-review cases, with parties from 64 countries and regions. In June 2026 it appointed an international commercial expert committee of 20 members from eight countries and regions.

The significance for a governance clause is that the court which supervises the arbitration is identifiable in advance, and it is a specialist court rather than a general civil division. Set-aside applications under Article 71 go to the intermediate court where the institution is located; for a Shanghai-seated arbitration administered by a Shanghai institution, that means the specialist court. Article 72 requires the application within three months of receiving the award — shorter than the six months that applied before the revision — and Article 73 requires the court to rule within two months of accepting the application. A party contemplating a challenge should read those two numbers together: the window to file is short, and the period of uncertainty afterwards is also short.

Article 83 sets out the grounds on which a foreign-related award may be set aside, and they are narrower than the domestic list: no arbitration agreement; the respondent was not notified of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the proceedings, or was unable to present its case for reasons not attributable to it; the composition of the tribunal or the procedure was inconsistent with the rules; or the matters decided fell outside the scope of the agreement or the institution had no power to decide them. Public policy is a separate ground. Notably, the domestic ground of “the evidence on which the award was based was forged” does not appear in the foreign-related list. For a foreign investor, that is a meaningful difference: the review is closer to the model law’s procedural checklist than to a re-examination of the merits.

After the award, and a checklist

Article 70 provides that an award takes effect on the date it is made. Article 75 provides that a party may apply to a people’s court for enforcement, and that the court shall enforce. In practice three steps follow.

The first is enforcement. Where the assets are in China, the application goes to the competent intermediate court. Where the respondent or its property is outside China, Article 85 permits a direct application to a competent foreign court, and Article 88 governs the recognition and enforcement of awards made outside China, on the basis of treaties or reciprocity — which in practice means the New York Convention for the large majority of China’s trading partners.

The second is preservation. Article 39 allows a party to apply for property preservation and for orders requiring or restraining conduct, both during the arbitration and, in urgent cases, before it is commenced. The institution transmits the application to the court. In a share transfer dispute, an order restraining registration of the transfer can preserve the entire remedy; without it, the award becomes a claim for damages against a counterparty that may no longer hold the shares.

The third is the pressure that follows an unpaid award. A party that does not perform is subject to enforcement measures, and to the credit and consumption restrictions that accompany them. For a joint venture partner that intends to keep operating in China, that is often the point at which settlement becomes rational.

A checklist for the clause and for the file:

  • Name the institution exactly, in the language of registration, and add a prevailing-language rule for the bilingual text.
  • State the seat, and state separately where hearings may be held.
  • State the governing law of the contract, distinct from the law of the arbitration.
  • Fix the number of arbitrators and the language.
  • List the instruments covered, and add a residual scope clause.
  • Provide for consolidation and joinder, or explain why not.
  • Specify an address for service and require notice of any change.
  • Record the internal approvals for the clause itself; a clause signed by someone without authority is a separate problem.
  • Diarise the three-month set-aside window from the date the award is received.
  • Identify, before filing, which claims are contractual and which are organisational, and file accordingly.

The direction of travel is toward more, not less, use of arbitration for these disputes. The revised law supports institutions going abroad and foreign institutions coming into free trade zones, and Article 87 expressly encourages foreign parties to choose a Chinese institution and a Chinese seat. For a foreign investor, that encouragement changes the calculation: a Chinese seat no longer implies a less predictable process than it once did, and a Shanghai-seated arbitration supervised by a specialist commercial court is a defensible default for a company whose assets, factories and partners are all in China. The clause should be drafted on that assumption rather than inherited from a template written for a different decade.

Sources

  • 中国人大网·《中华人民共和国仲裁法》(2025-09-12 修订通过,2026-03-01 施行,全文八章九十六条):http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202509/t20250912_447762.html
  • 中国人大网·新修订的仲裁法自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行(2025-09-12):http://www.npc.gov.cn/c2/c30834/202509/t20250912_447759.html
  • 中国人大网·全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的决定(第二百七十九条专属管辖,2023-09-01):http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202309/t20230901_431419.html
  • 上海市人民代表大会常务委员会·《上海市推进国际商事仲裁中心建设条例》(2023-12-01 施行):https://www.shrd.gov.cn/shrd/gbd348hshsrmdbdhcwwyhgb2023ndsh/content/d9779781-5407-4c35-bc7f-8473a40f075b.html
  • 上海国际仲裁中心·《上海国际经济贸易仲裁委员会(上海国际仲裁中心)仲裁规则(2024)》(2024-01-01 施行):https://shiac.org/h5/SHIAC?moduleCode=arbitrate_rules&securityId=AemPnu8_EA7m8anaza734A
  • 上海国际商事法庭·中外专家齐聚上海国际商事法庭(含收案数量与管辖范围,2026-09):https://shicc.a-court.gov.cn/xxfb/no1court_511/docs/202609/d_-10593.html

外资公司治理争议走仲裁还是诉讼:上海的程序选择指引

本文讨论的是哪一类争议

一家外资企业与中方伙伴设立合资公司。几年之后,关系撞上了四堵常见的墙:外方为维持股比需要增资,中方股东不同意;中方拟将股权转让给第三方,外方主张自己的优先购买权被绕过;董事会通过了一项关联交易决议,外方委派的董事认为这次会议根本没有依章程召集;或者双方在任何事项上都无法达成一致,公司不再作出任何决策。

这四件事,每一件都是公司法问题,每一件又都是合同法问题,因为合资合同与股东协议对这四种情形都会有说法。本文要回答的问题很窄、很具体:当事人已经写了仲裁条款,上述争议哪些可以仲裁、哪些必须进中国法院,条款应当怎么写,才不至于让答案由对方的程序异议来决定。

范围是刻意收窄的。本文不讨论修订后仲裁法的整体面貌,不讨论外国仲裁裁决承认与执行的一般问题,也不讨论货物买卖或建设工程争议的仲裁。它只讨论外资企业内部的治理争议——增资、优先购买权、决议、僵局——以及审理这些争议的场所。

在进入细节之前,先立两个框架。

第一,修订后的仲裁法自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行。该法于 2025 年 9 月 12 日通过,共八章九十六条,接替了一部施行三十年的法律。对治理条款而言,真正重要的内容多数不是新的:仲裁协议的三项要件、仲裁协议独立性、有效条款排除法院管辖,这些在修订前就已存在。变化发生在边缘,而治理条款恰好长在边缘上。用语从“仲裁委员会”改为“仲裁机构”;仲裁地成为法定概念;临时仲裁在自由贸易试验区和海南自由贸易港登记的企业之间的涉外纠纷中开了一道窄门;申请撤销裁决的期限缩短为三个月。

第二,上海不是中立的背景板。上海有一部建设国际商事仲裁中心的地方性法规,自 2023 年 12 月 1 日起施行;有一家现行仲裁规则自 2024 年 1 月 1 日起施行的机构;还有一家专门的国际商事法庭,2024 年 12 月底设立,自 2025 年 1 月 1 日起受理案件,集中管辖涉外商事审判与仲裁司法审查。对在长三角有实体经营的企业来说,真正的选择很少是抽象的“仲裁还是诉讼”,而是:写哪一家上海机构、按什么条件写、以及败诉方不付款时怎么办。

三项要件,从严把握

修订后的仲裁法第二十七条规定,仲裁协议包括合同中订立的仲裁条款和以其他书面方式在纠纷发生前或者纠纷发生后达成的请求仲裁的协议,并应当具备三项内容:请求仲裁的意思表示、仲裁事项、选定的仲裁机构。第二十九条接着给出让三项要件真正有杀伤力的后果:对仲裁事项或者仲裁机构没有约定或者约定不明确的,当事人可以补充协议;达不成补充协议的,仲裁协议无效。

两条放在一起读,是这个领域里最贵的一堂起草课。写“争议提交上海仲裁解决”的条款,指定的是城市,不是机构。写“争议提交上海的仲裁委员会”的条款,含义不确定,因为上海不止一家。写了一个并不存在的机构名称,或者写了一个只做调解、不做仲裁的机构,第三项要件即告落空。这些瑕疵都不会因为当事人意图明显而被治愈。判断标准不是意图,是机构。

修订后的法律在用语上放宽了,在要求上没有放宽。第八十九条把“仲裁机构”界定为依法设立的仲裁委员会、仲裁院等机构,这终结了一个老争论:自称中心、自称院的机构能不能管理案件。但它救不了一条什么都没写的条款。第二十七条还增加了一条过去没有明确规定的方式:一方在申请仲裁时主张存在仲裁协议,另一方在首次开庭前不予否认的,经仲裁庭提示并记录,视为当事人之间存在仲裁协议。对条款粗糙但对方不愿纠缠的申请人,这是一张安全网;对以为沉默就能保住立场的被申请人,这是一个陷阱。

另外两条补完整图景。第三十条规定仲裁协议独立存在:合同是否成立及其变更、不生效、终止、被撤销或者无效,不影响已经达成的仲裁协议的效力;仲裁庭有权确认合同的效力。这一点在治理争议中比在普通买卖合同中更重要,因为治理请求最常见的抗辩就是:载有该条款的那份文件本身——增资协议、股权转让协议、修订后的合资合同——无效或者从未获得批准。独立性意味着这个抗辩由仲裁庭听,而不是由被请求驳回起诉的法院听。

第三十一条处理对仲裁协议本身的异议:当事人可以请求仲裁机构或者仲裁庭作出决定,也可以请求人民法院作出裁定;一方请求机构或仲裁庭决定、另一方请求法院裁定的,由法院裁定。异议应当在仲裁庭首次开庭前提出。落到实务上,这类案件的管辖之争都很短、很前置、很早出结果。没有一个漫长的预备阶段可以试探水温。

专属管辖管的是法院,不是仲裁

民事诉讼法第二百七十九条列出三类由中国法院专属管辖的案件。第一类是因在中国领域内设立的法人或者其他组织的设立、解散、清算,以及该法人或者其他组织作出的决议的效力等纠纷提起的诉讼。第二类是因与中国领域内审查授予的知识产权的有效性有关的纠纷提起的诉讼。第三类是因在中国领域内履行中外合资经营企业合同、中外合作经营企业合同、中外合作勘探开发自然资源合同发生纠纷提起的诉讼。

第一项直接落在治理争议上,也最常被读成对管辖问题的回答。它不是。专属管辖是一条写给法院的规则:它告诉中国法院必须受理,不得以方便为由让给外国法院。仲裁法第五条回答的是另一个问题:当事人达成仲裁协议,一方向人民法院起诉的,人民法院不予受理,但仲裁协议无效或者法律另有规定的除外。

两条规则在不同层面上运作。专属管辖解决的是审判权在法院之间如何分配,包括外国法院判决能否被承认的问题。仲裁协议解决的是当事人是否已把争议整体移出审判。因此,一条有效的仲裁条款并不冒犯第二百七十九条,它在更早的一步就生效了。第二百七十九条真正的含义在实务中是:剩下的那条诉讼路径,不是当事人可以靠约定转向外国法院的路径;条款一旦失效,案件留在中国。

这个区分对起草有具体后果。约定在新加坡或者香港仲裁的条款,不因为基础合同是合资合同而无效。但兜底很重要。条款日后被认定无效,争议不会去当事人选定的外国法院,而会去有专属管辖权的中国法院。一个为外国仲裁地谈得很辛苦、却接受了模糊机构名称的当事人,实际上谈成的是中国诉讼。

这里有一片真实的灰色地带,应当说清楚而不是抹平。当请求指向股东会决议的效力,即主张决议根本未成立、或者未经法定多数通过,争议标的看起来就落在第二百七十九条第一项,中国法院倾向于把这类组织法上的请求留在法院。当请求主张某股东违反股东协议、以特定方式投票,同一批事实产生的是合同请求,明显可以仲裁。两类请求可以从同一次会议中同时长出。法律没有在文字上划定这条边界,任何条款也无法消除这个风险。条款能做的是明确分配:把可仲裁的请求写清楚,让它以合同请求的形式提出;把组织法上的请求留在它该在的地方。

还有一条规则补完整图景,而它决定的正是“外国法院在这类争议里值多少”。民事诉讼法第二百八十条处理平行诉讼:同一纠纷一方当事人向外国法院起诉、另一方当事人向人民法院起诉的,人民法院依照本法有管辖权的,可以受理;当事人订立排他性管辖协议选择外国法院管辖,且不违反专属管辖规定、不涉及主权、安全或者社会公共利益的,人民法院可以裁定不予受理,已经受理的裁定驳回起诉。第二百八十一条接着规范以外国法院先行受理为由申请中止诉讼的处理,第二百八十二条列出以更便利的外国法院为由拒绝行使管辖权的条件——凡属专属管辖的,这些通道都不开启。

对治理条款而言,后果是:外国法院就中国公司的解散、或者就其决议效力作出的判决,进不了中国。外国法院判决的承认与执行,不像仲裁裁决那样有一部多边公约托底,而是靠条约与互惠。仲裁裁决有这条路,而且是有条约的那条路。这一不对称,而不是对仲裁程序本身的偏好,是把这类争议写进条款的最强实务理由。

四类治理场景

有了上面的框架,四类场景可以分开看。

增资。 增资通常在两份文件上同时体现:一份股东会决议,一份认购协议或者合资合同修订。合同请求——一方承诺认购、承诺投赞成票、承诺不稀释——可以仲裁。增加注册资本的法人行为则是一项登记事项,走市场监督管理部门的程序,任何仲裁庭都无法命令登记机关作为。实务中,这类案件的裁决是判赔,或者判令一方投票并签署文件;登记随后完成,或者没有完成,而第二步的执行正是这类案件变难的地方。起草良好的条款会预见到这一点:把投票义务与签署义务写明确,并在法律允许的范围内约定代签安排——对公司法文件而言,这种许可范围很窄。

股权转让的优先购买权。 合资合同赋予股东优先购买权的,违反该权利向第三方转让会产生形式上属于合同、可以仲裁的请求。救济通常是判令停止转让、赔偿损失,或者两者并用。时间决定一切:受让方已完成股东登记之后才启动仲裁的,仲裁庭面对的是一个它无法处分的第三方,救济就塌缩成损害赔偿。这是“发现违约”与“提交仲裁申请”之间的间隔构成全部案情的场景,也是临时措施——依第三十九条申请,由机构转交法院——比终局裁决更值钱的场景。

撤销董事会或者股东会决议。 如前所述,组织法上的请求留在法院。但同一次会议通常还产生合同请求:一方委派的董事没有按股东协议的要求获得通知;一项保留事项未经协议要求的同意即被决定;一项关联交易绕过了合同约定的审批机制。这些请求可以仲裁,而认定同意机制被违反的裁决,可以在决议仍然留在登记簿上的情况下支持损害赔偿请求。实务中有人把这描述为“仲裁间接做到了它不能直接做到的事”。这个描述是准确的,值得提前设计,而不是事后发现。

僵局与解散。 这一类界限最清楚。请求司法解散公司,是请法院终结一个法人资格;它是持有一定比例表决权的股东享有的法定救济,不是当事人可以提交仲裁庭的请求。仲裁能做的是执行股东协议本应提供的合同出口:卖出选择权、按公式定价的收购、指定第三方评估师的权利、要求对方按专家确定的公允价值受让的权利。把僵局打到判决的公司常常发现,判决解散公司、按清算价值分配财产,这很少是任何一方想要的结果。合同出口通常是更好的商业结果,也正是仲裁条款能够交付的那一种。

四类场景背后的模式是同一个:仲裁触得到钱和承诺,触不到登记簿、法人资格和组织行为。忽略后一半的条款,产出的是正确却难用的裁决。

条款怎么写

条款很短,所以每个字都有分量。六个要素值得写全。

机构,写全称。 使用登记名称,机构公布过等效名称的,一并写上。第八十九条确认仲裁委员会与仲裁院都算,但更稳妥的做法是照抄机构官网上的准确名称,用其登记语言书写,对方是中国企业的,把中文名称一并写入。条款为双语的,加一句“就机构识别而言以中文文本为准”,以免一处翻译差错变成一条无效理由。

仲裁地。 第八十一条允许当事人书面约定仲裁地,并规定:除当事人对仲裁程序的适用法另有约定外,以仲裁地作为仲裁程序的适用法及司法管辖法院的确定依据,仲裁裁决视为在仲裁地作出。写明仲裁地不等于写明开庭地。约定“开庭在上海、仲裁地在新加坡”的条款,选的是新加坡的程序法与新加坡法院的撤销管辖。这是一个正当的选择,但必须是深思熟虑的选择。

合同准据法。 与仲裁地是两件事,且经常被漏掉。合资合同的准据法多数情形下是中国法;不写,就等于邀请一场“仲裁庭先决定适用哪部法、再决定任何实体问题”的争论。

语言与仲裁员人数。 第四十二条允许一名或者三名。文件有两种语言、董事来自三个法域的治理争议,通常选三名;条款应当写明仲裁语言是中文、英文还是两者兼用,以及文件是否可以不经翻译提交。

合并与追加。 治理争议很少只有两方。增资可能涉及公司、两名股东和一名新投资人;股权转让可能涉及受让方;僵局可能牵涉合资公司之上的持股平台。第二十七条允许一份协议覆盖多个事项,但对多起仲裁的合并只字未提。这个空白由机构规则填补:上海这家机构 2024 年规则对合并仲裁与案外人加入都作了规定,条件由机构掌握。不处理合并的条款,等于让当事人去跑几场结论可能互相矛盾的平行仲裁。

提交范围。 除机构名称写错之外,最常见的瑕疵是范围过窄或者过虚。只覆盖“本协议项下争议”的条款,可能够不到合资合同项下的请求,因为那是另一份文件。覆盖“与公司有关的一切争议”的条款,可能被质疑把不可仲裁的事项也包了进来。可用的写法是先列文件——合资合同、股东协议、章程中涉及合同性违约请求的部分、股权转让或者增资协议——再加一条兜底,覆盖与公司设立、运营、终止有关、且当事人依法有权提交仲裁的争议。

两个小点。其一,送达。第四十一条规定仲裁文件按当事人约定的合理方式送达,没有约定或者约定不明确的,按仲裁规则规定的方式送达。治理争议里常有一方不再回应;条款写明送达地址、并约定地址变更须通知的,就把缺席变成一道常规步骤。其二,保密。第五十二条使仲裁以不公开为原则,只有当事人协议公开才可公开,且涉及国家秘密、他人商业秘密或者个人隐私的除外。对涉及定价、客户名单与董事会记录的合资争议,这一默认是优势——但值得确认所选机构规则不会在当事人不希望的情形下允许披露。

上海:机构、仲裁地与司法审查

上海的供给由三层构成,常被混为一谈。

第一层是政策与法规。上海是全国国际商事仲裁中心建设试点的首批地区之一,2023 年 12 月,一部推进该项建设的地方性法规施行。该法规涉及仲裁机构的治理、行业开放、临时仲裁与仲裁地、以及支持政策。它是地方性法规,不是国家法律,但它是若干制度特征先在上海出现的原因。

第二层是机构。上海这家机构的现行规则自 2024 年 1 月 1 日起施行,接替 2014 年的自由贸易试验区仲裁规则。它是一套文件而不是一份文本:一部主规则、航空与数据两部特别规则、一份在线仲裁指引、一份临时仲裁协助服务指引。与治理争议相关的功能包括合并仲裁、案外人加入、临时措施与紧急仲裁员救济、更开放的仲裁员选择方式,以及在香港设立中心。其下设的自由贸易试验区仲裁院、航空仲裁院与各专业平台同属该机构,规则把对平台的约定视为对该机构的约定——这恰好是前面所说“机构名称写错”问题的一剂解药。

第三层是法院。上海国际商事法庭于 2024 年 12 月底设立,自 2025 年 1 月 1 日起受理案件。它集中管辖涉外商事一审、二审案件,仲裁司法审查案件,涉外调解协议确认案件,以及申请承认和执行外国法院民商事判决、裁定的审查案件。截至 2026 年 8 月底,已受理涉外商事与仲裁司法审查类案件三千七百余件,当事人覆盖六十四个国家和地区。2026 年 6 月,它设立了由来自八个国家和地区的二十名专家组成的国际商事专家委员会。

对治理条款而言,意义在于:监督这场仲裁的法院可以事先确定,而且是一家专门法院,不是普通民事审判庭。第七十一条规定的撤销申请向仲裁机构所在地的中级人民法院提出;对由上海机构管理、仲裁地在上海的仲裁,就是这家专门法院。第七十二条要求自收到裁决书之日起三个月内提出,比修订前适用的六个月更短;第七十三条要求法院在受理撤销申请之日起两个月内作出裁定。两个数字要一起读:提起的窗口很短,之后的不确定期也很短。

第八十三条列出涉外仲裁裁决的撤销事由,比国内裁决的清单更窄:没有仲裁协议;被申请人没有得到指定仲裁员或者进行仲裁程序的通知,或者由于其他不属于被申请人负责的原因未能陈述意见;仲裁庭的组成或者仲裁程序与仲裁规则不符;裁决事项不属于仲裁协议范围或者仲裁机构无权仲裁。违背公共利益是单独一项事由。值得注意的是,国内裁决事由中的“裁决所根据的证据是伪造的”并不出现在涉外清单里。对外国投资者而言,这一差别有实际意义:审查更接近示范法式的程序清单,而不是对实体问题的重新审理。

裁决之后,以及一份清单

第七十条规定,裁决书自作出之日起发生法律效力。第七十五条规定,一方不履行的,另一方可向人民法院申请执行,受申请的法院应当执行。实务中随后是三步。

第一步是执行。财产在中国境内的,向有管辖权的中级人民法院申请。被执行人或其财产在中国境外的,第八十五条允许直接向有管辖权的外国法院申请承认和执行;第八十八条规范在中国境外作出的裁决的承认与执行,依据是条约或者互惠——对中国的多数贸易伙伴而言,实际就是《纽约公约》。

第二步是保全。第三十九条允许当事人申请财产保全,以及请求责令一方作出一定行为或者禁止其作出一定行为;既可以在仲裁过程中申请,情况紧急的也可以在申请仲裁前申请,由仲裁机构将申请提交人民法院。在股权转让争议中,一份禁止办理转让登记的裁定可以保住整个救济;没有它,裁决就退化为对一个可能已不持有股权的对手方的损害赔偿请求权。

第三步是裁决未获履行之后的压力。不履行的一方将面对执行措施,以及随之而来的信用与消费限制。对一个打算继续在中国经营的合资伙伴,这往往就是和解变得理性的时点。

条款与卷宗的清单:

  • 准确写明机构名称,使用登记语言,并为双语文本加一条以何种文本为准的规则。
  • 写明仲裁地,另行写明开庭地。
  • 写明合同准据法,与仲裁程序适用的法律分开。
  • 确定仲裁员人数与语言。
  • 列出所覆盖的文件,并加一条兜底范围。
  • 对合并与追加作出安排,或者说明为什么不安排。
  • 指定送达地址,并要求地址变更须通知。
  • 把条款本身的内部授权记录下来;由无权人员签署的条款是另一个问题。
  • 自收到裁决书之日起,为三个月的撤销窗口设置台账提醒。
  • 申请仲裁之前,先分清哪些请求是合同性的、哪些是组织法上的,再据此提出。

方向是这些争议会更多、而不是更少地使用仲裁。修订后的法律支持中国机构走出去、支持境外机构进入自由贸易试验区,第八十七条明确鼓励涉外仲裁当事人选择中国(包括特别行政区)的仲裁机构、约定中国作为仲裁地。对外国投资者而言,这一鼓励改变了算法:中国仲裁地不再意味着比过去更难预测的程序,而对一家资产、工厂与合作伙伴都在中国的公司来说,由专门商事法庭监督的上海仲裁,是一个站得住脚的默认选项。条款应当按这个前提起草,而不是从为另一个十年写的模板里继承下来。

来源

  • 中国人大网·《中华人民共和国仲裁法》(2025-09-12 修订通过,2026-03-01 施行,全文八章九十六条):http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202509/t20250912_447762.html
  • 中国人大网·新修订的仲裁法自 2026 年 3 月 1 日起施行(2025-09-12):http://www.npc.gov.cn/c2/c30834/202509/t20250912_447759.html
  • 中国人大网·全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的决定(第二百七十九条专属管辖,2023-09-01):http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/c30834/202309/t20230901_431419.html
  • 上海市人民代表大会常务委员会·《上海市推进国际商事仲裁中心建设条例》(2023-12-01 施行):https://www.shrd.gov.cn/shrd/gbd348hshsrmdbdhcwwyhgb2023ndsh/content/d9779781-5407-4c35-bc7f-8473a40f075b.html
  • 上海国际仲裁中心·《上海国际经济贸易仲裁委员会(上海国际仲裁中心)仲裁规则(2024)》(2024-01-01 施行):https://shiac.org/h5/SHIAC?moduleCode=arbitrate_rules&securityId=AemPnu8_EA7m8anaza734A
  • 上海国际商事法庭·中外专家齐聚上海国际商事法庭(含收案数量与管辖范围,2026-09):https://shicc.a-court.gov.cn/xxfb/no1court_511/docs/202609/d_-10593.html