- Foreign acquisitions of Chinese technology companies are swept into three overlapping regimes: MOFCOM/NDRC security review, SAMR antitrust clearance, and technology-export licensing.
外资收购中国科技企业同时落入三套相互叠加的制度：发改委/商务部安全审查、市场监管总局反垄断审批，以及技术出口许可。- The Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports (revised 2020, with ongoing 2023–2025 refinement) can block or condition the transfer of sensitive know-how embedded in a target.
《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》（2020年修订，并在2023–2025年持续完善）可阻止或附条件于标的中敏感技术诀窍的转移。- “Control” of a critical-technology enterprise triggers mandatory national security review even below merger thresholds, and semiconductors sit at the centre of 2026 scrutiny.
取得关键技术企业”控制权”即便未达并购门槛亦触发强制性国家安全审查，而半导体正处于2026年审查的核心。- The 2022 revised Anti-Monopoly Law and SAMR guidance treat entanglements between tech giants and startups as potentially competition-reducing, adding a second gate.
2022年修订《反垄断法》及市场监管总局指引将科技巨头与初创企业间的捆绑视为可能减损竞争，构成第二道关口。- Deals should budget for parallel timelines and build a technology-export clearance condition into the SPA before signing.
交易应为并行的审查时限预留预算，并在签约前于股权转让协议中设置技术出口审批先决条件。- As of 2026, the “small yard, high fence” approach means narrow but strict controls on frontier tech rather than blanket bans, raising the premium on precise target mapping.
截至2026年，”小院高墙”思路意味着对前沿技术采取范围窄但强度高的管控，而非全面禁止，这进一步凸显精确梳理标的的重要性。
Key Technology M&A Review in China: Security Meets Competition | 中国关键技术并购审查：安全与竞争的双重关口
Three Regimes, One Deal
A foreign buyer pursuing a Chinese technology target rarely faces a single clearance. Three regimes routinely converge:
- National security review under the 2020 《外商投资安全审查办法》 (MOFCOM/NDRC Order No. 37) where the target sits in a key sector or holds critical technology.
- Antitrust merger control under the 《反垄断法》 administered by SAMR, where turnover thresholds are met.
- Technology-export control under the 《技术进出口管理条例》 and the 《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》 (Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technology Exports), which governs whether the underlying know-how can lawfully leave Chinese control.
The third regime is the one most often missed by foreign teams who plan only for antitrust and security review.
The Technology Export Catalogue
The Catalogue, administered by MOFCOM, lists technologies whose export is prohibited or restricted. The 2020 revision significantly expanded restricted entries—adding or tightening items across civilian drones, AI, quantum computing, laser, and satellite technologies. It was further refined through 2023–2025 consultations, and as of 2026 the restricted list captures a broad band of frontier and dual-use know-how. Where a target’s value depends on a restricted technology, the buyer must obtain an export licence (or restructure to keep the technology in China) before the deal can close. Failure to do so can void the transaction or attract penalties.
Security Review of Tech Targets
Under Order No. 37, acquiring “control” of an enterprise in critical and emerging technologies triggers mandatory security review. The 2026 posture is unambiguous: semiconductors, advanced packaging, EDA tools, and certain AI model capabilities are treated as core national-security assets. The review’s two-stage clock (30 + 60+ working days) applies, and conditions short of prohibition—such as onshore retention of R&D, governance limits, or data-localisation—are common outcomes.
The Antitrust Overlay
Even where security review is cleared, SAMR merger control may independently bite. The 2022 revised 《反垄断法》 strengthened the treatment of “gun-jumping” and introduced a stop-the-clock mechanism for deficient filings. For tech deals, SAMR’s 2021 《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》 and subsequent guidance signal that acquisitions by dominant platforms of nascent competitors warrant close scrutiny for potential elimination of future competition. A clean security clearance does not immunise a deal from an antitrust hold.
“Small Yard, High Fence” in Practice
China’s 2024–2026 technology-control posture is often described as “small yard, high fence”: the restricted perimeter is deliberately narrow but the controls within it are strict. For market entrants this means most ordinary technology transactions proceed, but any target touching listed frontier items—advanced chips, certain algorithms, cryptography, and dual-use sensors—will face a high wall. Precise target mapping against the Catalogue and the key-sector annex is therefore the single highest-leverage step in deal planning.
Practical Deal Structuring
- Run a tri-regime screen early. Map the target to the security-review key sectors, the merger thresholds, and the export Catalogue simultaneously.
- Sequence the filings. Export-licence applications and security-review filings often inform each other; begin both before signing.
- Use SPA conditions precedent for export approval and security clearance, with long-stop dates reflecting the special-review clock.
- Consider onshore carve-outs. Retaining restricted technology and R&D within a Chinese subsidiary, while the foreign parent acquires non-restricted assets, can clear the export gate.
- Plan for behavioural remedies. Expect possible commitments on R&D location, local data storage, and board governance.
Consequences of Missteps
A technology-export violation is distinct from, and can be more severe than, a security-review failure: the restricted know-how cannot lawfully transfer, which may collapse the deal’s value thesis. Combined with possible antitrust hold and security-order unwinding, the cumulative risk is substantial. Foreign acquirers should treat the Catalogue as a first-read document, not an afterthought.
中国关键技术并购审查：安全与竞争的双重关口
三套制度，一项交易
外资收购中国科技标的，鲜少只需一道审批。三套制度通常会汇聚于同一交易：
- 国家安全审查：依据2020年《外商投资安全审查办法》（发改委/商务部第37号令），当标的位于关键领域或掌握关键技术时适用。
- 反垄断经营者集中审查：依据《反垄断法》，由市场监管总局主管，于营业额达标时适用。
- 技术出口管制：依据《技术进出口管理条例》及《中国禁止出口限制出口技术目录》，规范底层技术诀窍能否合法移出中国控制。
第三套制度最常被只规划反垄断与安全审查的外资团队忽视。
技术出口目录
该目录由商务部主管，列明禁止或限制出口的技术。2020年修订大幅扩充了限制类条目——在民用无人机、人工智能、量子计算、激光及卫星技术等方面新增或收紧了项目。该目录在2023–2025年通过征求意见持续完善，截至2026年，限制清单已覆盖广泛的前沿与两用技术诀窍。当标的价值依赖某项受限技术时，买方须在交割前取得出口许可（或将技术留在中国境内并重组交易）。否则交易可能被认定无效或招致处罚。
科技标的的安全审查
依据第37号令，取得关键和新兴技术企业”控制权”将触发强制性安全审查。2026年的立场十分明确：半导体、先进封装、EDA工具及部分人工智能模型能力被视为核心国家安全资产。审查的两段式时限（30 + 60个工作日起）适用，而低于禁止水平的附条件措施——如研发境内留存、治理限制或数据本地化——是常见结果。
反垄断叠加
即便安全审查通过，市场监管总局的经营者集中审查仍可能独立介入。2022年修订的《反垄断法》强化了对”抢跑”行为的规制，并引入了针对瑕疵申报的”停钟”机制。对于科技交易，市场监管总局2021年《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》及后续指引表明， dominant 平台收购新生竞争对手的交易，将因可能消除未来竞争而受到密切审视。安全审查的通过并不能使交易豁免反垄断阻却。
“小院高墙”的实践
中国2024–2026年的技术管控态势常被概括为”小院高墙”：受限范围刻意收窄，但其中的管控强度很高。对市场准入者而言，这意味着多数普通技术交易可正常推进，但凡触及所列前沿项目——先进芯片、特定算法、密码学及两用传感器——的交易都将面临高墙。因此，对照目录与关键领域附件精确梳理标的，是交易规划中杠杆率最高的一步。
交易结构实务
- 尽早开展三制度筛查。 同步将标的映射至安全审查关键领域、并购门槛及出口目录。
- 统筹申报顺序。 出口许可申请与安全审查申报常相互影响，应在签约前同步启动。
- 在协议中设置审批先决条件，针对出口批准与安全审查设置反映特别审查时限的最晚截止日。
- 考虑境内分拆。 将受限技术与研发保留于中国子公司，由外国母公司收购非受限资产，可越过出口关口。
- 为行为性救济作准备。 应预判可能涉及研发地点、本地数据存储及董事会治理方面的承诺。
失误后果
技术出口违规不同于安全审查失败，且可能更为严重：受限技术诀窍无法合法转移，可能从根本上瓦解交易的价值逻辑。叠加可能的反垄断阻却与安全审查撤销令，累积风险相当可观。外资收购方应将技术目录视为首要审阅文件，而非事后补充。
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