- Digital-platform M&A is governed by SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》, which extends classic antitrust tools to multi-sided markets.
数字平台并购受市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》规范，该指南将经典反垄断工具扩展至多边市场。- Concentrations that entrench a platform’s dominance or eliminate nascent rivals face close review, even where the target is small or pre-revenue.
巩固平台支配地位或消除新生竞争对手的集中面临严密审查，即便标的规模小或尚无营收。- VIE-structured platforms are squarely within SAMR’s merger-control reach; the “VIE gap” is no longer a reliable exemption.
采用 VIE 结构的平台明确落入市场监管总局的经营者集中管辖；”VIE 漏洞”已非可靠的豁免。- Conduct remedies (data portability, interoperability, non-discrimination) are increasingly paired with merger clearance in platform cases.
在数据可携、互操作、非歧视等行为性救济，正日益与平台并购审批一并附加。- As of 2026, scrutiny extends to algorithm-driven consolidation, super-app ecosystems, and acquisitions of AI/Data assets by dominant platforms.
截至2026年，审查已延伸至算法驱动的整合、超级应用生态，以及支配平台对人工智能/数据资产的收购。- Entrants should assume that any platform acquisition with a dominance angle triggers a substantive, possibly extended, review.
准入者应预判：任何具有支配地位维度的平台收购，都将触发实质性的、可能延长的审查。
Platform M&A Scrutiny in China: Antitrust in the Digital Market | 中国平台并购审查：数字市场中的反垄断
The Platform Antitrust Framework
China’s pivot to platform-economy antitrust is anchored by SAMR’s 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 (Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy), published in February 2021. The Guidelines apply the AML to multi-sided digital markets, clarifying how market definition, dominance, and anticompetitive effect are assessed where network effects, data advantages, and ecosystem lock-in prevail. For any acquirer active in or buying into Chinese digital platforms, these Guidelines—not just the bare AML text—define the risk surface.
Why Platform M&A Draws Heightened Review
Platform acquisitions raise distinct concerns:
- Entrenchment. A leading platform buying a fast-rising challenger can neutralise a future competitor before it scales.
- Data advantage. Combining datasets deepens moats and can raise barriers for everyone else.
- Ecosystem lock-in. Super-app roll-ups let one firm control multiple adjacent markets simultaneously.
- Killer acquisition risk. Acquiring a startup solely to discontinue or absorb its product (covered in the next article).
These theories mean SAMR scrutinises not only current overlap but potential competition—the target’s trajectory absent the deal.
VIE Structures Are In Scope
A persistent myth held that variable-interest-entity (VIE) structures sat outside merger control. SAMR has made clear that VIE-structured internet platforms are subject to concentration filing like any other undertaking. Deals involving VIE targets must be screened, notified where thresholds are met, and cannot rely on the structure to escape review. This closed what was once a perceived loophole and is now settled practice entering 2026.
Substantive Theories SAMR Applies
In platform cases SAMR weighs:
- Market definition across relevant sides (e.g., matching, payments, delivery), recognising multi-sidedness;
- Dominant position inferred from share, user scale, data, and entry barriers;
- Elimination of potential competition, including “killer” and “sniping” acquisitions;
- Vertical foreclosure, where a platform favours its own acquired service.
Outcomes range from unconditional clearance to conditions—often behavioural remedies such as data portability commitments, interoperability obligations, and non-discrimination pledges—alongside, where needed, structural divestiture.
2026 Trajectory
Through 2026, platform-M&A scrutiny has broadened from commerce and ride-hailing to:
- Algorithm-driven consolidation, where combining recommendation engines or ad-tech raises concern;
- AI and data-asset acquisitions by dominant platforms, assessed for moat-deepening;
- Super-app ecosystems, where roll-ups across payments, local life, and content are examined for conglomerate foreclosure.
The through-line: a platform deal is judged by its effect on the future competitive landscape, not merely today’s market shares.
Practical Guidance for Entrants
- Assume potential-competition analysis. A small, pre-revenue target can still be “nascent rival” relevant.
- Prepare a competition narrative. Show why the combination benefits users and does not foreclose rivals.
- Expect behavioural remedies. Build data-portability and non-discrimination commitments into the plan.
- Mind the VIE point. Do not assume structural immunity; file where thresholds are met.
- Coordinate with data-security review where the target’s data is large-scale or “important”.
Stakes
Platform deals that misjudge scrutiny risk prolonged review, imposed remedies that reshape the business model, or prohibition. For foreign and domestic alike, the cost of a contested platform concentration is high—making early, candid engagement with SAMR’s theories the prudent path.
中国平台并购审查：数字市场中的反垄断
平台反垄断框架
中国转向平台经济反垄断，以市场监管总局2021年2月发布的《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》为支柱。该指南将《反垄断法》适用于多边数字市场，阐明在网络效应、数据优势与生态锁定居主导地位时，如何界定相关市场、认定支配地位及评估排除限制竞争效果。对于任何活跃于或拟收购中国数字平台的投资方而言，定义的不是 bare AML 文本，而是这份指南所勾勒的风险面。
平台并购为何受到更高审查
平台收购引发独特关切：
- 巩固地位。 领先平台收购快速崛起的挑战者，可在其规模化前消除未来竞争对手。
- 数据优势。 数据集合并加深护城河，并可能抬高他人进入壁垒。
- 生态锁定。 超级应用的横向整合使一家企业同时控制多个相邻市场。
- 扼杀式收购风险。 收购初创企业仅为停用或吸收其产品（见下篇）。
这些理论意味着，市场监管总局不仅审视当前重叠，更审视潜在竞争——即交易若不存在时标的的发展轨迹。
VIE 结构在管辖之内
一种长期误解认为可变利益实体（VIE）结构处于经营者集中管辖之外。市场监管总局已明确：采用 VIE 结构的互联网平台与其他经营者一样须受集中申报约束。涉及 VIE 标的的交易须接受筛查，达标须申报，且不能借结构逃避审查。这填补了曾经的漏洞，并成为进入2026年已稳固的实践。
市场监管总局适用的实质理论
在平台案件中，市场监管总局考量：
- 跨边市场界定（如匹配、支付、配送），承认多边性；
- 支配地位，由份额、用户规模、数据及进入壁垒推断；
- 消除潜在竞争，包括”扼杀式”与”掐尖式”收购；
- 纵向封阻，即平台优待其新收购的自营服务。
结果从未附条件批准到附加条件不等——常为行为性救济，如数据可携承诺、互操作义务及非歧视保证——必要时辅以结构性剥离。
2026年走向
至2026年，平台并购审查已从电商、网约车扩展至：
- 算法驱动的整合，合并推荐引擎或广告技术引发关切；
- 支配平台对人工智能与数据资产的收购，就加深护城河进行评估；
- 超级应用生态，就支付、本地生活与内容的横向整合审查其混合封阻效应。
其内在逻辑是：平台交易以其对未来竞争格局的影响来评判，而不只看今日的份额。
准入者实务指引
- 预设潜在竞争分析。 规模小、尚无营收的标的仍可能构成”新生竞争对手”。
- 准备竞争叙事。 阐明结合如何惠及用户且不封阻竞争对手。
- 预判行为性救济。 将 data-portability 与非歧视承诺纳入方案。
- 留意 VIE 要点。 勿假定结构豁免；达标即申报。
- 标的涉大规模或重要数据时，统筹数据安全审查。
利害关系
误判审查的平台交易，面临审查久拖、被迫附加改变商业模式的救济，或被禁止。无论外资还是内资，陷入争议的平台集中代价高昂——因此尽早、坦诚地对照市场监管总局的理论开展工作，是审慎之道。
Sources
- 国家市场监督管理总局 (SAMR) — 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》（2021年）
- 全国人民代表大会常务委员会 — 《反垄断法》（2022年修订，2022年8月1日施行）
- 国家市场监督管理总局 (SAMR) — 经营者集中审查相关规定及平台领域执法实践
- 国务院 (State Council) — 平台经济规范健康发展相关部署